Owoc v. Liquidating Trustee on Behalf of Liquidating Trust, — F.4th —-, 2026 WL 2294569 (11th Cir. August 10, 2026) (click for .pdf). The issue on appeal was whether a corporate debtor’s Subchapter S election constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate. Pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan, the debtor corporation’s reconstituted board removed the sole shareholder, John Owoc, from his position as chief executive officer and board member, although he remained the sole shareholder post-confirmation. Owoc thereafter sought relief from the automatic stay to terminate the debtor’s Subchapter S status. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion because the company’s “S election gives it the valued right to avoid tax liability” and, therefore, the S election is property of the estate and protected by the automatic stay. The decision was appealed to the District Court, which certified a direct appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Court, citing the Third Circuit case of Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 757 (3d Cir. 2013), held that the Subchapter S election is not property of the bankruptcy estate because the shareholders, and not the debtor, control its tax classification. “[T]he shareholders control the creation and termination of eligibility for Subchapter S status.” Although the company received a significant tax benefit from the election, the shareholders have the legal power to revoke or terminate the election. Therefore, the company does not have a legitimate claim or entitlement to the election.

The Court, therefore, reversed the lower courts and held that the Subchapter S election is not property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541. This abbreviated summary omits the substantive discussion of equitable mootness, law of the case, and laches.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and individuals in bankruptcy and reorganization matters for more than 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

On July 1, 2026 the Georgia Homestead Exemption increases from $21,500.00 to $50,000.00 for an individual debtor, or a double exemption of $100,000.00 if a non-filing spouse is also a co-owner. This is a dramatic increase for Georgia, and opens up Chapter 7 for many people who are facing bankruptcy and may otherwise have had to file a Chapter 13. We should see a significant increase in filings between July 1 and July 7 (foreclosure day in Georgia).

What is the Georgia Homestead Exemption?

A simplistic explanation of the homestead exemption is that it determines how much equity in a residence is protected in a bankruptcy case and, in many Chapter 13 cases, the amount of your monthly trustee payments. For example, if you own a house worth $300,000.00 and the balance of your home loan (and any other liens) is $250,000.00, your equity of $50,000.00 is fully protected in Georgia and the trustee would not have an interest in the house. If you had equity of $200,000.00, and the trustee sought a sale of your house, you would get the first $50,000.00 of the net sale proceeds. The exemption is available for a property if either the debtor or a dependent of the debtor resides at the property. For example, if a debtor owns a house in which a former spouse and dependent children reside, the exemption is applicable.

What is the Double Homestead Exemption?

The Georgia homestead exemption is doubled to $100,000.00 when the residence is co-owned by the individual filing the bankruptcy case and a spouse who is not in bankruptcy. In the second example above, if there is $200,000.00 in equity and the trustee sells the house, the debtor and spouse will receive the first $100,000.00 of the sale proceeds. This is a significant benefit for a spouse who is not in bankruptcy.

Will the Bankruptcy Trustee sell my House?

This is the real question, isn’t it? “Can I keep my house in Chapter 7?” is probably the most common question we are asked. The good news is that in addition to the increased homestead exemption in Georgia, in actual practice, the trustee is not interested in selling your house unless there is significant equity above your exemption. The trustee is interested in net recovery for creditors after accounting for your exemptions and the expenses of selling the house.

Let’s look at another example. Assume your house is worth $300,000.00 and you have equity of $75,000.00, leaving $25,000.00 in equity unprotected. To reach that $25,000.00, the trustee has to sell your house. The trustee’s expenses in selling the house will include a 6% real estate commission ($18,000.00) and perhaps $5,000.00 in legal and accounting fees. After those expenses, the net recovery is only $2,000.00 and very few trustees will be interested in selling a house for $2,000.00. Most trustees will want to net at least $10-15,000.00 (and often more) before selling a house. As a practical matter, this preserves an additional $25,000.00 in unexempt equity in the example. You can make the same calculations using the market value and loan balances for your house.

What is the market value of your house? Most people begin by looking at Zillow, Realtor.com or similar websites. Those estimates can be helpful starting points, but they are not always accurate. Bankruptcy trustees often retain a real estate professional to inspect the property and provide an opinion of value. If you believe you may have significant non-exempt equity, obtaining your own opinion of value before filing can be money well spent. Many real estate agents who work in your neighborhood will be willing to provide an opinion of value.

What Can I Do if the Chapter 7 Trustee Wants to Sell My House?

Let’s assume there is enough unexempt equity for the trustee to threaten to sell your house. Is there anything you can do to keep it? In many cases, yes. A trustee will often make an offer to settle for less than the net equity, after the costs of the sale. For example, if the trustee believes they can sell the house and after expenses clear $25,000.00, the trustee will likely offer to settle for a payment (or payments) of $25,000.00 or less. It is common for a trustee to offer a total settlement of $15,000.00 payable over six months.

I am currently in Chapter 13 and keeping my house. Does the increased exemption affect my case?

The new exemptions could affect your case, and this will be the subject of an upcoming post. If you are in a Chapter 13 case and own a house you should contact your lawyer to discuss the new exemptions. Many people file under Chapter 13 because they have too much equity for Chapter 7. The equity in your house also might affect the amount of monthly payments to the Chapter 13 trustee. Your lawyer will thoroughly analyze your case and determine if an amendment, or even a dismissal and refile under Chapter 7, is in your best interests.

Can I transfer half ownership of my house to my spouse before filing for bankruptcy to get the double exemption?

This is never a good idea unless you discuss with a lawyer well in advance of filing for bankruptcy and before transferring ownership to your spouse or anyone else. It might sound tempting to transfer property to someone else to keep it out of reach of the trustee, or to transfer a one-half interest in your residence to invoke the double exemption but this rarely works. You are required to disclose all recent transfers of property and trustees will check deed records. Depending on the circumstances and the applicable law, a trustee may be able to avoid (or reverse) transfers made years before the bankruptcy filing. Never transfer any property without first discussing with a lawyer.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

A recent Order from our Bankruptcy Court highlights several important considerations when choosing a bankruptcy lawyer and planning your case. On June 26, 2026, Judge Sacca, joined by the other judges in the Northern District of Georgia, entered a 147-page Order permanently disbarring a lawyer and law firm from practicing in Bankruptcy Court. The Order was effective immediately and the lawyer was promptly removed from the Clerk’s electronic filing system. According to PACER, the lawyer currently has 540 open cases, meaning approximately 540 people will need a new lawyer to continue their bankruptcy cases. The Court’s Order speaks for itself. This post is intended to highlight several lessons that may help consumers who are considering bankruptcy. An experienced bankruptcy lawyer should guide you through the process, ask detailed questions, and ensure that your case is properly prepared before it is filed.

If anyone is urging you to file a bankruptcy case, tell every lawyer you consult.

That person may have good intentions, or they may have motivations that do not align with your best interests. Ask the lawyers if they have a relationship with the other person. Most lawyers get new clients through referrals from people they know, and this is usually a positive because the lawyer is a trusted friend or professional colleague. If there is a financial relationship between the lawyer and the other person, it needs to be disclosed to you and you should consider at least consulting with other lawyers.

If anyone else is providing money to you to pay for the bankruptcy lawyer and case, it must be disclosed.

This is specifically asked in the documents filed with the Court. It does not matter whether the person is paying the lawyer directly, or giving you the money to pay the lawyer. The lawyer will consider whether there are any potential conflicts of interest and prepare the appropriate disclosures with the Court. Regardless of the source of funds, your bankruptcy lawyer has a legal duty to act only in your best interests. Do not allow anyone else to interfere with your relationship with your lawyer, and let the lawyer know if anyone tries.

Do not allow anyone else to manage your bankruptcy case or make decisions for you.

Similar to the above, only you should manage your case and make decisions regarding your case. A bankruptcy filing will be on your credit report and your assets are potentially at risk. You need to be in charge. Of course, this does not mean you cannot get some input from a spouse or other trusted person, but always run any “advice” by your lawyer.

All details concerning your debts and assets must be disclosed.

This is a fundamental part of a bankruptcy case. Your lawyer will need to know the approximate balances of your debts and the value of your assets, as this information is vital in determining what assets may be at risk in a Chapter 7 or what your payments might be in a Chapter 13 or individual Chapter 11 case. If the lawyer is not asking for detailed information concerning your house, vehicles and other valuable assets, and the balances of loans on these assets, before the case is filed, it might be wise to consult with other lawyers. The “attorney is required to perform a reasonable inquiry to include interviewing the client, requiring the client to produce relevant information, reviewing the client’s financial documents and other information, and resolving any inconsistencies prior to filing the case” and to “analyze the client’s financial situation, advise the client about whether to file for bankruptcy and if so, under what chapter, and assist the client in completing the petition, schedules, statements, and other documents necessary for the filing.” In other words, your lawyer should do far more than hand you forms to complete. A competent bankruptcy attorney should ask detailed questions, review your financial documents, resolve inconsistencies, and explain how the law applies to your specific circumstances.

In most cases, a bankruptcy lawyer is expected to represent you throughout your bankruptcy case.

While there are sometimes exceptions to this general rule, they must be clearly disclosed to you in writing and also disclosed to the Court. You must consent to any limited representation. All details concerning the lawyer’s fees must also be disclosed, including fees that might be due later.

Be especially diligent in emergency bankruptcy case filings.

The reality is that most individual bankruptcy cases, at least in our district, are filed a few days before a foreclosure, threatened repossession or eviction. They are sometimes called “skeletal” or “front page only” cases because only the minimum paperwork is filed. Unfortunately, many people do not consult with a lawyer until the last minute and there is no time to fully prepare a case. This is the time to be especially mindful of all of the points made above, because there is no turning back from a bankruptcy filing. If a lawyer is primarily focused on getting you to sign paperwork without taking the time to understand your complete financial situation, treat that as a significant red flag. Avoid this situation by planning ahead and consulting with two or three competent lawyers who take the time to review your entire situation. A properly prepared bankruptcy case begins long before the petition is filed. Taking the time to choose the right attorney and fully disclose your financial situation can help avoid unnecessary problems and give you the best chance for a successful fresh start.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and individuals in bankruptcy and reorganization matters for more than 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

Make sure you are disclosing ALL property, including any personal injury or other claims you might have against any other party. That includes disclosing it after your Bankruptcy case is filed in a Chapter 13 case. I expect the debtor might prevail on remand because he apparently promptly notified his Bankruptcy lawyer after the accident.

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated, — S.Ct. —- , 2026 WL 1686028 (June 11, 2026) (click here for .pdf) (click here for oral argument). The Debtor filed a Chapter 13 case in December 2019. In August 2021, while the case was still pending, Debtor was in a car accident and had a personal injury claim. He hired a personal injury lawyer and notified his Bankruptcy lawyer of the accident and claim, but no one disclosed the claim in the Bankruptcy case. After the Debtor filed suit on the personal injury claim in District Court, the defendant moved for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel and the failure of the Debtor to disclose the claim in the Bankruptcy case. Although the Debtor promptly amended his schedules, the District Court “found that [Debtor] knew of the facts underlying his claims and hypothetically had a motive to conceal, and therefore held the omission was not inadvertent or a mistake, entering summary judgment for [the defendant].” The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the lower courts should have considered the “totality of circumstances” rather than just knowledge of the facts and claim and a potential motive to conceal.

Judicial estoppel is an “equitable doctrine” intended “to protect the integrity of the judicial process” by “prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment” and preventing the “risk of inconsistent court determinations.”… The rigidity comes from the Fifth Circuit’s failure to fully recognize that “judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine.” … The Fifth Circuit’s rule allows courts to consider only two circumstances—whether the debtor knew of the underlying facts and whether there was a potential motive to conceal—and does not permit courts to look at any other evidence tending to show the omission was inadvertent. That rigidity is out of step with equity. The Fifth Circuit’s rule is also overly broad because it holds that an omission falls outside the exception any time a debtor knows certain facts or could potentially benefit from nondisclosure, circumstances that will almost always be true, as the Fifth Circuit recognized. A near-dispositive criterion is a poor fit for a fair inquiry into whether an omission is actually the result of inadvertence or mistake.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

In a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the intersection of Copyright Law and Bankruptcy Law, and whether an artist’s statutory copyright termination rights are property of the Bankruptcy Estate. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc. v. Mark Ross, Luther Campbell, et al., 2026 WL 1549151 (11th Cir. June 2, 2026) (click here for .pdf). What will be interesting to Bankruptcy lawyers is that the estate property in question is analyzed as of 2020, but the Chapter 7 case was filed in 2000 and closed in 2007. In what realm of the universe the property exists now is a question not addressed by the Court. (If you are mainly interested in Copyright Law, you probably should just go right to the opinion).

The statute at issue is Section 203 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §203.

Section 203 of the Copyright Act allows the authors of copyrighted works (or their successors in interest) to terminate grants of copyrights… The author (or his successors) can exercise his termination interests only by serving a signed, written notice on a copyright grantee or the grantee’s successor in title. … … [I]f a work has multiple authors, section 203 requires a majority of those authors (or their successors in interest) to sign a notice to cause a termination… [Additionally] section 203 makes an author’s termination interests
inalienable by agreement.

Now to the basic facts. 2 Live Crew is a hip-hop group formed in 1984, with members including Mark Ross (“Brother Marquis”), Luther Campbell (“Luke Skywalker”), David Hobbs (“Mr. Mixx”) and Christopher Wong Won (“Fresh Kid Ice”). The Band gave Luke Records the sound recording rights in all master recordings through 1990. In 1995, Campbell and Luke Records filed jointly administered Chapter 11 cases, in which Luke Records sold all sound recording copyrights it received under the agreement to Lil’ Joe Records and Joseph Weinberger. In 2000, Ross filed a personal Chapter 7 case (ND of Ala., 00-43637-JJR7), but his termination rights were never scheduled, administered or even mentioned in the case. “[P]roperty that is not scheduled, administered, or formally abandoned remains property of the estate ‘[u]nless the court orders otherwise.’” See id. § 554(c), (d).”

In 2020, Campbell, Ross and Wong’s heirs served a termination notice on Weinberger, Lil’ Joe and related companies, purportedly terminating 2 Live Crew’s grants of the copyrights to Luke Records for the albums recorded between 1986 and 1989. Lil’ Joe then sued (complaint) and sought a declaratory judgment that the copyrights were not, or could not have been, properly terminated. One of the grounds was that Ross transferred his termination interests to the Bankruptcy Estate in his 2000 Chapter 7 case, rendering ineffective his signature on the 2020 Termination Notice. After a trial, the District Court ruled the Termination Notice was valid and Lil’ Joe appealed.

The Court first concluded that Ross’ termination rights were property of his Chapter 7 Bankruptcy estate as a “contingent right to regain personal property,” which includes copyrights and other intellectual property, that existed when he filed his petition. 2 Live Crew argued that 17 U.S.C. §203 made the copyrights inalienable from and personal to the author, but the Court ruled that the Bankruptcy Code prevailed as to what is property of the Bankruptcy estate. The Band also argued that Ross’ termination interests were not property of the estate because they were contingent rights, “contingent on (1) Ross surviving until he could use his termination interests and (2) Ross and his co-grantors deciding to use those interests.” See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1), (3)–(4). Again, the Court held that contingency interests were property of the Bankruptcy estate.

Having concluded that Ross’ termination rights were property of his Chapter 7 Bankruptcy estate, he could not exercise his termination interests in 2020 because those rights remained with his Bankruptcy Estate and he had no authority to do so. “In a Chapter 7 case like Ross’s case, property that is not scheduled, administered, or formally abandoned remains property of the estate ‘[u]nless the court orders otherwise.’ See 11 U.S.C. § 554(c), (d). .. Because no one scheduled, administered, formally abandoned, or mentioned those interests, they remained part of Ross’s bankruptcy estate when he signed the notice.” Since Ross’ signature on the Termination Notice was ineffective, the Notice did not include a sufficient number of signatures. “Without Ross, the group’s termination notice exercised at most two of the group members’ interests. That number is too few to terminate a transfer of copyright that —like the alleged transfer at issue—was executed by four authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1), (4). A termination notice ends a transfer made by multiple authors only if it exercises most of their interests. Id. So two out of four interests is one interest short of an effective termination.”  Having concluded the Termination Notice was ineffective, the Court reversed the District Court. It did not address how the termination rights should be treated in Bankruptcy or what Ross’ heirs (he died in 2024) need to do to exercise those interests. Thus, Lil’ Joe Records still owns the rights to those 2 Live Crew albums and the Band can’t take them back (at least for now).

In less than a day, this case has already been covered by Music Business Worldwide, Bloomberg, Billboard and other media.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

In In re Newport 222 Mitchell Street, L.P., 2026 WL 1488930, Ch. 7 Case No. 24-54060-sms (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 27, 2026) (click here for .pdf) a creditor sought to compel the Chapter 7 Trustee to furnish information voluntarily provided to him by another creditor on a confidential basis. The basis for the motion was 11 U.S.C. §704(a)(7) which provides that the Trustee shall, “unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate’s administration as is requested by a party in interest.” The Trustee did not oppose the Motion, but suggested the statute should be narrowly interpreted and left it to the discretion of the Court. The Motion was opposed by the creditor that provided the information to the Trustee.

The Moving Creditor cited the case of In re Pearlstein, 2022 WL 1492236 (Bankr. D. Or. May 11, 2022), in which the court allowed discovery from the trustee of the debtor’s financial information. Judge Sigler noted that a more relevant case is In re Walters, 136 B.R. 256 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992), wherein “creditors challenging a debtor’s discharge under §727 argued that § 704(a)(7) required the trustee to provide the creditors information that the trustee’s accountants developed while investigating and prosecuting fraudulent transfer actions against the debtor’s wife, which the court defined as the ‘audit materials.'”

The Walters court … said that it could not accept the argument that the audit materials “constitute ‘information concerning the estate and the estate’s administration’” either under the plain language of the section, the broad context of the Bankruptcy Code generally, or under the specific facts of this case.

Judge Sigler ultimately allowed the Moving Creditor very limited discovery from the Trustee –

Other than the [Debtor’s] Bank Statements, the Requested Discovery belongs to a third party and was collected by the Trustee solely for the purpose of determining whether to pursue claims on behalf of the Estate. The Trustee chose not to pursue those claims and [Moving Creditor], presumably, is displeased with that decision. But a creditor’s discontent with a trustee’s course of action does not warrant an overbroad application of § 704(a)(7).

If the Requested Discovery fell within the scope of § 704(a)(7), the Court may need to evaluate why [Moving Creditor] wants the Requested Discovery or what [Moving Creditor] would do with it. But the threshold inquiry is whether the Requested Discovery is “information concerning the estate and the estate’s administration” and, for the reasons stated on the record at the March 30, 2026 hearing and supplemented in this Order, other than the Bank Statements, it is not.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

If you are contemplating filing for Bankruptcy and own a home, you probably will want to consider waiting a few weeks. Georgia Governor Brian Kemp has signed House Bill HB 1024, which increases the Georgia Homestead Exemption from the current $21,500.00 to $50,000.00 effective July 1, 2026. If the residence is titled in the name of one of two spouses who is a debtor, the exemption is doubled to $100,000.00. Further, starting on July 1, 2031, the exemption amount is revised annually based on the inflation rate of the prior year.

The amendments to O.C.G.A. §44-13-100 are:

“(1)(A) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $21,500.00 $50,000.00 in value,
in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses
as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; provided, however, that beginning July 1, 2031, and annually thereafter, such exemption shall be revised by being multiplied by the inflation rate of the prior year. In the event title to property used for the exemption provided under this paragraph is in one of two spouses who is a debtor, and such property is the primary residence of both spouses, the amount of the exemption hereunder shall be $43,000.00 $100,000.00; provided, however, that, beginning July 1, 2031, and annually thereafter, such exemption shall be revised by being multiplied by the inflation rate of the prior year;

(B) As used in this paragraph, the term ‘inflation rate’ means the annual inflationary index rate as determined for a given year by the state revenue commissioner by promulgating a standardized method for determining annual inflationary index rates which reflect the effects of inflation and deflation on the cost of living for residents of this state for a given calendar year. Such method may utilize the Consumer Price Index as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor or any other similar index established by the federal government if the state revenue commissioner determines that such federal index fairly reflects the effects of inflation and deflation on the cost of living for residents of this state.”

The Bill was cosponsored by Representative Soo Hong along with Rep. Matt Reeves, Rep. Rob Leverett and Sen. Marty Harbin.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, Trustee, 2026 WL 135998 (January 20, 2026) (click here for .pdf).  In 2014, Debtor Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC filed an adversary proceeding against Coney Island to recover $50,000.00 in unpaid invoices. Coney Island did not answer and a default judgment was entered in 2015. In 2021, the Trustee was able to garnish Coney Island’s bank accounts. Coney Island then filed a Motion to vacate the judgment pursant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 on the grounds that it had not been properly served and, therefore, the 2015 judgment was void. The Bankruptcy Court denied the Motion because it was not filed within a “reasonable time” and the District Court and Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Rule 60(b)(4) expressly provides that a party may move for relief from a void judgment. However, Rule 60(c)(1) provides that a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.”

The structure of Rule 60 confirms what the plain text of subdivision (c)(1) provides. When Rule 60 modifies the default reasonable-time limit, it does so expressly. For example, Rule 60(c)(1) imposes a 1-year limit on Rule 60(b) motions alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud. Thus, one would expect Rule 60 to include an analogous provision if a special, unlimited-time principle applied to motions alleging voidness. …But the Rule does not.

Coney Island argued that the reasonable time limit of Rule 60(b)(1) did not apply to void judgments, and the passage of time did not turn a nullity into an enforceable judgment.

This argument cannot bear the weight that Coney Island and others have placed on it. Even if the passage of time cannot cure voidness, the same principle holds true for most legal errors. Nevertheless, statutes and rules routinely limit the time during which a party can seek relief from a judgment infected by error. Therefore, a party in Coney Island’s position would need to show that some principle of law, such as the Due Process Clause, gives a party the right to allege voidness at any time. .. Giving a party a “reasonable” time to seek relief from an allegedly void judgment may well be all that due process demands.

The analysis is not different because the issue was failure of proper service and the possibility that a party may not learn of the judgment for a significant period of time. A defendant may strategically use that unlimited time to wait and file a Rule 60(b) motion until the plaintiff attempts to collect on the judgment. There was also no consensus among other courts that a party could move for relief at any time, and the Rule’s “text and structure” take precedence over historical practice. Similarly, policy concerns over an interpretation of a rule generally do not carry any weight when a rule is not ambiguous.

As Coney Island did not contend that its Motion was filed within a reasonable time, the lower court’s decision was affirmed. “Litigants seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(4) must comply with Rule 60(c)(1) and file a motion within a reasonable time.”

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

“Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.” Samuel Beckett in Worstword, Ho. Many have tried to extend the deadline for discharge complaints that is found in Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), almost always after missing the deadline. The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed that equitable tolling still does not apply to extend the deadline in TL90108 LLC v. Ford, 147 F.4th 1351, 2025 WL 2304512 (11^th Cir., August 11, 2025). The issue was whether equitable tolling applied to the Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) deadline to file a complaint under 11 U.S.C. §523(c) in light of subsequent Supreme Court opinions. 

A previous panel held that equitable tolling did not apply to Rule 4007. See In re Alton, 837 F.2d 457 (11th Cir. 1988). The Creditor argued that the decision in Alton had been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in  Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004), and Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010). In Kontrick, the Supreme Court held that Rule 4004 (denial of discharge) was a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule, but it stopped short of deciding whether equitable tolling might apply.

After Kontrick, the Court considered, in Holland, 560 U.S. at 645, 130 S.Ct. 2549, whether the nonjurisdictional statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) may be equitably tolled. The Court concluded that “a nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations is normally subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling.” Id. at 645–46, 130 S.Ct. 2549 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, based on the combination of Kontrick and Holland, the limitations period in Rule 4004—closely related to Rule 4007 —is presumably subject to equitable tolling.

The Creditor argued that these cases effectively established that Rule 4007 was also a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule like Rule 4004 and “have removed Alton’s doctrinal underpinning to the point of abrogation, leaving behind the presumption in favor of equitable tolling.”  The Circuit panel agreed that Rule 4007 is also a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule but that was not sufficient to overturn Alton. Nothing in Kontrick leads to the conclusion that Rule 4007 can be equitably tolled, and Holland does not apply to the Bankruptcy Rules. “The doctrinal underpinning of our decision in Alton was a plain reading of Rule 4007(c) and the absence of any express language in the rule indicating that its deadline was subject to equitable doctrines.” See also Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188, 139 S.Ct. 710, 203 L.Ed.2d 43 (2019) (“Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its jurisdictional character but rather on whether the text of the rule leaves room for such flexibility.” (emphasis added).  The Creditor’s motion to extend the deadline to file a discharge complaint was, therefore, properly denied in the Bankruptcy Court.

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.

In Barger v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC, Adv. Proc. No. 23-5164-bem, 2025 WL 1416871 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 15, 2025), the Chapter 7 Trustee sought to avoid a deed because every letter of the notary’s name was not fully discernible in the signature. The Court previously granted summary judgment to the lender/transferee and the Trustee sought reconsideration, contending that the Court erred in its interpretation of the Exact Name requirement in O.C.G.A. §45-17-8.1(a). Judge Ellis-Monro denied the Motion.

“[I]n documenting a notarial act, a notary public shall sign on the notarial certification, by hand in ink, only and exactly the name indicated on the notary’s commission and shall record on the notarial certification the exact date of the notarial act.”

O.C.G.A. § 45-17-8.1(a).  

The Court found that the statute does not impose a legibility requirement or a “directive as to the quality of the signature or the discernibility of each letter in the signature.”

Scott Riddle’s practice focuses on bankruptcy and reorganization. Scott has represented businesses and other parties in Bankruptcy cases for over 20 years.  You can contact Scott at 404-815-0164 or scott@scottriddlelaw.com.  For more information, click here.