The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer

Middle East Report

2025-12-06T20:33:00.009+08:00

James discusses this week’s Middle East developments on Radio Islam.

To listen to the podcast or watch the video, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/middle-east-report

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Transcript

[Anchor] 7.43am it is, Central African time, you're listening to Radio Islam International, live from our studios in Durban for this morning, on this Friday morning, and roundabout quarter to two is our time for the Middle East Report, and joining us is James M. Dorsey, award-winning scholar and journalist with a different perspective on the Middle East. Remember, you can subscribe to James' newsletter and blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, and visit his website jamesmdorsey.substack.com to get a perspective of James' thoughts and his articles and opinions on matters coming out of the Middle East and the greater world. Well, James, good day to you. Thank you for joining us.

{James M. Dorsey} As always, a pleasure to be with you on this Friday morning.

[Anchor} James, US President Donald Trump, in addition to the other issues he's addressing at home, this time, you know what, on an anti-Somalia rant, but nonetheless, turning the screws on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as policy towards Israel, and the Middle East emerges as a main fault line, or the main fault line, in the President's Make America Great MAGA support base.

I mean, that base itself is a divided base, you know, nonetheless, although it may have one rallying point, and that's the President himself. In recent days, Mr. Trump has nudged Mr. Netanyahu to abide by the Gaza ceasefire, facilitate the surrender of trapped Hamas fighters, refrain from attacks in Syria, and engage in negotiations with Lebanon, as opposed to airstrikes which have plagued that area for, renewed thereof. Your thoughts on that, James?

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed. In addition to pressure exerted regarding Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon, Trump is keenly aware that Israel constitutes the last fault line in white nationalist domination of his Make America Great Again support base. The Make America Great Again crowd has already adopted four of the far-right's five key principles, including reducing immigration to preserve white dominance, a perception of relations between whites and non-whites, and Christians and non-Christians as a zero-sum game, the ranking of Americans according to race, religion, and how far back they can trace their ancestors' presence in the country, and identity politics.

Meanwhile, Western and Arab diplomats expect the Trump administration to announce the composition of a Palestinian committee made up of non-affiliated Gazans that would run the Strip's day-to-day affairs in advance of Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington at the end of this month, summoning the Prime Minister for a fifth White House discussion, shifting attitudes in the President's support base, and pressure from his increasingly important Saudi and other Gulf allies suggests that Trump and Netanyahu's forthcoming meeting could mark a milestone.

[Anchor] James, moving back, I mean, all those years ago, 24 years ago, this is the premise of our next question, with regards to the September 11th, the 9-11 attacks, now there is a straight line that connects Osama bin Laden's alleged destruction of multiculturalism with the destruction of the 9-11 towers years ago, and mainstream racism, particularly in the form of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Many writers would suggest that there was an important catalyst, it was the turning point where the country, and many in the Western world for that matter, saw a rise in Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, various forms of racism, and it shattered this multicultural dream that many, who the world refers to sometimes as liberals, had already in a post-modern world. Your thoughts on that?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, what started with 9-11 has become government policy in multiple Western democracies, with France backed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia seeking to define what constitutes moderate Islam, and regulating how Muslims should dress. Donald Trump this week took such policies a step further, after an Afghan national shot two West Virginia National Guard people in Washington, killing one. He cast all Afghan migrants as suspects, ordered the review of green cards issued to nationals of 19 countries, half of them Muslim-majority nations, and halted the issuing of visas for citizens of all third world countries.

In addition, he launched an all-out racist attack on the Somali community in the United States, and Somalia as a country, calling them garbage. Meanwhile, the Make America Great Again crowd struggles to come to grips with rising anti-Semitism in its ranks, fuelled by Israel's conduct of the Gaza War, and perceptions of Israel's oversized influence in American policymaking and a divergence of US and Israeli interests.

[Anchor] James, coming back to matters related to the Middle East directly mired in financial crises. Now, the Houthis, the group of course, the Houthis in Yemen, resuming threats to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was practically well involved in the strikes against the Houthis a number of years back, they and the Emiratis in particular.

They had stopped the actual military incursions and the military strikes, but once again, the Houthis seemed to be threatening Saudi Arabia.

[James M. Dorsey] Since halting their attacks on international shipping after the Gaza ceasefire took effect in November, the Houthis have stepped up their verbal attacks against Saudi Arabia. They have accused the Kingdom of collaborating with Israel and threatened to resume cross-border attacks if Saudi Arabia does not lift its economic blockade of Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Houthis need the lifting to address an economic crisis.

Israeli strikes have damaged ports and Houthi-controlled businesses. In addition, US sanctions are having an effect. The Houthis hope that their threats will persuade the Saudis to pay public sector salaries in Houthi-controlled areas, something that was part of peace talks that have stalled and would provide relief.

The Houthis' stepped-up rhetoric raises the spectre of renewed hostilities.

[Anchor] Meanwhile, increased tensions with Yemen, are sharpening the divide between Saudi and United Arab Emirates policies in Yemen.

[James M. Dorsey] Differences between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over crises in Yemen and Sudan are becoming more pronounced. In Washington last month, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman urged Trump to mediate between the Saudi-backed Sudanese Armed Forces and the rebel UAE-supported Rapid Support Forces.

In Yemen, the UAE backs the Southern Transitional Council, which wants South Yemen to secede from the Houthi-controlled north of the country, while Saudi Arabia prefers to see Yemen remain united, and has signalled that it could accept Houthi rule. The Council this week moved into the resource-rich Hadhramaut region of Yemen. In response, Saudi officials visited Hadhramaut, calling for a withdrawal of the Council's forces.

With Council forces seeking to take control of an oil company that exploits two of Hadhramaut's oil fields, the risk is that developments in the region could shatter Yemen's de facto lull in the fighting.

[Anchor] James M. Dorsey, thank you for your time this morning of the year for us in South Africa. Have a good rest of your weekend, James.

[James M. Dorsey] Thank you for having me, and I wish you all the best.

Are Trump and Netanyahu approaching crunch time?

2025-12-06T00:24:00.000+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

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US President Donald Trump is turning the screws on Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu as policy towards Israel and the Middle East emerges as a main faultline in the president’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) support base.

In recent days, Mr. Trump has pressured Mr. Netanyahu to abide by the Gaza ceasefire, facilitate the surrender of trapped Hamas fighters, refrain from provocative attacks in Syria, and engage in negotiations with Lebanon.

Throwing Mr. Netanyahu a bone, Mr. Trump has sought to mollify him by pushing Israeli President Isaac Herzog to pardon the prime minister, who is on trial in three cases in which he is charged with corruption and/or breach of trust.

Mr. Trump’s pressure on Mr. Netanyahu, exerted in a phone conversation with the prime minister on Monday, has produced initial results.

Mr. Netanyahu has agreed to open the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza partially, allow Israeli officials to participate in US-led talks with Lebanon, suggested that a security agreement with Syria was possible, and keep the door open to an Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory that Israel has occupied since the fall of President Bashar al-Assad a year ago.

How far Mr. Trump is willing to go in ensuring that Israel reduces tension with Syria and Lebanon and cooperates constructively in the implementation of his Gaza ceasefire proposal by helping pave the way for an international stabilisation force to police the truce will likely be evident when the president meets Mr. Netanyahu in the White House in late December.

It will be Mr. Netanyahu’s fifth visit to Washington since Mr. Trump returned to the Oval Office in January. No other foreign leader has met with Mr. Trump that often, suggesting that the president may mean business.

One card Mr. Trump could play is reviving his October suggestion that he may push Mr. Netanyahu to release Marwan Barghouti, widely viewed as the most popular Palestinian politician, a potential future president, and a proponent of a two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Marwan Barghouti

Mr. Barghouti is serving five life sentences plus 40 years in an Israeli prison after being convicted in 2004 of planning attacks in which five civilians were killed. While behind bars, Mr. Barghouti has sought to bridge differences between Hamas and Al-Fatah, the backbone of the Palestine Authority, , the West Bank-based, widely discredited, legally recognised representative of the Palestinians.

The timing of Mr. Trump’s efforts to put Mr. Netanyahu on a leash is as much driven by developments on the ground in the Middle East as by sharp differences within Mr. Trump’s Make America Great Again base over Israel.

Influencer and former white nationalist Richard Hanania argues that Israel is the last friction point in a far-right takeover of much of conservative America.

He noted that the Make America Great Again crowd had adopted four of the far right’s key principles, including reducing immigration to preserve white dominance, a perception of relations between whites and non-whites and Christians and non-Christians as a zero-sum game, the ranking of Americans according to race, religion, and how far back they can trace their ancestors’ presence in the country, and identity politics.

Mr. Hanania suggests that attitudes towards Israel and Jews are the far right’s last frontier.

“Nearly every ambitious Republican politician and right-wing influencer thinks whites are oppressed and immigration should be significantly reduced, if not ended, and that it is wrong to ever denounce anyone on their side for racism or sexism. But the Jews remain the final boss of Republican establishment taboos,” Mr. Hanania said.

However, “with young Republicans more likely to be anti-Israel and adopt anti-Semitic attitudes, and major right-wing influencers sounding more and more like (Nick)Fuentes…there is more pushback here from GOP (Republican) donors, so the ultimate Groyper victory is taking longer. But the trends are unmistakable,” Mr. Hanania added.

Mr. Hanania was referring to the white nationalist far right by its moniker, Pepe the Frog, an Internet meme. Mr. Fuentes is a controversial 28-year-old white supremacist anti-Semite, widely viewed as a Groyper leader.

In the latest indication of the shift in attitudes of young Republicans, a New York City-based Republican club said it would honour Markus Frohnmaier, a leader of Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, at its annual gala, weeks after the club’s statewide counterpart was disbanded over a group chat in which members praised Adolf Hitler.

Meanwhile, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is attempting to take advantage of the growing far-right turn against Israel by embracing reforms demanded by the United States, Europe, and Arab states of the Palestine Authority.

Mr. Abbas hopes that, like Mr. Netanyahu, whose response to Mr. Trump essentially amounts to motion without movement, his more or less performative reforms will position the Authority as a key player in the second phase of Mr. Trump’s Gaza ceasefire proposal.

This week, Palestinian Foreign Minister Varsen Aghabekian reiterated support for the international stabilisation force in Gaza as envisioned in Mr. Trump’s proposal and mandated by a United Nations Security Council resolution.

“These forces would help restore security, protect humanitarian operations, monitor the ceasefire, and support Palestinian institutions. They would support — not replace — the Palestinian government,” Ms. Aghabekian said.

She spoke as the Saudi ambassador to Jordan and Palestine, Mansour bin Khalid bin Farhan Al Saud, presented Palestinian Acting Finance Minister Istifan Salameh with a US$90 million check to cover public sector salaries.

Potential Arab contributors to the stabilisation force want to be invited by the Authority as part of ensuring that the Trump proposal constitutes the launching pad for the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Like with Hamas, Mr. Netanyahu has ruled out any role for the Authority because that would put Palestinian national rights and the goal of a two-state resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict at the centre of moves to implement the second phase of the Trump Gaza proposal.

Hamas has rejected the formula and demanded safe passage for the fighters to areas of Gaza controlled by the group.

Some Israeli sources believe Mr. Netanyahu’s agreement to open the Rafah crossing for Palestinians leaving Gaza was in part to provide a pathway for the departure of the fighters, provided they agreed not only to disarm but also to go into exile.

“Why are you killing Hamas members trapped in the tunnels instead of allowing them to leave and surrender?" Mr. Trump asked Mr. Netanyahu in Monday’s telephone conversation.

This month’s Oval Office meeting could be crunch time if Mr. Trump continues to pressure Mr. Netanyahu.

To be sure, one predicts Mr. Trump’s next steps at one’s peril.

Even so, summoning the prime minister for a fifth White House discussion, shifting attitudes in the president's support base, and pressure from his increasingly important Saudi and other Gulf allies suggest that Messrs. Trump and Netanyahu's forthcoming meeting could mark a milestone.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Contributing Editor to WhoWhatWhy, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

Gaza Health Ministry declares war’s total death toll exceeds 70000

2025-12-01T22:48:00.014+08:00

James discusses the Gaza ceasefire and the international stabilisation force on TRT World.

To watch the video, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/gaza-health-ministry-declares-wars

Transcript

[Anchor] Let's bring in James M. Dorsey, who's a Middle East analyst and senior fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. James, welcome.

So can a ceasefire really be called a ceasefire when civilians, including children, continue to be killed by military means?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, I think what we're seeing basically is that both Israel and Hamas see the ceasefire as a way to further improve their situations and achieve their goals. That is not to say that there are not serious violations of the ceasefire, particularly by Israel. You see far more Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians, alleged Hamas operatives, and far less Hamas attacks on Israeli troops.

Now, obviously, Hamas's military capabilities have been severely decimated in this two years of war. But in a normal situation in which you had a ceasefire, if Israel sees a threat or a violation, it would be going to the U.S.-run deconfliction centre that was established in Israel. It doesn't do so.

It acts unilaterally.

[Anchor] James, talking about the second phase of the ceasefire, where are things at with that, particularly around the International Stabilisation Force that is tasked with disarming Hamas?

[James M. Dorsey] Obviously, U.S. President Trump will tell you something different. But in my mind, the process is stalled. You have a situation in which Gaza effectively already has been divided into two sectors, a sector that is controlled by Hamas and a sector that is controlled by the Israelis.

U.S. policy at this point is to improve the situation for Palestinians in the Israeli-controlled sector, in fact persuade Palestinians who are under Hamas control to move to the Israeli sector. In that constellation, it's hard to see how many of the countries that are being envisioned as members of the International Stabilisation Force will want to be the enforcers of a policy that divides Gaza, keeps the Israelis present in the Strip, rather than allows for Palestinian control of the area and a full Israeli withdrawal.

[Anchor] How much confidence then do you have about this second phase progressing, particularly as we've been seeing B-roll, as you've been speaking of the yellow line, which is actually looking like it's becoming more of a permanent situation and there have been violations of the ceasefire in areas which are meant to be safe zones for civilians?

[James M. Dorsey] I'd like to have more confidence than I have in it. At this point, I'm very sceptical. I just simply don't see how countries like Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, or Saudi Arabia would want to contribute troops on the ground where you don't have an agreement on disarmament of Hamas, you don't have an agreement on what the mandate precisely is, even though we now have a United Nations Security Council resolution that anchors the force in international law, and that is not about all of Gaza, rather than only part of Gaza. So, it's very hard to see how that's going to happen in practise.

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Trumps announces 'permanent pause on third world immigrants'

2025-11-28T22:29:00.014+08:00

James discusses on TRT World US President Donald Trump’s crackdown on migration in the wake of the shooting by an Afghan national of two Virginia National Guards in Washington.

To watch the video or listen to the podcast, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/trump-announces-permanent-pause-on

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Transcript

[Efnan Bayraktar] Joining me now from Singapore is James Dorsey. He's an adjunct senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

Thank you so much for being with us on the programme, James. How do you read into Trump's recent remarks and what does this ultimately mean for the people that aren't just trying to migrate to the United States, but people who are currently in the United States?

[James M. Dorsey] It's a pleasure to be with you. What this means basically is that the shooter, whether wittingly or unwittingly, gave U.S. President Trump the pretext that he needed. The 19 countries that he is targeting are the countries, apparently, that he targeted in June with the executive order to restrict immigration to the United States.

Half of those countries are Muslim-majority countries, including, of course, Afghanistan, but also Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen. What this feeds into is what we've actually seen since 9-11, when Osama bin Laden essentially destroyed the concept of multiculturalism. Since then, we've seen progressively racist attitudes, discriminatory attitudes, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic attitudes becoming increasingly mainstream and part of societal practise and the language that is used not only in the United States, but also elsewhere.

[Efnan Bayraktar] The details are still vague on how exactly he's going to permanently pause migration from what he calls these third world countries, but experts do believe that the ramifications, of course, will be damaging. Is there anything that can stop him from putting these orders into effect?

[James M. Dorsey] First of all, the Afghans, some 195,000 Afghans who are in the United States since 2021, they're going to be the most affected because each one of them is going to have their residency and presence in the United States reviewed. On top of that, I think that nationals of the countries that we just spoke about are going to find it increasingly difficult to gain entry into the United States. The unfortunate part of this is that there are obviously legal challenges that can be brought to bear, and I'm sure that that will happen in the United States.

But essentially, there is broad-based support for these kinds of measures among important segments of both U.S. and European societies.

[Efnan Bayraktar] The United States, as we know, has always claimed to be a nation of immigrants built by the people who arrived to America from different parts of the world. If Trump does go through with these policies, especially for an extended period of time, and gets rid of those that he sees unfit to be in the country, what would that mean for the future of America?

[James M. Dorsey] Immigrants have contributed significantly to what the United States is today culturally, economically, socially. However, we've seen this anti-migrant stance on the part of Donald Trump since he was in office in his first term, from 2016 to 2020. At the time, he tried to ban unsuccessfully, but nonetheless tried to ban all migration from Muslim countries.

So this is something that's going to be not only at the expense of potential migrants, but at the expense of the United States.

[Efnan Bayraktar] Okay, James Dorsey, thank you so much for being with me here on the NewsHour and sharing that analysis with us.

[James M. Dorsey] Thank you for having me.

Divide and conquer

2025-11-27T16:39:00.002+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

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Divide and conquer has become Israel’s main operating principle in a world in which it stands condemned for its war conduct, impunity, and intransigence, and is increasingly isolated.

Israel applies the principle whether it is in Gaza, Syria, its uphill battle to gain the high ground in its information wars, or its efforts to encourage Jewish immigration.

In Israel’s latest application of the principle, it sees an opportunity to capitalise on Christian assertions that their African brethren are the primary victims of Muslim aggression in what amounts to a religion-driven conflict.

A recent spate of kidnappings for ransom by criminal gangs and jihadists in Nigeria, a country with swaths of ungoverned land, and long-standing violence driven as much by religion and ethnicity as by access to land and water and crime, has fuelled the assertions.

This week, the Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria said as much in a statement. The statement called on the government to immediately stop the decimation of Christian communities.

The bishops warned that the government’s failure to respond in a timely and appropriate fashion has “given credence to allegations of ‘genocide’ in some quarters.”

At the same, bishops said they were “deeply concerned that Muslims and many other innocent citizens of diverse ethnic background have also been victims of this same cruelty that continues to desecrate our common humanity.”

Similarly, US President Donald Trump’s questionable claim that South Africa is committing genocide against whites has created openings for Israel in its information wars.

South Africa is the main plaintiff in proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that charge Israel with genocide in Gaza.

Last week, Mr. Trump lashed out at Nigeria for “doing nothing” to stop what US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz called "genocide wearing the mask of chaos."

Mr. Trump has threatened to cut all aid to Nigeria if the country fails to stop the "killing of Christians" by Muslim militants.

“Pro-Israeli groups have gone full court on Africa to promote Islamophobia and secure their ties to Christians,” said a well-connected conservative activist, noting that religion was only one of several drivers of the inter-communal violence in Africa.

Encouraged by supporters of Israel, some Trump administration officials pushed for the president to raise with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during his visit to Washington earlier this month the illicit flow of arms, allegedly including from Saudi Arabia, to Islamist and tribal Muslim militants in Nigeria.

“The flow of illicit weapons complicates the problem. We flagged this in advance of the crown prince’s visit,” a US official said.

It’s not clear whether Mr. Trump raised the issue with Mr. Bin Salman, nor is there evidence that Saudi arms have reached militants, whose primary sources of weaponry are looted Libyan and Nigerian military depots.

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), founded by Yigal Carmon, a former advisor to Israel’s West Bank and Gaza occupation authority and Prime Ministers Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, last week prided itself on highlighting the threats African Christians face, primarily from jihadists, according to the institute.

In doing so, MEMRI has for several years pushed a narrative that reduces the plight of African Christians to an exclusively religious conflict instigated by Islamists.

”Not a day goes by without the MEMRI...team documenting jihadi reports of attacks on African Christians,” said MEMRI’s executive director, Steven Stalinsky.

Analyst and former British army major Andrew Fox acknowledged that “a purely religious framing can indeed further inflame tensions” but cautioned that “for those living through the horrors, such academic balancing offers little solace.”

Ironically, many African Christians have a greater affinity with the conservative social mores of their Muslim brethren than with the social liberalism in the West, where many of their brethren have endorsed sexual diversity, including homosexuality.

The schism has driven a wedge that threatens to tear the Anglican church apart over LGBTQ and women's rights, and the Church of England's failure to support embattled African communities assertively.

In the latest fracture, the Global Anglican Future Conference, or Gafcon, a gathering of conservative churches, including the largest and fastest-growing congregations in Africa, took issue with last month’s appointment of Bishop Sarah Mullally as the first woman to be archbishop of Canterbury, the Anglican Communion’s symbolic spiritual leader.

The “future has arrived,” said Gafcon’s chairman, Archbishop Laurent Mbanda of Rwanda.

Encouraging anti-Muslim narratives to bolster the Christian assertions serves multiple Israeli purposes.

It allows Israel to garner favour with Evangelicals in Africa as well as in the United States, where once fervent supporters of Israel have become increasingly critical of the Jewish-majority state and more empathetic towards the plight of the Palestinians.

Writer and researcher Suraya Dadoo noted that “as the epicentre of Christianity shifts rapidly towards Africa and Pentecostalism, in particular emerges as a particularly potent presence on the continent, (Christian Zionism) will increasingly shape Israel’s public diplomacy in Africa.”

Israel’s focus on Africa paid off, when last year International Court of Justice Vice President Julia Sebutinde was the only member of the world’s highest judicial body to oppose all provisional measures it advocated in South Africa’s case against Israel.

“The Lord is counting on me to stand on the side of Israel,” Ms. Sebutinde said in August at the launch of a new Watoto Church Evangelical ministry in the Ugandan capital of Kampala.

Projecting African Christians as exclusively under attack by Muslims also expands the geography of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s assertion that Muslim migration to Europe is the driver of public opinion on the continent turning against Israel.

It bolsters Mr. Netanyahu’s positioning of Israel as the bulwark against Muslim barbarism that he hopes will resonate with the far right in the United States and elsewhere.

In doing so, Mr. Netanyahu, coupled with his alignment with the far right globally, despite its past and present associations with anti-Semitism, is playing a dangerous game that puts Jewish communities at risk.

By legitimising Islamophobia, Mr. Netanyahu opens the door to the legitmisation of religious, ethnic, and racial prejudice and bigotry across the board, including anti-Semitism.

Even so, Mr. Netanyahu and his Aliyah or Jewish immigration minister, Ofer Sofer, a member of ultranationalist Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionist party, have no qualms about prioritising immigration of Jewish communities that may broaden their electoral base rather than adhering to Israel’s founding assertion that it is a haven for Jews irrespective of their religious or political inclinations.

Not to mention the juxtaposition of Jewish immigration with Israeli efforts to depopulate Gaza, and eventually, the occupied West Bank.

In its latest move, the government this week approved the migration of 5,800 members of India’s Bnei Menashe community, who claim to be descendants of one of the lost Israelite tribes.

The catch is that Israel’s Orthodox rabbinate doesn’t recognize the Bnei Menashe as Jews. Like other communities, including Falashas from Ethiopia who were flown to Israel in several waves in the last 45 years, the Indian community will be forced on arrival to convert to Judaism in accordance with Orthodox religious practice.

Orthodox rabbis will likely encourage them to send their children to Orthodox schools and live in Orthodox communities in the hope that they will vote for Religious Zionism in elections expected in the coming year.

“According to most polls, were elections to be held today, Religious Zionism might not even cross the electoral threshold. A few thousand, or even hundreds (of) votes could determine whether or not this party makes it into the Knesset when elections are held,” said Haaretz reporter Judy Maltz.

Shifting Paradigms: MbS positions Saudi Arabia as a global powerhouse

2025-11-24T22:09:00.001+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

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Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. They make this column and podcast possible.

Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by subscribing to The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

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When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Washington this week, he shifted multiple paradigms.

In an increasingly multilateral world, Mr. Bin Salman, backed by US President Donald Trump, suggested that the kingdom is claiming its place at the table as a geopolitical and geoeconomic powerhouse.

US support gives (Mr. Bin Salman) more room to negotiate with big powers—US, China, and even Israel—on his own terms,” said analyst Hesham Alghannam.

Seen through a geopolitical lens, Mr. Bin Salman’s commercial dealings are about more than diversifying the kingdom’s oil-dependent economy and turning it into a 21^st-century, cutting-edge knowledge society.

In Mr. Bin Salman's mind, the dealings are about putting Saudi Arabia on near-par with the United States, China, and India in a world that is multilateral rather than bipolar, with the US and China as the dominant powers, or tripolar, with India eventually added into the mix.

Chinese analyst Cheng Wang noted that Saudi Arabia’s positioning of itself was reflected in the kingdom’s increasingly assertive language.

Opening this year’s Future Investment Initiative, Saudi Arabia’s premier annual investment conference, dubbed Davos in the Desert, Yasir al-Rumayyan, the head of the Public Investment Fund (PIF), the kingdom’s almost US$1 trillion sovereign wealth fund, declared, “We have brought Saudi Arabia to the world, and now the world is moving towards Saudi Arabia.’

Similarly, Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman told the conference, “I want to say to the Chinese - pay attention! We’re going to have a lot of competition in the battery space next year.”

The energy minister’s calling China, Saudi Arabia’s foremost oil customer, to attention and positioning Saudi Arabia as the People’s Republic’s competitor in the Chinese-dominated battery industry was a far cry from its past emphasis on cooperation, win-win arrangements, and mutual benefit.

Mr. Wang suggested that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' move from selling oil in exchange for imported industrial products to locally manufacturing items such as chips, consumer goods, including cars, batteries, hydrogen energy, and weapons undergirds the kingdom's newly found assertiveness.

In a further indication of the kingdom's posturing, Saudi Arabia has opened four anti-dumping investigations into Chinese products, including stainless-steel tubes, titanium dioxide, easy-open aluminium ends, and electrical fittings.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia demonstrated its perceived positioning when it recently signed a defence agreement with Pakistan, the Islamic world's only nuclear-armed state, that declares that "any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both," despite Indian concerns.

Saudi Arabia’s newly found assertiveness didn’t stop Mr. Bin Salman from inking agreements in Washington that link the kingdom’s positioning as more than a regional power to ever closer relations with the United States in an environment in which global status is increasingly defined not only by hard and/or soft power but also technological prowess and access to critical minerals.

Mr. Bin Salman’s acceptance of his dependence on the US is unlikely to prevent him from hedging his bets by maintaining close economic ties to China, even if it involves limiting his room to manoeuvre.

“The Saudis…didn't really have export control regimes… Their pitch to us was, let us know what we need to do. There was zero resistance. They understood that we saw deployment of…technology not just in economic terms, but in security terms,” said Michael Ratney, the last US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who stepped down when Mr. Trump entered the White House in January.

Mr. Trump has yet to nominate a new ambassador.

This week, Mr. Trump catered to Mr. Bin Salman’s ambitions by defining the US-Saudi relationship as “one of the most consequential in the world.”

Echoing Mr. Bin Salman’s positioning of the kingdom, Saudi political analyst Ahmed al-Ibrahim asserted that “Saudi Arabia is no longer a junior partner. It’s no longer a passive player. It’s a global actor.”

Ali H. Tulbah, a Middle East business consultant with longstanding high-level contacts in Saudi Arabia and a former George W. Bush administration official, described Mr. Bin Salman as seeing “himself as an absolutely transformational figure, not just for the kingdom, but for the kingdom's ability to influence the global economy. He sees himself as an innovator, a la Steve Jobs,” the co-founder of Apple.

Messrs. Trump, Al-Ibrahim, and Tulbah may not be wrong.

White House statement

A White House statement said agreements signed during Mr. Bin Salman’s visit aimed to achieve “nuclear energy, critical minerals, and technology dominance.”

Mr. Trump claimed that US and Saudi entities had signed contracts worth US$270 billion this week during a one-day Saudi-hosted Saudi-US Investment Forum in Washington.

With Mr. Bin Salman hiking his pledge to invest in the United States from US$600 billion to $1 trillion, Messrs. Trump and Bin Salman signed in the White House several agreements related to critical minerals, artificial intelligence, and the kingdom’s acquisition of F-35 fighter jets, which testify to the kingdom’s positioning.

The artificial intelligence memorandum of understanding “gives the kingdom access to world-leading American systems while protecting US technology from foreign influence,” a reference to China, and “ensuring that American innovators will shape the future of global AI.”

Barely 24 hours later, the administration approved the sale of advanced Nvidia chips to Saudi Arabia’s Humain, the kingdom’s Saudi artificial intelligence company established by the Public Investment Fund.

Last month, Humain launched the kingdom’s first AI-computer operating system, which it believes will eventually compete with Microsoft’s Windows and Apple’s macOS.

In another reference to China and US insistence that Saudi Arabia limit Chinese involvement in its technology infrastructure, the US Commerce Department said Humain, like the UAE’s G42, another Gulf recipient of advanced chips, would have to meet “rigorous security and reporting requirements.”

Meanwhile, Elon Musk, CEO of xAI and Tesla, announced a massive new data centre project in Saudi Arabia that would be among the world’s largest.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding with D-AI, a European leader in advanced artificial intelligence and high-performance computing infrastructure, to build data centres for “AI training, cybersecurity operations, securing computational workloads for government agencies,” and “creating sovereign cloud computing systems that store and process data under Saudi jurisdiction.”

The kingdom's quest to become a regional computing hub leverages the fact that the United States cannot meet the growing global demand for computing power, particularly in the Global South.

“So, who is going to be servicing Africa and South Asia and the Middle East. This is where Saudi Arabia comes in and says, ‘We want to be this computing hub’… The Crown Prince made the case very clearly,” said analyst Mohammed Soliman.

Critical minerals, like computing, are another pillar of Saudi Arabia’s projection of the kingdom.

“If oil was (the Saudis’) natural resource wealth of the first whatever, 80 years, minerals is the future. And minerals will continue to be in demand even if there's a tapering off of demand for fossil fuels. So, for them, it's this vast, untapped wealth,” Mr. Ratney said.

Extraction is one thing, separating rare earths another. Separation consumes between 9-13 times more energy than extraction.

That’s where Saudi Arabia has a competitive edge, given its significant investments in renewable energy and fossil fuel reserves, making it a country with some of the world’s lowest energy costs.

In addition, Saudi Arabia has the needed cash to invest, despite losing money on multi-billion-dollar giga projects that it is forced to scale back. The kingdom also has large swaths of relatively unregulated land on which to build refineries and processing plants.

Signalling Saudi ambitions, the kingdom’s Future Minerals Forum, launched in 2022, has become the go-to industry gathering. It has put Saudi Arabia at a crossroads in a world obsessed with the nexus of critical minerals, technology, and the military-industrial complex.

Saudi Arabia, alongside the UAE, plays a critical role in the US competition with China for access to critical minerals through its investments in Africa’s critical mineral industry.

“These countries are poor and they're gonna want a partner to help exploit their natural resources. If we, and a country like Saudi Arabia, could do that in place of the Chinese,, better for us. It provides us with access to strategic minerals that fuel our own tech ambitions,” Mr. Ratney said.

Once its infrastructure is up and running, Saudi Arabia will be a vital link in the global rare earths supply chain, positioning itself as the closest processing hub to countries that received the highest share of investment in rare earths exploration in 2024—Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia itself.

Geologists value Saudi critical mineral reserves, the world’s fourth largest, including rare earth elements, base metals, gold, phosphate, and titanium, at US$2,5 trillion.

As a result, Saudi Arabia has rapidly emerged as a top global destination for exploration, attracting more than US$140 million in investment in 2024. Exploration licensing rose nearly fourfold from 224 licenses in 2015 to 816 in 2023.

Saudi Arabia aims to be one of the world’s top seven mineral processors by 2030 and in a position to challenge China’s dominance in midstream processing.

The US Department of Defence said this week that it will finance a 49 per cent equity stake in a new rare earths refinery, in Saudi Arabia in partnership with MP Materials and Maaden, the kingdom’s flagship mining company.

Saudi Arabia’s rare earths deposits

Saudi processing ambitions could prove a tall order, given China’s control of nearly 70 per cent of global rare-earths ore production and some 90 per cent of processing capacity, making it the only country currently able to meet global demand at scale.

Rare earths are critical components of the United States’ Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, F-35 fighter jets, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator drones, and precision-guided weapons, as well as for civilian technologies, from automotive semiconductors to MRI machines and cancer-treatment technologies.

As a result, Saudi Arabia’s computing and critical minerals ambitions have profound implications not only for the competition with China but also for international relations in a 21^st-century world order.

“The 21st century will see Saudi Arabia not only as an energy powerhouse, but also as a central node in the global diplomatic and economic balance,” said Hana Jalloul Muro, vice-chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and the parliament’s rapporteur for Saudi Arabia.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and podcast, The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

The Middle East Report

2025-11-22T01:06:00.001+08:00

James discusses this week’s latest Middle East developments on Radio Islam.

To listen to the podcast, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/the-middle-east-report-c36

Transcript

[Anchor] Good morning, James. Always a pleasure to talk to you. Good morning.

[James M. Dorsey] It's always wonderful to be with you.

[Anchor] Israel's US support base is narrowing, coming at Israel from different directions. You've got US President Donald Trump, then you've got the increasingly critical evangelicals, which until recently was a rock-solid Israeli support base. You've got the influential Make America Great Again torchbearers, who are all chipping away at Israel's standing.

[James M. Dorsey]

Indeed, Trump signalled his changing attitude towards Israel with his intended sale to of F-35 fighter jets, the world's most advanced fighter. The sale, and Mr. Trump's remarks when announcing it with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at his side, puts the kingdom on par with Israel.

Potentially, the sale could alter the military balance in the Middle East and violate US law that obliges the United States to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative military edge in the region.

At the same time, Trump's move came also as Israel loses support among young American evangelicals, a traditionally pro-Israel support base, and criticism of Israel mounting among the President's Make America Great Again supporters.

[Anchor] American-born Rabbi Mir Kahani is back with a vengeance. His racist Jewish supremacist ideology looms large 35 years after he was assassinated in New York and 41 years after Israel banned his Kash party as a terrorist organisation. Tell us about that, James.

[James M. Dorsey] The pervasive influence of Kahani's ideology is evident across Israeli politics and society, as well as in segments of the country's military. His disciples, including National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Heritage Minister Amichai Ben-Eliyahu, occupy prominent government positions and propagate his precepts. Members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party are calling for the rehabilitation of Kahani.

Kahani's revival is hardly a uniquely Israeli phenomenon. It is one of the most militant, supremacist, and racist fixtures of the worldwide mainstreaming of far-right racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice and bigotry, including anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

[Anchor] So coming back to Mohammed bin Salman, right, in an increasingly multilateral world, the Saudi Crown Prince Washington message was that the kingdom is claiming what it feels is its rightful place at the table as a geopolitical and geoeconomic powerhouse.

[James M. Dorsey] Absolutely. When the Crown Prince visited Washington this week, he shifted multiple paradigms. In an increasing multilateral world, bin Salman suggested indeed rather than word that the kingdom and other Gulf states are claiming their rightful place at the table as geopolitical and geoeconomic powerhouses.

Trump catered to bin Salman's ambitions by defining the U.S.-Saudi relationship as one of the most consequential in the world. Saudi Arabia brings more than geography, money, and Mecca to the table. It is rich in globally sought-after minerals that allow it to position itself as a hub at the crossroads of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and as a competitor with China, the dominant minerals power in an equation that could impact the structure of a 21st century world order.

[Anchor] So, Trump's acceptance then of bin Salman's suggestion that he mediate an end to Sudan's civil war would prove to be a minefield because Saudi Arabia and the UAE are supporting opposing sides.

[James M. Dorsey] Yep. Casting himself as the world's foremost peacemaker, Trump announced this week that he would seek to mediate an end to the war in Sudan at the request of the Saudi crown prince. Although hard to believe, the United Nations describes the humanitarian fallout of the war in Sudan as worse than even Gaza.

Unlike many of the other conflicts which Trump has intervened, such as Rwanda and the Congo, or Azerbaijan and Armenia, Sudan could put the president in a delicate position. U.S. allies Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt support opposing sides in Sudan, with the UAE backing the rapid support forces that stand accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UAE denies that it backs the forces.

Nevertheless, mediation may require the kind of subtlety and delicacy which are hardly qualities one would associate with Trump. Indeed.

[Anchor] James, as always, thank you for your time and have a great week.

[James M. Dorsey] Thank you for having me. It was a pleasure.

Listeners can subscribe to James' newsletter blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, and check out his articles on https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com.

Thank you for joining me today.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. They make this column and podcast possible.

Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by subscribing to The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

Thank you for your support and loyalty.

Changing US attitudes catch Israel in a pincer movement

2025-11-21T03:39:00.001+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. They make this column and podcast possible.

Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by subscribing to The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

Thank you for your support and loyalty.

Israel’s US support base is narrowing.

Coming at Israel from different directions, US President Donald Trump, increasingly critical Evangelicals, until recently a rock-solid Israeli support base, and influential Make America Great Again torchbearers are chipping away at Israel’s standing.

On Tuesday, Mr. Trump highlighted his changing attitude when discussing in the Oval Office with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at his side the sale of 48 F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia.

Later, at a black-tie dinner in the White House, Mr. Trump declared Saudi Arabia “a major non-NATO ally,” a status already enjoyed by regional states Qatar, Bahrain, and Israel.

Potentially, the sale could alter the military balance in the Middle East and violate US law that obliges the United States to ensure that Israel maintains a "qualitative military edge" in the region, a pillar of the Jewish-majority state’s military posture.

“This is a great ally, and Israel is a great ally… They are both at the level where they should get top-of-the-line,” Mr. Trump said when asked whether Saudi Arabia would get as advanced a model of the F-35 as Israel has.

Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that operates F-35s, widely viewed as the world’s most advanced fighter jet.

Mr. “Trump made it clear… He wasn’t going to waste his time on stopping all these weapons and items sales just because of (Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin) Netanyahu,” said Nawaf Obaid, a former Saudi government foreign policy and media advisor.

The question is what Mr. Trump will offer Mr. Netanyahu as compensation to preserve the fig leaf of maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.

To be sure, the sale narrows but does not eliminate Israel’s military superiority.

“The Israeli Air Force's planning and operational capabilities have no parallel in today's Middle East... It will probably take time until they…manage to close the professional gap,” said journalist Amos Harel.

Even so, the sale is likely to put a similar deal with the United Arab Emirates back on the table.

The UAE suspended talks on acquiring F-35s as part of the 2020 deal that saw the Gulf state establish diplomatic relations with Israel, alongside Bahrain and Morocco, because the US feared that China could gain access to the plane’s technologies.

The significance of sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE goes beyond issues of the Middle East’s military balance of power. It binds the United States and Saudi Arabia in more than one way.

Saudi and Emirati investments in Africa’s critical mineral industry are of strategic importance to the United States, given China’s global domination of the sector. The production of F-35s depends on critical minerals.

US defence industry’s dependency on rare earth elements. Credit: Williston Basin CORE-CM

“Critical minerals is…a key part of the discussion here in Washington,” said Middle East analyst Firas Maksad, noting that Saudi Arabia was preparing to become a major critical minerals processing hub.

Moreover, the sale will inevitably impact Chinese influence, given likely US demands that Saudi Arabia erect a Chinese wall between F-35 operations and digital infrastructure involving Chinese technology.

The US will want to see the wall isolate the F-35’s environment from for example, encrypted satellite communications, logistics platforms, and data centres.

Mr. Trump’s tinkering with the nature of US relations with Israel comes as messianic Evangelical support for Israel is on the decline. Not just in the United States, but also worldwide.

Gaza may be the catalyst for the shift.

Yet, mounting criticism of Israel and greater empathy for Palestinians, particularly among American Evangelicals aged 18 to 29, reflects a power shift in the global Evangelical community.

“This train has left the station. It’s not coming back, especially with the younger generation,” said Republican Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, an Evangelical conspiracy theorist, who during the Covid epidemic compared masks to the yellow Star of David Nazis forced Jews to wear. Ms. Taylor Greene later apologised for her comment.

Mr. Trump’s tinkering also comes as influential figures in the president’s Make America Great Again base have turned up the volume on criticism of US support for Israel and mainstreamed far-right anti-Semites such as 27-year-old neo-Nazi white supremacist and Christian nationalist Nick Fuentes and blatantly anti-Semitic podcaster Candace Owens.

The shift is compounded by the rise to prominence of non-Western Evangelicals, including Palestinians and Middle Eastern communities, who account for 70 per cent of the global Evangelical community, and may share a belief in End Times, but have not politicised it to make support for Israel a commandment.

As a result, African states, which make up roughly 30 per cent of United Nations membership, favour, with few exceptions, the creation of an independent Palestinian state and reject Israeli annexation of territory conquered by Israel during the 1967 Middle East war, despite long-standing Israeli and American evangelist efforts to persuade them to be more supportive of Israel.

Pew Research predicted in 2015 that by 2050, sub-Saharan Africa would account for 38 per cent of the world’s Christian population. In 2019, the research group said that by 2060, six of the ten countries with the largest Christian populations will be in Africa.

For many American Evangelicals, the End Times involve the regathering of the Jews in the Promised Land at a time of persecution during the Tribulations. The Evangelicals believe that Jews who survive the persecution and recognise Jesus as their Messiah will be saved.

“Theological emphasis is shifting. We younger Evangelicals interpret the teachings of Jesus as emphasising compassion, peace, and justice for all, rather than a political alignment with a specific nation,” said a younger Evangelical activist.

The global power shift in the Evangelical community was on display last month when the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), which represents 600 million Evangelicals from 161 countries, last elected Sri Lankan activist Godfrey Yogarajah as chairman to replace Thomas Schirrmacher, a religious scholar with close ties to the German political establishment, at its general assembly in Seoul.

Botros Mansour

Mr. Yogarajah has not spoken publicly about Israel or the Gaza war, but stressed that he would work closely with Botros Mansour, a Nazareth-born Israeli Palestinian lawyer with a history of mediating between Israeli Palestinian Christians and Messianic Jews.

The Alliance appointed Mr. Mansour its secretary general and CEO in August.

Assembly attendees said Mr. Yogarajah was signalling that the WEA would take a more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than Mr. Schirrmacher’s more pro-Israel stance.

“It means something profound that, in this moment, a Palestinian Christian from Israel has been asked to serve as Secretary General”, Mr. Mansour said in his inaugural address.

In a similar vein, the European Baptist Federation (EBF) elected Lebanese Rev. Charles Costa as its new president in September. The EBF groups associations in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Even so, North American Evangelicals retain considerable influence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

That was evident last year when International Court of Justice (ICJ) Vice President Julia Sebutinde was the only member of the world’s highest judicial body to oppose all provisional measures it advocated in South Africa’s case, accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza.

“The Lord is counting on me to stand on the side of Israel,” Ms. Sebutinde said in August at the launch of a new Watoto Church Evangelical ministry in the Ugandan capital of Kampala. It was Ms Sebutinde’s first public comment on her opposition to the ICJ ruling.

Watoto Church was founded in 1984 by Zimbabwe-born fourth-generation Canadian missionary Gary Skinner.

The Ugandan government distanced itself from Ms. Sebutinde at the time of the ICJ ruling.

“The position taken by Judge Sebutinde is her own individual and independent opinion and does not in any way reflect the position of the government of the Republic of Uganda,” the government said in a statement.

The Middle East in 72 minutes

2025-11-13T23:39:00.001+08:00

To listen to the podcast, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/the-middle-east-in-72-minutes

On this edition of Parallax Views, independent journalist James M. Dorsey of The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey returns for our regular Middle East update. In this wide-ranging conversation, we discuss the historic visit of Al-Sharaa to Washington and what it signals for U.S.–Syria relations, the internal ethno-religious divides within Syria, and the concerns of the Alawite and other minorities amid shifting regional dynamics.

We then turn to Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia, where a push toward economic and cultural liberalisation coexists uneasily with continued political repression.

From there, we unpack the tenuous Gaza ceasefire, examining why some see it as farcical, how Israel’s long-term right-wing radicalisation complicates peace efforts, and the internal divisions within the Palestinian world that further muddy the waters.

Finally, we explore the emerging MAGA split on Israel—how evangelical Christians, particularly in the Global South, are no longer uniformly pro-Israel; and how segments of the MAGA movement are expressing a mix of Islamophobia and antisemitism, reframing their stance on Israel in troubling ways.

As always, James M. Dorsey brings deep insight and context to a region where politics, religion, and power intersect in volatile and unexpected ways.

Ye's repentance: A blip on the radar

2025-11-12T17:05:00.001+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. They make this column and podcast possible.

Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by subscribing to The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey.

Thank you for your support and loyalty.

American rapper Ye, formerly known as Kanye West, has repented for his history of anti-Semitism.

Last week, Mr. Ye sought in New York absolution from Orthodox Rabbi Yoshiyahu Yosef Pinto, an Israeli who serves as the chief rabbi of Morocco.

Holding hands with Mr. Pinto and speaking through a translator, Mr. Ye said he felt “really blessed being able to sit here with you today and just take accountability.”

Mr. Ye attributed his history of anti-Semitism to his bipolar disorder.

Mr. Ye’s track record includes a song praising Adolf Hitler, anti-Semitic tirades on social media, and kickstarting the mainstreaming of 27-year-old neo-Nazi white supremacist and Christian nationalist Nick Fuentes by introducing him to Donald Trump.

In February, Mr. Ye advertised a white T-shirt with a swastika during this year’s Super Bowl, the annual US National Football League championship.

Mr. Ye signalled his epiphany in May when he announced on X that he was "done with anti-Semitism," “love(s) all people,” and asked God to forgive him.

Alarmed by shifting attitudes towards Israel and rising anti-Semitism in Mr. Trump’s support base, Israeli officials likely see Mr. Ye’s repentance as a rare success of their multi-million dollar endeavour to halt a tidal shift among American Evangelicals and Make America Great Again (MAGA) figures away from Israel and towards the Palestinians that, at times, is laced with anti-Semitism.

The effort also aims to shape responses by Artificial Intelligence services such as ChatGPT, the first such attempt by a state, according to Israeli newspaper Haaretz.

The newspaper reported the campaign focussed on "churches and Christian organizations in the western United States," targeting eight million churchgoers and four million Christian students.

The campaign seeks to counter "declining support for Israel among evangelical Christians" and "raise awareness of Palestinian ties to Hamas and support for terrorism."

It relies on "biblically based arguments highlighting the importance of Israel and the Jewish people to Christians" and assertions that "the Palestinians chose Hamas… they murder Christian aid workers… they celebrated (Hamas’s) October 7 massacre and shelter terrorists… (and that) Palestinians and Iran share genocidal intentions toward Israel."

Mr. Fuentes’ move from an outcast to mainstream influencer is emblematic of the tidal shift in American Evangelical youth attitudes towards Israel and the rise to prominence of non-Western Evangelicals, including Palestinians and Middle Eastern communities, who account for 70 per cent of the global Evangelical community, and may share the belief in End Times, but have not politicised it to align the religious group with Israel.

Interestingly, the shift in Evangelical youth attitudes hasn’t meant fewer negative views of Muslims. On the contrary.

The Islamophobia Index, which measures the degree to which people endorse anti-Muslim stereotypes, has risen sharply in 2025 compared to previous years. Among the general US public, the index jumped on a scale of 0 to 100 from 25 points in 2022 to 33 in 2025. Among white Evangelicals, the index jumped the most from 30 to 45 points.

Mr. Fuentes was long condemned and shunned by much of the far right and Mr. Trump’s Make America Great Again crowd because of his blatant anti-Semitism, support for Nazi ideology, denial of the Holocaust, and misogynist and anti-LGBTQ bigotry.

A series of recent events that have rattled Mr. Trump’s support base at the highest levels fuelled Mr. Fuente’s mainstreaming. Mr Fuentes is increasingly popular among disgruntled, racist, primarily Gen Z males, who describe themselves as “groypers.”

Last month, Tucker Carlson, whose online show is one of the Make America Great Again movement’s most influential media platforms, crossed a Rubicon by hosting Mr. Fuentes for a two-hour softball interview, viewed on YouTube by 5.7 million people that only a few months ago would have been unthinkable.

Earlier, Mr. Trump offered blatantly anti-Semitic podcaster Candace Owens a similar platform on his show.

Messrs. Carlson and Fuentes and Ms. Owens advocate the white supremacist Great Replacement Theory. The theory asserts that America’s elite, at times manipulated by Jews, aims to replace and disempower white Americans. The theory has sparked mass shootings in the United States, New Zealand, and elsewhere.

The theory does not just cast Jews in a negative light. As non-white immigrants, Muslims too are in the firing line, standing accused of eroding Western civilisation and threatening the continued existence of the white race.

Tucker Carlson interviewing Nick Fuentes

The Fuentes interview contrasted starkly with Mr. Tucker’s view of Mr. Fuentes as recently as August, when the podcast host denounced him as a “weird little gay kid in his basement” who was a psychological warfare operative seeking to discredit genuinely right-wing, anti-war voices like himself and Ms. Owens.

Mr. Tucker apologised to Mr. Fuentes for his earlier remarks during their interview.

Mr. Tucker’s Fuentes interview brought into the open a chasm in Mr. Trump’s support base between supporters of the two men’s anti-Jewish, anti-Israel stance in the name of free and unfettered debate, and outraged supporters of the Jewish-majority state.

It also sounded like an opening salvo in the battle to define Trumpism.

The defenders of Messrs. Carlson and Fuentes included Kevin Roberts, the president of the Heritage Foundation, widely viewed as Mr. Trump’s brain trust.

Kevin Roberts

Mr. Roberts insisted that Christians should be free to criticise Israel without being accused of anti-Semitism, a fair proposition, but then descended into anti-Semitic tropes by accusing the “globalist class” of seeking to silence Christian critics whose “loyalty” is to “Christ first, and to America always.”

In a similar vein, Vice President JD Vance last week sidestepped the issue of anti-Semitism while answering a student’s question about US support for Israel that was laced with anti-Jewish connotations.

In a twist of irony, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his Minister for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Anti-Semitism, Amichai Chikli, the son of a conservative rabbi, who serves as Israel’s de facto ambassador to the global far right, many of whom have anti-Semitic antecedents, facilitated the mainstreaming of the likes of Mr. Fuentes.

Mr Netanyahu has long honoured men like US televangelist John Hagee, chairman of Christians United for Israel, who have histories of anti-Semitism.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu thanks United Christians for Israel

Mr. Chikli, supported by lawmakers Amit Halevi and Ohad Tal, Simcha Rothman, the architect of Mr. Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reform, and Innovation, Science and Technology Minister Gila Gamliel, has spent much of his tenure cozying up to the global far right rather than meeting with Jewish communities worldwide.

Mr. Chikli’s engagements included influential Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) meetings in Maryland and Hungary alongside Holocaust deniers, self-identified Nazis, and Christian nationalists.

In Budapest, Mr. Chikli last year shared the stage with Tom van Grieken, the head of Belgium's Vlaams Belang, a party with long-standing ties to both European neo-Nazis and Mr. Netanyahu’s Likud party.

Mr. Chikli also engaged with far-right Spanish party Vox who until last year was too toxic even for Mr. Netanyahu, Republican Congresswoman Elise Stefanic, a onetime proponent of the Great Replacement Theory and candidate for New York governor, Sweden Democrats, the second-largest party in the Scandinavian nation’s parliament, that has neo-Nazi and antisemitic roots, and France’s National Rally, formerly the National Front, founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, who called the Nazi gas chambers a "detail" of World War Two history.

Mr. Le Pen’s daughter, Marine Le Pen, has sought to distance the party from her father’s anti-Semitism.

Earlier this year, Messrs. Netanyahu and Chikli crowned their efforts to whitewash the global far right and sideline reform and more liberal strands of Judaism by inviting for the first time some of the far right’s most prominent representatives to an Israeli government-sponsored conference in Jerusalem on combatting anti-Semitism.

The invitation prompted prominent, staunchly pro-Israel Jewish activists and German officials tasked with countering anti-Semitism to boycott or downgrade their participation in the conference.

Notwithstanding Israel’s efforts to regain ground among Mr. Trump’s Evangelical and Make America Great Again support base, Mr. Ye’s epiphany may be an opportunistic blip on the radar rather than a turning of the tide.

Mr. Ye’s “apology…is a mockery of repentance,” said Rabbi Shmuley Boteach, viewed as one of America’s most prominent Jewish religious figures.

“The Torah demands teshuvah gemurah—complete repentance. That means returning what was stolen, repairing what was broken, healing what was harmed. Kanye has done none of that. His music remains online. His statements remain uncorrected. His followers, many of whom gleefully repost antisemitic tropes, have not been told by their idol to stand down,” Mr. Boteach added.

Mr. Sharaa goes to Washington

2025-11-11T19:50:00.005+08:00

James discusses Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington on ANews.

To watch the interview, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/mr-sharaa-goes-to-washington

Transcript

[Anchor] And now we are going to have another guest, James M. Dorsey is joining us here on ANEWS to answer my question about the latest situations that is unfolding in the international world at the moment. James, thank you so much for joining us.

[James M. Dorsey] Always a pleasure to be with you. Thank you for having me.

[Anchor] Thank you. Well, we have been talking about Ahmad al-Sharif's visit to White House and symbolic shift for new Syria. So what is your thoughts about this Sharif's visit to Washington signifying for U.S.-Syria relations after years of hostility?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, obviously it's very significant. It's historic. It's historic in different ways.

It's historic in terms of this being the first Syrian president to visit Washington, but it's also historic given Ahmad al-Sharif's background and the fact that he has a jihadist history and yet has increasingly gotten Western endorsement since the overthrow of former President Bashar al-Assad. For Ahmad al-Sharif, or for both sides, the stakes are high. For Ahmad al-Sharif, the stakes are first and foremost economic.

He needs assistance. He needs aid. He needs investment.

Syria is a war-ravaged country after more than 10 years of civil strife. But on the other hand, there's probably a price that President Trump will want to extract. The price is twofold.

The first part is relatively easy for Ahmad al-Sharif, and that is participating in a coalition against the Islamic State or the remnants of the Islamic State, which are still powerful in Syria. More complicated are arrangements with Israel. Ahmad al-Sharif has made very clear that he does not want conflict with Israel and that he's willing to come to security arrangements.

But what Trump would like to see is far more. He would like to see Ahmad al-Sharif joining the Abraham Accords. In other words, recognising Israel and establishing diplomatic relations.

And that's going to be very difficult, in part because of Gaza, of course, but also given the fact that Israel occupies not only lands it has moved into since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, but it occupies the Golan Heights, which Trump has recognised as part of Israel.

[Anchor] Well, let's talk about Syria cracking down on Daesh, Ahmad al-Sharif's White House visit, as well as we have been talking about the optics, we have been talking about how it is a significant process, and you have said it is a historic moment. So what message do you think that is Syria trying to send Washington by intensifying its fights against Daesh, Ahmad al-Sharif's visit, in your opinion?

[James M. Dorsey] I think that Ahmad al-Sharif is sending the message that Syria is a moderate Arab state. With other words, it is no longer tied to Iran. It is no longer tied to groups like Hezbollah.

It is interested in coming to arrangements with Israel. The conditions on which it is willing to do so are essentially mainstream Arab. With other words, an end to the Gaza War, a credible and irrevocable pathway towards an independent Palestinian state, and in addition to that, security arrangements.

Keep in mind that since Ahmad al-Sharif's office, Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes in Syria, first and foremost to emasculate the Syrian military, but also to prevent the Syrian military from moving south of Damascus. Israel has projected itself as the protector of Syrian minorities, the Druze in the south, on whose behalf it says it has intervened several times, but also of the Kurds and the Alawites. You recently had a meeting in Tel Aviv of Syrian minority representatives, most of them in exile, which included Alawites, Kurds, Druze, Yazidis and others.

[Anchor] Well, James, thank you so much for answering my questions and thank you so much for joining us here on A News. This was an important situation, as you have put it so nicely, that this meeting is probably going to be something historic between the United States and Syria, if not the Middle East and the West as well. Thank you so much for joining us.

[James M. Dorsey] Thank you for having me.

The Middle East Report

2025-11-08T16:10:00.001+08:00

James discusses this week’s Middle East developments on Radio Islam.

To listen to the podcast, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/the-middle-east-report-b30

Transcript

[Anchor] Middle East Report with James M. Dorsey on Sabah al-Muslim. James, a very good morning to you and welcome.

[James M. Dorsey] Good morning, pleasure to be with you.

[Anchor] So, Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, two peas in a pod. Their commonalities foot a global pattern, though.

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed. So, Netanyahu and Trump both crave others' lands. They are ethno-nationalists with a particular dislike for Muslims.

They blur the lines between the civilisational and the national. They opt for indiscriminate violence despite available alternatives. And they are autocrats who hollow out democracy.

In addition to that, they share many of these traits with a critical mass of world leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Modi, Narendra Modi, and, of course, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. They all have also a healthy disregard for the law, a distorted definition of human rights, and a warped sense of the truth. All of this has an impact on what's going to be happening in Gaza.

In other words, the commonalities coupled with their country's positioning in the geopolitical pecking order and their political priorities is going to shape the approach towards tactical differences regarding, for example, potential annexation of the West Bank, ending the Gaza War, and the Strip's future. What that means will be clear as Trump tries to move from the first phase to the second phase of his Gaza ceasefire proposal involving post-war security and governance arrangements.

[Anchor] Now, as Hamas returns more remains of deceased Israeli captives, the U.S. President approaches to crush time on whether he can move from the first to the second phase of his Gaza ceasefire proposal.

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed, Trump says the creation of an international stabilisation force that would enter Gaza will happen soon. The United States has already circulated a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council that would anchor the force and the Trump plan in international law.

The chances of the draft being adopted depends on answering key unanswered questions, including whether Hamas and Israel can agree on what the force's mandate will be, what constitutes disarmament, what a post-war technocratic Palestinian administration of the Strip would look like, and whether it would be under the guardianship of a board presided by Donald Trump.

Getting agreement on the answers to those questions is easier said than done.

[Anchor] Now, evangelicals to the rescue. I mean, it may seem like an oxymoron, James, in the case of Gaza and Palestine, yet the ground seems to be shifting under the core where traditional pro-Israel pillars of U.S. President Donald Trump's support base.

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed, a survey carried out by the Barnar Group, a Christian research organisation, found that support for Israel among evangelicals, particularly the youth aged between 18 and 29, had dropped dramatically even before the Gaza war. The survey showed that support had plunged from 75% in 2018 to 34% in 2021. The shift in attitudes among Western, particularly American evangelicals, is compounded by the rise to prominence of non-Western evangelicals.

Including Palestinian and Middle Eastern communities, who account for 70% of the global evangelical community, and may share a belief in end times, but have not politicised it. To name just one example, the World Evangelical Alliance, which represents 600 million evangelicals in 161 countries, appointed in August a Nazareth-based Israeli-Palestinian as its General Secretary.

[Anchor] So, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Salman won't give Trump what he wants when he visits the President in the White House later this month. Trump wants Saudi recognition of Israel, but Salman will only entertain the thought if there is a credible pathway to a Palestinian state.

[James M. Dorsey] Trump seems to be grappling at straws. This week's announcement that Kazakhstan would join the Abraham Accords that led to the recognition of Israel in 2020 by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan is meaningless. Kazakhstan recognised Israel in the early 1990s, has an embassy in Tel Aviv, and has close relations with Israel.

Speculation that Saudi Arabia, the crown jewel in recognition, will agree to establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish majority state when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visits Trump on November 18, may be encouraged by the Kazakh PR stunt, is pie in the sky. Bin Salman wants formal relations with Israel, but only if there is a credible pathway to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. And that, at best, is a long-term prospect.

[Anchor] Indeed. James, as always, thank you for your time and for the analysis.

[James M. Dorsey] As always, it's my pleasure. Have a great week, James. And the same to you.

[Anchor] jamesmdorsey.substack.com You can check out James' latest articles there.

Evangelicals to the rescue

2025-11-07T03:02:00.001+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

The rise of Artificial Intelligence magnifies the importance of journalists with true expertise, top-notch sourcing, and historical depth. These journalists, like me, tell and analyse in-depth stories. Their goal is to enhance their readers and listeners’ ability to form informed opinions of their own.

We don’t just chronicle events. Our reporting and analysis are shaped by years of on-the-ground coverage, expertise, and historical knowledge. In my case, I have covered geopolitics, the Middle East, and the Muslim world for decades, having been based in multiple countries, including Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Turkey.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

Evangelicals to the rescue. That may seem an oxymoron in the case of Gaza and Palestine.

Yet, the ground is shifting under a core, traditionally pro-Israel pillar of US President Donald Trump’s support base.

The shift is occurring against the backdrop of legitimate concern that mounting criticism of Israel in the Make America Great Again (MAGA) crowd is, at times, laced with anti-Semitism and the rise of New York mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani, a proponent of an Israel or a state that grants equal rights to all its citizens, Jewish and non-Jewish.

Mr. Mamdani’s candidacy and electoral victory have provoked a wave of Islamophobia, rather than the frank and healthy debate needed amid growing doubts whether a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains feasible.

Ironically, mounting Evangelical empathy with the plight of the Palestinians constitutes, among Western Evangelicals, a break with their politicised anti-Semitic End Times theology that long formed the basis for the Christians’ uncritical alliance with Israel.

For many Evangelicals, the End Times involve the regathering of the Jews in the Promised Land at a time of persecution during the Tribulations. The Evangelicals believe that Jews who survive the persecution and recognise Jesus as their Messiah will be saved.

A survey carried out by Barna Group, a Christian research organisation, found that support for Israel among Evangelical youth aged 18 to 29 dropped dramatically even before the Gaza war. The survey showed that support had plunged from 75 per cent in 2018 to 34 per cent in 2021.

The shift in Evangelical attitudes towards Israel was on public display when US Vice President JD Vance, a proponent of greater US decisiveness in relations with Israel, was hosted several days ago by Turning Point, the conservative youth movement on American high school, college, and university campuses, founded by assassinated activist Charlie Kirk.

A confessed “confused” Christian student asked Mr. Vance to the applause of the audience why the United States “owed “Israel to support it with a “multi-hundred-billion-dollar foreign aid package, to quote Charlie Kirk, (to) cover this ethnic cleansing in Gaza…considering the fact that their religion does not agree with ours but also so openly supports the prosecution of ours.”

In response, Mr. Vance acknowledged theological differences between Jews and Christians, called for dialogue, and advocated cooperation between Israel and the United States when the two countries’ interests coincide, but did not take issue with the anti-Jewish sentiment in the student’s question.

The shift in attitudes among Western, particularly American Evangelicals, is compounded by the rise to prominence of non-Western Evangelicals, including Palestinians and Middle Eastern communities, who account for 70 per cent of the global Evangelical community, and may share the belief in End Times, but have not politicised it.

Newly elected WEA Chair Godfrey Yogarah

The shift was also on display when the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), which represents 600 million Evangelicals from 161 countries, last month elected Sri Lankan activist Godfrey Yogarajah as chairman to replace Thomas Schirrmacher, a religious scholar with close ties to the German political establishment, at its general assembly in Seoul.

In August, the Alliance appointed Botros Mansour, a Nazareth-born Israeli Palestinian lawyer with a history of mediating between Israeli Palestinian Christians and Messianic Jews, as the Alliance’s secretary general and CEO.

For several years, Mr. Mansour operated a popular website that highlighted Israeli discrimination against Israeli Palestinians, who account for 20 per cent of the country’s population. The website invited Evangelicals to visit Israel to establish facts for themselves rather than uncritically accept predominantly American pro-Israel Evangelical assertions.

The website “aimed at Western Christians, many of whom confuse biblical references to Israel with the modern state by that name, and often think of the Palestinians as a modern extension of the Philistines that Joshua fought in Old Testament times,” said Israeli Palestinian lawyer and human rights activist Jonathan Kuttab.

At the same time, the Baptist World Alliance, of which the EBF is a member, appointed Jordanian Rev. Nabeeh Abbassi as its first ambassador to the Middle East and North Africa.

Israel bombs Gaza’s Al Ahli Baptist Hospital. Credit: AFSC

Following an Israeli attack on the Baptist Hospital in Gaza early in the Gaza war, Mr. Abbassi emphasised Jordanian King Abdullah’s consistent call “for the right of the Palestinian people to establish their independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital, along the entire borders of June 4, 1967,” a reference to the war in which Israel conquered the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

Evangelicals long constituted a main pillar of US support for Israel. They still are, but the pillar may become shaky. It’s a trend, coupled with splits in the Make America Great Again crowd, that Mr. Trump and Christian Zionists among Evangelicals will not be able to ignore.

“It is very clear that the WEA is witnessing change because…the European and North American leadership is gradually being replaced by Eastern, African and Asian leaders,” said Rev. Jack Sara, president of Bethlehem Bible College and general secretary of the alliance’s Middle East and North Africa region.

“It means something profound that, in this moment, a Palestinian Christian from Israel has been asked to serve as (the WEA’s) Secretary General”, added Mr. Mansour.

Testing boundaries

2025-11-01T23:47:00.002+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

Palestinian public opinion is blowing new wind into Hamas’s sails, shredded by two years of brutal warfare in Gaza.

The most recent public opinion poll, conducted in late October after a fragile ceasefire took hold, suggests that Hamas may have reversed its consistent rock bottom performance in repeated surveys during the war.

Thirty-two per cent of those surveyed expressed support for Hamas as opposed to 20 per cent for Al-Fatah, the backbone of the West Bank-based, internationally recognised Palestine Authority. Forty-three per cent supported neither or said they did not know.

Sixty per cent endorsed Hamas’s conduct of the Gaza war.

Credit: PCPSR

Forty-three per cent favoured armed struggle to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to 37 per cent opting for negotiations. Fifty-nine per cent described Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel that sparked the Gaza war as “correct.”

Similarly, 55 per cent of Gazans surveyed and 78 per cent of West Bankers opposed disarmament of Hamas as envisioned by US President Donald Trump’s proposal, even “if this is a condition for the war to not to return the Gaza Strip.”

Hamas has so far insisted it would only disarm once an independent Palestinian state has been established. Mediators have suggested a face-saving solution in which it decommissions what is left of its depleted missile and rocket arsenal but keeps sidearms, including automatic guns.

Fifty per cent of Gazans and 39 per cent of West Bankers supported the Trump proposal. Sixty-two per cent backed Hamas’s response to the plan. Fifty-one per cent of Gazans favoured the creation of a non-partisan, post-war Palestinian administration of Gaza.

Sixty-eight per cent of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank opposed the creation of an Arab and Muslim force if it were tasked with disarming Hamas, while 53 per cent of Gazans would support it if disarmament were not part of its mandate.

All of this is not to say that Hamas would win elections, but it suggests that it may be one reason the group has shown itself to be more assertive since Mr. Trump launched his 20-point Gaza proposal and coerced Israel and Hamas into accepting the plan’s first phase.

As a result, Israel and Hamas agreed to a fragile ceasefire that is on life support, and the troubled exchange of Hamas-held captives abducted during the group’s October 7 attack for Palestinians incarcerated in Israel and bodies of deceased Palestinians in Israeli custody.

With neither Hamas nor Israel enthusiastically welcoming Mr. Trump’s initiative and Arab, Muslim-majority, and European nations declaring support without buying into all of its provisions because of the president’s imprimatur and the fact that it is the only game in town, both Hamas and Israel have sought to push the envelope and test what the red lines may be.

In doing so, Hamas and Israel have weaponised the prisoner exchange, blaming each other for violations of the agreement, and twice in outbursts of violence brought the 19-day-old ceasefire to the verge of collapse.

At the core of the tit-for-tat is a deliberately muddled understanding of what Israel and Hamas have agreed to and what remains a matter of negotiation, particularly regarding Hamas’s potential disarmament and future role in Gaza, if any.

A Hamas refusal to disarm complicates key tenets of Mr. Trump’s proposal, including the creation of a primarily Arab and Muslim international stabilisation force.

In what amounts to the fog of an information war, Mr. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu have projected Israel and Hamas’s first-phase endorsement and third-country support of the president’s proposal as acceptance of the plan as such, while Hamas insists that the terms of implementation have yet to be negotiated.

Likely encouraged by the findings of the poll, Hamas has probed Israeli defences, prompting Israeli airstrikes in response, brutally cracked down on its opponents, including gangs and clans armed by Israel, and seemingly toughened its negotiating position.

Hamas may have taken heart from the fact that Mr. Trump’s proposal and subsequent statements potentially leave room for a political future for the group, even if it rules out Hamas being part of Gaza’s post-war governance.

The proposal allows for amnesty for “Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons” and “safe passage” to a third country should they want to leave Gaza.

Reacting to the latest bout of violence, Mr. Trump noted, “If (Hamas) are good, they are going to be happy and if they are not good, they are going to be terminated; their lives will be terminated.”

Hamas may have also been emboldened by Mr. Trump’s holding out the possibility of pressuring Israel to release imprisoned Marwan Baghrouti, widely viewed as the most popular Palestinian politician, a potential future president, and a proponent of a two-state resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In prison, where he is serving five life sentences plus 40 years after being convicted by an Israeli court in 2004 of planning attacks in which five civilians were killed, Mr. Barghouti has sought to bridge differences between Hamas and Al-Fatah.

Forty-three per cent of those surveyed in the poll said they would vote for Mr. Barghouti as opposed to 17 per cent for Hamas and five per cent for the Palestine Authority.

While Mr. Trump spoke about Mr. Barghouti, arch-rivals Hamas and Al-Fatah agreed in meetings in Cairo to back an apolitical committee to govern post-war Gaza.

Like with Hamas, Israel has ruled out a role for the Palestine Authority in the future of Gaza.

Hamas officials have implied the agreement involved Hamas joining the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which Al-Fatah dominates. The PLO and the Authority have recognised Israel, in contrast to Hamas, which is pushing for a multi-year ceasefire between an independent Palestinian state and Israel.

However, boosted by the vagaries in US statements that differ from Mr. Netanyahu’s insistence on the “total destruction” of Hamas, the group appears to be testing boundaries not only on the battlefield but also at the negotiating table.

Since Cairo, Hamas officials have seemingly backtracked on their repeated concession that they would not be part of post-war governance in Gaza. However, the group likely expected that it could influence the composition of the apolitical committee.

Speaking to Al Jazeera Arabic, Hamas Political Bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouk warned, “Do they know what excluding Hamas means? It could mean a civil war… It could mean internal fighting… Hamas is part of the Palestinian people and has accepted being part of the Palestinian people's administration or representatives of the Palestinian people through the PLO and the Authority… Excluding it…will lead to chaos.”

In a similar vein, Mr. Abu Marzouk’s Beirut-based colleague, Osama Hamdan, lashed out at the United Arab Emirates, which, like Israel, is viscerally opposed to Hamas, because of its past links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Mr. Hamdan’s attack reflected concerns that the UAE was manoeuvring to capitalise on Israeli, US, Arab, and European rejection of a role for the group in Gaza and Israel’s opposition to involvement of the Palestine Authority to promote Abu Dhabi-based Mohammed Dahlan as head of a post-war administration.

Hailing from Khan Younis, Mr. Dahlan, a former Al-Fatah security chief, whose forces Hamas routed in 2007 when the group seized control of Gaza, is a confidante of Mohammed bin Zayyed, who frequently serves as the Emirati president’s Palestinian troubleshooter.

Mr. Hamdan accused the UAE of “sending (to Gaza) an intelligence and security team under the guise of the UAE Red Crescent to search for missile launch sites and give their coordinates to the occupation. Its foreign minister is asking the Israelis to continue the battle until the resistance, specifically Hamas in Gaza, is crushed.”

Hear Nothing See Nothing Say Nothing

2025-10-25T16:33:00.004+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

Allegations of double standards go into one ear of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and out the other.

This week, the IOC halted all discussions with the Indonesian Olympic Committee about the hosting of future events and advised international sports associations to follow suit.

The IOC boycott constituted the Committee’s response to the Indonesian government’s cancellation of visas for Israeli athletes scheduled to compete in this week’s 53rd Artistic Gymnastics World Championships in Jakarta.

In a statement, the IOC said the boycott “highlighted the IOC’s principled position: all eligible athletes, teams, and sports officials must be able to take part in international sports competitions and events without any form of discrimination by the host country.”

Earlier, the Court of Arbitration for Sport rejected the Israel Gymnastics Federation’s request for an injunction that would allow Israeli athletes, including Olympic gold medalist Artem Dolgopyat, to participate in the championships.

The boycott contrasts starkly with the IOC and world soccer body FIFA’s silence about the US State Department’s refusal to issue visas for a nine-member Iranian Football Federation delegation that was scheduled to attend the 2026 World Cup draw in Washington in December.

The State Department declined to confirm or deny the refusal reported by Iranian media. The absence of a State Department confirmation may be one reason why the IOC and FIFA have remained silent.

By refusing to warn the United States that rejecting of Iranian visa applications would violate IOC and FIFA statutes, the two sports associations were avoiding getting on the wrong side of US President Donald Trump.

Well-placed sources suggested FIFA could move the draw to Mexico, which is co-hosting next year’s World Cup together with Canada and the United States.

The status of Iranian officials, athletes, and fans is not only a World Cup issue but also for the 2028 Olympics hosted by Los Angeles.

Beyond the issue of double standards, the IOC and FIFA’s silence comes against the backdrop of repeated calls for a boycott of Israel because of its conduct of the Gaza war, FIFA President Gianni Infantino’s problematic ties to Mr. Trump, and Indonesia’s complex relationship with Israel.

Mr. Infantino has hewed close to the US president, repeatedly popping up at events involving Mr. Trump in which the FIFA executive had no immediate business.

Most recently, Mr. Infantino appeared on stage for a group photo at Mr. Trump’s peace summit earlier this month in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, where Arab, Muslim, and European leaders endorsed the president’s proposal for ending the Gaza war.

The proposal involves the creation of an international stabilisation force to maintain security in post-war Gaza.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who attended the summit, has offered to contribute 20,000 troops to the force.

A proponent of the problematic notion that sports can be a driver rather than a tool for bridgebuilding, Mr. Infantino suggested his presence at a gathering “aimed at establishing a new era of regional security and stability” was important.

In May, Mr. Infantino arrived late for a FIFA Congress in Paraguay because he placed greater importance on accompanying Mr. Trump on a visit to the Gulf that had nothing to do with FIFA-related business.

Subsequently, Mr. Infantino popped up in the Oval Office to present Mr. Trump with a personalised red card to brandish at those who step out of line, despite the president’s consistent authoritarian definition of who steps out of line and what constitutes stepping out of line.

The IOC’s sanctioning of Indonesia also contrasts starkly with FIFA’s awarding of Indonesia the hosting rights for that year’s Under-17 World Cup in June 2023. Israel did not qualify for the tournament.

FIFA awarded the rights three months after Indonesia lost the hosting rights to the FIFA Under-20 World Cup because two provincial governors refused to allow Israel to participate.

Indonesia pulled out of hosting the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC) World Beach Games a month after FIFA awarded it the Under-17 because of domestic opposition to Israeli participation.

With no diplomatic relations with Israel, Indonesia maintains informal contacts with the Jewish-majority state.

At times, Israeli officials, analysts, and journalists quietly travel to the archipelago republic. Senior Muslim religious figures have visited Israel and, at least once, met with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. At the same time, Indonesian tourists cross from Jordan into Israeli-controlled territory to visit religious shrines.

European soccer body UEFA recently postponed a vote that was likely to favour the suspension of Israel after Israel agreed to the first phase of Mr. Trump’s proposal, involving a ceasefire in the Gaza war and an exchange of the remaining dead and alive Hamas-held captives for Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli prisons and the remains of deceased Palestinians.

Indonesia’s barring of Israeli athletes is in line with Arab and Muslim-majority states’ decades-long refusal to engage with Israel on the sports field.

Although geographically part of Asia, Israeli soccer competes in Europe because the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) expelled the Jewish-majority state in 1974 at the behest of Arab and Muslim associations at a time when the Arab and much of the Muslim world refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence.

More recently, the charged environment in which Israeli athletes compete has expanded to Europe amid mounting public anger at Israel’s conduct of the Gaza war.

This month, authorities in Birmingham banned Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending their team’s Europa League match against Aston Villa because of fear that the Israeli club’s militant supporters’ presence risked violence.

A recent study by British anti-racism group Kick It Out and The Jewish-Arab Center for Peace reported that Maccabi Tel Aviv fans accounted for a third of the 67 per cent increase in the chanting of racist slogans in Israeli stadiums.

With athletics lacking the kind of passions evoked by soccer and the militant fans that often populate football stadiums, Indonesia’s refusal to accommodate Israeli athletes was motivated more by politics rather than security, even if the Israeli presence could have sparked protests in a country in which Palestine and Gaza resonate widely.

Even so, Indonesian concerns, like Mr. Infantino’s cozying up to Mr. Trump, make a mockery of the IOC, FIFA, and other international sports associations' insistence that sport and politics are separate and never shall the twain meet.

Trump’s Middle East reality check

2025-10-22T14:14:00.001+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

US President Donald Trump may think his 20-point proposal will end the Gaza war and solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but reality on the ground suggests otherwise.

To be sure, Mr. Trump's proposal is the only game in town, if only because no one, not Israel, not the Palestinians, who weren't consulted, not the Arab states, wants to get on the wrong side of the president.

While all welcomed Mr. Trump's proposal, a set of principles with no terms or mechanism for implementation, no one has wholeheartedly bought into the scheme.

Israel has so far endorsed only the first phase of the proposal, involving a fragile ceasefire, an exchange of Hamas-held alive and dead captives for Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli prisons and Palestinian corpses in Israeli custody, and a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces in Gaza.

US Vice President J.D. Vance and negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are in Israel to prevent the already disrupted ceasefire from breaking down and to nudge Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to engage in a second phase that would involve post-war security and governance arrangements in Gaza.

Hamas has released the remaining 20 living hostages, returned 13 bodies of dead captives it has been able to find under the rubble in Gaza, and is searching for the outstanding 15 corpses.

The group has also agreed that it will not be part of a post-war Gaza administration.

Even so, Hamas has rejected key elements of the proposal, such as disarmament of the group, and insisted that non-aligned Palestinian technocrats should govern Gaza in advance of elections with no international oversight.

Hamas has also rejected the idea of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, saying it would only agree to a long-term ceasefire with the Jewish-majority state.

Speaking at the inauguration of a US military coordination centre in Israel, Mr. Vance insisted that Hamas would have to disarm, but refrained from setting a deadline. He also stopped short of reiterating Israel’s goal of destroying Hamas.

“Hamas has to disarm… Hamas actually has to behave itself, and that Hamas, while all the fighters can be given some sort of clemency, they’re not going to be able to kill each other and they’re not going to be able to kill the Palestinians,” Mr. Vance said.

At the same time, Mr. Kushner said there would be no funding for reconstruction in areas controlled by Hamas.

For their part, Arab and Muslim states want to see a reformed Palestine Authority involved in post-war Gaza to lend the process legitimacy. The West Bank-based, internationally recognised representative of the Palestinians is widely seen as corrupt and ineffective.

Moreover, wealthy Gulf states are unlikely to fund the reconstruction of the territory that Israel’s military has turned into a moon landscape without credible assurances that the post-war process will not disintegrate into renewed hostilities.

Complicating matters is the fact that Mr. Trump and Israel's approach to ending the war and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once and for all, authored by Mr. Kushner during the president’s first term in office, is at loggerheads with what the rest of the international community, including the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Muslim world, China, Russia, and Europe, envisions.

In contrast with the international community that sees the creation of an independent Palestinian state as the solution, the Trump administration, backed by Israel, has backed away from a two-state solution, believing instead that economic development will be the panacea.

In doing so, it reversed three decades of US backing for a two-state solution, involving the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

“The biggest message that we've tried to convey to the Israeli leadership now is that, now that the war is over, if you want to integrate Israel with the broader Middle East, you have to find a way to help the Palestinian people thrive and do better,” Mr. Kushner said in a recent CBS 60 Minutes interview.

Compounding obstacles to the implementation of the Trump proposal, Hamas, unlike the United States and Israel, and despite suffering enormous body blows during the war, was prepared for the day the guns would fall silent.

Body blows are nothing new for Hamas, even if the group suffered the most in the latest war. Israel has targeted, detained, and assassinated its leaders for more than two decades and has fought five wars with Hamas since 2008.

Rather than committing all its resources to a war it could not win, Hamas kept thousands of activists in reserve for the day it hoped to reestablish control in those parts of Gaza from which Israel would withdraw.

Moreover, Hamas benefitted from the fact that Gazan clans and criminal gangs that Israel armed failed to confront Hamas and take control of areas from which Israel withdrew as part of the ceasefire.

As a result, Hamas was able to reassert brutally its authority in areas from which Israel withdrew.

The clans and gangs either disbanded when the ceasefire took effect last week or were confronted and suppressed by Hamas, which demonstrated a degree of control and command Israel thought it had destroyed during the war.

Israeli officials fear that the possible inclusion of Turkey in an international stabilisation force that, if and when it is established, would maintain security in those parts of post-war Gaza from which Israel withdraws, could back Hamas in its effort to retain control.

Mr. Vance said Israel would have to agree to the composition of the force. “We’re not going to force anything on our Israeli friends when it comes to foreign troops on their soil. But we do think there is a constructive role for the Turks to play,” he said.

A mediator, alongside the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, Turkey endorsed the Trump proposal, which includes a call for the disarmament of Hamas, even though it tacitly allows the group's exiled members to travel in and out of Turkey and spend months at a time in Istanbul.

Early in the war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that "Hamas is not a terrorist organisation, it is a liberation group, 'mujahideen' waging a battle to protect its lands and people."

That didn't stop Israel from acceding to a Turkish request earlier this month to allow 66 Palestinians, some of whom have Turkish citizenship or family ties to Turkey, to leave Gaza. They included 16 relatives of former Hamas leader and chief negotiator Ismail Haniyeh.

Israel sees the gesture as a way of improving relations with Turkey in advance of the country possibly playing an on-the-ground role in post-war Gaza.

Israel assassinated Mr. Haniyeh in Tehran in July of last year. The Israeli military killed three of Mr. Haniyeh's sons and four of his grandchildren in an air strike on their car in Gaza three months earlier.

Significantly, Turkey is one of four non-Arab Muslim countries, together with Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Qatar, that has expressed a potential interest in contributing to the stabilisation force that Egypt could lead.

Even so, contributors would need the fig leaf of an invitation by the Palestine Authority.

With Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu opposing the Authority's involvement in post-war Gaza and the US and Israel focussing on economics and reconstruction of Gaza rather than Palestinian national aspirations, that could prove another hard nut to crack.

In the ultimate analysis, ending the Gaza war, let alone resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, hinges on the Trump administration remaining engaged in the process and willing to pressure Israel to make a 180-degree political U-turn.

Given the administration's track record and backing away from the notion of an independent Palestinian state as the resolution of the conflict, and the opposition of a majority of Israelis to a Palestinian state, the odds are that the Trump proposal, at best, will lead to a lull for whatever period rather than a sustainable end to hostilities.

This story is being simultaneously published by WhoWhatWhy.

Racism in sports raises its ugly head on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide

2025-10-21T21:52:00.001+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

Nowhere are the lines separating legitimate criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism more blurred than on the soccer pitch.

A series of incidents in the last year highlights the confusion and obfuscation, part the product of an Israeli effort to deliberately conflate criticism with anti-Semitism in a bid to stifle questioning of Israeli policies and part the result of a decades-long information war that pits Israelis and Jews against Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims in which labelling of the other is often ideologically determined.

The labelling includes Israel's consistent referral to Israeli Palestinians as Arabs rather than Israeli Palestinians in a bid to erase a separate Palestinian identity, and many Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims using the terms Israeli, Zionist, and Jewish interchangeably rather than acknowledging the differences between the various categories.

Adding to the confusion and obfuscation is the fact that, colloquially, many Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims often indiscriminately refer to Israelis, Jews, and Zionists as ‘yahud,’ or Jews.

The incidents occurred against the backdrop of mounting public criticism in Europe of Israel's conduct of the Gaza war and long-standing European efforts to combat racism in stadiums.

They include violence in Amsterdam almost a year ago between Maccabi Tel Aviv fans and anti-Israel protesters, this month's clashes in Oslo between pro-Palestinian protesters and police during a Norway-Israel World Cup qualifier, and, most recently, the Birmingham municipal and law enforcement's controversial decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending next month's Europa League match against Aston Villa.

Unlike British soccer associations, Norway has campaigned for holding the Israel Football Association’s (IFA) feet to the fire for violations of world and European soccer bodies FIFA and UEFA’s statutes.

Asian Football Confederation (AFC) President Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa

This week, Asian Football Confederation (AFC) President Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa appeared to support UEFA’s evasion of a vote that would have likely favoured suspension of Israel by pointing to US President Donald Trump’s Gaza ceasefire agreement.

Earlier, Mr. Khalifa advocated Israel’s suspension at a FIFA Congress in Bangkok a year ago.

“I wish to once again express our solidarity with the Palestine FA and extend my deepest sympathies to all the victims in Gaza. While we are all relieved by the recent peace announcement in Gaza, I would like to assure the Palestine FA of our full support as they continue to rebuild their football activities, safeguard their players and officials, and keep the spirit of the game alive under these challenging circumstances,” Mr Al-Khalifa said during AFC meetings in Saudi Arabia last week..

Earlier this month, the IFA charged that sportswear giant Reebok had backtracked on a demand that the association remove the company’s sponsorship logo from the Israeli national team’s jerseys and kit.

A coalition of runners on a 10-mile run from Cambridge to Seaport planned this weekend to deliver to Reebok’s Boston headquarters a letter from 367 Palestinian sports clubs and associations demanding that the company cancel its sponsorship.

Reebok denied the Israeli assertion and rejected demands by the Boycott, Diversification, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, saying “We don’t do politics; we do sport.”

Asia would have been the precedent for a potential Israeli suspension.

Although geographically part of Asia, Israel competes in Europe because the Asian Football Confederation expelled the Jewish-majority state in 1974 at the behest of Arab and Muslim associations, who refused to play Israel at a time that the Arab and much of the Muslim world refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence.

Meanwhile, the Birmingham ban is proving to be contentious, in part because it follows on the heels of an attack earlier this month on a synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur, the highest holiday on the Jewish religious calendar, in which three people were killed.

The Westland Midlands Police said “physical and safety factors” had prompted the Maccabi ban, citing last year’s violence in Amsterdam.

“Let that sink in. They have banned Maccabi Tel Aviv fans from attending their Europa Conference League game against Aston Villa because they cannot keep Jews safe in Birmingham,” charged Aston Villa fan, analyst, and former British army major Andrew Fox, who served in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland.

Asserting that “what West Midlands Police are really saying is chilling: they cannot protect Jews from a repeat of Amsterdam because mobs now rule our streets,” Mr. Fox spun a legitimate point to denounce anti-Israel protesters as mobs while describing racist songs and slogans of Israeli fans with a history of anti-Palestinian and anti-Muslim attitudes as “unpleasant Israeli football chants.”

In doing so, Mr. Fox failed to acknowledge that racism straddles both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian divide.

Moreover, like many Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims, Mr. Fox deliberately conflated the categories of Jews and Israelis, given that not all Jews are Israelis and not all Israelis are Jews.

There is no doubt that Maccabi Tel Aviv’s Amsterdam detractors expressed vile anti-Semitism. Yet, that is no better or worse than Maccabi Tel Aviv’s chanting, “olé, olé, let the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) win, we will f--k the Arabs, ” asserting that there were “no children” left in Gaza, and shouting anti-Arab slogans in Israeli stadiums.

Israeli soccer fan racism, long a fixture of Israeli football, reflects widespread anti-Palestinian sentiment in Israeli society. A recent Instagram video captured Israeli women chanting, “May your village burn, may your village burn,” as they worked out in a gym.

The genocidal rhetoric is prevalent among Israelis, Palestinians, and their supporters far beyond the borders of Israel and a potential future Palestinian state.

Asrar Rashid

There are good reasons to tackle the Israel Football Association for its inclusion in Israeli leagues of clubs from illegal Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory in violation of international law and FIFA statutes and its failure to robustly crack down on racism among Israeli soccer fans.

Yet, that does not relieve British law enforcement of its responsibility to protect the right of Israeli fans to attend a match as long as Israel remains unsanctioned.

“The police can deploy hundreds to protect politicians at party conferences. They can lock down city centres for climate protests, but when it comes to Jewish football fans, they throw up their hands and say: Sorry, too risky,” Mr. Fox argued.

In the latest example of British law enforcement marshalling its forces, London’s Metropolitan Police was supported by units from across Britain when last month some 100,000 people congregated in the British capital for a far-right anti-immigration march.

“Once you start excluding Jews for their own safety, you are normalising their exclusion. We have seen where that road leads before,” Mr. Fox said.

Broadening Mr. Fox’s argument to include minorities as such, not just Jews, Ian Murray, a minister at the British Department for Culture, echoed Mr. Fox but noted that the Birmingham decision raised a dangerous spectre for all minorities.

The Birmingham ban was "the wrong decision in terms of the message that it sends out for anti-Semitism, but it is also the wrong message to the entire country - that you would be banned from going to public events if you're of the wrong race, religion or creed," Mr. Murray said.

The Middle East Report with James M. Dorsey

2025-10-18T23:14:00.001+08:00

James discusses the prospects of US President Donald Trump’s Gaza proposal on Radio Islam.

To listen to the Radio Islam podcast, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/the-middle-east-report-with-james

[Anchor] James, a very good morning to you and welcome. It's a pleasure to be with you. I look forward to our weekly chats.

So do I. It took barely 24 hours for US President Donald Trump's Gaza proposal to fray at the edges with Israel and Hamas selling allegations of ceasefire violations at one another.

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed, so what this shows is the deep degree of distrust between Hamas and Israel, which is no surprise of course, and the fact that both Hamas and Israel are pursuing very different objectives and motives in agreeing to the Trump proposal for an end to the Gaa war.

Essentially, the Israelis are accusing the Hamas of not releasing the bodies of the deceased captives deliberately rather than because of the practical problems involved. Even though the Israelis knew going into this that it would be difficult because of the degree of devastation that they have rained on Gaza, it would be difficult to find all of the remains of the dead captives under the rubble in Gaza.

Paired with that is the fact that Israel essentially has agreed only to the first phase of the Trump proposal, that is a ceasefire that would allow for an exchange of prisoners. Hamas held captives for Palestinians incarcerated in Israel and Hamas sees this as really withdrawal from the Gaza Strip to which the Israelis haven't really committed as such, and of course a permanent end to the war. And you're seeing that play out on the ground in Gaza with the Israelis still striking targets and Hamas trying to brutally, for that matter, reassert its authority and control in the Strip.

[Anchor] Even so, the hostage issue may in retrospect prove to be the easy bet, James.

[James M. Dorsey] Absolutely. Despite all the complications that we're seeing in that prisoner exchange phase of the Trump plan, the rest of it is much more complicated and nothing is agreed.

So, with other words, who's going to administer Gaza? Is there going to be an international stabilisation force? What will be the mandate of that and the rules of engagement of that stabilisation force?

What is the end goal here? Is that depopulation of Gaza? Is that trying to improve the economic and social circumstances of Gazans, or is it a Palestinian state?

Trump may think that this is all done and dusted. Fact of the matter is nothing is done and dusted, and these are going to be very complex negotiations, if they're going to be negotiations at all.

[Anchor] Now the vagueness of the Trump proposal has shaped Palestinian, Arab and Muslim buy-in into what is a set of post-war principles and objectives, with no terms or mechanism for implementation. At the same time, it offers proponents of Palestinian national rights an opportunity to fill the vacuum.

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed, so essentially what we've seen is that Arab and Muslim states have a degree of leverage, particularly with Donald Trump. What we've also seen is that everybody, Arabs, Israelis, Palestinians, Muslims, have bought into this plan, not because they agree to all of its provisions or principles, but because Trump is the only game in town at this point, and nobody for multiple reasons of their own wants to get on the wrong side of Donald Trump.

Now that is where there's opportunity.

So ,for example, if the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Muslims would insist that for this to work, the United States and the Trump administration has to commit to the creation of a Palestinian state, that implementation of the proposal, and the proposal itself is anchored in international law by having the United Nations Security Council, for example, endorse it steps in which the Palestinians, the Arabs, and Muslims can shape this process, or at least sincerely attempt to shape the process, which they have yet to take.

Those are steps which they have yet to take, or opportunities that they have to grab head on.

[Anchor] So James, the need for a proactive Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim effort is compounded by widely varying perceptions of what it would take to turn Gaza into a springboard for a potentially sustainable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. I

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed. So essentially, you have two very fundamentally different concepts of what the end game is. The end game for the Palestinians, for Arab states, for Muslim-majority states, is the creation of an independent Palestinian state as the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the Trump administration and for Israel, this is an economic approach.

With other words, much like we had with the deal of the century in the first Trump administration. When Trump this week left Sharm el-Sheikh, where he had this summit of European and Arab and Muslim leaders, and the Egyptian co-host, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the president of Egypt, talked about a Palestinian state, Trump said, we're talking about very different plans. My plan is the economic reconstruction of Gaza.

With other words, the approach of a real estate magnet. And that is the field of tension, if you wish, in which Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims could start to at least attempt to shape the process and use their leverage.

[Anchor] All right, James, as always, thank you so much for your time, and we look forward to chatting to you next week. It's always a pleasure. Thank you.

Fraying at the edges, the Gaza ceasefire spotlights fragility

2025-10-16T17:52:00.003+08:00

By James M. Dorsey

Thank you for joining me today.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

It took barely 24 hours for US President Donald Trump’s Gaza proposal to fray at the edges, with Israel and Hamas hurling allegations of ceasefire violations at one another.

In the process, Israel didn’t do itself or Mr. Trump any favours by again turning desperately needed humanitarian aid in a territory it has reduced to rubble into a weapon designed to pressure Hamas at the expense of an emaciated population deprived of essential life services.

A day after Mr. Trump summoned world leaders to the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh for a performative peace summit, Israel halved the number of aid trucks it would allow to enter Gaza, accusing Hamas of failing to hand over all of the 28 bodies of Israelis it kidnapped during the group’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. The Israelis died in captivity.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu initially throttled the flow of humanitarian aid despite knowing in advance that Hamas would have difficulty locating the remains of dead captives but then seemingly reversed his decision. Hamas has so far handed over 10 corpses, one of which Israel said was not an Israeli captive.

At the core of the dispute is the deep distrust between Israel and Hamas, the almost impossible logistics of finding the bodies in a territory that has been reduced to a pile of rubble and is partly occupied by Israel, and the two parties jockeying for position in what are likely to be complicated and drawn-out negotiations over the implementation of Mr. Trump’s proposal.

The fact of the matter is that, despite widespread international endorsement of the 20-point proposal and Mr. Trump’s premature declaration that the Gaza war is over, nothing has been fully agreed beyond a ceasefire to facilitate the exchange of the Hamas-held captives, dead or alive, for Palestinians incarcerated by Israel and to allow for negotiation of post-war arrangements in the Strip.

The vagueness of the Trump proposal has shaped Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim buy-in into what is a set of post-war principles and objectives with no terms or mechanism for implementation. At the same time, it offers proponents of Palestinian national rights an opportunity to fill the vacuum.

The need for a proactive Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim effort is compounded by widely varying perceptions of what it would take to turn Gaza into a springboard for a potentially sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In contrast to Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim insistence that the solution lies in the creation of an independent Palestinian state, Messrs. Trump and Netanyahu, in lieu of depopulating Gaza, see the future in economic rather than political terms.

Leaving the Sharm el-Sheikh summit that he co-chaired with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Mr. Trump suggested that the Egyptian leader was “talking about a different plan” when he called for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

“I’m talking about something very much different. We’re talking about rebuilding Gaza,” Mr. Trump said.

Even so, Mr. Trump gave the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims an opening by refusing to outline what a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could look like.

“A lot of people like the one-state solution. Some people like the two-state solution. So we’ll have to see. I haven’t commented on that… At some point, I’d decide what I think is right, but I’d be in coordination with other states,” Mr. Trump said.

Walking through Mr. Trump’s door would entail the president’s Middle Eastern and Muslim-majority partners insisting that the president commit to the principle of Palestinian statehood and a verifiable timetable for a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, as well as support a United Nations Security Council resolution that embeds the proposal in international law and includes penalties for violations.

The president’s partners’ leverage is magnified with Arab and Muslim-majority countries expected to populate an international stabilisation force that would police the implementation of the Trump proposal.

So far, Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan, rather than Arab countries, have expressed the greatest interest in contributing to the force, whose mandate and rules of engagement have yet to be determined.

The force would also be tasked with training a Palestinian police force that would eventually take responsibility for Gaza’s security and law enforcement and replace Hamas and other Palestinian militants.

Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan, have not ruled out participating in the force but are hesitant to join an entity that could be perceived as a fig leaf for catering to Israeli rather than also Palestinian concerns and contributing to a process that does not lead to Palestinian statehood.

Their hesitancy is reinforced by the Trump proposal’s lack of a clearly defined roadmap for getting from A to B, uncertainty about Hamas’s future, the spectre of armed clashes if the group refuses to disarm, and distrust of Israel’s intentions.

With the creation of a stabilisation force likely to be a matter of months rather than days, the United States is sending 200 troops to Israel to monitor the ceasefire. The troops will remain in Israel and not enter Gaza to monitor adherence firsthand.

As a result, the prospects for a forceful intervention by Mr. Trump’s partners are mixed at best.

Moreover, rather than grab the opportunity by the horns, early indications suggest that key Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, prioritise their geopolitical interests above alleviating the suffering of more than two million Gazans and pushing for a first step towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is at the core of Middle Eastern conflicts.

The leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Mohammed bin Zayed, shone in their absence in the Sharm el-Sheikh gathering of heads of state and government, dispatching their foreign ministers instead.

Some diplomats, officials, and analysts suggested that Messrs. Bin Salman and Bin Zayyed resented Egypt, a country dependent on their largesse, taking centre stage at the Red Sea summit, even though Gulf states were expected to foot the humongous bill for the reconstruction of Gaza, expected to run in the tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars.

Complicating the prospects of turning the Trump proposal into a blueprint for a brighter future is the fact that Palestinians’ political representatives have lost legitimacy, are widely viewed as incompetent and ineffective, if not corrupt, and lack popular support.

In response to mounting public criticism and resistance, Hamas, whose popularity in Gaza has hit rock bottom, has resorted to brutally cracking down on its detractors.

Mahmoud Abbas, the internationally recognised, West Bank-based Palestinian president, was invited to attend the Sharm el-Sheikh summit and warmly welcomed by Mr. Trump, weeks after he denied the Palestinian leader a US visa to participate in last month’s UN General Assembly in New York.

But Mr. Abbas, unlike Mr. Netanyahu, was not consulted when Mr. Trump drew up his proposal with the help of his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and Jared Kushner, the US president’s son-in-law, who advocate an economic approach to Middle East peace-making. Neither was any other Palestinian.

Equally worryingly, Mr. Trump’s proposal puts whatever post-war Gaza administrative body made up of non-aligned Palestinians may be created under the guardianship of a ‘Board of Peace’ presided by the US president with controversial former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as its possible chief executive.

“Gaza needs leadership called in by the people themselves, not appointed from the outside. Rebuilding what’s been destroyed may be impossible, but any future worth living begins with that right for representation,” said Gaza journalist Sundos Fayyad.

“Legitimacy cannot be imported or imposed. It must emerge from within,” added analyst Tareq Baconi, the author of a book on Hamas.

Breakthrough in Gaza, but Palestine in Limbo

2025-10-15T12:07:00.001+08:00

BFM 89.9 Guest: Dr. James M. Dorsey (Adjunct Senior Fellow), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Two years after the events on October 7th, the remaining Israeli captives have been released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners and detainees under phase 1 of President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Gaza. But is the hardest part still to come in securing lasting peace and independence for Palestine? We discuss this with Dr. James M. Dorsey of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

To listen to the podcast, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/breakthrough-in-gaza-but-palestine

Transcript

[Anchor 1] 7:30 a.m. You are listening to The Morning Run. I'm Shazana Mokdar with Keith Kham and Elaine Boye. We're continuing with a look at what's happening in the Middle East because after two long years of the war in Gaza, finally a breakthrough in peace negotiations has emerged thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump. Under his 20-point plan, a ceasefire in Gaza took effect last Friday with the Israeli military withdrawing from parts of the enclave. Yesterday, 20 Israeli captives held by Hamas were released in exchange for over 3,000 Palestinians imprisoned or detained by the IDF. Phase one of the ceasefire is supposedly to see a surge of humanitarian aid channeled to Gaza, which is desperately needed amid famine conditions caused by the Israeli blockade.

[Anchor 2] President Trump flew to the Middle East where he addressed the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, and also met with international leaders at a summit hosted by Egypt. While the latest developments close a chapter on the brutal war, the road to lasting peace, the reconstruction of Gaza and true independence for Palestine remains fraught. So what will the coming weeks and months hold for the long-standing fight for Palestinian sovereignty?

[Anchor 1] For more analysis on these developments, we speak to Dr. James M. Dorsey, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. James, good morning.

Always good to have you on the show. Now, we have to give credit where credit is due. How did U.S. President Donald Trump manage to achieve the seemingly impossible, namely coming to an agreement between Israel and Hamas to cease fighting, release captives and prisoners, as well as resume humanitarian aid?

[James M. Dorsey] I think that, first of all, most parties, including Israel and Hamas, recognize that this is the only game they've found. In other words, the United States is the country that has the greatest leverage over Israel. And if anyone can persuade this to modify policies, it would be Donald Trump.

The second factor, I think, is Trump's personality. In fact, that he has a idiosyncratic, if you wish, approach to foreign policy and does not like people disagreeing or undermining what he's trying to do. And therefore, nobody wished to get on the wrong side of Donald Trump.

But I would also not minimize the role that the other mediators, Qatar and Egypt, played in terms of pressuring Hamas to come to the negotiating table or to make the kind of concessions needed to achieve a ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners and an opening of Gaza's borders so that humanitarian aid can flow in.

[Anchor 1] James, yesterday, President Trump addressed the Israeli Knesset and attended a summit in Egypt. What do his remarks and broader discussion reveal about the next stage of the Gaza peace plan?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, the problem with it is that it didn't reveal much. For all practical matters, what Trump has put forward is a set of principles. It's not a plan.

There is no definition of the terms under which the principles would be implemented. And there is no implementation mechanism. None of that was negotiated during the less than 24-hour trip that Trump made to Israel and Egypt.

Moreover, what we have is a situation in which Israel essentially really only bought into the first things of this agreement. In other words, ceasefire, not clear for how long, an exchange of prisoners and the flow of aid into Gaza. There's no cabinet approval of the rest of the plan.

Netanyahu has made clear that the next step has to be disarmament, and otherwise Israel could revive the hostilities. So I think we're a long way from knowing how this is all going to unpack. You have 200 U.S. troops going to Israel, not to Gaza, to monitor the ceasefire. This talk, or in case Trump has been touted, his board of peace that he would preside, that would sort of oversee a technocratic Palestinian government. There is no agreement on that as such. There's no agreement on who would populate that board.

There's at least no public understanding of who would populate an international stabilization force, how many troops would be included in that force, what its mandate would be. So all of these details and endeavors have yet to be negotiated.

[Anchor 2] So James, what did the leaders actually sign in Sharm el-Sheikh a few hours ago then? It was touted as a peace agreement of sorts, but it didn't include Israel or Hamas. Do we know how effective whatever agreement it is they signed would be?

[James M. Dorsey] Again, it's a set of principles signed by external powers with none of the parties, not only Israel or Hamas for that matter, but equally importantly, the Palestine Authority, which is an internationally recognized West Bank-based representative of the Palestinians. Now, to be fair, the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas was at the talks in Sharm el-Sheikh, and perhaps just as importantly, only weeks after Trump denied Mahmoud Abbas a visa as well as his entourage so that he could attend the United Nations General Assembly in New York, he was given a very public welcome by Donald Trump. It was one of the longest handshakes of leaders attending the summit that Trump had with Abbas.

So in that sense, the Palestinian issue was put back on main stage, and that is an important development.

[Anchor 1] Very quickly, James, I think, what do you think we'll need to look at in the days and weeks and months moving forward to, I think, be vigilant against attempts to whitewash any annexation of Palestinian territories? Because like you said, things are still very unclear on what happens after phase one.

[James M. Dorsey] Well, I don't think at this point that the issue is going to be annexation of the Gaza Strip. You have had an Israeli withdrawal. Now, you're going to need an international stabilization force, an international force in the Gaza Strip to maintain a degree of security and create an environment for a transition.

The real concern, I think, is about annexation, whether de facto or de jure, on the West Bank. The Trump proposal makes no mention of the West Bank.

[Anchor 1] James, thank you very much for speaking with us. That was Dr. James Dorsey, adjunct senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, giving us some initial takeaways of what we're seeing over in the Middle East with this US-led peace plan for Gaza and how it could affect the broader Palestine state.

Because I think there hasn't really been a clear indication from this peace plan that a Palestine state will emerge from it. And I think there's a lot of discussion on how the power vacuums are going to be filled in Gaza as well as broader Palestine.

[Anchor 2] So, I mean, if we look at the positives of this, as James was saying, for now, we don't see that there's going to be any annexation of Gaza. There also seems to be a ceasefire that's holding. But that's about all we have right now.

As James was saying as well, the devil's in the details of whatever peace agreement that's been signed, which hasn't been made known to the press at this present moment.

[Anchor 1] And there's that very controversial E2 project in West Bank that's cleaving the enclave there in two. So, I think lots to watch on the Middle East. It's nowhere near over for sure.

Gaza ceasefire: Now the difficult bit

2025-10-14T15:02:00.000+08:00

Thank you for joining me today.

Hard-hitting reporting and analysis that lets the chips fall where they may is even more critical in a world of brutal wars, unimaginable humanitarian crises, and increasing authoritarianism.

That is The Turbulent World with James M. Dorsey’s mission since its inception 15 years ago.

Thousands worldwide are avid readers and listeners of The Turbulent World. Join them in helping to maintain and expand the column and podcast by becoming a paid supporter by clicking here.

Subscribing allows you to participate in a poll, listen to the podcast, watch the video, access the archive, post comments, and direct message me with your questions.

Exchanging Hamas-held hostages for Palestinians incarcerated in Israeli prisons was the easy bit.

Ensuring that the ceasefire equates a permanent end to the war and arrangements for the post-war administration and reconstruction of war-ravaged Gaza, let alone a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is the difficult bit.

US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan is a declaration of principles and objectives with no terms or mechanism of implementation beyond the prisoner exchange, the fragile ceasefire, and the US promise to send 200 troops to Israel, rather than Gaza, to oversee the truce.

Mr. Trump hopes that the 20-nation summit in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh will ensure that Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia contribute troops that may enter the Strip as part of an international stabilisation force.

Even so, who will administer post-war Gaza remains an open question, as is what the mandate of the non-American troops, dubbed an international stabilisation force, will be.

With no good options, Hamas has placed a risky bet on Mr. Trump and Arab and Muslim states as guarantors that Israel will remain committed to the proposal and not restart the war once the group has released its captives.

From Hamas’s perspective, the group has already gotten off to a shaky start.

While Mr. Trump has put his credibility on the line by attaching his name to the proposal and making a victory lap in Israel and Egypt, his track record is one of a short attention span, which means Israel may just have to bide its time in undermining progress in the implementation of the proposal and/or reviving the war.

Moreover, Arab and Muslim states appear reluctant to engage in a process that does not include a credible pathway to the creation of an independent Palestinian state and could be seen as offering Israel a fig leaf.

Mr. Trump’s Arab and Muslim partners in his Middle East endeavour have made clear to the president that there can be no peace process without Israel committing to end its 57-year-long occupation of Palestinian lands, including Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, and the creation of a Palestinian state.

Mr. Trump’s proposal makes only a non-committal reference to a Palestinian state.

Even so, Mr. Trump, together with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, put Palestinian national aspirations in the spotlight by inviting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to the Sharm el-Sheikh summit.

Weeks after denying Mr. Abbas and his entourage US visas to attend last month’s United Nations General Assembly in New York, Mr. Trump publicly greeted the Palestinian leader, shook his hand, and posed for photographs with him.

“Abbas’s high-profile presence alongside global leaders…strengthens secular Palestinian nationalism. While it is too early to declare the full revival of Palestinian nationalism, Sharm El-Sheikh represents a clear moment of diplomatic affirmation,” said journalist Daoud Kuttab.

Even though the Trump proposal contains something for everyone, few in the Middle East, the Muslim world, Israel, or Palestine have wholeheartedly embraced the proposal; most recognise that it is the only game in town.

By the same token, none of the Middle Eastern or Muslim players was willing to get on the wrong side of Mr. Trump by accepting it conditionally or rejecting it out of hand.

"While (the proposal) is likely to save numerous lives, at least for the time being, and should be welcomed for that reason alone, it is hardly a peace agreement nor one that lays the basis for attaining Palestinian rights," said analyst Mouin Rabbani.

Moreover, Mr. Netanyahu has so far publicly refrained from declaring that the ceasefire and prisoner exchange mean an end to the war. Mr. Netanyahu’s Cabinet has only endorsed the proposal’s first phase, involving the ceasefire and prisoner exchange.

In a video statement, Mr. Netanyahu threatened to use force if Israel's demands, including Hamas's disarmament, were not met. "If this is achieved in the easy way, it's all for the better. And if not, it'll be achieved the hard way," he said.

Ironically, Mr. Netanyahu's limiting of his acceptance of the Trump proposal to the proposal's first phase makes it easier for Hamas to negotiate the terms of the plan's other provisions, such as the demand that the group immediately disarm.

Hamas has insisted that it would disarm only once an independent Palestinian state is established.

Equally worryingly, Mr. Trump, in a repetition of a problematic history, drafted his plan in consultation with Mr. Netanyahu but not with any Palestinians whose buy-in is a sine qua non.

Instead, the Trump proposal puts whatever Gaza administrative body made up of non-aligned Palestinians is created under the guardianship of a 'Board of Peace' presided by the president with controversial former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as its possible chief executive.

Palestinians may be willing to accept Mr. Trump, in a bid to keep him engaged, but are unlikely to accept Mr. Blair, who is perceived as an Israeli frontman and is widely viewed as complicit in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Moreover, as a result of Mr. Netanyahu's interventions, the proposal omits any reference to the West Bank. This makes Mr. Trump's projection of the ceasefire as the launching pad for a long elusive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a fata morgana.

Similarly, the Trump formula risks alienating Palestinian public opinion that has shifted towards greater support of a two-state-solution because of the Gaza war. If taken into account, the shift mitigates in favour of the Trump proposal even though it does not contain a firm commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Palestinians "want anything that will stop the bloodshed.... The current situation has increased people’s commitment to ending the conflict," said Ramallah-based pollster Zayne Abudaka.

Countering Israel's insistence that Gaza needs to be 'deradicalised,' Mr. Abudaka suggested that a majority of Palestinians advocated peaceful means to achieve their goals, including boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel, protests, and negotiations.

"Armed resistance is not unpopular, it’s just (in) not the top three (preferred options)... People are not anti-resistance, they just want to practically do things that will keep them on their land and relatively safe while also pushing back and hurting the enemy," Mr. Abudaka said.

Implicitly suggesting that Israel, too, may need deradicalisation, Mr. Abudaka noted that Palestinian, rather than Israeli, public opinion favoured a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Multiple polling of Israeli Jews suggests that a majority of Israelis want an end to the war to achieve the release of the Hamas-held hostages and because they don't see the war achieving Mr. Netanyahu's war goals, which they support despite distrusting the prime minister.

Similarly, Hamas has good reason to concede that it will not be part of Gaza's post-war administration.

"People don’t want Hamas to rule Gaza—that’s very strong, they don’t want that. They didn’t like Hamas before the war, and they like it much less now," Mr. Abudaka said.

Hamas suffered a further setback with Israel’s refusal to include Marwan Barghouti, a leader of Al-Fatah, the backbone of the West Bank-based, internationally recognised Palestine Authority, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) General Secretary Ahmad Sa’adat, in the exchange of the Hamas-held captives for Palestinians in Israeli prisons.

Hamas had insisted that Israel release Mr. Barghouti, who is serving five life sentences plus 40 years for planning attacks that led to the killing of four Israelis and a Greek monk.

Mr. Barghouti is widely viewed as a figure who can unite the Palestinian polity. He consistently emerges in opinion polls as the most popular Palestinian leader, whom Palestinians would vote for in a presidential election ahead of Palestine Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas leaders.

In a sign, if one were needed, that Israel rejects an equitable resolution of the conflict and is likely to squash Mr. Trump's dream of an "everlasting peace" in the Middle East, Israel's refusal to release Mr. Barghouti is designed to keep Palestinians divided and weak in future negotiations.

Saleh al-Jafarawi

Adding to the Trump proposal’s pitfalls, divisions within Gaza and the spectre of internal strife gained greater prominence with the killing on Sunday of 28-year-old Saleh Al-Jafarawi, a controversial social media figure and journalist with alleged links to Hamas accused of pocketing millions of dollars raised to fund the construction of a children’s hospital.

Mr. Al-Jafarawi’s Israeli and Palestinian detractors have provided no evidence for his alleged wrongdoing.

Wearing a bullet proof vest that identified him as a journalist when he was killed, Mr. Al-Jafarawi was assassinated during clashes between Hamas and the powerful Doghmush clan. Hamas and the Doghmush have long been at loggerheads because of the clan’s involvement in weapons smuggling and drugs trafficking.

Israel unsuccessfully tried to convince the Doghmush to join a future Gaza administration of non-aligned Palestinians that would be attentive to Israeli concerns.

Mr. A-Jafawari told Al Jazeera days before his killing that he had received Israeli death threats.

“Honestly, I lived in fear for every second, especially after hearing what the Israeli occupation was saying about me. I was living life second to second, not knowing what the next second would bring,” Mr. Al-Jafarawi said.

It’s politics, stupid

2025-10-12T16:00:00.003+08:00

Play the Game’s 2025 conference, ‘Driving Dialogue for Democracy in Sport,’ opened in Tampere, Finland, on October 5. One of its first panels focused on ‘Protest and play? The upcoming battles between sport and politics on US soil,’ with as speakers Professor Jules Boykoff, Human Rights Watch’s Minky Worden, Canadian-Egyptian journalist Karim Zidan, Danish National Olympic Committee President Hans Natorp, and myself.

My remarks follow below and at are at minute 46:57 – 57:05, minute 1:02.36 – 1:04:25, and 1:22:51 – 1:24:04 on the video of the full panel at https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/its-politics-stupid

Transcription:

There’s a silver lining in being the last contributor in a panel of distinguished speakers who have eloquently essentially said what there is to be said. Nevertheless, I would like to add some critical notes as food for thought on various aspects of our discussion.

Let me start with the elephant in the room. Much of what we heard in the excellent presentations by Jules, Karim, Minky, and Hans discusses the fallout of the incestuous relationship between sports and politics: the assault on human rights, the politicisation and weaponisation of sports, and the double standards that are not unique to sports but are reflected in the policies of international, regional, and national sports associations.

What I miss in these legitimate and valuable discussions is a focused approach to handling and regulating the relationship between sports and politics. Let me be clear: I don’t have well-rounded solutions, but rather pointers that may help us think things through. What I do know is that unless we start thinking proactively about the relationship between sports and politics and make it a focal point of continuous discussion, we will continue to fight rearguard battles rather than tackling the underlying issues that enable some of the problems raised here.

To clarify, this is not intended to put human rights groups and activists on the defensive. On the contrary, it is to stimulate discussion.

Sports and politics are inseparable Siamese twins joined at the hip. They are a fact of life and necessary, as seen, for example, in the importance of sports in public health policies and the contribution of sports to various sectors of the economy, including tourism, hospitality, entertainment, and the leisure industry.

Sports are not unique in grappling with the relationship to politics. The same is true for finance, with regulators like the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States and the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority in the United Kingdom. Or the independence of central banks to safeguard monetary policies. Another example is Ofwat, the Water Services Regulation Authority in Britain, one of the few countries to have privatised water as an asset.

Sports may need more than just a regulator. I would argue that it requires a code of conduct that is supervised and managed by a regulator.

Without a supervisory and regulatory mechanism, sports executives have a free hand under the fictional mum that sports and politics are separate.,

Let me digress for a moment to place all of this in a broader context that underscores the urgency of discussions on sports and politics. That larger context is that we live in a world in which the number of leaders who are not simply authoritarian or autocratic, but, more importantly, think in civilisational terms, has reached critical mass. Just go down the list: Trump, Putin, Netanyahu, Orban, Narendra Modi, and Xi Jinping, just to name a few. In other words, regulating the relationship between sports and politics is not just about sports, it is also about the broader implications of this relationship.

This, coupled with the issue of double standards, has consequences for activists, particularly regarding the promotion of social and gender rights in the context of the culture wars being waged by civilisational leaders. This may require a more selective targeted approach to name and shame name-and-shame tactics..Moreover, the standards issue underscores the importance of grassroots and educational work, in addition to investigating and documenting abuse and violations, as well as efforts to influence policies at national, regional, and international levels.

Finally, allow me to address the concept of sportswashing. Too often, activists position sportswashing as the primary rationale of autocratic sports acquisitions and sponsorships. Reputation is undoubtedly a factor, but it is not the primary factor. In addition, the relative significance of reputational drivers is modified by the fact that Gulf states appear similar at first glance but, in reality, are significantly different. Those differences are reflected in the varying drivers of their sports investment policies.

The litmus test is whether countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates would invest in sports if reputational issues, such as human rights concerns, were not at stake. The answer is a resounding yes, which means that sportswashing is at best a secondary driver. For Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, it's about his economic diversification plan and sports contribution not only in its own right but also in terms of public health, tourism, and entertainment.

To be sure, reputation in terms of the ability to organise mega events, international standing, and nation branding are considerations, but they are not by definition sportswashing, which is at best a by-effect.

Moreover, if the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi is anything to go by, it didn’t take long for Bin Salman to put the reputational damage behind him, aided by a world of civilisational leaders.

One lesson from the Qatar World Cup is the need for grassroots work not only in target countries, but equally crucial among fans globally. The fact of the matter is that only a minority of fans truly cares about human or labour rights. More important for fans in Qatar were the complexities of the haya system and the cost of attending the World Cup.

Finally, one last point: the discussion about a sports boycott of Israel. Again, let me be clear. I favour a boycott. But we need to be honest about the fact that boycotts involve one of the aspects of Israeli policy that we take Israel to task for, namely, collective punishment. What that means is that, to the degree possible, we have to tailor boycotts to ensure that those who stand on the right side of history or are, to whatever degree, victims of objectionable policies are exempted from punitive measures.

There is no debate about including Israeli West Bank settler teams or clubs like Beitar Jerusalem with racist policies. Beitar is the only Israeli club that refuses to hire Palestinian or Muslim players, or, in rare instances, when they did, allowed a racist fan base to force those players' departure.

There is a clear distinction in various calls for a sports boycott of Israel. In contrast to the Game Over Israel campaign, which demands a blanket boycott of Israeli football, including the national federation, the national team, clubs, and players, United Nations experts called exclusively for a boycott of Israel’s national team.

The Game Over blank boycott approach punishes Israeli Palestinian players who frequently encounter racist attacks. It also punishes teams like Bnei Sakhnin, Israel’s foremost Israeli Palestinian squad.

These are challenging and sensitive issues, and there may not always be clean solutions. Even so, these are issues one has to confront head-on rather than leaving them unspoken.

In summary, all of this is a collection of random notes intended as food for thought.

Thank you

Ceasefire approved but is peace in sight?

2025-10-11T04:09:00.003+08:00

Israel has approved a ceasefire deal with Hamas. But with one explosion reported in Gaza hours after the deal was passed, can we still expect peace as Israel begins withdrawing from parts of Gaza? Lance Alexander and Daniel Martin speak with correspondent Blake Sifton and James M. Dorsey, Adjunct Senior Fellow, RSIS

To listen to the podcast, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/ceasefire-approved-but-is-peace-in

[Anchor] It's a Singapore Today top story with Lance and Daniel on CNA 938. Israel has approved a ceasefire deal with Palestinian militant group Hamas. This clears the way to suspend hostilities in Gaza within 24 hours and free Israeli hostages held there within 72 hours after that.

The Israeli cabinet agreed to the deal roughly 24 hours after mediators announced an agreement to free Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. But with one explosion reported in Gaza hours after the deal was passed, how secure will this period of peace truly be? Before we go to our Middle East expert for insights, let's get the latest from Blake Sifton, who joins us from Tel Aviv in Israel.

Blake, with this ceasefire now in effect, are we still expecting a hold on hostilities in Gaza within 24 hours and Israeli hostages to be freed within 72 hours after that?

[Blake Sifton] Good evening. So the deal has only just begun, but there is still quite a bit of uncertainty. Now, according to the deal as it was signed, as we understand, the ceasefire was meant to come into effect the moment the Israeli government signed off on it.

So that would have been early this morning. Now, however, there's been, yesterday a government spokesperson said it would be within 24 hours. Now, there has been tank shelling and gunfire in Khan Yunis.

And so we'll see whether it ends sooner than the 24-hour period they outlined. Now, what we do know, hostages are withdrawing as we speak. They are expected to complete their withdrawal sometime today.

And once they have completed that withdrawal, within 72 hours of that period, that's when the clock starts ticking on the release of the hostages. Hamas must release all 48 hostages, living and dead. We understand that there may be some flexibility on returning the bodies of the hostages because it may be difficult for Hamas to find them or access them because they could be buried under rubble.

Now, when it comes to the release of the live hostages, the living hostages, we understand that they will be handed to the Red Cross. The Red Cross will then deliver them to Israeli forces inside Gaza. They'll then be taken out of Gaza into Israel and be taken to hospitals.

Now, it's going to be very different than the previous hostage releases we've seen. There will be no ceremonies by Hamas. There will be no spectacles.

[Anchor] Quick point, Blake, before we tap out with you. We just want to know, as you've just described, there are many phases, many timelines, many milestones to this agreement. What can we expect right now with the earliest phase, with phase one, and is everything in line with what needs to happen for it to happen?

[Blake Sifton] Yes, this phase is looking good. I think it's important to note that this is really more at this stage of a ceasefire agreement, which we've had before, hostage release, prisoner exchange for a ceasefire. But what's being envisioned by President Trump is a comprehensive peace plan.

That would be discussed and negotiated in later phases, and that will be much more challenging to overcome. But this part, we're on track.

[Anchor] We'll leave it there with Blake. Blake, thank you very much. We understand it's probably very difficult getting that signal out of where you are right now.

He's reporting to us live from Tel Aviv in Israel, Blake Sifton, our correspondent. We're understanding the Israel-Gaza ceasefire deal that is kicking in real time, actually, as we speak here on Singapore Today. We're joined by James Dorsey, Adjunct Senior Fellow at RSIS, to break down the latest developments around this landmark ceasefire deal.

James, let's talk about the main factors that really pushed both sides towards accepting this time round. What was it about October in 2025? Was it because it was the anniversary of the initial October 7th attack?

Was it because of strains and resources on either side? Was it because, potentially, of agreements made behind the scenes between the Americans and the Iranians and the Saudis or the Israelis that we know of? What do you think finally pushed both sides to accept?

[James M. Dorsey] It may have been a bit of your last point. I don't think it was anything of the other points. I think the key issue here is that Donald Trump put his foot down and put his name to this, put his foot down.

And therefore, it's Donald Trump's credibility on the line, in part. Nobody in the Middle East wants to cross Donald Trump. And even if they were unhappy with aspects of the proposal that he put on the table, they were not going to go against it.

So I think that's one reason for it. And as a result of that, I think there was pressure on Hamas to concede, certainly, on the hostage issue, in a sense. I think what various Arab states were arguing is that the hostages which had given Hamas leverage until now were turning into a liability for the group.

And at the same time, Hamas has made some major concessions here. There is no irrevocable link between the release of all the hostages and a permanent end to the war, and a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Hamas is basically betting on Trump following through, remaining engaged, and following through in terms of saying that this is the end of the war, and that this has to lead to a process.

[Anchor] Mr. Dorsey, this is such a fragile truce, and it's a long road ahead of us. A brief statement from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office said the cabinet approved the outline of a deal to release the hostages, without mentioning other aspects of the plan that are quite controversial. Is there a concern once hostages dead or alive are released, Israel could perhaps start something and breach that ceasefire?

[James M. Dorsey] There's definitely a concern. It's very clear that what Netanyahu has done is he wants the hostages back. He doesn't want an end to the war.

He's been forced into this. Now, having said that, or let me put it differently, Netanyahu's history is one of breaking deals in this war, is one of manipulating the situation so that he can continue the war. That could very well remain the case, but it's equally possible that Netanyahu will see an advantage in this, in terms of we're about a year away from scheduled elections in Israel.

And Netanyahu has to start taking that into account. Keep in mind that a majority of Israelis want to see this war ended, first and foremost because of the hostages, but also because the country's become tired. It's cost the country a great deal.

And they don't see the sense of this war, even though they may share Netanyahu's war goals in terms of Hamas and the Palestinians. And one option for Netanyahu, although this is pure speculation, is that he would go for a snap election or an early election because he now has a success in bringing the hostages home.

[Anchor] You mentioned the idea that he has a history of pulling out of or not following through on these agreements. We've seen reports of an explosion in Gaza just hours after the deal was passed. Already, how fragile would you say this ceasefire looks?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, first of all, I think, let's be clear, as your correspondent mentioned earlier, there's a contradiction in terms of what the agreement or the proposal says and what is happening on the ground. With other words, the guns should have fallen silent last night. They didn't.

The Israelis said they need 24 hours. While the cabinet was meeting and throughout the night, there was more than one explosion. There was tank fire.

There were bombings, not quite at the scale as they had been before, but they were there. So I wouldn't just write on this one explosion. This is fragile, and it will remain fragile throughout.

[Anchor] What of the other Middle Eastern nations, there may be a ceasefire currently on in Gaza, but could Israel continue conducting military action in countries like Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran?

[James M. Dorsey] Israel acts with impunity, yes, it could, and it may very well. I mean, this is a ceasefire that is exclusively regarding Gaza. It's not even regarding the West Bank, where you have significant problems.

So if Israel felt that there was or felt that there was a need for a strike in southern Lebanon or in Lebanon as such, something it's been doing since the ceasefire that was concluded with Hezbollah in November of last year, or if it feels that it needs to strike in Syria or in Iran, Israel will do so, Gaza ceasefire or not.

[Anchor] Do you think that everything could change or pivot if and when the hostages are fully returned?

[James M. Dorsey] I don't think anything fundamentally pivots. The problem remains what it is. Without Hamas-held hostages and without Palestinians incarcerated in Israel, this is a conflict of the fundaments of which go far beyond captives and prisoners.

[Anchor] Okay, let me rephrase. Do you think that at the point where the hostages are returned fully, that it would be the opportunity for Israel to back out of the rest of the agreement?

[James M. Dorsey] Absolutely. I mean, that's what the fear is, and that's where the engagement of Donald Trump is going to be crucial. Again, Netanyahu may have reasons to stay in the agreement for a while.

Fact of the matter is, however, that the notion of opposition to an independent Palestinian state is something that goes far beyond Benjamin Netanyahu, far beyond the far-right, ultra-nationalist elements in his cabinet. There's a lot of popular support for things like depopulation of Gaza, even if there may not be popular support to act on that now. So yes, Netanyahu could at any point in which he thinks it's politically convenient, he could opt to move out of this agreement.

The question is to what degree he's willing to take on a confrontation with Donald Trump.

[Anchor] Mr. Dorsey, you mentioned the West Bank. So what happens now? Because we know U.S. President Donald Trump has said he will not allow Israel to annex the occupied West Bank. We already know half a million Israeli settlers are there in the West Bank. It's considered illegal by the International Court of Justice. What happens there?

[James M. Dorsey] Unless there is a credible process, and I don't see that happening, which would have to involve land swaps, a halt to further Israeli settlement on the West Bank, nothing happens. With other words, it remains the same. One of the most crucial points right now is that Israel several weeks ago said it was going to start construction of more than, I think, 3,000 housing units in what is called the E1 sector.

The E1 sector is a sector that extends out of Jerusalem into the West Bank and for all practical purposes cuts the territory in two, which would mean that if that project goes ahead, putting together a contiguous Palestinian state is going to be very difficult.

[Anchor] Looking at it from the U.S. perspective right now, politically, how important is this for U.S. President Donald Trump to hold together, taking into account the U.S. government shutdown, taking into account the global tariff war that exists right now, amongst his own supporters, amongst his own political base, how important is it for him to hold it together as it is written in the agreement?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, obviously, Trump has a lot of fish to fry and some very big ones. Having said that, you've seen a significant shift in public opinion, as well as within Trump's own Make America Great Again support base, a shift that is far more critical of Israel, that wants to see an end to the Gaza war. And therefore, that's something that Trump has to take into account, even if he has a lot on his plate.

Now, what happens when you no longer get the pictures out of Gaza that we've had from the hospitals with no provisions and so on? That's an open question. One of the issues, of course, is going to be that Israel will presumably want to control and severely limit access to the Gaza Strip, particularly by the international media, because they don't want the pictures of the devastation that they've caused to be broadcast around and independent interviewing of Palestinians on the ground.

[Anchor] What happens to the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu? We know he's up for corruption charges. Like you said, fresh elections are due next year, if I'm not mistaken.

Will he still stay in power, you think, if there is truce and it holds?

[James M. Dorsey] I think we still have to wait and see what impact the ceasefire and the release of the hostages are going to have on Netanyahu's polling. At this point, he is unlikely to become the next prime minister. Now, the one thing I think one has to caution about, which is that, you know, the next prime minister of Israel will not necessarily be a panacea.

He obviously may not have the narcissistic elements of Netanyahu's personality. But fundamentally, policy may not—and he may also be more willing to avoid open confrontation with the international community. But fundamentally, those policies are not going to be that different.

[Anchor] With this ceasefire, will we finally see humanitarian aid getting into Gaza?

[James M. Dorsey] I think we're going to see that immediately. I would expect that to kick in any minute. And that's obviously enormously crucial for Palestinians in Gaza.

But I think that's one of the first things that we'll see alongside the exchange of hostages and prisoners.

[Anchor] Thank you, James Dorsey, who is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at RSIS. This has been a Top Singapore Today story.

Can the Gaza ceasefire agreement hold?

2025-10-10T04:34:00.006+08:00

James M. Dorsey from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies weighs in on the Israel-Hamas Gaza ceasefire deal and discusses whether Israel will commit to the agreement.

To watch the video, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/can-the-gaza-ceasefire-agreement

[Auskar Surbakti] James M. Dorsey is an adjunct senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Really good to have you back with us, James.

This has been a long time in the making. We have another ceasefire deal that's been agreed upon by all parties. As we heard from Nizar, a number of nations including Turkey, the United States and Qatar are guarantors of this deal.

Are you hopeful that this deal will last?

[James M. Dorsey] Oscar, good to be with you. I think, as a number of analysts have suggested, we're going to see a ceasefire. The question is for how long.

We're going to see the release of Amash-held captives in exchange for Palestinians incarcerated by Israel. First of all, we don't know exactly what the modalities of all of this are. It seems—one must assume that even though the modalities have not been announced, they have been agreed upon, which I think is encouraging to believe that this first phase of the agreement will take place.

What happens after that is anybody's question. In other words, we don't know that Israel is going to be committed to this agreement. Israel has been clear from the beginning that it was forced to sign on to the Trump 20-point proposal.

At the same time, Hamas is probably not going to be very happy with this. Hamas is putting its trust in the fact that President Trump, the U.S. president, has pressured Netanyahu to enter into this agreement, and has committed that Israel will stop the war in Gaza and will cooperate in executing the rest of the 20 plans. And in a sense, he's given his guarantee by saying that he will remain engaged in putting his credibility with this agreement on the line.

But we're going to have to wait and see how that all plays out.

[Auskar Surbakti] Yes, and a number of people have agreed, like you have, that Trump has been a key figure in this second ceasefire deal. Is there an element of self-interest here on his part? We know he's made no secret of the fact that he's vying for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Do you think that has had a part to play in this?

[James M. Dorsey] I have no doubt about it. He projects himself as a peacemaker. He prides himself on having already resolved seven conflicts in his statement since he came back into office in January.

But the two major conflicts, Ukraine and Gaza, have eluded him until now. And so, securing a ceasefire in Gaza is a major achievement. I think we've got to keep in mind that this would not have happened without Donald Trump.

Now, it also would not have happened without the other mediators—Ghatta, Egypt, Turkey. It would not have happened with both the Israeli public, the Palestinian public, and, for that matter, much of the American public wanting to see this conflict, this war, end. But, as with anything, Donald Trump is going to exploit this for his political and personal interests.

[Auskar Surbakti] Yes, you mentioned the pressure that Israel had faced both internally and externally. It seemed, though, for a while that the Israeli government simply didn't care about the growing calls and condemnation over its genocide in Gaza. Has that played a part in getting Israel to come on board to this deal, do you think, the growing international pressure, as well as the pressure at home?

[James M. Dorsey] I think it played a part in Donald Trump's calculations. I'm not sure it played a part in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's calculations. He has been immune to the enormous reputational damage that Israel has suffered as a result of its conduct of the war.

And it's going to take Israel quite a bit, despite Trump's promise that he wanted to help Israel repair its image. It's going to take a long time and quite a bit of work. I think that if Netanyahu had had his way, this war would continue.

[Auskar Surbakti] Okay. James M. Dorsey, thank you, as always, for joining us on the programme.

[James M. Dorsey] Always a pleasure. Thank you for having me.

A look at key events of the Israel-Hamas war in the past year

2025-10-09T05:28:00.007+08:00

Staring at minute 04:18, James discusses the Gaza ceasefire talks on CNA

To watch the video, go to https://jamesmdorsey.substack.com/p/a-look-at-key-events-of-the-israel

Transcript

[Anchor] Broken truces, unreleased hostages, expanded military operations and accusations of genocide as the Israel-Hamas war enters its third year. We take a look at key events of the conflict in the past year. A chance encounter in southern Gaza meant the end of Israel's enemy number one.

The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar marked the second year of the devastating war between Israel and Hamas in the enclave. Israel had identified the 61-year-old as the architect of the October 7th attack that sparked the conflict. In November, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Hamas and Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for alleged war crimes.

By then, the death toll had soared past 44,000, with thousands more injured or missing. But then, a reprieve in January after 15 months of war. A ceasefire deal took effect the same month, resulting in a pause in fighting and the release of Hamas hostages and hundreds of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

But that peace was short-lived. Less than a month in, both sides traded accusations of truce violations. In March, Israel again cut off aid to the enclave.

Not long after, it resumed strikes across the Strip and enforced a punishing blockade. In May, it gave the green light for a handful of trucks to resume aid delivery to starving Palestinians. For the United Nations, it was a drop in the ocean.

In August, the UN confirmed a famine in the enclave, a charge Israel denied, while their counter-terrorism efforts were operations in Gaza City. Efforts for a new truce hit a major roadblock in September. Israel struck at the heart of Qatar, targeting Hamas officials who were discussing ceasefire proposals.

A week later, the IDF launched a major ground offensive in Gaza City, forcing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to flee once again. For an independent UN investigating team, it was clear. Last month, several Western nations made clear their support of a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly.

A landmark change in diplomatic tide amid mounting pressure from the International Civil Society. But Israel insists letting an independent Palestinian state exist would be rewarding terrorism. The U.S. president seems to think differently. His 20-point peace plan to end the war includes creating a pathway for a Palestinian state. It means the immediate end to the war itself, not just Gaza. It's the war itself.

Israel has agreed, while Hamas has stopped short of accepting it unconditionally. It may be the closest both sides have come to a permanent ceasefire. But an air of uncertainty lingers as the war enters its third year.

I'm joined by James M. Dorsey. He is Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University here in Singapore.

Dr. Dorsey, 20 points, this peace plan by U.S. President Donald Trump. For you, the word plan in this instance might be a misnomer.

[James M. Dorsey] Indeed, so what we have is a set of principles that would guide ending the war and theoretically eventually ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The problem here is severalfold. First of all, there are no terms for the implementation of those principles, nor is there a mechanism suggested how these terms would be implemented.

I think the second thing is that despite the overall and general acceptance of the plan, nobody really likes the principles as they are stated. However, they are the only game in town. And equally importantly, they involve the engagement of the single most important player in all of this, the U.S. President Trump. All right. Dr. Dorsey, if no one likes the deal, but they still have to sign up to the deal, does it matter whether or not they in fact like it, whether or not they agree or disagree, as long as they agree to the terms of any ceasefire? Well, that's the whole issue, if you wish.

We have the principles and what we're seeing at the moment in the negotiations that are going on in Cairo is trying to negotiate the terms of this. So you have on the one side Hamas, which says we're willing to exchange the Hamas held captives who were taken, who were abducted on October 7 two years ago during the Hamas attack in exchange for Palestinians held in Israeli prisons, but equally importantly, in exchange for a permanent end to the war and a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. On the other hand, what we're seeing from the Israelis are that their acceptance at this point involves focussing on the release of the Hamas held captives rather than on what that would entail and how to get to the release of those captives.

[Anchor] So there's a huge gap and there's no indication at this point, despite the optimism, that that gap is being bridged. It stands to reason that either side, each with its own vested and likely contradictory interests, is likely to be emphasising what they want to see and downplaying what they do not want to see. Is there any overlap in terms of what they might agree with, even if they might not like to agree to those terms?

[James M. Dorsey] Let's put it this way. I have little doubt that the Palestinians want to see an end to this. I think there's a question mark whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants to see an end to this.

There are reports that it took some arm twisting by the U.S. president to get Netanyahu to at least nominally accept the plan. But unless you can agree on the terms of release of captives and release of prisoners and on the terms of what a process, a ceasefire would entail, it's going to be very difficult to bring the two sides together. Our pressure from Washington likely exacerbated by irritation from the White House when Israel chose to bomb Qatar, even as Hamas was looking closely at that proposal from Steve Whitcock, U.S. special envoy, and that quite clearly frustrated President Trump. U.S. pressure, should the U.S. choose to exert that pressure, could that make the difference in Prime Minister Netanyahu actually going the extra mile to sign this agreement? Qatar may have been the straw that broke the camel's back, but we've seen moments of frustration, irritation on the part of Trump towards Netanyahu actually from the beginning of his second term in office. The real question is, and that's what I think is missing at the moment in Cairo, is whether or not Trump is going to exert the kind of pressure that is going to force Netanyahu to end this war.

What we're right now seeing in Cairo is the Egyptians and the Qataris negotiating with Hamas and the Israelis standing by, and that's not a very hopeful indication. On the question of whether U.S. pressure on Israel would make the difference, if the U.S. were to take real measures, that is to partially at least impose a weapons embargo, curtail financial aid, be more cooperative with other parties in the United Nations Security Council, that's pressure that the Israeli prime minister cannot ignore. So we look at progress from these talks and certainly what's happened in the last few days, including continued bombardment by Israel of Gaza, despite Washington demanding an end to any strikes so that these talks can proceed as they should.

[Anchor] What does that tell you in terms of where Washington is really putting the pressure?

[James M. Dorsey] Well, I think one has to be careful with jumping to conclusions, but certainly first impressions are that the pressure is at this moment on Hamas and that if the talks were to fail, in a sense, Hamas is being set up to be the fall guy. And indeed, the fact that Trump on Friday clearly said, I want the bombings to stop now, and it's now Tuesday, and those bombings continue, even if they may be less intense, is an indication or can be construed as an indication that Trump may not want to go all the way in pressuring Netanyahu.

[Anchor] And a final question here, Dr. Dorsey, do you see, as some hope, perhaps you might find incremental progress, so achieving first phase progress and results, for example, exchange of prisoners, release of prisoners, hostages on one side, prisoners on the other, and building on that to larger and far more complicated agreements of withdrawal and governance of the Gaza Strip? Is that even a realistic hope? Incremental progress.

[James M. Dorsey] The fact that the talks are taking place is in and of itself hopeful. There's no question about that.

However, the captives that Hamas holds is its major trump card at this moment. It's highly unlikely that Hamas will surrender all of those trump cards. In other words, 48 Hamas-held captives, whether dead or alive, without having guarantees for an end to the war and an Israeli withdrawal.

[Anchor] Are there interim measures possible? Yes, it's possible. Will Israel and the United States agree at this point to a partial release of captives?

[James M. Dorsey] Hard to say. Both Trump and Netanyahu have insisted that all captives need to be released at this point in one go.

[Anchor] Thanks, James M. Dorsey, the Adjunct Senior Fellow at the S.Rajaram School of International Studies right here in Singapore at NTU.