The Bar News

Chicago Law Schools to Become Federal Courtrooms for Citywide October Session

Marybeth Stanziola — Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:21:11 +0000

WASHINGTON - The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will hold oral arguments at six Chicago law schools and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit courthouse from October 5 through October 8. Eight three-judge panels will hear 32 pending appeals drawn from the court’s nationwide docket.

The Federal Circuit hears appeals involving patents, veterans’ benefits, international trade, federal employment, and government contracts from across the country. The proceedings being held in Chicago will be official sessions of the court, and attorneys will present arguments before federal judges under the same procedures followed at the Federal Circuit’s courthouse in Washington, D.C.

“Chicago is a great legal city,” said Chief Judge Kimberly A. Moore. “The Federal Circuit serves the entire country, and sessions like this give law students and members of the public an opportunity to see the court at work. We look forward to hearing cases across Chicago and meeting with students.”

The out-of-town session is a part of the court’s regular public and educational outreach, bringing its work to communities outside of Washington, D.C. Following the conclusion of oral arguments, law students will have the opportunity to participate in question-and-answer sessions with judges about appellate advocacy, the judicial process, legal careers, and more.

The Federal Circuit has held similar sessions in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas; Wilmington, Delaware; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; San Francisco, California; and Boston, Massachusetts.

All eight sessions begin at 10 a.m. CDT. The schedule is:

Monday, Oct. 5, 10 a.m. CDT
- Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law: Thorne Auditorium
- DePaul University College of Law: Leonard M. Ring Courtroom
Tuesday, Oct. 6, 10 a.m. CDT
- Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law: Judge Abraham Lincoln Marovitz Courtroom
- University of Illinois Chicago School of Law: Edith and Philip Baim Courtroom
Wednesday, Oct. 7, 10 a.m. CDT
- Loyola University Chicago School of Law: Power Rogers & Smith Ceremonial Courtroom
- University of Chicago Law School: Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom
Thursday, Oct. 8, 10 a.m. CDT
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: Main Courtroom, 27th floor
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: James B. Parsons Ceremonial Courtroom, 25th floor

Oral arguments are open to the public and news media, subject to available seating and security requirements. Additional information is available in the court’s October 2026 public calendar and notice for the October 2026 session.

About the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Established in 1982 and based in Washington, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals from across the country involving patents,international trade, government contracts, federal employment, veterans’ benefits and other areas of federal law. More information is available at www.cafc.uscourts.gov.

For additional information, please contact the Circuit Executive’s Office at 202-275-8040.

Illinois Supreme Court Appoints Associate Judge Sarah Duffy as Circuit Judge in Eleventh Circuit

Marybeth Stanziola — Tue, 29 Sep 2026 17:38:11 +0000

Justice Lisa Holder White and the Illinois Supreme Court have announced the appointment of Associate Judge Sarah Duffy as a Circuit Judge in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.

Judge Duffy is being appointed to fill the vacancy created by the impending retirement of Chief Judge Casey Costigan on October 16, 2026. The appointment is effective October 19, 2026, and will conclude on December 7, 2026.

Judge Duffy has served as an Associate Judge in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit since 2018. Prior to joining the bench, she was with the Fellheimer Law Firm in Pontiac.

Judge Duffy earned both her undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

The Eleventh Circuit includes Ford, Livingston, Logan, McLean, and Woodford Counties.

(FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: James Brunner, Public Information Officer of the Illinois Supreme Court at 217.208.3354 or jbrunner@illinoiscourts.gov.)

Open Role for Attorney at the Environmental Protection Agency

Marybeth Stanziola — Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:16:01 +0000

The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) is accepting applications for the following attorney role.

Senior Public Service Administrator, Opt 8L (Chief Legal Counsel)

Title: Senior Public Service Administrator

Work Location: 2520 West Iles Avenue Springfield, IL 62704

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency

Salary: $13,333.00-$14,333.00 Monthly

Closing Date/Time: 10/13/2026

Postilion Overview:

The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (Illinois EPA) is seeking an experienced Illinois‑licensed attorney with strong knowledge of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act and pollution‑control regulations to serve as Chief Legal Counsel. Reporting to the Director, this role provides legal advice on complex issues, ensures Agency compliance, and supports leadership decision‑making.

The Chief Legal Counsel oversees approximately 40 attorneys and support staff in the Division of Legal Counsel, directing attorneys in the Regulatory and Enforcement Units and providing legal support across all Agency bureaus. Key responsibilities include leading rulemaking and enforcement actions, representing the Agency in administrative proceedings, and negotiating intergovernmental and pollution‑control‑related agreements.

The benefits of working at the IEPA include a 37 ½ hour work week, a generous salary and benefits package (paid time off for vacation, sick or personal leave, holidays), pension and other retirement benefits, tuition reimbursement, and insurance eligibility on day one (medical, dental, vision, and life).

Minimum Qualifications:

Requires knowledge, skill, and mental development equivalent to completion of four years of college
Requires prior experience equivalent to four years of progressively responsible administrative and managerial experience in a public or business organization and administrative manager experience.
Requires possession of an Illinois Law License.

Learn more about this role and view the full list of essential job duties.

Borrowed Language

Marybeth Stanziola — Mon, 28 Sep 2026 14:50:11 +0000

In his quarterly Illinois Bar Journal column, Feedback Loops, Patrick Barry weaves technology, the social sciences, notable thinkers and leaders, and lessons he’s learned from teaching law students into an exploration of giving and receiving feedback. In his September column, “Borrowed Language,” Barry focuses on the value and the dividends of being a good listener and how acknowledging you’ve truly heard someone is a secret power.

Read, "Borrowed Language," in the September Illinois Bar Journal.

Illinois Supreme Court Disbars 2, Suspends 8 in Latest Disciplinary Filing

Marybeth Stanziola — Mon, 28 Sep 2026 14:34:51 +0000

The Illinois Supreme Court announced the filing of lawyer disciplinary orders on September 25, 2026. Sanctions were imposed because the lawyers engaged in professional misconduct by violating state ethics law.

Disbarred

Osman A. Mirza, Brookfield, WI

Mr. Mirza, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 2016 and in Wisconsin in 2017, had his eligibility to practice law in Wisconsin revoked following his conviction for one count of felony stalking and one count of misdemeanor criminal trespass to a dwelling, both as acts of domestic violence directed at his former spouse. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline and disbarred him.

Michael Roy Nack, St. Louis, MO

Mr. Nack, who was licensed to practice law in Missouri in 1978 and in Illinois in 1980, was disbarred in Missouri after he practiced law in that jurisdiction in violation of a previous order of suspension, misappropriated trust funds, and was convicted of multiple instances of driving while intoxicated. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline and disbarred him.

Suspended

Mahdis Azimi, Chicago, IL

Ms. Azimi, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 2015, was suspended for three years and until further order of the Court. Between 2021 and 2023, she did not file petitions or applications on behalf of her clients in seven immigration cases, either did not communicate with her clients about the status of their cases or made false statements to them, did not refund unearned fees in six cases, did not return client files in four cases or produce those files in response to an ARDC subpoena, and gave false testimony during the ARDC’s investigation of her conduct.

A suspension until further order of the Court is an indefinite suspension that requires the suspended lawyer to petition for reinstatement after the fixed period of suspension ends. Reinstatement is not automatic and must be allowed by the Supreme Court of Illinois following a hearing before the ARDC Hearing Board.

Kenton Carthal Cobb, Conway, AK

Mr. Cobb was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1994 and in Wyoming in 2023. On April 8, 2026, the Supreme Court of Wyoming suspended him for three months for his inattention to a suit brought against his client by a credit card company. He neither filed an appearance on behalf of the client nor an answer to the complaint against her, did not attend a scheduling conference, did not respond to the company’s motion for summary judgment, did not convey his client’s lump-sum settlement offer, and falsely stated to the client that the company had rejected her settlement offer. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline and suspended Mr. Cobb for three months. The suspension is effective October 15, 2026.

Katherine M. Gipe, Chicago, IL

Ms. Gipe, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 2014, was suspended from the practice of law for one year and until she reimburses the Client Protection Program for any payments the Program makes to her former clients. Ms. Gipe accepted a total of $7,000 as security retainers from two clients to represent them in domestic relations matters, deposited the funds into a personal business checking account instead of a trust account, did little to no work on behalf of the clients, intentionally used the security retainers for her own purposes before she had earned them, and did not return the unearned portions of the retainer funds to the clients when the representation ended. The suspension is effective October 15, 2026.

Paul David Katz, Deerfield, IL

Mr. Katz, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1973, was suspended for 90 days. Over a period of one year, he misused minimum billing increments to charge more than 4,000 hours for work he performed as a court-appointed attorney, thereby overrepresenting the time he actually spent and collecting an unreasonable fee. The suspension is effective October 15, 2026.

Thomas Gordon Maag, Wood River, IL

Mr. Maag, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 2000, was suspended for two years and until further order of the Court. Mr. Maag did not diligently represent a married couple in three separate claims, did not reasonably communicate with them about the status of those cases or return their files to them after being discharged, and engaged in dishonesty by fabricating materials to make it appear that his effort to return the files to them had been damaged by postal authorities. He also made a false statement during the disciplinary investigation and refused to comply with an investigative subpoena. A suspension until further order of the Court is an indefinite suspension that requires the suspended lawyer to petition for reinstatement after the fixed period of suspension ends. Reinstatement is not automatic and must be allowed by the Supreme Court of Illinois following a hearing before the ARDC Hearing Board.

Yanely Rocha Perez, Fort Worth, TX

Ms. Perez, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 2017, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. She used for her own purposes $820 that had been given to her by a client to pay filing fees for immigration matters involving the client and the client’s children, then did not file the applications the client requested. She also practiced law despite having been removed from the roll of attorneys for failing to meet her continuing legal education requirements and improperly held herself out as being authorized to practice law despite that removal. The suspension is effective October 15, 2026.

Troy Michael Schmelzer, Los Angeles, CA

Mr. Schmelzer was licensed in Illinois in 1992, in Arizona in 1998, and in California in 2000. On December 17, 2025, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona suspended him for six months and one day for knowingly failing to comply with a California court order concerning his own child support obligations, despite having previously been placed on disciplinary probation in Arizona and being ordered to come into compliance with those obligations. He was also suspended from the practice of law in California, effective October 23, 2024. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline and suspended him for six months and until he is reinstated to the practice of law in Arizona. The suspension is effective October 15, 2026.

Reprimanded

Daniel Edward Morgan, Salt Lake City, UT

Mr. Morgan was licensed in Illinois in 2002 and was admitted in Arizona as in-house counsel in 2019. On November 23, 2025, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona reprimanded him. He acted as general counsel and chief compliance officer for an insurance agency and a securities firm, represented those entities in various transactions with a purchaser, and also represented a corporate official in his individual capacity. When the entities became involved in litigation in Florida, he negligently failed to recognize and inform his jointly represented clients of the effects of his joint representation and the common interest doctrine on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline and reprimanded him.

Robert John Walsh, Las Vegas, NV

Mr. Walsh was licensed in Nevada in 1989 and in Illinois in 1990. Although Mr. Walsh has never been admitted to practice law in Arizona, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Arizona reprimanded him for agreeing to represent a client in connection with claims arising from a car accident in Phoenix and misstating his billing rate on a billing statement and on a lien he asserted on the client’s personal injury recovery. The Illinois Supreme Court imposed reciprocal discipline and reprimanded him.

The Following Order Was Entered Before the September 2026 Term but Was Not Included in Any Prior Information Release

Sean Lenckus, Bloomington, IL

Mr. Lenckus, who was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 2017, was suspended on an interim basis and until further order of the Court. He was indicted in the federal court for the Central District of Illinois on five felony counts of Interstate Communications with a Threat to Injure. Those charges were based on Mr. Lenckus’ alleged posting of threats to kill African Americans in the comments sections of seven separate YouTube videos.

Latest Developments in DUI and Traffic Laws

Marybeth Stanziola — Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:33:17 +0000

Latest Developments in DUI and Traffic Laws

Live Webcast

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

8:55 a.m. – 3:20 p.m.

5.75 hours MCLE credit, including 1.0 hour Professional Responsibility MCLE credit (subject to approval)

Get the latest insights and updates you need with this full day seminar that’s designed for new practitioners, seasoned litigators, and everyone in between. Learn how criminal charges and non‑criminal proceedings can affect clients’ livelihoods, rights, and long‑term opportunities, while gaining a better understanding of the increasingly complex regulatory landscape governing Commercial Driver’s License compliance and prohibited court dispositions. Discover how the legal practice is evolving and shifting due to demographics in attorney population, the recent disciplinary developments, key ABA ethics opinions, and the emerging role of AI in risk management and firm protection. Get litigation tips for handling attacks against preliminary breath testing devices, as well as best practice tips for cross-examining arresting officers, breath‑test technicians, and officers trained in ARIDE protocols. Additional topics include: how to collect, organize, and present persuasive evidence during negotiations and sentencing, how to strengthen advocacy through strategic mitigation, the importance of discovery, and the case law and legislative updates that may impact your practice and clients. Register here.

Illinois Supreme Court Assigns Hon. Thomas Donnelly to First District Appellate Court

Marybeth Stanziola — Fri, 25 Sep 2026 13:39:22 +0000

The Illinois Supreme Court has announced the assignment of Cook County Circuit Judge Thomas More Donnelly to the First District Appellate Court. The assignment is effective October 16, 2026, and will continue until further order of the Court.

Judge Donnelly has served on the Circuit Court of Cook County for 25 years. He currently sits in the Chancery Division. He has served as a Circuit Judge of Cook County since 2021. He previously served as an associate judge for 19 years. While assigned to the Civil Jury Section First Municipal Division and the Law Division, he tried over 400 jury trials. Before joining the bench, Judge Donnelly clerked for Justice Mary Ann G. McMorrow and worked in the Cook County Public Defender’s office for 12 years, serving as supervisor for 10 years. He supervised the Training Division, Misdemeanor and Felony Preliminary Hearing Courts, and the Post Conviction Unit.

Upon news of his assignment, Judge Donnelly said, “I am grateful to the Supreme Court for this new opportunity to serve the citizens of the State of Illinois.”

Judge Donnelly serves as the vice-chair of the Illinois Judicial Conference’s ADR Task Force. He previously served on the Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Pretrial Practices and on the Statutory Court Fee Task Force. He served on the Illinois Judicial College Board of Trustees from 2016 until 2023 and served as liaison to the Committee on Judicial Education. From 2016 to 2019, he served as the inaugural chair of the Illinois Judicial College Board. He currently serves on the Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee.

He has chaired both the Chicago Bar Association Professional Responsibility Committee and the Illinois State Bar Association Standing Committee on Professional Conduct. He also served as Reporter for Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility, and as a member of the IPI Criminal Jury Instruction Committee for the Illinois Supreme Court. He helped draft Illinois Supreme court Rule 280, the Consumer Fairness Act, and the Illinois Driver’s License Certificate Act. He also helped found the Statutory Suspension Pro Bono program, the First Municipal Jury Trial Pro Bono Program, and the Commercial Calendar Pro Bono Program.

Judge Donnelly earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from St. John’s College and his Juris Doctor from the Loyola University School of Law. He has taught at Loyola since 1987 where he has taught Illinois Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Professional Responsibility. He served as the Director for Loyola’s Philip Corboy Trial Advocacy Fellowship from 1996 to 2016. Loyola has awarded him the St. Robert Bellarmine Award and made him an honorary member of its Circle of Advocates. He additionally serves on the faculty of the National Judicial College where since 2017 he has taught hundreds of judges around the country.

Judge Donnelly’s awards include the Chicago Bar Association’s Vanguard Award, Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Access to Justice’s Hon. Thomas L. Kilbride (Ret.) Judicial Access to Justice Award, St. John’s Alumni Association Award of Merit, Hon. Mary Ann G. McMorrow Distinguished Service Award from the Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity, the Impact Award from the Center for Disability and Elder Law, and the Harold Sullivan Award from the Illinois Judges Association, and the Catholic Lawyer of the Year from the Catholic Lawyers Guild of Chicago. He has served on the boards of the Illinois Judges Association, the Chicago Bar Association, the Chicago Bar Foundation, Lawyers-Lend-Hand to Youth, the Lawyers Assistance Program, and the Catholic Lawyers Guild of Chicago.

(FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: James Brunner, Public Information Officer of the Illinois Supreme Court at 217.208.3354 or jbrunner@illinoiscourts.gov.)

Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, September 24, 2026

Kelsey Jo Burge — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 21:43:53 +0000

Leading appellate attorneys review the eight Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, September 24.

Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2026 IL 132066

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

This opinion deals with the arbitrability of claims asserted against Uber Technologies, Inc. arising out of the death of Mark Geller, a passenger in an automobile being operated by an Uber driver which was involved in a single vehicle accident on an expressway. While the procedural aspects of the case, and the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issues, can be efficiently summarized in short here, the lengthy opinion written for the unanimous court by Justice Overstreet will often be consulted for its detailed analyses of threshold issues in arbitration matters.

Mark’s wife Gloria Sheridan Geller is the independent administrator of the estate of her deceased husband. She filed this action asserting claims for wrongful death and under the Survival Act. Uber filed a motion to dismiss or compel arbitration, grounded upon terms-of-use agreements containing arbitration provisions which had been separately executed by both Mark and Gloria. The circuit court granted that motion, compelling arbitration of Mark’s estate’s survival claims based on Mark’s agreement, but denied the motion to the extent that it sought to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claims in reliance on Gloria’s agreement. The estate moved to voluntarily dismiss the survival action, which was granted.

Uber appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claims. The appellate court reversed the circuit court, stating that although the wrongful death claims belong to Gloria individually, the arbitrator, and not a court, must decide whether the wrongful death claims fall within the scope of Gloria’s own arbitration agreement. The estate’s petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed.

Gloria’s agreement was worded to involve claims arising from her own “access to or use of” Uber’s services in her individual capacity. The court noted that the wrongful death claims arise from injuries Mark sustained from his access to and use of Uber’s services. The court listed the several capacities in which Gloria was in the litigation: as an individual who had accepted terms governing her own transportation activities; as a beneficiary under the Wrongful Death Act; and as personal representative of the estate asserting wrongful death claims brought for the benefit of Mark’s next of kin. “A wrongful death action filed by a surviving spouse... is not an asset of the deceased’s estate that can be limited via the deceased’s arbitration agreement...”

The court decided that Gloria had not “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to delegate arbitrability of the estate’s wrongful death claims to an arbitrator and that the wrongful death claims did not fall within the scope of Gloria’s own agreement to arbitrate.

Much of the court’s analysis is taken up with the question of whether the parties had agreed to delegate the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court stated that the wrongful death claims arose from Mark’s death, which in turn resulted from his own use of Uber’s services, not Gloria’s.

Because delegation of the determination of arbitrability is an exception to the general rule that arbitrability is a question for the courts, the party seeking delegation of that determination must demonstrate that intention of the parties by clear and unmistakable evidence.

This summary cannot do substantial justice to the many layers of inquiry involved in this opinion. In addition to the general law of contracts and arbitration, the court takes up in detail the Federal Arbitration Act, pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and state and federal intermediate reviewing court activity following SCOTUS guidance.

The wrongful death counts were remanded to the circuit court, to be resumed there, and the survival counts remain dismissed by the estate’s voluntary action.

Chicago Title Land Trust Company v. Watkin, 2026 IL 132383

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

This compact opinion by Justice Tailor for the unanimous court, dealing with an unpaid note and a mortgage, touches upon the survival of an obligation itself beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations; a response to a motion for summary judgment which asserted, inter alia, that a party had the right to appeal to the debtor to honor the debt out of a sense of moral obligation; and the equitable maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity.”

Marline and Melvin Stein were the beneficial owners of what is described as a property in Wilmette, with Chicago Title as the trustee. The Steins executed a note in favor of Sara Watkin, promising to pay her “up to the sum of $150,000,” with a provision for interest and a one year term. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property. The Steins never made any payment on the note.

One day before the 10 year limitations periods on both the note and the mortgage were to lapse, Watkin filed a foreclosure action. Chicago title moved to dismiss for failure to send an acceleration notice. That complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and an amended complaint was never filed.

A year later, Chicago Title (as land trustee) filed a complaint to quiet title, seeking an order that the mortgage lien had no force because the statute of limitations had elapsed and an order enjoining Watkin from asserting any interest in the property. Watkin moved for summary judgment, asserting that the expiration of the limitations periods did not affect the validity of her mortgage lien and had not extinguished the underlying debt. She further argued that she “retained the right to appeal to the debtor to honor the debt out of a sense of moral obligation even if the legal obligation could no longer be enforced.” The circuit court granted summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, saying in part that Chicago Title improperly “conflated the ability to enforce the mortgage or note with the very existence of the underlying obligation.”

The parties agreed that Watkin may no longer bring an action to enforce the note or to foreclose on the mortgage lien. The issue concerned whether the mortgage lien itself continues. Section 13-115 of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes a 10 year limitation on foreclosure actions. Section 13-116 states, in part, that “the lien of every mortgage... shall cease by limitation after the expiration of 20 years from the time the last payment on such mortgage ...became or becomes due...” “Read together, the plain language of (those sections) indicates that a mortgage lien is not extinguished upon the lapse of the limitations period...; rather, ... the lien will ‘cease’ 20 years after the last payment on the mortgage became due.” The Court held that the lien, albeit unenforceable now because a foreclosure action is time-barred, will survive for at least 20 years after the last payment became due.

Speaking more generally to the nature of limitations, the Court stated “It is well settled that a limitations statute affects remedies; it does not extinguish substantive rights.” Here, while the statute bars Watkin from bringing a foreclosure action, it does not extinguish the debt Marline owes Watkin or the mortgage lien that secures it. The debt remains the same as before, excepting that the remedy for enforcement is gone.

Additionally, the Court invoked the maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity” as “inform[ing] our conclusion.” Noting that quiet title actions are equitable proceedings, and that the trust beneficiary had never paid the debt to Watkin, the grant of quieting title was not supported.

The Court concluded its opinion by stating that Marline could secure the lien’s release “by satisfying her debt to Watkin.” It ends with “Otherwise, she will have to wait.”

Greenswag v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc., 2026 IL 132101

By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University

In Greenswag v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff stated a legally sufficient claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. After analyzing the language of both the Consumer Fraud Act and the Condominium Property Act, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a legally sufficient claim and affirmed the judgment of the lower courts. To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on its own recent precedent clarifying the public policy purpose of the Condominium Property Act as well as the factors to be considered when looking at claims brought under the Consumer Fraud Act.

At issue in the case was the defendant condominium management company’s compliance with a provision of the Condominium Property Act. The Act requires condominium sellers to provide a set of documents to prospective buyers. The Act also required that the owner’s association furnish the disclosure documents and allowed the association to charge the seller a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-pocket cost of providing such information.” Plaintiff sought to sell her condominium, and the defendant charged her $470 to prepare and deliver the required disclosure documents. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit alleging that the defendant engaged in an unfair business practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Act by charging an allegedly excessive and unreasonable fee. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appellate court affirmed.

In the Illinois Supreme Court, plaintiff argued that the defendant violated the Consumer Fraud Act in three ways: 1) the fee was not a reasonable fee to cover defendant’s out-of-pocket costs for providing the disclosure documents; 2) the fee was not reasonable because defendant had already prepared the documents in its regular course of business; and 3) the condominium owners had already paid for the preparation and maintenance of the documents through their regular association fees. The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis with the language of the Condominium Property Act. The Court noted it had recently considered the public policy set forth in section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act in Channon v. Westward Management, Inc., 2022 IL 128040. The Court found in Channon that section 22.1 was designed primarily to benefit potential buyers, not sellers, and that the reasonable fee provision was “merely incidental to the underlying purpose of section 22.1” and that “the legislature did not intend section 22.1 to imply a private right to relief for unit sellers.”

The Court then turned to the language of the Consumer Fraud Act. The Court noted that plaintiff did not allege that the defendant engaged in deception or fraudulent conduct but instead that the fee charged to provide the disclosure documents was unfair. The Court then explained that in determining whether a business practice is “unfair,” it will consider 1) whether the practice offends public policy, 2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, and/or 3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers. The Court also noted that charging a high price, even an unconscionably high price, “is generally insufficient to establish a claim” and that additional evidence of unfairness is required to sustain a claim. Here, the Court concluded that plaintiff could not establish a violation of public policy because the public policy behind section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act is to protect buyers and not sellers and that purpose was fulfilled when the condominium buyer was supplied with the disclosure documents in a timely manner. The Court also concluded that while the condominium sellers were a “captive audience” in that they were required to obtain the documents from the owner’s association, the lack of choice resulted from the statutory scheme and not from a management company’s business practices. As such, the Court explained that the plaintiff failed to allege how the defendant’s business practices were oppressive or unfair. Finally, the Court noted that plaintiff failed to allege that she was substantially injured by the defendant’s business practice because the claim that the documents were too costly was not the type of injury the Act was designed to remedy.

The Supreme Court also noted that since the filing of plaintiff’s lawsuit, the Condominium Property Act was amended by the General Assembly to place a cap of $475 as the maximum fee a condominium association can charge unit sellers to obtain the statutorily required disclosure documents. The Court noted that this amendment did not change its analysis and, to the contrary, undercut plaintiff’s argument that condominium owners had already paid for the service through their regular association fees because both versions of the statute rejected the notion that the services provided by the defendant had already been paid for. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint. The unanimous opinion was authored by Justice Neville. Justice Tailor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2026 IL 132627

By Amanda J. Hamilton, Akerman LLP

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Holder White, the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 610.5(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which governs motions to modify parenting time, requires only a “showing of changed circumstances,” and not the “substantial change in circumstances” required under section 610.5(c) for modifications of parenting plans or allocation judgments. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Nancy Reynolds and Christopher I. Reynolds Sr. are the unmarried parents of two daughters, D.R. and E.R. In July 2016, the McHenry County Circuit Court entered an allocation judgment based on the parties' agreement, granting petitioner primary parenting time and significant decision-making responsibilities. Respondent received weekly parenting time with limited overnight visitation.

In November 2021, respondent filed a motion to modify the allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting plan pursuant to sections 600 and 610.5 of the Act. He later amended the motion to seek only an increase in parenting time, citing changes since 2016, including his switch to remote work, his move to a larger home closer to the children's schools, D.R.'s autism diagnosis and her bond with a similarly diagnosed half-sibling, and the children's growing relationships with their half-siblings. Respondent's proposed increase in parenting time was consistent with the recommendation of a court-appointed custody evaluator, Dr. Mark L. Goldstein, who opined that the existing parenting plan was not in the children's best interests.

After respondent rested his case, petitioner moved for a directed finding. The circuit court found that respondent had established a prima facie case of changed circumstances, but under the second step of its analysis, concluded that respondent failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances as required by section 610.5(c) of the Act. The court granted the motion for a directed finding.

The Second District Appellate Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard. The appellate court held that section 610.5(a), not section 610.5(c), provides the applicable standard for a motion seeking to modify parenting time only, requiring a showing of changed circumstances rather than a substantial change in circumstances. The appellate court rejected the contrary reasoning of the Third District in In re Marriage of Trapkus, 2022 IL App (3d) 190631.

On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the plain language of section 610.5(a) treats motions to modify parenting time differently from motions to modify allocation judgments or parenting plans. Subsection (a) permits modification of parenting time "at any time, without a showing of serious endangerment, upon a showing of changed circumstances that necessitates modification to serve the best interests of the child." By contrast, subsection (c) applies to modifications of parenting plans or allocation judgments and requires a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. The Court further held that applying subsection (c)'s heightened standard to parenting-time modifications would render the provisions of subsection (a) meaningless and superfluous. The Court expressly overruled Trapkus to the extent it was inconsistent with this holding.

Applying the correct legal standard, the Court found that the circuit court's order granting the directed finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court noted that even the circuit court itself had acknowledged that respondent proved there had been changes since 2016 but erroneously required those changes to be substantial and unanticipated. The Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the matter for the circuit court to determine whether respondent demonstrated that those changes necessitate a modification in parenting time to serve the best interests of the children under section 610.5(a).

People v. Benson, 2026 IL 131191

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court

Majority written by Justice Overstreet, joined by Justices Neville, Holder White, Cunningham, Rochford, O’Brien and Tailor

Summary

Vacates the appellate court’s decision to review a defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge to his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The challenge was raised for the first time on appeal, and the Supreme Court found that the record was not adequately developed because the defendant failed to raise the issue before the circuit court.

The defendant, James Benson, was convicted of reckless discharge of a firearm, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF), and domestic battery. On direct appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the UPWF statute, both facially and as applied to him. He argued that the UPWF statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because his prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon was not an inherently dangerous felony justifying a permanent ban on firearms possession. The appellate court found the claim forfeited but agreed with the defendant that the record was sufficient to reach the merits. It rejected the defendant’s contention that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because his conduct was not “inherently dangerous.”

The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal the appellate court’s ruling with respect to the defendant’s as-applied challenge.

The Court noted that as-applied constitutional challenges require the court to consider the particular facts and circumstances relevant to the application of the statute to an individual defendant. Whereas a facial challenge may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal, an as-applied challenge must be raised in the circuit court so the factual record is sufficiently developed for appellate review. A narrow exception to this rule was observed in People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, where all the facts and circumstances necessary to decide the defendant’s challenge were already in the record. That exception did not apply here.

First, the Court observed that the UPWF statute excepts persons granted relief under the Firearm Owners Identification Act. The FOID Act permits “non-dangerous” felons to apply for a FOID Card, and resolving an as-applied challange would require the court to consider whether the defendant qualified for the exception.

Next, the Court favorably cited cases that declined to consider an as-applied challenge in the absence of a factual record, including People v. Boss, 2025 IL App (1st) 221855 and People v. Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428. Those courts found that the record did not disclose the circumstances of the defendant’s prior felony conviction, nor how the facts of those convictions related to the current as-applied challenge. Those circumstances are potentially crucial to determining what danger a defendant may pose, and without such information a reviewing court is in no position to rule on an as-applied second amendment challenge.

Without a factual record, a reviewing court also cannot determine whether the statute (as the defendant contended) permanently disarms him where it explicitly provides for relief under the FOID Act. When such a challenge is raised for the first time on appeal, the record is silent as to whether the defendant applied relief under the FOID Act, which the Court found was “integral to the consideration of whether the application of that statute to convict the defendant of UPWF is constitutional.”

The Court therefore vacated the portion of the appellate court’s judgment that considered the merits of the defendant’s as-applied constitutional claim and affirmed the remaining portions of the judgment.

People v. Wade, 2026 IL 131745

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court

Majority written by Justice O’Brien, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, and Tailor

Justice Rochford took no part in the decision.

Summary

Vacates one of the defendant’s two convictions for aggravated kidnapping under “unit of prosecution” analysis. The defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated kidnapping for committing two distinct criminal sexual assaults during a kidnapping. However, he only committed the criminal act of kidnapping once.

Patrick Wade, the defendant, committed a kidnapping, during which he committed two separate acts of criminal sexual assault upon the victim. He was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated kidnapping because he committed two felonies (criminal sexual assault) upon the victim during a kidnapping. He was found guilty on all four counts, and the court imposed consecutive 15-year sentences for the two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two concurrent 10-year sentences for aggravated kidnapping.

The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that it violated the one-act, one-crime rule because he committed only a single act of kidnapping. The appellate court (First District) rejected the defendant’s argument and affirmed his convictions and sentence.

Before the Supreme Court, the defendant renewed his argument and further contended that multiple convictions are impermissible where the “unit of prosecution” for the offense of aggravated kidnapping is the kidnapping itself, so only one conviction may be entered per kidnapping. Unit of prosecution analysis is used to determine what the statute seeks to prohibit and what unit of time, action, or instance of a crime constitutes a single commission of that offense. The State conceded error and agreed that one of the defendant’s kidnapping convictions had to be vacated.

The Supreme Court agreed, finding that although the kidnapping statute did not expressly define the unit of prosecution, the statute’s plain language prohibits the act of kidnapping and imposes enhanced punishments for various aggravating circumstances. The presence of multiple aggravating circumstances does not create additional offenses of aggravated kidnapping. Here, the defendant kidnapped one victim, and two aggravating circumstances were present. The Court agreed with the parties that the case should be remanded to the trial court to “vacate the less serious of the two aggravated kidnapping convictions” and impose a sentence on the more serious offense.

Because the Court found that the “unit of prosecution” for aggravated kidnapping is the kidnapping, it found that it did not need to determine whether the defendant’s convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule.

People v. Nibbelin, 2026 IL 131825

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court

Majority written by Justice Rochford, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, O’Brien, and Tailor

Summary

Resolves the split within the Fourth District over whether a defendant may raise a complaint about errors in the imposition of assessments for the first time on appeal by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the plain language of Rule 472, this case holds that a defendant must raise issues pertaining to the imposition of assessments in the trial court first and may not raise them for the first time on appeal. Affirms the appellate court’s remand of the case to the circuit court so the defendant may raise a Rule 472 challenge to the imposed assessment.

The defendant, Carthall Nibbelin, was charged with 10 counts of possessing child pornography, and he pled guilty to four counts. He was sentenced to 36 months’ probation, ordered to register as a sex offender, and ordered to refrain from consuming alcohol. The court imposed fines, fees, and costs in the amount of $14,947. The clerk applied the defendant’s $10,000 bond to the assessments, and after a probation fee was added, the total amount owed was $5,847.

The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation multiple times by consuming alcohol and accruing several new charges for failing to register as a sex offender. Eventually, following the State’s ninth petition to revoke the defendant’s probation, the defendant was sentenced to a term of four years’ imprisonment. The court imposed costs, fines, and assessments.

The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a waiver of the assessments. He cited Supreme Court Rule 404(e), which provides that a defendant who is represented by a public defender is entitled “to a waiver of assessments as defined in 725 ILCS 5/124A-20(a).” The Rule requires defense counsel to file an appropriate certification with the court. The defendant argued that (1) he was represented by a public defender, (2) his counsel failed to file the certification, and (3) he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure, since there was a reasonable probability his assessments would have been waived if the certification had been filed.

The State responded by pointing out that Rule 472, which deals with errors in the imposition of assessments, grants the circuit court continuing jurisdiction to address errors in the imposition of fines, fees, assessments, and costs. It further provides that no appeal may be taken on such issues unless the error is first raised in the circuit court. The appellate court (Fourth District) agreed with the State’s position and remanded the matter to allow the defendant to raise it in the circuit court.

Before the Supreme Court, the defendant emphasized that he alleged error on the part of his counsel and not on the part of the court. He argued that Rule 472 only covers errors of the court, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was therefore properly raised for the first time on appeal.

Construing Rule 472 (titled “Correction of Certain Errors in Sentencing”), the Supreme Court found that its purpose was to “quell the rising tide of appeals raising only fines and fees issues that went unaddressed in the lower courts.” It observed that different panels within the Fourth District had resolved cases raising the failure to file an assessment waiver differently. Some held that Rule 472 barred such claims unless they were first pursued in the circuit court, while others found that Rule 472 only barred claims of error against the court. However, the Rule itself contains no such limitation.

The Court noted that when Rule 472 was enacted, the Court also enacted Rule 452, which requires the State to prepare a sentencing order for review by the defendant (or defense counsel) that is to be submitted to the court. The sentencing order must include “all applicable fines, fees, assessments and costs” imposed against the defendant. Thus, the duty to avoid error falls on all relevant parties.

Further, Rule 404(e) offers no ambiguity. When a defendant is represented by a public defender, his counsel must file a certification requesting a waiver of assessments and the defendant “shall be entitled” to such a waiver. The imposition of assessments despite the defendant’s representation by a public defender is precisely the problem Rule 472 was designed to remedy, and it must be corrected by filing a motion under Rule 472. Such corrections are attainable “at any time following judgment.” Thus, the case was remanded for the defendant to file a motion under Rule 472.

People v. Aguilar, 2026 IL 131382

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court

Majority written by Justice Overstreet, joined by Justices Neville, Holder White, Cunningham, Rochford, O’Brien, and Tailor

Summary

Holds that the State may not charge a defendant with aggravated DUI for committing a DUI while his driver’s license is suspended for reasons other than those listed in section 11-501(d)(1)(G) of the Vehicle Code. To elevate a simple DUI to an aggravated DUI based on a suspension not listed in section 11-501(d)(1)(G) would contravene the purpose of the statute and render section 11-501(d)(1)(G) superfluous.

The defendant, German Aguilar, was charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) at a time when he did not possess a driver’s license. At the time of the offense, the defendant’s license was suspended because he failed to comply with the financial responsibility insurance requirement of the Vehicle Code. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the State’s information did not state an offense. The State responded that the defendant did not “possess” a license because his right to drive had been suspended. The circuit court dismissed the charges, and the State filed two new counts, adding the detail that the defendant’s license was suspended due to a financial responsibility insurance suspension. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges a second time, and the circuit court dismissed the two new counts with prejudice. The appellate court (Fifth District) affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code. Section 11-501(d)(1)(H) of the Vehicle Code elevates a DUI offense to an aggravated DUI offense where the person commits a DUI “while he or she did not possess a driver’s license or permit or a restricted driving permit or a judicial driving permit or a monitoring device driving permit.” Subsection (G) of the same statute also elevates a DUI offense to an aggravated DUI offense, but only where the person committed a DUI “during a period in which the defendant’s driving privileges are revoked or suspended” for certain specified reasons. Those reasons include having a prior DUI offense, refusing chemical testing, leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving injury or death, or reckless homicide. They do not include the defendant’s failure to maintain financial responsibility insurance.

Interpreting the plain language of the statute, the Court found that the defendant’s suspension did not elevate his DUI offense to an aggravated offense. The State argued that because the defendant’s license was suspended, he possessed neither a physical license nor the right to operate a vehicle. However, the State’s interpretation would render section 11-501(d)(1)(G) superfluous, since every license suspension would also qualify as a failure to “possess” a license. The Court found that a more reasonable reading is that subsection (H) “addresses individuals who never acquired one of the licenses or permits identified in that subsection [citation] while subsection (G) separately addresses individuals whose licenses are suspended because of the specific offenses enumerated in that subsection [citation].”

The State also argued that the Vehicle Code generally treats driving with a suspended or revoked license more seriously than driving without ever having obtained a license, comparing the statutes governing driving on a suspended or revoked license (Class A misdemeanors) and the statute governing driving without ever having been issued a license (Class B misdemeanor). But the Court observed that the Vehicle Code makes numerous distinctions between different types of unlicensed driving and driving on different kinds of suspensions. The legislature has not adopted any categorical rules about unlicensed driving and has instead assigned different penalties to different circumstances. The Court declined to delve into the legislative history of subsections (G) and (H) given the unambiguous language and structure of the two subsections.

In reaching its decision, the circuit court relied on an unpublished Fourth District case, electing not to rely on the dicta contained in a Second District opinion, which was the only precedential authority available at the time of the court’s decision. The Second District case was People v. Rosenbalm, 2011 IL App (2d) 100243, and it initially found that the appellant’s arguments had been forfeited. Nonetheless, it addressed the merits of the case and found that a person whose license was revoked, suspended, or expired did not “possess” a driver’s license. Rosenbalm went on to acknowledge that its interpretation rendered subsection (G) superfluous. The Supreme Court observed that judicial dicta are not binding precedent if it is found to be erroneous, and here the dicta was erroneous because it conflicted with the plain statutory language.

Finally, the Court reversed the circuit court’s decision to dismiss the charges against the defendant with prejudice. The relevant statutes (section 114-1(a)(8) and section 114-1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) state that dismissal based on a defect in the charging instrument does not prevent the State from filing a new charge. Because the charges were dismissed based on defects in the charging instrument, the State should have been permitted to re-file them, and the Court modified the circuit court’s judgment accordingly.

You Be the Judge: Ratings for Cook County Judicial Candidates Now Available

Marybeth Stanziola — Thu, 24 Sep 2026 13:02:36 +0000

The Illinois State Bar Association's Cook County judicial ratings for the November 3, 2026, election are available online.

In Cook County, an ISBA Judicial Evaluations committee used the results of a questionnaire, background investigations, and in-person interviews to rate candidates for all judicial offices. Candidates for the Appellate Court outside of Cook County were also evaluated using this method.

In counties outside of Cook, the ISBA conducted an advisory poll. Those are available to view by county. The advisory poll is conducted by mail and is sent to all ISBA members in the circuit or district from which a candidate seeks election. Licensed attorneys who are not members of ISBA, or any attorney outside the circuit or district, may request a ballot. Opinions expressed in the poll are of those attorneys who chose to respond and do not reflect the opinion of the Illinois State Bar Association or the opinion of all Illinois attorneys.

For more information, visit the Judicial Elections & Appointments webpage.

Member Appreciation Reception Honoring the 2026 Class of Distinguished Counselors

Marybeth Stanziola — Wed, 23 Sep 2026 16:02:01 +0000

New Date and Venue! Join us in Lombard on November 12 as we honor the 2026 class of Distinguished Counselors at our Fall Member Appreciation Reception!

Celebrate this year’s class of Distinguished Counselors, connect with your ISBA friends and colleagues, and enjoy an evening of networking at The Westin Chicago Lombard. The reception will feature hors d’oeuvres, beer, and wine. We hope to see you there!

Date: November 12, 2026

Time: 5:30 - 7:30 p.m.

Location: The Westin Chicago Lombard | Lombard, IL

For questions, please reach out to Kim Weaver.

ISBA Group Health Insurance — We Need Your Help!

Marybeth Stanziola — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 19:32:09 +0000

Seeing huge health insurance cost increases again this year? The ISBA is working on a solution but we need your help!

After a successful response to our initial member survey, the ISBA is moving on to the next phase of our project to explore the development of a group health insurance offering for members’ law firms. While the project is progressing, we remain in the early stages with much work yet to be done, and we need your help.

Specifically, we need as many members as possible to fill out the form linked below and securely submit it to KeyRisk Underwriters (the firm the ISBA has contracted with to assist with this project). The form collects basic information about your firm’s employees and their dependents that are covered by the firm’s current health insurance offering. You will likely need to forward this form to the staff member at your firm who is responsible for health insurance and/or human resources. Once we have collected as many forms as possible, KeyRisk Underwriters and the ISBA will use the aggregate data to begin discussions with health insurance carriers about coverage plans for ISBA members’ firms.

How to Help in This Effort:

Download our ISBA Group Health Insurance Quote Form.
Deliver this digital form to the staff member at your firm who is responsible for health insurance and/or human resources.
Once the form is complete, upload it to KeyRisk Underwriters' secure document portal. Do not send this form to the ISBA!
- Note: The link for the secure upload portal is also included on the digital form itself.
- Note: If your firm has more employees and dependents than will fit on one form, please download a second form and simply continue listing employees and dependents on the second form and then upload all forms together.

download THE ISBA GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE QUOTE FORM

Illinois Judicial Conference Seeks Applications for Volunteer Members

Marybeth Stanziola — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 14:37:03 +0000

The Illinois Judicial Conference (IJC) is accepting applications for two upcoming vacancies:

An attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois (S. Ct. Rule 41(b)(1)(L)) and
A clerk of court (S. Ct. Rule 41(b)(1)(J)) (this position may be filled by either a circuit or reviewing court clerk).

About the IJC

The IJC is charged with considering the work of the courts, suggesting improvements in the administration of justice, and strategic planning for the Illinois Judicial Branch. The 2026-2028 Judicial Branch Strategic Agenda is available here.

IJC membership is governed by Supreme Court Rule 41. The 29-member body includes 15 judicial members and 14 non-judicial members, and the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court serves as chair.

Expectations of IJC Members

IJC members are expected to attend two in-person meetings each year, participate in periodic Zoom meetings as needed, and actively contribute to at least one IJC task force that meets throughout the year.

Appointments will be effective January 1, 2027. IJC members serve three-year terms and may serve up to two consecutive three-year terms.

Application Process

To apply for an Illinois Judicial Conference vacancy, please complete the application form via this link and email your resume to mwiesman@illinoiscourts.gov. Applications and resumes must be received no later than Friday, October 9, 2026 at 11:59pm CT. Application decisions will be announced in late 2026. If you have questions about the application process or the Illinois Judicial Conference, please email Deputy Director of Strategic Planning Marisa Wiesman at mwiesman@illinoiscourts.gov.

If you submitted an application in 2025 and you would like that application to be considered again this year, please contact Marisa Wiesman at mwiesman@illinoiscourts.gov.

ISBA 2026 Solo & Small Firm Conference

Celeste Antoinette Niemann — Tue, 22 Sep 2026 13:32:20 +0000

The Illinois State Bar Association hosted its 2026 Solo & Small Firm Conference: From Log Cabin to Legacy: Growing and Sustaining a Solo or Small Firm in Illinois, September 17–18 at the Peoria Marriott Pere Marquette, 501 Main Street. The conference provided attendees with practical best practices, valuable insights, and strategies to support every stage of their professional journey—from launching a practice to building and sustaining a successful firm.

PC: ISBA

Illinois Supreme Court Appoints 3 to State Public Defender Commission

Marybeth Stanziola — Mon, 21 Sep 2026 19:34:52 +0000

The Illinois Supreme Court announced today three appointments to the State Public Defender Commission (Commission) pursuant to the State Public Defender Act. The Commission will play a vital role in overseeing and supporting the Office of the State Public Defender (OSPD), ensuring the delivery of legal representation to indigent defendants in Illinois mandated by the constitution. The three appointees are Jeffrey D. Colman, the Hon. Brian Otwell (ret.) and Jeffrey York.

The FAIR Act establishes an independent State Public Defender Commission to oversee the Office of State Public Defender, which becomes effective on January 1, 2027. The Commission will be comprised of 11 members, with three members appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court, four members appointed by the Governor, and four members appointed by the Legislature.

“The establishment of OSPD represents a genuine inter-branch partnership that fulfills the right to counsel mandate codified in the constitution,” Chief Justice P. Scott Neville, Jr. said. “The Supreme Court is confident its appointees will be instrumental in making sure this new independent agency housed within the judicial branch fulfills its mandate to provide attorneys who will provide the adversarial testing required by the Constitution.”

Jeffrey D. Colman, of the Chicago law firm Jenner & Block, has focused his 50-year career on complex civil and criminal litigation at both the trial and appellate levels. He has received numerous awards for his extensive pro bono and public service activities and is the namesake for the Jeffrey D. Colman Access to Justice Award given annually by the Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Access to Justice.

Judge Otwell (ret.) served as Sangamon County Chief Public Defender for 15 years before becoming a Seventh Circuit associate judge in 2010. He was a judge for eight years before retiring from the bench.

Jeffrey York has served as the Chief Public Defender for DuPage County since 2010. He began his career with the DuPage County Public Defender's Office as an Assistant Public Defender in 1997 and was promoted to Public Defender in 2000. He became a Supervising Assistant Public Defender in 2006 and Deputy Public Defender in 2007.

Public Act 104-0300, also known as the Funded Advocacy and Independent Representation or “FAIR” Act was signed into law in August 2025, creating a new statewide oversight office that will deliver indigent defense services. The FAIR Act was developed following a 2021 report from the Sixth Amendment Center, which evaluated Illinois’ public defense system and concluded that the current system fails to satisfy the constitution’s adversarial testing standard due to overwhelming caseloads, insufficient funding and resources, and the lack of statewide oversight.

(FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: James Brunner, Public Information Officer of the Illinois Supreme Court at 217.208.3354 or jbrunner@illinoiscourts.gov)

8th Annual Bock Food Law and Policy Conference

Marybeth Stanziola — Mon, 21 Sep 2026 15:37:42 +0000

8th Annual Bock Food Law and Policy Conference

Friday, October 23, 2026

ISBA Regional Office, 20 S. Clark Street, Suite 820, Chicago

9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.

6.25 hours MCLE credit

Thank you to our financial sponsors!

Bahr Anderson Law Group

Illinois Stewardship Alliance

McCarthy Duffy LLP

Food law is a highly interconnected field that is directly impacted by agricultural production, environmental protection, natural resource management, and intellectual property. Join us in Chicago for this full-day conference that offers an overview of the evolving legal issues shaping the food and beverage industry. Attorneys with all levels of practice experience who attend this program will better understand: the current regulations governing aquaculture’s rapidly growing global market; how to expand Illinois food and beverage sales into California without triggering private enforcement claims, class actions, and high-dollar settlements; what you need to know about livestock welfare standards and the animal-raising label laws impacting consumers; the emerging litigation surrounding ultra-processed foods; the legal strategies used by FarmSTAND to drive transparency and local food access; the unique obstacles journalists face when reporting on the food sector; how geopolitical friction and trade shocks disrupt agribusiness profitability; and how to navigate contract law, liquidity, and capital access for emerging brands. Register here.

Sex, Lies, & Generative AI

Marybeth Stanziola — Mon, 21 Sep 2026 15:09:55 +0000

In the AI-themed September Illinois Bar Journal, George Crouse takes a look at Illinois law and the First Amendment when it comes to artificial intelligence and the nonconsensual disclosure of intimate, but fake, images. Among his takeaways: In Illinois, a person who disseminates sexually explicit images or digitized sexual depictions of someone they know, but without that person’s consent, may be criminally liable even if the image doesn’t contain identifiable information.

Read, "Sex, Lies, & Generative AI," in the September Illinois Bar Journal.

Open Role for Attorneys at DCFS

Marybeth Stanziola — Fri, 18 Sep 2026 15:01:01 +0000

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is accepting applications for multiple open attorney positions.

Special Assistant General Counsel (Chicago, IL)

Title: Public Service Administrator – Special Assistant General Counsel

Work Location: 60 E Van Buren, Chicago, Illinois, 60605

Agency: Department of Children and Family Services

Salary: Anticipated Starting Salary: $10,350 - $11,600/month

Closing Date/Time: 10/06/2026

Essential Functions

Provides legal advice and counsel to the agency’s central office management and professional staff
Provides advice and counsel to staff of the Division of Licensing regarding any and all questions on licensing rules, statutes, and procedures
Provides legal advice and counsel to program staff concerning any and all questions on adoptions, guardianship, permanency goals, and other initiatives
Provides legal counsel to professional staff concerning any and all questions on adoptions and permanency issues in developing case presentation and interpreting court orders, statutes, and regulations
Serves as a liaison and provides coordination with the Attorney General’s Office regarding state level appellate cases involving the Department
Represents the Department in administrative hearings and licensing appeals which involve some adverse decision of actions regarding a DCFS license, such as revocation, placement hold, non-renewal, license denial, etc.
Reviews drafts and coordinates with staff the finalization of Department Intergovernmental Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding
Performs other duties as required or assigned which are reasonably within the scope of the duties enumerated above

Minimum Qualifications

Requires graduation from an accredited law school and possession of a valid license to practice law in Illinois
Requires three years of progressively responsible administrative experience in the practice of law

Simmons Hanly Conroy Attorneys Recognized in 2027 Editions of the Best Lawyers in America and Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch

Marybeth Stanziola — Fri, 18 Sep 2026 14:19:29 +0000

ALTON, Ill. – Simmons Hanly Conroy, one of the nation’s largest mass tort law firms and a national leader in representing mesothelioma patients and their families, is proud to announce that 33 of its attorneys have been recognized in the 2027 edition of The Best Lawyers in America®.

In addition, 10 Simmons Hanly Conroy attorneys were named to the 2027 Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America list, which recognizes professional excellence among attorneys earlier in their careers.

“We are proud to see so many of our attorneys recognized by their peers for their work on behalf of our clients,” said Simmons Hanly Conroy Managing Partner Laurence V. Nassif. “These honors reflect the talent and dedication our attorneys bring to their work every day. I congratulate each of this year’s honorees on this well-deserved recognition.”

Best Lawyers is one of the country’s most highly regarded attorney referral publications. Recognition in The Best Lawyers in America and Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch in America is based on peer-review surveys in which leading attorneys evaluate the professional abilities of their peers. Attorneys are not permitted to pay a fee to participate or receive recognition.

The following Simmons Hanly Conroy attorneys are listed in the 2027 edition of The Best Lawyers in America, along with their recognized practice areas, organized by firm office/location:

Alton

Michael J. Angelides, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
Nicholas J. Angelides, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
John A. Barnerd, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs. Best Lawyers 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” – Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs, St. Louis
Perry J. Browder, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Sarah Burns, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
Brian J. Cooke, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Kenneth P. Danzinger, partner: Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs; Workers’ Compensation Law – Claimants
Paul Dix, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
John Foley, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
Taylor Kerns, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
J. Conard Metcalf, of counsel: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Todd Neilson, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Jo Anna Pollock, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
Melissa Crowe Schopfer, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Drew Sealey, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
John Simmons, named partner and chairman: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Judge Luther W. Simmons, Jr., partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
G. Michael Stewart, partner: Medical Malpractice Law – Plaintiffs
Andrew S. Williams, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs

New York City

Daniel P. Blouin, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
Donald P. Blydenburgh, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Lisa Nathanson Busch, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
Jayne Conroy, named partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Mildred Conroy, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Gary DiMuzio, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
Moshe Horn, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
Ellyn Hurd, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
Jim Kramer, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Laurence V. Nassif, managing partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
Sanford Smokler, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
An Truong, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs

San Francisco, California

Jennifer L. Alesio, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
Deborah R. Rosenthal, partner: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs

The following Simmons Hanly Conroy attorneys are listed in the 2027 edition of Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch in America, along with their recognized practice areas, organized by firm office/location:

Alton

Lindsey Balaco, attorney: Health Care Law
Payal A. Gurnani, attorney: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs; Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
David Kargel, attorney: Health Care Law
Jenny Paulson, attorney: Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Plaintiffs
Luke Pfeifer, attorney: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Elisa J. Pleasant, attorney: Health Care Law
Philip E. Proud, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs

New York City

Brett F. Fuller, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
Olivia P. Kelly, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs
John B. Wetmore, partner: Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs; Product Liability Litigation – Plaintiffs

About Simmons Hanly Conroy LLP

Simmons Hanly Conroy is one of the nation’s largest mass tort law firms, dedicated to helping victims of mesothelioma and asbestos-related cancers. Other primary areas of litigation include prescription opioids, sexual abuse, pharmaceutical, consumer protection, environmental, and personal injury. The firm's attorneys have been appointed to leadership in numerous national multidistrict litigations, including prescription opioids, Vioxx, Yaz, Toyota unintended acceleration, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, DePuy Pinnacle, Uber Rideshare sexual assault, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Norfolk Southern East Palestine train derailment, social media adolescent addiction, hair relaxer products injury, and the Volkswagen emission scandal. The firm also represents small and mid-size corporations, inventors and entrepreneurs in matters involving business litigation. Firm attorneys’ passion for improving the lives of asbestos victims and their families extends to the firm’s contributions to mesothelioma cancer research and ongoing support through initiatives including the firm’s annual Miles for Meso 5K race and fun run/walk. Firm offices are located in Alton, Illinois; Boston; Los Angeles; Miami; New York City; San Francisco; and St. Louis. Read more at www.simmonsfirm.com.

Access to Justice Commission to Accept Proposals for 2027 Disability Access Grant

Marybeth Stanziola — Fri, 18 Sep 2026 13:49:58 +0000

The Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Access to Justice (ATJ Commission), and the Access to Justice Division of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (AOIC) are excited to announce the launch of the application process for the 2027 Disability Access Grant, to enable courts and other stakeholders to apply for funding to advance accessibility for people with disabilities in their jurisdiction. The grant policy is posted here. The Request for Proposals is available and the application is open through October 23, 2026.

The Disability Access Grant recognizes that courts have obligations to address accessibility barriers and provide equal access to people with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Illinois Human Right Act (IHRA), and the recently updated Illinois Supreme Court Policy on Access for People with Disabilities (Policy).

While all courts must work towards meeting the requirements of the ADA, IHRA, the Policy, and corresponding laws and regulations, the ATJ Commission recognizes that needs and resources differ across jurisdictions. Where one court may have funding to provide state-of-the art accessibility aids, make changes to physical spaces, and seamlessly process reasonable modifications, other courts may want to improve accessibility but lack the funding to realize their goals. To forward the objective of equal access to court for people with disabilities, and to ensure more uniform access to resources for courts, the Disability Access Grant supports projects or activities from local courts who need resources to promote dignity, advance accessibility, and reduce barriers to equal access to courts for people with disabilities.

Courts, clerks, sheriffs or bailiffs, law librarians, state’s attorneys, and public defenders, can apply for Disability Access Grants. Grant funds may be used for activities or projects that addresses barriers to equal access to court for people with disabilities, including, but not limited to, installing ramps or implementing accessible jury boxes and witness stands, conducting comprehensive accessibility audits, providing funding for Communication Access Realtime Translation, or funding a community partner to lead a listening session or town hall to better understand the experiences of people with disabilities. The needs of each applicant for grant funding are unique; projects or activities that are funded will also be distinct.

For more information, contact: August Hieber, Sr. Program Manager, ATJ Division at 217.208.3331 or at ahieber@illinoiscourts.gov)

ISBA’s 8th Annual Abraham Lincoln’s Legal Legacy: Lincoln and the Rule of Law

Celeste Antoinette Niemann — Wed, 16 Sep 2026 16:17:35 +0000

On September 10, 2026, the Illinois State Bar Association presented the 8th Annual Abraham Lincoln’s Legal Legacy: Lincoln and the Rule of Law at the ISBA Chicago Regional Office. The seminar explored Lincoln’s legal mind and how it shaped his leadership of the nation. The program was co-presented by the Illinois Supreme Court Historic Preservation Commission.

Special thanks to our program coordinator, John A. Lupton, for helping make this event possible!

PC: ISBA