Organizational culture and the transition to the African continent

Unlike al-Qaeda, which was founded in Pakistan, the Islamic State emerged in the heart of the Arab world from a small organization known as Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad led by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi. The strategic Arab location in Iraq provided the organization with everything it needed to support its ideology and logistical presence, especially in the dual success of its propaganda and recruitment, which despite its limitations at the beginning, was the building block from which the organization was formed. In terms of ideological legitimacy, the region presented a unique opportunity for fighting American forces in Iraq under the concept of defensive jihad (repelling the aggressor) and fighting the “Crusaders.” As a result, the organization received great support, especially before the fighting between it and other groups and factions on the Iraqi scene after the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006.

A key factor that shaped the organization’s early structure was the distribution of its fighters and leaders among different Arab nationalities, starting with al-Zarqawi, who was Jordanian. The phase that followed the announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq, however, saw a narrowing of the organization’s structure and a transition from pan-Arab leadership and fighters to an emphasis on Iraqis and Syrians, to the point where the leadership of the organization in its military and security councils would later be dominated by Iraqis, Syrians being relegated to second place. Most critically, the position of the organization’s overall leader has known no one but Iraqis, from the organization’s formation in 2006 to the declaration of the caliphate in 2014 and up to the present day. This emphasis on Iraq and Syria, and on Iraq especially, illustrates the strangeness of the African environment to the organization’s identity and leadership core.

In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate in Mosul, the Iraqi city that has witnessed unrest since the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003. Following the declaration, the extremist organization’s media machine sought to appeal to Western societies and Muslims in the diaspora (if that is the right expression) by issuing written and visual media publications in multiple languages, most notably English and French, calling for immigration to the so-called “land of the caliphate.” Despite these calls, which achieved actual results on the ground and raised concerns among Western governments about the danger of returnees carrying out terrorist operations, the organization maintained a structure based on ethnic distinction between its Arab and foreign members, and on a more narrow distinction between most Arab nationalities and Iraqis, who maintained and controlled the highest positions in leadership, including the position of caliph, and to a lesser extent Syrians. The foundations of the ethnic structure of the organization go back to the period after Zarqawi with the declaration of the proto-caliphate, the Islamic State of Iraq. Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, its first leader, worked to separate Iraqi members from other nationalities that represented the pillar of the organization during Zarqawi’s time, so that al-Baghdadi became responsible for the Iraqis in the organization, while the Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, the minister of war, took responsibility for the non-Iraqi “immigrants.”

The system of ethnic discrimination in the Islamic State organization was strengthened following the killing of Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and the assumption of power by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2010, which was soon followed by the outbreak of civil war in Syria and then by the declaration of the caliphate several years later. Al-Baghdadi worked to create a new bureaucracy for the organization, one based on restructuring the position of minister of war, recentering his functions in the military council, whose members he chose from a group of former Iraqi army officers who were new to the jihadi ideology. This group, composed of those trusted by al-Baghdadi, included such figures as Abu Ali al-Anbari, Abu Ahmed al-Alwani and Abu Abdulrahman al-Biblawi. Through these he worked to neutralize the immigrants, especially the Arabs, distributing them within the new structure in various bodies and media institutions.

Some of these immigrants represented the currents accused of extremism that were later liquidated by al-Baghdadi’s inner circle. Al-Baghdadi also reinforced the importance of the position of the caliph. This was reflected in the criticism directed by the dissident Abu Muhammad al-Hashimi, a self-proclaimed defector from the Islamic State, in his 2019 book “Restrain Your Hands from Pledging Allegiance to al-Baghdadi,” in which he accused al-Baghdadi and his inner circle of dominating the organization through what is known as the Delegated Committee. He also accused them of extremism and brutality and accused al-Baghdadi of having forfeited the caliphate with reference to religious and jurisprudential eligibility requirements.

Despite the collapse of the territorial caliphate in its last stronghold in Baghouz, Syria in 2019 and the subsequent loss of the organization’s geographic influence in Iraq and Syria, the leadership environment of the Islamic State organization continued to reflect an Iraqi character. With the demise of al-Baghdadi in October 2019, the assumption of the position of caliph by Amir Muhammad Sa‘id al-Mawla (aka Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi; d. Feb. 2022) coincided with the onset of a more decentralized administration of the organization’s provinces. This character was evident in both the Shura Council (which is responsible for choosing the caliph) headed by Jum‘a al-Badri, al-Baghdadi’s brother, and the Delegated Committee (responsible for executive management) headed by the so-called Sami Jassim al-Jubouri and composed entirely of Iraqis. Despite the lack of complete certainty about the identity of the third and fourth caliphs, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (d. Oct. 2022) and Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi (d. Apr. 2023), it is widely assumed that they were Iraqis as well.

In January 2023, the Telegram account “Exposing the Worshippers of al-Baghdadi and al-Hashimi,” an account run by defectors from the Islamic State, referred to a person called “Abu Sara al-Iraqi,” who was subsequently killed, as being in charge of the administration of the provinces at the time. According to the same account, Abu Sara had wide influence over the Shura Council and forbade non-Iraqis from assuming the position of caliph.

The killing of Abu Sara, if the account is correct, raises the question of non-Iraqis assuming the position of caliph and the possibility that Abdul Qadir Mumin al-Somali in Somalia (or any other non-Iraqi figure) is in fact the current caliph, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. However, this hypothesis remains weak. Although shifting the Islamic State’s leadership to Somalia would place the caliph directly in the region where the organization carries out its most intensive financial operations, undertaken through what is known as the al-Karrar office, as well as some 60% of the total military operations in Africa branches of the organization worldwide, The current focus on Africa is best understood as temporary and expedient as opposed to representing a genuine strategic shift.

The Islamic State’s turn to Africa in recent years is due to a number of reasons, most notably the lack of international focus on counterterrorism in the African continent and conditions there of political chaos and economic malaise. The relatively poor living conditions mean that the organization does not need a high operating budget, specifically in paying the monthly salaries of fighters, while relatively weak counterterrorism pressure makes the area suitable for establishing financial networks that feed other branches of the organization worldwide. In this way, Somalia has become a prominent node in the Islamic State’s financial network, supporting provinces in in central and southern Africa, Mozambique, and other states outside the African continent.

Iraq and Syria in the organization’s narrative

The centrality of Iraq and Syria to the organization’s caliphate is primarily due to the ways in which this geographical area enhances the appeal of the organization’s narrative about the caliphate, and the fact that this was the original headquarters of the caliphate where most of its leaders and key actors have hailed from. As in Africa, the area of Iraq and Syria suffers from political instability and economic malaise, yet it also possesses a historical distinctiveness for the group that Africa does not. For one, this was the seat of the caliphate in the past (the Abbasids in Baghdad and the Umayyads in Damascus), a fact that strengthens the organization’s narrative surrounding the caliphate claim. In more recent times, it was also promoted by the organization as a land of immigration (hijra), and the memory of having reestablished the caliphate there looms large in the group’s propaganda and narrative.

Although the organization proclaimed a universalist vision back in 2014 with its “the breaking of the borders” between Iraq and Syria, in theory making African and other lands equal to all others, in reality the organization remains wedded to the environment in which it was born. For all its successes in Africa, it has not been able to achieve the necessary level of influence and control there as was the case in Iraq and Syria in the years beginning in 2014. Indeed, Africa today does not have a realistic strategic advantage over these Arab lands that qualifies it to be a center of the Islamic State other than the absence of local and international efforts to combat terrorism.

A major theme in the Islamic State’s propaganda, which distinguishes it from other jihadi groups, is the claim of having transcended the stage of preparation and proceeded to the stage of statehood, in other words, of having moved from the stage of advocacy and incitement to the stage of conquest and empowerment. This theme goes back to 2006 with the proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq, which promoted a narrative about the restoration of Islamic rule and the glories of the early caliphate in Medina. This was critical to its propaganda efforts in appealing to the feelings of Muslim youth, Muslim Arab youth in particular, who generally suffer from political oppression, poor economic conditions, and a sense of civilizational decline relative to the West, all of which contributes to a longing for the early Islamic era of victories and conquests. Indeed, there is a sense in which Muslim Arabs live imprisoned by certain jurisprudential interpretations glorifying the Islamic sword, which may not apply in the case of Africa.

The Islamic State’s naming of its previous magazine Dabiq, which was published in English, is an example of the importance of the Iraqi and Syrian geographic area to the organization’s narrative. The name Dabiq goes back to a statement attributed to the Prophet Muhammad in which he refers to one of the battles the End Times in which the armies of the Muslims (which the organization assumes it represents) will fight their enemies before launching a campaign towards Constantinople (Istanbul) and the rest of the world. The supposed battle takes place in the Syrian village of Dabiq, 35 kilometers northeast of the city of Aleppo. The organization took control of Dabiq in August 2014 and fought fiercely there until it lost control of it in October 2016. No Islamic references of such theological or eschatological importance are to be found in Africa.

In August 2023, Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari, the Islamic State’s official spokesman, announced the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi to the position of caliph in a speech titled “Rejoice in the Pledge You Have Made.” Abu Hafs thus became the fifth caliph in the line beginning with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was killed in October 2019. While little of his identity is known, Abu Hudhayfa did state that the new caliph is a veteran of the Islamic State with experience fighting “the Crusaders and apostates” who was “bolstered by adversities, and made experienced by severe trials of fate.” Notably, Abu Hudhayfa compared the four slain caliphs before Abu Hafs to the Rightly Guided caliphs of the seventh century who were similarly “killed through treachery.” And while he paid tribute to “the soldiers of the caliphate” in the lands of Khurasan and Africa, he first did so to those in “Iraq and al-Sham,” once again illustrating the primacy of this area to the Islamic State’s self-conception.

Quraysh, without a doubt

Despite the wide influence that the Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Muhajir had in al-Qaeda in Iraq, which led the Bush administration to put bounty on him as the successor to al-Zarqawi, it was not he but Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi who was chosen as the emir of the Islamic State of Iraq when this was announced in 2006. In this way would the new leader meet one of the traditional conditions for assuming the office of the caliphate, which, as mentioned by the scholar al-Mawardi (d. 1058) and others, is Qurashi lineage, meaning a pedigree that traces back to the Prophet’s tribe of Quraysh. At first, however, the Islamic State of Iraq’s media refrained from underlining al-Baghdadi’s Qurashi lineage, presumably because it did not wish to present him as being the actual caliph. The initial statement announcing the Islamic State of Iraq only identified him as “Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi,” while the author of I‘lam al-anam bi-milad dawlat al-Islam, a key ideological text legitimizing the group’s early statehood bid from January 2007, did not emphasize it as a condition for the caliph, only discussing the condition in passing. The first reference to al-Baghdadi’s Qurashi lineage appeared in Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi in a statement issued in October 2006, where he was described as “the Husayni, Qurashi, Hashemite” (al-husayni al-qurashi al-hashimi). All of this raised a number of questions and criticisms from various jihadis about the meaning of the term “state” and the bestowing of the title “Commander of the Faithful” on al-Baghdadi, as would be addressed by the al-Qaida leader ‘Atiyyatullah al-Libi in an essay penned in December of that year.

Despite the limited research into the truth of the Qurashi lineage of Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, it later represented a pivotal point that resurfaced with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi when he was presented as a Qurashi Husayni, a fact used to illustrate how he met the conditions of the caliphate as explained by Turki al-Bin‘ali in his book “Extend Your Hands to Pledge Allegiance to al-Baghdadi,” from July 2013. Later, opponents of the Islamic State would seize on the lineage issue to claim that the successor of al-Baghdadi, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi, could not be caliph as his Turkmen origin allegedly made him not of Qurashi descent. While that issue failed to discredit the Islamic State leader in the eyes of his supporters, the condition of Qurashi lineage remained an important axis in the appointment and legitimation of subsequent caliphs, featuring (as least in public statements) as a more critical qualification than other traditional requirements such as religious knowledge, probity, bravery, etc.

In early 2024, rumors began to spread that Abdul Qadir Mumin, the emir of the Islamic State’s branch in Somalia, was in fact the newly appointed caliph Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, a possibility some believed was plausible because of the tribal ties between Abdul Qadir’s Darod clan and the Quraysh through ‘Aqil ibn Abi Talib, the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad. The Islamic State has neither confirmed nor denied these reports, but the prospect that Abdul Qadir is in fact Abu Hafs appears highly unlikely. Whether he has a valid claim to Qurashi lineage in the eyes of the Islamic State’s traditional base of Iraqi leaders is unknown, but even if he did, those leaders, who form the powerful Iraq lobby within the organization, would be loath to abdicate their authority by appointing an African caliph, who, in the case of Mumin at least, is a relative latecomer to the group. The importance of the position of caliph in the extremist organization is highlighted by the fact that it plays a political and spiritual role for the organization. Moreover, with the creation of what is known as the General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) and its management of the financial offices and global networks in the organization, the caliph no longer plays the most prominent administrative role he once did. While the paramountcy of the caliph has not been challenged, the rise of the GDP has entailed a greater degree of decentralization in the running of the pseudo-state’s affairs. In such circumstances, it seems unnecessary for the organization to transfer the position of caliph to someone whose pedigree is questionable in terms of Qurashi lineage and whose empowerment would cause disputes in the original geographic center of Iraq and Syria and among Middle Eastern Arabs more generally. Since reports indicate that Abdul Qader has assumed the leadership of the Karrar office for financial coordination within the structure of the GDP, there would be no need to transfer the office of the caliphate to Somalia except in the possible interest of keeping the caliph alive for more than a period of months, which is how long the two previous caliphs lasted. Yet while the possibility cannot be ruled out, for the reasons mentioned above, it appears unlikely indeed.

In the past, HTS’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, had praised al-Qaida, of which his group once formed a part, and repeatedly stated that his highest aim was to implement the sharia. “Whether we are with al-Qaida or not,” he declared in an interview in 2015, “we will never retreat from our principles and our constants. We will continue to strive to implement the sharia.” Two years earlier, in his very first interview, he outlined his vision for how Syria would be ruled post-Asad:

When we come to the stage of liberating al-Sham, when Damascus falls, for instance … at that time sharia committees will assemble; the people who loosen and bind (ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd), and religious scholars (‘ulama) and intellectuals from among those who participated [in the fight] and who sacrificed, those with an opinion, even if they are from outside the country, will assemble; and the religious scholars of al-Sham will assemble, for instance; and shura councils and councils of the people who loosen and bind will be convened. Then a plan will be put forward appropriate for administering this country. Of course, this will be in accordance with the Islamic sharia, and in it God’s law will rule, consultation will be extended, and justice will spread.

Al-Jawlani’s vision here was a profoundly religious one, informed by traditional Islamic concepts like the notion of ahl al-hall wa-l-‘aqd, which refers to “those members of the religious and the political elite” who select and advise the caliph, and emphasizing rule by the sharia. Indeed, it was applying the sharia that mattered above all. In the same interview, he went on to say,

We do not strive to rule the country, but we strive for the sharia to be applied in the country. Whether we rule or not, this matter does not concern us. What concerns us is for the sharia to rule, for justice to spread, for the oppression of the people to be lifted, for a righteous Islamic government to be established on the prophetic methodology that seeks to liberate Muslim lands, to apply God’s law, to act justly toward the people, to relieve people of oppression—that is what we strive to achieve.

Some years later, in yet another interview, he reiterated the point, stating, “We do not aspire to rule in the country, but we do aspire for the sharia to rule in the country.” As for his own role in a future government, he foreswore any political ambitions, saying that once a proper “Islamic government” is formed, “we will be the first soldiers in this righteous government, and we do not aspire to rule or anything else.”

Yet now that Damascus has indeed fallen, and al-Jawlani, opting for his given name of Ahmad al-Sharaa, has assumed the role of “overall leader” of Syria’s transitional government, the man of the hour has been singing a different tune. Having swapped out his military fatigues for suit and jacket, he continues to equivocate on the question of his own political future, saying in response to a question about running for Syria’s presidency, “If the Syrians do not want that, I will be satisfied.” But otherwise his language is of a dramatically different character. Gone is the emphasis on implementing the sharia, replaced by a newfound emphasis on tolerance, minority rights, and building an inclusive and representative government whose leaders are chosen by the people.

For al-Sharaa’s jihadi critics, such utterances are proof positive of what they have long believed: that he has abandoned jihadism altogether, becoming a garden-variety Islamist who aims not to apply the sharia but rather to impose a system of rule more akin to that of Erdogan’s Turkey. Having previously criticized him for abandoning al-Qaida and “diluting” the jihadi methodology, they are crying foul once again, this time over his seeming embrace of democracy and reluctance to apply the sharia.

Islamic state or constitutional democracy?

The idea that Western-style democracy is tantamount to polytheism (shirk) is one of the keystones of jihadi ideology. The view is premised on the idea that in Islam sovereignty belongs to God and God’s law, whereas in democracy sovereignty belongs to the people and their manmade laws. This was a view that, even after leaving the fold of al-Qaida, HTS never deviated from. As ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Atun, HTS’s chief religious authority, wrote in early 2019, “Democracy, from a creedal standpoint, is opposed to Islam, as Islam is premised on giving rule to God, while democracy is premised on giving rule to what is apart from God, whatever that may be.” In the same year, a statement of HTS’s core principles affirmed that “The sovereignty of the sharia is the aim of the jihad and the revolution, and rejection of democracy and secularism.”

Yet now, if his utterances are to be believed, al-Sharaa has developed a newfound affection for representative government. In a December 19 interview with BBC, for instance, he spoke about the need to build “the infrastructure for elections,” noting that half of all Syrians are currently living abroad, many of them lacking proper documentation. On hearing this the interviewer interjected, “You’re talking about elections. Does that mean you would like this country to become a democracy?” “The people,” al-Sharaa responded, “have the right to choose who leads them. The people have the right to choose those who represent them in the people’s assembly (majlis al-sha‘b) and the council of representatives.” The people’s assembly is the name of Syria’s parliament, while the council of representatives is an older term for the same body. Thus, going by al-Sharaa’s words, Syria’s future government will include a legislative body whose members are elected by the people, and will include an executive (president) likewise to be elected by the people.

It will also include a new constitution, as he went on to explain, noting that the process for drafting a new constitution is underway with “a legal committee” consisting of various Syrian “experts and legal authorities.” In saying all this, al-Sharaa studiously avoided any mention of the term sharia, opting instead for the less Islamic term qanun, meaning law or law code, typically in the sense of secular or administrative law. Whereas before his goal was for the sharia to rule in Syria, he now stated that “the law (qanun) is what will rule this country, and the law will protect all, and will preserve the rights of all.” “At the end of the day,” he added, “what the Syrian people agree upon in terms of law and constitution, our objective is to implement it, to maintain it, and to safeguard it.”

Given how decidedly at odds all this was with what al-Sharaa had previously stood for, it was inevitable that his jihadi critics would respond. The most notable of these is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Jordanian-based scholar whose writings were critical to the formation of jihadi ideology. A supporter of al-Qaida and the Taliban, al-Maqdisi is well known for his condemnations of the Islamic State, though he has been no less critical of HTS.

On December 20, al-Maqdisi posted on X a video of al-Sharaa’s answer to the question of whether he intends for Syria to become a democracy, asking, “Is this not the plain rule of democracy? For sovereignty to belong to the people who choose, according to the majority, the one who rules them even if he is a secularist? The one who rules by manmade laws! Is this their right in God’s law? Or in the democracy of Ahmad al-Sharaa?” He followed this up with another post accusing al-Sharaa of a host of opportunistic and treacherous acts. “Al-Jawlani turned against ISIS and swore fealty (bay‘a) to al-Qaida so that it would stand with him against ISIS,” he wrote. “Then he betrayed his bay‘a to al-Qaida and turned against it. He used the jihadis in martyrdom operations and promised them that their blood would not be in vain but would be a price for applying the sharia. Then when he arrived at the presidential palace he announced that the law (qanun) will rule and that democracy will be the methodology.”

Avoiding a “hypocritical society”

Typically, when jihadi groups have come to power in recent years, they have made a show of implementing the so-called canonical penalties (hudud) in public fashion (e.g., chopping off hands of convicted thieves), thereby showcasing their stalwart commitment to applying the sharia. When HTS first took control of Idlib, it did not indulge in such displays of brutality as the Islamic State did in the areas it occupied, but it did ban the sale of alcohol and field a morality police force aimed at enforcing conformity with Islamic strictures, such as a dress code for women and bans on smoking and the intermingling of the sexes in public. According to some reports, however, even these efforts were gradually reined in. “Buying and selling alcohol was banned” in Idlib, the New York Times recently reported, “but residents said the group did not try to root out drinkers, and people were allowed to smoke in public.” According to CNN, summarizing the views of Jerome Drevon, al-Sharaa “slowly phased out the strict application of Islamic law, turned a blind eye to gender mixing and smoking and allowed protests against him. A Sharia law-based morality unit was disbanded but women were encouraged to cover their hair.”

In April 2024, al-Sharaa offered some justification for this relatively more permissive environment, saying twice in a public address that he did not wish to foster “a hypocritical society,” by which he meant one that abides by Islamic legal norms only out of fear. On the matter of requiring prayer, for instance, he stated, “The government does not have the right to impose worship on people. We do not wish to turn society into a hypocritical society wherein if they see us, they pray, and if they don’t see us, they don’t pray.” In matters of commanding right and forbidding wrong, he added, the government’s approach was one of emphasizing “the aspect of preaching over the aspect of the stick.” This did not mean that the government had no authority to impose prohibitions, but that any such prohibition “had to be truly a matter of consensus, of decisive proof and evidence,” for the government to impose it.

Despite some early reports of women being required to cover their hair, the same light touch to enforcing sharia norms appears to have prevailed so far in post-Asad Syria. On December 15, ‘Abdallah al-Muhaysini, a Saudi former sharia official in HTS who remains close to al-Sharaa, tweeted what appeared to be a defense of this less punitive approach. Here he echoed much of what al-Sharaa had said in his comments back in April:

I am receiving a flood of questions on the reality of the new Syrian state, among them:

How will the mujahidin deal with behaviors that are prohibited and women wearing makeup in the newly liberated areas, where people are accustomed to a different way of life?

My answer:

The reality of the people [i.e., the leadership] in the new Syrian state today is that they are more mindful of issues such as the question of prohibited behaviors and how to deal with them. The brothers prioritize the aspect of preaching and bolstering it, and abstaining from alienating people and taking care to preserve the spirit of love that, by God’s leave, we have won, such that we do not produce a hypocritical generation that refrains from prohibitions out of fear of us and not of God. All this without diluting the religion and while clarifying what is prohibited and proffering advice thereon.

In response to this post, al-Maqdisi quickly authored an essay titled “Warning against a Corrupt Phrase Diluting the Religion and Justifying the Suspension of the Laws of the Sharia and the Application of Manmade Laws.” The phrase in question, he wrote, “which has been repeated by certain leaders of the revolution, their shaykhs, and their prominent personalities in Syria, in the past and recently, is their words, ‘We will not impose the hijab or prayer or any other such rites on anyone, in order not to produce a hypocritical generation that refrains from prohibited acts out of fear of us and not of God, one that prays when they see us and refrains from prayer when they don’t see us.’” Al-Maqdisi’s main argument, as betrayed by the title, was that such words corrupted and diluted the religion, particularly as regards the duties and obligations imposed by God on Muslim rulers, above all the duty of applying the sharia.

According to al-Maqdisi, the sentiment behind this phrase has no basis in Islam, being out of step with the words of the Prophet’s companions and numerous scholarly authorities. To make the point he drew attention to the widely attested dictum, attributed to two of the early caliphs, that “God deters with political authority (al-sultan) that which He does not deter with the Quran.” The meaning of this, according to al-Maqdisi, citing premodern Muslim scholars, was that more people are deterred from committing evil acts out of fear of the sultan than they are out of fear of God. On this basis, it was widely deemed appropriate for the ruler to coerce right behavior in conformity with the sharia, including prayer. The same idea, he noted, is present in one of the Prophetic hadith in which God is described as observing those who “are dragged to paradise in chains.” As these prooftexts showed, al-Maqdisi argued, the early Muslims were perfectly comfortable with the idea that a Muslim sovereign ought not only to apply the sharia but also to impose legal obligations on his subjects. By contrast, the “cowards” of HTS seek to evade responsibility for applying the sharia and enforcing conformity with the religious obligations “in order to please the infidel West, which they fear more than they fear God.”

The bars of Damascus

On December 14, the day before al-Muhaysini’s tweet that drew al-Maqdisi’s ire, Agence France-Presse published a story about Damascus’s bars cautiously reopening. According to the story, the bars and liquor stores of the capital remained closed for four days after al-Sharaa’s forces entered the city, but this had been due to fear, not a ban. Once bar and store owners received word from the new authorities that they were free to operate as usual, business resumed. “Talk about an alcohol ban is not true,” an anonymous HTS official was quoted saying. The official grew irritated when pressed for further comment, noting that the government has “bigger issues to deal with.” The story received coverage in the Arab press as well.

In his December 19 interview with BBC, al-Sharaa was asked whether his new administration would ban alcohol, expressly forbidden in Islamic law. He responded in an equivocal manner, saying, “Many issues I do not have the right to speak on, because this is a purely legal matter (masʾala qanuniyya).” He went on to describe the committee of experts tasked with drafting a new constitution, remarking that “they are the ones who will decide this matter.” In a separate interview on December 16, asked whether he would ban alcohol and pork, al-Sharaa responded, “We will not interfere in personal freedoms in a deep way.”

Al-Maqdisi’s response to these remarks was a pair of tweets bemoaning the fact that “[e]ven on the matter of alcohol, al-Jawlani’s tongue has been tied after coming to power,” and condemning him for failing to keep his promises to “the mujahidin who brought him to where he is today.” Similarly, al-Maqdisi’s colleague Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim, an Egyptian jihadi scholar based in Canada, posted on his Telegram channel about the bars in Damascus reopening, “What is happening in Syria?! What is the plan? What is the methodology? What is the reference? Where is the bearded minister of the interior? Is it a secular, infidel state, or an Islamic, sharia-based state? What is the difficulty in adopting one of the two ideologies, when there can be no third!?”

That al-Sharaa would fail to commit himself to an alcohol ban is indeed remarkable, as the widely acknowledged punishment for drinking in Islamic law, as established by the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634-644), is flogging by 80 lashes. Moreover, as Felicitas Opwis has observed, “this punishment was considered to belong to the divinely prescribed punishments, the so-called ḥudūd (sg. ḥadd), which are imposed for particular acts forbidden in the Qur’ān, such as theft (sariqa), unlawful sexual intercourse (zinā), wrongful accusation of adultery (qadhf), and banditry (qaṭ‘ al-ṭarīq, ḥirāba).” This point would be raised by another Egyptian jihadi scholar in al-Maqdisi’s camp, the London-based Hani al-Siba‘i, who wrote on his Telegram channel on December 20, “Alcohol is forbidden (haram) in our religion, and the penalty (hadd) for it is well known … Has fear of the West reached the point that we are going to form a committee of legal experts [to decide the matter]”?

From jihadi to Islamist

As far as al-Maqdisi and his allies are concerned, the transitional government of Ahmad al-Sharaa so far amounts to a complete betrayal of the Islamic principles that he previously espoused. Not that this came as a shock. For them, al-Sharaa’s seeming embrace of democracy and unwillingness to apply the sharia are the consummation of a long trajectory of unprincipled and duplicitous behavior, one beginning with the decision to break ties with al-Qaida and progressing to security cooperation with (infidel) Turkey and persecution of al-Qaida loyalists.

This is not to say that al-Maqdisi’s perspective is entirely valid. While it is true, as I have written elsewhere, that al-Sharaa likely used his jihadi affiliations opportunistically in pursuit of power, and has gradually distanced himself from jihadi ideology more generally, it is also likely that he remains a committed Islamist who intends to transform the Syrian state in ways not amenable to Syria’s minority communities and more secular-minded Syrians, to say nothing of Syria’s neighbors and the international community more broadly. The reality, in all likelihood, is that al-Sharaa is pursuing a more gradualist and democratic approach to Islamizing Syria’s state and society than is tolerable to jihadis, but it is still an approach premised on an Islamist agenda. In the case of alcohol, for example, his statement about deferring the matter to a committee of legal experts may sound moderate today, but if legislation is passed banning the sale and consumption of alcohol it will have a very different look to it. Perhaps a legislative ban is what al-Sharaa is counting on from a freely elected Syrian parliament, along with a host of other such measures informed by the sharia.

As for democracy and a new constitution, it is now clear that al-Sharaa is working on a longer timetable than previously appeared from his earlier interviews. In a subsequent interview with the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya, aired December 29, he indicated that drafting a new constitution will “need a long time,” and “perhaps will take two or three years.” As for elections, he similarly noted that “we need a long time” to prepare, signaling that this could take as long as four years. (Asked if preparations could take four years, al-Sharaa answered, “maybe,” going on to explain the difficulties involved.) At the end of the day, the democratic system he intends to put in place may well resemble Turkey’s more than France’s, with al-Sharaa playing the role of the long-ruling Erdogan, who, it may be noted, further cemented his power by pushing through a series of constitutional amendments in 2017.

While all this may be anathema to jihadis like al-Maqdisi, it is not a betrayal of a more general Islamism, meaning an approach to politics aimed to instituting a manifestly Islamic regime. Unless something drastic changes, that may well be where Syria is headed under al-Sharaa’s leadership.

Al-Qaida, however, has a problem in taking this pro-Hamas stand. This is that some of the key jihadi ideologues who have long supported al-Qaida, and who command a certain following within al-Qaida’s global network, are deeply uncomfortable with it. The most noteworthy of these is Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959), the Palestinian-Jordanian scholar whose many books, essays, and fatwas have profoundly shaped the ideological complexion of the jihadi movement, or “the jihadi current” (al-tayyar al-jihadi) as it is most commonly known in Arabic, going back to the 1980s. Al-Maqdisi has long served as something of the jihadi movement’s ideological standard-bearer, ensuring conformity with Salafi doctrinal principles that emphasize strict monotheism (tawhid) and condemnation and denunciation of all that goes again it, from supplicating saints at tombs to democracy and nationalism and failure to rule by God’s law.

Unlike in previous years when al-Maqdisi used social media accounts and wrote frequently online, over the past year or so his social media usage and his writing have been restricted by the Jordanian authorities. Even so, a number of his messages have appeared online since October 7, and for the most part these have comprised severe criticism of al-Qaida. While al-Maqdisi is not as categorically anti-Hamas as the Islamic State, he has no tolerance for what he sees as al-Qaida’s unprincipled stand of all-out support for the Palestinian militant group, a stand that he sees as representing al-Qaida’s ongoing ideological evolution toward a more generic kind of Islamism. These concerns of al-Maqdisi go to the heart of what al-Qaida is trying to become in the present moment as it repositions itself as the more “moderate” alternative to the Islamic State—and the challenge that this intended makeover entails.

Hamas between al-Qaida and al-Maqdisi

The Islamic State, to reiterate, has nothing positive to say about Hamas whatsoever. Back in January, the Islamic State’s official spokesman urged Hamas to “correct your path,” arguing that its “recent battle in Gaza” was not about “achieving the unity of God and making His word supreme” but rather about “the dirt and the land.” He went on to fault Hamas for failing to implement the Sharia in Gaza and for allying itself with Shiite Iran’s “axis of resistance,” noting that the “expansionary designs” of the “Rejectionists” (i.e., the Shia) are no less a threat to the Muslims than “the conspiracies and enmities of the Jews and the Crusaders.” The only way for Hamas to be worthy of the Islamic State’s support, in other words, was for it to abandon the resistance axis and transform itself into an extension of the Islamic State.

Al-Qaida has also in the past condemned Hamas, but never so severely and never to the point of outright excommunication (takfir). In 2006 al-Qaida’s approach turned negative when Hamas pivoted from being principally a terrorist militia to being a political group as well. That year Hamas participated in the Palestinian legislative elections, and al-Qaida responded by condemning it for participating in these “polytheistic assemblies” and effectively recognizing the Oslo Accords. In 2007 Osama bin Laden famously stated that Hamas had “forsaken their religion.”

Al-Maqdisi was even more critical of Hamas in this period, writing extensively about its perceived transgressions from its embrace of the “polytheistic” religion of democracy to its failure to implement the Sharia in Gaza (after Hamas’s takeover there in 2007) and the nationalism underlying its jihad, among other things. More broadly he critiqued Hamas for not adhering to the correct path or methodology (manhaj), meaning the ideological path associated with the jihadi movement, or Jihadi Salafism, with its emphasis on tawhid and its commitment to overthrowing the “apostate” rulers of the Islamic world.

It was in this context that al-Maqdisi came into conflict with the al-Qaida commander Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (d. 2010), who in a 2009 interview casually stated that “we and Hamas share the same thinking and the same manhaj.” Al-Maqdisi responded with a 20-page rebuttal setting out all the ways in which Hamas did not adhere to “the manhaj of the Jihadi Salafi current” (manhaj al-tayyar al-salafi al-jihadi). Abu al-Yazid duly issued a correction, explaining that he had misspoken (“the phrase was not precise”) and clarifying that al-Qaida’s position is one of distinguishing between the political wing of Hamas, which is deeply flawed, and Hamas’s military wing (i.e., the al-Qassam Brigades), which merits support as mujahidin fighting a shared enemy. Al-Maqdisi has sometimes indicated his agreement with this distinction between the political and the military wings of Hamas, though he has never been entirely comfortable with it. In any event, the episode with Abu al-Yazid demonstrated the kind of ideological authority that al-Maqdisi wielded within al-Qaida circles at this time. In recent years, however, this has changed, with al-Maqdisi finding himself critiquing what he sees as al-Qaida’s ideological drift and al-Qaida only drifting further.

In 2021, for instance, during an earlier round of conflict between Israel and Hamas, al-Maqdisi rebuked al-Qaida’s official media agency, al-Sahab, for its statement mourning the death of a Hamas senior military commander. He framed his criticism as though reflecting the concerns of a great many erstwhile supporters of al-Qaida. “Many mujahid brothers, shaykhs, and preachers,” he wrote,

were displeased by the al-Sahab statement’s exaltation of the al-Qassam leader who was killed in the recent war in Gaza, and they wondered astonishedly: “Are our brothers not aware of the deviation of Hamas and its leadership from the path of tawhid in favor of the path of democracy, and of their alignment with Hizb al-Lat [i.e., Hizbullah] and Bashar [al-Asad] and Iran?” … Has the manhaj changed?! Have the ranks of al-Qaida been penetrated by those who pay no heed to the purity of the manhaj?”

This was a major escalation in al-Maqdisi’s occasional criticism of al-Qaida, which had earlier included reprimanding the group for mourning the late President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt. For the first time, al-Maqdisi had accused al-Qaida of turning its back on the jihadi manhaj that he and others had worked so hard to construct. Al-Qaida was from his perspective trying to remake itself into a more pan-Islamist group that could appeal to the global Muslim community, or umma, more broadly, and this meant dispensing with the jihadi manhaj and all its ideological strictures. Since October 7, al-Maqdisi’s concerns about al-Qaida have only grown greater.

Early reactions

Al-Qaida would waste little time in publishing a statement of support for the Hamas operation. On October 13, the al-Qaida senior leadership, or “general command,” issued a statement titled “But Surely God’s Help is Nigh” (Q. 2:214) in which it hailed the October 7 attack as “one of the most courageous of heroic acts in Islam in this modern time,” and “one of the most important Islamic strides that will lead to the liberation of all the land of Palestine.” Addressing “the knights of Palestine,” the statement declared that “your brothers in al-Qaida, and all the righteous mujahidin worldwide, stand together with you in a single column, in the same trench of battle.” It further called on Muslims around the world to wage jihad against the Jews and their allies, announcing that “we are upon a great transformation in the path of global jihad.”

The October 13 statement was followed at the month’s end by the first essay in a series by Sayf al-‘Adl, al-Qaida’s presumptive leader since the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri in summer 2022. Writing under the pseudonym Salim al-Sharif, al-‘Adl heaped similar praise on the October 7 operation, portraying it as a strategic marvel that heralded the beginning of the end for the Jewish state. Despite the pain and destruction now being visited upon the people of Gaza, he wrote, the operation was nonetheless necessary in order to achieve the ultimate objective of driving the Jews from Palestine. It would further have the effect of lifting the morale of the umma and of the Muslims of the Middle East in particular, leading them “to revolt against their kings and emirs and presidents” who had done nothing over the years to restore Muslim rule in Palestine. With these two statements, al-Qaida was practically claiming October 7 as its own, portraying the attack as both a part of and in furtherance of al-Qaida’s jihad against the standing regimes of the Middle East.

Al-Maqdisi’s initial reaction was somewhat out of character. Rather than polemicizing against Hamas, he counseled restraint in condemning it at this sensitive time. In a comment relayed via Telegram on October 12, he expressed exasperation at receiving numerous inquiries about his earlier writings concerning Hamas. “I have been troubled by the brothers’ repeated questioning concerning our previous well-known statements about Hamas at this time,” he wrote, suggesting that this was not the moment for dredging up this material. At the present time, he continued, “it is obligatory to work to support Gaza and its people by any means possible, by the hand and by the tongue and by beseeching God to support the people of Gaza over the nations of unbelief who have rallied against them,” and it is further obligatory “to avoid all that might be seen as forsaking [the people of Gaza] at this time.” This moratorium on Hamas-bashing was bound to be brief.

Al-Maqdisi’s next comments on Hamas came in an issue of the jihadi magazine al-Mahajja, which appeared on November 6. In his article, titled “Proud Gaza and the al-Aqsa Flood: Studies and Lessons,” he began by praising October 7, saying that “there is no believer of true faith in this world who did not feel joy at the al-Aqsa Flood operation.” Yet this praise soon was shown to be backhanded, as in the very same paragraph al-Maqdisi described Hamas’s jihad as “marked by corruption” as he pondered “what would be the case were it a jihad in the path of God and in the path of applying His law on earth, as our Lord wishes and desires?” From here he proceeded to reaffirm his earlier criticisms “of the deviations of Hamas and its government,” saying that no military operation, no matter how great, can erase these transgressions. “The crime of neglecting the Sharia,” he wrote,

is not erased but by applying it; the sin of democracy is not erased but by dissociating from it; the veneration and adulation of the worst Rejectionist criminals and the showing of loyalty to the murderers of the Sunnis such as [Qasim] Sulaymani and his state and their satanic ayatollahs are not erased but by dissociating from them; and the praising and burnishing of Bashar [al-Asad], murderer of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, rapist of women, and destroyer of lands and persons, are not erased but by dissociating from him and his criminal regime.

Al-Maqdisi went on to note that it was the Hamas government that had instituted a “truce” with Israel in the first place, stifling the efforts of the smaller militant groups in Gaza, including the “Jihadi Salafi” ones, from making war on the Jewish state.

Here was al-Maqdisi returning to form. Whatever reservations he had about criticizing Hamas in the immediate aftermath of October 7 were gone. As al-Maqdisi announced of himself:

I am not one who is deceived by that which is not real, who goes out beating the drum for Hamas and dressing it up and beautifying it, with all its vices and faults, because of a raid it successfully carried out. In this way are people misled and their creed diluted. A great many shaykhs and groups have ridden the wave of this flood such that they have nearly drowned their followers in the misconceptions of innovative groups and ensnared them in contradictions! As if all the grave offenses that the Hamas government has committed and continues to commit are excused so long as it is fighting Jews! As if fighting Jews has become an impediment to condemnation and to takfir!

The criticism of certain unspecified “shaykhs” and “groups” here no doubt encompassed al-Qaida with its statement of unqualified pro-Hamas sentiment.  

Al-Maqdisi’s frustration with al-Qaida became even clearer in his next public remarks concerning Hamas. In this brief commentary, relayed via Telegram on November 15, he argued that there was a major difference between calling on God to support a flawed Islamic group such as Hamas and “misleading the umma” by endorsing it and exaggerating its merits. The former was perfectly in accordance with the Sharia, but the latter was not. Indeed, to take the latter course was “to destroy all that we have built before of doctrinal fortresses examining the deviation of those who fight in the path of democracy and rule by manmade laws.” “What the jihadi organizations and shaykhs are doing today,” he continued, naming al-Qaida, “is precisely this destruction and annihilation of the edifice that they had previously erected,” a structure that was built to show “the falsity of democracy and the blameworthiness of governments that refuse to apply the Sharia.” Al-Qaida and certain unnamed scholars, al-Maqdisi was thus saying, were “misleading the umma” and “destroying” the ideological edifice of Jihadi Salafism. This was heavy criticism indeed.

“Don’t ride a wave that isn’t yours”

It was not till early January 2024 that al-Maqdisi’s next words concerning al-Qaida and Hamas appeared online. What seems to have prompted him to write at this stage was the release by al-Qaida the previous month of a short video featuring footage of Hamas fighters squaring off against Israeli forces. The video, based on an earlier newsletter from November, urged Muslims to join the battle alongside “the heroes” of October 7 by waging jihad against the “Zionist” Arab regimes of the Middle East, in particular “Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon.” Once again, al-Qaida was presenting Hamas’s war on Israel and the regional agenda of al-Qaida as part of the same general jihad. Another al-Qaida media product from December did even more to portray Hamas and al-Qaida as being in perfect alignment. This was a newsletter released at the end of the month presenting the “the blessed al-Aqsa Flood operation” as the successor to 9/11, and predicting that this “the second September 11” would inevitably lead to “the third September 11.” Notably, the newsletter suggested that the perpetrators of this third 9/11 might even be “non-Muslims,” given how widespread the anger at America in the West had become.

These attempts by al-Qaida to blur the distinction between Hamas’s and al-Qaida’s strategic agendas did not sit well with al-Maqdisi. In an essay published on Justpaste.it on January 8 and shared by followers on X and Telegram, he warned al-Qaida against trying to insert itself into a war it had no business being a part of. Hamas, he explained, “adheres to a Muslim Brotherhood, Islamo-democratic manhaj, it rules according to manmade laws, and it does not fight to establish God’s law!” Implicitly addressing al-Qaida, only later identified by name, he wrote, “You are simply not a part of its [Hamas’s] direction … [and] you haven’t the least participation or say in its vital decisions.” Indeed, Hamas could end this war at any time on the orders of its foreign patrons and without consulting you. The Hamas leadership “disagrees with you in the foundations of belief (usul), not just in the branches (furu‘). You and they are not aligned either in direction or in means or in objectives.” The “Rejectionists” of Iran and Hezbollah are the more natural allies of them. “Therefore,” he concluded, “your enthusiasm for them [Hamas], and your words and your statements about them, as though you are speaking on their behalf, is to be considered fake wailing. Truly, your drumbeating for them without concern for their methodology is a mixture of stupidity and naiveté and foolishness.”

It was at this point that al-Maqdisi finally mentioned al-Qaida by name, noting the fact that it

has begun to draw in its videos from the videos of Hamas’s fighters in order to talk about the global jihad that the Hamas of the Resistance dissociates from, and indeed considers to be terrorism, or to incite through the clips of the al-Qassam fighters against idolatrous rulers and regimes that Hamas is loyal to in the first place! … So long as you have wasted the milk in the summer and have not prepared for this day in terms of men and capabilities and damaging targets, then don’t ride a wave that isn’t yours, and don’t beat the drum and dance to songs that don’t suit you.

Not only was al-Maqdisi calling out al-Qaida’s “stupidity and naiveté and foolishness” in showering praise on Hamas and misrepresenting its loyalties and strategic aims, but he was also calling out al-Qaida’s irrelevance on the Palestinian scene, as an actor that had not mobilized and prepared for battle there. Simply put, this attempt at annexing Hamas’s war with Israel to al-Qaida’s global jihad was disingenuous nonsense.

This was not to say that the only appropriate course of action was for al-Qaida, or other jihadis, to sit the war in Gaza out. But to the extent that one participated, al-Maqdisi counseled, one ought to have a clear-eyed view of what Hamas is and where one fits within the Hamas-dominated battle. “In the event that you must participate,” he wrote, “then participate as one who has become involved in a battle over which one exercises no control, but in which one sees a benefit for the Muslims and through which one aspires to an awakening of the umma and an igniting of the burning coal of jihad.” In other words, participation in Hamas’s jihad against Israel was allowed, but only participation in a supporting role aimed at “an awakening of the umma.”

This was not the only comment by al-Maqdisi to appear on January 8. A second essay, titled “The Spittle of the Stricken One,” also circulated on Telegram that day, though initially without attribution to al-Maqdisi—indeed with a deliberate attempt to mislead as to his authorship by referring to him in the third person. The writing, however, was unmistakably al-Maqdisi’s, and the attribution was soon clarified when reposted by a follower days later. Here al-Maqdisi presented the current controversy surrounding Hamas as the third “tribulation” (fitna) to afflict the jihadi movement in a series of fitnas beginning with that of the Islamic State (too extreme) and that of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (too lax). He reminded readers of what Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had said about Hamas’s deviations and pointed to his own older statements as well, asserting that Hamas is still Hamas—“a deviant and innovative nationalist group.” “We can take pleasure in their fighting the Jews,” he wrote, “just as we take pleasure in any innovative group’s fighting the Jews, but without endorsing it and deceiving and misleading people concerning its manhaj.” Rehashing many of the criticisms in the previous essay from the same day, al-Maqdisi concluded with the following admonition: “Do not mislead the umma, do not forsake your principles, and do not turn away from your manhaj or corrupt your compass!” These words, one can safely assume, were directed first and foremost at al-Qaida.

Dr. Tariq and al-Qaida’s “end”

Since January, no new writings by al-Maqdisi have appeared online, even as al-Qaida has continued to release statements and essays supportive of Hamas. Al-Maqdisi’s criticisms of al-Qaida, however, continue to circulate and reverberate on jihadi Telegram, and other ideologues of his ilk have made similar al-Qaida-critical comments. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is the Canadian-based Egyptian jihadi ideologue Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim (b. 1948).

In April, Tariq, who holds a Ph.D. in engineering from the University of Birmingham, called attentiom to a statement issued by al-Qaida on April 22 offering condolences for Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau in Qatar, on the death of several of his children and grandchildren in an Israeli strike in Gaza. This statement seemed to be a departure from al-Qaida’s previous stance of distinguishing between Hamas’s political and military wings, as here it was saluting Hamas’s political leader as “the honorable shaykh”—twice.

On April 24, Tariq re-published al-Maqdisi’s essay “The Spittle of the Stricken One” on his Telegram channel, preceded by the words “The statement of the Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” as if to suggest that this was a response to al-Qaida. Minutes later, Tariq offered some critical commentary of his own, lamenting al-Qaida’s descent into ideological disorder and organizational impotence. “There is no doubt that al-Qaida,” he wrote, “following the martyrdom of its two pioneers,” meaning Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, “has passed into a state of manifest instability, confusion, and waywardness, as is perhaps apparent in its recent statement concerning the family members of Ismail Haniyeh who were assassinated by the hand of Zionist treachery.” Without elaborating, he attributed this “drumbeating” by al-Qaida for Hamas to Sayf al-‘Adl’s father-in-law, Mustafa Hamid, whom he described as carrying on close relations with Iran (where he and al-‘Adl both reside) and as the one in control of the al-Sahab media agency. As for al-Qaida’s health as an organization with real-world influence, Tariq offered a grim prognosis: “Perhaps the organization’s role on the ground has come to an end with the demise of its two pioneers.”

Surely al-‘Adl and his colleagues in the al-Qaida leadership see things differently. For them it is the exclusivist ideology promoted by the likes of Tariq and al-Maqdisi that has run its course, not al-Qaida. In the present global environment, which is witnessing an unprecedented spike in anti-American sentiment driven by Washington’s continued support for Israel, the optimal course is to put exclusivist ideology aside and to unite the umma around al-Qaida’s strategy of attacking the United States as the source of the Islamic world’s ills.

Whether al-Qaida is wisely repositioning itself for future success, or whether its self-transformation reflects profound confusion and impotence, is a question that can only be answered in time. The U.S. intelligence community has been adamant that al-Qaida, at least in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is at its weakest point in decades and is unlikely to see a revival. That assessment would seem to support Tariq’s view that al-Qaida central may well have reached its end point as a force on the ground.

In any event, what is clear beyond doubt is that al-Qaida’s pan-Islamic turn has grown increasingly visible since October 7, alienating some of the organization’s big-name scholarly proponents as never before. The controversy over Hamas and al-Qaida points to a crisis of identity on the non-Islamic State side of the global jihadi movement.

During these months of negotiations, al-Libi had been in charge of carrying out the talks with al-Zarqawi and his group on behalf of al-Qa‘ida. Yet, al-Libi still had to report and answer to his two bosses, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. Given that Bin Ladin was particularly difficult to contact at this time, al-Libi turned to al-Zawahiri for guidance during the process, even as he chose to ignore some of al-Zawahiri’s concerns, including the latter’s disapproval of al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda. However, the Libyan would eventually brief Bin Ladin about all the details of the negotiation, including the correspondence with al-Zarqawi’s group, in a message written a day after the merger was proclaimed.

Al-Libi’s letter to Bin Ladin, the most detailed account of the negotiation process that we have, was discussed in the first installment of this series. What remains to be addressed here is the subsequent reactions of the top two al-Qa‘ida leaders, Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri, to the merger. Once again, the Abbottabad files offer insights. On October 20, 2004, al-Zawahiri penned a missive to Bin Ladin—saved as “Risala li-l-Hizbar” (Letter to the Lion) in Bin Ladin’s archives—in which he provided his account of the merger and outlined the internal divisions al-Qa‘ida was facing as it came to terms with al-Zarqawi. Nearly two months later, on December 9, 2004, Bin Ladin responded to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s letters in a message to which he attached several other documents.

Al-Qa‘ida’s Internal Squabbles

In his message to Bin Ladin, Abu al-Faraj al-Libi was clearly concerned by the upcoming dispatch of al-Qa‘ida’s senior military leader, ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, to al-Zarqawi’s group in Iraq. Al-Libi portrayed al-Iraqi as a divisive figure at the heart of “the problems” al-Qa‘ida was going through at the time, noting that some within the Waziristan-based jihadi milieu pointed to al-Iraqi to justify not allying with Bin Ladin’s men. According to al-Libi, these internal tensions had “significantly decreased” with the Egyptian Khalid al-Habib taking over al-Qa‘ida’s military affairs portfolio from al-Iraqi and the popular field commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi joining forces with the organization in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Al-Zawahiri’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin substantiates al-Libi’s account about the organization’s internal squabbles, admitting that “some problems” were persisting within its senior ranks, including with al-Iraqi. “The affairs of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] have been in a state of struggle, as he has admitted to me”, al-Zawahiri writes, pointing to the “problems” and “conflict” between the Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id al-Misri (“al-Qari”), a founding member of al-Qa‘ida who would later become its general manager. “Each of them is complaining to me, but I am far away and all I can do is send letters at infrequent intervals”, al-Zawahiri laments. As is apparent from the letter, al-Iraqi was also quarreling with Hamza al-Jawfi, a senior Egyptian explosives trainer and weapons supplier whose strained relations with al-Iraqi had led him to stop working with al-Qa‘ida. Al-Jawfi, al-Zawahiri explained, “claimed that the problem was with ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi] and that he was waiting for his departure” before going back to the fold. With al-Iraqi’s demotion, al-Jawfi expressed “his commitment” to resuming his cooperation with al-Qa‘ida.

For al-Zawahiri, however, it was al-Libi, not al-Iraqi, who was the primary troublemaker in al-Qa‘ida’s hierarchy. “Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] has been reckless and has exposed himself to hazards repeatedly”, al-Zawahiri wrote to Bin Ladin, adding that al-Libi had “caused a large problem with his continued absence that is nearly constant” as the Libyan “moves about frequently”. Over the past year, al-Libi had been mainly based in Abbottabad inside Pakistan while al-Iraqi and the bulk of al-Qa‘ida’s leaders operated from South Waziristan in Pakistan’s tribal areas. “I emphasized to Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi] that he must stick close to the location of ‘Abd al-Hadi [al-Iraqi]”, al-Zawahiri stated, “because his leaving is dangerous and could lead to numerous problems”. Yet, “neither giving advice nor giving direct orders has diverted him from his path”, he complained. The Libyan’s “continued absence” ended up leaving “affairs and responsibilities unclear” and “things proceeding in an undisciplined manner” inside al-Qa’ida, notably causing the “conflict” between al-Iraqi and Shaykh Sa‘id. “I have exhausted all avenues with Abu al-Faraj [al-Libi]”, al-Zawahiri lamented, urging Bin Ladin to “issue a clear order to him [i.e., al-Libi] that he keep to a reliable location, such as the locations of ‘Abd al-Hadi, and leave the cities”, as staying inside urban Pakistani areas was deemed too dangerous.

Mindful of his lieutenants’ grievances, Bin Ladin authored a seven-page document saved as “al-Shura” (Consultation), which he attached to his December 2004 letter. An updated version of a missive written “a long time ago”, the “al-Shura” document aimed at resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal turmoil by charting a framework regulating command-and-control and duties within the organization. In setting all this out, Bin Ladin firmly stood by his decision to appoint al-Libi as al-Qa‘ida’s “general manager” and reaffirmed his confidence in his young Libyan commander. “I consider you apt to manage the work under these circumstances”, Bin Ladin assured al-Libi, adding that the latter should not be “embarrassed because of the other brothers who had previous experience in the jihad or are older than he is”. Well-aware of the criticism around al-Libi’s leadership, Bin Ladin wanted to make very clear to the “senior brothers” in the Af-Pak region that “the author of these lines [i.e., Bin Ladin] is the one who appointed Tawfiq [i.e., al-Libi] as the overall head for all the al-Qa‘ida brothers”, thereby making al-Libi “the most senior official in the [Af-Pak] area”.

On the other hand, Bin Ladin took al-Zawahiri’s admonishment of al-Libi’s operational security recklessness very seriously. Consequently, the leader of al-Qa‘ida, in one of the attachments to his main letter, directed al-Libi to undertake his activities “using letters and very few couriers” and to “refrain from moving around unless there is a dire need [to do so]”, underlining that this was “an obligatory order and is not subject to discussion”. Further, in his “al-Shura” document, Bin Ladin reminded his Libyan lieutenant that his critics were not nobodies, advising him to “always remember that the respected brothers whose names were mentioned have good past experiences in the jihad”. The al-Qa‘ida leader went on to praise al-Zawahiri as “the cream of the crop of what was left from the mujahidin during these past decades” and instructed al-Libi to “increase your consultation with him and take his opinion, in addition to the fact that he is the deputy of the overall emir”. As for the “virtuous” Shaykh Sa‘id, another player in the group’s discord, Bin Ladin suggested that, “if possible”, al-Libi should “make friends with him, without him trespassing your privileges”. In sum, Bin Ladin wanted al-Libi to play ball for the organization’s sake by getting along with the other leaders. At the same time, Bin Ladin instructed him, “go forward and do not look back and do not hesitate, even if some people would talk [negatively] about you”.

With regard to the contentious case of al al-Iraqi, Bin Ladin weighed in in favor of his detractors, headed by al-Libi, whose complaints had been voiced in the Libyan’s October 2004 letter. First, Bin Ladin validated al-Libi’s decision to demote al-Iraqi as al-Qa‘ida’s military leader. He initially considered replacing the Iraqi with Abu ‘Ubayda al-Misri, a veteran military figure who was then leading al-Qa‘ida’s operations in Kunar, as he was “proven [in our eyes]”, while Khalid al-Habib would become “a trainer or an administrator, assuring the preparations of the brothers”. Eventually though, “we learned you had appointed brother Khalid al-Habib [as] the military emir”, Bin Ladin wrote to al-Libi, essentially endorsing the Libyan’s choice by confirming al-Habib as the new military leader “for a period of a year from his being given the assignment”.

Also, Bin Ladin sided with al-Libi regarding al-Iraqi’s relocation to Iraq. As we saw in the first article in this series, the leader of al-Qa‘ida initially favored dispatching al-Iraqi to Iraq. Yet, he changed his mind after learning that this move was causing concerns and was opposed by numerous top al-Qa‘ida figures, including al-Libi and al-Habib. As a result, Bin Ladin recommended in his December 2004 letter that al-Iraqi “delay his travel at this stage”. Instead, the Iraqi commander should “be assigned the file of al-Tanbul [the short] if that is possible, or whatever you see fit”. “Al-Tanbul” possibly refers to al-Zarqawi, especially given that al-Iraqi continued to work as a liaison to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq after 2004 (more on this in the next installment in this series). 

The Al-Rabi‘a-Al-Zarqawi Nexus

Besides backing al-Libi on the al-Iraqi issue, Bin Ladin also rallied behind the Libyan’s proposal concerning al-Qa‘ida’s external operations. Earlier, al-Libi had recommended to Bin Ladin that the group “transfer the external work department to Iraq” by sending there Hamza al-Rabi‘a, the external wing’s head, or Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, al-Qa‘ida’s best bombmaker, “or both of them”. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin sanctioned the “transfer” of al-Rabi‘a to Iraq. He noted that “it is fine for him to travel alone”, hence implying that he did not see the presence of al-Muhajir as necessary.

Bin Ladin further advised that before traveling al-Rabi‘a should first reach out to and coordinate with al-Zarqawi to obtain “reassurance regarding the security of the road” between Pakistan and Iraq. The leader of al-Qa‘ida also wanted al-Rabi‘a to explain to al-Zarqawi the purpose of the mission at hand, namely to “form an independent apparatus to carry out external operations” from Iraq so as to capitalize on the numerous foreign fighters there who could easily travel abroad to mount these attacks. Al-Rabi‘a was also told that before setting off he ought to brief al-Zarqawi on external operations by sending the latter a message “comprising [information on] our previous experiences in this work”, with a focus on the “conditions necessary to be met” for would-be operatives. In doing so, Bin Ladin reasoned, al-Rabi‘a would not be starting from scratch if he managed to get to Iraq as al-Zarqawi would already be working on global attacks; on the other hand, if al-Rabi‘a were unable to travel, then external plotting would still continue from Iraq.

Bin Ladin attached a document to his December 2004 letter specifying the joint mission on which al-Rabi‘a and al-Zarqawi ought to cooperate. In it, the leader of al-Qa‘ida stipulated that, among their top priorities, the two should focus on planning attacks in the U.S., especially in “the states which elected [George W.] Bush, starting with Florida and Ohio and Texas”. Indeed, Bin Ladin seemed inclined to spare the states that did not vote for Bush, stipulating that there should be “some kind of security [guarantee] for them” and that al-Qa’ida should “issue a special message clarifying their status”. This echoes the conclusion of a public video by Bin Ladin released earlier in October 2004 in which he stated that “every [American] state that doesn’t play with our security has automatically guaranteed its own security”.

Another Abbottabad file indicates that Bin Ladin’s instructions were then communicated to al-Zarqawi. In a draft of a statement entitled “The America Speech”, Bin Ladin refuted the notion that al-Qa‘ida’s international attacks had waned and gloated that the war in Iraq had even strengthened the organization’s “military wing responsible for operations against America”. To further his point, he announced that “we have asked our brother … Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to establish another wing there [i.e., in Iraq], for recruiting those energies qualified to operate against America and its allies”. He went on to threaten that “the best witness of the success of this wing will be the operations undertaken in the capitals of Europe”, mentioning the 7/7 London bombings as the wing’s latest success. Lastly, while Bin Ladin acknowledged that “no operations have occurred in America recently”, he claimed that it was not because of the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts but the “result of some mistakes committed by some of the brothers in Pakistan [who] were discovered by … the apostate Pervez [Musharraf]”. The al-Qa‘ida leader nonetheless warned the U.S.: “what will come to you all is the most bitter thing you will have tasted … And the results will come … when the preparations are completed”.

It is worth noting that Bin Ladin’s December 2004 letter, the attached document threatening the states that voted for Bush and “The America Speech” all corroborate claims by U.S. intelligence back in 2007 that the leader of al-Qa‘ida had asked al-Rabi‘a “to send Zarqawi a briefing on al Qaeda’s external operations, including information about operations against the American homeland”. The same intelligence sources reported that Bin Ladin had also “tasked [al-Zarqawi] with forming a cell to conduct terrorist attacks outside of Iraq” and that he had “emphasized that America should be Zarqawi’s number one priority in terms of foreign attacks”. It is most likely that al-Libi was the one who transmitted Bin Ladin’s directives to al-Zarqawi, as the Libyan is reported to have called on al-Zarqawi “to target U.S. interests outside of Iraq”. The same U.S. intelligence sources added that al-Zarqawi had “welcomed this direction and claimed he had already come up with some good proposals”.

On January 19, 2006, al-Jazira broadcasted a new audio statement from Bin Ladin, who had not been heard in the media for a year. Entitled “A Message to the American People: The Way to End the War”, this message was a heavily edited version of “The America Speech” in which the leader of al-Qa‘ida was far less candid about his group’s planning for international attacks. The public address made no mention of the “external wing” or the nexus with al-Zarqawi in Iraq and instead remarked that “Iraq has become a point of attraction and recruitment for qualified forces”. Bin Ladin also chose not to evoke the “mistakes … of the brothers in Pakistan” to explain al-Qa‘ida’s failure to strike inside the U.S., rephrasing the passage as follows: “As for the delay in the occurrence of similar operations in America, it is not because of the impossibility of penetrating your security arrangements, but rather, operations are in preparation and you shall see them on your own soil when they are completed”. Finally, Bin Ladin did not issue threats against Europe, contenting himself to celebrate the achievements of “the mujahidin … as evidenced by what you have seen in terms of bombings in the capitals of the most important European States”, referring to the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005.

Al-Zawahiri’s “Glad Tidings”

In his October 2004 letter, al-Zawahiri recounted to Bin Ladin that two days earlier, he had heard “the glad tidings” in the media: al-Zarqawi had declared his allegiance to Bin Ladin and “urged the umma to unite against the Crusaders and the Jews”. The news had been reported by newspapers such as al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, al-Quds and Radio America (in Pashto) but was “completely ignored” by the BBC, despite the latter “filling its bulletins with a lot of rubbish!!”, al-Zawahiri fumed.

Al-Zawahiri went on to narrate the negotiation process between al-Qa‘ida and al-Zarqawi’s group, citing details that largely match those of al-Libi’s version. Before the merger, al-Zawahiri wrote, al-Libi had “sent [me] a message about the conditions of Iraq”. The main points of this message were that the “mujahidin” were thriving as they “controlled large areas” of Iraq, were well-resourced and had “hundreds” of recruits coming “from the neighboring countries”; that they were “about to form a unified group” that would include “most of those working on behalf of the jihad”; that they were planning “large-scale operations in neighboring countries”; that they had begun targeting the Shi‘a only after the Badr Corps started attacking “the Sunnis and their scholars”; and that after they had asked to swear allegiance to Bin Ladin, al-Libi told them to go ahead with the oath of allegiance, saying he would reach out to al-Zawahiri “to speed up the matter”. Al-Libi then “requested the approval of Abu Fatima [i.e., al-Zawahiri] with brief directives”, which would be followed by more detailed guidance at a later time.

It is worth noting here that al-Zawahiri’s letter helps to clarify al-Zarqawi’s rationale for joining al-Qa’ida, something which was missing in al-Libi’s letter. In discussing al-Zarqawi’s eagerness to pledge allegiance, al-Zawahiri specified that the Jordanian’s group initially showed “some hesitancy as concerns [Bin Ladin’s] forbearing from fighting the client rulers” but that Bin Ladin’s most recent message had “reassured” them. Although not more explicit, this passage echoes the account of a member of al-Zarqawi’s group who related that al-Zarqawi used to see al-Qa‘ida as “soft” on “the apostate rulers – especially the Saudis – and their armies” and had thus refused to join al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of 9/11, however, Bin Ladin “explicitly declared the obligation to fight [the Saudi regime] in some of his addresses” and “the obstacles preventing the unification … were thereby removed”. It thus appears that it was the post-911 takfiri friendly agenda embraced by al-Qa‘ida that “reassured” al-Zarqawi and prompted him to join forces with an organization he saw as previously not adhering to the “correct” methodology.

Based on his understanding of Bin Ladin’s policy, al-Zawahiri sent a response to al-Libi urging al-Zarqawi’s group to “prepare immediately to announce the bay‘a”. He added that the oath “should not be in the name of a person”, namely al-Zarqawi, but rather on behalf “of the collectivity of the mujahidin in Iraq”. Al-Zawahiri’s message also addressed the scope of jihad for al-Zarqawi’s group: the Jordanian’s men should “stop working against the Shi‘a” and “postpone activity against the client rulers at the present time, so that their efforts are not scattered across two fronts given that we are now in the stage of mobilizing the umma for jihad”. Nonetheless, he added, “confronting the client rulers will eventually come, God willing, and victory will not be achieved without it”. As mentioned earlier, al-Libi withheld some of these instructions from al-Zarqawi’s group. While al-Libi notified Bin Ladin about this, none of the files I’ve reviewed indicates that al-Zawahiri was informed about this.

Bin Ladin’s Guidelines

In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin rejoiced over the news of al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a, saying that it pleased him greatly and describing it as “great and promising”. The leader of al-Qa‘ida urged al-Zawahiri and al-Libi to “pay close attention to this event” as it was “a major step toward unifying the efforts of the mujahidin … not only in Iraq, but in the whole region”. In view of the fact that unity among Muslims is “one of the most obligatory of legal duties”, Bin Ladin wanted his two lieutenants “to ask the brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to urge the other mujahid groups in Iraq and its environs to unite their efforts with him”, adding that al-Zawahiri and Abu al-Layth al-Libi should issue public messages calling for unity among the elements of the Iraqi insurgency. Bin Ladin also suggested publicizing the additions to al-Zarqawi’s group, even the “small” ones, as doing so would “raise the morale of Muslims and increase their interest and support for the mujahidin”. Bin Ladin commented on the rest of the Iraqi insurgency by stating that the Islamic Party and Ansar al-Sunna “should be encouraged and supported” in their operations.

As explained in the first installment in this series, al-Zarqawi and al-Libi wanted Bin Ladin to deliver a public pronouncement endorsing the Jordanian’s group, inciting the militants in Iraq and the Levant to rally behind it and “encourag[ing] the youth there” as they were in the midst of heavy military pressure from the U.S. in Fallujah. Following al-Libi’s and al-Zarqawi’s advice, Bin Ladin recorded an audio addressed to “the Muslim brothers in Iraq in particular and the umma in general” in which he lauded “the free people in the land of al-Anbar, particularly the residents of the heroic city of al-Fallujah” who were giving “an example of steadfastness for others in the face of U.S. barbarism”.

More importantly, the statement formally sanctioned the bay‘a of “the dignified brother” al-Zarqawi and his group. “We, in the al-Qa‘ida organization, warmly welcome their union with us”, Bin Ladin said, emphasizing that “this is a great step toward rendering successful the efforts of the mujahidin to establish [an Islamic state]”. He further stressed that “it should be known that the mujahid brother Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi is the emir of al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Two Rivers [i.e., al-Qa‘ida in Iraq]” and that “the brothers in the group there should heed his orders and obey him”. Bin Ladin also encouraged others in the jihadi landscape in Iraq to come together under al-Zarqawi’s leadership, stating that “the mujahid groups [there] ought to coordinate amongst themselves in order to unite their ranks under one banner”.

Bin Ladin’s audio advocated broad mobilization for fighting in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world where “the Crusader-Zionist coalition” was seeking to subjugate the umma, including Afghanistan and Palestine. “The most important and serious issue today,” he explained, “is this Third World War”. In these circumstances, jihad was an “individual duty” (fard ‘ayn) on every member of the Muslim umma, who “are required to devote of their resources, sons and wealth what is sufficient for fighting the unbelievers and driving them out of their lands”. Adopting a more takfiri rhetoric more in tune with al-Zarqawi’s thinking, Bin Ladin also touched on “a number of the most important and serious legal judgments” concerning those who refrain from supporting this jihad. The first pertained to “those who support the unbelievers against the Muslims”. According to Bin Ladin, “giving support to America or [Ayad] Allawi’s apostate government … in any way whatsoever … is greater unbelief that expels one from the community”. This included “the owners of companies and the workers who transport fuel, ammunition, food supplies and any other needs”. All these “have apostatized from the religion and it is necessary to fight them”. In the same vein, he stated that “those Iraqis … who belong to Allawi’s apostate government, such as members of the Army, the security agencies and the National Guard … their blood is licit”. The second issue was about “participation in the upcoming elections” in Iraq. Given that the Iraqi constitution was “a constitution of unbelief” and that the elections “will be held upon America’s orders”, Bin Ladin maintained that “if anyone participates in [these elections] knowingly and willingly, he will have rejected God”.

In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin had advised that al-Zarqawi’s men “focus [their] operations against the Americans, their allies and the apostate government of Allawi”, arguing that “undoubtedly, they have the right to defend themselves and their brothers against any force wanting to harm them”. Similarly, the audio praised al-Zarqawi’s jihad in Iraq, highlighting the “daring operations against the Americans and Allawi’s apostate government”. Yet, the leader of al-Qa‘ida also argued that the “mujahidin” should “beware the shedding of innocent blood, except for what the law permits, such as in the case of people being used as shields (tatarrus), without going to excess”, a likely reference to the numerous Iraqi civilians killed in jihadi bombings in Iraq. In his December 2004 letter, Bin Ladin also recommended that al-Zarqawi’s group “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”, which is almost certainly a reference to delaying an all-out war against the Shi‘a in Iraq.

Epilogue

In addition to the one on Iraq, Bin Ladin would record an additional audio statement in late 2004 focusing on the Arabian Peninsula. These two files as well as the other documents cited in this article, including Bin Ladin’s operational security directives to al-Libi, were all supposed to be sent together as a response to al-Libi’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages from October 2004. But as another document from the Abbottabad files suggests, Bin Ladin’s effort to reach out to his two deputies failed, at least initially.

This document is a letter addressed to al-Libi (“Wakil Sahib”) signed by a certain “Jaragh al-Din”. Clues from this missive and from al-Libi’s October 2004 letter to Bin Ladin indicate that Jaragh al-Din was part of Bin Ladin’s inner circle, living with or in close proximity to the leader of al-Qa‘ida in Haripur and transmitting the latter’s messages to his aides. In his October 2004 letter, al-Libi asked Bin Ladin “to permit brother Ahmad … to meet with us” so that “we can introduce him to at least one or two new brothers … so that you might benefit from us regarding sending communications”. Al-Libi also told Bin Ladin that “we can take advantage of the meeting to teach the brother some of the new means of encryption that we have”. In his letter to al-Libi, Jaragh al-Din wrote: “as for your request to meet with me, I would love to see you … but the Professor [i.e., Bin Ladin] would like us to arrange the meeting at a later time and also would like the study of encryption … to take place via correspondence”. These excerpts show that Jaragh al-Din and Ahmad were one and the same and that he was part of Bin Ladin’s courier network. Given his profile, it is possible that “Ahmad” is just short for the infamous Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who would end up being killed along with “the Professor” during the Abbottabad raid.

In any event, Jaragh al-Din’s letter to al-Libi reveals that the files Bin Ladin produced in late 2004, from the “al-Shura” document to the audio statements on Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, “were lost with Salih”. Together with a certain “Hassan”, Salih was one of “the two current lines” in al-Qa‘ida’s courier network on the receiving end of the correspondence from Bin Ladin at the time. Although the circumstances of the losses were not explained, in his letter to Bin Ladin al-Libi had warned that “the two current lines” were “overstretched” and “not safe on account of the extent of the demand on them” inside the organization.

Eventually though, Bin Ladin’s files reached their intended recipients. In his December 2004 letter, he notified al-Libi that he wanted the audio about the Arabian Peninsula to be released first, either on December 14 or 15, as there was an unspecified “interest related to this date”. If that was not possible, he continued, then the Iraq audio should be released before the Arabian Peninsula speech. Jaragh al-Din instructed al-Libi to “find a secure path” for “the two audio messages” to be released on “the internet” as “we do not think they will be published in their entirety in the media”. He asked the Libyan to “give a copy of them to al-Zarqawi’s representative if he visits you” so that the “important legal judgments” contained in these “messages” could be disseminated in Iraq.

On December 16, Bin Ladin’s Arabian Peninsula audio address was released on jihadi forums, the same day that anti-monarchy protests were planned in Riyadh and Jeddah at the initiative of the Saudi Islamist Sa‘d al-Faqih. Eleven days later, on December 27, the Iraq audio was released.

Reflections

When al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a to Bin Ladin was announced on October 17, 2004, the communiqué noted that “our most generous brothers in al-Qa‘ida came to understand the strategy of [our group], and their hearts warmed to its methodology”. Here, al-Zarqawi was signaling that, while nominally under Bin Ladin’s leadership, it was his “strategy” and “methodology” that Bin Ladin was agreeing to sign up for, and not the other way around.

The Abbottabad files studied in this series lend credence to the communiqué’s claim. As noted earlier, al-Zarqawi’s willingness to come under Bin Ladin’s leadership appears to have been facilitated, at least in part, by the more avowedly anti-regime stance adopted by al-Qa‘ida in the wake of 9/11. Indeed, it was only when al-Qa‘ida moved away from its “attack the West only” program to include a local component closer to al-Zarqawi’s line of thinking that he agreed to join forces. He likely reasoned that if he were to subordinate himself to al-Qa‘ida, he would not be encumbered by what was before 9/11 al-Qa‘ida’s exclusive focus on the far enemy.

Besides the positive signals in the form of Bin Ladin’s more takfiri statements, al-Zarqawi must have felt even more vindicated when, behind the scenes, al-Libi commended his strategy in Iraq, telling the Jordanian’s envoy that “what al-Zarqawi is doing, i.e., striking the Americans in Iraq and all the apostates who help them” while using “the Iraqi theater to make preparations for neighboring countries in terms of training and arrangements”, was “absolutely correct”. After the meeting where al-Zarqawi’s emissary outlined his group’s vision for Iraq and the region to al-Libi, the latter sent a message to his counterpart in Iraq announcing that al-Zawahiri had accepted the bay‘a and asking al-Zarqawi to present the bay‘a in public.

With all this in mind, it is easy to see why al-Zarqawi would think he had succeeded in bringing al-Qa‘ida on board with his strategic vision. However, the Abbottabad files also show that, despite the positive signals, al-Qa‘ida’s top leaders were not in full agreement with the Jordanian when his bay‘a was first accepted by al-Libi. Bin Ladin was originally keen on keeping al-Zarqawi in check by dispatching a senior figure, al-Iraqi, to Iraq in order to uphold al-Qa‘ida’s true agenda there, namely “the escalation in the resistance to the occupying forces” and “the prevention of the opening of other secondary fronts, such as [against] the Shi’ites”. Al-Zawahiri, for his part, wanted al-Zarqawi’s group to “stop working against the Shi‘a” and to “postpone activity against the client rulers”, which was to form a later stage of jihad. Likewise, al-Libi had notified al-Zarqawi’s emissary that Bin Ladin considered jihad against the Arab regimes “an advanced stage” and that the current priority was “the stage of fighting the greater unbelief (the Americans)”.The Libyan also appeared concerned by the mass-casualty attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a community.

Nevertheless, al-Qa‘ida—or al-Qa‘ida central, as it would soon come to be known—was in no position to strong-arm al-Zarqawi into following its preferred path in Iraq. From the start, al-Zarqawi had made clear that it was up to al-Qa‘ida to embrace his program, telling Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri that “if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner”. In the aftermath of the first battle of Fallujah, the Jordanian had the upper hand in the negotiation as he had become the leading figure in the most important battleground for jihad. By contrast, letters from al-Libi and al-Zawahiri highlight that al-Qa‘ida was then enduring intense military and security pressure in Pakistan as well as internal rifts. The level of strain was such that the planning of external operations had “practically halted” and Bin Ladin had to write a guidance document (the “al-Shura” letter) focused entirely on bringing harmony to the ranks. In this precarious context, the prospect of a merger with al-Zarqawi appeared particularly attractive to al-Qa‘ida, which viewed Iraq as a new El Dorado which could reverse the organization’s fortunes, especially in terms of planning international attacks.

Hence, the concerns of al-Qa‘ida’s leadership, and its divergences, were transmitted in attenuated form or even hidden from al-Zarqawi altogether. The one “warning” to al-Zarqawi against “excess” contained in Bin Ladin’s audio about Iraq was only briefly expressed and came very late in what was otherwise a speech endorsing the Jordanian’s actions. Bin Ladin was not much more assertive in private. He eventually gave up on trying to rein in al-Zarqawi, instructing al-Iraqi to “delay” his journey to Iraq and, instead of confronting the Shi‘a elephant in the room head-on, merely shared his view in his letter to al-Libi and al-Zawahiri that al-Zarqawi’s group should “avoid opening fronts that could be delayed”. Even then, he made sure to qualify his subtle criticism with the expression “the witness sees what the absent one does not see”, in deference to al-Zarqawi and his team. It is telling that while Bin Ladin devoted an entire missive to resolving al-Qa‘ida’s internal disputes (the “al-Shura” letter), his strategic instructions to al-Qa‘ida in Iraq were limited to a six-line paragraph shorter than the one discussing wedding arrangements for his son Khalid”. This somewhat lax approach on the part of Bin Ladin would later be confirmed by al-Zawahiri, who stated in 2006 that while Bin Ladin had instructed the “brothers in Iraq” to “focus their efforts on the Americans and neutralize the rest of the powers as best as they could”, he had still given “them some freedom of movement, telling them that the witness sees what the absent one does not see.”

With regard to al-Zawahiri, although he was the bluntest in criticizing al-Zarqawi’s sectarian agenda internally, his disapproval was purposely concealed from the Jordanian by al-Qa‘ida’s general manager, al-Libi. From the Abbottabad files, the Libyan emerges as the most driven and ambitious of al-Qa‘ida’s top officials in brokering a deal in Iraq, as illustrated by his Iraq-focused October 2004 letter that provided detailed guidance on the topic. Bin Ladin’s and al-Zawahiri’s messages on the matter were rather laconic by contrast. It can be argued that al-Libi’s influence in forging the merger was more significant than either of his two bosses’. Besides his role in brokering the deal with al-Zarqawi’s group, he was also instrumental in convincing Bin Ladin to “delay” the dispatch of al-Iraqi, who was supposed to maintain al-Qa‘ida’s interests in Iraq. Furthermore, determined as he was to expedite the negotiation process and remove any remaining impediments, al-Libi, of his own initiative, accepted al-Zarqawi’s bay‘a on behalf of his bosses even as he withheld some of al-Zawahiri’s opinions from al-Zarqawi.

Although al-Libi’s resourcefulness likely facilitated the positive outcome of the negotiation, it also put al-Qa‘ida central in a precarious position in its relationship with its brand new subsidiary and helped to sow the seeds of the coming discord between the two sides. A union had been proclaimed, but strategic divergences had not been fully resolved—let alone conveyed to Zarqawi’s side. Before the announcement of the bay‘a, al-Libi had asked al-Zarqawi for a “detailed report on your situation”, which al-Libi intended to send to his bosses so that they could make well-informed decisions regarding the course of the Iraqi jihad. The files I have archived do not tell if this “report” was ever sent. In any case, the unresolved issues hidden by al-Libi and ignored by Bin Ladin would remain, proving an enduring source of tension as illustrated by al-Qa‘ida’s endless attempts over the years to “rectify” the policies of its affiliate behind the scenes.

Ultimately, al-Qa‘ida came to fully grasp the negative impact of the leeway granted to its Iraqi subsidiary from the outset. At least al-Zawahiri did. In a letter written to Bin Ladin in January 2011, the Egyptian was still arguing over issues that had been preoccupying him ever since the merger, including attacks against Iraq’s Shi‘a and “opening new fronts, whether inside or outside Iraq”. Another issue was the arrival of a new leader named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose presence was further eroding the already strained relations between al-Qa‘ida central and the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Qa‘ida in Iraq’s latest incarnation. Particularly vocal in his opposition to the Islamic State’s conduct, al-Zawahiri urged Bin Ladin to restrain al-Baghdadi’s men by sending them a message detailing the policies to follow in Iraq. In the past, al-Qa‘ida’s top leadership had postured diplomatically when questioning the actions of its troublesome affiliate, stating, in the case of Bin Ladin, “the witness sees what the absent one does not see,” and, in the case of al-Zawahiri, “I see the picture from afar, and … you see what we do not see”. Now, the same al-Zawahiri was telling Bin Ladin that “I hope that you do not conclude your message with sayings like … ‘the witness sees what the absent one does not see’, as these sayings nullify every directive preceding them”. As the coming divorce between the two groups later showed, al-Zawahiri’s plea for a more assertive approach was too little, too late—if it ever stood a chance in the first place.

Background: jihadism confronts democracy

The Arab Spring uprisings of 2010-11, which saw autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt overthrown, paving the way for temporary democratic experiments in each, posed the initial test for the jihadi movement’s approach to democracy. In a series of message over 2011-13 directed to the people of Egypt, al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri reiterated his opposition to the electoral system, stressing that “democracy is in reality a religion that rests on the sanctification of the will of the majority” and that “we, as Muslims, must reject the political process and elections, except on a foundation of the sovereignty of the Shari‘a.” Nonetheless, he refrained from calling for jihad against Egypt’s elected Islamist president, Mohammed Morsi, stating in April 2013, “I have not called for revolution against Muhammad Morsi. Rather, I have called for the continuation of the blessed revolution that brought us Muhammad Morsi, until the desired change is achieved.” This position represented a tactical toleration of the democratic outcome in Egypt, a departure from the previous al-Qaida position of calling for the overthrow of all the region’s political leaders. A similar approach was taken by the Palestinian-Jordanian jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who from prison in 2013 wrote that it would be “politically stupid to open up battle fronts at this stage” with the newly elected rulers.

This stance was by no means an embrace of democracy, though some in the jihadi movement effectively did end up promoting democracy as a vehicle for change. The most notable example was the Syrian scholar Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who in November 2011 endorsed the Salafi candidate Hazim Salah Abu Isma‘il for president of Egypt, earning him a sharp rebuke from a member of al-Maqdisi’s Shari‘a council.

Al-Qaida’s position on Morsi may have been merely tactical and temporary, but for the ideological purists of the Islamic State it was the sort of wishy-washiness that they were no longer willing to tolerate. As the Islamic State distanced itself from al-Qaida in 2013-14, seeking to distinguish itself as the standard-bearer of a more puritanical version of Jihadi Salafism, it highlighted the issue of democracy, and of Morsi in particular, as a key area of divergence. In one of his more noteworthy audio statements, the Islamic State’s spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani cited al-Qaida’s soft position on Morsi and failure to urge jihad against him as evidence of the group’s deviation. Rejection of democracy tout court became a signature feature of the Islamic State’s messaging. As Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi stated in his mid-2014 sermon following the announcement of the caliphate, “The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement to make that will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy, and uncover its deviant nature.”

While the democratic winds have since subsided in the Arab world, the occasional controversy over democracy still flares with respect to Turkey, where President Erdoğan attracts a certain level of sympathy in jihadi circles. This is because Erdoğan, an Islamist, is seen as better than his political opponents in the more nationalist and secularist opposition. Most jihadis still consider him an apostate for his embrace of democracy and secularism, as well as for contributing forces to the anti-Taliban and anti-al-Shabaab missions in Afghanistan and Somalia, respectively. But they nonetheless tend to see him as preferable to the alternative.

The Turkish presidential elections of 2018 because a source of controversy when Abu Qatada Filastini, a Palestinian-Jordanian jihadi scholar based in Jordan, expressed joy in Erdoğan’s successful election. As he wrote on his Telegram page at the time, in June 2018, “There is no doubt to one possessed of knowledge that [Erdoğan’s] victory is a mercy for the people in Turkey and that the alternatives to him are apostate unbelievers who hate the religion.” His own view, Abu Qatada clarified, was that “the man does not represent me, but I am fond of his triumph over his religion-hating enemies among the leftists, secularists, and nationalists.”

A year earlier, the Islamic State had condemned the idea that one may rejoice in victories for Erdoğan. As an editorial in the group’s weekly newsletter, al-Naba’, stated in July 2017, concerning the outcome of a pro-Erdoğan constitutional referendum, “Naïve people today are rejoicing in the victory of the idol-ruler (taghut) Erdoğan over some of his opponents.” This was a mistake, for rather than choosing one taghut over another, Muslims are required to reject and wage jihad against all of them. Another recent al-Naba’ editorial, from July 2020, reiterated the Islamic State’s opposition to Erdoğan and the folly of participating in the “polytheism of democracy.” The claim that voting for a democratic ruler might bring some benefit is invalid, it said, as the greatest benefit of all is God’s oneness (tawhid), which empowering an apostate like Erdoğan vitiates.

Al-Maqdisi’s “pure milk”

The latest Turkish elections have invited even more controversy than previously, in part because Turkey now plays a key role in sustaining the presence of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former al-Qaida affiliated that rules in northwest Syria. Since late 2017, HTS has cooperated militarily with Turkey, first permitting Turkish troops to establish bases and observation posts in and around Idlib Governorate and then coordinating with them more extensively. The Turkish military presence in the northwest effectively serves to guarantee the HTS statelet’s continued existence. It is unclear whether Erdoğan’s political opponents would maintain this policy, and thus for HTS and its supporters, Erdoğan’s status as Turkey’s ruler is of paramount importance.

For its collaboration with Turkey and for many other perceived transgressions, HTS is viewed as heretical by the Islamic State. But there are also numerous jihadis not aligned with the Islamic State who view HTS unfavorably, accusing it of abandoning the jihadi methodology (manhaj) in making concession after concession to secure its rule. Most of these critical voices are aligned with al-Qaida. One of these is the jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

In January 2022, after Erdoğan announced the upcoming elections in May, al-Maqdisi wasted no time in firing off a warning shot against participation. The next day, on January 23, he published an article on Telegram under the title “Concerning Elections: Leave the Froth and Take the Pure Milk.” The main argument was that God’s oneness (tawhid) requires the believer to disavow and reject all idols (tawaghit, sing. taghut) as God says in Q. 16:36, “Worship you God and eschew taghut.” The elected political leader today is a taghut, or idol-ruler,by virtue of the fact that he rules not by God’s law but by manmade laws and so arrogates to himself God’s divine prerogative regarding legislation. The polytheism (shirk)that he embodies is “the shirk of legislation and rule that assigns partners to God, who legislate for the people that which God did not permit.” While a taghut might exhibit some positive attributes, this does not make it permissible to vote for him. “It is only permissible, O monotheist, to call for dissociation from all forms of shirk and the rejection of all taghuts—for their rejection and not their election.”

Here as elsewhere, al-Maqdisi employed his favorite anti-democracy terms, Islamocrat (islamuqrati) and Islamo-secularist (‘ilmanislami), using these to portray his ideological foes as seeking to corrupt Islam with the polytheistic taint of democracy and secularism. Much of the article is devoted to countering the anticipated arguments of those termed “the shaykhs of Islamocracy and Islamo-secularism,” also described as “the cheerleaders of the taghuts.” The principal argument that he refuted relates to the victory of Byzantium over Persia in the seventh century, which the Qur’an mentions in Surat al-Rum, stating that “on that day the believers shall rejoice.” The argument that some democracy advocates use, al-Maqdisi explained, is that if the Qur’an can celebrate the victory of Christian Byzantium over Zoroastrian Persian, the former being seen as the closer to monotheism, then surely Muslims can cast a vote for the lesser of two evils in an Islamic context. For al-Maqdisi, however, this is wrong, for there is an important distinction to be drawn between rejoicing and supporting. While it is permissible, pursuant to the Qur’anic example, to rejoice in the victory of a more tolerable taghut over a more tyrannical one, it is not permissible to support any taghut’s empowerment by voting for him. “When we warn against participation in elections,” al-Maqdisi wrote, “we are warning against all of them. We are not aligning with a harsh and dictatorial taghut against a gentle and democratic taghut, nor against an Islamocrat like Morsi or Erdoğan.” Choosing between the lesser of two taghuts is not the business of the believer. It is believer’s business to worship God alone and “dissociate from all taghuts—all of them—for shirk and the following of taghuts are not made permissible by any of a taghut’s desirable attributes.”

Al-Mahdi and al-Dhahabi weigh in

Unsurprisingly, it was the supporters of HTS in the jihadosphere who would make the case for voting for Erdoğan. The most outspoken of these was the Syrian scholar and preacher ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahdi, a former member of HTS who would later resign his post, complaining about his inability to thwart HTS’s acts of “oppression.” Despite such criticism, he has remained broadly supportive of HTS and its governance project in the northwest, where he continues to reside, working as a teacher and popular writer. His fatwa channel on Telegram, where he responds to all manner of inquiries, has over 23,000 subscribers.

A recent inquiry, from late April 2023, put to al-Mahdi the following question: “What is the religious judgment (hukm) concerning participation in the elections that will take place in Turkey in the coming month? Is the one who participates in these elections charged with sin, or is there no fault in him?” Al-Mahdi’s response, or fatwa, came a week later in the form of a series of Telegram posts published between May 6 and 11. Al-Mahdi began by noting that Muslim scholars have articulated five positions on the issue of participating in elections, ranging from forbidden and excommunicable to permissible and even obligatory.

Before offering his own take on the matter, he stated that it is first necessary to establish some basic facts about Erdoğan’s challenger and what his victory would entail. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, he said, belongs to the Alawite sect and is a staunch secularist in thrall to “Kemalist ideas.” As the head of the Republican People’s Party founded by Ataturk, Kılıçdaroğlu “always stresses that he will preserve the teachings of Ataturk and his opposition to the Islamization of the state.” As president, he would likely launch a campaign against Islam and Muslims to include banning the hijab, persecuting clerics and preachers, and expelling or imprisoning those who fled the savagery of the Arab regimes. Furthermore, a president Kılıçdaroğlu would withdraw Turkey’s forces from Syria, handing power in the “liberated areas” over to the Asad regime.

Turning to the legal status of participating in elections, al-Mahdi quoted the judgments of the two most prominent Salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia of the late twentieth century, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz and Muhammad ibn ‘Uthaymin, who both approved of participating in elections in certain circumstances. “Most Muslim scholars,” al-Mahdi declared, have thus judged participation to be permissible, “so long as the objective is establishing the Shari‘a, even if as a distant prospect, or minimizing evils and securing benefits to Muslims in their religious or worldly affairs.” He further cited a recent statement signed by dozens of scholars worldwide supporting Erdoğan in the coming election, largely on the grounds of the “great benefit” that his presidency has brought to Muslims in Turkey, including the millions of refugees.

Al-Mahdi concluded by urging his readers not to “hesitate in electing Erdoğan and the members of AKP,” noting that whatever faults or insufficiencies Erdoğan may have when it comes to implementing the Shari‘a, these pale in comparison to what is on offer in his opponent. Implicitly addressing al-Maqdisi, he wrote, “Whosoever deems elections to be forbidden contradicts the great scholars of the Hijaz, Egypt, al-Sham, and the lands of the Arab west and the Islamic east; and he gives no consideration to the principles acknowledged by the consensus of Muslim scholars: ‘the lesser of two evils,’ or ‘the lesser of two harms,’ or ‘the accrual and enlargement of benefits and the aversion of evils.’”

Also adding his voice to the mix at this time was the more obscure figure of Hani Dahab, an Egyptian former associate of HTS who goes by the name “al-Dhahabi” online. In several posts on Telegram, al-Dhahabi likewise advocated the permissibility of participating in the Turkish elections and of voting for Erdoğan. For al-Dhahabi, the heart of the matter was the comparison between the two potential outcomes, and to his mind a Kılıçdaroğlu victory was a far worse scenario than an Erdoğan one. “If the Ataturkists prevail,” he wrote, “then Turkey will return to the era of forbidding the hijab, not to mention the expulsion of the Syrians and every oppositionist who has found in Turkey a place to live … Whosoever deems Erdoğan’s victory as equivalent to his opponent’s knows nothing about the situation in Turkey nor the files related to it, especially that of Syria and the liberated areas.”

Like al-Mahdi, al-Dhahabi defended participating in elections, though unlike the former he appealed to the authority not of mainstream Salafi scholars but of the more fiery ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Tarifi, a Saudi scholar whose views are closer to Jihadi Salafism. (Al-Tarifi was arrested in 2016, shortly after criticizing the Saudi move to disempower the religious police force, and has been imprisoned ever since.) On the matter of voting in elections, al-Tarifi was supportive in the event that some benefit was to be gained. In a Telegram post, al-Dhahabi embedded a video in which al-Tarifi can be heard saying, in response to a question about participating in elections, “If a person is securing a benefit or averting a harm, then this is a permitted matter in which there is no fault.” His approval was limited, however, only to such cases and not to those where the choice is between two equally corrupt options.

Al-Maqdisi would respond to both of these critics in a series of tweets. First, he emphasized the point that the choice in Turkey was not between a candidate who would implement the Shari‘a and one who would not, but rather between one taghut and another. “As for your democratic elections,” he wrote, “they are marked by unbelief, as the choice therein is limited to rulers all of whom will refrain from applying God’s law.” “Be not deceived by the deceptions of the Islamocrats,” he added later, stating that “democracy” in the present case is “patent unbelief and flagrant polytheism.” Erdoğan, he continued, has promised to draft a new “civil constitution,” and “will not those voting for him bear responsibility for this constitution? … We are not partisans of the democratic game. Rather, we draw near to God by dissociating from it and from all those who rule by manmade laws. We are among the followers of the religion of Abraham (millat Ibrahim), which rejects shirk and its adherents and which unifies God in His worship and His sovereignty.” In another comment, al-Maqdisi described his opponents as “the Islamocrat scholars and the jihadi Murji’ites [i.e., those unduly tolerant in creedal matters],” claiming that they “wish to portray the struggle between the gentle secularist Erdoğan and his harsher secularist opponent as a struggle between Islam and unbelief, and in this they have deceived Muslims … If they had [merely] wished for Erdoğan’s victory without distorting facts and deceiving Muslims, I would not have criticized them. No one who is knowledgeable wishes for the victory of the more wicked.”

Evidently, al-Maqdisi himself saw an Erdoğan victory as preferable, even if he was unwilling to say so explicitly. In a reply, al-Dhahabi sought to make al-Maqdisi’s position clearer, writing that “anyone who indicates to you his lack of interest in the Turkish elections … writing for you at length about the judgment concerning elections and God’s sovereignty, [matters] about which there is no dispute … is in reality, between himself, wishing for his victory.” For al-Dhahabi, al-Maqdisi’s position was self-contradictory. Like his opponents, al-Maqdisi was hoping for an Erdoğan victory, but he simultaneously opposed any act that might help to bring that victory about.

Abu Qatada’s intervention

Al-Maqdisi’s attacks on al-Mahdi and al-Dhahabi soon elicited a response from Abu Qatada al-Filastini, al-Maqdisi’s rival in Jordan’s jihadi milieu, in the form of a Telegraph post on May 18. In recent years, Abu Qatada has split with al-Maqdisi on a range of issues, advocating a more pan-Islamist vision of jihadism that includes support for HTS. He would continue in that spirit here, implicitly criticizing al-Maqdisi (never mentioned by name) for too severely condemning his opponents and for questioning their adherence to monotheism (tawhid). Abu Qatada’s main point was that al-Maqdisi was wrong to make the dispute over elections a creedal matter as opposed to a legal one admitting of more than one acceptable view. As he wrote, “The dispute between two Muslims over the issue of legislative and presidential elections is not a dispute over the oneness of God’s lordship (tawhid al-uluhiyya),over the fact that God is the All-Ruling who possesses the right of deeming what is permissible and what is forbidden, the right of legislation.” Anyone who rejects this, in part or in full, stated Abu Qatada, is not a Muslim. However, a Muslim jurist seeking to derive a judgment on the matter of elections should be able to do so without having his tawhid thrown into question. “This is his ijtihad, and he might judge rightly and he might err,” meaning that if he errs he will still be rewarded for his sincere effort. To make the matter about tawhid, which is a creedal issue,is to put forth “a false conception of the dispute” that will inevitably lead to pronouncements of takfir.

The next day al-Maqdisi responded on Twitter, defending himself and accusing Abu Qatada (though not by name) of “seeking to sugarcoat the wicked fatwas that permit” participation in elections. The election of a person such as Erdoğan, who “embraces secularism” and has pledged to rule in accordance with “a liberal constitution,” is undoubtedly “a matter connected to tawhid al-uluhiyya.” A person can believe that God has the sole right of legislation, but that does not absolve him of stripping God of that right by issuing a fatwa permitting a vote for him. This is a “violation of tawhid.” “Whosoever issues a fatwa on behalf of electing an unbelieving, secularist ruler who refrains from ruling by the Shari‘a, who shows loyalty to unbelieving apostates, and who gives support to them against the Muslims in Somalia and elsewhere, on the grounds that in doing so he is averting the greater evil by tolerating the lesser evil, is not in reality calling for the toleration of the lesser evil; rather, he is calling for its election … And thus the fatwa is connected to tawhid even if they deny it.”

Following the exchange, one of al-Maqdisi’s allies, the Canada-based Egyptian scholar Tariq ‘Abd al-Halim, chimed in on Telegram, ridiculing Abu Qatada for making an argument so patently at odds with the basic principle of Jihadi Salafi thought. “The matter of electing someone who will rule by other than what God has revealed,” he wrote, “is not a jurisprudential matter over which jurists debate and in which creed has no place! It is a creedal matter that the right of legislation belongs to God alone, and whosoever grants it to other than God, in part or in full, has disbelieved as a matter of consensus.” ‘Abd al-Halim followed up in another post by quoting from an old essay of Abu Qatada’s condemning democracy as polytheism, asking how the methodology (madhhab) on display there can be reconciled with what he is displaying today.

This sentiment al-Maqdisi seemed to approve of, though he would also seek to defend Abu Qatada against accusations that took the criticism too far. On June 1, a certain jihadi tweeted a montage showing Abu Qatada together with a group of “Islamocrat” scholars, to which al-Maqdisi responded by saying: “It is unjust to place Shaykh Abu Qatada together with the Islamocrats. Fear you God. However much we might disagree with people it is still obligatory to be just with them. Were you to say that Abu Qatada defends some of the Islamocrat shaykhs and excuses them,” that would be acceptable, but depicting him together with such people is “wrong and we condemn it.”

Rejoicing in Erdoğan’s victory

For all the contretemps between al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada, their reactions to Erdoğan’s victory on May 28 would be quite similar. This was to express delight in Erdoğan’s triumph in light of the perceived benefits that it would bring for the Muslims of Turkey and beyond. Abu Qatada’s Twitter account reposted his reaction to Erdoğan’s win from five years earlier, in which he had written, “There is no doubt to one possessed of knowledge that [Erdoğan’s] victory is a mercy for the people in Turkey and that the alternatives to him are apostate unbelievers who hate the religion.” This included, however, the qualifying statement that “the man does not represent me.” In a similar vein, al-Maqdisi responded to the outcome by stating, “Praise be to God who averted from our brothers in Turkey the worse and more severe in enmity to Islam and Muslims.” Yet he also made sure to reiterate his negative view of Erdoğan and democracy, adding, “And we ask God to provide [the Turks] with someone who will rule by God’s law and annul secularism and positive laws. And we congratulate our brothers, the proponents of tawhid who did not participate in the 2023 Turkish elections, on their resolve in adhering to truth and not succumbing to the fatwas of the Islamocrat shaykhs.”

The response to Erdoğan’s victory from those labeled the “Islamocrats” was naturally more enthusiastic. Al-Mahdi wrote on Telegram, “We congratulate the Turkish people on the victory of President Recep Tayyib Erdoğan … And we ask God to grant success to President Erdoğan in what will bring benefit to the land and to the Muslims.” Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, one of the top leaders in HTS, likewise congratulated the Turkish people in a Tweet, imploring God to “grant President Erdoğan success and to distance him from the Alawite criminal [i.e., Bashar al-Asad] who has killed the Sunni Muslims of al-Sham.” His colleague in HTS, the cleric Mazhar al-Ways, also conveyed his congratulations to the Turkish people, as did HTS itself in a statement released by its Department of Political Affairs. Notably, these statements were not qualified by the reservations expressed by al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada.

A range of views

What this dispute over the Turkish elections shows is that the jihadi movement today admits of a range of views on the issue of democracy in Turkey. The most extreme position is that held by the Islamic State, which considers Turkey’s democracy to be shirk, rejects the validity of any opinion permitting participation, and opposes the idea that Muslims may rejoice in Erdoğan’s victory. The next most extreme is that held by al-Maqdisi, who considers Turkey’s democracy to be shirk and rejects the validity of any opinion permitting participation but accepts that Muslims may rejoice in Erdoğan’s victory. Next down the line is the position held by Abu Qatada, who considers Turkey’s democracy to be shirk but accepts the validity an opinion permitting participation and accepts that Muslims can rejoice in Erdoğan’s victory. After this is the position of the so-called “Islamocrats,” such al-Mahdi and the followers of HTS, who consider Turkey’s democracy to be shirk (at least in theory) but who themselves permit participation and even in some cases call for it. These are four distinct, if overlapping, opinions, and one could surely identify further distinctions and nuances by looking more closely.

The ideological confusion in the jihadis’ approach to this issue is further evidence of the movement’s fractured state at the present time. While the main division in the movement runs through the Islamic State and al-Qaida, there is a broader spectrum of opinion than the two-camp picture suggests. Religious authority in the movement is increasingly diffuse. While many subscribe to the Islamic State’s every word, those in the al-Qaida camp tend to revere al-Maqdisi’s views or Abu Qatada’s or those of another scholar or leader. As time goes on, it becomes harder and harder to locate the ideological center of gravity that gives this movement coherence and a sense of common purpose and identity.

In these addresses, Jawlani mixes themes that he previously spoke on, while adding new details about recent achievements from HTS’s perspective and potential plans to better develop HTS-controlled territory.

The State-Building Project

Jawlani continues to focus on the importance of state-building. He notes the many successes from his perspective in building institutions, but stresses that these efforts must continue: “We have to always think that we need to build more … and organize more.” Even though HTS does not believe in liberal democracy or popular sovereignty, Jawlani tries to frame the state-building project as inherently a population-wide effort. As he puts it in his address to the Idlib notables: “We are all one institution, we all have authority, we are all the people.” This is why “the Salvation Government is a very important stage in the history of the Syrian revolution,” according to Jawlani in his address to the SSG ministers.

Jawlani focuses on the need for there to be a middle ground between total government assistance and constant cycles of chaos for people. He explains in his address to the notables of Jisr al-Shughur that “we are trying to build a society that can live by itself and can protect itself.” He likewise states in the inauguration of the project to deliver water to Sahl al-Rouj that he sees anything else as a “flawed condition”: “As for relying only on assistance or extorting people here for assistance or international negotiations that take place for the sake of some first aid baskets or some milk cartons to reach the liberated areas, this is frankly a kind of humiliation for the Syrian people.” Therefore, there is a need to build greater self-sufficiency. To do this, Jawlani outlines in his addresses what amounts to a three-pronged development plan concentrating on agriculture, industry, and public services.

Agriculture

Jawlani discusses the need to further increase irrigation efforts, which he sees as the biggest barrier to increasing agricultural production. Thus, as Jawlani explains at the dedication of the Sahl al-Rouj water project, there should be a three-stage plan to improve agriculture. First, the “agricultural plan should be integrated between the almanac set by the Ministry of Agriculture and the farming brother.” In other words, farmers should more efficiently take advantage of the seasons to achieve food security. Second, an interconnected local agricultural industry should be developed. And third, there should be exporting to the outside world so that local farmers can take advantage of the global economy. In this way, according to Jawlani, the needs of local residents, the agricultural industry, and the outside market will be met.

Industry

Jawlani notes in his address to the notables of Idlib that Idlib in general lacks an industrial sector compared to, for example, Aleppo. He stresses that there should be “uncomplicated laws” to allow for industrial development with support for local production. As Jawlani explains, creating a conducive environment for industry should be realized through development of technical services, electricity, real estate management, chambers of commerce, and the like. HTS has made such strides in this direction that now if someone wants to build an industrial site, said person only requires three or four days to acquire all the necessary permits. The end goal is that “we must get to the stage in the liberated areas where the rate of exports is greater than the rate of imports,” whereas right now these areas import more than they export by a proportion of around two-thirds. The goal should be first to achieve an export-import balance and then for exports to exceed imports.

Public Services

According to Jawlani, right now HTS and the SSG are focused on providing basic necessities such as street cleaning, electricity, water, and trash. On top of this, they are attempting to assist with things that the industrial and agricultural markets need to better thrive.

During his speeches, Jawlani touts some recent achievements. For example, in his address to the Idlib notables, he claims that during the past year more than 110,000 homes, businesses, and industrial and agricultural sites have been supplied with electricity, which he proclaims to be a big and speedy accomplishment. Likewise, Jawlani admits that the Ministry of Agriculture lacks resources, yet says that because of “cooperation” between farmers, the SSG, and the Ministry, they were able to increase the volume of domestic consumption from 30% to 40%, which he considers to be a good level. From Jawlani’s perspective, the inauguration of the new water pumping system from Ain al-Zarqa to Sahel al-Rouj will add new water that can increase productivity.

Open Dialogue, But Not Free Speech

In his various addresses, Jawlani gives the impression of holding open meetings where everyone can discuss issues and raise problems so that they can be rectified. Thus, in the Jisr al-Shughur meeting, two individuals are featured complaining about the services in the area, such as roads and electricity. One of these goes so far as to say, “[we are] deprived of many services,” arguing that these problems must be rectified to make sure that the “sons [of this area] cling to its soil.” Yet despite this pretense of open criticism and debate, one should bear in mind the number of activists against HTS rule who are either dead or imprisoned because of their outspokenness regarding the failures or inadequacies of HTS’s regime. While HTS may be tolerant of individuals submitting complaints through proper channels to their local officials and the SSG about something not so political like provision of electricity, the same is not the case for people airing grievances openly on social media or to outside media (as opposed to HTS-friendly/approved media) on topics the group might deem more sensitive and potentially “disruptive to public security” (e.g., foreigners living in confiscated homes and causing issues for local inhabitants).

A Ministry of Defense?

In his address to the notables of Idlib, Jawlani refers to the HTS-led military operations room that organizes the military efforts of most of the factions in Idlib. He also highlights the project of the “Military College” that is supervised by “the best of the defecting officers present in the liberated areas.” This college, according to Jawlani, could “perhaps” become the nucleus of a future “Ministry of Defense” with an organized structure that would allow for a departure from the faction model of military organization. Time will tell if this is an avenue whereby HTS as an entity (as well as other groups) subsumes its current infrastructure into such an entity. If this were to happen, from a policy perspective, it would further weaken the case for HTS being designated as a terrorist group, since it would no longer be a separate group but officially a part of the SSG.    

Expanding the HTS State?

Jawlani and other leaders in HTS continue to repeat the claim that their ultimate goal is to liberate Damascus, alongside all the other key cities like Aleppo and Hama. But what’s new this time is that Jawlani notes that their institutions would be ready to expand once HTS gains new territory. This is because in contrast to the regime, HTS wants people “who are liberated to feel that there is a big difference in their lives in terms of security, education, health, agriculture, economic and all parts of life.” While focused on the ultimate prize of Damascus, this could also be an indirect point about rumors that HTS wants to take over territory from its rival in the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in northern Aleppo province (the area spanning Afrin to Jarabulus).

Some Progress, But Continued Limitations

Based on Jawlani’s meetings, it is clear that HTS strives to make progress in and mature its state-building project capabilities. In particular, the group seeks to develop local industries, open up local markets to the global economy, and perhaps create a Ministry of Defense. Yet there are four issues that will likely continue to give pause to those in the U.S. government who may consider it worthwhile to engage with HTS: (1) HTS’s treatment of minorities in its territory; (2) its top ideologues’ eagerness to eulogize Ayman al-Zawahiri after his death; (3) its public displays of support for the terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad during its recent rocket campaign against civilians in Israel; and (4) the continued presence in HTS territory of terrorist-designated foreign fighter-run organizations.

One of the themes that Jawlani reiterates again in these meetings is that “we have borne the burdens of very long years, we have borne the burdens of 100 years of oppression, humiliation, regression, decline and the like.” The Islamic ummah, he explains in the address to the notables of Idlib, has never faced oppression like the oppression it has faced in the past 100 years, facing threats to its identity besides mere division of political power. This is one of the reasons why, as Jawlani states in his address to the SSG ministers, “the project in the liberated areas is no longer merely a revolution against oppression and tyranny but rather it has transformed into building a Sunni entity, because Sunnis are facing an existential danger in Syria.” There is no doubt that the Assad regime has run a sectarian regime for 50-plus years, which has harmed the majority Sunni population.

Yet in light of HTS’s own sectarian Sunni identity, it is important to temper expectations when Jawlani meets with Christian or Druze notables. The latter were forced many years ago (when HTS was Jabhat al-Nusrah) to renounce their faith and declare conversion to Sunni Islam, and this policy of forced conversion has not changed. Moreover, the original Druze inhabitants still have many grievances over confiscation of homes and inheritance rights and face the risk of being targeted for harassment and even killing at the hands of more hardline jihadis in northwest Syria who consider them “disbelievers,” not accepting the idea of their conversion to Sunni Islam. While the Christians are not accorded the dhimmi status of second-class citizenship for Jews and Christians in a classical Islamic state and are instead given the status of musta’min (i.e. treated as though they have temporary residence with no obligation during that time to pay the poll tax levied on dhimmis), their status is still very much subordinate and based on accepting Sunni Muslim rule and domination.

As for the latter two issues, top HTS leaders and ideologues like ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Atun and Abu Mariya al-Qahtani put out messages of condolences following the U.S. drone strike that killed al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. ‘Atun described Zawahiri as “a man who lived for his religion, fought, resisted, and struggled in its path for half a century or more,” and expressed hope that he would be “grant[ed] the highest paradise with the prophets.” This was more a case of these ideologues showing respect for a fellow jihadi in the trenches than a sign that HTS might be coming home to al-Qaida. Indeed, al-Qahtani recently called on al-Qaida’s branches to dissolve the organization, in particular urging al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula to “break their external tie,” recalling how HTS came to break off from al-Qaida. Nevertheless, these statements highlight problematic aspects of HTS’s political and ideological orientation, illustrating its sympathies with jihadism and Islamic militancy outside of Syria. This is especially noteworthy in light of HTS’s claims to want to be taken off the U.S. terrorism lists. Likewise, HTS’s Manarat al-Huda Da‘wa Center posted moral support a number of times for Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s rocket campaign against Israeli civilian targets, putting out a graphic with the slogan, “We are all Gaza’s arrows on the Jews.” Finally, the territory that HTS controls is one where other terrorist designated groups affiliated with HTS operate, such as Jama‘at Ansar al-Islam, Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, and Katibat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, as well as non-designated foreign fighter groups.

HTS continues to have what are certainly unpalatable characteristics from a Western perspective. This is likely why Jawlani, in one of his speeches, urged people in HTS-controlled territory to be strong in the face of the West, even if the West does not cooperate. Based on Jawlani’s and HTS’s continued actions, it is clear that he wants to garner legitimacy without having to actually give up on the hardest aspects of his group’s ideology. This is HTS’s conundrum. For until it demonstrates a pronounced shift away from sympathies with jihadi and Islamist militant causes inside and outside of Syria and a willingness to improve the lot of minorities in its territory, it will remain in its current predicament, unable to realize its lofty plans to make its territory a sustainable and vibrant entity.

The advice, or nasiha, was not received well in al-Qaida circles. Several critics of the nasiha wrote at length against it, castigating its author as an ignoramus and dismissing his arguments as unfounded. Two of these authors purport to be members of al-Qaida. The exchange is worth considering, as Abu Mariya is no stranger to the inner workings of al-Qaida—he belonged to it for more than a decade—and the advice he offered clearly struck a nerve. It may well shed light on the still murky future of the group after al-Zawahiri.

Abu Mariya’s journey

Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, whose real name is Muyassar ibn ‘Ali al-Juburi, was born in the town of al-Rasif outside Mosul, Iraq in June 1976, and soon after moved to the nearby town of Harara, where he grew up (hence the occasional nickname al-Harari). His studies ultimately took him to the University of Baghdad, where he obtained a diploma in management and bachelor’s degree in Islamic law. While it has been said that he served in the Iraqi police and volunteered in the Fedayeen Saddam, he has denied these claims as enemy propaganda. What is clear, at any rate, is that Abu Mariya has been a committed jihadi since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and that his religious education prepared him for senior positions in the insurgency and beyond.

According to what appears to be the most reliable biography of the man, upon the U.S. invasion, Abu Mariya did not hesitate to join the jihadi opposition, fighting in the ranks of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaida in Iraq in its first incarnation as Jama‘at al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad. After participating in battles in Falluja, Tal ‘Afar, Mosul, and elsewhere, he was injured in a U.S. raid outside Mosul in 2004, and thereafter was imprisoned for a year and a half. After his release in 2006, he was appointed al-Qaida in Iraq’s general Shari‘a official for the western Mosul area and the chief official for tribal relations. Following the announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006, he became the head of the ministry of commanding right and forbidding wrong and a member of the Shari‘a council of Nineveh Province. The next year, in 2007, he was captured again during a U.S. raid in west Mosul, and this time was sentenced to four years in prison.

Upon his second release, in 2011, he was offered senior positions with the Islamic State of Iraq, but instead chose to head to Syria, seeking to bolster the opposition to the regime of Bashar al-Asad. He soon linked up with Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, a Syrian commander in the Islamic State of Iraq whom Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had sent to Syria to form an Islamic State of Iraq cell that became known as Jabhat al-Nusra. (According to other accounts, Abu Mariya went to Syria together with al-Jawlani.) With the approval of the leadership back in Iraq, Abu Mariya quickly became a key leader in the new Syrian group. Al-Jawlani appointed him Jabhat al-Nusra’s general Shari‘a official and gave him command of the group’s operations in the eastern provinces of Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, and al-Hasaka. During this time he was involved in the kidnapping and ransoming of American hostages, including the journalist Theo Padnos. In later 2014, he would cede the position of chief Shari‘a official to the Jordanian Sami al-‘Uraydi and relocate to Dar‘a in southern Syria. From there he eventually made his way to Idlib, joining the rest of Jabhat al-Nusra’s leadership in its northwestern stronghold. He stayed with the group all the way through its transformation into HTS, and remains one of al-Jawlani’s top lieutenants.

Abu Mariya is often presented by HTS’s followers as a religious scholar (‘alim, shaykh), but first and foremost he is a commander and operator—more man of action than scholar, and certainly not a poet. That being said, in the period between 2014 and 2015, he played a leading role as an ideologue making the case against the “extremists” of the Islamic State. So instrumental was he in this role that he earned the moniker “subduer of the Kharijites” (qahir al-khawarij). In numerous essays and audio statements, he cast the Islamic State as “the Kharijites of this age,” aggressively attacking the group for pronouncing takfir on Muslims and spilling Muslim blood. The only way to liberate Syria from the yoke of the “criminal Nusayri regime,” he said in one address in 2014, is first “to excise this evil sickness … to uproot the wicked tree of extremism,” and that could only be done by the sword. In a subsequent essay, he faulted certain unnamed jihadi leaders and scholars for failing to condemn extremists and their criminal acts, such as mass casualty bombings in markets and excess in takfir. For his role in ceaselessly condemning the Islamic State, the group’s “al-Khayr” province in Deir al-Zour released a video in 2017 showing him unmasked. The description reads: “the traitor apostate Muyassar al-Harari.”

While appearing as a loyal member of al-Qaida in these messages, Abu Mariya did not shy away from criticizing al-Qaida and its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In a series of tweets in April 2015, for instance, he urged al-Zawahiri to take a harder line on the Islamic State, calling on him to carry out “your duty to save your people in al-Sham” by condemning the extremists who had sullied al-Qaida’s name. In a subsequent Twitter thread, in September 2015, he complained that al-Zawahiri was sowing confusion by seeming to portray the Islamic State as mujahidin, not Kharijites. “Among the group’s mistakes,” he wrote in another series of tweets in June 2015, speaking of al-Qaida, “is that it did not dissociate from extremists … people who do not espouse the thought of al-Qaida and Shaykh ‘Atiyya,” referring to ‘Atiyyatallah al-Libi, a senior al-Qaida commander and scholar who was killed in Waziristan in 2011. Abu Mariya was indeed fond of ‘Atiyya, considering him the repository of al-Qaida’s true manhaj, or methodology, one that embraced the principles of pragmatism and restraint in takfir. As he wrote in an introduction to ‘Atiyya’s four volumes of collected works, published in 2015, “the school of Shaykh ‘Atiyyatallah al-Libi is the true school and the true thought of the Qa‘idat al-Jihad organization,” a school and a thought completely at odds with “the Iraqi ISIS school that has produced extremism and ignorance … and has destroyed all the theaters of jihad.”

One can perhaps see in Abu Mariya’s early frustrations with al-Qaida’s leadership the seeds of his later conclusion that the group’s time has passed. Abu Mariya was among the leaders most adamant that Jabhat al-Nusra separate from al-Qaida, as it did between 2016 and 2017, eventually becoming HTS. As early as April 2015, he defended the idea of breaking ties as a theoretical possibility. After the separation was completed, in early 2017, an unnamed Shari‘a official in HTS commented on the development to an Arabic news outlet, saying that al-Qaida’s days were numbered. “Sayf al-‘Adl is a prisoner in Iran,” he said, “and al-Zawahiri is in another world” (i.e., in a world of his own). “Al-Qaida has come to an end,” he concluded. According to one source, the unnamed official was Abu Mariya al-Qahtani. There is every reason to believe it was.

Abu Mariya’s nasiha

While Abu Mariya may have told a journalist that “al-Qaida is over” back in 2017, he would refrain from publicly criticizing the group for the next several years, even as he led the charge against the al-Qaida loyalists who remained in Syria. The death of al-Zawahiri last month appears to have changed his calculus, prompting him to write the controversial nasiha.

Abu Mariya’s nasiha appeared on his Telegram channel (which has more than 100,000 followers) on August 15, two weeks after al-Zawahiri’s death. The nasiha has two parts The first is a brief note to the membership of Muslim Brotherhood, calling on them to dissolve the organization given its history of disappointment and failure. The second, which is much longer, is directed to the branches of al-Qaida (see my full translation below). “[M]y advice to the branches of al-Qaida,” he wrote in this second part, “is to dissolve the al-Qaida organization and to remove the pretext for the states that have come to treat al-Qaida as a scapegoat.” In what follows, Abu Mariya develops two principal arguments for why this step is necessary. The first relates to the problem of succession, the second to general strategy.

The main challenge with regard to succession, according to Abu Mariya, is that Sayf al-‘Adl, the presumptive next in line, is based in Iran. In fact, Abu Mariya claims, al-‘Adl is “imprisoned” there, living “under confinement and coercion.” “How can Sayf al-‘Adl,” he writes, “who is a man imprisoned, manage the affiliates of al-Qaida?!!” “The idea of giving command to one who is impotent is untenable,” he continues. “Has our condition became like that of the Rejectionists who give allegiance (bay‘a) to one who is absent? We seek refuge in God from ignorance and disappointment.” Even if al-‘Adl were able to succeed al-Zawahiri, there remained the question of his track record as a leader. In Abu Mariya’s view, al-‘Adl’s record in trying to influence events in Syria was abysmal: “We witnessed in al-Sham what Sayf al-‘Adl achieved in terms of tribulations and affairs whose victims could not have imagined the outcome.”

The second reason for dissolving al-Qaida has to do with what Abu Mariya sees as the optimal strategy for jihadi groups in the “stage through which the umma and its peoples are passing.” For Abu Mariya, this is a stage that requires greater cooperation with neighboring states and peoples in the Arab Middle East, particularly Sunni Arab states and peoples, so as to be able confront the growing threat of Iran. “The Islamic umma,” he writes,“must stand together and form an alliance against the Iranian occupation that has taken hold of a number of Arab Muslim capitals and is threatening others.” The affiliates’ connection to al-Qaida stands in the way of this, providing these states with a “pretext” for attacking them and making cooperation impossible. He highlights in particular the case of the affiliate in Yemen, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which he says ought to “concentrate on confronting the Iranian project, announce the sundering of their ties to foreign entities, revise their internal and external polices, address the world and the people of Yemen in a new way, and save our Sunni people in Yemen who have been exhausted by wars and afflicted by the firepower of Iran.” Yet if “they continue to have an association with al-Qaida, it will weaken their position against the Houthis who are one of the arms of Iran—where Sayf al-‘Adl is living under confinement.”

While Abu Mariya refrains from saying so here, the path that he proposes is largely the path taken by HTS, which cut ties with al-Qaida in 2016-17 and has since increased its cooperation with neighboring states, particularly Turkey. What Abu Mariya is calling for, in other words, is for the affiliates of al-Qaida to heed the HTS model.

Reactions to the nasiha

The response to Abu Mariya’s nasiha from members and supporters of al-Qaida was swift and severe. On Twitter, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Palestinian-Jordanian scholar with a wide following in pro-al-Qaida circles, emphasized that these proposals were coming from “a senior personality in HTS,” which made clear that HTS’s breaking of ties with al-Qaida was no mere organizational dispute but rather a sign of ideological backsliding. No comment was forthcoming from al-Maqdisi’s ideological rival, Abu Qatada al-Filastini, a fellow Palestinian-Jordanian scholar known for his support for HTS and its strategy of appealing to the broader umma, though one of Abu Qatada’s students, the London-based Abu Mahmud al-Filastini, was quick to chime in. In a Telegram post, Abu Mahmud praised the nasiha, noting that he had been calling for the same thing for more than two years. “Al-Qaida is not Islam,” he wrote, “and therefore parting ways from al-Qaida, either organizationally or ideologically, is not unbelief or deviation. Indeed, whosoever contemplates reality and truly seeks to support Muslims will find that parting with the name [of al-Qaida] and severing ties [with it] are a binding obligation.”

With the exception of Abu Mahmud, the loudest and most vociferous voices have been those keen on defending al-Qaida. Three refutations of the nasiha in particular may be noted here. All are by pseudonymous authors and were disseminated on Telegram channels associated with al-Qaida.

The first, published the same day as the nasiha and titled “Advice to a Deceived Adviser,” is signed by a certain ‘Adil Amin, who identifies himself as “a soldier from the army of al-Qaida.” The gist of the refutation is that Abu Mariya is someone with a questionable past who is totally unqualified to advise the mujahidin of al-Qaida’s branches, and that the advice he proffers—rescinding the bay‘a to al-Qaida and instead drawing close to the idolatrous rulers (tawaghit) of regional states—is based on “ignorance and malice.” The key to everything Abu Mariya proposes, Amin states, is the distinction between two methodologies (manhajayn): the manhaj of al-Qaida, “firm and unwavering”, and the manhaj of Abu Mariya’s HTS, “updated and pragmatic.” Abu Mariya is effectively calling on the branches of al-Qaida to follow the HTS model of abandoning global jihad and collaborating with secular states such as Turkey, even though this model has not proved successful and could blow up at any moment. Amin mentions recent reports of a potential rapprochement between Turkey and Damascus as evidence that the HTS project is vulnerable. Contrary to what Abu Mariya supposes, Amin continues, al-Qaida is not in decline but rather is “spreading and becoming stronger.” The notion “that al-Qaida has been weakened” is refuted by “Western analytical reports themselves … [which] recognize that the disbanding of al-Qaida has become impossible, as it is firmly established and is more dangerous than ISIS.” For all these reasons, Amin concludes, the bay‘a to al-Qaida is “a badge of honor.” It is “the pragmatists,” not al-Qaida, who ought to be dispensed with. Amin plays down the issue of Sayf al-‘Adl’s presence in Iran, noting that al-Zawahiri’s death has not yet been confirmed.

The second refutation, which appeared on Telegram on August 16, was written by a certain Jalal ibn Hamdan, who reveals himself to be a member of AQAP. Ibn Hamdan makes many of the same points as Amin, including that the success of HTS’s “true model” is illusory. The HTS project, he notes, has involved internecine warfare and the shameful hosting of Turkish and Russian security patrols. Furthermore, the area under HTS control is miniscule compared to the area controlled by al-Shabaab in Somalia, a loyal al-Qaida affiliate. Then there is the matter of the about-face Abu Mariya is calling for. How, Ibn Hamdan asks, can a group like AQAP, which has warned against the tawaghit and foreign powers for years, suddenly change course and endorse collaboration with them? To do so would be “the epitome of hypocrisy.” Abu Mariya’s nasiha is an appeal to “abandon values and principles in order to achieve imaginary benefits.” As far as Yemen is concerned, Ibn Hamdan goes on, Abu Mariya knows not of what he speaks, as certain Yemeni groups have adopted the approach he is advocating only to be used and betrayed. As regards Sayf al-‘Adl, Ibn Hamdan relates with pride how his group took hostage an Iranian diplomat and (in 2015) brokered a prisoner exchange resulting in al-‘Adl being freed (at least from detention/house arrest). Praising al-‘Adl’s decades-long record of commitment to jihad, Ibn Hamdan affirms that were he chosen as the next leader of al-Qaida, “then by the might of God they will see from us only listening and obeying.”

The third refutation, which appeared several days later, on August 20, is signed by a certain Abu ‘Ali al-Qahtani, who echoes most of the arguments made in the previous two refutations. Al-Qahtani focuses on three issues. The first is the matter of the proposed breaking of ties with al-Qaida, which al-Qahtani says would require invalidating the bay‘a to the group. “As for voiding [the bay‘a] without the permission of the emir,” he writes, “as was done by the leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, that is prohibited and is not allowed.” And what good did this do HTS anyway? The group’s gambit caused internal strife and bloodletting, and HTS has not liberated any territory since announcing itself as such. “Will victory be achieved by dissolving the bay‘a?” he asks. “No. Victory will not be achieved through sin.” The second issue he brings up is the question of Sayf al-‘Adl’s succession to al-Zawahiri. After praising al-‘Adl as a veteran jihadi leader, al-Qahtani draws attention to the prisoner exchange mentioned by the second refuter. He notes that while al-‘Adl was freed, he was prohibited from leaving Iran as part of “an effort by the enemies to restrict his activities.” Whether al-‘Adl is in a position to assume command of al-Qaida or not, al-Qahtani does not say, but he does assert that al-‘Adl has more autonomy in Iran than HTS does in Syria. For HTS does not even have the power to open small battlefronts should it wish (presumably because of the influence of Turkey). The third issue broached by al-Qahtani is the proposed strategy of focusing all efforts on “the Iranian project.” While agreeing with Abu Mariya on the significance of the threat, he notes that HTS has done nothing to stop the Iranian project in Syria from advancing and has even prevented mujahidin from taking action against it. He also contends that “the Crusader project” is more threatening than the Iranian one, which it supports. In any event, HTS is in no position to confront either of these projects. “The truth,” he says, addressing Abu Mariya, “is that you and your group are contributing to the bitter reality that the Islamic umma is enduring.” In other words, the HTS model is part of the problem, not the solution.

The end of al-Qaida?

The question raised by Abu Mariya al-Qahtani’s nasiha is of course whether any of the al-Qaida affiliates will take it up. Are they really interested in dissolving al-Qaida and forging relationships with regional states? Judging by the responses reviewed above, the answer appears to be no. For one thing, Abu Mariya is not viewed favorably in al-Qaida circles. He has a reputation for persecuting al-Qaida loyalists in Syria, and some have even accused him of assisting in the assassination of Abu al-Qassam al-Urduni. Then there is the issue of the HTS model’s appeal. Abu Mariya may see exemplary accomplishments in northwest Syria, but his opponents see an enfeebled organization dependent for its survival on treacherous foreign powers.

Yet while the al-Qaida branches are unlikely to embrace Abu Mariya’s proposals, it is also the case that al-Qaida finds itself in a precarious position today. How the organization’s branches will respond to the situation is unclear. Sayf al-‘Adl’s location in Iran is indeed a problem. Only one of the refuters noted above affirmed that he would give bay‘a to al-‘Adl in Iran without hesitation; the others dodged the issue. The relationship with the Taliban also raises uncomfortable issues for al-Qaida. One of al-Zawahiri’s last addresses was an implicit critique of the Taliban for seeking a seat at the United Nations, a body seen by al-Zawahiri as a den of polytheism. There is also the question of how much support the Taliban is willing to offer al-Qaida. The Haqqani network may be unswervingly loyal to the group, but there also appear to be restrictions on its activities in Afghanistan.

Whether al-Qaida will even name a successor to al-Zawahiri remains to be seen. One can imagine a scenario in which the affiliates do not “dissolve” al-Qaida, as Abu Mariya advises, but do allow it to die a quiet death. In Islamic law, the bay‘a is given to an individual, not a group. If no new leader is proposed, and no new bay‘a is given, then that would effectively mean al-Qaida’s end. Such an outcome could potentially free the affiliates to pursue strategies more in line with what Abu Mariya is advocating.

This, of course, is only one possible scenario. One could also see Sayf al-‘Adl, or some other leader, assuming power and at least ensuring al-Qaida’s continuity. The new leader would likely keep a lower profile than al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden, seeking to advise the affiliates from behind the scenes. In this case, the organization would persist, but with the same deficiencies and contradictions as before—namely, a leadership whose priorities are out of step with those of the affiliates, an ideology at odds with that of the Taliban, and a problematic relationship with Iran.

Translation of Abu Mariya al-Qahtani’s nasiha:

Likewise, my advice to the affiliates of al-Qaida is to dissolve the al-Qaida organization and to remove the pretext for the states that have come to treat al-Qaida as a scapegoat. We have not forgotten that Sayf al-‘Adl is living in Iran and is directing the affiliates while under confinement and coercion. We witnessed in al-Sham what Sayf al-‘Adl achieved in terms of tribulations and affairs whose victims could not have imagined the outcome.

My advice to the affiliate in Yemen is thus that they concentrate on confronting the Iranian project, announce the sundering of their ties to foreign entities, revise their internal and external polices, address the world and the people of Yemen in a new way, and save our Sunni people in Yemen who have been exhausted by wars and afflicted by the firepower of Iran. The Islamic umma must stand together and form an alliance against the Iranian occupation that has taken hold of a number of Arab Muslim capitals and is threatening others, as it must strive to form regional alliances with the states neighboring Yemen to break Iran’s power, dislodge its arms, and drive its evil from the region.

Ibn Hazm, among other scholars, related that our lord ‘Umar said, “A man is not safe or free from fear if he can be restrained, tortured, or bound.”[1] Being restrained and being threatened are indicative of coercion, so how can Sayf al-‘Adl, who is a man imprisoned, manage the affiliates of al-Qaida?!! This is contrary to the meaning of the Prophet’s words, “The imam is a shield that guards.” The idea of giving command to one who is impotent is untenable. Has our condition became like that of the Rejectionists who give allegiance (bay‘a)to one who is absent? We seek refuge in God from ignorance and disappointment.

The people of Yemen must come to an agreement to defend against the criminal Houthis and put their internal differences aside. Yemen must turn the page of the past, and its people must drive away the arms of Iran. If they continue to have an association with al-Qaida, it will weaken their position against the Houthis who are one of the arms of Iran—where Sayf al-‘Adl is living under confinement—and it will weaken the position of those who seek to aid the suffering people of Yemen from the nearby states in the region.

I hope for the rest of the branches of al-Qaida to consider this note of mine carefully and not to allow my disagreement with and harsh criticism of their leadership to prevent them from accepting my words. For the truth ought to be followed even if it comes from an enemy or an adversary or an opponent. God knows that these words of mine are intended only as advice to and compassion for our Sunni people in all places. The stage through which the umma and its peoples are passing requires relations with states and peoples. It is unreasonable that Iran should occupy our capitals and declare war on others.

The present state of the Islamic umma is bitter, and we must reflect and consider the condition of our people who have been afflicted by the firepower of Iran. Sufficient for us is God, and He is the best Disposer of affairs. O God, repair our condition, heal our fragmentation, and give us victory over those who have wronged us and shown us enmity. O God, forgive us, grant us pardon, and return us to the truth and return us in a good way. O God, arrange our affairs, for we do not do it well. Praise belongs to God, Lord of the worlds.

Abu Mariya al-Qahtani 17 Muharram [August 15, 2022]

[1] The paraphrased quotation appears to belong to the scholar al-Razi (d. 1209) in his tafsir, not ‘Umar.

In April, when we reviewed the potential of various story possibilities on AQ, Ayman al-Zawahiri did not even make it to our shortlist of top AQ personalities to storify. Our team and the extremism experts who regularly contribute to our output have agreed that the most compelling stories could be about the AQ senior leaders living under controlled circumstances in Iran. They were operationally active, their relationship with Iran had big question marks, and, significantly, we found that AQ supporters on social media appeared to be uninformed about them. 

Our decision not to invest in Zawahiri stories was based on several factors, including his increasing detachment from the realities on the ground. We kept analyzing his numerous speeches only to wonder why he was not addressing the key issues that mattered to AQ members and affiliates. After the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Zawahiri’s messages seemed to lack any substance of practical importance. 

Even Zawahiri-related issues were best addressed to others. Thus, we pressed Taliban representatives on the subject of Zawahiri’s bay‘a (oath of allegiance) to the Taliban leader. Spokesman Suhail Shaheen answered us with a clear “There is no bay‘a,” seemingly clinching Zawahiri’s growing irrelevance. All of Zawahiri’s efforts to portray the Taliban emir as his supreme leader were thus publicly undermined.

We closely monitored Zawahiri’s productions, but focusing on the AQ Tehran group’s story was much more rewarding. Unlike Zawahiri’s largely void lectures, we found compelling insights in the writings of Mustafa Hamid, the ideological ally and father-in-law of Saif al-Adl, the heir apparent to Zawahiri. We found clues that led us to argue that the AQ remnants in Iran must be suffering from “Tehran Syndrome,” the title of our upcoming documentary series. 

Was Zawahiri aware of how the senior leaders in Tehran were diverging from the operations and the ideology of Zawahiri’s AQ? 

In his last messages, Zawahiri was showing signs of ideological flexibility, to the extent that some of us felt he was trying to embrace the Muslim Brotherhood, something unthinkable until recently. In contrast, Mustafa Hamid offered a different worldview for Salafi-jihadis, proposing to align with Iran. That, taken together with Saif al Adl’s influence on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the latter’s murky dealings with pro-Iran militias, was too much to be a coincidence. 

The Taliban’s return as the rulers of Afghanistan also undercut Zawahiri while improving the standing of Mustafa Hamid. Unlike Zawahiri, Hamid maintained excellent links with the Taliban without being a direct liability.

Zawahiri had his protectors in the intensely fragmented Taliban system. However, in essence, the Taliban’s victory represented a counterexample to the AQ model, a case of what could be possible for locally focused jihadis if only they abandoned AQ’s failed global jihad. In Syria, another locally focused jihadi group under Abu Muhammad al-Jolani survived by distancing itself from global jihad. Jolani appeared to have saved his neck while the remnants of AQ were being hunted in airstrikes.

That was the overall context when the news of Zawahiri’s death in Kabul came, and the media scene was flooded with analyses and opinions on his career and leadership.

What kind of a leader had he been, and what did he demonstrably achieve before meeting his end in Kabul? 

I’m befuddled by some of the research and academic-oriented perspectives that regard Zawahiri as a successful leader. 

For starters, he was a divisive and vengeful character. To really feel it, take a good look at the 1982 video showing his Sayyid Qutb-inspired angry outburst behind bars in Egypt. That was the man he was. 

Under Bin Laden, Zawahiri undermined internal rivals to the organization’s detriment. His leadership style evolved but did not fundamentally change over the years. 

In “What Leadership Type will Succeed Al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri?” Tricia Bacon and Elizabeth Grimm wrote last month: 

While at the helm of al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri represents a clear-cut caretaker of bin Laden’s legacy. He has had missteps as a leader tha[t] bin Laden was unlikely to make—for example, his failure to prevent the split with the Islamic State—but he has continued the how and the why established by bin Laden.

Based on his actions, Zawahiri was not a visionary or a fixer. He wasn’t a great caretaker either, having done little more than shepherd his organization’s continuous decline toward irrelevance and eventual demise. Given how his life ended, perhaps he fit the profile of a “figurehead” better than anything else. 

Isn’t that the net balance of Zawahiri’s tenure as the leader of AQ? His most memorable achievement will be to have overseen the vanishing of AQ while not missing opportunities to harm the foundations of the jihadi camp. Credit where credit is due: Zawahiri’s leadership had a critical part to play in the emergence of ISIS from the womb of AQ. 

ISIS is not just the archenemy of AQ, but it is also the illegitimate child of it. From the perspective of the young men who might be attracted to extremist causes, all the violence ISIS unleashed on the world must be counted toward Zawahiri’s and AQ’s failures column as well, given the organization’s stated goal of making jihadism less bloody. 

Zawahiri is said to have grown the affiliate network of AQ. In the big picture, he lost perhaps the most crucial affiliate in Syria as Jolani broke away from AQ without abandoning its ideology. Then Jolani embarked on a campaign of arresting and eliminating the AQ remnants in Syria. 

Zawahiri allowed, or at least could not stop, AQAP from straying out of his command and practically joining the side of pro-Iran forces in Yemen. All because he declined or was unable to arbitrate between squabbling seniors. What is left of the responsibilities of a leader if he shrinks from such moments?

The rupture between AQ central and AQAP resulted in significant defections, making it easier for the pro-Iran clique to clean up the leadership and the rank-and-file so the remnants could align with the Houthis increasingly more brazenly. 

Some affiliates did expand during Zawahiri’s time. That’s not to say Zawahiri deserves credit for it. Many groups adopted or simply continued to use the AQ brand for convenience rather than out of any organic link they had with or benefit they drew from AQ. 

ISIS’s extreme brutality is a top reason why many Salafi-jihadi groups wanted to emphasize alignment with AQ’s ideology, a ploy for acceptability among potential recruits, funders, and supporters. They used the AQ brand as a descriptive reference rather than out of genuine attachment or belonging. That did not require or show any success on the part of Zawahiri.

While Zawahiri kept producing ideological videos, many affiliates realized he was out of touch with the realities on the ground, leading them to pursue locally focused agendas. Who is left as “real” AQ other than Ahmed Diriye in Somalia and a handful of Hurras al-Din in Syria? How long before they also discover that localizing their struggles might save them and their organizations for another day? 

We can go on and on. To focus on the fundamentals, we must ask: Isn’t it a historic blow in itself that Zawahiri was found and killed in Kabul? He sought refuge under the Taliban’s wings and pledged them bay‘a, which the Taliban kept denying it had acknowledged. Would Zawahiri himself consider this a success? 

The implications of the way he died are disastrous for AQ. While protected by the Haqqanis, Zawahiri was despised by many other Taliban leaders. 

Anba’ Jasim, a source who broke the Abu Muhammad Al-Masri killing in Tehran in August 2020, recently cited jihadi sources saying Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul “was a Haqqani top secret project.”

Zawahiri’s death in a high-security district of Kabul is costly for the Taliban for many reasons. For months, they have allowed Zawahiri to produce and disseminate threats and incitement to violence from the soil of Afghanistan, directly violating the Doha accords.

Those arguing that this activity did not violate the accords risk missing the point. Irrespective of the semantics and technicalities, Zawahiri’s activities in Kabul were detrimental to the interests of the Taliban movement, its government, and the Afghan people.

What was the role of the senior Taliban leadership, apart from the Haqqanis, in Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul? They either approved it, or they didn’t know. Both possibilities make Taliban senior leadership look terrible. They cannot but take harsh measures against those involved internally and on the AQ side.

What happened makes the Taliban emirate’s need and desire to get international recognition and aid much more complicated than before. That will anger the Taliban government and exacerbate strife within the broader movement. In Afghanistan’s complex ethnic, tribal, and regional fabric of a thousand splendid patches, imagine the tensions that must now be brewing within the Taliban. 

This comes at a time when the Taliban is finding out what a huge responsibility and burden it is to govern and what heartbreakingly poor shape the country is in. Seeing their top priorities ruined by a bunch of irresponsible adventurers will make the Taliban furious.

For the sake of one man, AQ has shown it don’t care about the Taliban or the Afghan people. All the talk of how AQ members living in Afghanistan were heeding the Taliban’s conditions and authority has been exposed as futility. The Taliban will now have to look at every AQ member with distrust.

Zawahiri thus left the scene with explosive tension between AQ and the Taliban. In the most likely scenario, the Taliban will now be extremely tough with AQ remnants, giving them little choice between total obedience and expulsion.

In his last breath, Zawahiri destroyed AQ’s primary and vital safe haven irreversibly. It’s befitting of a leader known for prioritizing the narrow interests of his racist clique.

Under Taliban pressure, it won’t be surprising to see some AQ remnants joining Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP), which has become a magnet for extremists who have fallen out with the Taliban. The Taliban will now have to allocate meager resources to rein in AQ militants more closely.

Finally, isn’t the ultimate measure of success for a leader what kind of organization he leaves behind? Some say jokingly that Zawahiri reduced AQ to nothing but a boring podcast. That has a grain of truth to it.

Zawahiri leaves behind an organization with no clear succession plan. Some of the most likely candidates are in Iran, seemingly attracted to the worldview of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). They will have serious legitimacy issues as they will be seen as either co-opted by or willing collaborators of the Iranians.

AQ fanboys quickly moved from denial of Zawahiri’s death to celebrating his “martyrdom.” If they opened their eyes and hearts, they might see a different reality: Ayman al Zawahiri was not in Kabul seeking a glorious end. On the contrary, he was there looking out for the interests of himself and his family, just as he had always done. He certainly did not rush headlong toward martyrdom. 

In 1981, Zawahiri’s comrades killed Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, a hero of peace. That’s the root Zawahiri stems from, and after more than 40 years, his true legacy is about stealing hope from and wasting the energies of several generations of young Muslims, and harming countless other innocents.

None of this looks like success to me—or “a good sealing,” for that matter. 

Within Jihadi propaganda, terrorism in the West against ‘the crusaders’ or ‘the infidels’ features prominently. The AQAP-produced magazine Inspire specialized in calling for action and advising al-Qaida supporters on how to attack in addition to providing religious justification. The latest issue of Inspire was published in summer 2017, and since then a string of new magazines and supporter organizations calling for terrorist attacks has emerged. One such example is the Wolves of Manhattan magazine that has so far published three issues. 

In February 2022, another new magazine started to be shared on encrypted platforms carrying the title ‘O Mujahideen in the West’. Until now, the group behind the magazine, Hurras al-Tawheed, has published six issues and a Ramadan special issue.

Initially, the magazine did not stand out for its calls for jihad in the West. What really caught my attention was how it positioned itself within the Jihadi current and its way of communicating. Although disseminated through well-known al-Qaida channels and praising al-Qaida pioneers, it made it explicit that its objective was to unify al-Qaida and Islamic State sympathizers in the West, to settle their internal differences and animosity to enable a unified covert military front threatening Western security. 

With regard to communication, its format and style of writing was short and concise, and the editor even explained why. Since it was addressed to the youth, it should not be long, dry and boring since no youth would ever read it. Instead, it should offer brief justifications for attacks and simple recipes for how to conduct them.

These emphases of the magazine were intriguing, and they prompted me to make contact with Hurras al-Tawheed, which agreed to an email interview telling me more about itself, its propaganda, and its raison d’être. I should add that Hurras al-Tawheed responded to every single one of my questions, providing long and seemingly honest answers.

Besides elaborating on the above issues, the interview offers exciting insights into al-Qaida’s online ecosystem, the state of Jihadi supporters in the West, and not least the origin and structure of Hurras al-Tawheed.

Below you find the entire interview.

Question: To begin with can you tell me about the origins of Hurras al-Tawheed? It first appeared online on Rocket.Chat in mid-February. Was this the beginning of the group?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed was established before February but was a closed group online, it did not have have any online presence and kept everything between close brothers only. The step towards going online was due to the members thinking that we should try to invite other Muslims to Jihad before seeking our martyrdom, because Allah says:

“So fight, [O Muhammad], in the cause of Allah ; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] might of those who disbelieve. And Allah is greater in might and stronger in [exemplary] punishment.” 

[sūrat l-nisāa (The Women) Verse 84]

That is why in February we took our first leap into “Al-Qaeda rocket chat”.

Question: Is it exclusively a media unit or is it better understood as a group with a structure and a political objective?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed started as something really humble and small, however after the release of our first magazine, our inboxes where full of supporters in the West filled with excitement and joy over the magazine. Even though the magazine was really primitive at first, but it still manage to garner people from the West and Alhamdulillah to the East. Because of this, we were motivated to try making another magazine and see how it is received, and by the grace of Allah, many brothers and sisters came to us with joy and happiness. 

In the midst of this excitement, an Al-Qaeda media worker contacted us and asked us to explain who we are and if we are the one who makes the magazine or not, which we said that his claim was positive, and gave us advice in how to further structure our group, and we followed their example and showed our gratitude for their advice.

It is narrated on the authority of Tamim ad-Dari that the Prophet (ﷺ) said:
“The Religion is sincerity.” We said, “To whom?” He said “To Allah, to His Book, To His Messenger, and to the leaders of the Muslims and their masses.”

[Sahih Muslim 55a]

By the grace of Allah, we were bombarded with positive comments and saw the joy of the believers, and decided to start gathering people for the sake of Allah. We never planned it to go this far, but by the will of Allah, we saw many people wishing to help in any way they could, from seniors and majority from the youth, sick and strong. The Structure of Hurras Al-Tawheed became established, and here it is:

Hurras Al-Tawheed, with the help from Allah have 3 departments:

1. Al-Hijra
2. Al-Jihad
3. The Media

Al-Hijra: This department has the task of guiding the Muhajireen to their destination, giving them tips and guidance in how to reach their destination as safe as possible, and try to establish a network in these different countries with different groups to accept the Muhajireen we send. All praise is due to Allah, we have sent many Muhajireen to their destination and we ask Allah to grant us more chances to be a service for the Ummah. As this is the second most neglected duty of a Muslim.

Al-Jihad: This department is for soldiers who wants to attack the Disbelievers where they feel the most safest, in their own home country. Main task of this department is to gather weapons which is easily acquirable and can be used by the lone wolf during his operation. Grant the lone wolves 1 to 1 conversation in who to attack and how to go about it. What do expect during the operation and how to win against the fear. If possible, fund the operations and do our part so we can get a share of his or her blessed attack.

The Media: This is our biggest department, we have translators from the West to the East, willing to give their time to translate different works and try to spread the message of Hurras Al-Tawheed. Alhamdulillah, the magazine has become longer and more detailed, and increased in quality, due to so many contribution for its success. We appreciate any Believer who helps us, no matter how insignificant it seems, it is big in the movement of Jihad. All praise and glory is due to Allah alone.

Question: Also can you tell me more about yourself? I just know that you are the spokesperson of Hurras al-Tawheed and it appears that you are the ‘face’ of HAT publishing all its messages. Hence, it is relevant to know more about yourself.

Answer: We did not see it appropriate to talk about the spokesperson too freely as media attention is coming our way, and we do not want to put our brother in any position of harm, however here is an explanation of him:

Abu Yahya Al-Khurasani, is one of the co-founders of Hurras Al-Tawheed, he has been here since the beginning and was picked by the members to be the one to drive the group forward. We deemed him to be a good leader with great vision. If we have any disagreement with him, he is quick to listen and make our stands together stronger. 

Here are some of our members and what they think of Abu Yahya:

Abu Ibrahim:

I have known Abu Yahya for more than a year now and i have come to like his maturity, leadership skills, and character as a whole. I think he would be best suitable for the spokesperson role because of these reasons

Abu Abdullah:

Abu Yahya is the most fit to be the spokesman from us due to his experience and great managing skills. He has faith in his choices and is well respected, Allahuma Barik. He obeys the orders of the emir and doesn’t go against him unless it’s advice. He knows who he is addressing and how to address them. His hate and anger doesn’t overcome him, which is essential when being a spokesman.

Abu Luqman:

Abu Yahya is a brother I deem to be the best person in the position of spokesman, he is a brother who thinks deeply before speaking. He is a person I have much trust in due to his skill and experience. Allahuma barik. He knows when and how to speak, and doesn’t allow emotions to have an impact on him when speaking. I believe these are important qualities a spokesperson needs, and therefore believe he is best fit for the position of spokesman.

Question: I came to know of Hurras al-Tawheed because of the magazine ‘O Mujahideen in the West’. What can you tell me about the magazine?

A: The magazine “O Mujahideen in the West” is an effort from Hurras Al-Tawheed to make the Muslims in the West to understand that they have been fooled about Islam and they want to white-wash Islam, to be make Islam more inclined and tolerant towards modern filth, such as feminism, liberalism, pro-sodomy etc. To quote from the Qur’an and Sunnah and show them the statements of our great scholars and what they think we should do in our time and situation. The war around the world, which as instigated by the Disbelievers, and how to solve this by using the sword and do not neglect the duty of Jihad. 

We chose English as our main language, as it is the most widely spoken around the world, especially the lingua franca of the West. Many thing Jihad is an exclusive club for the Arab speakers, this is wrong, by reading our magazine, you will be quick to realize that there is so much a “english-speaker” can do, or any other language. A sword has one function, and no language barrier will stop you from using it.

Question: For me the striking part about the magazine and HAT’s general statements are the explicit calls for action in the West. You write that you “want to open the doors to hijrah and Jihad” for people in the West. Is such operations the primary objective of the group?

A: The main work of Hurras Al-Tawheed is to facilitate Jihad and HIjrah. The most neglected duties of the Ummah. It could be that the Believer feel agitated about the war crimes of the West and wish to do an operation here, or feel the urgency to return home to the land of Jihad and help the groups there to fight against the apostates and disbelievers. These are the main objectives of the group Alhamdulillah. 

Question: Operations in the West have since 2015 mainly been associated with the Islamic State and in recent years, very few attacks have occurred, and only a handful can be associated with al-Qaida. Is it your objective to promote new attacks carried out by supporters of al-Qaida?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed has not made the magazine exclusive to Al-Qaeda supporters, it is for every Muslim who resides in Western countries to do an attack. May it be Tandhim Dawlah or Tandhim Al-Qaeda. We want to be among those who try to revive the movement of Jihad in the West, if blood is what we have to pay, so be it. Lone wolves does not need any association with a group to earn his place in Jannah. So let any of the two groups spread terror, and use our magazine if needed. 

And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged.

[sūrat l-anfāl (The Spoils of War) Verse: 60]

Question: At some point you write that HAT is based in the West as well. What can you say about this?

A: With this we mean that we have not taken our leap and made an official base, but we are residing in different Western countries, physical support is needed, we will try to provide one. We are entirely online, if Allah will that our Hijrah department continues to send Muhajireen, we will take talk to our contacts and let them know that we wish to take the next step, however this is all in the Hands of Allah. Success does not come without Sabr, we have given it before and we can continue give Sabr by the permissions of Allah.

Question: Another interesting point is a thing mentioned in issue 3 of the magazine. You write that you “have understood that the youth are used to short and quick information” making you follow the mantra ‘Quick – Simple – True’. This is the reason why the magazine was initially short and absent of long articles. In your view, what does this say about the youth nowadays and also the new generation of Jihadis?

A: Initially the magazines were and we were going to keep it short. Just show how to make different bombs and let the reader use the magazine as a recipe book. We were criticized due to it and we did not care about the blame of the blamers, however, many Believers looked forward to the magazine and said that they wait eagerly for the next issue. Many said that they were re-living the experience of “inspire” magazine from Al-Malahim. We saw how important another “inspire” magazine was needed in the West and English speakers so we decided to put more effort into the magazine, hence why the quality of the magazine increased by the grace of Allah alone. We try to make them easy to read and try to not bore the reader with too much of the same content. We try to make this magazine more engaging, by introducing “Sawt Al-Muwahid”, so the any Muslim can try to tell their own story. 

We had no plan on being the new Inspire magazine, however we are happy that we got many readers from Inspire magazine who shares them around. Our team finds joy in reading the great feedback from the Believers who enjoys reading our work. This motivates us even further to make more and more content for them to enjoy. 

Question: The latest issue (issue 6) is 44 pages and issue 5 was 16 pages. Why this change and is this an indication that HAT is growing bigger with more capacity to produce its media publications?

A: As mentioned previously, our media team is growing by the grace of Allah, and this has made it more viable for us to produce more and satisfy the demand.

Question: In the magazine (issue 4) you also write that HAT is not an al-Qaida magazine and that the group is not against the Islamic State. But HAT is present on the al-Qaida Rocket.Chat server and promotes historic al-Qaida leaders. How should this be understood?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed has not given any official pledge of allegiance to any group, we want the Muslim in the West to forget this Fitnah which came from Sham. We do not see the need for a lone wolf to worry what group to affiliate himself with, rather we want him to fully dedicate his or her life to Allah and do an operation for the sake of the entire Ummah, not for a group. So we will help the lone wolf no matter what his affiliation with is, unless we disagree with the operation.

If an operation does not bring a lot of benefit, we will guide the lone wolf Mujahid and tell him to pursue other missions, if he does not take our advice, we will take our distance from him or her, and we try to free ourselves from the crimes for those who fight for the sake of their own desires.

Question: Relating to the questions above, you write about the fitna between al-Qaida and the Islamic State that split the Jihadi movement. These tensions are still vividly present in much of the Muslim world where these groups are active, but you write that this Ramadan should be used as an opportunity to “unite and forgive” among Jihadis in the West. Can you say more about this project and how you see the milieu in the West develop in the future?

A: As for the groups in the East, there have been multiple times to settle the dispute between the groups but sadly it usually ends with bloodshed. For the believers in the West, constantly hearing these two groups fighting each other while they could have entirely focused the invaders, brings sadness to the Ummah. So for the Believers in the West, what we can do is try to sow the seed of unity in them, so the animosity between these groups decreases and eventually with the help from Allah,  in the future, the youth of these groups will eventually seek unity rather than disunity. We have been criticized by side of Dawlah and the side of Al-Qaeda. We understand that this is not easy to achieve, and many have cursed and insulted us by trying. 

what good idea comes without consequences of dogs barking? We do this for the sake of Allah, if this brings no benefit to the movement of Jihad, than we ask Allah to make us understand, and make us move to other important issues. For now, Hurras Al-Tawheed wants the supporters to not bring any harm to each other in the West, all the focus should be at the Disbelieving criminals.

Question: Are you attempting to forge a middle group similar to the efforts of sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi?

A: Shaykhuna Abu Muhammed Al-Maqdisi, May Allah grant him and his family the best in this world and the next. We Hurras Al-Tawheed has high respect for our shaykh who has exhausted his tongue in trying to guide the Mujahideen around the world. As mentioned previously, making such “middle group” is not easy and it will need a lot of sacrifice. As we know that there was an effort made to settle the dispute among Dawlah in 2014 and sadly those who tried to settle the dispute where executed. May Allah grant them martyrdom, Amin.

Question: In issue 5 you focus on killing prison guards. How come you see this as particularly important?

A: By Attacking the guards, and focusing our fire at the prison guards, it will make the Disbelievers more wary in imprisoning Muslims, and will waste more money to upgrade their security. There are many guards who abuse the Believers in prisons, and we do not want these Criminals to live life without justice. Many prisons around the world are torturing innocent people, especially scholars. We Hurras Al-Tawheed want to make it easy for the lone wolves, and give them a legitimate target, which is attacking prisons at the best of their ability. Killing guards on their way home, or on their way to work. Weaken their mentality and grant anxiety to the guards and make them rethink before abusing another Muslim. 

Incite the believer to do more “prison break” operations, such as the operation to save Shaykh Khalid Batarfi (May Allah preserve him).

The reason why these scholars are in jail is because the government knows that if the youth listens to them, their reign will collapse and justice will prevail. So targeting prisons and guards around the world. As long as 1 Muslim is inside that prison, we hope that a lone wolf will pick his weapon and seek revenge for that single Believer. These operations are not exclusive to the West, rather we want Saudia to be the most prepared for these attacks. The scholars told the apostate government to not ally with the Invaders, the leaders of Saudia does what it does the best, bowing down to other than Allah, and the scholars were taken to jail and tortured, where they are still inside and suffering. 

Question: In addition to HAT, you established the media wing al-Bidayah. Does this imply that HAT is evolving more into a group of mujahideen with a separate institution dedicated to media as one part of HAT activities? (…) Announcement came on 13 March, but now two months later, no videos have been issued. Why is that? What kind of videos can be expected?

A: In the intial message, Abu Yahya made the message really clear that Al-Bidayah will take its leap into videomaking, however it will take time. How long? Allah knows best. Jihad will last until the Day of Judgement, so there is no need for hastiness. Whatever Allah has willed, will happen. I am not allowed to give further details of Al-Bidayah.

Question: Most recently you started collaborating with TTP’s Umar Media. Is this because HAT sees itself as the global Jihadist movement or because there is a special relation with the group in Pakistan?

A: Hurras Al-Tawheed wants to use all of our resources to help the Mujahideen around the world. We know that Urdu translators are needed, and we had no issues in helping our brothers in Umar Media in translating some of their messages. This does not mean we have given our pledge of allegiance, however it means that any group who wants our help, we will be willing to give our time and effort to help them in whatever task they ask of us. Alhamdulillah, by the grace of Allah, we have established contacts in different parts of the world, however I was told to refrain to mention anything until official messages had been made.

We ask Allah to deliver our message and make it easily understood by the masses. O Allah bring victory to Islam and the Believers!

Early the next day, on March 28, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the Hadera attack. Its A‘maq news agency released a separate report that included an image of the attackers swearing the oath of allegiance, or bay‘a, to the new Islamic State caliph. A video of the bay‘a ceremony appeared online shortly afterwards. The A‘maq report also gave favorable mention to the “commando attacker” (inghimasi) in Beersheeba, though stopping short of claiming the attack outright.

Such attacks by the Islamic State on Israeli soil have been exceedingly rare, the last claimed attack being in June 2017. The recent attacks raise the question of whether more can be expected from the Islamic State in the weeks and months ahead. While the group would like us to believe that is so, the reality is that there are few Palestinians who identify with the cause of the caliphate and the Islamic State is not ideologically disposed to concentrating its efforts on the Jewish state.

Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi

To understand how the Islamic State views Israel, it is helpful to begin with the relevant statements of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (d. 2006), the Jordanian founder of al-Qaida in Iraq whose ideas form the foundation stone of the present-day caliphate. Palestine was not a prominent theme in al-Zarqawi’s speeches and lectures. Nor was attacking the Israelis a priority for him. On several occasions, he claimed that the liberation of Palestine would come only after victory had been achieved in Iraq and the Shi‘a had been subdued.

In a speech in July 2005, al-Zarqawi described the conquest of Jerusalem as subsequent to jihad in Iraq. Explaining that he and his followers were not fighting merely to expel the occupiers in Iraq and thereafter lay down their arms, he said,

The totality of what we hope for is that God will grant us victory in Iraq, and then we will head to Jerusalem, the first qibla of the Muslims and the site of the night journey of our noble Prophet. These are developments that we await with great anticipation. “And they will say, ‘When will it be?’ Say: ‘It is possible that it may be nigh’ (Q. 17:51).”

A year later, in April 2006, al-Zarqawi again envisioned the future conquest of Jerusalem, saying in his first and only video address, “My dear umma, we in Iraq are a stone’s throw from the site of the night journey of the Messenger of God. We are fighting in Iraq while our eyes are on Jerusalem, which will be recovered only by a Book that guides and a sword that overpowers.” Similar language was found in a written interview released posthumously in late 2006, five months after his death in June. Here he is quoted saying, “We are fighting in Iraq both for it and for what is beyond it. We are fighting in Iraq while our eyes are on Jerusalem. We are fighting in Iraq while our eyes are on Mecca and Medina.” By adding Mecca and Medina here, al-Zarqawi indicated that he conceived of the jihad in Iraq as the first stage of a much more extensive struggle, one that would include not only Palestine but also Saudi Arabia and other places. While there is certainly nothing in these statements to suggest that al-Zarqawi was opposed to fighting in Palestine, it is clear that he saw the battle there as belonging to a future stage of jihad, not the present one.

It was also his view, as is clear from his lectures on the Shi‘a, that before one could effectively fight the “original unbelievers,” meaning the Jews and the Christians, it was first necessary to fight the Shi‘a. In this he was guided by his reading of medieval Islamic history, in particular the late Crusader period coinciding with rise of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (aka Saladin) and his defeat of the (Shi‘i) Fatimid caliphate in Egypt. In 1171, Saladin abolished the Fatimid caliphate and went on to construct a Sunni state spanning Egypt and Syria. A decade and a half later, in 1187, he captured Jerusalem following the decisive Battle of Hattin against the Crusader forces.

As al-Zarqawi saw it, there was “an important lesson” to be gleaned from this history. This was that “there will not be victory over the original unbelievers except after fighting the apostate unbelievers who are allied with the original believers.” In al-Zarqawi’s recounting, the Shi‘i Fatimids were the allies and “clients” of the Crusaders, and thus to liberate Jerusalem it was necessary for Saladin first to eliminate these treacherous “Rejectionists.” “History has shown us,” he stated, “that Jerusalem, which fell into the hands of the Crusaders with the aid of the Rejectionist Fatimids, was only recovered at the hands of Saladin … after he waged war on the Rejectionist Fatimids for several years and destroyed their state entirely.” For al-Zarqawi, then, the blueprint for jihad was clear: First, attack the Shi‘a and other “apostates” collaborating with the Christians and the Jews; then, having destroyed their state, proceed to the next phase of the jihad, which is the battle for Palestine and other captured Islamic lands.

Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi

Al-Zarqawi and his group laid the groundwork for the establishment, in October 2006, of the Islamic State of Iraq, whose first leader was Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi (d. 2010). A former Iraqi police officer, al-Baghdadi articulated a similar view to al-Zarqawi’s, adding the idea that building a proper Islamic state was a precondition for the conquest of Jerusalem.

In February 2008, amid escalating conflict between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants in Gaza, al-Baghdadi delivered an audio address setting out his organization’s position on “the struggle with the Jews.” After condemning Hamas for participating in democracy and allying with the “apostate” Syrian regime, al-Baghdadi reiterated al-Zarqawi’s Saladin theme, saying, “Saladin did not enter Jerusalem victorious until he put paid to the Rejectionist Fatimid state in Egypt and al-Sham.” Toward the end of his address, he returned to the theme with a new emphasis—the importance of the state built by Saladin and his predecessor, Nur al-Din Zangi. In al-Baghdadi’s view, it was the building of a Sunni Islamic state in Syria and Egypt that paved the way for liberating Jerusalem, and this was the model to be followed. “We hope to God,” he stated, “and we beseech Him, that just as the state of the martyr Nur al-Din was the foundation stone of the return of al-Aqsa to the arms of the umma … we hope that the Islamic State of Iraq will be the foundation stone of the return of Jerusalem.”

In his address, al-Baghdadi did not oppose all efforts of jihad in Palestine, but he maintained that the groups currently fighting there were theologically flawed. He encouraged the Jihadi Salafis in the area to dissociate from them and to rally together under a pure Islamic banner. The true victory, however, awaited the consolidation and expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq.

Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

Following the death of Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and his lieutenant, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, in a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid in 2010, the role of delivering speeches was assumed by the Islamic State of Iraq’s new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (d. 2019), and its official spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani (d. 2016). Together, these men oversaw the group’s expansion to Syria and its subsequent declaration of the caliphate in June 2014, after which it would be known simply as the Islamic State. As was the case with al-Zarqawi and the first al-Baghdadi, Palestine did not occupy a prominent place in the words of these new leaders, and its conquest was presented as something to be achieved at a later stage.  

In al-‘Adnani’s speeches, Jerusalem appeared in several lists of places that the Islamic State would one day eventually conquer, together with al-Andalus (Islamic Spain) and Rome. In a 2013 address, for instance, he stated, “We will not rest until we free the Muslim prisoners in all places, and until we recover Jerusalem, restore al-Andalus, and conquer Rome by God’s will.” Similarly, in a speech in 2015, he sought to incite “the soldiers of the caliphate” to action by telling them, “Go forth, for Mecca and Medina and Jerusalem and Rome await you.” In another speech, he remarked of the mujahidin of the Islamic State, “Their bodies are in Iraq, while their souls are in captured Mecca, their hearts are in Jerusalem, and their eyes are on Rome.” How far off such conquests were in al-‘Adnani’s mind is unclear, but at least one of them, Rome (Rūmā), seems to belong to End Times, this being a reference to the prophesied Muslim conquest of Rome in Muslim apocalyptic.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s mentions of Palestine were also few. On one occasion, in November 2014, he praised the Islamic State’s new Sinai Province for its “support for Jerusalem” and for “terrorizing the Jews,” and on another, in May 2015, he expressed his hope, addressing the Sinai Province, “that we will see you in Jerusalem soon.”

The most extensive remarks of al-Baghdadi’s on Palestine came in a speech in December 2015, in which he sought to reassure his audience that the Islamic State had not forgotten about the Jews. Commenting on the establishment of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, al-Baghdadi called into question the coalition’s Islamic character, arguing that a truly Islamic coalition would, among other things, make its objective “killing the Jews and liberating Palestine.” He continued as follows:

Yes, Palestine, which the Jews thought we had forgotten about and which they thought they had distracted us from. That is not the case, o Jews! We have not forgotten about Palestine for a second. God willing, we will not forget it, and soon, God willing, you will hear the approach of the mujahidin and their vanguards will encircle you, on a day that you see as distant but we see as near. We are drawing nearer to you day after day, and your accounting with God will be harsh indeed! You will never be at peace in Palestine, o Jews! It will never be your home or your land. Palestine will only be a graveyard for you. God has only gathered you there so that the Muslims may kill you, when you will be hiding behind the trees and rocks, as you know well. “So await. We are awaiting with you” (Q. 9:52).

It is hard to escape the conclusion that al-Baghdadi saw the coming confrontation with the Jews in Palestine as belong to End Times. In the unfolding of the apocalyptic narrative as understood by the Islamic State, Jesus will one day return to the earth to lead the Muslims in a war against the Antichrist and the Jews in Jerusalem. Thereafter, the Muslims wil go on to conquer Rome. Whether that is the only scenario that al-Baghdadi (and al-‘Adnani) entertained for Palestine is unclear. What is clear is that these leaders, like their predecessors, saw the battle for Jerusalem and Palestine as belonging to a future phase of jihad.

Abu Hamza al-Qurashi

A rather different approach to the Palestine issue was articulated by al-‘Adnani’s successor as Islamic State spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurashi (d. 2022). In a January 2020 address, Abu Hamza presented the war against the Jews as a matter of great urgency. Midway through the address, he related that the new caliph, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (d. 2022), had resolved to initiate “a new stage” of jihad consisting of “fighting the Jews, recovering what they have stolen from the Muslims—which will not be recovered but by a Book that guides and a sword that overpowers—conquering Jerusalem, and delivering the banner to the mahdi Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah, God willing.” Abu Hamza went on to incite the “soldiers of the caliphate,” especially those in Sinai and Syria, to attack “the settlements and markets of the Jews,” and to use them as a testing ground for “your weapons and your chemical-laden missiles.” He also called on Palestinians to join the ranks of the Islamic State and to rise up and fight the Jews in Palestine, “bringing failure to their plans, such as their deal of the century.”

The latter reference was to former President Donald Trump’s Middle East peace plan that was rolled out beginning in 2019. Abu Hamza’s announcement of a “new stage” of jihad against the Jews thus seems to have been calibrated to exploit the grievances, real or imagined, generated by the Trump peace plan and rumors of Arab-Israeli rapprochement. It did not have the intended effect—no Islamic State attacks in Israel would be reported for more than two years.

Abu Hamza’s announcement was quite a departure from precedent—a call for escalation in Palestine rather than the studied focus on fighting the “apostates” as the precondition for a future showdown with the Jewish state. It should be understood, however, that this announcement was both brief and isolated. The more familiar approach, which sees jihad in Palestine as a lesser priority, has dominated discussions of the issue in Islamic State discourse, including in the pages of its weekly Arabic newsletter, al-Naba’.

Al-Naba’

It is in several articles in al-Naba’ where the Islamic State’s most extensive treatment of the subject of Palestine is found. These articles echo the views of al-Zarqawi and his successors in deprioritizing the fight in Palestine, but they go even further in deemphasizing the importance of the issue in general, dismissing the idea that Palestine is some sort of exceptional theater of jihad deserving of special attention.

The first of these articles, which sets out the main themes and arguments that would be reiterated in subsequent ones, was published in March 2016. Titled “Jerusalem: A Shari‘a Issue First and Foremost,” its main point is that “the issue of Palestine” must always be placed in “its correct legal framework,” meaning the framework of the Shari‘a with its objective of advancing monotheism (tawhid) and destroying polytheism (shirk). Jihad in Palestine will not be legitimate unless it is in service of advancing tawhid and destroying shirk. “Indeed,” the article says, “jihad for the purpose of recovering Jerusalem from the hands of the Jews is not permissible unless it be in the path of eliminating the rule of the idol-rulers (tawaghit) there and establishing the religion there completely.” This is largely a dig at “the apostate Hamas movement,” which is accused here of practicing “the polytheism of democracy” and failing to apply the Shari‘a. Were Hamas to take the place of Jews as the rulers of Palestine, this would be merely the substitution of one idol-ruler (taghut) for another.

The underlying grievance of the article is the view that the Palestine issue has been held up by opportunistic political actors as “the first issue of the Muslims,” becoming in effect an “idol” that has been worshiped for decades. These actors, beginning with the Arab nationalists, have manipulated and exaggerated the issue, pretending that nothing else can be addressed until Palestine is liberated. Yet as far as the Shari‘a is concerned, the article retorts, no issue ought to be placed ahead of tawhid, and no land should be placed above any other when it comes to where jihad should be waged. “Were the merit of a land to determine the preference for jihad there,” it adds, “then jihad to recover Mecca and Medina from the hands of the idol-rulers of the Al Saud would undoubtedly take precedence over all other lands.” When it comes to the struggle for Palestine, the editorial concludes, “it is wrong to exaggerate it and to place it above the tawhid of God.”

For the authors of al-Naba’, fighting the Jews in Palestine is of course an individual obligation on all Muslims, but this applies first of all to the Palestinians themselves, given the legal dictum that one should fight those nearest to them. For most Muslims, however, the reality is that the only viable path to fighting the Jews and destroying Israel involves first fighting and defeating the idol-rulers in nearby lands, who are the protectors and defenders of the Jewish state. Moreover, the Jews, being one of the categories of “original unbelievers,” are of lesser priority than apostates: “The apostate idol-rulers ruling in the lands of Islam are more severe in unbelief than [the Jews], and fighting them is of higher priority than fighting the original polytheists.”

Subsequent articles in al-Naba’ touching on the Palestine issue have come in response to various developments. These include an editorial responding to Israeli military operations against the Islamic State, in May 2016, and another responding the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, in December 2017.

A more substantive editorial appeared in May 2021 in response to a crisis in Gaza that saw Hamas fire numerous rockets at Israel. Titled “The Road to Jerusalem,” the editorial argues that only jihad, properly conceived, holds the promise of conquering Palestine and other places. “The path to Jerusalem and Mecca and al-Andalus is one path,” it says, and that is the path of jihad, not the Iranian-led “resistance” represented by Hamas and like groups. The soldiers of the Islamic State are the ones following this path, and they are the ones who will one day conquer Jerusalem for Islam: “All of their battles today, east and west, are but stations on the path to Jerusalem and Mecca and al-Andalus and Baghdad and Damascus, and all the captive Islamic lands. It is one battle.” The editorial also reiterates the Islamic State’s position on not overstressing the importance of the Palestine theater. “The soldiers of the caliphate,” it states, “have not exaggerated the issue of Palestine and have not made it an exception among the issues of the Muslims … They have not differentiated between the blood of their Muslim brethren in Palestine and the blood of their brethren in other lands.”

The most recent al-Naba’ editorial about Palestine was published at the end of March, coming in response to the Beersheeba and Hadera attacks. The editorial celebrates the Hadera attackers and ridicules those who claimed that they were driven by “purely nationalist motives.” The reality, it says, is that they were driven by purely Islamic motives, the Islamic State’s war against the Jews being “purely Islamic and theological,” not nationalistic. The editorial also responds to the allegation that “that the Islamic State does not fight the Jews because it does not wish to do so,” this being a “lie” circulated by the group’s enemies to deter potential recruits. The truth, it counters, is that numerous obstacles—governments and parties and militias—have prevented a rise in attacks, not a lack of desire. In saying this, the editorial reaffirms that the Islamic State’s stance regarding the struggle in Palestine remains the same as outlined previously in the speeches of its leaders and the articles in al-Naba’. This is a stance of neither “exaggeration” nor “laxity,” one that conceives of jihad in Palestine within the framework of the Shari‘a.

At the end of the editorial, the Palestinian youth are encouraged to awaken from their inactivity and to rise up, but they are also called upon to correct their false beliefs and to free themselves from “the slavery of nationalism.” Only then will their jihad will be in accordance with the Shari‘a.

Conclusion

As has been seen, for most of its history the Islamic State has not prioritized or put great emphasis on the fight against Israel. From al-Zarqawi onward, the general pattern has been one of deprioritization and deemphasis, the assumption being that victory in Palestine will only come at a later stage and that it would be folly to focus on Palestine to the neglect of other, equally important theaters of jihad.

Al-Zarqawi argued that before conquering Jerusalem it was necessary to fight and defeat the surrounding apostates, particularly the Shi‘a, on the model of Saladin in the twelfth century. Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi expressed the same view, adding that it was necessary to build a proper Islamic state as Saladin and his predecessor, Nur al-Din Zangi, had done. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani depicted Jerusalem as a place to be conquered sometime in the future, together with al-Andalus and Rome. The articles of al-Naba’ have condemned the idolization of the Palestine issue, arguing that the greater priority should go to “the apostate idol-rulers” who form the main line of defense for the Jewish state. The lone exception to this pattern of deprioritization and deemphasis was the announcement of a “new stage” of jihad in Palestine by Abu Hamza al-Qurashi in January 2020, though the announcement came to little and has been overshadowed by the standard themes.

What does all of this suggest for the future of Islamic State terrorist acts against Israel? The general lesson seems be that the Islamic State will not devote considerable resources or energies to the issue of Palestine, where the number of its supporters is “relatively small” to begin with. To give sustained attention and emphasis to the Palestine issue would be out of keeping with more than a decade and a half of strategic and theological pronouncements. The occasional attack may occur, and the Islamic State will gladly claim it, saying that it has never opposed jihad in Palestine, which it has not. But unless the group manages to find a new base of support in Palestine, there is likely to be little change.