The NCVS is an annual self-report survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau on behalf of the BJS that captures information about nonfatal personal and household crimes experienced by U.S. residents age 12 and older. The current report summarizes findings using data combined from the years 2020 to 2023. By pooling results across multiple years, the estimates become more stable and reliable, allowing for clearer comparisons among different groups.

Whether an area is labeled urban, suburban, or rural depends on where the victim lives, not where the crime happened. Urban areas include locations within city boundaries or census-designated places that meet certain thresholds for population size and density. Rural areas are defined as those lying outside of urbanized zones and clusters as designated by the U.S. Census Bureau. Suburban areas are essentially the in-between spaces that don’t fall neatly into either the urban or rural category, such as classic residential suburbs, small towns with limited downtown areas, and smaller cities with low urban density. On average, 69% live in suburban areas, 19% live in rural areas, and 12% live in urban areas.

Violent Crime

Overall, rural areas had the highest reporting rate for violent crimes (51%), followed by suburban areas (43%), while urban areas had the lowest reporting rate (38%). The differences were most stark for rape/sexual assault, which only 13% of urban victims reported compared to 52% in rural areas, a difference of 39 percentage points. Reporting rates for simple and aggravated assaults also followed a similar pattern, with the lowest reporting rates in urban areas. For robbery, reporting rates followed a slightly different pattern, with the lowest rates in suburban areas (49%), compared to 63% in urban areas and 73% in rural areas.

Source: Wang & Thompson (2025). “Reporting to Police by Type of Crime and Location of Residence, 2020–2023,” Figure 1. Bureau of Justice Statistics. https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/reporting-police-type-crime-and-location-residence-2020-2023/web-report

Property Crime

While people were less likely to report property crimes in general, patterns mirrored those for violent crimes. Rural areas had the highest reporting rates (36%), followed by suburban (33%) and urban (25%) areas. This pattern was largely driven by theft reporting rates, which were 31% in rural areas, followed by 28% in suburban areas, and 20% in urban areas. For auto theft, people from rural areas were most likely to report (81%) and people in urban areas were the least likely (73%). For burglary, rates differed only slightly, ranging from 41% to 44%.

Wang & Thompson (2025). “Reporting to Police by Type of Crime and Location of Residence, 2020–2023,” Figure 2. Bureau of Justice Statistics. https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/reporting-police-type-crime-and-location-residence-2020-2023/web-report

Conclusion

Overall, people living in rural areas were the most likely to report crime to the police, regardless of crime type (property vs. violent). According to a companion report published in 2024, there are several reasons why people may choose not to report crime, including fear of getting the offender in trouble, belief that the police would not do anything to help, or if the issue was considered too personal or too trivial to report.

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What Exactly Is Retail Theft?

“Retail theft” is a broad term covering a range of theft-related crimes where a retail business is the victim. This can include shoplifting, burglary, embezzlement, robbery, and even vandalism, depending on how the crime is committed and the value of goods stolen. Because statewide crime statistics don’t track offenses by victim type, there’s no single data point that captures retail theft. For this analysis, the report uses two proxies: shoplifting (stealing $950 or less from a store during business hours) and nonresidential burglary (unlawfully entering a store or other non-home location to commit theft, regardless of value). These two categories offer the clearest available picture of how retail theft may be evolving.

Retail Theft Trends: A Decade in Review

The rate of reported retail theft in California has shifted over the past ten years, with notable increases and declines tied to key events. After a modest rise in 2015, theft rates fell steadily, dropping 20% between 2015 and 2021. This included a sharp drop between 2019 and 2020, likely driven by pandemic-related shutdowns and stay-at-home orders that temporarily reduced opportunities for theft.

However, that downward trend reversed after the early pandemic period. Between 2021 and 2023, reported retail theft jumped by 32%. Over the full 2014–2023 period, the statewide rate rose by 11%, or an additional 48 incidents per 100,000 people.

Importantly, this data may understate the real scope of recent increases: several major law enforcement agencies—covering about 10% of the state population—failed to report complete data for 2023. For example, the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department submitted only partial data for the year.

Source: California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), “Retail theft in California,” Figure 1.

County-Level Differences

The statewide trend masks significant variation across counties. For example, while the state saw a slight increase in theft rates between 2014 and 2015, some counties experienced declines. More recently, from 2019 to 2023, the sharpest increases in theft were concentrated in large urban counties, especially Los Angeles, Alameda, Sacramento, and San Mateo. In contrast, many smaller counties actually saw theft rates decline. The report suggests that differences in retail density or other local conditions may explain these trends, though the exact reasons remain unclear.

Source: California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), “Retail theft in California,” Figure 2.

Impacts of Policy Changes

A variety of factors can influence retail theft, ranging from retail technology and economic conditions to homelessness and addiction. This report focused on how changes in criminal justice policy may have shaped California’s retail theft trends over the past decade. Two major influences stand out: the passage of Proposition 47 and a series of criminal justice system shifts that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Proposition 47

Proposition 47, approved by voters in 2014, significantly reduced penalties for lower-level crimes, including many types of retail theft. It reclassified several offenses from felonies or wobblers (crimes that can be charged as either misdemeanors or felonies) to misdemeanors. For example, shoplifting offenses involving goods valued under $950 must now be charged as misdemeanors, even if the same conduct might previously have qualified as felony burglary or “petty theft with a prior.” Receiving stolen property under the $950 threshold is also now a misdemeanor.

These changes altered arrest and detention protocols, making it more difficult for officers to arrest individuals for misdemeanor thefts unless they directly witnessed the offense. Moreover, the measure limited the Legislature’s ability to later increase penalties without securing a two-thirds majority vote. Collectively, these reforms led to lower arrest and incarceration rates for retail theft and may have weakened deterrents, influencing how law enforcement agencies respond to theft-related incidents.

Pandemic-Era Criminal Justice Changes

The COVID-19 pandemic brought a second wave of systemic changes that further disrupted the criminal justice landscape. Temporary policies such as zero-dollar bail enabled many individuals arrested for lower-level offenses to be released immediately. Efforts to reduce jail and prison crowding led to early releases, while law enforcement agencies often shifted toward issuing warnings rather than making arrests in order to limit in-person contact.

Additional policy changes included shortened probation terms under AB 1950 and increased investment in pretrial release programs, both of which reduced the number of people held in custody. At the same time, many law enforcement agencies reallocated resources to address rising violent crime, likely reducing the attention given to property crimes like retail theft.

Two Key Mechanisms Driving Crime Rates

Criminal justice policies tend to influence crime rates through two primary mechanisms: the likelihood of apprehension and the rate of incarceration. When individuals perceive a low likelihood of being caught, crime often increases. In California, the property crime clearance rate dropped from 14% in 2014 to just 8% in 2023, with a particularly sharp decline during the pandemic.

Source: California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), “Retail theft in California,” Figure 4.

Similarly, a decline in incarceration rates may have expanded the pool of people in the community with the opportunity to commit crime. Following Proposition 47, California’s incarcerated population declined by about 7%, and it fell by another 22% between 2019 and 2023 due to pandemic-related reforms.

Source: California Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), “Retail theft in California,” Figure 5.

Empirical research generally supports the conclusion that Proposition 47 led to an overall increase in larceny, including both retail and non-retail theft. A 2018 study found that California experienced a 9% higher larceny rate compared to other states following the law’s implementation. However, its specific impact on retail theft is harder to quantify, given changes in how such offenses are defined and reported.

The effect of pandemic-era changes on retail theft appears more modest. A 2024 study found that reductions in jail populations and declining clearance rates may have increased nonresidential burglaries by 2% to 3%, but these factors could only account for roughly one-third of the total increase in retail theft observed during the pandemic period.

Legislative Responses

In response to mounting concerns about retail theft, California lawmakers have passed a wide range of new laws aimed at deterring theft, increasing penalties for repeat or organized offenses, and enhancing law enforcement’s ability to respond. While some of these laws date back a few years, many of the most significant reforms only took effect in late 2024 or early 2025. These changes focus on three main goals: increasing the likelihood of apprehension, expanding incarceration options for repeat offenders, and improving coordination and enforcement capacity.

Strengthened Arrest and Detention Authority

Two recent laws have strengthened law enforcement’s authority to arrest and detain shoplifters. AB 2943 (2024) permits officers to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanor shoplifting even if they did not witness the crime firsthand. Meanwhile, AB 1065 (2018) allows courts to hold certain shoplifting suspects in custody before trial, particularly those with recent theft-related citations. These changes could deter theft by increasing the chance of immediate consequences.

Elevating Misdemeanors to Felonies

Several recent laws have made it easier to charge retail theft as a felony, which carries longer potential incarceration terms. Proposition 36 (2024) and AB 2943 allow prosecutors to aggregate the value of multiple thefts—regardless of whether they occurred at different stores or over a period of time—to meet the $950 threshold required for felony charges. AB 1065 (2018) formally defined organized retail theft as a felony when individuals work together to steal and resell merchandise. Additionally, AB 2943 (2024) established a new felony offense for possessing stolen goods valued at $950 or more with the intent to sell, even if the possession spans multiple incidents. Proposition 36 also reinstated a version of petty theft with a prior, enabling felony charges for people with two or more prior theft convictions.

Longer Sentences and Supervision

Some recent laws have extended the length of penalties and probation terms for retail theft offenses. AB 2943 allows courts to impose up to two years of misdemeanor probation for shoplifting cases, doubling the previous standard of one year. Additionally, SB 1416, AB 1960, and Proposition 36 provide for longer prison sentences when the value of theft or property damage exceeds $50,000, with further sentence enhancements for large-scale crimes involving multiple participants.These changes aim to reduce repeat offenses by keeping high-volume offenders off the streets for longer periods and encouraging court-mandated treatment.

Boosting Enforcement Capacity and Retail Protections

Implementation Considerations

With a wide range of new retail theft laws now in effect, the California Legislature’s job isn’t done. Lawmakers must now monitor how these laws are being implemented and whether they’re delivering real results. Lawmakers may want to review usage data or consult directly with stakeholders to understand whether laws are gaining traction or being ignored because they’re too cumbersome to use.

Retailers, police officers, prosecutors, and even the general public need to understand the new tools available. Without awareness and training, these reforms won’t be used effectively and may fail to deter theft. For example, felony charges now depend on the cooperation of retailers to document and report repeated thefts. If stores don’t know that their evidence could make a legal difference, they may not invest the effort.

Some prosecutors might aggressively pursue felony charges under Proposition 36, while others may take a more lenient stance. Similarly, corporate chains may benefit more than small businesses when thefts across multiple locations can be aggregated. Uneven application could lead to questions about fairness, equity, or unintended consequences.

When local law enforcement agencies and district attorneys develop successful approaches for tackling retail theft, the Legislature should ask whether those insights are being collected and disseminated across counties and cities.

Online resale markets are evolving fast, and so are the methods used to fence stolen goods. The Legislature may need to revisit current rules on online platforms to ensure they’re still effective as new technologies emerge.

Key Outcomes to Monitor

With tougher retail theft laws now in effect, California lawmakers face a critical question: Are these laws actually achieving what they set out to do? While implementation is one piece of the puzzle, the real test lies in outcomes. Below are the key outcomes the Legislature should be considering to guide effective oversight.

Retail Theft Rates

Ultimately, the goal of recent laws is to reduce retail theft. Monitoring reported rates of shoplifting and commercial burglary will help lawmakers track trends over time. But interpreting these numbers isn’t always straightforward. New laws may encourage more reporting or increase arrests, making it seem like crime is rising even if actual theft is not. That means increases in reported crime could reflect greater enforcement, not necessarily more criminal activity.

Clearance Rates

Clearance rates, i.e., the share of crimes solved or closed by arrest, are a strong signal of how likely offenders are to be caught. Research shows that increasing the chance of apprehension can deter crime more effectively than longer sentences. Monitoring clearance rates for retail theft and burglary could help assess whether law enforcement is better equipped to catch and charge suspects under the new laws. But again, more reporting could push clearance rates down even if police are actually solving more crimes.

Unintended Consequences

Every major policy shift carries risk. More aggressive enforcement of retail theft might push crime into other areas, or lead organized theft rings to exploit legal gaps—for example, recruiting minors who face less severe punishment. Lawmakers should also watch for disparities in how the laws affect different groups, especially by age, race, housing status, or region. Engaging directly with law enforcement and community stakeholders may reveal these patterns before they show up in statewide data.

Costs vs. Benefits

The final and most important question: Are these new laws worth it? Tough-on-crime policies can be expensive, especially when they rely on incarceration. Research consistently shows that interventions increasing the chance of being caught (such as more patrols or coordinated investigations) are often more cost-effective than longer sentences. The Legislature should weigh whether recent laws strike the right balance between effectiveness, fairness, and fiscal responsibility.

Increased arrests, prosecutions, and longer sentences will likely drive up jail, prison, and probation populations, especially if prosecutors and judges apply the new laws broadly. But actual cost increases will vary widely depending on local implementation. Monitoring incarceration and supervision trends over time can help lawmakers identify cost drivers. Understanding who is being incarcerated under the new laws and for how long can also guide future decisions about resource allocation.

Conclusion

In response to growing public concern, both the Legislature and California voters have enacted a series of law changes aimed at reducing retail theft. These changes significantly expand the enforcement and prosecutorial tools available to law enforcement agencies and local prosecutors. However, the actual impact of these reforms will depend heavily on how they are implemented at the local level.

The report by the Legislative Analyst’s Office outlines the key provisions of these recent laws, reviews research on how such tools can influence crime rates, and identifies key oversight questions for the Legislature to consider. As the state moves forward, careful monitoring of both implementation and outcomes will be essential. Ongoing legislative oversight can help ensure that these laws are applied effectively, fairly, and in a manner that delivers measurable public safety benefits.

These recent laws reflect a significant shift in how California is approaching retail theft: emphasizing more aggressive arrest powers, tougher penalties for repeat and organized offenders, and investments in coordination and prevention tools. Whether these changes will meaningfully deter theft or shift criminal behavior remains to be seen, but they mark a major reversal of the more lenient policies of the past decade.

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Researchers found that the spike in homicides was tended to be more severe in cities and communities already struggling with high baseline violence, with contributing factors including reduced police staffing, disrupted public services, and concentrated group-related gun violence. Surprisingly, unemployment shifts during the pandemic were not consistent predictors of rising homicides, challenging common assumptions.

National Homicide Spike

Homicide rates in the United States rose by 30% in 2020, marking the largest single-year increase in homicides in over a century. Elevated homicide rates persisted through 2021 but began normalizing over the next two years, resembling those of 2018 and 2019 by mid-2024. As established by the research, the initial rise in homicide rates corresponded with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was exacerbated by social unrest following the death of George Floyd. The Manhatten Institute study categorized the period into three phases: 1) Baseline (2018–2019), 2) Spike (2020–2021), and 3) Recovery (2022–2023).

Source: Manhattan Institute (2025), Spike and Recovery Homicide in Big Cities, 2018–23.

City-Level Analysis

Analysis of cities’ recovery from homicide spikes reveals diverse outcomes. Researchers found that cities with higher initial homicide rates prior to the spike period experienced the largest absolute increases in homicide rates. However, looking at proportional changes, which allow for a focus on how much a rate has increased relative to its original figure, painted a different picture. For example, St. Louis and New Orleans had very high baseline homicide rates and also saw some of the largest raw increases. However, because their starting points were already elevated, these increases appear less dramatic when looking at proportional increases. Yet, from a public health and safety perspective, any increase in these high-crime areas is often much more damaging because these cities already face considerable social and economic challenges. Even a modest uptick in their homicide rates can be indicative of serious destabilizing trends.

In contrast, Portland, Mesa, and Austin had relatively low homicide rates before the pandemic, and experienced the largest proportional increases. In these cities, a jump from 5 to 10 homicides per 100,000 people is still a 100% increase, which feels much more significant relative to the city’s previous experience with crime.  For example, Portland, which started with a homicide rate of about 4.2 per 100,000, saw its rate more than double to 10.5 per 100,000 in the Spike period, representing a massive disruption in the social fabric and the capacity of the local justice system to cope with crime. States with significant social unrest following events such as the death of George Floyd, like those in the Midwest and Northwest (e.g., Minneapolis, Portland), experienced higher proportional increases.  The unrest likely disrupted social order and also led to reductions in proactive policing. In the case of Portland, for instance, much of the increase in violence was attributed to the police defunding movement, which significantly reduced police staffing and resource allocation.

Some cities experienced impressive recoveries, reverting close to pre-spike homicide levels. For example, St. Louis nearly fully recovered, but to an extremely high baseline, with the highest homicide rate in the sample across all three periods. Meanwhile, cities Miami, Buffalo, and Nashville experienced spikes of at least 20% but then recovered to within 10% of their starting value. Other cities did not recover so well, with homicide rates that remained high or even continued increasing in the Recovery period. This is particularly concerning among cities that already had high baseline rates. For instance, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Memphis, and New Orleans had baseline homicide rates above 15 homicides per 100,000 population, experienced spikes of at least 40%, and recovered by less than one-third.

This correlation suggests that high baseline rates may predict poorer recovery outcomes. However, this was not universally true, as there were a few strange anomalies. For example, Portland started from a low baseline, saw the largest homicide spike in proportional terms, and continued to see increases even as the nation as a whole recovered. In contrast, Baltimore’s homicide rate has consistently been one of the highest among U.S. cities, with the second-highest baseline homicide rate (54 per 100,000, behind only St Louis). Yet, the city did not see a sharp proportional uptick in homicide rates. This contrasts with cities like St. Louis or New Orleans, which experienced significant spikes. Further, some cities were resilient against the homicide spike altogether, such as Anchorage, Honolulu, and Newark, New Jersey. For the former two, it’s quite possible that being outside of the contiguous United States played a role that made these two cities different than the others. The same cannot be said for Newark, however.

Ultimately, these diverse outcomes underscore the complex, interwoven factors ranging that shaped each city’s response to the crisis, emphasizing that no single factor can fully explain the fluctuations in homicide rates.

Unemployment and Crime

The study found that while unemployment was modestly correlated with homicide in the baseline period (2018-2019), where a clear pattern emerged showing a correlation between unemployment rates and homicide rates across various regions. This correlation supports a well-documented theory in criminology that socioeconomic factors, such as job availability and economic stability, can influence crime levels.

However, when the analysis shifted to consider changes in unemployment rates (comparing the baseline period to the spike period), the impact on violence and homicides was statistically insignificant. This suggests that while unemployment may generally be associated with violence, it does not necessarily predict specific changes during these tumultuous years. Cities that experienced some of the sharpest rises in homicide, such as Louisville, St. Louis, and New Orleans, did not see corresponding changes in unemployment. Conversely, some cities with high unemployment did not suffer a major rise in homicides. In essence, even as unemployment may have risen dramatically during the pandemic, it did not lead to a predictable increase in violent crime.

This disconnect challenges longstanding assumptions about economic distress as a driver of violent crime and suggests other crisis-related factors may have played a more pivotal role. This perspective advocates for deeper investigations into the multifaceted causes of crime, especially during unprecedented times. Factors such as changes in policing practices, law enforcement responsiveness, community engagement, social services availability, and even broader societal conditions (e.g., mental health crises, social isolation) may overshadow the impact of mere economic factors like unemployment.

Law Enforcement Dynamics

One of the study’s main findings relates to reductions in proactive policing during the pandemic and in the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder in 2020. Proactive policing refers to officers actively engaging in measures to prevent crime before it occurs, rather than solely responding to incidents after they have happened. This can include strategies such as community policing, increased patrols in high-crime areas, and proactive investigations aimed at deterring criminal activity. The 2020 homicide surge coincided with a dramatic drop in proactive policing across many jurisdictions. This was partly due to pandemic-related staff shortages, but also to widespread anti-police protests and rising criticism of law enforcement, particularly in major cities. Cities with both high homicide rates and significant pullbacks in policing (e.g., St. Louis, Milwaukee, and Atlanta) were especially affected.

This decrease in proactive policing may correlate with the rise in certain types of violence, especially gun-related and gang violence. However, because law enforcement practices vary quite a bit across localities, the relationship between police activity and homicide rates is likely nuanced. While strong local law enforcement practices may act as a deterrent to crime, gaps in these practices could exacerbate violence, particularly during high-stress periods. According to the Manhattan Institute study, when police departments experienced increased turnover, resignations, or a shift in focus towards managing protests and community dissatisfaction, the effectiveness of proactive policing diminished. This could have created an environment more conducive to crime, with potential offenders perceiving reduced risks of apprehension.

Another important consideration is police staffing levels, which is crucial for the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in managing crime. The study identifies a noticeable relationship between changes in police staffing and shifts in homicide rates during the Baseline and Spike periods. Cities that started with higher homicide rates and saw significant reductions in police personnel typically experienced more substantial increases in homicide rates. The findings highlight the need for law enforcement agencies to focus on maintaining adequate staffing and implementing proactive measures that foster community engagement and trust, aiming to reduce overall crime rates and improve public safety effectively.

Outliers and Anomalies: Portland and Baltimore

Not all cities followed these trends. Baltimore, for example, had one of the highest baseline homicide rates but did not see a dramatic increase during the spike. Portland, on the other hand, had a low baseline but experienced a record-breaking homicide surge. These anomalies support the idea that local dynamics play an important role in the homicide increase and merit further study.

Portland

According to a homicide analysis from the Portland police department, from 2019 to 2021, homicides became increasingly concentrated among a small segment of the population, with only about 0.1% directly involved. Gun homicides rose significantly, making up 75% of all homicides during this period, compared to 60% from 2015 to 2019. Over half of these were linked to gang-involved individuals, with around 30 active gangs and 1,000–1,495 members citywide. Nearly one in five gang-affiliated individuals were involved in a homicide or shooting during the study period, pointing to a high-risk, tightly connected group driving much of the violence. Group violence tended to stem from ongoing disputes and retaliations, with retaliatory shootings occurring, on average, 125 days after an initial violent incident. Public safety efforts are urged to focus on these high-risk networks to interrupt cycles of violence.

According to a data published in 2025, gun violence was also highly concentrated among a small group of individuals and geographical areas: 77% of firearm homicides occurred in 26 disadvantaged neighborhoods, and houseless individuals—who made up 38% of all homicide victims—were found to be 650 times more likely to be killed by gun violence than housed residents. The top drivers of gun violence included gangs/groups (33%), domestic violence (12%), housing instability (12%), robbery or stolen vehicles (8%), and personal disputes (8%).

Baltimore

In sum, Baltimore’s experience suggests that a mix of policing reform and adaptive social infrastructure can help cities weather periods of acute instability. Its trajectory offers valuable lessons for designing durable public safety strategies, particularly in urban areas with histories of concentrated violence. Understanding these nuances can critically inform future public policy and community safety initiatives aiming to manage and mitigate interpersonal violence, particularly in urban settings.

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Let us all take a moment today to remember those who gave their lives in the defense of freedom.

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