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	<title>University of Illinois Law Review</title>
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	<link>https://illinoislawreview.org</link>
	<description>The University of Illinois Law Review is an academic publication published by the students of the University of Illinois College of Law.</description>
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		<title>Truth and Deception in Criminal Sentencing</title>
		<link>https://illinoislawreview.org/print/vol-2026-no-3/truth-and-deception-in-criminal-sentencing/</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 17:25:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paul H. Robinson <sup><a class="fn-reference" href="#note-a">*</a></sup> & Hugh Rennie <sup><a class="fn-reference" href="#note-b">**</a></sup>]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Featured]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vol. 2026 No. 3]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://illinoislawreview.org/?p=10115</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">Public discourse about criminal punishment routinely centers on the sentences judges publicly impose in court. Yet, in most American jurisdictions, the sentence publicly imposed bears little resemblance to the term of imprisonment an offender will actually serve. Through statutory analysis and sentencing and release data, this Article demonstrates that in all but a handful of states, legislatively authorized sentence discounts—often exceeding fifty percent and in many cases reaching seventy-five percent or more—systematically distort the meaning of the announced sentences, even when those sentences are characterized as “minimum” terms. These discounts are also not confined to minor offenses. States routinely apply them to serious violent crimes, including rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and murder. The Article argues that this gap between announced sentences and actual time served is not accidental but institutionalized.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">As Part II details, this institutionalized deception allows states to project a strong deterrent threat and to limit the costs of incarceration. Both Republican- and Democratic-controlled states have embraced this practice for financial or ideological reasons.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">Part III contends, however, that this system of sentencing deception carries substantial social costs. Because most crimes are committed by repeat offenders, the deterrent effect of inflated sentences is largely illusory. More damaging is the erosion of the criminal justice system’s credibility once the public recognizes that announced sentences do not mean what they appear to mean. As institutional trust declines, so too does the system’s normative authority to secure people's assistance, cooperation, acquiescence, and compliance, as well as its ability to induce people to internalize its norms.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">These concerns help explain the “truth in sentencing” movement examined in Part IV, including the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which requires offenders to serve at least 85% of their imposed sentences—though few states have followed suit.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">The Article does not at all argue for longer prison terms but rather for greater transparency. Whatever imprisonment policies states choose, they should accurately disclose at sentencing how offenders will be punished. Greater transparency would mitigate the harms of institutionalized deception and enable more rational and informed criminal justice policymaking.</p><p class="pt-Abstract" style="text-align: center;"></p>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">Public discourse about criminal punishment routinely centers on the sentences judges publicly impose in court. Yet, in most American jurisdictions, the sentence publicly imposed bears little resemblance to the term of imprisonment an offender will actually serve. Through statutory analysis and sentencing and release data, this Article demonstrates that in all but a handful of states, legislatively authorized sentence discounts—often exceeding fifty percent and in many cases reaching seventy-five percent or more—systematically distort the meaning of the announced sentences, even when those sentences are characterized as “minimum” terms. These discounts are also not confined to minor offenses. States routinely apply them to serious violent crimes, including rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and murder. The Article argues that this gap between announced sentences and actual time served is not accidental but institutionalized.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">As Part II details, this institutionalized deception allows states to project a strong deterrent threat and to limit the costs of incarceration. Both Republican- and Democratic-controlled states have embraced this practice for financial or ideological reasons.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">Part III contends, however, that this system of sentencing deception carries substantial social costs. Because most crimes are committed by repeat offenders, the deterrent effect of inflated sentences is largely illusory. More damaging is the erosion of the criminal justice system’s credibility once the public recognizes that announced sentences do not mean what they appear to mean. As institutional trust declines, so too does the system’s normative authority to secure people&#8217;s assistance, cooperation, acquiescence, and compliance, as well as its ability to induce people to internalize its norms.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">These concerns help explain the “truth in sentencing” movement examined in Part IV, including the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which requires offenders to serve at least 85% of their imposed sentences—though few states have followed suit.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">The Article does not at all argue for longer prison terms but rather for greater transparency. Whatever imprisonment policies states choose, they should accurately disclose at sentencing how offenders will be punished. Greater transparency would mitigate the harms of institutionalized deception and enable more rational and informed criminal justice policymaking.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract" style="text-align: center;">
<p id="note-a" class="pt-FootNote"><span class="fn-ref">* </span> Colin S. Diver Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. As a matter of full disclosure, Professor Robinson was one of the original Commissioners of the United States Sentencing Commission, which was created by the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which also shifted the federal system to one of “truth in sentencing.” We thank Sarah Robinson for her extensive research contributions. </p>
<p id="note-b" class="pt-FootNote"><span class="fn-ref">* </span> Hugh Rennie is a member of the University of Pennsylvania Law School Class of 2025. </p>
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		<title>Contagion Policing</title>
		<link>https://illinoislawreview.org/print/vol-2026-no-3/contagion-policing/</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 17:24:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Wayne A. Logan <sup><a class="fn-reference" href="#note-a">*</a></sup>]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Vol. 2026 No. 3]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://illinoislawreview.org/?p=10112</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">Today, crime, especially that involving gun violence, is often regarded as a contagious disease. Among public health actors, the recognition<b> </b>inspires efforts directed at prevention and cure. Police, especially in poor, crime-plagued, racially segregated communities, also regard crime as a contagion. They, however, respond in a very different manner—with punishment and stigmatization. In so doing, they effectively engage in a form of “healthwashing” and create a new public health problem: themselves.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">This Article surveys how what I term “contagion policing” manifests, identifies the many serious harms it causes, and offers a new policing model dedicated to achieving positive outcomes in both public safety and public health. To achieve change, both the mien and minds of police must be transformed—from the current warrior mentality to one where they see themselves, and they are seen as, guardians of both public health and public safety. A large literature demonstrates that preventive interventions produce significant decreases in crime and promote community well-being. These findings should be deployed to inform new policing tactics and strategies. <span style="color: #000000">With violent crime especially, intervention is needed</span><span style="color: #000000">—</span><span style="color: #000000">to hold individuals accountable, prevent future harm, and signal to the community that the behavior will not be tolerated.</span> Police, in short, can be guardians of community health yet still invoke the coercive force of the state when circumstances require.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">To ensure success of the model, a new way of assessing police effectiveness is needed. Police performance should no longer be measured solely in terms of crime control metrics but rather be tied to both improved public safety and public health outcomes. For instance, even if resorting to high-intensity arrests for minor offenses reduces crime to a degree, evaluation should take into account the significant harms the tactic causes individuals and the communities in which they live. Importantly, moreover, metrics of success should be informed by the views of community members and key stakeholders, such as clergy and businesses, who for too long have been excluded from the goals and practices of police. </p>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">Today, crime, especially that involving gun violence, is often regarded as a contagious disease. Among public health actors, the recognition<b> </b>inspires efforts directed at prevention and cure. Police, especially in poor, crime-plagued, racially segregated communities, also regard crime as a contagion. They, however, respond in a very different manner—with punishment and stigmatization. In so doing, they effectively engage in a form of “healthwashing” and create a new public health problem: themselves.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">This Article surveys how what I term “contagion policing” manifests, identifies the many serious harms it causes, and offers a new policing model dedicated to achieving positive outcomes in both public safety and public health. To achieve change, both the mien and minds of police must be transformed—from the current warrior mentality to one where they see themselves, and they are seen as, guardians of both public health and public safety. A large literature demonstrates that preventive interventions produce significant decreases in crime and promote community well-being. These findings should be deployed to inform new policing tactics and strategies. <span style="color: #000000">With violent crime especially, intervention is needed</span><span style="color: #000000">—</span><span style="color: #000000">to hold individuals accountable, prevent future harm, and signal to the community that the behavior will not be tolerated.</span> Police, in short, can be guardians of community health yet still invoke the coercive force of the state when circumstances require.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">To ensure success of the model, a new way of assessing police effectiveness is needed. Police performance should no longer be measured solely in terms of crime control metrics but rather be tied to both improved public safety and public health outcomes. For instance, even if resorting to high-intensity arrests for minor offenses reduces crime to a degree, evaluation should take into account the significant harms the tactic causes individuals and the communities in which they live. Importantly, moreover, metrics of success should be informed by the views of community members and key stakeholders, such as clergy and businesses, who for too long have been excluded from the goals and practices of police. </p>
<p class="pt-Document"><span style="color: #000000"><i>Ultimately, public health and public safety must be seen as inseparably linked. Both are critically important public goods and positive outcomes for each should be the goal of policing.</i></span></p>
<p class="pt-Document">
<p id="note-a" class="pt-FootNote"><span class="fn-ref">* </span> University Research Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law. Thanks to Susan Bandes, Nadia Banteka, Alyse Bertenthal, Bennett Capers, Andrew Ferguson, Rachel Harmon, Aziz Huq, Eisha Jain, David Logan, Christopher Slobogin, Ron Wright, and Bob Weisberg for their helpful comments. </p>
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		<item>
		<title>The Paradox of Punishing for a Democratic Future</title>
		<link>https://illinoislawreview.org/print/vol-2026-no-3/the-paradox-of-punishing-for-a-democratic-future/</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 17:24:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rachel López <sup><a class="fn-reference" href="#note-a">*</a></sup> &  Geoff Dancy <sup><a class="fn-reference" href="#note-b">**</a></sup>]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Vol. 2026 No. 3]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://illinoislawreview.org/?p=10108</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract"><a name="_Toc67936887"></a>Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with an issue of first impression in this country, but one familiar to other jurisdictions around the world—that is, whether a former head of state should be immune from prosecution for his criminal acts while in office. Those who argue in favor of criminal accountability, at home and abroad, often trumpet the democratic benefits of punishing state officials. Their reasoning has been consecrated in law, finding its way into judicial decisions that overturn amnesty laws. But is there any evidence to support the central claim on offer—that punishment leads to a more democratic future? </p><p class="pt-Abstract">Using empirical evidence from other countries that have prosecuted state officials for their crimes over the last three decades, this study sheds light on the possible effects of these prosecutions on democratic institutions and behaviors. First, it examines an in-depth case study of Guatemala, a country where this issue recently came to the fore, to develop a set of hypotheses about the democratic effects of punishing state officials. To determine whether the lessons gleaned from Guatemala are generalizable, it tests these hypotheses using the most extensive global data set of prosecutions of government officials in domestic courts, which specifically focuses on human rights prosecutions. </p><p class="pt-Abstract">Interestingly, the findings reveal a paradox. While criminal prosecutions of state officials for human rights violations are associated with some positive outcomes, like increased civil society activism and pro-democratic mobilization, they are also associated with greater political polarization and anti-system backlash. By contrast, they appear to have little effect on democratic institutions. Considering these data, a central takeaway is that the democratic effect of prosecuting political leaders tends to rest with the people. Whether punishing them helps to ensure a more democratic future depends more on how the populace responds—negatively or positively—than on the limited institutional effects resulting from punishment. </p><p class="pt-Abstract"></p>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract"><a name="_Toc67936887"></a>Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with an issue of first impression in this country, but one familiar to other jurisdictions around the world—that is, whether a former head of state should be immune from prosecution for his criminal acts while in office. Those who argue in favor of criminal accountability, at home and abroad, often trumpet the democratic benefits of punishing state officials. Their reasoning has been consecrated in law, finding its way into judicial decisions that overturn amnesty laws. But is there any evidence to support the central claim on offer—that punishment leads to a more democratic future? </p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">Using empirical evidence from other countries that have prosecuted state officials for their crimes over the last three decades, this study sheds light on the possible effects of these prosecutions on democratic institutions and behaviors. First, it examines an in-depth case study of Guatemala, a country where this issue recently came to the fore, to develop a set of hypotheses about the democratic effects of punishing state officials. To determine whether the lessons gleaned from Guatemala are generalizable, it tests these hypotheses using the most extensive global data set of prosecutions of government officials in domestic courts, which specifically focuses on human rights prosecutions. </p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">Interestingly, the findings reveal a paradox. While criminal prosecutions of state officials for human rights violations are associated with some positive outcomes, like increased civil society activism and pro-democratic mobilization, they are also associated with greater political polarization and anti-system backlash. By contrast, they appear to have little effect on democratic institutions. Considering these data, a central takeaway is that the democratic effect of prosecuting political leaders tends to rest with the people. Whether punishing them helps to ensure a more democratic future depends more on how the populace responds—negatively or positively—than on the limited institutional effects resulting from punishment. </p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">
<p class="pt-Document">
<p id="note-a" class="pt-FootNote"><span class="fn-ref">* </span> Rachel López is a Leonard Barrack ’68 Chair in Law at Temple University Beasley School of Law. </p>
<p id="note-b" class="pt-FootNote"><span class="fn-ref">* </span> Geoff Dancy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, Canada. The authors are grateful to Gabriella Villafan for her research assistance. This research was also facilitated by fellowships with the Program in Law and Public Policy at Princeton University, the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge, the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School, and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law as well as Global Scholar Award from the Fulbright U.S. Scholar Program. We are also thankful for the opportunity to present this research at the “Transitions to Democracy Revisited” workshop at Princeton University, the Global Justice Workshop at Harvard Law School, CrimFest, the American Society of International Law’s International Criminal Law Interest Group Works in Progress Conference, and the Graciela Olivárez Latinas in the Legal Academy (“GO LILA”) Workshop, as well as at the American Associations of Law Schools (“AALS”) 2024 Annual Meeting. We are grateful to have had the immense privilege of presenting this research to many of Guatemalan human rights lawyers and indigenous rights advocates who pushed for criminal accountability on June 10, 2025, and to researchers at Diálogos on June 11, 2025 in Guatemala City. Their feedback was critical to this Article. This piece was enriched by feedback from Raquel Aldana, Yutian An, Gabriella Blum, Rita Canek, Stephen Cody, Netta Cohen Barak, Connie de la Vega, Erick de León, Gabriela Domínguez, Karen Engle, Astrid Escobedo, Mailyn Fidler, John Goldberg, Daniel Haering, María Hortencia Lajuj, Juan Gabriel Ixcamparij Nolasco, Marissa Kardon Weber, Stephen Koh, Ryan Liss, Orlando López, Jane Manners, Dennis Martínez, Candida Mercedes Morales, Daniel McConkie, Carlos Morales, Rony Morales, Raul Nájera, Daniel Nuñez, Cristian Otzin, Deborah Pearlstein, Hilda Pineda, Juan Luis Polanco Santizo, Jaya Rami-Nogales, Evelyn Quina Oxlaj, Evelyn Marcelina Rangel-Medina, Itay Ravid, Dunia Ramirez, Gloria Reyes, Kim Lane Scheppele, Kathyrn Sikkink, Silvio Tay, and Richard Wilson. Finally, we would also like to express our sincere gratitude to the editors of the <em>University of Illinois Law Review</em>, especially Kendall Crispin, Abby Milhiser, and Brad Schutter. </p>
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		<title>Cornerstones and Keystones: Confronting Stealth Attacks on the Regulatory State</title>
		<link>https://illinoislawreview.org/print/vol-2026-no-3/cornerstones-and-keystones-confronting-stealth-attacks-on-the-regulatory-state/</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 17:24:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Allan Wolf <sup><a class="fn-reference" href="#note-a">*</a></sup>]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Vol. 2026 No. 3]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://illinoislawreview.org/?p=10105</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">This Article is the first to identify the Roberts Court’s pattern of stealth overruling of several takings precedents by neutralizing or ignoring essential language from prior decisions. The Article explores six examples of this phenomenon and proposes a framework for identifying when a subsequent Court’s critical assessment of key language from a prior decision, whether it technically qualifies as a “holding” or not, necessitates consideration of the stare decisis factors used in <i>Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization</i>. Rather than focusing on the sometimes-arbitrary distinction between holding and dictum, the Article introduces two other indicia of precedential language that warrant a robust stare decisis consideration à la <i>Dobbs</i>. First, the targeted language may be a cornerstone, that is, the foundation for a significant body of subsequent state and federal case law. Second, the passage in question may constitute a keystone, that is, language that was critical to the formation of a majority opinion or without which the opinion no longer makes sense.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">Litigators and their allies can mine several sources to identify cornerstones and keystones, allowing them to argue convincingly that the Court’s attempt to ignore or abandon precedential principles warrants a full stare decisis analysis: state and federal cases, public papers of Supreme Court Justices, oral arguments, and party and amicus briefs. Relying on dozens of takings cases and snippets from the public papers of Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, Powell, and Stevens (reproduced here), the Article demonstrates how the Roberts Court has already overruled by stealth six essential principles of takings jurisprudence.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">While scholars, judges, and advocates have fixated on the Court’s head-on confrontation with <i>Chevron</i> deference in <i>Loper Bright</i>, the Roberts Court has been issuing perturbing decisions with even greater implications for the future of the regulatory state. Flying under the radar, the Court has followed a path that, if continued, could result in the gradual dismantling of police power and other regulations at all levels of government. </p>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">This Article is the first to identify the Roberts Court’s pattern of stealth overruling of several takings precedents by neutralizing or ignoring essential language from prior decisions. The Article explores six examples of this phenomenon and proposes a framework for identifying when a subsequent Court’s critical assessment of key language from a prior decision, whether it technically qualifies as a “holding” or not, necessitates consideration of the stare decisis factors used in <i>Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization</i>. Rather than focusing on the sometimes-arbitrary distinction between holding and dictum, the Article introduces two other indicia of precedential language that warrant a robust stare decisis consideration à la <i>Dobbs</i>. First, the targeted language may be a cornerstone, that is, the foundation for a significant body of subsequent state and federal case law. Second, the passage in question may constitute a keystone, that is, language that was critical to the formation of a majority opinion or without which the opinion no longer makes sense.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">Litigators and their allies can mine several sources to identify cornerstones and keystones, allowing them to argue convincingly that the Court’s attempt to ignore or abandon precedential principles warrants a full stare decisis analysis: state and federal cases, public papers of Supreme Court Justices, oral arguments, and party and amicus briefs. Relying on dozens of takings cases and snippets from the public papers of Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, Powell, and Stevens (reproduced here), the Article demonstrates how the Roberts Court has already overruled by stealth six essential principles of takings jurisprudence.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">While scholars, judges, and advocates have fixated on the Court’s head-on confrontation with <i>Chevron</i> deference in <i>Loper Bright</i>, the Roberts Court has been issuing perturbing decisions with even greater implications for the future of the regulatory state. Flying under the radar, the Court has followed a path that, if continued, could result in the gradual dismantling of police power and other regulations at all levels of government. </p>
<p class="pt-Document">
<p class="pt-Document">
<p id="note-a" class="pt-FootNote"><span class="fn-ref">* </span> Richard E. Nelson Eminent Scholar Chair in Local Government, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Thank you, Danaya Wright, for allowing me to bounce ideas off your impressive and creative brain, along with Ben Johnson, Jerold Kayden, Lyrissa Lidsky, Merritt McAlister, Timothy Mulvaney, and Christopher Serkin. The author also appreciates the valuable feedback he received from participants at the 2023 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference. This Article benefited greatly from the expertise of two out-standing professionals: Elizabeth Hilkin of the Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center (UF) and Ryan Reft of the Manuscript Division in the Library of Congress. Sam Mendez provided excellent research assistance. </p>
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		<title>Accommodating Childhood in Immigration Removal Proceedings</title>
		<link>https://illinoislawreview.org/print/vol-2026-no-3/accommodating-childhood-in-immigration-removal-proceedings/</link>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 17:24:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nickole Miller <sup><a class="fn-reference" href="#note-a">*</a></sup>]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Vol. 2026 No. 3]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://illinoislawreview.org/?p=10102</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">The United States of America’s adversarial immigration court system adultifies children. Approximately one million children in immigration court must navigate notoriously complex proceedings while being held to virtually the same standards and procedures as adults. Children—even infants—are expected to respond to the charges against them, present and rebut evidence, make legal arguments, and pursue their claims for legal relief, all without appointed counsel. As a result, most are unrepresented and predictably unsuccessful in their fight against deportation. The challenges these children face are compounded by issues of race, ethnicity, class, language, trauma, dependency on adults, and other factors that limit the children’s resources and increase their vulnerabilities. Despite this, lawmakers and judges so far have been unwilling to extend special protections to children in immigration court.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">But children are not simply miniature adults. Recent advances in our understanding of child development and brain science reveal that children are different from adults in ways highly relevant to legal proceedings. Our immigration court system must change to reflect these new insights.</p><p class="pt-Abstract">This Article is the first to marshal current scientific findings regarding the cognitive, developmental, emotional, and social immaturity of children to argue children are developmentally incompetent to represent themselves in immigration court. This Article establishes that it is unfair to nominally provide children with the same rights and responsibilities as adults without considering their ability to meaningfully effectuate them. Brain and behavioral science can and should be used in the immigration context, much like their present use in the juvenile delinquency and juvenile sentencing context, to compel appointed counsel and other accommodations like child advocates and specialized juvenile dockets. Applying a developmental lens to the treatment of children in removal proceedings exposes how structural inequities baked into the immigration court system uniquely harm children, thereby unlocking new insights and strategies for advocates and policy makers to create a fairer immigration court system for children.</p><p class="pt-Abstract"> </p>]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p class="pt-Abstract">The United States of America’s adversarial immigration court system adultifies children. Approximately one million children in immigration court must navigate notoriously complex proceedings while being held to virtually the same standards and procedures as adults. Children—even infants—are expected to respond to the charges against them, present and rebut evidence, make legal arguments, and pursue their claims for legal relief, all without appointed counsel. As a result, most are unrepresented and predictably unsuccessful in their fight against deportation. The challenges these children face are compounded by issues of race, ethnicity, class, language, trauma, dependency on adults, and other factors that limit the children’s resources and increase their vulnerabilities. Despite this, lawmakers and judges so far have been unwilling to extend special protections to children in immigration court.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">But children are not simply miniature adults. Recent advances in our understanding of child development and brain science reveal that children are different from adults in ways highly relevant to legal proceedings. Our immigration court system must change to reflect these new insights.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">This Article is the first to marshal current scientific findings regarding the cognitive, developmental, emotional, and social immaturity of children to argue children are developmentally incompetent to represent themselves in immigration court. This Article establishes that it is unfair to nominally provide children with the same rights and responsibilities as adults without considering their ability to meaningfully effectuate them. Brain and behavioral science can and should be used in the immigration context, much like their present use in the juvenile delinquency and juvenile sentencing context, to compel appointed counsel and other accommodations like child advocates and specialized juvenile dockets. Applying a developmental lens to the treatment of children in removal proceedings exposes how structural inequities baked into the immigration court system uniquely harm children, thereby unlocking new insights and strategies for advocates and policy makers to create a fairer immigration court system for children.</p>
<p class="pt-Abstract">
<p id="note-a" class="pt-FootNote"><span class="fn-ref">* </span> Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Middleton Center for Children’s Rights at Drake University Law School. Prior to joining the legal academy, I was a Managing Attorney at Immigrant Defenders Law Center in Los Angeles. There, I defended children in their immigration removal proceedings and provided legal orientation workshops to children in Office for Refugee Resettlement shelters. Thank you to following people for the helpful insights and conversations at various stages of this project: Hunter R. Clark, Kate Evans, Anthony Gaughan, Laila Hlass, Kathleen Kim, Elizabeth Keyes, Erin Lain, Jennifer Lee, Brent Pattison, Suzan Pritchett, and Mary Yanik. This paper benefited from feedback at the New Voices in Immigration Law Works in Progress Session at the 2025 AALS Annual Meeting, the NYU Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop, and the AALS Sections on Education Law &#038; Children and the Law Works-in-Progress Convening. Special thanks to my husband Erik, my colleagues at Drake University Law School, and my research assistants Martha Ames, Aubrey Kohl, Kelsey Lear, Erin Stender, Samantha Stewart, and Jasmine Yant for your edits, encouragement, and support. </p>
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