This is to let you know that, after more than 12 years of continuous operation, LobeLog.com will be placed in internet aspic, and our work will continue at ResponsibleStatecraft.org, an internet platform of the new Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft (QI), a newly launched, transpartisan think tank that will promote diplomacy and restraint, particularly in regard to the use of military force, in U.S. foreign policy. I consider that the policies and general foreign policy worldview likely to be propounded by QI and ResponsibleStatecraft.org to be broadly consistent with those that LobeLog and its contributors have offered over the years.

One difference, however, is that LobeLog has focused mostly on U.S. policy in the Greater Middle East, although we have published occasional posts on East Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, as well as on those parts of East and North Africa affected by what used to be called the “Global War on Terror.” As a foreign-policy think tank, of course, QI’s mandate is much broader, although it will concentrate initially on the Greater Middle East and East Asia. The contributors to LobeLog whose work you have been reading and appreciating over the years will continue to publish on Responsible Statecraft, so continuity in that respect should be assured. 

From its beginning as a blog that focused primarily on the neoconservative influence on U.S. Middle East policy to its broader focus on the policy more generally, as well as on the region’s own complex internal dynamics, LobeLog produced more than 7,500 articles, most of which ran between 800 and 1200 words, by more than 400 different contributors. That archive will still be available on the LobeLog.com site.

We who have worked on LobeLog are very proud of what we have accomplished. Not only did we produce an average of well over 600 posts a year (about 800 in the last few years), but we also vastly increased our viewership over time. We hopefully raised the level of public and elite debate on the region by presenting critical analyses and viewpoints that were or are only rarely reflected, if it all, in mainstream news coverage and, in that way, effectively challenged many conventional approaches and stereotypes that have inflicted so much harm on the region, as well as on U.S. foreign policy itself. Occasional citations and quotations from — and links to — LobeLog posts by some major publications, notably the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and a number of network television programs, suggest that we have had at least some impact on the national and international news agenda. We were also very honored to receive the Arthur Ross Media Award for Distinguished Reporting and Analysis of Foreign Affairs from the American Academy of Diplomacy in 2015, the first and so far only weblog to have gained such recognition.

I would personally like to acknowledge the vital contributions to LobeLog’s success made by Jasmin Ramsey, who effectively co-directed the site after coming on in 2010 and whose expertise in social media, among other talents, greatly expanded LobeLog’s audience and reach; Eli Clifton, whose association with LobeLog dates back to its launch and whose investigative reports on the relationship between money and foreign policy, not to mention the dubious and often incestuous interconnections between various groups and individuals who have promoted aggressive, belligerent, and Islamophobic (among other reprehensible ideologies) policies, consistently broke new ground and sometimes prompted mainstream media to do their own dot-connections; and early contributors Ali Gharib and Daniel Luban who helped establish the strong journalistic and analytical standards that permitted LobeLog to attract its ever-expanding roster of contributors. LobeLog’s editors John Feffer and Derek Davison also deserve enormous credit for their skill and patience in working with contributors and ensuring that high standards were sustained, especially over the last several years when viewership effectively quintupled.

I would also be remiss in not thanking the Ploughshares Fund, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Arca Foundation for their essential support in sustaining LobeLog as it grew. Finally, thanks are due to both Inter Press Service, the international news agency for which I worked as Washington DC bureau chief for some 30 years and which launched LobeLog in 2007, and to the “other IPS,” the Institute for Policy Studies, which, after my retirement from Inter Press in 2015, took in LobeLog which, in turn, created all kinds of administrative challenges and headaches that IPS staff always cheerfully overcame.

P.S. I may be tweeting, at least occasionally, at @lobelog.

French President Emanuel Macron has said, “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO.” He attributes much of that to his belief that “European countries…can no longer rely on America to defend NATO allies.” He is wrong on both points, but he is right in citing U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambivalence about the Alliance, though in his meeting with Macron in London before the summit, Trump has softened his criticisms of NATO. The problem is not that NATO is brain dead, but that it has been leadership dead.

Macron has a chance to do something about this problem at the NATO mini-summit in England, which convenes on December 4^. But for Macron it will be a tough slog. There is only one thing that needs to happen for this meeting to be a genuine success (and result in a great sigh of relief across the Alliance)—Trump needs to speak just 13 words, which so far he has been unwilling to do: “The United States is unalterably committed to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.” Article 5 states that “an armed attack against one or more of [the allies] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” There is no actual commitment to do anything about it; that’s decided by each ally on its own, but the politics of solidarity are critical.

The bet is that Trump won’t say these few words or their functional equivalent. 

Paying the Way

Trump will almost certainly once again beat up on most of the allies for not paying their fair share of defense costs, as “freeloaders.” There is a magic number agreed in 2014 that each ally should spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on military matters.  Only about 7 of the 29 allies do so now, though all the others have promised to do so within in a decade or so. Trump acts from the moral and political high ground, or at least the U.S. so claims: it spends about 3.7 percent of GDP on defense. That masks the fact that the United States is counting all the money spent on all its military involvements abroad, not just in Europe, even though some forces deployed elsewhere could be rushed to Europe in a crisis.  An honest count shows that the United States spends less than 1 percent of GDP on European defense.

Out of political necessity, the Alliance will be giving Trump something to take home.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who is naturally worried that the U.S. president will set a bad tone at the NATO meeting by excessive hectoring of allies, has noted that, in the last three years, NATO members have collectively increased their military spending by $130 billion—no rival to the U.S. defense budget, but it’s something.

Further, the allies have already agreed to a redistribution of shares by individual allies in the NATO common budgets.  The US now pays 22 percent. Its share will drop to 16 percent, and Trump and the allies will all make a big deal of that. Most people don’t know, however, that these “common budgets,” both military and civilian spending by the Alliance itself, total only about $1.7  billion a year.  Actual allied military forces don’t belong to NATO but to nations; and thus those monies don’t figure in common funding statistics. Dropping the U.S. share of the common budgets by 6 percent works out to about $96 million. In comparative terms, that is one-fifteenth of one percent of the U.S. military budget or about one hour and twenty minutes of what it takes to run the Pentagon.  Still, Trump will be able to claim an achievement.

DeGaulle 2.0

Macron is speaking up not just because he cares about NATO and making it, again, as he might put it, “brain alive,” but because he sees an opportunity to increase French influence, as well as to represent to his constituents at home that he is exercising leadership on a world stage.  There is zero chance that France could replace the U.S. as leader of the Alliance, though with all the doubts about Trump’s America, including domestic political turmoil over possible impeachment, Macron can make a play. More important is his effort to pump up a supplement to NATO, a European military force based on the European Union. No prizes for guessing who he sees as leading this force! In the process, however, he is honestly attempting to fill a major gap in European security, overall, caused by Britain’s impending departure from the EU. Even though the U.K. will still be a fully-paid-up member of NATO, it will no longer be involved in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy; it will no longer be able to play a mediating role in Franco-German relations, which are now going through one of their regular tiffs. And it will no longer be part of EU efforts to shore up Central European countries and Ukraine with economic instruments and democracy-promotion.  Notably, the only person outside of Britain who really likes Brexit is Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Macron is doing a useful service, though not with the finesse useful for producing a positive result, by taking on Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his increasingly fractious role within the Alliance. In countering the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, the U.S., in particular, has partnered with the Kurds, who have made a major difference. But the Kurds also have ambitions in Turkey, which are anathema not just to Erdogan, but to most non-Kurdish Turks. Macron is raising the issue, including whether Turkey is any longer a useful NATO ally. For his part, Erdogan  has countered that, if he doesn’t get NATO’s help regarding the Kurds—whom he calls terrorists—he will veto NATO’s plans to increase its military role in reassuring the three Baltic states against Russian pressures. Like all allies, Turkey does have a veto. Most likely, however, the Macron-Erdogan shots across the bow will by the end of the NATO meeting be consigned to side diplomacy, and the Baltic states will get their desired reassurance.

No Substitute for America

Macron does understand that if it came to any heavy lifting in European security—that is, in case of further aggression by Russia—nothing means very much unless the United States is a full player. But Macron is gambling that the United States in its own self-interest would not stand aside if there were a real security threat to allies; and despite all the talk about where Trump stands, that is a pretty safe bet. Further, Macron wants the Alliance to take up some of French security burdens in Africa, where it has been suffering losses in its peacekeeping efforts in Mali.  And—this is very much to his credit—he wants the Alliance to finally start figuring out just how far it will go elsewhere, especially in the Middle East, where U.S. engagement and policy coherence are shaky at best.

All these items are on the agenda in England, either formally or in corridor talk. Leadership is indeed needed. But in the final analysis that can only come from Washington. That’s true even for Macron’s idea of a Europe-only defense force which, as has been clear for more than two decades, depends on U.S. military support to be effective—as demonstrated in the “non-NATO” intervention in Libya nearly a decade ago. 

The mini-summit this week will likely punt on the more difficult matters, and most of the allies will engage choreographed happy time (with France and Turkey being notable outliers, for domestic political reasons). The Alliance may also commission yet another “experts group” to chart NATO’s future. Except for one in 1967 (the Harmel Report) which dealt with major strategic challenges regarding the role of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, the others have just been make-work and useless.

NATO: America’s Best Investment

NATO continues to be highly relevant, at least as a regional alliance with some engagement in parts of the Middle East, as well.  Certainly, it is the unmatched source of stability and security confidence in Europe. Further, though Trump and some other American NATO-doubters are unwilling to acknowledge it, firm U.S. commitment to the Alliance buys America a huge amount of influence in Europe, politically, economically, and for the U.S. private sector.  Trump’s ambivalence on NATO has not made America great again; it has weakened a precious national, self-interested asset. This week he needs to show he understands this elemental truth.

The widespread protests caused by the Iranian government’s decision on November 15 to raise the price of gasoline by a whopping 50 percent have generated a flurry of speculation about their wider political implications for Iran’s rulers. What does seem clear, as several Iran experts have noted, is that these protests were in some sense unprecedented. In a matter of hours, they spread to some 100 cities, including southern Tehran. The protesters set fire to myriad institutions that many Iranians associate with the regime, including banks and Friday prayer halls, and many of them denounced Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and called for the downfall of the regime. This spasm of popular resistance was far more extensive than the protests of 2018 and early 2019.

In fact, in both geographical and political terms, the demonstrations rivaled—and perhaps even surpassed—the 2009 June “Green Movement” that brought hundreds of thousands into Tehran’s streets. The Iranian government’s decision to shut down the internet in the entire country—a first for any developing nation—underscored the regime’s perception that the protesters posed a dire security and political threat, one that had to be met with decisive and massive force.

Most Iran experts would also agree that the government’s violent response achieved its desired goal: to restore order and, in so doing, signal that any renewal of the protests would not be tolerated. The killing of some 143 protesters, according to Amnesty International, was itself a sign of just how threatened the regime felt. In fact, it had tried to avoid killing large numbers of Iranians lest it be accused of perpetrating the kinds of massacres that helped set the stage for the fall of the shah in 1978. Wagering that it had no choice but to use a heavy-handed approach, for the time being the regime has prevailed. The partial restoring of the internet (and threat to close it down permanently) suggests that its strategy to contain growing anger among the very classes on which the regime has tried to sustain its revolutionary legitimacy is meeting with some success.

The bigger question is whether the protests will produce a wider political movement, one that has the support of an urban professional and business middle class that remains reluctant and/or incapable of challenging the regime. This reluctance is entirely understandable. Over the last few years the security apparatus has been upgraded by a government that believes—not without reason—that it is facing a US-led economic war whose ultimate aim is to destroy the Islamic Republic of Iran. This fear feeds the deeply held view that foreign forces are the real instigators of all protests, including those that have shaken Iran-backed governments in Lebanon and Iraq. But neither brute force nor cash transfers into the accounts of those Iranians most affected by price increases will provide what Iran needs most: a renegotiation of the social and political contract. The problem for the regime (and the opposition) is that its securitization of the political arena is closing the door to any form of peaceful political accommodation. This may be welcome news for those who imagine that Iran is ripe for a new revolution. But the more likely outcome is that the Islamic Republic will deteriorate into a security state that will be incapable of solving the basic problem of political representation.

A Fraying Ruling Bargain

Since the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the country’s leaders have provided the promise of economic security, jobs, and a basic level of social justice in return for citizen support—or at least acquiescence. This ruling bargain is literally fueled by oil. But it is also justified by an official religious doctrine that has been articulated by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his allies in the clerical and political institutions. It is enforced by a powerful security establishment led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and allies in the police and intelligence forces. This patronage system was also buttressed by the incorporation of a state-controlled electoral system that allows elites representing diverse constituencies the opportunity to negotiate over a range of issues, including economic policy.

This semi-authoritarian system gave the regime a means of managing conflicts so long as two conditions obtained: oil income kept flowing and elected leaders (and their allies in the press, universities, and business community, among others) did not reject the legitimacy of the state itself. The repression of the 2009 Green Movement underscored this system’s limits to dissent, especially by a vast urban middle class. By dint of its education, professions, and exposure to global forces, this middle class seeks not merely economic goods but also the intellectual benefits that come from working in parliament, universities, the media, the legal profession, and other vocations that require a minimal degree of free speech and discussion.

Over the last years, this ruling bargain has frayed to the point that it may be impossible to restore. The key driver of this development has been a growing economic crisis whose most visible manifestations are escalating inflation rates, rising unemployment (10.5 percent nationally last September with 26 percent among youth), a plummeting national currency, the rial, and an increasing poverty rate. With 75 percent of Iran’s 83 million people living in urban areas, this downward spiral has made life difficult precisely in those areas whose educated residents have access to cell phones and the internet and, further, to city streets and squares that offer a potential avenue for mobilizing mass protests.

There is little doubt that the sanctions imposed by the Trump White House have made it much harder to sustain the massive spending required to fund the ruling bargain. Faced by a sharp decline in oil exports (down to an available 350,000 bpd in November after domestic consumption), the Iranian government has been pressed to reduce expenditures. The latter include a direct monthly cash handout of $10.80 (455,000 rials) each to some 78 million Iranians as well as a huge subsidy for fuel.

Three days after the gasoline price increase, the government announced a compensation plan designed to assist low income families. Why it failed to make this announcement in tandem with the price increases is a mystery, particularly since it appears that the government had prepared this plan in advance. Still, it is unlikely that any promise to compensate those most harmed by the price increases would have made much difference since, in fact, the protesters’ actions signaled fundamental political concerns. The burning of hundreds of banks and government buildings, according to a government minister underscores escalating anger with what is widely perceived as a corrupt and unaccountable political elite. Echoing the deeper political grievances of so many other protesters in the Middle East and beyond, many of Iran’s demonstrators assailed the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and its top leaders, from Khamenei on down. As one Washington-based Iran expert put it, the protesters struck at the “heart of the regime’s revolutionary legitimacy.”

From Legitimacy Crisis to What?

The road from a legitimacy crisis to regime change or transformation is long and uncertain. Along the way three possibilities may emerge. The first, which is most likely, is a further hardening of the regime and a closure of the existing political arena. The second, which could actually emerge as a consequence of the first, is a gradual (if de facto) process of political liberalization whose parameters and limits would be negotiated and fought over by rival political leaders. The last and least likely possibility is regime collapse followed by a democratic revolution.

A further closure of an already stifled political arena is not without risks. As the clampdown on the opposition that followed the 2009 protests demonstrated, efforts by hard-liners to shut down all dissent and exclude reformist leaders and parties from the political arena can have the unintended effect of denuding the system of the very institutions that provide a mechanism for managing and deflecting conflict. Deprived of the mechanism, the gap between regime and society expanded, thus setting the stage for the election of President Hassan Rouhani in 2013 and the subsequent effort to strengthen a fractured reformist camp. But Iran’s intervention in Syria and the widening war in Iraq against the so-called Islamic State—coupled with the backlash from hard-line forces that followed the signing of the 2015 nuclear agreement—had the effect of sidelining reformist forces. Their fate seemed practically sealed two years later, when the Trump Administration’s decision to abandon the nuclear agreement and reimpose sanctions not only pulled the rug out from under Rouhani, but it all but guaranteed that hard-liners would exploit his misfortunes to assert even greater control over the political and economic system.

The hard-liners’ efforts were abetted by a strengthening of the security apparatus that had in fact begun following the 2009 uprising. The regime expanded the police (the “Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” or NAJA) by increasing their numbers, building new police stations, and creating in Tehran some 400 patrolling units in 375 neighborhoods. These actions were clearly designed to make it difficult for middle class protest in the political heartland of Iran. Fast forward to 2018, when in the wake of countrywide protests, especially in rural areas—the backbone of the regime—the parliament authorized a 400 percent weapons increase for NAJA. If, as it appears, it was NAJA forces rather than the IRGC or Basij forces that led the recent (and ongoing) repression of protests, this development would only underscore the prospects for a wider securitization of the political system.

As noted above, Iran’s recent history suggests that a further hardening of the regime could have the unintended effect of reopening the door to the now isolated reformists. The power and authority of Iran’s supreme leader and his office—already greatly debilitated—could be eroded if he finds himself dependent on one key faction and thus incapable of posing as the ultimate arbiter of the political field. But as his recent uncompromising statements make clear, Khamenei’s number one priority is reasserting control. This requires a close alliance with the IRGC, even if such an entente could further isolate the supreme leader and the office he embodies.

The second scenario is a reassertion of reformist influence through the existing electoral system. While Iran’s experience demonstrates that reformists can sometimes mobilize support in ways that surprise both them and their potential followers, reformist leaders are not well positioned to leverage the protests. They are not only divided; in the wake of protests that featured attacks on government institutions, reformist leaders appear reluctant to speak out in a manner that might identify them with the protesters. However justified they may be, the demonstrators’ actions have played well into the hands of hard-liners and the supreme leader, who has painted the protesters as witting or unwitting agents of foreign forces determined to spread chaos. Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that the protesters command equal support across the ideological and social spectrum of Iran’s complex society. Fear of disorder should never be underestimated—a point that was suggested by at least one public opinion poll conducted by the University of Maryland, which reported that some 66 percent of the sample believes that the police handled the 2017-2018 protests “very well” or “somewhat well.”

It is not yet known whether the recent protests have provoked similar concerns about public order. What is clear is that the demonstrators’ actions—coupled with the hard-liners’ efforts to depict them as foreign agents—have left Rouhani with little room to maneuver. With hard-liners on the march and a leaderless protest movement whose ardent youth have rebelled against the system itself, he has chosen to emulate and amplify Khamenei’s verbal assaults. Thus, while insisting that the right to legal protest must be respected, Rouhani has not hesitated¹ to back Khamenei.

For those Iranians and their supporters who believe and assert that the only path forward is “to move beyond the Islamic Republic toward a radical redistribution of wealth and power,” Rouhani’s statement is positive proof that the system cannot be changed from within. Indeed, the discrediting and isolation of the reformists will reduce the political conflict to a polarized contest that could only invite more violence, thus precluding an even limited reopening of the political system down the road. Iran’s hard-liners might welcome such an outcome even if it comes at the cost of making Iran increasingly ungovernable.

The Dangerous Irrelevance of US Policy toward Iran

Responding to the protests, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted  that the “US is with You, the US Supports You,” addressing the protesters. He then followed up this declaration with another tweet, inviting Iranians to send video documentation of the crackdown to the US government. Whether these tweets help or harm Iran’s demonstrators is a matter of debate. But what is sure is that Iran’s hard-liners will make every effort to ensure the failure of what they call the “western conspiracy” to bring chaos. A country under the thumb of a paranoid security apparatus that, among other things, has effectively taken hostage no less than 13 Iranians with binational citizenship will not bend to the White House’s policy of “maximum pressure.”

On the contrary, both at home and abroad, the IRGC is pushing back with its own pressure campaign. The Trump Administration has embraced the protesters’ cause. For the United States and the White House, in particular, this approach brings little risk or costs. But for those Iranians who seek some path forward, a precarious US-Iranian stalemate is bad news. What Iranian protesters and their cohorts in the wider region need is the political space and will to forge an exit ramp off the highway of escalating conflict. Sadly, none of the regional powers favor such an outcome. As for the United States, it is largely out of the game.

Daniel Brumberg is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, where this article was originally published. 

Two weeks after the eruption of protests in Iran due to the rise in petrol prices, the unrests may have subsided but discontent is still on the rise, like the clam before the storm which may erupt once more in the not so distant future.

Without prior notice, petrol prices were increased in Iran at midnight on Friday November 15. The price of rationed petrol rose by 50 percent and free petrol by 300 percent. From the afternoon of that very same day, protests began in small towns and the poorer areas of larger cities, reaching a zenith on Saturday.

Based on official reports, 28 out of 31 Iranian provinces and over 100 cities were engulfed by protests. To counter the situation, the government disconnected the internet on a national level to prevent the protesters from using social media. According to the Minister of the Interior, Rahmani-Fazli, over fifty military posts were attacked, 731 banks, 140 public spaces, 70 petrol stations, 307 private cars, and 183 military vehicles were set on fire.

The exact number of people who lost their lives is not clear. Amnesty International has reported 143 deaths during the unrests; but this has been denied by Iran. Even so, Iranian officials have confirmed that the protests were the most widespread and violent the country had experienced in recent years. The spokesperson for the Iranian Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy, Naghavi-Hosseini, placed the number of arrests at over 7,000.

Iranian authorities have announced that bank arsons and unrests were the work of insurgents, counter-revolutionaries, and the enemies of Iran. Iran’s Intelligence Ministry has even reported the arrest of CIA agents involved in the protests. Although the opposition in exile, such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization and supporters of the ousted Pahlavi monarchy, may be attempting to exploit popular protests, the fact that people are not satisfied with the current economic situation cannot be denied.

Reasons for petrol price rises

The Iranian government has cited social justice and help for the lower-income classes, as well as controlling petrol consumption and imports, and environmental issues as the main reasons for the hike in petrol prices. It announced that it will use the resulting income to credit the accounts of 60 million people from Iran’s 84 million strong population on a monthly basis.

However, most economic experts have opposed the plan. They believe the lower-income brackets could have received government help through increased taxes on higher income brackets. Iranian economist, Mahmoud Jamsaz, said that government policies have led to the collapse of the middle classes and there is now a rich minority and a poor majority in Iran.

Famous Iranian sociologist, Emad Afrough, has also said: “From a sociopolitical viewpoint, we no longer have a middle class. We have a ruling class that decides, and a large lower class that has to obey.”

Even those economists who agree with petrol price rises believe that this should have been implemented step by step with a maximum price increase of 20 percent per year. Most experts believe that the plan has been carried out to offset the government deficit given the drop in oil sales, restrictions on other exports, and foreign currency earnings; although, the Iranian government strongly rejects this.

Impacts on domestic policies

The rise in petrol prices has eroded what little social capital Rouhani had left. The hardliners called this an imprudence by the government and began to exploit it to weaken the moderates. Hence, it seems that in the next Iranian parliamentary elections due in March, hardliners and conservatives will be the winners.

The decision-making approach to the price rise has also been criticized by some lawyers and lawmakers, because it was taken by an organ which has no place in the Iranian Constitution and was formed by the Supreme Leader of the Revolution a few weeks after the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal.

The Supreme Council for Economic Coordination of the three branches headed by the president, parliament speaker, and head of the judiciary approved the plan which was endorsed by the Supreme Leader; whereas, such decisions must be ratified by Parliament. Thus, this shows the discrediting of parliament and a departure from processes and democratic and transparent decision-making.

Impact on nuclear negotiations

The eruption of protests and unrests in Iran must have led the U.S. administration to conclude that maximum pressure is working and its continuation will bring Iran to its knees. Inebriated with the protests, they are further distancing themselves from any negotiations. Be that as it may, it is a mistake to conclude the undisputed surrender of the proud leaders of Iran to the U.S.

After reducing the unrests, the Supreme Leader of Iran pointed out in a speech that “Both friends and foes should know that we have repelled the enemy in the war in military, political and security issues. The recent actions were security issues, not from the people. We have repelled the enemy in various areas, and by God’s grace, we will also definitely repel the enemy in the economic war.”

Regardless of the outcome of this war, what is clear is that the parties are far from diplomacy. Even the EU seems to be moving closer to the U.S. camp.

What will be the future of the protests?

Although the security forces were able to squelch the protests far more violently than previously, dissatisfaction is higher and the impact of petrol prices on other goods may add fuel to the fire and unrests may erupt once again intensely and more widespread.

The government has stressed that the price of other goods will not rise. But economics and existing evidence say otherwise. Urban transportation and, consequently, fruit prices have risen as we speak and it is possible that other goods and services will follow suit.

While protesters in the aftermath of the 2009 elections were predominantly the urban middle classes, the base of recent protesters, as well as the December 2017 protesters, were mostly the lower-income classes and the unemployed youth living on the margins of cities. This is very dangerous for the Iranian establishment, as the latter have nothing to lose and no prospects of improving their lives in terms of employment and welfare.

Yet, lack of leadership among the protesters, the absence of a potential alternative to the current Iranian system, lack of a strategic goal among the protesters, a fear of civil war and total infrastructural collapse among the people, and the use of extreme force and range of methods by the establishment to crush the protests does not currently provide the prospects for regime change.

Amir Delshad is a freelance journalist in Iran.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, under indictment for corruption, has been launching vociferous counterattacks that sound quite familiar to anyone (including editorial pages of the mainstream U.S. press) who has been following a parallel story of high-level wrongdoing in the United States. Netanyahu said that earlier reports of the conduct that led to charges against him were “fake news.” He has labeled investigations into the matter a “witch hunt.” Now he is saying that the indictments are part of an “attempted coup.” The similarities between a beleaguered Netanyahu and Donald Trump extend beyond such rhetoric to larger habits of never admitting wrongdoing and constantly attacking their accusers. Their common objective has been retention of power free of any introspection about larger values.

Both heads of government have long histories of demagoguery, with an apparent disregard for possibly violent consequences. Netanyahu’s history includes stirring up hatred against political rivals who participated in the Oslo peace process—rabble-rousing that the family of the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin believes, with good reason, was partly responsible for Rabin’s assassination by a right-wing Jewish Israeli.  More recently, Netanyahu’s racist rhetoric has featured warnings about Arabs turning out to vote “in droves.” Trump’s well-known racist rhetoric has included calling white supremacists at Charlottesville “very fine people” and calling Mexican immigrants rapists. No U.S. leaders have been assassinated as a result, but such demagoguery encourages violence against immigrants and members of ethnic groups associated with immigration.

The parallel attitudes and habits of Netanyahu and Trump underscore what has become a more direct political link between the two. Netanyahu’s government has pursued policies toward Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians that have been increasingly and blatantly indefensible in terms of peace, justice, and international law. As such, support for Israel and its policies in the United States has been narrowing to a political base on the right dominated by evangelical Christians who bestow their support partly according to religious doctrine that gives a special God-given place to Israel. Trump’s political strategy on this and many other issues is focused on the same narrow base. Accordingly, the Trump administration’s policies toward Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have consisted of one gift after another to Netanyahu’s government, unaccompanied by any benefit to U.S. interests. The gifts have included movement of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights, diverse forms of Palestinian-bashing, and the repudiation of international law regarding colonization of conquered territory.

The offenses of both Netanyahu and Trump have involved bribery and corruption of democratic elections. The indictment of Netanyahu mentions such traditional mediums of corrupt exchange as luxury goods (in Netanyahu’s case, expensive cigars and champagne) given in return for policies that favor the business interests of those giving the goods. In the other cases that the incitement covers, the benefit Netanyahu is accused of seeking in return for policy favors to business interests is favorable treatment in the newspapers or online news outlets those interests control. Trump, who had welcomed and openly invited Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, attempted to coerce Ukraine into interfering in the 2020 U.S. election by making U.S. military aid and a presidential meeting contingent on Ukraine publicly incriminating a rival presidential candidate.

An obvious difference in the two leaders’ election-corrupting activities is that the offenses covered by the indictment of Netanyahu all took place within Israeli domestic politics, whereas Trump’s case has involved interference by foreign powers. Even here, however, is a political link between the two. Notwithstanding the significance of Russia’s interference in U.S. politics and Trump’s attempt to get Ukraine to interfere, the biggest foreign interference in U.S. politics has for years been that of Israel. That’s what the string of gifts that the Trump administration has bestowed on Netanyahu’s government, and the hoped-for electoral implications of those gifts, is about (in addition to personal and religious inclinations of some members of the Trump administration involved in the gift-giving). Benjamin Netanyahu has been directly involved in some of the most blatant foreign interference in U.S. politics, including denouncing policies of the then-incumbent U.S. administration from the rostrum of the U.S. House of Representatives, at the invitation of the opposition party.

As the corruption case against Netanyahu has gathered attention, Trump has tried to play down his relationship with the prime minister, saying, “Our relations are with Israel, so we’ll see what happens.” That line should be given no more weight than any of Trump’s many other attempts to distance himself from Trump collaborators who became public relations liabilities. The same was true of Trump saying of Gordon Sondland—a central figure in implementing Trump’s attempt to coerce Ukraine, who gave incriminating testimony about that attempt—that “I don’t know him very well.”  And it was true of Trump saying he didn’t know whether Rudy Giuliani, his chief dirt-digger in Ukraine, was still his attorney.

The indictment against Netanyahu, and the recent impeachment hearings about Trump and Ukraine, by no means include all the suspect activity by either leader that is worth scrutinizing or that raises parallels between the two men. Although not covered in the recently announced indictment, Israel’s attorney general also has been investigating a case involving Netanyahu, a cousin of his, possible bribery, and the purchase of some German-made submarines that Israeli military leaders say they don’t need. This affair—apparently involving a political leader ignoring the judgment of military leaders—evokes Trump’s recent interference in the case of a Navy SEAL convicted of misconduct.

Trump, a teetotaling non-smoker, will not be selling any favors in return for cigars and champagne, but the counterpart to that portion of Netanyahu’s offenses is Trump’s mixing of private and government business in defiance of the U.S. Constitution’s emoluments clause. Trump’s obstruction of justice, as catalogued in Robert Mueller’s report and with the catalog growing larger during the current impeachment investigation, finds a counterpart in Netanyahu’s efforts to obstruct justice by impeding the investigation of his own case.

Activities that fall under the label of corruption do not constitute the most damaging malfeasance by Netanyahu. That distinction would belong to his government’s policies regarding the use of armed force and subjugation of the Palestinians—policies that can genuinely be regarded as crimes. Trump’s administration, by unreservedly supporting and abetting those policies, makes the United States share all the more in the ill consequences of permanent conflict and injustice and the killing of any chance of peace in that part of the Middle East.

The bad effects of corruption in high places in both Israel and the United States include compromising the national security interests of each country. This can include waste from letting personal financial interests interfere in military procurement decisions. It can include weakening order and discipline in the armed services by letting politics interfere in the military justice system.

Even more serious is the damage to representative democracy from corruption of the electoral process. Here, the United States has farther to fall, given that Israel has long been a democracy only for a portion of the population it rules, and not for the other substantial portion that is denied political rights. American democracy already had its own flaws, such as gerrymandering and voter suppression laws, before Trump’s arrival on the political scene. But the active encouragement of involvement by foreign governments constitutes substantial further damage to that democracy—one that the Founding Fathers warned against as an ill consequence of passionate partisanship.

The stakes couldn’t be higher in a world in which civilizationalist leaders risk shepherding in an era of even greater political violence, disenfranchisement and marginalisation, and mass migration.

The risks are magnified by the fact that players that traditionally stood up for at least a modicum of basic economic, social, political and minority rights have either joined the civilisationalists or are too tied up in their own knots.

The United States, long a proponent of human rights, even if it was selective in determining when to adhere to its principles and when to conveniently look the other way, has abandoned all pretence under President Donald J. Trump.

Europe is too weak and fighting its own battles, whether finding its place in a world in which the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance is in doubt, Brexit or the rise of civilizationalist leaders within its own ranks.

The long and short of this is that civil society’s reliance on traditional strategies and tactics to exert political pressure serves to fly the rights flag but is unlikely to produce results.

The same is true for traditional often heavy-handed and violent government attempts to quell protests.

In some ways, this weekend’s landslide vote for pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong lays down a gauntlet for the governments of the city and China.

“Even if the current wave of protests recedes, the instability will very likely persist for some time and may even become a permanent situation… because the problems that cause the protests appear unresolvable by means of the current political and economic system,” said Israeli journalist Ofri Ilany.

Mr. Ilany put his finger on the pulse. This decade’s global breakdown in confidence in political systems and leaders not only spotlights the problem but may also create opportunities for out-of-the-box thinking.

The key lies in the fact that protesters across the globe in Santiago de Chile, La Paz, Bogota, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Paris, Barcelona, Moscow, Tbilisi, Algiers, Cairo, Khartoum, Beirut, Amman, Tehran, Jakarta, and Hong Kong as well as movements like the Extinction Rebellion essentially want the same thing: a more transparent, accountable and more economically equitable world.

The Middle East and North Africa, the one part of the world that exasperates the most, also represents the worst and the best of responses to the global clamour for change.

While Egypt under general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi is almost a textbook example of what drives global protest, Tunisia and Kuwait, offer lessons to be learnt. So do some of the world’s longer standing success stories such as Singapore.

Tunisia has emerged as the one country that experienced a successful revolt in 2011 and was able to safeguard its achievements because its leaders, much like Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, saw power as a tool to secure national rather than personal interests and at a time of crisis worked with civil society to engineer a national dialogue that crafted a way forward.

Similarly, Kuwait, a constitutional semi-democratic anomaly in a region governed by secretive autocrats, recently opted for a more transparent competitive approach towards politics.

As a result, Kuwait saw this month its ruling family take its internal differences and disputes public. The differences forced the government to resign as members of the ruling family accused each other of embezzlement in advance of parliamentary elections scheduled for next year and a possible succession in which the assembly would have a say.

Achieving protesters’ goal of more equitable and accountable political and economic systems involves not only adherence to the rule of law, including the implementation of international law, and application of the principle of equality before the law of not only individuals and organizations but also states.

It further involves the need to make principles of right and wrong and of respect of human dignity the moral and ethical underpinnings of the architecture of a new world order by which all ranging from an individual to a state are judged.

That is the fundamental message of protests across the globe that denounce a world in which financial or economic benefit justifies violations of rights and civilisationalists have abandoned any pretence of adherence to international law.

Heeding the protesters’ message means ensuring that at least international law provides an effective mechanism to hold accountable security forces that use lethal force against largely peaceful protesters as well as politically responsible officials that authorize unjustified brutality in what often amounts to mass killings.

This year’s numbers speak for themselves, including some 100 on a single day in Sudan, more than 350 in a matter of weeks in Iraq, more than 100 in Iran and scores in Chile.

The need for morals and ethics is gaining momentum with hardline realist proponents of the projection of power as well as some leaders raising the alarm bell.

The rise of artificial intelligence persuaded former US secretary of state and national security advisor Henry A. Kissinger, a symbol of realpolitik and the wielding of power, to recognize the importance of morals and ethics.

Writing in The Atlantic, Mr. Kissinger warned that the consequence of artificial intelligence “may be a world relying on machines powered by data and algorithms and ungoverned by ethical or philosophical norms.”

Threats resulting from the abandonment of international law and the lack of moral and ethical yardsticks were evident in this month’s unilateral recognition by the Trump administration of the legality of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory long viewed by jurists and the international community as illegal.

The move highlighted the link between protecting individual rights and freedoms and national security.

Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad warned that the administration’s move meant that “we are no longer safe. If a country wants to enter our country and build their settlements, that is legal. We cannot do anything,”

Mr. Mahathir was projecting onto states a sentiment of vulnerability among protesters and minorities across the globe that results from the random, unrestricted employment of power by those in positions of authority.

Similarly, Singapore’s Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon warned last month that “countries increasingly adopt a zero-sum mentality in eschewing multilateral agreements as shackles on sovereignty and a burden on economic growth.”

Mr. Menon’s words must have been music in the ears of Norway’s successful US$1 trillion rainy-day oil fund that has proven that growth and profitability are achievable without abandoning norms of moral and ethical investment.

Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund returned three percent or US$28.5 billion to the country’s pension pot during in the second quarter of 2019.

Guided by Norway’s Council of Ethics, which monitors the fund’s investments, GPFG recently

blacklisted shares in British security company G4S because of the risk of human rights violations against its workforce in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Said New York Times columnist David Brooks: “The world is unsteady and ready to blow… The big job ahead for leaders…is this: Write a new social contract that gives both the educated urban elites and the heartland working classes a piece of what they want most.”

To achieve the kind of social and economic justice as well as live-and-let live environment that Mr. Brooks advocates, leaders, governments and civil society will have to rediscover and readopt the moral and ethical values that are embedded in the world’s multiple cultures and common to much of mankind.

Republished with permission from The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

After years of investigation and months of delay, Israel’s Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit formally indicted Benjamin Netanyahu for crimes ranging from his violation of public trust to bribery and fraud. Israel’s apologists will argue that the fact that a sitting Prime Minister has been charged with crimes against the state and people presents compelling evidence of the country’s democracy and commitment to the rule of law. This is the very point that Mandelblit made in announcing the indictments – “The public interest requires that we live in a country where no one is above the law.” However, this is only partially true since it appears that in Israel the principles of democracy or the rule of law only apply to Israeli Jews or the interests of the state, itself. In fact, Netanyahu’s entire sordid career is evidence of the selectiveness of Israeli’s sense of justice.

In the past the Netanyahu household has been charged with some of the pettiest forms of corruption imaginable. For example, his wife was found guilty of taking the empty bottles from beverages consumed at official state functions and keeping the money she received for turning them for recycling. The Netanyahus were also known to bring three weeks of dirty laundry on two-day official state trips and sending them to the hotel in which they were staying for a night so that the cleaning bill would be charged to the state’s budget. This is the sort of past petty thievery for which the Netanyahus were famous.

Looking at the recent indictments, it is clear that the Prime Minister has graduated to bigger and better forms of fraud and corruption. What’s striking, however, is that all of the crimes with which he is charged were focused on feeding his ego or his appetites. In some instances, they were favors done for a businessman in exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars in gifts, in others they were the corrupt deals he made with various media tycoons in which he promised them benefits in exchange for their guaranteeing him positive coverage in their news outlets.

There is no doubt, that in all of these cases, Netanyahu’s behavior has been clearly criminal and reprehensible, and, as described by the Attorney General, a breach of the public’s trust. But what I find so striking and disturbing, is that these crimes pale in significance when compared to what Netanyahu has done to the Palestinian people and the prospect for Israeli-Palestinian peace – crimes for which he will not be called to account.

After Oslo, Netanyahu organized a back-door lobby to mobilize US Congressional opposition to the peace accords. This was the first time an Israeli lobby worked in the US to oppose their own government. He should have been charged with treason.

Back in Israel, during the same period, he organized with Ariel Sharon and a few others a smear campaign of incitement against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The campaign was so virulent and threatening that many Israelis, including Rabin’s wife, held Netanyahu responsible for Rabin’s assassination. Netanyahu should have been charged with incitement.

In 1996, he was elected Prime Minister on a platform dedicated to ending the peace process and he did everything he could to slow down, distort, and ultimately sabotage the Oslo Peace Process. Even the agreement he signed with the Palestinians at Wye so encumbered the process that by the end of his first term in office, peace was on life support. He should have been charged with destroying the prospects for peace and putting at risk the lives of millions.

During his last three terms in office, he incited violence and hatred against Palestinians, both those who are citizens of Israel and those living under occupation. This has fueled extremist settler movements that have engaged in daily acts of violence, destruction of property, and murder. He also encouraged soldiers in the Israeli army to murder defenseless Palestinians and supported them when they were charged with crimes. In addition, as he did with Rabin, he has falsely accused his Israeli opponents of being too close to the Arabs and accused the Palestinian citizens of Israel of being enemies of the state. He should have been charged with hate crimes.

During his time in office he has: expanded settlements on stolen Palestinian land and the demolition of Palestinian property; overseen a number of devastating assaults on Gaza resulting in the indiscriminate massacre of thousands of innocent civilians and the destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure; instituted and maintained a cruel blockade of Gaza’s population, as an act of collective punishment, in which, for long periods of time, food, medicine, and other essential items were restricted or severely regulated – resulting in death, disease, and impoverishment of millions of innocents. He should have been charged with war crimes.

The list could go on, but this should suffice.

The bottom line is that, to be sure, Netanyahu is a criminal. But in today’s Israel he can’t be found guilty of his most serious crimes – treason, incitement, destroying peace, hate crimes, and war crimes. Instead, he will be asked only to answer for his narcissistic appetites and corruption.

Saudi officials hope that talks mediated by Oman and Britain between the kingdom and Houthi rebels will lead to a revival of stalled talks between the Yemeni insurgents and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman has tasked his younger brother and Saudi deputy defense minister, Khalid bin Salman, with engineering an end to the Yemeni war as part of a broader revamp of Saudi foreign policy.

The revamp involves a return to a more cautious foreign and defense policy that embraces multilateralism after several years in which the kingdom adopted an assertive and robust go-it alone approach that produced several fiascos, including the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen 4.5 years ago.

The revamp was prompted by attacks in September on two of the kingdom’s key oil facilities as well as doubts about the reliability of the US defense commitment to the Gulf.

The kingdom’s return to a more cautious approach is also intended to allow Saudi Arabia to project itself in 2020 as president of the Group of 20 (G20) and repair its image tarnished by the Yemen War, the killing last year of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and a domestic crackdown on dissent. The G20 groups the world’s twenty largest economies.

Mr. Trump’s response to the September drone and missile attacks for which the Houthis claimed responsibility was the latest, and in some ways clearest indication, that Gulf states may not be able to count on the United States in times of crisis even though the Trump administration insisted that Iran rather than the rebels was to blame for the incident.

“That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us. But we would certainly help them. If we decide to do something, they’ll be very much involved, and that includes payment. And they understand that fully,” Mr. Trump said at the time, adopting a transactional attitude towards Gulf security.

A US official involved in Gulf policy said more recently that “the attacks made the Saudis and other Gulf states realize that escalation of US-Iranian tensions would make them targets in an environment in which the United States may not wholeheartedly come to their rescue.”

Another US official suggested that the Saudis’ “prime objective now is to lessen their involvement in Yemen, to get the Houthis to stop being some version of a proxy, so they (the Saudis) can deal directly with Iran.”

United Nations Yemen envoy Martin Griffiths told the UN Security Council this week that the number of air attacks by the Saudi-led coalition had dropped by nearly 80 percent in the last two weeks.

“We call this de-escalation, a reduction in the tempo of the war, and perhaps a move towards an overall ceasefire in Yemen,” Mr. Griffiths said. He held out the hope that a negotiated end to the war could be achieved early next year.

Saudi efforts to end the war as well as gestures towards Iran in recent months by the United Arab Emirates did not stop senior Saudi and UAE officials from adopting a hard line at this week’s Manama Dialogue.

“Appeasement simply cannot work with Iran. We hold Iran responsible for the attack on Abqaiq. We do not want war, but Iran needs to be held accountable. The question is whether Iran can abandon its ambition to propagate the revolution and respect sovereignty,” Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs Adel al-Jubeir told the Bahrain gathering. By mentioning Abqaiq, Mr. Al-Jubeir was referring to one of the two Saudi oil facilities targeted in September.

Mr. Al-Jubeir’s UAE counterpart, Anwar Gargash, added: “Germany under Hitler, the Soviet Union, Iran today: revisionist states threaten international order. The key to stability is deterrence, and steadfast resolve by the international community that Iran must change. If not, sanctions must be increased, not loosened.”

The US Treasury, expanding harsh sanctions that aim to force Iran to re-negotiate on American terms the 2015 international agreement that curbed the Islamic republic’s nuclear program, sanctioned this week Iranian communications minister Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi for blocking access to the Internet as part of a bid to squash anti-government protests.

The blockage made it difficult for protesters to post videos on social media, generate support for their rejection of recent fuel price hikes, and obtain reliable reports on the extent of the unrest. Amnesty International said more than 100 protesters had so far been killed by security forces.

Mr. Al-Jubeir and Mr. Gargash’s tough remarks notwithstanding, winds in the Gulf appear to be blowing in the direction of reduced tension on all fronts, including the 2.5-year old Saudi-UAE-led boycott of Qatar.

Inevitably, reducing tension will only prove sustainable if US-Iranian friction is dialled back.

Sustainability moreover will depend on some sort of regional understanding on non-aggression that would involve Iran and create the basis for a more multilateral security architecture that would embed rather than replace the regional US defence umbrella.

Bahraini foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa appeared to anticipate a more multilateral approach in his remarks at the Manama Dialogue. Rejecting an Iranian call for a security architecture that would exclusively involve regional states, Mr. Al Khalifa asserted that “Iran’s regional security proposals are fundamentally flawed, especially because they do not include external powers.”

A series of Saudi and UAE gestures in recent months, beyond the Saudi-Houthi talks, signal moves towards reducing tensions not only on the Yemeni but also the Iranian and Qatari fronts.

In the latest indication, Khaled Al Jarallah, deputy foreign minister of Kuwait, the official mediator in the dispute with Qatar, said a decision this month by the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini national soccer teams to compete in the Gulf Cup in Qatar, despite their boycott of the Gulf state, “provides a clear indication that a breakthrough has taken place.”

Similarly, a Saudi official, in a rare gesture, told reporters in Washington earlier this month that Qatar had taken a step towards resolving the crisis by passing an anti-terrorism funding law, a key demand of the boycotting countries.

Besides withdrawing forces from Yemen, the UAE refrained from blaming Iran for the attacks on the Saudi installations and earlier explosions on vessels off the Emirati coast and sent officials to Iran to discuss maritime security.

Saudi and UAE support for the US’ maximum pressure campaign is certain to weaken if Gulf efforts to reduce tensions progress, particularly with regards to Iran. A peace process in Yemen and a Gulf dialogue with Iran would be significant steps in that direction.

Republished with permission from The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer. 

Russia, and especially Ukraine, have been centerpieces of the House impeachment hearings, as well as of massive media coverage. But largely lost in the domestic politics focused disarray is serious discussion of the foreign policy aspects of American engagement with these two countries. Factors relating to both are of course “fair game” for critics of President Trump’s tenure in office. But there is risk of “throwing the baby out with the bathwater,” as the saying goes. In this case, however, both are important.

It has been clear since before the breakup of the Soviet Union that Russia’s future is of great importance to the United States, as well as to U.S. allies and partners across Europe. Fiona Hill, formerly the senior National Security Council staffer for Russia (and related matters), was quite direct on this point in last week’s testimony to the House Impeachment hearings: “I do not think long-term conflict with Russia is either desirable or inevitable. I continue to believe that we need to seek ways of stabilizing our relationship with Moscow even as we counter their efforts to harm us .”

She is not alone. Among most—but not all—U.S. and allied strategists and political leaders, finding a way to deal with Russia, consonant with U.S. national interests, is critical to Western security as well as to the overall makeup of post-Cold War Europe.  President George H. W. Bush proposed trying to create a “Europe whole and free” and at peace. On that basis, both he and President Bill Clinton worked to square several circles regarding the future of European security, primarily through NATO and the European Union.

Three Key Factors in Post-Cold War European Security

Three factors were key: first, taking Central European countries off the geopolitical chess board. This was done through NATO’s Partnership for Peace and, for some countries, NATO membership. The EU responded in kind. Second was trying to engage Russia in European structures, in order to try avoiding what happened with Germany following the First World War when the Treaty of Versailles required that Germany take full responsibility for causing that war. The Nazis used this clause as part of their propaganda that Germany had been victimized. To try avoiding a similar situation with Russia, NATO worked to bring Russia into Partnership for Peace (1994) and signed a far-reaching NATO-Russia Founding Act in May of 1997, before NATO took its first decisions on enlarging its membership. The Founding Act included major principles regarding security, set out 19 specific areas for NATO-Russia Cooperation, and created a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (in 2002 turned into a NATO-Russia Council).

The Ukrainian Dimension

The final element of this effort was to find a place for Ukraine. It couldn’t be consigned to a Russian sphere of influence. But while NATO stated  that all countries in Europe should be able to choose their future orientations, Ukraine’s membership in NATO was quietly but effectively ruled out. NATO did argue that this would not make Ukraine a “buffer state,” but that was as much pretense as reality. Thus, NATO and Ukraine concluded a Charter and created a NATO-Ukraine Council (As US Ambassador to NATO, on behalf of the Alliance, I negotiated the final draft of the  Charter with  a senior member of the Ukrainian foreign service). It was recognized that Ukraine becoming part of the Russian “near abroad “ would be unacceptable to Western Europe, but also, bringing Ukraine formally into Western security and economic institutions—i.e. NATO and the European Communities—could have a similar impact in Moscow. It was a delicate balance.

Further, Ukraine is a complex country, with profound differences between a Western as opposed to an Eastern orientation, different languages predominating (one Ukrainian president spoke only Russian and had to learn Ukrainian after he was elected!), and different histories. Thus, the Crimean Oblast of the Soviet Union had been part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian, transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a “birthday present.” At that time, this made no difference, but it certainly did when the Soviet Union broke up.

Ukrainian public opinion was not all of one mind after the Soviet Union dissolved (and it still isn’t) about the country’s orientation. Indeed, the government in Kiev has been on-again, off-again about seeking membership in NATO, a fact that is now ignored in the U.S. impeachment hearings. This observation in no way justifies Vladimir Putin’s seizure of  Crimea in 2014, nor continuing Russia-backed aggression in other parts of Ukraine (primarily Eastern-leaning). These actions were in direct violation of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. But it didn’t happen out of the clear blue sky.

US-Russian Relations Off the Rails

By the late 1990s, both the West and Russia  lost sight of the elder  Bush’s grand strategy of a Europe whole and free, which would benefit everyone. In practical terms, building on that idea meant  that the West and Russia should work to try developing a viable West-Russian relationship and, at the same time, help stabilize Ukraine through  making major progress both politically and economically, without violating either Western or Russian red lines. (For the West, that included respecting Ukrainian democratic aspirations.)

Maybe Vladimir Putin’s accession to power meant that these efforts were doomed to fail, and he certainly spoke a revanchist language. But the West, notably the United States, also dropped the ball. Late in the Clinton administration, it began a process of wholesale enlargement of NATO, beyond the inclusion of three countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. Russia sat still for the inclusion of these three (but not more) because they surrounded Germany with NATO. That step served as reinsurance especially for Russia but also for France and some Central European states regarding the Federal Republic’s future—however much a repeat of past German ambitions can be ruled out. Indeed, this project was initiated by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

In 1995, Russia did support NATO’s effort to stop the Bosnia war and joined the subsequent Implementation Force. However, it opposed NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in1998, in part because it was not authorized by a United Nations Security Council Resolution. Then in 2002, President George W. Bush’s administration cancelled the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It was no longer needed, but it was one of Russia’s few engagements with the United States that allowed it to pretend it was still a great power. U.S. deployment of anti-ballistic missile forces in Central Europe (directed not against Russia but North Korea and Iran) followed suit, with the same Russian sense of being ignored in an area of interest.

In 2008, at the NATO Bucharest summit, the Bush administration pressed to have Ukraine and Georgia given what were called Membership Action Plans, one step toward eventual formal membership. Almost nobody in NATO-Europe backed even this modest step. They were not prepared to defend either country if it were attacked.  Thus ruled out was granting either one  the NATO Treaty’s Article 5, which declares “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” But to placate  the U.S. president, the allies quickly cobbled together a form of words that sounded promising but was in fact designed to put the decision on membership off into the indefinite future, saying: “We agreed today that these countries [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO.” In their haste, they did not realize that this was the moment of commitment. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili read it literally and provided an excuse for Russia to invade two Georgian separatist regions. Putin also added this NATO declaration to his assertion, for domestic consumption, that NATO was planning to “encircle” Russia. Further, as Fiona Hill last week told the impeachment hearing, she learned from a senior Georgian official “that Putin had said directly to Saakashvili, ‘Your Western allies, your Western partners, promised a great deal. They didn’t deliver. I threatened, I delivered.’”

End to Tacit Agreement on Ukraine 

In November 2013, Russia began the process of breaking the “tacit agreement” on Ukraine when the pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, refused to ratify an association agreement with the EU. Protests led him to flee the country for Russia, and opposition grew in what became known as “the EuroMaiden,” a reference to Kiev’s central square, the focal point of the protests. Russian seizure of Crimea followed in February 2014. This was after the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs was caught on an open telephone line talking with the U.S. ambassador in Kiev about who the U.S. would like to see emerge as Ukrainian president —tugging Ukraine to the West as Russia had been trying to tug it to the East. Russia, which no doubt leaked the phone conversation, used that U.S. “interference” (paralleling Russia’s!) as an excuse for seizing Crimea.

The chance to build something positive for European security in which Russia would somehow be included and Ukraine would not be pulled one way or the other therefore died. But the major problem remains of what to do about both Russia and Ukraine.  Regrettably, the necessary strategic and diplomatic efforts were put in the deep freeze, where they remain.

Russia in U.S. Domestic Politics

Following what for so many American pundits was the surprising election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, many Democrats could not accept that a large part of the reason for Hillary Clinton’s loss derived from a poorly run campaign, as well as reaction against the bicoastal elites, a problem that had been growing for many years in significant parts of America (Clinton didn’t help herself by saying during the campaign that “half of Trump’s supporters are in what I call a basket of deplorables”).

The charge by many Clinton supporters was that Russian interference in the U.S. election was a prominent, perhaps decisive, factor in Trump’s election. It thus became a major issue in U.S. domestic politics, overshadowing other causes for Clinton’s defeat. Then, the Russia factor became central as the best means for getting rid of Trump through impeachment—calls for which began even before he was inaugurated. It has proved to be a useful cudgel.

Whatever the truth regarding the extent and impact of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, once in the White House Trump did try to change the dynamics of U.S.-Russia relations. Whether he did that because of some personal affinity for Vladimir Putin as opposed to valid foreign policy reasons , the result in U.S. domestic politics is there can now be no progress in trying to figure out a way of dealing with Russia that does not just mean Cold War II, from which no one can benefit.

One critical difference today from the Cold War is that now there are areas in which the U.S. and Russia do work together despite hostile Russian actions in Europe and Western sanctions. These include the International Space Station, the Arctic, anti-terrorism cooperation, aspects of the Afghanistan conundrum, and “deconfliction” of U.S. and Russian air combat sorties in Syria.

However, there is common agreement in U.S. foreign policy circles and among almost all NATO allies that Russian aggression in Ukraine and other threats to Western interests in Europe, including cyber, energy, and hybrid warfare, must be countered, and that military deterrent steps by NATO in Central Europe are critical parts of the Western response. But that is only one element; the other needs to be a renewed search for some way to move beyond confrontation, in recognition that Russia will inevitably return to the ranks of major powers (but not as a superpower), as George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton understood.

Popular perceptions of the “Trump connection” to Russia have gone so far as producing almost total unwillingness in the U.S. even to consider steps to try moving beyond confrontation. Indeed, that has included dismissing some useful proposals Putin made at the July 2018 Helsinki summit with Trump. Several had merit, including on arms control, that would serve both countries’ national interest. But the media and “all anti-Trump, all the time” commentators seized on what they perceived as Trump taking Putin’s word over that of the U.S. Intelligence Community regarding Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. While Trump should have spoken with greater deftness, his words need to be parsed precisely: “I have great confidence in my intelligence people, but I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial today.” In the U.S. domestic political climate at the time, the fact that he did not actually take Putin’s line over the judgment of the U.S. Intelligence Community was lost, along with all possibilities of trying to find means of beginning to mitigate problems of U.S.-Russian relations.

Ukraine Replaces Russia in US Impeachment Debate

With the continuing Democratic search for grounds to impeach Trump, a new and potentially damning incident emerged, involving Ukraine. It was, of course, not that this incident (“quid pro quo”) led to the impeachment process, but rather that Democrats already wanted to impeach Trump and found a serious issue on which to hang their efforts.

The U.S. foreign policy problem is that consideration of the complexities of U.S. interests and actions regarding Ukraine and its part in any efforts to create a viable system of security across the European continent has virtually stopped. U.S. domestic politics has become the sole focus for thinking about Ukraine, as well as about Russia.

For many years, one major Ukraine-related debate within the U.S. and West European foreign policy communities has been about the nature of Ukrainian society—as noted above, is it really one country, other than in formal terms? This is in addition to  NATO’s need to show the Russians “thus far and no farther,” without bringing Ukraine fully into Western institutions—thereby following Moscow in upsetting the delicate balance struck in the 1990s about Ukraine’s place in European security. This formula does not mean denying Ukraine’s access, as a society, to the “democratic West,” along with promoting its  economic and political development (including the fight against corruption.)

The debate in the U.S. government and with NATO allies has for several years included whether to provide lethal arms to Ukraine.  This is not a simple matter.  It includes making difficult distinctions about different classes of arms.  Thus, is  an anti-tank missile a defensive or offensive weapon or both?) U.S. policy for many years, including under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, has been to provide enough weapons to Ukraine to help it defend itself, but not so much support (including types of lethal arms) that it could be tempted to enlarge the war. (That may be an unfair judgement for an outside power to make about another country’s definition of its security requirements, but three U.S. administrations have made it.)

US Foreign Policy Suffers

In sum, the future of U.S. democracy and the U.S. presidency (especially the future of Donald Trump) are the most critical matters for U.S. debate and decision. But in terms of American foreign policy, the most important issues tied to the impeachment process are U.S. relations with and critical decisions regarding Russia and Ukraine.  Both are now treated more like symbols than substance, where the words “Russia” (or “Putin”) and “Ukraine” have become metaphors in U.S. domestic policy, while serious concerns about U.S. national interests are virtually ignored.

In regard to both countries,  much needs to be done to secure America’s interests, and it is losing critical opportunities, in major part because of Russia and Ukraine being so deeply enmeshed in the impeachment debate, to the exclusion of foreign policy analysis and strategic planning. There are people in the U.S. government and outside able to put U.S. security interests regarding Russia and Ukraine back on track. But as things stand now, that is unlikely to happen so long as the impeachment and possible trial process remains unresolved and, indeed, until the American electorate decides next November who will be president. Two critical areas of U.S. foreign policy are thus pawns to domestic matters, as important as the latter clearly are.

The death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October, during a raid by US special forces in Syria’s Idlib province, would have been an opportune time for US media to reflect on the 18-year-long “War on Terror,” and US policy more broadly in the Middle East. But the circumscribed coverage of al-Baghdadi’s death represented yet another artful evasion of any critical discussion of imperial foreign policy.

Time (10/27/19) declared that “al-Baghdadi’s death is a crucial symbolic victory in the battle against the embattled terrorist group” and “a victory for the Trump administration.” The Associated Press’ report, “The Tip, the Raid, the Reveal: The Takedown of al-Baghdadi” (10/28/19), read like a Hollywood action movie treatment of the assassination raid, excitedly describing how “the night unfolded with methodical precision and unexpected turns,” presenting the “daring raid” as the “culmination of years of steady intelligence-gathering work.”

The New York Times (10/27/19) reveled alongside Trump in the “daring American commando raid” that claimed “a significant victory” in the “War on Terror,” and wrote how al-Baghdadi’s death could be “a signal moment in the generation-long war against terrorists as well as in Mr. Trump’s presidency,” because it “culminated” in the elimination of a “ruthless enemy.” To the extent the Times was critical of the operation, it echoed Democratic criticisms that Trump didn’t keep congressional leadership informed, questioned the veracity of Trump’s account of the raid before his death, or scolded him for not maintaining proper presidential etiquette by using “boastful and provocative language unlike the more solemn tone typically adopted by presidents in such moments.”

On the same day, the Times’s 3,000-word obituary (10/27/19) of al-Baghdadi described details of his life—including his brutal crimes, the significance of his claim to be restoring a theocratic “caliphate” through ISIS, and how his movement differed from Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda—all without explaining the US’s role in creating ISIS, or mentioning US assistance to its Al Qaeda rivals (FAIR.org, 3/21/16, 1/4/17). Nor did the obituary explore why people in the Middle East, like the “tens of thousands of followers” ISIS “electrified,” would seek to “take up arms” against US presence in the Middle East, which would mean examining US Mideast policy and the US’s own war crimes (FAIR.org, 9/11/19).

The Washington Post’s original headline for its obituary, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Austere Religious Scholar at Helm of Islamic State, dies at 48” (10/27/19), was widely derided because it could have been used to describe an academic who died in his sleep, as opposed to a violent guerrilla leader killing himself and his three children while being pursued by US commandos.

Like the Times, the Post downplayed the role US Mideast policy plays in inspiring animosity against the US; it said the US invasion of Iraq offered the things ISIS “needed most: a new cause and a fresh and nearly boundless source of recruits and arms,” but did not explain why US intervention—generally portrayed in the Post as benevolent and altruistic—would prompt such a response. It attributed ISIS’s success in seizing and holding “territory that would form the basis of a declared Islamic caliphate” to al-Baghdadi’s “canny pragmatism as a leader,” allowing him to “meld…a fractious mix of radical Islamist militants and former Iraqi Baathists.”

Why do radical Islamist militants want to attack the US, instead of countries like Costa Rica and Switzerland? Why would former Baathists, who weren’t sympathetic to any form of Islamism—despite popular narratives seeking to exonerate the US’s role in the rise of ISIS, based on Saddam Hussein’s 1993 Faith Campaign—want to join fanatics like ISIS? Could the Bush administration’s decision to disband the Iraqi army and render more than 500,000 well-armed and well-trained troops unemployed overnight be a reason why many former Baathist military leaders have leading roles in ISIS (Time, 5/29/15; Intercept, 1/29/18)? The Post gave no answers to these kinds of critical questions.

The Wall Street Journal’s report on the raid (10/27/19) also triumphantly described al-Baghdadi’s death, describing it as “fulfilling a long-held US goal and marking the most significant setback for the militant group since losing the last of its territorial caliphate earlier this year.” The Journal’s accompanying obituary (10/27/19) also downplayed the US role in creating ISIS—omitting, for example, the US decision to dissolve the Iraqi military. It also obfuscated US support for Al Qaeda fighters opposed to the Syrian government (misleadingly referred to as “moderates” or “rebels” throughout corporate media), when it discussed how al-Baghdadi helped “establish an Al Qaeda affiliate called Nusra Front in 2012,” and later managed to lure “most of Nusra’s foreign fighters to Islamic State,” without mentioning this important fact.

Fox News (10/27/19) exemplified the vapidity of hyperpartisan journalism by immediately emphasizing the political benefits the death of al-Baghdadi would offer the Trump administration as the impeachment process began. Instead of giving facts about the mission, or raising questions about the continued War on Terror and how the US contributed to al-Baghdadi and ISIS’s rise, Fox tried to play “Gotcha!” by contrasting Washington Post coverage of Osama bin Laden and al-Baghdadi’s deaths, as well as citing how House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other Democrats lavished praise on Barack Obama after his assassination of bin Laden, “while pointedly avoiding complimenting the president in any way.” Is the degree of adulation accorded presidents for killing foreign leaders really the most important issue to be addressed?

Matt Taibbi (Rolling Stone, 10/28/19) articulated the problem with our broken media’s tunnel-vision emphasis on the political benefits for the two major parties, at the expense of all other considerations:

This ought to have been a moment to reflect on what’s happened in the last 20 years, and if our policies across multiple administrations have been the right ones. Would we even be launching operations against such a person if we hadn’t invaded Iraq all those years ago? What’s the endgame? What do the people of the region think?

It’s telling that one of the few questions corporate media raised about the raid was to criticize the Trump administration’s subsequent, largely imaginary “pullout” from Syria, further reinforcing the notion that the US has the right—and even obligation—to illegally invade and occupy Middle Eastern nations (FAIR.org, 10/18/19). Despite reporting on al-Baghdadi’s time in US captivity in Camp Bucca, corporate media obituaries omit that eight out of the ten months al-Baghdadi spent in US captivity were at the notorious Abu Ghraib prison (Intercept, 8/25/16). Both US prisons were notorious for being sites of brutal torture, as well as for being “jihadi universities” that ISIS members actively infiltrated to recruit and train new members; al-Baghdadi connected there with the jihadists and former Iraqi military officials who would later make up ISIS’s leadership. Yet these pertinent details of al-Baghdadi’s biography weren’t used to question the US’s continued presence in the Middle East.

Despite lies from US Iraq War architects claiming to be “surprised” by the lengthy violent insurgency erupting from Iraq after the illegal invasion, prewar assessments by the CIA and the National Intelligence Committee warned the Bush administration that the invasion would result in a deeply divided Iraqi society prone to violent conflict, with increased sympathy for terrorist objectives (New York Times, 9/28/04, 10/13/05). The destabilization and power vacuum following the invasion is what allowed ISIS to rise, making ISIS an indirect US creation, and a fulfillment of Osama bin Laden’s objectives behind the 9/11 attacks (Extra!, 7/11; CounterPunch, 9/19/14; Guardian, 7/6/16).

A 2004 Defense Science Board Task Force report concluded that “Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather, they hate our policies.” Indeed, US officials have known for more than half a century that US Mideast policies engender hatred against the US, and consciously pursued them anyway. In 1958, Dwight Eisenhower noted to his staff that there “is a campaign of hatred against us, not by the governments, but by the people,” with his National Security Council later noting that “the majority of Arabs” (labeled “Arab nationalists”) believe that the US is “seeking to protect its interest in Near East oil by supporting the status quo and opposing political or economic progress.” The NSC paper explicitly noted that the US can’t afford to “accommodate” the demands of “Arab nationalists,” because of the “disparities between our interests.” The paper foresaw the “probable necessity of continued deployment of troops in the Near East, with the likelihood of increasingly serious incidents and the resultant risks of war.”

Just as the US cultivated Osama bin Laden and the mujahideen fighters in the 1980s to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, a 2012 Pentagon report predicted and even welcomed the possibility of a “Salafist principality” (Salafism being ISIS’s official ideology), because it hoped an organization like ISIS would lead a violent insurgency to weaken the Syrian government (Salon, 11/18/15; Guardian, 6/3/15).

Corporate media can’t bring themselves to mention this information in their coverage of al-Baghdadi’s death, or of the endless wars in the Middle East. Informing their audiences of the possibility that US officials are consciously endangering Americans by cultivating and sponsoring terrorist groups, or that aspects of US foreign policy can qualify as terrorism, would endanger US imperialism, the military/industrial/media complex and the entire basis for this so-called “War on Terror” (Extra!, 8/05; FAIR.org, 3/13/19).