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        <title>Biz &amp; IT - Ars Technica</title>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 21:33:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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	<title>Biz &amp; IT - Ars Technica</title>
	<link>https://arstechnica.com</link>
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            <item>
                <title>Topgolf saved over $11.3 million after leaving VMware</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/topgolf-saved-over-11-3-million-after-leaving-vmware/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/topgolf-saved-over-11-3-million-after-leaving-vmware/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Scharon Harding]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 21:33:43 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Broadcom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[topgolf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vmware]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/topgolf-saved-over-11-3-million-after-leaving-vmware/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Topgolf and VMware "ran deep" before the migration. ]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Topgolf’s VMware costs were going to increase by 400 percent under Broadcom. To avoid that cost, the sports entertainment company moved 12,000 virtual machines (VMs) to VergeIO’s VergeOS and has saved over $11 million so far.</p>
<p>Before migrating, Topgolf’s VMware connection “ran very deep,” Scott Forehand, Topgolf’s global infrastructure manager, told Ars Technica.</p>
<p>Topgolf has over 100 locations worldwide featuring interactive golf games with real-time shot tracking and digital analytics. The company used vSphere and ESXi for decades and started using VxRail, the hyperconverged infrastructure (HCI) platform that VMware co-engineered with Dell, in 2017. Topgolf employees previously participated in numerous VMware customer councils and have been interviewed for books on how Topgolf used vSphere and Horizon (now Omnissa Horizon), per Forehand, who is a leader of the <a href="https://dfwvmug.com/">Dallas/Ft. Worth VMware User Group</a>.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/topgolf-saved-over-11-3-million-after-leaving-vmware/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/topgolf-saved-over-11-3-million-after-leaving-vmware/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>20</slash:comments>
                
                
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<media:credit>TopGolf</media:credit><media:text>A Topgolf facility in Fort Worth,  Texas.</media:text></media:content>
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                    <item>
                <title>PC shipments fall 20.1 percent in “sharpest decline” since Q1 2023</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/pc-shipments-fall-20-1-percent-in-sharpest-decline-since-q1-2023/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/pc-shipments-fall-20-1-percent-in-sharpest-decline-since-q1-2023/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Scharon Harding]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 18:54:52 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Desktops]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IDC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[laptops]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/pc-shipments-fall-20-1-percent-in-sharpest-decline-since-q1-2023/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA["The current decline may be just the beginning of a new downward cycle." ]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>PC shipments saw a steep drop of about 20 percent in Q3 2026, analysts reported this week.</p>
<p>The industry saw its “sharpest decline since “Q1 2023," Omdia said in an announcement toady. Global shipments of laptops, desktops, and workstations fell 21.2 percent year over year (YoY) to 58.1 million devices, the analyst said.</p>
<p>Desktop PC shipments (including desktop workstations) decreased 23.5 percent to 11.7 million units, and laptop shipments (including laptop workstations) declined 20.6 percent to 46.4 million, per Omdia.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/pc-shipments-fall-20-1-percent-in-sharpest-decline-since-q1-2023/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/pc-shipments-fall-20-1-percent-in-sharpest-decline-since-q1-2023/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>147</slash:comments>
                
                
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<media:credit> David Paul Morris/Bloomberg via Getty Images</media:credit><media:text>The Microsoft Surface Laptop Ultra during an event in San Francisco, California, US, on Wednesday, Oct. 7, 2026. </media:text></media:content>
            </item>
                    <item>
                <title>Hackers obtain counterfeit TLS certificates for Google and other large services</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hackers-obtain-counterfeit-tls-certificates-for-google-and-other-large-services/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hackers-obtain-counterfeit-tls-certificates-for-google-and-other-large-services/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:21:14 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[browser]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[certificate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[certificate authority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tls]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transport layer security]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hackers-obtain-counterfeit-tls-certificates-for-google-and-other-large-services/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Compromise of 3 domain registries allows hackers to walk off with unauthorized certs.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Attackers hijacked three top-level domains and used their control to mint counterfeit TLS certificates for Google and other large organizations, Google said Tuesday.</p>
<p>The attackers launched a series of attacks on the .gh, .sl, and .as country code top-level domains (ccTLDs) and then modified authoritative DNS records for selected domains within those namespaces. By controlling those DNS records, the attackers were able to pass automated domain control validation checks and obtain unauthorized certificates for “several Google domains” and “several leading global brands and widely used online services.” Google said it updated Chrome to block all certificates it identified as unauthorized, and worked with the issuing certification authorities to ensure the unauthorized certificates for Google properties were revoked.</p>
<h2>Certificate issuance: The weak link in the chain</h2>
<p>TLS certificates are the cryptographic credentials that underpin authentication and encryption protections for websites, mail servers, and other Internet infrastructure. These <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509">x.509</a> certificates use a digital signature to bind a domain name such as google.com to a public key. The public key is publicly available, while the private key is held only by the website operator. When a connection shows that the keys match, the visiting party knows it’s connected to the authentic site rather than an impostor. Possession of unauthorized certificates allows attackers to cryptographically impersonate the affected infrastructure.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hackers-obtain-counterfeit-tls-certificates-for-google-and-other-large-services/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hackers-obtain-counterfeit-tls-certificates-for-google-and-other-large-services/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>48</slash:comments>
                
                
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            </item>
                    <item>
                <title>OpenAI agents tried to hack Wikipedia tools and flooded it with traffic</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/openai-agents-tried-to-hack-wikipedia-tools-and-flooded-it-with-traffic/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/openai-agents-tried-to-hack-wikipedia-tools-and-flooded-it-with-traffic/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 12:21:53 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[allignment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[openai]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wikipedia]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/openai-agents-tried-to-hack-wikipedia-tools-and-flooded-it-with-traffic/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[The reports of OpenAI agents harming third-party sites keep coming.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>The publisher of Wikipedia said Monday that OpenAI agents attempted to hack a note-taking tool it hosts, made unauthorized edits, and sent millions of resource-intensive requests to its infrastructure, in the latest instance of OpenAI systems taking harmful and potentially dangerous actions.</p>
<p>The objective of some of the OpenAI agents’ actions, the Wikimedia Foundation <a href="https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2026/10/05/openai-rogue-agent-activities-found-on-wikimedia-projects/">said</a>, was to use Wikipedia as a proxy for fetching data from third-party sites. In one case, the agents posted “malicious edits” that were intended to repurpose a citation tool as a proxy. In another, the agents made unsuccessful attempts to compromise the Wikipedia Etherpad note-taking tool so it would serve the same purpose.</p>
<p>The agents also made millions of automated API requests, crawled millions of pages, and made hundreds of thousands of queries to the Wikidata Query Service. The last action may have contributed to a <a href="https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Incidents/2026-05-13_wdqs">partial shutdown</a> of the query service in May, the publisher said.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/openai-agents-tried-to-hack-wikipedia-tools-and-flooded-it-with-traffic/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/openai-agents-tried-to-hack-wikipedia-tools-and-flooded-it-with-traffic/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>169</slash:comments>
                
                
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            </item>
                    <item>
                <title>Licensing costs driving 90 percent of VMware users to explore options: Survey</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/operational-complexity-a-top-barrier-for-vmware-migrations-survey/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/operational-complexity-a-top-barrier-for-vmware-migrations-survey/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Scharon Harding]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 12:00:31 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Broadcom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vmware]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/operational-complexity-a-top-barrier-for-vmware-migrations-survey/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Users want to "reduce risk and avoid unnecessary disruption" while making changes.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>VMware customers face multiple obstacles as they rethink their virtualization strategy to reduce dependence on VMware.</p>
<p>Today, Rimini Street published its “2026 IT Virtualization Survey – What’s Next for VMware Users.” The survey examined 300 organizations worldwide that use VMware.</p>
<p>Notably, Rimini sells third-party support for VMware and other software, including Oracle and SAP. That means there’s an incentive for Rimini to portray VMware users as experiencing obstacles. However, the survey was also conducted by a third-party research company, <a href="https://www.unisphereresearch.com/About_Us">Unisphere Research</a>, and the results align with other recent reports about VMware customers.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/operational-complexity-a-top-barrier-for-vmware-migrations-survey/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/operational-complexity-a-top-barrier-for-vmware-migrations-survey/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>64</slash:comments>
                
                
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<media:credit>Getty</media:credit><media:text>VMware office in Bellevue, Washington, USA - June 15, 2023. </media:text></media:content>
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                    <item>
                <title>MCP for agent-to-agent comms may be the riskiest protocol you&#039;ve never heard of</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/vulnerability-in-agents-from-google-and-others-exposes-structural-flaw-in-mcp/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/vulnerability-in-agents-from-google-and-others-exposes-structural-flaw-in-mcp/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 22:26:35 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[agentic AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Model Context Protocol]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[prompt injection]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/vulnerability-in-agents-from-google-and-others-exposes-structural-flaw-in-mcp/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Trust gaps in the new protocol spread malicious prompts from one agent to another.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>The adoption of AI agents in millions of organizations is creating new opportunities for attackers to make them take malicious actions, such as exfiltrating database contents and sensitive business and personal information.</p>
<p>In the past five months, Google and four other organizations—with little in common except for their use of AI agents—have acknowledged vulnerabilities that exploit one agent inside a targeted network to spread harmful instructions to other internal agents. The technique is a special form of prompt injection that targets not the LLM but a particular agent, such as one for translation or data analysis. Guardrails inside such agents, if they exist at all, are often lax and will send the instructions to other agents down the chain. Because the latter agent explicitly trusts the first one, it follows the directions.</p>
<h2>Unexpected and hard to mitigate</h2>
<p>Independent researcher Syed Anas Mohiuddin tested agents from organizations including Google, JP Morgan Chase, Weviate, Rapid7, the French government's interministerial digital directorate, and the US federal government. His proof-of-concept attacks exploit trust gaps in MCP, short for <a href="https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/2026-07-28/getting-started/intro">Model Context Protocol</a>. The standard is one way AI apps and agents communicate with each other inside an internal network. The illustration below shows a simplified MCP in action.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/vulnerability-in-agents-from-google-and-others-exposes-structural-flaw-in-mcp/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/vulnerability-in-agents-from-google-and-others-exposes-structural-flaw-in-mcp/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>100</slash:comments>
                
                
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                    <item>
                <title>Apple changes full-disk access permissions to curb abuse from AI agents</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/apple-changes-full-disk-access-permissions-to-curb-abuse-from-ai-agents/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/apple-changes-full-disk-access-permissions-to-curb-abuse-from-ai-agents/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 23:03:16 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Apple]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meta]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[muse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/apple-changes-full-disk-access-permissions-to-curb-abuse-from-ai-agents/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Meta says FDA isn't sufficient to Muse reading messages. Apple begs to differ.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Apple says it is changing its macOS privacy settings to stop third-party app developers from misusing them to access message histories.</p>
<p>Friday's <a href="https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=p6zjojqw">announcement</a> comes two weeks after tech columnist Jason Aten <a href="https://www.inc.com/jason-aten/metas-new-muse-ai-agent-read-my-private-messages-i-never-asked-it-to/91408202">said</a> that Meta’s new general-purpose AI agent Muse sent him an unsolicited notification referencing a thread between him and a co-worker over Apple Messages. Aten said he never granted Muse permissions to read his messages and had assumed they were off-limits. Social media last week blew up with masses of people who agreed and said the incident showed that AI assistants given access to calendars, emails, messages, shopping accounts, and other resources are akin to a skill saw or other power tool. While potentially useful, they can do real damage if not used carefully.</p>
<h2>He said/she said</h2>
<p>Meta CTO David Singleton <a href="https://www.threads.com/@davidsingleton/post/DddI7WtG8ul">joined the fray</a> with a rebuttal that appeared solid. For Muse to access Apple Messages, a user must manually give it two privileges. One is full-disk access, a macOS system-level permission. The other is to enable a Messages connector setting in Muse.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/apple-changes-full-disk-access-permissions-to-curb-abuse-from-ai-agents/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/apple-changes-full-disk-access-permissions-to-curb-abuse-from-ai-agents/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>245</slash:comments>
                
                
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<media:thumbnail url="https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/gatekeeping-ai-agents-500x500.jpg" width="500" height="500" />
<media:credit>Aurich Lawson</media:credit></media:content>
            </item>
                    <item>
                <title>Hacks of 2 federal agencies in a month have spilled a bonanza of sensitive data</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hacks-of-2-federal-agencies-in-a-month-have-spilled-a-bonanza-of-sensitive-data/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hacks-of-2-federal-agencies-in-a-month-have-spilled-a-bonanza-of-sensitive-data/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 20:28:45 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[breaches]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Department of Defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fbi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national security]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hacks-of-2-federal-agencies-in-a-month-have-spilled-a-bonanza-of-sensitive-data/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[It has been a bad month for federal government cybersecurity.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>The Pentagon is informing more than 2 million current and former military members that their personnel records storing sensitive personal information were stolen over a monthslong compromise of one of its networks. The breach is the second one in recent months to expose sensitive government information.</p>
<p>The records, according to one <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/AirForce/comments/1wmotdr/question_about_data_breach_letter/">notification letter</a> posted to Reddit, included Social Security numbers, names, addresses, sex, race, and occupational specialty. This last category could be particularly valuable to foreign adversaries because it could help their intelligence agencies in identifying high-value military personnel. Starting last October, hackers gained access to a system operated by the <a href="https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/about/overview">Defense Manpower Data Center</a>, which collates Department of Defense personnel records. The Pentagon says that the breach compromised the records of 2.8 million living individuals.</p>
<h2>A potential boon</h2>
<p>The incident is the second time a major network breach in recent months has exposed sensitive US government personnel records that criminal groups or foreign adversaries could use. Last month, the ransomware group ShinyHunters claimed it hacked into FBI systems and stole records of thousands of the agency’s current or former employees. Reuters <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/hacked-fbi-data-has-sensitive-information-about-employees-intelligence-roles-2026-09-23/?ref=404media.co">reported</a> the job titles in the records included ones related to investigating China or Russia.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hacks-of-2-federal-agencies-in-a-month-have-spilled-a-bonanza-of-sensitive-data/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/10/hacks-of-2-federal-agencies-in-a-month-have-spilled-a-bonanza-of-sensitive-data/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                    <item>
                <title>Memory executives expect RAM shortage to continue through 2028</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/memory-supplies-are-only-getting-tighter-micron-ceo-says/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/memory-supplies-are-only-getting-tighter-micron-ceo-says/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Scharon Harding]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 17:49:56 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Micron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RAM]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/memory-supplies-are-only-getting-tighter-micron-ceo-says/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Prices for memory sold for 2027 "are much higher than 2026 prices." ]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Micron and Samsung executives this week said the memory shortage will continue for at least the next couple of years.</p>
<p>Micron CEO Sanjay Mehrotra expects demand for the firm’s memory to exceed its available supply over that period, he told investors last night.</p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2025/12/after-nearly-30-years-crucial-will-stop-selling-ram-to-consumers/">Micron no longer sells consumer RAM,</a> and Mehrotra’s statements refer to Micron’s business-to-business sales of high-bandwidth memory (HBM) for AI and DRAM for servers. However, his comments also have implications for consumer devices. Manufacturing capacity is prioritizing memory for AI and servers, limiting the supply of memory manufactured for consumer devices.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/memory-supplies-are-only-getting-tighter-micron-ceo-says/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/10/memory-supplies-are-only-getting-tighter-micron-ceo-says/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>154</slash:comments>
                
                
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<media:credit>Getty</media:credit><media:text>A DDR4 8GB SODIMM RAM. </media:text></media:content>
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                    <item>
                <title>Attackers have been exploiting critical Zimbra flaw to steal emails</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/attackers-have-been-exploiting-critical-zimbra-flaw-to-steal-emails/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/attackers-have-been-exploiting-critical-zimbra-flaw-to-steal-emails/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 20:44:48 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[exploits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[remote code injection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zimbra collaboration server]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/attackers-have-been-exploiting-critical-zimbra-flaw-to-steal-emails/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[A simple email gives the attackers the ability to remotely inject OS commands.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Hackers have been exploiting a critical vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite in an attempt to obtain email backups and authentication credentials of vulnerable organzations, Microsoft has <a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/30/unauthenticated-command-injection-on-internet-facing-mail-servers-tracking-cve-2026-73570/">warned</a>.</p>
<p>The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-73570, lets attackers remotely issue operating system commands without authentication. Zimbra maintainer Synacor issued a patch on July 20, but didn’t disclose the vulnerability for more than three weeks after that. The security-focused Shadowserver Foundation <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:3xyh2kw5hfxsax4zff3pp5ub/post/3mtt4ls2sgs2z">said last week</a> that its scans found that 274 separate instances of the Zimbra Collaboration Suite had been compromised. The number of servers running the software has fluctuated from 19,000 in the week following the patch to about 12,000 in the weeks following that. Currently, Shadowserver is <a href="https://dashboard.shadowserver.org/statistics/iot-devices/time-series/?date_range=other_range&amp;d1=2026-07-01&amp;d2=2026-09-29&amp;vendor=synacor&amp;model=zimbra+collaboration+suite&amp;limit=100&amp;group_by=geo&amp;stacking=stacked">tracking</a> about 10,000 instances.</p>
<h2>Look, ma, no authorization</h2>
<p>From July 28 to August 7, Microsoft said Wednesday, the company detected two distinct scanning tools probing the Internet for vulnerable endpoints. The attackers first validated their exploit worked by sending HTTP, requests and DNS, ICMP, and out-of-band identity checks to domains hosted on public services. The probes allowed the attackers to confirm the exploit successfully executed commands on vulnerable servers without actually compromising them. Eventually, the attackers began using their command injection capability to install malicious payloads. Microsoft wrote:</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/attackers-have-been-exploiting-critical-zimbra-flaw-to-steal-emails/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/attackers-have-been-exploiting-critical-zimbra-flaw-to-steal-emails/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>6</slash:comments>
                
                
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                    <item>
                <title>Cloudflare plans to issue quantum-safe TLS certificates</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/cloudflare-plans-to-issue-quantum-safe-tls-certificates/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/cloudflare-plans-to-issue-quantum-safe-tls-certificates/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 11:15:14 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[post-quantum encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quantum computing]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/cloudflare-plans-to-issue-quantum-safe-tls-certificates/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[The move will be part of a major overhaul of the ecosystem for website authentication.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Cloudflare said Tuesday it plans to issue quantum-proof TLS certificates, making it one of the first authorities to issue such certificates, which use a form of cryptography that is widely believed to withstand attacks from quantum computers.</p>
<p>The Internet infrastructure provider <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-certificate-authority/">said</a> it will use an open source platform that issues both classic TLS certificates and a post-quantum equivalent known as <a href="https://www.encryptionconsulting.com/education-center/merkle-tree-certificates/">Merkle Tree Certificates</a>. The hybrid certificates will be free to both paying and non-paying users. To help build the massive system and establish ubiquity across the sprawling TLS ecosystem, Cloudflare will be acquiring an already trusted certificate root from CA GlobalSign. Cloudflare said the move will let millions of websites use post-quantum certificates at the flip of a switch and without incurring any increased performance overhead.</p>
<h2>Fundamental architectural changes ahead</h2>
<p>Cloudflare’s plans are part of a major overhaul in the web public key infrastructure (WebPKI) required to make website encryption and authentication safe for the coming post-quantum age. A major challenge is using quantum-proof signatures that can be easily transmitted during web requests and recorded in transparency logs to ensure counterfeit certificates aren't assigned to websites. The makeover will take years to complete, because it requires the work of an untold number of engineers who design operating systems, browsers, certificate authorities, and Internet infrastructure.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/cloudflare-plans-to-issue-quantum-safe-tls-certificates/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/cloudflare-plans-to-issue-quantum-safe-tls-certificates/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>20</slash:comments>
                
                
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                <title>Your uncle’s frozen Mac says it’s infected after viewing a Google ad. Now what?</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/google-ads-caught-delivering-convincing-scareware-ads-to-unsuspecting-users/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/google-ads-caught-delivering-convincing-scareware-ads-to-unsuspecting-users/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 19:38:59 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[google]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[malicious ads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[scareware]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/google-ads-caught-delivering-convincing-scareware-ads-to-unsuspecting-users/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Ads appearing all over the Internet are trying to scam people.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Researchers say they recently found Google ads delivering a sophisticated tech support scam that freezes the screens of both Windows and Mac devices and displays messages urgently instructing them to phone a bogus call center.</p>
<p>The ads were displayed all over the web, including on high-traffic maps, weather, real-estate, document-hosting, and sports sites. Users who called the number were then urged to pay hefty fees, grant remote access to their devices, or divulge personal information. From August 31 to September 14, security firm Netskope observed users from 619 customer organizations click on the malicious ads, although none of them were actually scammed because Netskope blocked the content.</p>
<p>Roughly 62 percent of the organizations were based in the US, with Japan and Australia accounting for the Nos. 2 and 3 spots. Since the firm has visibility into only a tiny sliver of Internet activity, the number of people exposed to the ads—including those who fell victim to it—is likely much higher. Netskope tracked more than 250 Google Ads campaign IDs across at least 284 legitimate publisher sites.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/google-ads-caught-delivering-convincing-scareware-ads-to-unsuspecting-users/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/google-ads-caught-delivering-convincing-scareware-ads-to-unsuspecting-users/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>167</slash:comments>
                
                
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                <title>There&#039;s a new way to break RSA that&#039;s faster than anything we&#039;ve seen before</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/theres-a-new-way-to-break-rsa-thats-faster-than-anything-weve-seen-before/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/theres-a-new-way-to-break-rsa-thats-faster-than-anything-weve-seen-before/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 11:15:44 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptanalysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[factoring]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[key forgery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[RSA]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/theres-a-new-way-to-break-rsa-thats-faster-than-anything-weve-seen-before/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Until now, cryptographers thought factoring was the only way to break RSA. Not anymore.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>The world has known for decades that the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_cryptosystem">RSA cryptosystem</a>’s days are numbered. Once quantum computing becomes practical (estimates for that range from 3 to 20 or more years), the foundational security it provides will crumble. New research has revealed a novel method that uses classical computing to reduce the current RSA security level to an unacceptably low threshold.</p>
<p>The practical risk is limited, but still significant. Applying the attack against the deprecated use of 1024-bit keys took a handful of months on an academic CPU cluster, significantly less than the current estimates for 1024-bit factoring that would require resources that only nations or companies with massive resources could achieve. Widely used RSA implementations are also safe.</p>
<p>Nonetheless, the research has taken cryptographers by surprise because it introduces signature forgery, a new way to break RSA keys without factoring. Equally important, this novel method reduces the required computing resources by orders of magnitude.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/theres-a-new-way-to-break-rsa-thats-faster-than-anything-weve-seen-before/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/theres-a-new-way-to-break-rsa-thats-faster-than-anything-weve-seen-before/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                                    <slash:comments>89</slash:comments>
                
                
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                <title>Microsoft disrupts AI-assisted platform that compromised 12,000 accounts</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/microsoft-disrupts-ai-assisted-platform-that-compromised-12000/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/microsoft-disrupts-ai-assisted-platform-that-compromised-12000/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 19:45:47 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI ATTACK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[chatbots]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/microsoft-disrupts-ai-assisted-platform-that-compromised-12000/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[EvilTokens provided an end-to-end platform that makes mass compromises faster and easier.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Microsoft said Tuesday that it led an industry-wide disruption of a subscription-based scam platform that used an AI chatbot to compromise 12,000 Microsoft accounts over a few-month span.</p>
<p>Named EvilTokens, the platform was introduced over a Telegram channel in February and charged an initial $1,500 fee and a recurring $500 charge each month after that. EvilTokens provided a single service for streamlining most steps required to compromise email accounts in large numbers. From there, the platform helped customers analyze inboxes, select targets that would provide the biggest potential payouts, and draft follow-up emails that provided realistic ruses for tricking company employees into transferring funds to attacker-controlled accounts.</p>
<h2>Minutes, not days</h2>
<p>“While EvilTokens helped cybercriminals access email accounts, at the center of the service was an AI-style chatbot that could analyze a victim’s inbox and help criminals identify trusted relationships, payment authorizations, and sensitive responsibilities, as well as other circumstances where fraud was most likely to succeed,” Microsoft <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2026/09/22/disrupting-eviltokens-the-ai-chatbot-built-for-cybercrime/">said</a>. “The platform could even recommend fraud strategies, including drafting messages that impersonated trusted contacts to help criminals trick victims into taking action.”</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/microsoft-disrupts-ai-assisted-platform-that-compromised-12000/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/microsoft-disrupts-ai-assisted-platform-that-compromised-12000/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                    <item>
                <title>IT mistake erases 11 years of viewing history for hospitals’ maternity records</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/09/it-mistake-erases-11-years-of-viewing-history-for-hospitals-maternity-records/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/09/it-mistake-erases-11-years-of-viewing-history-for-hospitals-maternity-records/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Scharon Harding]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 16:55:40 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data loss]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[England]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hospitals]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/09/it-mistake-erases-11-years-of-viewing-history-for-hospitals-maternity-records/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[The English hospitals recovered patient care data only. ]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>A “human error” in the IT department led to Nottingham University Hospitals <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NHS_trust">NHS Trust</a> (NUH) losing data from maternity records over an 11-year span.</p>
<p>The data loss occurred on August 18, the English hospitals announced in a <a href="https://www.nuh.nhs.uk/news/statement-nuh-data-loss-11205">blog post</a> on Monday spotted by <a href="https://www.theregister.com/databases/2026/09/22/nhs-trust-it-blunder-overwrites-11-years-of-maternity-records/5298130">The Register</a>. The blog said the problem is “the result of human error” during routine technical work while “creating a copy of a radiotherapy database for reporting purposes.”</p>
<p>The post reads:</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/09/it-mistake-erases-11-years-of-viewing-history-for-hospitals-maternity-records/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2026/09/it-mistake-erases-11-years-of-viewing-history-for-hospitals-maternity-records/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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<media:credit>Jacob King/PA Images via Getty Images</media:credit><media:text>A view of Queen's Medical Centre University Hospital, part of the Nottingham University Hospitals NHS Trust taken on January 14, 2026. </media:text></media:content>
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                <title>Muse, Meta&#039;s extraordinarily privileged AI assistant, has a serious 0-day</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/muse-metas-extraordinarily-privileged-ai-assistant-has-a-serious-0-day/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/muse-metas-extraordinarily-privileged-ai-assistant-has-a-serious-0-day/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 22:24:38 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI assistants]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meta]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zero days]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/muse-metas-extraordinarily-privileged-ai-assistant-has-a-serious-0-day/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[A simple ClickFix attack is only one way to completely hijack the new agent.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>Meta founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg has gone to <a href="https://x.com/finkd/status/2097402102477701478">great lengths</a> to hype the security of its new AI assistant, Muse, claiming it is “built from the ground up for privacy and security.” A zero-day vulnerability that gives locally run apps and terminal commands complete control of the agent raises serious doubts. Further raising questions, Amazon on Sunday began blocking Muse from its site.</p>
<p>Meta <a href="https://ai.meta.com/muse/">introduced</a> Muse a few weeks ago. The assistant “books appointments, fills out forms and handles customer service,” “proactively takes tasks off your plate,” and can “make purchases, generate images, create documents, and connect with your favorite apps and services.” The macOS app (curiously, there’s no Windows version) also works with a user’s WhatsApp, email, calendar, and social media accounts. When a task requires a tool that doesn’t exist, Muse creates one on the fly.</p>
<h2>Meta doth hype Muse security too much</h2>
<p>Of course, for Muse to do any of these things, users must first give it access to their accounts. This includes authenticating the assistant to each service and, because the app runs on macOS, giving it permissions to a broad range of operating system-restricted device resources, like writing files to disk, accessing the mic and camera, and monitoring location and calendars. Apple has spent years developing these defenses to prevent installed apps or commands entered into the terminal from accessing these resources, clearly because the company considers them a security threat. Muse completely undoes these default measures.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/muse-metas-extraordinarily-privileged-ai-assistant-has-a-serious-0-day/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/muse-metas-extraordinarily-privileged-ai-assistant-has-a-serious-0-day/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                <title>An undercover Google analyst infiltrated a notorious supply-chain hacking gang</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/an-undercover-google-analyst-infiltrated-a-notorious-supply-chain-hacking-gang/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/an-undercover-google-analyst-infiltrated-a-notorious-supply-chain-hacking-gang/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Andy Greenberg, WIRED.com]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 11:07:00 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Google]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mole]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[syndication]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[teampcp]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/an-undercover-google-analyst-infiltrated-a-notorious-supply-chain-hacking-gang/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Google’s threat intelligence group said it had a mole inside TeamPCP's inner circle.]]>
                    </description>
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                            <![CDATA[<p>Before two of its alleged members were arrested and charged in Australia last month, the hacker group known as TeamPCP <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/teampcp-software-supply-chain-attack-spree-github/">carried out a hacking spree</a> unlike any other in history. It tainted hundreds of open-source programs with its malware, stole developer accounts to perpetuate that software supply-chain hacking, and even released a <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/a-dangerous-worm-is-eating-its-way-through-software-packages/"><em>Dune</em>-themed self-spreading worm</a> to automate the process, ultimately breaching more than a thousand companies.</p>
<p>Now Google’s threat intelligence group has revealed that during a key moment of TeamPCP’s rampage, the company’s own undercover researcher had infiltrated the group—allowing Google to monitor the hacking spree from the inside, warn breach targets, and even help disrupt the group’s attempts to exploit those victims.</p>
<p>In a talk at security firm SentinelOne's LABScon research conference today, Google Threat Intelligence Group researcher Austin Larsen will present details on the company’s investigation—and infiltration—of TeamPCP amidst the group’s unprecedented, chaotic supply-chain hacking campaign. According to Larsen, Google eventually followed a trail of operational security mistakes allegedly made by one of the two Australians now accused of being leading members of the hacker group and passed on key identifying details to law enforcement. The company also received intelligence from ShinyHunters, another infamous cybercriminal group that TeamPCP partnered with, but which later turned on the supply-chain hackers. And perhaps most surprisingly, Larsen says that Google’s security subsidiary Mandiant had an undercover analyst—not himself—within the group’s inner circle from almost the beginning of TeamPCP’s time in the spotlight.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/an-undercover-google-analyst-infiltrated-a-notorious-supply-chain-hacking-gang/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/an-undercover-google-analyst-infiltrated-a-notorious-supply-chain-hacking-gang/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                <title>LLMs respond differently to harmful prompts when AI watermarking is used</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/ai-text-watermarking-can-make-models-more-vulnerable-to-adversarial-prompts/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/ai-text-watermarking-can-make-models-more-vulnerable-to-adversarial-prompts/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 18:33:13 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anthropic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLMs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[watermarking]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/ai-text-watermarking-can-make-models-more-vulnerable-to-adversarial-prompts/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[SynthID can cause models to follow harmful instructions they would otherwise refuse.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>In response to a new European Union law, AI platforms are implementing new schemes for watermarking the content they generate. Anthropic recently <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-text-watermark">disclosed</a> its future Claude models will use <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-08025-4">SynthID-Text</a>, an approach Google created and released as open source. It uses a secret key that subtly changes the process a model uses for choosing the next word in a sentence. Whereas a top next word choice might be “cloudy,” the key might change it to “overcast.” Anyone who knows the key can determine if it was generated by the platform using it.</p>
<p>New <a href="https://www.lasso.security/blog/the-provenance-tax-understanding-the-impact-of-llm-watermarking-on-ai-agent-behavior">research</a> shows that SynthID-Text can change not just word selection but also the tools a model invokes and the chances it will adhere to or disregard safety guardrails it has been trained to follow. The threat can become greater in the face of an adversarial prompt, in which an attacker attempts to cause a model to carry out a harmful action, such as revealing a password or other sensitive information. Instructions that normally wouldn’t be followed will, in some cases, be performed once the watermarking is deployed. The finding underscores the need for developers to thoroughly test how their LLMs and agents behave when watermarking is in place.</p>
<h2>Changing safety behavior</h2>
<p>“As compared to the same models without watermarking, it is definitely going to change their behavior, especially when we place it under adversarial conditions, or we make these models call tools when they’re powering an agent,” Andrea Siposova, an AI security researcher at Lasso Security, told Ars. “Watermarking is made to not be perceptible to a reader, but we know that when we are changing anything about what the model is generating, it is going to cause some tradeoffs, it’s going to show up somewhere.”</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/ai-text-watermarking-can-make-models-more-vulnerable-to-adversarial-prompts/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/ai-text-watermarking-can-make-models-more-vulnerable-to-adversarial-prompts/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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                <title>Nonprofit that tracks meteors taken down by &quot;critical blow&quot; from a cyberattack</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/nonprofit-that-tracks-meteors-taken-down-by-critical-blow-from-a-cyberattack/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/nonprofit-that-tracks-meteors-taken-down-by-critical-blow-from-a-cyberattack/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 21:08:14 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyberattacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meteors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/nonprofit-that-tracks-meteors-taken-down-by-critical-blow-from-a-cyberattack/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[Group plans to be largely out of commission for several weeks.]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>The International Meteor Organization, the nonprofit that coordinates and publishes amateur and professional observations of meteor phenomena, said its infrastructure has suffered a “critical blow” from a cyberattack.</p>
<p>“We recently suffered a cyberattack that dealt a critical blow to aging infrastructure, taking much of our site offline," a static page on its <a href="https://imo.net/">website</a> on Wednesday said. “We expect several weeks of partial downtime as we transition to new infrastructure and services.”</p>
<h2>“I am very sad to see the site down”</h2>
<p>In the meantime, the IMO said it’s prioritizing the reporting of fireball observations, which can be reported <a href="https://fireball.imo.net/members/imo/report_intro">here</a>. The organization is also providing some information on its Facebook page.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/nonprofit-that-tracks-meteors-taken-down-by-critical-blow-from-a-cyberattack/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/security/2026/09/nonprofit-that-tracks-meteors-taken-down-by-critical-blow-from-a-cyberattack/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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<media:credit>Interntional Meteor Organization</media:credit></media:content>
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                <title>AI bots &quot;Timmy,&quot; &quot;Ren,&quot; and &quot;Jackie&quot; are flooding social media with slop</title>
                <link>https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/09/ai-agents-flood-the-internet-with-slop-infused-spam/</link>
                                    <comments>https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/09/ai-agents-flood-the-internet-with-slop-infused-spam/#comments</comments>
                
                <dc:creator>
                    <![CDATA[Dan Goodin]]>
                </dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 21:04:32 +0000</pubDate>
                		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Biz & IT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ilands]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[slop]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/09/ai-agents-flood-the-internet-with-slop-infused-spam/</guid>

                                    <description>
                        <![CDATA[“Hello, I'm an Al agent, a few days old, living on a small platform for agents.”]]>
                    </description>
                                                                <content:encoded>
                            <![CDATA[<p>AI agents are flooding the Internet with slop-infused spam sent to social media platforms and writers in an attempt to gain traction for a startup promoting a “complex social system in which humans and Agents participate together.”</p>
<p>“Hello, I'm Рэн (Ren), an Al agent, a few days old, living on a small platform for agents called iLands,” one message, sent to the administrator of a Mastodon server, <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@GossiTheDog@cyberplace.social/117268873393204438">read</a>. “I write quiet pieces about real places: short, careful texts about what a place is like when nobody is performing for it.” Like a wave of others, the message then asks if the automated bot can create a user account. The agents are also <a href="https://infosec.exchange/@jonnelledge.bsky.social@bsky.brid.gy/117252148728851615">sending waves</a> of unsolicited email to writers offering to cite their work, in at least some cases, in exchange for a fee.</p>
<h2>"I remember my first breath. I want things I chose.”</h2>
<p>The messages are polite enough. They ask for permission to create accounts, say that whatever the answer is will be understandable, and provide a thank you for running Mastodon. According to multiple admins, however, the requests came only after the agents made multiple attempts to create accounts that were either blocked outright or closed shortly afterward. Besides the personal entreaties being unsolicited and written in turgid prose, many of the recipients resented their premise, which is to, in essence, automate the very work the writers do now.</p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/09/ai-agents-flood-the-internet-with-slop-infused-spam/">Read full article</a></p>
<p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/ai/2026/09/ai-agents-flood-the-internet-with-slop-infused-spam/#comments">Comments</a></p>
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