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	<title>Philosophy of Consciousness</title>
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	<description>Philosophy of Consciousness</description>
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		<title>Infographic &#8211; Hierarchical Construct Theory</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/infographic-hct</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/infographic-hct#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Oct 2018 19:34:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Infographic]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=3406</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As a primary task it should not be difficult to promote the thesis that understanding how and why consciousness emerged entails understanding the evolution of a hierarchy of systems-constructs. Why? If not irrefutable, it is at least commonly held that: &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/infographic-hct">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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		<title>Intentionality and non-mental representation &#8211; Michael Tye&#8217;s Ten Problems of Consciousness</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentionality-tye</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentionality-tye#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jun 2014 10:48:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Critiques]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tye - Ten Problems of consciousness]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=2909</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[William Lycan&#8216;s (2008) introductory statement on intentionality for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins as follows: Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, properties and states of affairs” (Representational Theories of Consciousness, &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentionality-tye">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentionality-tye/feed</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Intentional States &#8211; John Searle vs Mother Nature</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentional-states-searle</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentional-states-searle#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 01 Jun 2014 21:57:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Critiques]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Searle - Expansive Intentionality]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=3187</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[John Searle&#8217;s book entitled &#8216;Intentionality&#8217; could otherwise be entitled &#8216;The principles and conditional characteristics of conceptual representation&#8217;. I say this because his irreducible stance on Intentionality is tightly restricted to and fixated on conceptually confined modes of analysis of mental &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentional-states-searle">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Intentional Stance: Dennett&#8217;s 1 vital error is Searle&#8217;s 1 critical omission</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentional-stance</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentional-stance#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2014 16:00:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Critiques]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intentionality - Dennett's Error]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=2456</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Through impartial analysis of Daniel Dennett&#8217;s &#8216;The Intentional Stance&#8217; (1987), I identify several inconsistencies in his position on intentionality. Then, I reveal a fatal flaw in the stance, but rather than throw the baby out with the bath water, make &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/intentional-stance">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>33</slash:comments>
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		<title>Michael Tye on Do fish have feelings?</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/michael-tye-on-fish</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/michael-tye-on-fish#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2014 20:56:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Michael Tye talk on fish feelings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Miscellaneous]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=2863</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Michael Tye is of the view that the problem as to whether fish have feelings or not, is best addressed epistemically than metaphysically. At his lecture at King&#8217;s College London yesterday entitled &#8216;Do fish have feelings?&#8217;, he compiled and appraised &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/michael-tye-on-fish">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Aesthetics, Afferent Processing Mechanisms, and the Categories of Conflation</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/aesthetics-afferent-efferent-mechanisms</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/aesthetics-afferent-efferent-mechanisms#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2014 09:25:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[5 Aesthetic theory - Categories of Conflation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=2768</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There is an aspect to aesthetics that takes it beyond the bounds of coherent conceptual analysis. It shares this characteristic with consciousness itself. There is something about aesthetic experience that evades objective study and yet it is immediately accessible and &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/aesthetics-afferent-efferent-mechanisms">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Dynamics in Action by Alicia Juarrero: Hermeneutic Wholes?</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/hermeneutic-wholes</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/hermeneutic-wholes#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Apr 2014 22:15:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[11 Dynamics in Action]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=2710</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Section 1 of 4 &#8211; Ali the particle physicist: “covering-laws” and the hermeneutic approach Consider Ali, the particle physicist. Unlike a physicist in the real world, he has no concept of the contained entity we call “the atom”. Imagine that &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/hermeneutic-wholes">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Terrence Deacon’s Incomplete Nature &#8211; Identifying the thermodynamic homunculus</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/incomplete-nature</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/incomplete-nature#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Apr 2014 16:00:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Critiques]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrence Deacon - Incomplete Nature]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=2613</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[1. Intro &#8211; Incomplete Nature is Deacon’s Hierarchical Systems Model Although not explicitly expressed as such, Terrence Deacon’s ‘Incomplete Nature’ is a hierarchical model for explaining, through emergent process, how mind arises from matter. Deacon states, Our ultimate scientific challenge &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/incomplete-nature">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>What is knowledge? &#8211; Answers by Edna the alien and Massimo Pigliucci</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/what-is-knowledge</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/what-is-knowledge#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 21 Sep 2013 20:56:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[13 What is Knowledge? Edna the Alien vs Massimo Pigliucci]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=2030</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What is knowledge? Knowledge can be defined as a type of information construct that has evolved from a reflective discourse with the environment such that it enables the extension of that construct’s temporal existence through its functions and actions. Consequently, &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/what-is-knowledge">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Hierarchical Theory of Moral Philosophy and how it relates to Efferent Neural Information Processing</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/theory-of-moral-philosophy</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/theory-of-moral-philosophy#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 18 May 2013 08:00:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[4 Ethics & Categories of Action]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=660</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Abstract: Hierarchical Systems Theory dictates a particular theory of moral philosophy. This hierarchical moral philosophy provides a link with the evolution of efferent information processing. In other words, the key to this theory of moral philosophy is in the proposition &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/theory-of-moral-philosophy">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Hierarchical Construct Theory vs Dispositional Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/dispositional-higher-order-thought-theory</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/dispositional-higher-order-thought-theory#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Apr 2013 08:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[3 HST vs DHOT]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=1136</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ABSTRACT: Through the utilization of a descriptive illustration and detailed referencing of Carruthers (2000 &#8211; Phenomenal Consciousness), a comparison of Hierarchical Construct theory (2007 &#8211; On the Origins of Life, Consciousness, and Personal Identity) with Dispositional Higher-Order Thought theory of &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/dispositional-higher-order-thought-theory">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Phenomenal vs Noumenal Consciousness and the problem of Personal Identity</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/phenomenal-noumenal-consciousness</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/phenomenal-noumenal-consciousness#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Apr 2013 08:00:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[2 Noumenal Consciousness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Papers]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=656</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If there is Phenomenon of conscious experience, what could Noumenal Consciousness be? ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness &#8211; &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/phenomenal-noumenal-consciousness">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>6</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Emergence &#038; the Evolution of Consciousness &#8211; Hierarchical Construct Theory</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/evolution-of-consciousness</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/evolution-of-consciousness#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 06 Apr 2013 08:00:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[1 Emergence & Evolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Papers]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=1068</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[ABSTRACT: This philosophy article provides a reductive explanation of ‘phenomenal experience’ and in doing so, provides an explanation for the emergence and evolution of human consciousness. The explanation demonstrates compliance with philosophical criteria. It does this by describing and explaining &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/evolution-of-consciousness">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>References</title>
		<link>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/reference-index</link>
		<comments>http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/reference-index#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Mar 2012 01:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Pharoah]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[References]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/?p=246</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Alexander, S. (1920). Space, Time, and Deity. London: Macmillan. Armstrong, D. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge. Armstrong, D. (1984). Consciousness and causality. In D. Armstrong &#38; N. Malcolm (Eds.), Consciousness and Causality (pp. 103-191). Oxford: Blackwell. &#8230; <a href="http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/reference-index">Continue reading <span class="meta-nav">&#8594;</span></a>]]></description>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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