Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, representing the Otzma Yehudit party, and Environmental Protection Minister Idit Silman from Likud advanced a plan to use crocodiles to guard a prison facility where Hamas’s Nukhba unit terrorists might be held.

According to Hadashot 13, Silman classified the Nile crocodile as a “cultivated wild animal” — חיית בר מטופחת. This decision should allow the security structure to keep such animals at a controlled facility and effectively opens the possibility of placing them in the Ketziot prison complex in the Negev.

Journalists called the event a “crocodile takeover”, as the Israel Nature and Parks Authority opposed the initial project. After this, Silman used her ministry’s powers and changed the legal status of the animals.

However, the crocodiles have not yet been delivered to Ketziot, the moat around the prison has not been dug, and the final security project has not been approved.

How Ben-Gvir’s idea turned into a state project

The proposal first became known on December 20, 2025.

Ben-Gvir presented it during an operational meeting with the Commissioner of the Israel Prison Service — IPS — Lieutenant General Kobi Yaakobi. The minister proposed building a special facility for terrorists, surrounded by an area with crocodiles, which were to become an additional obstacle to escape.

Some high-ranking IPS officers met the proposal with ridicule. However, the prison service leadership was instructed to check its technical, financial, and legal feasibility. Initially, the construction of a new facility near Hamat Gader — a tourist complex south of the Kinneret, where Israel’s largest crocodile farm has been operating for over 40 years — was considered.

January 1, 2026 a group of IPS officers arrived at Hamat Gader.

Prison Service employees studied the behavior of crocodiles, feeding methods, maintenance rules, necessary pool depth and width, fence height, risks to personnel, and possible project costs.

This was not a sightseeing visit. IPS representatives recorded technical requirements and gathered information to prepare a professional opinion.

According to a later publication by Hadashot 13, the concept changed: instead of building a separate facility near Hamat Gader, the transportation of crocodiles to the existing Ketziot complex, which is officially called Lavi Prison today, is now being considered.

Ketziot is located in the northwestern part of the Negev, near the border with Egypt. The complex occupies about 400,000 square meters and is mainly used for holding prisoners associated with terrorist activities. After the war began, detained militants, including members of the Nukhba special unit, were also brought there.

Why Ben-Gvir needed crocodiles

Supporters of the project cite two main arguments.

The first is to prevent escapes.

Ben-Gvir believes that the presence of dangerous predators near the outer perimeter of the prison will be not only a physical but also a psychological barrier. According to him, the very possibility of ending up in a zone with crocodiles should reduce the motivation of prisoners to plan an escape.

The second argument is the supposed savings.

The Ministry of National Security believes that creating a natural barrier could reduce costs for security, personnel, and technical surveillance means. Project representatives claimed that purchasing animals would be cheaper than building and maintaining additional protective structures for many years.

However, an open economic calculation comparing the cost of the crocodile perimeter with conventional security systems has not yet been published.

It was planned to purchase about 60 crocodiles.

A young animal was estimated at approximately 8,000 dollars, an adult up to 20,000 dollars. The ministry considered purchasing young but already potentially dangerous crocodiles, which would continue to grow directly on the complex’s territory.

If 60 young crocodiles are purchased at the minimum stated price, the purchase of animals alone could cost about 480,000 dollars. This amount does not include the construction of pools, fences, water purification systems, pumps, electricity, feeding, veterinary care, and specialist salaries.

NANews — Israel News notes: statements about savings are still based on preliminary estimates by project supporters, not on a published state budget.

A crocodile is not an alarm system

Hamat Gader’s CEO Yossi Musengad warned that keeping crocodiles is significantly more complicated than it might seem.

According to him, a crocodile is not an animal that can simply be released into a water-filled moat. It requires pools of a certain width, depth, and water level, special fences, regular feeding, and temperature control.

The activity of the animals depends on the time of year. In winter, crocodiles become less mobile, which may reduce their effectiveness as a supposed deterrent.

Keeping 60 animals, according to Hamat Gader’s management, will require several thousand shekels a week just for current expenses. Additionally, a professional caretaker, security, pumps, water treatment, and constant power supply will be needed.

“Keeping a crocodile in captivity is not easy. It’s not a poodle,” Musengad explained.

He also emphasized that it is impossible to accurately predict a predator’s reaction to a human. Behavior depends on temperature, season, the animal’s condition, the time of the last feeding, and whether the crocodile perceives a person as an intrusion into its territory.

Additional questions arise, for which there are currently no public answers:

• what will happen in the event of a rocket attack and damage to the fence;
• how to evacuate animals in case of fire;
• who will be responsible for the safety of prison staff;
• how to repair pools and clean water;
• what to do with crocodiles in case of power or pump failure;
• can the animals survive the climatic conditions of the Negev desert;
• how to prevent their escape beyond the prison complex.

What exactly did Idit Silman change

Before Silman’s intervention, crocodiles were considered protected wild animals. Their maintenance, transfer, and transportation required special permits.

The Israeli Wildlife Protection Law provides for a separate category of “cultivated wild animals”. It can include species that are bred in captivity and officially recognized as such by the minister.

In the past, crocodiles and ostriches were already included in this category in Israel. This status allowed them to be bred for economic purposes. Later, during Gilad Erdan’s tenure as Minister of Environmental Protection, crocodiles and ostriches were removed from the list, leaving the category effectively empty.

Now Silman has re-included the Nile crocodile in this legal framework, providing for the possibility of its maintenance by a security organization.

Therefore, the claim that the Knesset passed a special “crocodile law” would be inaccurate. According to published data, it is an administrative decision by the minister within the existing law, not a new law passed through three readings in parliament.

At the same time, changing the animal’s status does not cancel the requirements of the Animal Protection Law. The state is still obliged to ensure conditions that meet the biological and behavioral needs of crocodiles.

Israel’s answer to “Alligator Alcatraz”

Ben-Gvir did not hide that he was inspired by the American project Alligator Alcatraz.

This migration center was opened in Florida in July 2025 on the site of a former airfield in the swampy Everglades area. Supporters of the facility emphasized that the surrounding swamps, alligators, and pythons create a natural barrier to escapes.

But the American model was fundamentally different from the Israeli idea.

In Florida, animals were not specifically purchased and placed in a moat around each wall. The center was simply located in a region where alligators and other dangerous animals naturally inhabit.

The project was accompanied by environmental and human rights lawsuits. Opponents claimed that the facility was built without the necessary environmental review and threatened the sensitive Everglades ecosystem.

Notably, on June 25, 2026, less than a month before Silman’s new decision, Florida authorities announced the closure of “Alligator Alcatraz.” The inmates were transferred to other facilities. Officially, the authorities stated that the temporary facility had fulfilled its purpose, and its continued use became unsafe with the start of hurricane season.

It turns out that Israel continues to study a model that American authorities have already abandoned after a year of legal, environmental, and organizational disputes.

What has been decided, and what still exists only on paper

As of July 16, 2026, several real steps can be discussed.

Ben-Gvir officially instructed the IPS to check the feasibility of the project.

Prison Service officers visited Hamat Gader and studied the conditions for keeping crocodiles.

Preliminary cost estimates for purchasing about 60 animals were obtained.

Idit Silman changed the legal classification of Nile crocodiles, removing one of the obstacles to their transfer to a security structure.

The Ketziot prison complex is now named as a possible project implementation site.

But not yet published:

• the final engineering scheme;
• the approved state budget;
• permission to build pools;
• a contract for the purchase of animals;
• a veterinary plan;
• an environmental assessment;
• an independent safety assessment;
• the start dates of the pilot project;
• a decision on which part of Ketziot should be surrounded by crocodiles.

It is not even clear whether it is about the entire outer perimeter, a separate sector for the most dangerous prisoners, or a small demonstration area.

NANews — Israel News emphasizes: calling the project an already functioning “prison with crocodiles” is premature. However, it is no longer a random phrase by Ben-Gvir. The idea has gone from a proposal that caused laughter among officers to a service check, a visit by IPS specialists, and a change in the legal status of animals.

Now the main question is not whether Israeli security structures will be allowed to keep crocodiles, but whether the state will decide to turn an unusual political initiative into a real, costly, and potentially dangerous element of prison infrastructure.

Where can you find a qualified specialist in Haifa or Tel Aviv? What should you pay attention to during the first meeting? How can you tell if a lawyer is truly working for results? Below is a clear guide and practical action plan from the office of attorney and notary Ariel Katsman.

Why a Russian-speaking lawyer means real results

Legal wording is subtle: one word in a contract can change the outcome of a dispute. When a specialist explains the nuances in Russian and also shows how it reads in Hebrew, you make informed decisions and avoid paying for someone else’s mistakes. For those looking for a Russian-speaking lawyer in Haifa or planning a consultation in the center of the country, this is critical.

How to choose a good lawyer: client checklist

• — Ask about experience and practical cases: how many years in practice, and how similar cases were resolved.
• — Clarify education and qualifications: which university, additional licenses, special permits.
• — Check specialization: does it match your needs — family law, real estate, status, criminal/traffic cases, etc.
• — Discuss communication: how often you’ll get reports, who will be in touch, how decisions are made step-by-step.
• — Review “practical” details: is the location convenient, are there offices in Haifa and Tel Aviv, how quickly do they respond.

Experience and licenses: why Ariel Katsman’s office

Ariel Roman Katsman — member of the Israel Bar Association since 31.05.1999 (Attorney License No. 25942), notary (License No. 218510). Holds a special license to represent in military courts and an Israel Bar permit to train interns. Over 20 years of practice: from civil and family disputes to criminal, traffic, immigration cases, and real estate transactions.

Office locations: Haifa and Tel Aviv

— Haifa: 43 Ha’atzmaut St. (5th floor).
— Tel Aviv: 32 Ben Yehuda St. (7th floor, Office 725).
— Appointment phone: 077-869-9526.
— Website: www.katsmanlaw.co.il

Key practice areas

Family law (family attorney)

Marriage and divorce, alimony, property division, child visitation, travel abroad. In Israel, civil and religious courts operate in parallel; it’s important to choose the right jurisdiction, collect evidence, and prepare agreements so that the court understands exactly “what we ask” and “why it’s fair.”

Real estate and transactions

Buying/selling/renting involves registry checks, mortgages and easements, spousal and bank consents, accurate calculations, and deadlines for property transfer. We assess risks in advance, set protective clauses, oversee payments, and register rights so that the client’s interests are protected on paper, not just “in words.”

Repatriation, citizenship, STUPRO, residence status

Status issues are about checklists and evidence: family ties, dates, certificates. A “STUPRO lawyer” helps navigate narrow procedures without delays or refusals: which documents are critical, common mistakes, filing order, and how to respond to official requests.

Criminal and traffic law

From initial statements and motions — to plea negotiations and courtroom defense. In traffic matters — working with fines, license revocation, accidents, compensation, insurance companies, and medical records.

Corporate and civil law

Company registration, contracts, claims work, dispute resolution. In civil matters — debt collection, debtor protection, negotiations, and litigation support.

Inheritance and wills

Bilingual wills, application filing, assisting heirs with deadlines and procedures. Conflicts often arise from small mistakes: wrong signature, missing notifications, incorrect dates. Careful document preparation saves months.

How the process works: clear steps

1. Initial review: brief description of the situation, documents, goal.
2. Plan: where to file, what evidence is needed, order and deadlines.
3. Implementation: prepare documents, submit, track status, report each step.
4. Communication: explain decisions in plain language, avoid “legalese,” keep a responsible lawyer in contact.
5. Finalization: confirm results, provide the client with all documents and future instructions.

When you should have called “yesterday”

Received a summons, a draft settlement agreement, or a contract draft? Don’t delay. Fixing someone else’s mistakes is almost always more expensive than prevention. One poorly worded clause in a contract can “fire back” six months later in court — our job is to catch it early.

Frequently asked questions

Can it be resolved without court?
Often — yes. Negotiations, mediated settlements, and well-drafted letters resolve half of conflicts. The key is a legally correct form so that the “peace” doesn’t fall apart in a month.

How long will the case take?
It depends on the court, workload, and the other party’s willingness to negotiate. We outline stages and realistic timelines upfront, without “tomorrow” promises.

Do you work with Russian-language documents?
Yes. We translate meaning, not just words, clarifying disputed points in both Russian and Hebrew to prevent misinterpretation.

Who is this page for and what searches does it answer
If you searched for “lawyer in Israel” or “Haifa lawyer,” need a “family attorney” or a specialized “STUPRO lawyer,” or want a “Russian-speaking lawyer in Tel Aviv” — this is for you. We handle real-life legal needs: property division, alimony, status and repatriation, real estate deals, inheritance, accidents, debts, and corporate matters.

What to do right now
Write briefly: what happened, what documents you have, and what result you need. We’ll offer the nearest available slot for an in-person meeting in Haifa or Tel Aviv, or schedule a video call. Then — we’ll check, advise, prepare, and see your case through to a clear resolution.

Contacts and consultation booking
— Haifa: 43 Ha’atzmaut St. (5th floor).
— Tel Aviv: 32 Ben Yehuda St. (7th floor, Office 725).
— Tel.: 077-869-9526.
— Website: www.katsmanlaw.co.il

The Publishing House of “Dukh i Litera” is one of the oldest Ukrainian publishers of humanitarian literature, founded in 1992 at the Kyiv Mogilyan Academy. It specializes in the release of books on philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, theology and, above all, on Judaic.

For a Jewish audience in Israel, this publishing house is of particular interest, since it unites the traditions of the two peoples and helps to strengthen interethnic ties.

History and Mission of the Publishing House

The publishing house was created in 1992 on the basis of several research centers of the Kyiv Mogilyan Academy. His mission is to make high -quality humanitarian literature accessible to a wide range of readers, to preserve and convey the spiritual and cultural heritage, as well as stimulate a dialogue between Ukrainian and Israeli cultures.

Buying books is available on the publishing house – https://duh-i-litera.com/

The main achievements of the publishing house:

• Over more than 25 years of work, over 1000 items have been released.
• The most complete series of books on Judaic in Ukraine has been formed.
• Active cooperation with the center of Judaic of the Kyiv Mogilyansk Academy has been established.

As the director of the publishing house noted, Konstantin Sigov:

“We are sure that high-quality non-fiction should be available to everyone, and books are able to open new worlds and unite peoples.”

The main areas of activity

The Publishing House “Dukh i Litera” covers a wide range of humanitarian topics:

• Philosophy and theology:The release of classical works of European thought and Christian theology, contributing to spiritual enlightenment.
• History and culture:The publication of books on the history of the Jewish people, the study of the Holocaust and the analysis of Ukrainian-Jewish relations.
• Judaika:A special series of scientific and artistic works on the study of Jewish culture, religion, traditions and art.

A selection of books on the Judaic of the Publishing House “Dukh i Litera” in Ukrainian – https://duh-i-litera.com/bookstore/mfp/3f-kategoriya.judaka

What is Judaic?
Judaic is an interdisciplinary area of ​​research, covering history, religious studies, philosophy, literature and art of the Jewish people. It helps to understand the spiritual heritage, traditions, rites and intellectual achievements that have formed the identity of the Jewish community for centuries.

• Fiction:The publication of collections of prose and poetry, reflecting both classical and modern views on life, culture and national identity.

Particular attention is paid to Judaic books, since they are a unique contribution to the study and preservation of Jewish cultural heritage in Ukraine.

Significant projects and publications

The publishing house implements a number of key projects in cooperation with the center of Judaic of the Kyiv Mogilyansk Academy. Among the iconic publications can be distinguished:

• “Tegilim – Psalms” (Tom 1 and 2):Detailed comments on psalms that combine traditional interpretations with modern research.
• “Jewish addresses of Ukraine”:Guide to historical places related to Jewish culture in Ukraine.
• “Black Book”:A collection of materials dedicated to the Holocaust and the history of the Jewish people.
• “Culture by the Yiddish language”:The study of the traditions of Jewish culture through the prism of Yiddish.
• “Prayer for power”:Historical work on revolutionary processes in the relations of Ukrainians and Jews.
• “Jewish civilization. Oxford Judaic Textbook “:A fundamental textbook revealing the basics of Judaic.

Impact on intercultural dialogue

The Publishing House “Dukh i Litera” plays a key role in the development of interethnic dialogue. It not only issues books, but also organizes lectures, presentations and discussions, contributing to the meetings of scientists and readers. Such interaction is especially important for the Jewish audience in Israel, since it helps to deepen the understanding of the cultural heritage of Ukraine and helps to strengthen ties between peoples.

In analytical materials NAnews – Israeli News Repeatedly emphasized that cooperation in the field of humanities is a powerful tool for creating cultural bridges between Ukraine and Israel.

Founders

Konstantin Sigov

Co -founder, director

The philosopher and public figure, director of the Center for European Humanitarian Studies of the National University of the Kiev-Mogilyansk Academy, organizer of the annual international conference “Assumption Readings” and the Kyiv summer theological institute. It has rich experience in leading universities in the world (Sorbonne, Oxford, Stanford, Geneva, Luven, etc.). The author of the course “European culture: conflict of interpretations” in the science. Cavalier of the Order of Academic Palm (France).

Leonid Finberg

Co -founder, editor -in -chief

Sociologist, editor -in -chief of Spirit and Literal, Director of the Center for Research on History and Culture of Eastern European Hebrew Science. He edited a number of books of the publishing house, including “Jewish civilization. Oxford textbook on Judaic ”(in 2 volumes),“ Jews and Slavs ”,“ Maidan. Certificates ”(in 2 volumes) and others. The author of the book “On different and a little about yourself.” The editor-in-chief of the Almanac “Egupets”, a member of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Department of the International Pen-Club, the host of the UKRLIFETV program-“Spirit and Litecture: Dialogs about culture”.

Basic challenges and recommendations

Despite successes, the following tasks are faced with the publishing house:

• Financing and modernization:It is necessary to attract investments to update publishing infrastructure and implement modern technologies.
• Expansion of the audience:Active promotion of books and cultural projects both in Ukraine and abroad.
• Preservation of cultural heritage:Adaptation of classic texts for a modern reader without loss of original meaning.

We recommend to readers:

• Familiarize yourself with key publications (for example, “Tegilim – Psalms”, “Jewish addresses of Ukraine”).
• Participate in cultural events, lectures and presentations organized by the publishing house.
• Support projects, contributing to the strengthening of the interethnic dialogue between Ukraine and Israel.

International cooperation and prospects

The prospects of the publishing house are closely related to international cooperation. The expansion of partnerships with leading universities and cultural centers will not only increase the circulation of publications, but also provide access to high -quality humanitarian literature for a wide audience. This is especially true for Israel, where interest in research in Judaic is constantly growing.

Strategic tasks include:

• Innovative development of publishing Using modern digital technologies.
• Active involvement of investments for modernization of production.
• Strengthening cultural ties Through the organization of joint international projects.

Conclusion

The Publishing House “Dukh i Litera” is a unique cultural project uniting the Ukrainian and Israeli traditions through the prism of literature on Judaic. For more than 25 years, it has been a bridge between peoples, helps to maintain historical memory and develop a dialogue between cultures. High -quality literature is able not only to enlighten, but also to unite peoples, contributing to mutual understanding and cultural exchange.

We, the team NAnews sincerely recommend that you familiarize yourself with the work of the Publishing House “Spirit and Litera”. Support for such initiatives plays a decisive role in strengthening cultural ties between Ukraine and Israel, expanding the horizons of knowledge for all interested.

A selection of books on the Judaic of the Publishing House “Dukh i Litera” in Ukrainian – https://duh-i-litera.com/bookstore/mfp/3f-kategoriya.judaka

The “Maccabi-Ukraine” team included 50 athletes from 11 Ukrainian cities. They participated in competitions in 13 sports and won awards in fencing, badminton, table tennis, volleyball, karate, judo, beach volleyball, and Greco-Roman wrestling.

The official page “Israel in Ukraine” reported 12 Ukrainian medals: three gold, four silver, and five bronze. However, the disciplines listed in the same publication, as well as separate reports from the Maccabi World Union, indicate a different result.

A detailed count shows that the Ukrainian team could have won 13 medal positions: three gold, three silver, and seven bronze.

The Maccabiah returned to Israel after being postponed

The XXII Maccabiah World Games were held in Israel from June 30 to July 14, 2026.

The opening ceremony took place on July 1 at the Teddy Stadium in Jerusalem, and the closing event was held on July 13 in Tel Aviv.

Initially, the Maccabiah was planned to be held in the summer of 2025, but the competitions were postponed for a year due to the war between Israel and Iran and the associated security risks.

The Maccabiah is held in Israel every four years and is considered the largest international sports forum for Jewish athletes in the world. It is often called the “Jewish Olympic Games.”

The official website reported more than 8,000 athletes from approximately 55 countries, 45 sports, about 3,000 tournaments, and the same number of medals.

At the same time, journalists present at the opening reported about 5,000 actually arrived athletes, including about 2,000 representatives from Israel and 900 participants from the USA.

Organizers also spoke of 5,000 athletes from 55 countries — about half as many as at the previous Maccabiah in 2022. It is likely that the figure of 8,000 referred to the initially declared or registered composition, while some delegations reduced their participation due to the war, security issues, and travel difficulties to Israel.

The games were held under the slogan More Than Ever.

Organizers emphasized that after the events of October 7, 2023, and prolonged wars, the Maccabiah should become not only a sports tournament but also a demonstration of unity between Israel and Jewish communities in the diaspora.

The program included four main categories: juniors, Open, Masters, and Paralympic competitions.

Jerusalem became the main center for Open category competitions, Haifa hosted juniors, and Herzliya hosted Masters participants. Tournaments were also held in Tel Aviv, Hadera, Ra’anana, and other cities.

Representatives of the IDF Disabled Veterans Organization were involved in organizing the Maccabiah. They participated in the Games as athletes, staff, volunteers, and participants in official events.

Projects of the Maccabiah also included survivors of the Nova festival attack, former hostages, and families of those affected on October 7.

Ukraine was represented by athletes from 11 cities

The Ukrainian delegation included 50 athletes from:

1. Kyiv;
2. Kharkiv;
3. Odesa;
4. Dnipro;
5. Vinnytsia;
6. Zaporizhzhia;
7. Mykolaiv;
8. Poltava;
9. Chernivtsi;
10. Lviv;
11. Khmelnytskyi.

The team was formed by the All-Ukrainian Association “Maccabi”. Ukrainian participants competed in 13 sports.

For Ukraine, participation in the Maccabiah had special significance.

Athletes represented a country that continues to resist full-scale Russian aggression. Many participants prepared for the competitions under conditions of air raids, shelling, destroyed infrastructure, and constant uncertainty.

Despite this, Ukraine managed to assemble one of the notable delegations from Eastern Europe and win awards in several individual, pair, and team disciplines.

Three gold medals for Ukraine

Maria Bogorad from Kyiv won a gold medal in fencing.

The Maccabi World Union reported her victory on the 12th day of the competition, noting the high level of preparation and confident performance of the Ukrainian athlete. The specific type of weapon was not specified in the available publication.

Sophia Chernomorova from Mykolaiv won gold in women’s doubles badminton.

In addition, the Ukrainian athlete became a bronze medalist in mixed doubles, winning two awards at the Maccabiah.

Svetlana Simacheva from Vinnytsia won in the women’s doubles table tennis tournament.

She became one of the most successful representatives of the Ukrainian delegation. According to “Maccabi-Ukraine,” Simacheva also received silver in the team tournament and bronze in individual competitions.

Silver in volleyball, karate, and table tennis

The women’s team “Maccabi-Ukraine” won a silver medal in the volleyball tournament of the Open category.

The Ukrainian team reached the decisive matches and finished the competition in second place.

David Shatokhin from Odesa received a silver medal in karate.

During the competition, he sustained an injury that prevented him from continuing to perform at the same pace. Despite this, the Ukrainian karateka managed to finish the tournament with silver.

Another silver medal position for Ukraine was brought by Svetlana Simacheva in team table tennis competitions.

Thus, according to separate publications of the Maccabi World Union, three silver results are confirmed: volleyball, karate, and team table tennis.

In the official message of the “Israel in Ukraine” page, four silver medals are indicated, but two of them are attributed to table tennis. It is likely that in preparing the final message, one of Svetlana Simacheva’s awards was misclassified.

Seven possible bronze results

The first medal of the Ukrainian delegation at the Maccabiah was won by Mikhail Rudy.

On July 6, he took third place in Greco-Roman wrestling competitions. “Maccabi-Ukraine” called his result the first success of the Ukrainian team at the 2026 Games.

Sophia Chernomorova received a bronze medal in mixed doubles badminton.

Vladislava Relis from Dnipro became a bronze medalist in junior judo competitions.

In English-language reports of “Maccabi-Ukraine,” her surname is indicated as Vladislava Rehlis.

Igor Makhini from Odesa won bronze in karate.

He competed alongside David Shatokhin, who received a silver medal.

Yana Yelkina from Odesa and Eleonora Kirilova from Vinnytsia became bronze medalists in beach volleyball.

Each athlete received a physical medal, but in the overall team standings, the result of the pair is usually counted as one medal position.

Junior Katerina Sagolovska from Kyiv received a bronze medal in team fencing competition.

Another bronze was won by Svetlana Simacheva in the individual table tennis tournament.

There are seven bronze medal positions:

• Greco-Roman wrestling;
• Badminton;
• Judo;
• Karate;
• Beach volleyball;
• Team fencing;
• Individual table tennis.

Why the official medal tally does not match

On the official page “Israel in Ukraine,” it is indicated that Ukraine won 12 medals:

• three gold;
• four silver;
• five bronze.

However, in the same publication, six bronze disciplines are listed: team fencing, karate, beach volleyball, judo, Greco-Roman wrestling, and badminton.

So even without considering Svetlana Simacheva’s individual bronze in table tennis, the list contains not five but six bronze results.

Separate publications of the Maccabi World Union add Simacheva’s bronze in the individual tournament to them. They also clarify that the athlete received gold in the women’s pair and silver in the team championship.

If we gather the published results and count each pair or team prize place as one position, the most likely outcome looks like this:

• three gold medal positions;
• three silver;
• seven bronze.

Total — 13 prize results.

Most likely, there was an editorial or arithmetic error in the final message: one bronze medal was omitted, and one of the table tennis results was incorrectly attributed to silver.

NANews — Israel News emphasizes that this is a restored result based on separate publications of the Maccabi World Union.

A publicly available final table of the Ukrainian delegation with the names of all participants, exact categories, and results of each final has not yet been published by the organizers. Therefore, the wording about 13 medals requires final confirmation from “Maccabi-Ukraine” or the organizers of the XXII Maccabiah.

More than a sports result

Regardless of the discrepancies in the counts, the performance of the Ukrainian team became a notable event at the Maccabiah-2026.

Ukraine sent 50 athletes from Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Khmelnytskyi to Israel.

They competed in 13 sports and reached the podium in eight sports directions.

The Maccabiah once again showed that the ties between Israel and Jewish communities in Ukraine are preserved and developed even in the most difficult periods.

For Ukrainian athletes, it was not only an international competition but also an opportunity to represent their country, meet Jewish teams from around the world, and remind that Ukraine continues to fight, live, and win.

This is not about the influence of states or external control. It’s about people shaped by the experience of Jewish life in Odessa, Kharkiv, Kherson — cities where security was never guaranteed, and the ability to survive became part of everyday culture. This experience was in demand at a time when the young state of Israel needed not just intelligence, but a survival system. This was noted by Valery Boyanju in “Odessa Life”.

Ukrainian Jewish Reality as a Factor of Thinking

Jewish Ukraine at the end of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century was a space of constant risk. Pogroms, revolutions, changes of empires, the Civil War, Stalinist repressions, Nazi occupation — all these are not abstract chapters of textbooks, but personal memories of thousands of families. For these people, the state was rarely a source of protection. More often — a source of threat or, at best, indifference.

It was in such an environment that a type of thinking was formed, based on three principles: not trusting declarations, verifying reality, and acting in advance. This approach later became one of the unspoken foundations of the Israeli security system.

Mossad as a Product Not Only of the State but Also of the Diaspora

Officially, Mossad was created in 1949, after the declaration of Israel’s independence. At an early stage, it was a compact structure with limited resources. However, it quickly began to rely on people with experience in underground struggle, military intelligence, and living under constant threat.

Immigrants from Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, fit organically into this logic. They did not perceive security as something given. For them, it was always a process, not a state.

Meir Amit (1963–1968): Kharkiv Roots and Systemic Transformation

Meir Amit (Hebrew: מאיר עמית, born Meir Haimovich Slutsky) led Mossad from 1963–1968, during a period when Israeli intelligence was transitioning from the stage of formation to the stage of institutional maturity. Although Amit was born in Israel, his parents came from Kharkiv — one of the largest Jewish intellectual centers in Eastern Europe.

Article in the Ukrainian Wikipedia – Meir Amit.

In English biographies, it is consistently mentioned that he was a cousin of the poet Boris Slutsky, and Slutsky himself grew up/was formed in Kharkiv (this is about the poet).

This background was reflected in his management style. Amit was opposed to improvisation for the sake of heroism. He insisted on analytics, data structuring, and strategic planning. It was under him that Mossad became not just a set of operations, but part of a unified architecture of national security.

During his leadership, intelligence played a key role in preparing for the Six-Day War. After leaving his post, Amit did not disappear from public life: he became a member of the Knesset, participated in economic and technological projects, including telecommunications and the defense industry. This highlights an important detail: for this generation, intelligence was not an isolated profession, but part of the general state thinking.

Yitzhak Hofi (1974–1982): Odessa Pragmatism in an Era of Crisis

Yitzhak Hofi (Hebrew: יצחק חופי, born Yitzhak Poberesky) led Mossad from 1974–1982 — one of the most challenging periods in Israel’s history. His leadership came after the Yom Kippur War, the rise of international terrorism, and the strengthening of threats beyond the Middle East.

Article in the Ukrainian Wikipedia – Іцхак Хофі.

Hofi was born in Mandatory Palestine, but his parents emigrated from Odessa. The Odessa Jewish environment always combined irony, caution, and harsh realism. This cultural code was reflected in his management style.

Hofi avoided publicity and believed that the best operation is the one that neither journalists nor politicians know about. Under him, Mossad significantly expanded its international agent networks and strengthened its ability to operate beyond the region, including in Europe and other continents.

Meir Dagan (2002–2011): Kherson, the Holocaust, and the Rejection of Illusions

The most famous figure with Ukrainian roots was Meir Dagan (born Huberman, in another transcription Huberman), who led Mossad from 2002–2011. He was born in Kherson in 1945 to a family that survived the Nazi occupation. (in some sources, 1947 is indicated; Odessa is also named as Dagan’s place of birth).

His grandfather was killed during the Holocaust, and this family tragedy became part of his worldview.

Article in the Ukrainian Wikipedia – Meir Dagan.

Dagan came to intelligence from the army, went through key Israeli wars, and formed a reputation as a person who does not believe in the “goodwill” of the enemy. In his office, a photograph of a deceased relative was kept for many years — not as a symbol of revenge, but as a reminder of the price of strategic mistakes.

Under Dagan, Mossad focused on preventive actions against strategic threats, including the nuclear programs of Israel’s adversaries. He consistently opposed the illusions of diplomatic appeasement and believed that intelligence must prevent threats before they become the subject of public discussions.

Behind the tough image was a person with unexpected interests. Dagan was fond of painting and sculpture, was a vegetarian, and valued unconventional thinking. This combination of internal reflection and strategic toughness made him one of the most controversial figures in the history of Israeli intelligence.

Common Denominator: Experience of Instability

What unites these people is not geography per se, but the experience of living in conditions of instability, characteristic of Jewish Ukraine. This experience formed several key principles that later became the foundation of Israeli intelligence culture:

absolute distrust of declarations without confirmation;
willingness to act in conditions of uncertainty;
understanding that the weakness of the state is always perceived as an invitation to aggression;
orientation towards long-term survival, not short-term political comfort.

Myths Around the “Ukrainian Trace”

In recent years, the topic of the Ukrainian roots of Mossad leaders is often used for propaganda purposes. This is a distortion of reality. Mossad has always been and remains an instrument of the Israeli state, subject to its laws and political leadership.

The Ukrainian roots of its leaders are part of the history of the Jewish diaspora, just like the Polish, Lithuanian, German, or Iraqi. Attempts to turn this fact into a political sensation only simplify the complex and tragic history of the 20th century.

Why This Matters Today

Against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine and the protracted conflict around Israel, the historical context takes on new significance. Ukrainian Jews are not a “bridge of influence” or a political tool. They are part of the common historical fabric, in which the destinies of Ukraine, Israel, and the Jewish people are intertwined.

Understanding this allows for a better view of the logic of Israeli security — a logic formed not by abstract doctrines, but by real experiences of loss, flight, and survival.

Instead of a Final Point

The history of Mossad is the history of specific people who brought not only professional skills but also personal memories of what happens when security is underestimated. The Ukrainian Jewish trace in this history is not a sensation and not an argument in political disputes.

It is a reminder that from Odessa, Kharkiv, and Kherson, the path sometimes led not only to emigration but also to the very heart of the system responsible for the survival of the state.

Category: “Jews from Ukraine” | NANews – news of Israel

“We share the results of the Translate Ukraine 2025 translation support program. This year, the Ukrainian Book Institute received 161 applications for participation, 133 applications passed the technical selection, and 80 passed the expert council selection. The program resulted in 75 new translations,” says the message from UBI.

It is noted that translations in 2025 geographically covered 28 countries: Bulgaria, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Greece, Georgia, Egypt, Israel, India, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Lebanon, Moldova, Germany, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Finland, France, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Sweden.

Which books and genres were included in the program

The translations include fiction, poetry, non-fiction, and children’s literature. The list includes both contemporary Ukrainian authors and classics, including anthologies and key texts of the national literary canon.

The program is focused not on one-time publications but on full-fledged book editions — with ISBN, national publishers, and entry into local markets.

Israel and Hebrew: an important, though rare case

The participation of Israel deserves special attention. In 2025, as part of Translate Ukraine, a Ukrainian book was translated into Hebrew — a language into which Ukrainian literature is translated very limitedly (but it is translated – ed.).

Translation into Hebrew and Israel: anthology of Ukrainian poetry and the project נְמָלָה

A project implemented in Hebrew and in Israel deserves special attention within the Translate Ukraine 2025 program. It concerns the book “Anthology of Ukrainian Poetry, Volume I: Classics (from Skovoroda to Franko)”, published in Hebrew under the title מבחר השירה האוקראינית, כרך א: קלאסיקה (מסקובורודה עד פראנקו).

The edition was carried out by the Israeli publishing house Persimmon Books Ltd (Israel) and became part of the literary initiative נְמָלָה / Nemala — a cultural project dedicated to the dialogue between Ukrainian and Hebrew literary traditions through translation.

The Nemala (נְמָלָה) project is positioned as a bilingual platform and series working with poetry, classical texts, and translations that rarely enter the mass book circulation. The name combines two meanings: in Hebrew נְמָלָה means “ant,” a symbol of painstaking and consistent work, and in Ukrainian nemala means “significant, weighty.” It is in this vein that the project builds its editorial philosophy.

We have already written about the “Nemala” project:

Israeli project “Nemala נְמָלָה”: Enthusiasts connect Ukrainian and Jewish literatures through translations, creating a cultural bridge between Israel and Ukraine.

Ukrainian literature in Hebrew: how the state program “Translate Ukraine” opens new horizons for cultural cooperation.

The book by Ukrainian writer Serhiy Zhadan “הפנימייה” (Internat) was published by the Israeli publishing house “פועלים” in Hebrew: an Israeli review of the Ukrainian novel.

Ukrainian classics in Hebrew: “Every city has its own character and rights” by Hryhorii Skovoroda has already been translated by the “Nemala נְמָלָה” project as part of the Translate Ukraine 2025 program.

On October 24, 2025, Persimmon Books Ltd announced that the book “Word, why are you not a solid steel” — the first volume of the anthology of Ukrainian poetry — was printed. This is not a separate novel or an experimental collection, but a systematic representation of the Ukrainian poetic tradition of the 18th–19th centuries for the Israeli reader — from the philosophical poetry of Hryhorii Skovoroda to the classics of Ivan Franko.

The anthology includes works by authors such as:

Hryhorii Skovoroda, Ivan Kotliarevsky, Petro Hulak-Artemovsky, Marta Pysarevska, Levko Borovykovsky, Viktor Zabila, Yevhen Hrebinka, Amvrosii Metlynsky, Taras Shevchenko, Mykhailo Petrenko, Oleksandra Psel, Oleksandr Korsun, Panteleimon Kulish, Leonid Hlibov, Anatolii Svidnytsky, Osyp-Yurii Fedkovych, Mykhailo Starytsky, Kateryna Sokolovska, Mariia Volvach, Borys Hrinchenko, Pavlo Hrabovsky, Lidiia Sokhachevska, Lesia Ukrainka, Nadiia Kibalchych, and Ivan Franko.

The translation of the anthology into Hebrew was done by Anton Paperny. The book is released as a full-fledged publishing edition with an international ISBN and is aimed not only at private readers but also at libraries, educational, and cultural institutions in Israel.

It is reported that the book will be available for purchase from January 1, 2026. Pre-orders are already open — for this, the publisher offers to contact directly at info@persimmon-books.com.

For Israel, where translations of Ukrainian literature into Hebrew remain rare, this project is of particular significance. It expands the understanding of Ukrainian culture beyond the news and historical context, introducing it into the realm of poetry, philosophy, and literary classics — it is in this form that NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency seeks to capture it.

The Israeli book market is small and highly competitive, and decisions on translations are made cautiously. Therefore, even one supported project in Hebrew is an indicator that Ukrainian literature is perceived not as a local or temporary plot but as part of a broader cultural and historical dialogue.

In the context of close human, historical, and migratory ties between Ukraine and Israel, such translations play a special role — they work not only with the current agenda but also with a deeper cultural layer.

What Translate Ukraine 2025 ultimately provides

75 new translations in one year is not just statistics. These are new readers, new university courses, the participation of Ukrainian authors in international festivals, and the consolidation of Ukrainian literature in the book ecosystems of other countries.

And the fact that among these languages and countries in 2025 were Hebrew and Israel underscores the importance of cultural ties that are formed not by declarations but by real books and real readers — it is such processes that NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency captures when it comes to the intersection of Ukrainian culture and the Israeli space.

On July 15, 2026, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar ordered the creation of a special task force to prepare for events related to the supposed two-thousandth anniversary of the Baptism of Jesus Christ.

The group was headed by Ambassador George Deek, Israel’s special envoy for relations with the Christian world. In a statement from the Foreign Ministry, the event was described as having deep spiritual significance for more than two billion Christians. Israel expects that millions of pilgrims may arrive in the region.

At first glance, a logical question arises: why is the Foreign Ministry of the Jewish state involved in preparing for a Christian jubilee?

The answer is that Israel did not set the date, did not establish a religious holiday, and does not plan to conduct church rituals. The task of the Foreign Ministry is diplomatic contacts with churches, Christian organizations, religious leaders, and foreign governments, as well as coordination with other Israeli agencies ahead of the possible mass arrival of foreign citizens.

Israel joined an already existing project

The wording that the Israeli Foreign Ministry “began preparations for the celebration” creates the impression that it was Jerusalem that declared 2030 a jubilee year.

In reality, Israel joined an initiative that Jordan began promoting much earlier.

Jordanian shore and UNESCO site

The main center of future events, Jordan considers the place “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” — Al-Maghtas, located on the eastern bank of the Jordan River, nine kilometers north of the Dead Sea.

The archaeological area includes two main zones:

• Tell al-Kharrar, also known as Jabal Mar Elias, or the hill of the prophet Elijah;
• the area of the churches of John the Baptist near the river.

On the territory, remains of Roman and Byzantine churches, chapels, a monastery, hermit caves, water collection systems, and ancient baptismal pools have been discovered. In 2015, the site was inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Most Christian denominations recognize this area as the probable site of Jesus’ Baptism by John the Baptist.

On the opposite, western bank of the Jordan is Qasr al-Yahud, located in the Jericho area on the West Bank and under Israeli administration.

The Jordan at this point is quite narrow: pilgrims on both banks essentially look at each other. But each bank promotes its own version of pilgrimage infrastructure and its own access to the Baptism site.

This is where religious history simultaneously turns into a matter of tourism, diplomacy, transportation, security, and international influence.

And Yardenit?

Yardenit is another well-known baptismal complex in the waters of the Jordan, located in northern Israel, near Kibbutz Kinneret, where the river flows out of Lake Kinneret and heads south.

It appeared in 1981 as a safe and convenient alternative to Qasr al-Yahud. After the Six-Day War of 1967, the traditional Baptism site of Jesus near Jericho ended up in a closed border zone: surrounded by minefields, military barriers, and free access for pilgrims was practically impossible.

In Yardenit, stairs and platforms for descending to the water, changing rooms, showers, places for worship, and group baptisms were equipped. Thanks to this, the complex quickly became popular among Christian pilgrims from around the world.

However, Yardenit is not considered a historical site of the Baptism of Jesus Christ. The evangelical event is traditionally associated with Qasr al-Yahud on the Israeli bank and Bethany Beyond the Jordan on the Jordanian side. Yardenit is a modern pilgrimage center that arose due to the long-term lack of safe access to the traditional site.

A $100 million project appeared back in 2022

On December 13, 2022, it became known that Jordan is launching a master plan worth about $100 million, aimed at attracting approximately one million Christian pilgrims in 2030.

The project was not presented by the Vatican or an ecumenical council, but by a non-profit foundation created with the participation of the Jordanian state to develop the “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” area.

The chairman of the foundation, businessman and former Jordanian Minister of Labor Samir Murad, explained that the area should retain its spiritual and natural character. The developers abandoned the idea of building luxurious five-star hotels and chose the concept of a “biblical village,” which should remind pilgrims of life two thousand years ago.

The first phase of the project was estimated at approximately $15 million. The second — up to $85 million.

The plan included creating comfortable tent accommodations, affordable lodging for pilgrims, establishments with local organic food, a three-star hotel, restaurants, a shopping area, a museum, a wellness center, botanical gardens, and a nature reserve on the bird migration route.

Electrical cables and communication lines were planned to be buried underground so that modern infrastructure would not disrupt the visual atmosphere of the historical site.

Nine religious organizations received the right to create their own facilities for receiving pilgrims. Among them was the World Baptist Alliance, cooperating with the Jordanian Baptist Convention.

At a dinner dedicated to the launch of the project, about 250 guests were present, including King Abdullah II of Jordan, his two sons, and the country’s prime minister. The Secretary-General of the World Baptist Alliance, Elijah Brown, stated that both phases should be completed by 2029 so that the area is ready for the 2030 events.

Thus, the first public presentation of the 2030 date was primarily associated with a specific Jordanian investment and pilgrimage project.

How a tourist date turned into a religious initiative

The next stage began in January 2025.

At the beginning of the month, a new Catholic Church of the Baptism of Jesus was consecrated on the Jordanian side of the Jordan. The ceremony was attended by the Vatican’s Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin, who arrived as a special representative of Pope Francis, and the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa.

The construction of the church took about 15 years. The first stone was previously blessed by Pope Benedict XVI in the presence of King Abdullah II and Queen Rania.

On January 28, 2025, Father Rifat Bader, director of the Catholic Center for Studies and Media in Jordan, stated in an interview with Vatican News that Jordan is beginning a five-year preparation for its “Great Jubilee.”

He explicitly said that in 2030, Jordan intends to celebrate 2000 years since the Baptism of Jesus. However, this was a statement from a representative of the Latin Patriarchate in Jordan, published by Vatican News, not a papal bull or an official act of the Holy See establishing a worldwide jubilee year.

In other words, the presence of high-ranking Vatican representatives gave the project significant ecclesiastical weight, but in itself did not turn 2030 into a mandatory jubilee for the entire Christian world.

Pizzaballa linked 2030 and 2033

On December 17, 2025, in Amman, at the Al-Husseiniya Palace, King Abdullah II met with Christian and Muslim religious leaders of Jerusalem and Jordan.

At this meeting, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa stated:

• 2030 should mark 2000 years since the Baptism of Christ;
• 2033 should mark 2000 years since the Resurrection.

Pizzaballa added that representatives of churches from around the world should come to Jordan, primarily to “Bethany Beyond the Jordan.”

Here, the overall structure of the project became visible: the period from 2030 to 2033 should be presented as a symbolic path from the Baptism and the beginning of Jesus’ public ministry to the crucifixion and Resurrection.

But even this statement was not a decision of all Christian churches. It was support for the Jordanian program from one of the most influential Catholic hierarchs of the Holy Land.

Official state support appeared on May 18, 2026

On May 18, 2026, King Abdullah II visited the Baptism site at “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” and opened the International Orthodox University Baptism Site International Orthodox University — BIO University.

This is a non-profit educational institution created by the Jerusalem Orthodox Patriarchate. The university is designed to accommodate 40 students, provides for the possibility of distance learning, and was supposed to start accepting students in September 2026.

During the event, the king instructed the Jordanian government to adopt and support the Baptism 2030 initiative.

And here is the precise answer to the question of who officially put forward the current initiative: it was proposed by the Council of Church Leaders of Jordan.

The chairman of the Council, Greek Orthodox Archbishop Christoforos Atallah, thanked the king for his support and stated the need to develop programs and strategic plans jointly with churches.

Cardinal Pizzaballa called 2030 not just a historical date, but an opportunity to strengthen unity, mutual understanding, and harmony.

The Anglican Archbishop of Jerusalem and Primate of the Episcopal Church of Jerusalem and the Middle East Hosam Naoum stated that the preparation should include infrastructure development, service improvement, staff training, and work with churches and Christian organizations worldwide.

The state plan of Jordan covers religious events, the development of pilgrimage routes, the promotion of “Bethany Beyond the Jordan” and other Christian sites, infrastructure renewal, and the creation of services for foreign visitors.

NANews — Israel News compared the dates: the Israeli task force appeared almost four years after the first public presentation of the Jordanian project and two months after King Abdullah II’s official directive.

What Israel was preparing on its shore

Israel was not just observing Jordan’s actions.

On February 10, 2026, after extensive reconstruction, the Qasr al-Yahud complex on the western bank of the Jordan River reopened.

The cost of the work amounted to 25 million shekels, or approximately 8.1 million dollars at the exchange rate at the time of opening. Funding was provided by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism and the Civil Administration, and the work was carried out by the State Tourism Company.

The project included:

• road and parking repairs;
• landscaping;
• construction of a prayer pergola;
• a large air-conditioned sanitary facility;
• hot showers and changing cabins;
• a wide wooden deck for safe access to the water.

There were also plans to create an air-conditioned hall for prayers and events in any weather and separate water access for people with disabilities.

Qasr al-Yahud is called the third most important Christian site in Israel and the West Bank after the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.

Thus, by the time of the Foreign Ministry’s decision, infrastructure preparation on the Israeli side was already in full swing.

Why George Deek headed the task force

On April 23, 2026, Gideon Sa’ar appointed George Deek as Israel’s first special envoy for relations with the Christian world.

Deek is an Arab-Christian from Jaffa, a career diplomat, and a former Israeli ambassador to Azerbaijan. He became the first Christian to head an Israeli embassy. His father, Yousef Deek, led the Orthodox Christian community of Jaffa and Israel.

The appointment came amid a serious deterioration in Israel’s relations with some Christian leaders.

During military restrictions, the police did not allow Cardinal Pizzaballa and other high-ranking clergy to attend the Palm Sunday service at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. After international reaction, the authorities reversed the decision, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the patriarch be granted access.

Additionally, in April 2026, an IDF soldier was filmed smashing a statue of Jesus with a sledgehammer in the Christian village of Debel in southern Lebanon. The soldier and the colleague filming the incident were removed from combat duties and punished after an investigation. Catholic leaders of the Holy Land called the incident a grave insult to the Christian faith.

There were also reports of attacks by radical settlers on Christian communities in the West Bank and increasing cases of insults, spitting, and attacks on Christians in the Old City of Jerusalem.

Therefore, preparation for 2030 has not only tourist but also diplomatic significance for Israel. It is an opportunity to restore relations with Christian churches and demonstrate that the state guarantees freedom of religion and access to holy sites.

Who actually “declared” 2030

Based on the documents found, the following chain can be reconstructed.

On December 13, 2022, a Jordanian state-affiliated foundation publicly presented a $100 million project and named 2030 as the time to celebrate the two-thousandth anniversary of the Baptism.

In January 2025, representatives of the Catholic Church in Jordan announced the start of a five-year preparation for the “Great Jubilee.”

On December 17, 2025, Cardinal Pizzaballa publicly linked 2030 with the Baptism and 2033 with the Resurrection.

On May 18, 2026, King Abdullah II instructed the Jordanian government to support the Baptism 2030 initiative proposed by the Council of Church Leaders of Jordan.

On July 15, 2026, the Israeli Foreign Ministry joined the already existing project.

However, no single document was found by which the Pope, the Ecumenical Patriarch, the World Council of Churches, or any other body representing all of Christianity officially declared 2030 as the worldwide year of the two-thousandth anniversary of Christ’s Baptism.

Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of a jubilee recognized by the entire Christian world, but of a Jordanian church-state initiative, supported by a number of influential Christian leaders and later picked up by Israel.

Why the date 2030 itself raises questions

The Gospels do not specify the exact calendar year of Jesus’ Baptism.

The main chronological reference is found in the Gospel of Luke. The beginning of John the Baptist’s ministry is attributed to the fifteenth year of the reign of the Roman Emperor Tiberius. Jesus’ Baptism occurred shortly after John’s ministry began.

The problem lies in how exactly to count the years of Tiberius’ reign.

His independent reign is usually counted from the death of Emperor Augustus in 14 AD. By this calculation, the fifteenth year of Tiberius falls between the second half of 28 and 29 AD.

A study by Andrew Steinmann, published in the Tyndale Bulletin in 2022, compares Roman, Jewish, and early Christian written sources, coins, and inscriptions. The author concludes that contemporaries counted Tiberius’ reign from 14 AD, and Jesus’ Baptism most likely occurred in 29 AD.

In scientific and theological literature, there are other calculations that date the beginning of the ministry to 28 AD or, when counting Tiberius’ co-regency with Augustus, to an even earlier period. But there is no exact historical basis specifically for the year 30.

If the Baptism occurred in 29 AD, the two-thousandth anniversary falls in 2029. To get 2030, one must assume a conditional date of Baptism in 30 AD.

Therefore, 2030 is not a proven historical date, but a convenient symbolic marker.

It allows for a clear four-year concept:

2030 — Baptism and the beginning of ministry;
2033 — crucifixion and Resurrection.

For an international pilgrimage campaign, such a scheme is convenient. For strict historical chronology, it remains controversial.

Conclusion

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indeed begun preparations for the events of 2030, but Israel did not invent this anniversary.

The date appeared in the public domain no later than December 2022 as part of the Jordanian development project ‘Bethany Beyond the Jordan’. It was then supported by Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican leaders of Jordan and Jerusalem. In May 2026, King Abdullah II turned the Baptism 2030 initiative into a state program.

Israel joined later when it became clear that Jordan intended to turn the eastern bank of the Jordan into a global center for Christian pilgrimage.

On the western bank, Israel has already invested 25 million shekels in the reconstruction of Qasr al-Yahud, created the position of a special envoy for relations with the Christian world, and is now forming a diplomatic infrastructure to work with churches and future pilgrims.

Therefore, behind the religious formulation are several processes: faith, historical memory, relations with the Christian world, restoration of Israel’s reputation, competition with Jordan, and the struggle for a huge international pilgrimage flow.

And the year 2030 itself remains primarily a symbolic, church-tourist, and politically convenient date, rather than an indisputably established two-thousandth anniversary of the Baptism of Jesus Christ.

On July 15, 2026, the German government published preliminary statistics on export permits issued from January to June. The total value of weapons and other military products that German companies were allowed to supply to foreign customers reached 13.87 billion euros.

This is a record figure: in six months, Germany approved more military exports than it had in some full years. Of the total amount, about 9.6 billion euros is directly related to weapons of war — combat vehicles, artillery, ammunition, and other systems subject to the strictest state control. Another approximately 4.3 billion euros accounted for other military products, including transport, electronics, optical systems, components, and support equipment.

Ukraine retains first place

The main individual destination for German military exports was once again Ukraine.

In the first half of 2026, German authorities approved export permits for Ukraine worth about 2.52 billion euros. This is approximately 18% of the total value of all permits issued by Germany for the half-year.

In Berlin, these decisions are directly linked to supporting Ukraine’s right to self-defense against Russian aggression. Ukraine remains the only country outside NATO to receive such a large share of German export permits.

After Ukraine, the largest recipients are:

Next are Latvia, Norway, Estonia, and Slovenia.

The list shows that a significant part of German military exports is related to strengthening European security and NATO’s eastern flank. However, Ukraine occupies a special place in this system: it not only purchases German products but directly uses them to defend against the Russian invasion.

Germany supplies Ukraine with air defense systems, artillery, combat and armored vehicles, ammunition, small arms, medical equipment, and personal protective equipment. In addition to supplies from Bundeswehr stocks, Berlin finances the production of equipment by German enterprises and orders from companies in other countries. Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, Germany has provided or reserved about 55.5 billion euros in military support for Ukraine. Another approximately 41 billion euros is for civilian aid.

As noted by NAnews — Israel News, these amounts cannot be mechanically added to the export permit figures. They refer to different forms of support and different calculation methods.

Israel received permits worth almost 800 million euros

Israel ranked sixth among individual countries, receiving permits for German military exports totaling 799.34 million euros.

For Israel, which in recent years has faced restrictions and political disputes over European arms supplies, this amount seems significant. However, the published data does not mean that Germany allowed the transfer of nearly 800 million euros worth of bombs, missiles, or artillery ammunition to Israel.

More than 60% of the Israeli volume is related to one major naval defense project. This is at least 480 million euros. The German government has not officially named the system or vessel for which the permit was issued.

Earlier, German media linked large permits for naval military products with the supply of a new submarine INS Drakon to Israel, built by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. However, the project name is not disclosed in the government-published statistics, so it cannot yet be claimed that the entire amount relates specifically to this submarine.

Another almost 20% of permits issued for the Israeli direction is related to cooperation between German and Israeli defense enterprises in the interests of the Bundeswehr itself. In other words, part of the products may formally be sent to Israel for development, processing, or integration, and then used by the German armed forces.

The remaining amount relates to military products that, under German law, are not classified as directly ‘weapons of war.’ This may involve components, electronics, transport systems, surveillance, communication, and other equipment.

This is an important clarification for the Israeli reader. The figure of 799 million euros does not indicate how much weaponry Germany has already physically transferred to the IDF and where it may be used.

An export permit does not yet mean delivery

The main mistake of many headlines is that an export permit is presented as already delivered weapons.

In reality, a license means that the German government has allowed a German company to enter into a contract and export certain products. Months or even years may pass between the issuance of a permit and the actual delivery.

Some of the permitted equipment still needs to be produced. Large naval projects, air defense systems, and armored vehicles are usually delivered in stages. Some contracts may be executed in several batches, and their cost is fully included in the statistics at the time of permit issuance.

Moreover, export data does not show who exactly pays for the delivery. It could be the government of the recipient country, the German federal budget, an international coalition, or a third state.

Therefore, it is more accurate to say that Ukraine and Israel became some of the largest recipients of German arms and military product export permits, rather than having received all this weaponry in the first six months of 2026.

For Ukraine, part of the assistance may not be reflected in German export statistics at all. Germany finances the production of weapons directly at Ukrainian enterprises, purchases products from third-country companies, pays for the training of military personnel, and ensures the repair of already transferred systems.

Since the start of the full-scale war, almost 26,000 Ukrainian military personnel have been trained in Germany. These expenses are also part of military support but do not relate to arms exports.

Two different directions of German policy

The position of Ukraine and Israel in the same ranking does not mean that Germany pursues the same policy towards the two states.

The Ukrainian direction is primarily associated with the attempt to stop Russian aggression and protect the European security system. For Berlin, Ukraine’s defeat would mean an increased threat from Russia to the entire continent.

Germany’s relations with Israel are based on Germany’s historical responsibility for the Holocaust, security cooperation, and long-standing joint defense projects. At the same time, supplies to Israel remain a subject of political and legal disputes within Germany.

Meanwhile, military-industrial cooperation between the two countries is bilateral. Germany not only supplies military products to Israel but also purchases Israeli systems. One of the most famous examples was the Arrow 3 missile defense system acquired by Berlin from Israel.

For NAnews — Israel News, it is especially important to distinguish between political statements, export licenses, actual deliveries, and total military aid amounts. Otherwise, large figures create the impression that all permitted weapons have already been transferred to recipients and are in service.

Germany is becoming one of the main military centers of Europe

The record figures for the first half of 2026 indicate a significant change in German defense policy.

After decades of caution, Germany is increasing its own military spending, expanding the production of ammunition, equipment, and air defense systems, while simultaneously supplying allies and partners.

Ukraine remains the main individual recipient of permits — 2.52 billion euros. Israel, with a figure of about 799 million euros, ranks sixth, although a significant part of this amount is related to a naval project and industrial cooperation in Germany’s interests.

Thus, the new ranking reflects not only the volumes of arms trade. It shows two strategic directions of German policy: support for Ukraine in the war against Russian aggression and the preservation of military-technical partnership with Israel.

https://renovation.nikk.co.il/

That is why the topic of apartment painting goes far beyond repair as such.

In northern Israel, it is closely linked with trust, local housing specifics, humidity by the sea, old housing stock, apartments after tenants, and the owner’s desire to put the property in order without heavy capital intervention. For NAnews readers, this story is also interesting because it very accurately shows how client behavior is changing in Israel: people are less and less reacting to the loud ‘cheap’, and more and more looking for peace of mind, a clear estimate, and normal human organization of the process.

Why apartment painting has become a separate topic for the Israeli housing market

In theory, painting seems like one of the simplest services. But in reality, it often becomes decisive for the perception of an apartment. Old traces from fixtures, stains on the ceiling, scuffs, unevenly painted areas, traces of dampness, darkened corners, visual fatigue of the walls — all this makes the housing less attractive, even if otherwise it is quite suitable for living.

For Haifa and the entire Krayot belt, this is especially noticeable. Humidity, the age of some buildings, an active rental market, and constant tenant turnover lead to the fact that it is the walls and ceilings that begin to show the apartment’s fatigue the fastest. Therefore, painting in the local reality is not a cosmetic trifle, but a full-fledged tool for preparing real estate.

Where this is especially felt

The most typical scenarios for northern Israel look like this:

• the apartment is being prepared for a new family to move in;
• the housing needs to be quickly refreshed after tenants;
• the owner wants to make the property visually tidier before selling;
• after dampness, stains, or a local leak, the room needs to be returned to a normal appearance;
• the family does not want to start a major renovation but wants to remove the feeling of neglect.

In all these cases, the client is looking not for ‘the cheapest painting’, but for a solution that will relieve household and financial anxiety.

Why the Israeli client looks at such a service differently

In Israel, there is a very strong sensitivity to time and predictability of expenses. People are willing to pay not only for manual work but also for the absence of chaos. That is why for Haifa, Kiryat Ata, Kiryat Bialik, Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Yam, Kiryat Haim, Nesher, and Tirat Carmel, not abstract promises of quality work best, but specific and understandable formulations: a predetermined volume, agreed deadlines, the ability to work in a residential apartment, neatness, help with damp walls, and no sudden additional charges.

What exactly the apartment painting market in Haifa and nearby sells

If you look at how the topic of apartment painting is presented in Israel, it quickly becomes clear: the market sells not just a master. It sells peace of mind, speed, a clear price, and no surprises. This is the key logic that today cannot be ignored by either business or the editorial office if it wants to honestly explain to the audience why some offers work better than others.

The main triggers that the client responds to

Urgency

One of the strongest motivators is the ability to do it quickly. Before moving in, after tenants, before holidays, before selling — in these situations, it is important for a person not in a month, but now. Therefore, the promise of quick deadlines and a predetermined schedule has become one of the strongest market arguments.

Work in a residential or furnished apartment

This is no longer an additional bonus, but a full-fledged competitive advantage. Not every family can move out furniture, vacate the apartment, and turn off normal life for several days. The ability to paint housing without moving and without completely freeing up space is a serious factor in choice.

Dampness, mold, and problematic walls

For coastal Haifa and parts of the northern regions of Israel, this is a separate topic. The client often looks not just for painting, but for a solution to a more painful problem: traces of moisture, mold, peeling old paint, and tired ceilings. Where the contractor can not just ‘paint over’, but honestly assess the condition of the surface and prepare it, trust is higher.

Clear estimate before starting

The Israeli client is extremely sensitive to an inflating price. Therefore, the strongest offers are those where the estimate is discussed in advance, the volume is fixed before the start, and does not spread during the process.

Cleanliness and neatness

For a residential apartment, this is one of the main factors. People are not afraid of the painting itself, but of turning the house into a mess. Where neat work, furniture protection, and normal handover of the object are promised, conversion is higher.

Why a cheap offer is not always the best for the northern Israel market

At first glance, it may seem that the one who promises a lower price wins. But in reality, too aggressive cheap offers often attract not the highest quality leads. The client comes for the price ‘from…’, and then faces the fact that in reality, everything is more expensive, more complicated, and more unpleasant. As a result, both sides are dissatisfied.

For Haifa and Krayot, a different model works stronger. Not ‘from 400 ₪ and then we’ll see’, but a calm bundle:

• fix the volume in advance;
• work neatly even in a residential apartment;
• help with mold, dampness, and problematic walls;
• do not impose unnecessary;
• discuss deadlines in advance;
• do not create sudden additional charges out of thin air.

This logic is perceived today as mature and reliable. For the Israeli audience, this is much closer to the real request than the loud ‘cheapness at any cost’.

How this is related to the real estate market and the psychology of the apartment owner

Painting is also about control. When an apartment is being prepared for rent, sale, or occupancy, the owner wants to quickly regain a sense of manageability. He is not always ready for large-scale repairs, but wants to remove obvious visual problems.

Here the practical power of the service is manifested. Well-organized painting allows:

• quickly change the first impression of the apartment;
• make the property visually brighter and tidier;
• reduce the feeling of ‘fatigue’ without heavy investments;
• prepare the housing for the next stage of use.

For the Israeli reality, this is especially relevant in cities where the rental market is active, and apartments often work as an investment asset. And here NAnews — Israel News can look at the issue more broadly than the household level: painting becomes part of a real estate management strategy, not just a household trifle. That is why NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency considers this topic not only as a service but also as socio-economic: it is about how Israelis reduce costs, speed up housing preparation, and try to minimize stress around property.

What is especially important for Haifa, Krayot, Nesher, and Tirat Carmel

The local context is critical here. You cannot talk about painting an apartment in a conditionally new residential complex and in an old house with a history of dampness, dozens of traces of previous rentals, and walls that have not been updated for years in the same way.

Local specifics of the area

For this zone, the following are characteristic:

• old housing stock;
• coastal humidity;
• apartments after long-term rentals;
• the need to quickly prepare housing for re-renting;
• high sensitivity to deadlines and price.

That is why a separate service page, separate advertising, and a separate presentation of the topic work better than general texts ‘about repairing everything in the world’.

Why it is important to list cities, not hide behind the word ‘Krayot’

For trust and SEO, it is very important to say not only ‘Krayot’, but specifically: Kiryat Ata, Kiryat Bialik, Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Yam, Kiryat Haim, plus Nesher and Tirat Carmel. When a person sees their place directly, the text is perceived as a response to their real situation, not as a universal template.

Which offers really work best

Below is a short table of what most effectively removes client fear and better sells the service in this market.

What apartment owners should consider before ordering painting

Before choosing a contractor, it is useful for the owner to check not only the price but also the logic of the offer itself.

What to look at first

Is there a clear explanation of the scope of work

If it is unclear what exactly is included in the price, there will almost always be problems later.

Are they ready to work in a furnished apartment

For families and busy people, this is often one of the main questions.

Is there an honest conversation about problem areas

If there are traces of moisture on the ceiling or mold on the walls, it is important not the promise ‘everything will disappear’, but a real assessment.

Do they understand the local specifics

Haifa and northern Israel are not an abstract market. Here, humidity, old stock, and quick housing preparation scenarios are important.

Where you can view services on the topic

Russian version:

https://renovation.nikk.co.il/

Hebrew:

https://renovation.nikk.co.il/he/

English version:

https://renovation.nikk.co.il/en/

Conclusion

Apartment painting in Haifa, Kiryat Ata, Kiryat Bialik, Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Yam, Kiryat Haim, Nesher, and Tirat Carmel is no longer a story about ‘finding a painter and refreshing the walls’. Today it is a full-fledged service where peace of mind, speed, a clear estimate, neatness, work in a residential apartment, and no unpleasant surprises are sold.

For the Israeli audience, this is especially sensitive because an apartment here is not only a place of life but also an expensive asset, a rental object, family security, and a constant source of household solutions. That is why the market is increasingly moving away from cheap loud promises and moving towards normal, clear, and predictable service.

For business, this means one thing: the winner is not the one who shouts the loudest about the price, but the one who best alleviates the client’s fears. And for the reader, it means something else: when choosing a painting service, it’s important not to look at the attractive number in the first line, but at how well the scope, deadlines, limitations, and real results were explained to you in advance.

NANovosti believes that it is precisely such local topics that today form the true picture of everyday Israel: where decisions are made not at the level of advertising, but at the level of trust, practicality, and the ability to save a person time, money, and nerves.

For many, this is not a “commemorative date” or a formality. Donetsk Airport became one of the first symbols of Russian aggression against Ukraine — long before the full-scale invasion. It was there that what would be repeated over and over again first manifested in a concentrated form: when the enemy cannot break the defense in direct combat, they try to destroy the point of resistance itself along with the people, turning the building into a mass grave.

On this day, all the “cyborgs” — the defenders of the airport — are remembered. But in the section “Jews from Ukraine“, it is impossible to overlook the name Yevhen Yatsyna, call sign “Benya” — the youngest cyborg warrior who died in January 2015 in the new terminal of Donetsk Airport.

More about the defense of Donetsk Airport – “People endured, concrete did not”: in Ukraine, January 20 is the Day of Remembrance for the Defenders of Donetsk Airport

Who is Yevhen Yatsyna and why his call sign is especially resonant

Yevhen was born on January 25, 1989. A native of Kyiv, Pechersk. He studied at the Kyiv National Linguistic University, in the Faculty of Economics. Friends remembered him as a star of the university KVN and a “one-man band” — bright, lively, very sociable.

The nickname “Benya” was part of his life even before the front, and later became his call sign. And in this detail, there is an important intonation for the Jewish community: Yevhen greeted friends with the word “shalom”, responded to “Benya”, and this manner of communication was remembered by many more strongly than any official biographies. It was later reported that Yevhen’s mother was Jewish, and he himself had visited Israel and been to Jerusalem.

These strokes are important not for “origin for the sake of origin”. They show that the Jewish line in Yevhen’s history is not a decorative signature at the end, but part of his living language, habits, and connections.

The Defense of Donetsk Airport: Why It Became a Symbol

The defense of the airport lasted for months. The new terminal was turning into ruins right during the battles — under shelling, assaults, explosions. There, the war was fought not on a map, but on stairs, corridors, breaches in walls. People held positions in conditions where every day could be the last.

The word “cyborgs” appeared as an attempt to explain what seemed impossible: Ukrainian soldiers held on so persistently that even the enemy called them “not human”. And this is an important point for understanding the modern war: the Russian side from the very beginning acted on the logic of destruction, not “negotiations” or “disputes”.

Then, in 2015, the terminal was blown up, and part of the defenders ended up under the rubble. Today, in the years of full-scale war, the same principle works throughout the country: strikes on cities, energy, residential buildings — to destroy not only the defense but also the ability of society to live.

The Last Connection and Days That Ended in the Terminal

The last time Yevhen, a soldier of the 81st Brigade of the 90th Separate Airmobile Battalion, made contact was on January 18, 2015. He was definitely in the new terminal of Donetsk Airport that day.

According to his comrades, on January 19, he was wounded (a torn wound on the cheek) and concussed.
On the evening of January 20, Yevhen was caught under the collapse of the airport building after an explosion. His comrades pulled him out from under the rubble. According to them, he had fractures in both legs and a severe spinal injury — he could no longer move. He had a tag with his surname and individual code.

He did not live to see his 26th birthday — January 25 was just a few days away.

Different testimonies record different dates of death — January 19, 20, or 21. But the meaning is the same: Yevhen died in the last days of the defense of the new terminal, at the very point where the war led to the literal collapse of the building on people.

“To Georgiy Borisovich, shalom…”: Words of Georgiy Tuka

Volunteer Georgiy Tuka remembered Yevhen briefly and as one speaks of a close person — without unnecessary “literature”:

“Zhenya. Zhenya Yatsyna. Call sign ‘Benya’. A native of Kyiv. Pechersk. 25 years old. I met Zhenya back when the battalion was stationed in Zhytomyr. Zhenya had the opportunity to ‘dodge’ the draft, but as a man, as a citizen, he did not do this, and honestly went to fulfill his duty. Zhenya was the youngest fighter in the battalion. Without exaggeration, everyone’s favorite. The funniest, most sociable, most contactable. Every time our phone conversation started with the words: To Georgiy Borisovich, shalom!… Still a lump in the throat…”

This quote holds what is often lacking in official memory: voice, habit, life. Not a “hero’s portrait”, but a person who is truly missed.

“Jerusalem Thread”: A Story from His Mother

Yevhen’s mother, Svetlana, said that her son died due to closed fractures of the legs. And she recalled a detail that really brings a lump to many throats:

Once she brought a Jerusalem thread from Israel. When Zhenya came from Zhytomyr, she secretly sewed this thread into his uniform — into pockets, cuffs, “everywhere”. She did it quietly because her son considered such things “nonsense”.

But before leaving for Vodiane, Yevhen put on Pavlo Tuka’s pants — his own were dirty. And later, when the mother found out about this, she said: “Well, now it’s clear why it was the legs — there were no mother’s threads on the pants.”

This story is not about mysticism or “amulets”. It’s about a mother’s attempt to keep her son alive by any means, even the most inconspicuous. And about how war breaks such attempts mercilessly and routinely.

Help from Friends and What They Didn’t Have Time to Deliver

After Yevhen went to the army, friends collected over 40,000 hryvnias on social networks for a thermal imager, thermal underwear, and protective equipment. But they didn’t have time to deliver it to him.

This detail very accurately shows how Ukraine lived in the early years of the war: the front was held not only on orders and headquarters but also on horizontal support — when people collected money “from the world by a thread” to protect a specific fighter. Sometimes they made it. Sometimes — not.

“Wall of Memory of Those Who Fell for Ukraine”: Portrait and Exact Location

Another point of Kyiv’s memory is the memorial “Wall of Memory of Those Who Fell for Ukraine”, open to the urban space. This place is arranged so that a person can come and find a specific face — not “in the general list”, but nearby, at arm’s length.

Yevhen Yatsyna’s portrait on the “Wall of Memory” is placed with precise marking: section 5, row 3, place 38. This precision turns memory into action: you can come and stop right at his portrait.

In recent years, the “Wall of Memory” has also become part of the public diplomacy of memory: Volodymyr Zelensky often brings foreign guests there to show the cost of Russian aggression not in the language of statistics, but with the faces of the fallen.

Order “For Courage” III Degree: Fixing the Feat at the State Level

The feat of Yevhen Yatsyna is also enshrined in a state document. He was awarded the Order “For Courage” III Degree (posthumously).

The basis is Presidential Decree of Ukraine No. 270/2015 of May 15, 2015. The decree states that the award is given “for personal courage and high professionalism shown in the defense of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, loyalty to the military oath”.

Together, these elements — the funeral in Kyiv, community participation, memorial plaques, portrait on the “Wall of Memory”, and state order — form a coherent line: Yevhen Yatsyna did not dissolve in the war as “one of”. He remained a name, a face, and a story — for Ukraine and for the Jewish community, which shared this loss as their own.

Knesset and Words About the Contribution of Jews from Ukraine

On December 23, 2015, during a speech in the Knesset, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko said a phrase that still sounds like a political and human testimony:

“In confronting external aggression, our country has revived its army. And in this army, citizens of Ukraine of different nationalities are fighting. And we are proud of the contribution that Jews make to the defense of the country. I cannot but recall the glorious cyborg warrior who died in January this year at Donetsk Airport, Yevhen Yatsyna with the call sign ‘Benya’. We are proud of his feat. Posthumously, he was awarded the state order ‘For Courage’.”

This is not just a “mention of a name”. It is a public acknowledgment that the Jewish community of Ukraine is not an observer and not a “separate topic”, but part of the resistance to Russian aggression.

And this is especially important now, when Russia continues the war and continues to try to blur responsibility, substitute cause-and-effect relationships, and play the card of societal division. Stories of such people break this propaganda because they are very simple and very direct: a citizen of Ukraine went to defend the country, died, and he is remembered — by the state, the university, and the community.

Why the Story of “Benya” Sounds Sharper Today Than Ten Years Ago

Donetsk Airport was one of the first places where the war showed its true face. Back then, many still hoped that “everything would end soon”. Today, after the full-scale invasion, it has become clear: Russian aggression is a long-term project of destruction, exhaustion, terror in the rear, and an attempt to erase identity.

Against this background, the story of Yevhen Yatsyna looks not like an “episode of the past”, but as a point from which much began. It shows that resistance in Ukraine was initially nationwide — including with the participation of the Jewish community, which provided the country with warriors, volunteers, doctors, support for the families of the fallen, and public memory.

And in the end, there remains a simple formula that sounds especially honest in the section “Jews from Ukraine“:

Memory is us with you. As long as we name names and tell stories in living words, the war cannot turn people into impersonal numbers. NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency.

The story of Maya Rybnikova: from occupied Lugansk to Haifa.

A significant event for the Ukrainian diaspora took place in Haifa, in the heart of Israel.

The Embassy of Ukraine handed over the state award on December 19, 2024 “Honored Teacher of Ukraine” Maya Rybnikova is a math teacher from Russian-occupied Severodonetsk.

This award is recognition of her many years of work and resilience in the face of war and forced migration.

Maya Rybnikova left her native Lugansk in August 2014, when the Russian occupation made further residence there impossible, writes “Severodonetsk online“.

“I am a mathematics teacher with 28 years of experience. I lived in Lugansk and had no intention of leaving there until they came to release me in 2014. For a long time we hoped that Lugansk would be fired. Therefore, we left the city in August, when there were few options left to leave..”

Since then, Severodonetsk became her home for eight long years.

In 2022, with the start of a full-scale invasion, Maya was forced to flee again.

This time she ended up in Israel, in the city of Haifa, where she continues to teach mathematics online to her students from Ukraine.

Maya Rybnikova is a symbol of dedication to her work and faith in the future. Through her lessons, she inspires high school students even from afar, showing that education is a power that transcends boundaries.

Teaching at a Distance: Challenges and Achievements

Maya Rybnikova, with 28 years of experience, believes that distance learning is not a temporary solution, but a way to preserve the educational process in war conditions.

Her key achievements:

• Every year, Maya's students take the NMT (National Multi-Subject Test) with 200 marks.
• She organized full-fledged online courses for high school students preparing for final exams.
• Maya actively supports the initiative to maintain distance learning for schools in the temporarily occupied territories.

“Education is something that cannot be taken away. It will always stay with you,” says Maya.

“Honored Teacher of Ukraine”: what does this award mean?

For Maya Rybnikova, the title “Honored Teacher of Ukraine” is not just an honorary recognition, but an incentive to continue working and helping students, despite the distance.

» Not exactly the point. There is still some way to go. I don’t want to have defeats, I want to be in shape. For example, I was upset, although I expected it, that the 200-point results this year are much lower than last year. And it’s as if you understand that it’s not your fault, but you’re always haunted by the thought that you could have done better.

This title was never my goal. This is definitely not a piece of paper that I will wave around everywhere. And it has nothing to do with the quality of my work. I worked without a title, and I still work with it. But honestly, it’s nice!“,” Maya shares.

Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv: a bridge between Israel and Ukraine

The award ceremony took place in Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Avivwhich became an important link between Ukrainian and Jewish cultures.

“There are a lot of pleasant, solemn moments in the work of a diplomat. One of them is in these photos. Yesterday in Haifa I had the honor to present the state award “Honored Teacher of Ukraine” to Maya Rybnikova,” wrote Zoryan Kis, coordinator Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv

The Center actively supports Ukrainians forced to leave their homeland, providing a platform for dialogue, cultural exchange and preservation of national identity.

“At the request of the Lugansk Regional State Administration, the Embassy of Ukraine in the State of Israel had the honor to present the state award “Honored Teacher of Ukraine” to Mrs. Maya Rybnikova, a teacher at the Severodonetsk Multidisciplinary Lyceum in the Lugansk Region of Ukraine.” – noted a representative of the center.

“Ukraine and Israel share the values ​​of freedom and education. The story of Maya Rybnikova is an example of how two cultures can inspire each other,” we will add, NAnews.

Why is this story important to Israelis?

The Ukrainian community in Israel is one of the most active. The story of Maya Rybnikova resonates with Israelis, because it reflects values ​​that are close to both nations:

1. Family and home. Like the Jewish people, Ukrainians know what it means to lose a home.
2. Education. Teachers in both cultures are revered as guardians of knowledge.
3. Dream of return. Just as Jews dreamed of returning to Israel, Maya dreams of seeing a free Severodonetsk.

Prospects and hopes

Maya Rybnikova believes in the future of her homeland and dreams of returning to the Ukrainian Severodonetsk.

“I am sure that one day we will open the doors of our lyceum again. This will be a victory day for all of Ukraine,” she says.

Support for Ukrainians in Israel

Website NAnews – Israel News has repeatedly covered the initiatives of the Ukrainian community in Israel, emphasizing their contribution to strengthening relations between our peoples.

The story of Maya Rybnikova is a reminder that strength of spirit and the desire to teach can overcome any boundaries.

“We believe that Ukraine and Israel will inspire each other to new achievements. Together we are stronger,” notes the editors of NAnovosti.

This story shows how personal example can become a symbol of the unity of two peoples.

Ukraine and Israel, teacher and student, dream and reality – all this is united in the fate of one strong woman.

………………..

Leave a comment on WhatsApp – channel NAnews ↓ — Israel News

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According to published data, a piece of red fabric approximately 10 by 15 centimeters was sold for 80 thousand dollars.

But the value of this item lies not in the sickle, hammer, or Soviet symbolism. The flag is a reminder of a time when two rival superpowers could simultaneously compete, converse, and leave room for gestures of goodwill.

Today the contrast looks especially sharp.

In 1969, an American astronaut voluntarily took the USSR flag to the Moon to emphasize that space exploration should unite humanity.

Decades later, Putin’s Russia is waging a war of aggression against Ukraine, cooperating with the Iranian regime, hosting representatives of Hamas in Moscow, politically shielding Hezbollah, and using international platforms to pressure Israel.

The story of the small flag became a story of what path could have been chosen — and where Putin’s Russia actually led.

The flag was a gesture, not a Soviet victory on the Moon

At the Sotheby’s auction, the item was listed as lot №45 under the title:

Flown to the Moon on Apollo 11 — Buzz Aldrin’s USSR Flag.

The flag belonged to Buzz Aldrin’s family trust. It retained the astronaut’s signature and a blue pen inscription:

FLOWN TO THE MOON ON APOLLO XI.

The preliminary estimate was 7–10 thousand dollars. Sotheby’s public card confirms that the auction ended on July 15, 2026, but the final result is available only to registered users.

It is important to understand: this was not a flag planted by Soviet cosmonauts on the lunar surface.

It was taken by Buzz Aldrin, one of the first two people to set foot on the Moon.

The flag was in his Personal Preference Kit — PPK, a small personal set of items allowed for each astronaut. Along with the Soviet flag, Aldrin took flags of the USA, Texas, and his native New Jersey.

In a letter accompanying the lot, Aldrin explained his choice as an act of diplomacy and a gesture of goodwill between the USA and the Soviet Union. According to him, he wanted to show that Apollo 11 was an achievement of humanity that transcended national borders.

The flag flew aboard the command module Columbia. It reached lunar orbit and returned to Earth, but there is no evidence of it being transferred to the lunar module and the Moon’s surface.

Thus, it is not about Soviet presence on the Moon, but about a personal gesture of an American astronaut towards his country’s main rival.

Even at the height of the Cold War, there was room for contact

The Apollo 11 mission was primarily an American victory in the space race.

The USSR was the first to launch an artificial satellite, the first to send a human into space, but the USA was the first to land people on the Moon.

Despite this, the American side tried to give the flight an international meaning.

On board were flags of American states, territories, and other countries. A silicon disk with messages from leaders of 73 countries was left on the Moon. A plaque with the words: “We came in peace for all mankind” was attached to the landing stage of the Eagle.

Six years later, symbolic gestures turned into real cooperation.

On July 17, 1975, the American Apollo spacecraft docked in orbit with the Soviet Soyuz. Astronaut Thomas Stafford and cosmonaut Alexei Leonov exchanged a historic handshake. The joined spacecraft remained together for about 47 hours, with crews visiting each other, conducting experiments, and practicing technologies for future joint missions.

The USA and the USSR did not cease to be adversaries.

They still had nuclear missiles, intelligence, propaganda, competition for allies, and fundamentally different political systems. But even in such conditions, they understood that there were areas where cooperation was necessary for the safety of the entire world.

Buzz Aldrin’s small Soviet flag was one of the first symbols of this possibility.

Putin’s Russia chose the opposite path

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia had a chance to become part of the system of international cooperation.

However, the Putin regime gradually built a state for which external aggression, blackmail, propaganda, and the search for enemies became a way to maintain power.

The culmination was the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

The Russian army began destroying Ukrainian cities, attacking residential buildings, hospitals, power plants, and other civilian infrastructure. In June 2026, the European Council again stated that Russia had intensified large-scale missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities and energy facilities.

On November 23, 2022, the European Parliament recognized Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state using terrorist methods.

The decision was supported by 494 deputies. The European Parliament pointed to deliberate attacks by Russian forces on civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. This was a political resolution, not an inclusion in a pan-European legal list, as no such mechanism existed in the EU. But the assessment was crystal clear: the actions of the Russian regime are considered terrorism.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also recognized the Russian regime as terrorist and condemned Russia’s use of energy terrorism against the population.

Therefore, the expression “Russia is a terrorist” did not arise as an emotional slogan of social networks. It became a political and legal assessment of a state that turned missiles on cities into a tool of pressure.

The war tied Russia with Iran

For Israel, it is especially important who Putin’s Russia has built a new system of alliances with.

One of Moscow’s main partners became the Iranian regime.

Iran supplied Russia with drones, missiles, ammunition, and technologies related to their production for the war against Ukraine. The European Union repeatedly imposed sanctions against Iranian companies, military, and intermediaries involved in supplying weapons to the Russian army.

In January 2026, the EU imposed new restrictions, emphasizing that Iran’s military support for Russia continues and poses a direct threat to European security.

Cooperation works both ways.

According to the US State Department, in response to Iranian military assistance, Russia began offering Tehran an unprecedented level of defense cooperation — in the fields of missiles, electronics, and air defense. The British parliamentary committee also indicated that Moscow is likely helping Iran’s missile program in exchange for support in the war against Ukraine.

On January 17, 2025, Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a twenty-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

The document provides for the development of military and military-technical cooperation, joint exercises, exchange of intelligence information, interaction in energy, finance, and nuclear technologies. It is not a treaty of unconditional mutual defense, but it consolidates the strategic rapprochement between Moscow and Tehran.

For Israel, this is not a distant European problem.

Iran uses Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other armed formations for attacks on Israel and destabilization of the Middle East region. The European Council directly calls Hamas and Hezbollah part of the system of Iranian-supported terrorist and armed groups.

It turns out to be a vicious circle.

Iran helps Russia destroy Ukrainian cities.

Russia strengthens the regime that arms and finances Israel’s enemies.

Hamas gains political legitimacy in Moscow

Russia does not recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization and has been receiving its leaders at the official level for many years.

Moscow’s behavior after the massacre on October 7, 2023 is particularly telling.

Already on October 26, 2023, less than three weeks after the attack on Israel, a Hamas delegation arrived in Moscow. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially confirmed the visit. Simultaneously, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran was in the Russian capital.

In January 2024, the Russian Foreign Ministry again received a Hamas delegation. Moscow claimed it demanded the release of hostages, including Russian citizens, but the very fact of an official reception after the mass killing of Israelis provided the terrorist organization with an international platform and political legitimacy.

Contacts continued in 2025: a delegation led by Mousa Abu Marzouk again held talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov.

There is no confirmed open-source data on direct Russian arms supplies to Hamas.

However, assistance is not only military.

Official meetings, refusal to recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization, diplomatic protection, and providing a Moscow platform allow the group’s leaders to demonstrate that after October 7, they were not in complete international isolation.

Moscow protects Hezbollah too

The situation with Hezbollah is similar.

It was Iran that created and armed this organization for decades, turning it into one of the largest missile threats to Israel.

The Russian Foreign Ministry not only refused to take a tough stance against Hezbollah but also publicly emphasized its resilience.

In October 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that Hezbollah, including its military wing, retained control and demonstrated organization. Simultaneously, Moscow accused Israel and its Western partners of expanding the conflict.

This does not prove direct Russian financing of the organization.

But such rhetoric shows whose side the Kremlin’s political sympathy is on. Instead of unconditionally condemning the group that shelled northern Israel with rockets and drones, Russian officials effectively assessed its combat capability and blamed Israel.

At the same time, strengthening strategic partnership with Iran objectively strengthens the state that finances, arms, and directs Hezbollah.

In the UN, Russia systematically opposes Israel

The assertion that Russia votes against Israel in absolutely all cases would be inaccurate.

But Moscow’s overall line is clear: on international platforms, it systematically supports documents directed against Israel and resists attempts to hold Hamas accountable for the war.

In October 2023, Russia submitted its own draft resolution on Gaza to the UN Security Council. The text condemned violence against civilians, but Hamas was not mentioned at all, despite the massacre on October 7 and the hostage-taking. The project did not receive the necessary number of votes.

In June 2024, Russia was the only member of the Security Council to abstain from voting on Resolution №2735, which supported a ceasefire plan, the release of hostages, and a negotiation process. The other 14 members of the Security Council voted in favor.

Moscow seeks to present itself as a mediator, but its practical actions speak otherwise.

It receives Hamas, cooperates with Iran, politically shields Hezbollah, and uses the UN primarily to pressure Israel and oppose the USA.

This is no longer neutral mediation.

It is part of a broader strategy in which any force capable of weakening the West, Ukraine, or Israel is seen by the Kremlin as a useful partner.

What the sold flag really symbolizes

The Soviet flag that flew to the Moon with Apollo 11 does not remind of the greatness of the USSR.

It reminds of the possibility of dialogue between adversaries.

Buzz Aldrin did not support the Soviet regime. The USA did not abandon competition and did not forget the threat from Moscow. But the American astronaut considered it possible to take the symbol of a rival state on a flight as a sign that there are achievements belonging to all humanity.

In 1975, this gesture continued with a handshake between an American and a Soviet cosmonaut in orbit.

Today, Putin’s Russia offers a completely different symbolic series:

• rockets over Kyiv;
• Iranian drones over Ukrainian cities;
• agreements with a regime threatening Israel’s destruction;
• Hamas delegations in Moscow;
• political shielding of Hezbollah;
• and votes in the UN, where condemning Israel is almost always more important for the Kremlin than condemning the terrorists who attacked it.

For NAnews — Israel News, the story of the flag is important precisely because of this contrast.

Once, even during the Cold War, a small flag could become a sign of respect between rivals.

Putin, with his war against Ukraine, has turned modern Russia into a state that seeks not cooperation, but alliances with dictatorships, terrorist structures, and enemies of Israel.

Buzz Aldrin’s red flag remains an artifact of a lost opportunity.

And today’s Russia chose not a handshake in space, but rockets, terror, and partnership with those who fight against Ukraine and Israel.

This decision comes after four years of struggle, numerous appeals, administrative procedures, and a court appeal. In 2022, Israeli authorities demanded that the mother and her minor daughter leave the country and return to Ukraine — at a time when their native Kherson was under Russian occupation.

Now the court has recognized that serious errors were made in the consideration of the case, and the family’s real connection to Israel was not properly assessed.

Deportation to Kherson during a full-scale war

Oksana K. first came to Israel in 2011. She later married an Israeli citizen, and in 2012 began the process of legalizing her status based on marriage. Her daughter Liza, who came to the country as a child, lived with her in Israel.

The family settled in Petah Tikva. Liza attended an Israeli school, spoke Hebrew fluently, and spent almost her entire conscious life in Israel.

Oksana’s husband died in August 2019. After his death, the usual procedure for obtaining status was halted, and the mother and daughter appealed to the Ministry of Interior to allow them to stay under special humanitarian circumstances.

The review was delayed.

On February 24, 2022, a few hours after the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Oksana and Liza attended a scheduled meeting at the Population Authority. They waited about six months for a response to their appeal.

In early September 2022, the Ministry of Interior reported that it did not consider their situation sufficient humanitarian grounds. The women were ordered to leave Israel within 14 days and return to Kherson, which was then under Russian control. Oksana’s eldest son was serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and participating in combat at that time.

At the time of the decision, Liza was still a minor. She was born on December 6, 2004, so in September 2022 she was 17 years old, not 15, as stated in some later retellings of this story.

Why the Ministry of Interior denied the family

The Population Authority argued that long-term residence in Israel alone is not sufficient reason to grant status.

In its official response, the agency stated that Oksana, besides her daughter, had no close relatives in Israel, while her son and sister remained in Ukraine. The Ministry of Interior also cited Oksana’s trips to Ukraine and questioned whether Israel was truly the center of the family’s life.

Some officials’ doubts concerned Oksana’s relationship with her deceased Israeli husband. According to the Population Authority, the legalization process was stopped and resumed several times, and the circumstances presented were insufficient to grant humanitarian status.

However, the agency’s formal approach almost did not take into account the daughter’s life.

Liza grew up in Israel, graduated from school here, spoke mainly in Hebrew, had friends, a team, coaches, and a professional future in the country. Ukraine remained her country of birth, but practically all her social and sports life was connected to Israel.

Israeli team — without Israeli status

Liza began playing handball shortly after arriving in the country. In the second grade, she enrolled in the Maccabi Petah Tikva sports school and later joined the youth and reserve teams of Israel.

The Israeli Handball Federation publicly supported the athlete back in September 2022. The women’s team coach, Reuven Yosfolski, described her as a tall, strong, and athletic handball player with serious technical capabilities and prospects in Israeli sports.

An absurd situation arose: Liza trained in the Israeli team uniform and was supposed to represent Israel in competitions, but the state itself refused to recognize her as a permanent resident.

Due to the lack of regulated status, she could not work normally, serve in the IDF, use regular medical insurance, or freely travel to international tournaments. In 2023, the athlete said she missed the European Championship, although she remained on the team until the last moment: the lack of documents prevented her from traveling with the team.

Liza also could not fulfill another dream — to undergo military conversion. Her school friends received draft notices and began service, while the girl who wanted to voluntarily serve Israel remained without official status.

Meanwhile, her sports career continued. Liza played for the adult team Maccabi Petah Tikva, was recognized as one of the breakthrough athletes of the season, and during her loan to Bnot Herzliya, participated in the club’s championship playoff matches.

Three years of administrative struggle

Alex Zernopolsky’s office got involved in the case at the stage of appealing the deportation decision.

After filing the appeal, the initial decision was overturned, and the mother and daughter’s application was sent for consideration by the interdepartmental humanitarian commission. However, this did not mean immediate receipt of documents.

According to Zernopolsky, the Ministry of Interior continued to delay the process. Family representatives were told that the police’s position was awaited, then claimed that the decision was under review by the central office. The internal appeal remained unanswered for a long time.

On July 31, 2023, the humanitarian commission reviewed the case again, but by September, a final decision had still not been made. The mother and daughter continued to live in Israel without regulated status, medical insurance, or certainty about the future.

The case then went through the Appeals Tribunal for Entry and Stay in Israel and reached the Jerusalem District Court.

What the Jerusalem District Court recognized

The final turn occurred on July 5, 2026.

Judge Tamar Bar-Asher of the Jerusalem District Court granted the administrative appeal of Liza K. and Oksana K. The court ruled that the Appeals Tribunal incorrectly assessed their connection to Israel.

The judge noted that Oksana’s trips to Ukraine could not automatically be used as evidence that the center of the family’s life was outside Israel. These trips needed to be considered in the context of her marriage, family situation, and many years of living in the country.

One of the key violations was that the Population Authority staff did not conduct a separate full interview with Liza. Her individual story — childhood in Israel, education, language, sports career, social connections, and desire to serve in the IDF — was not properly studied.

The court also took into account the conclusion of the representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs, who recommended granting the mother and daughter’s request.

As a result, the court not only sent the case for another review but ordered the Population Authority to grant both women permanent resident status in Israel.

“As if I was released from prison”

After the decision, 21-year-old Liza told Israeli media that for the first time in many years, she felt solid ground under her feet.

She compared the years of uncertainty to being in detention and said she now finally feels part of the country. Obtaining permanent status allows her to voluntarily enlist in the IDF, begin the conversion process, and continue her professional sports career without previous restrictions.

Alex Zernopolsky called the decision the end of years of injustice against the widow of an Israeli citizen and her daughter — an athlete representing Israeli handball.

“I am glad that justice for the mother and daughter was achieved, even if delayed by several years,” the lawyer said after the court’s decision.

Why this decision is important for Israel

Liza K.’s story shows how serious the consequences of a formal approach to humanitarian cases can be.

A person can grow up in Israel, graduate from an Israeli school, speak Hebrew, represent the national team, aspire to serve in the IDF, and still remain a temporary foreigner to the state system for years.

The court’s position on minor children included in their parents’ immigration cases is especially important. Their circumstances cannot be considered only as an attachment to the mother’s or father’s documents. State bodies are obliged to separately assess where the child grew up, what language they speak, where they study, with which society they are connected, and which country they truly consider their home.

For Liza and Oksana K., the court decision ended almost four years of struggle against deportation.

For the Israeli system, this decision served as a reminder: humanitarian circumstances consist not only of passport stamps, entry and exit dates, or formal procedural stages. Behind each such case is a human life that cannot be put on hold for four years.

Page – Law Office of Alex Zernopolsky

Shmuel Agnon (born July 17, 1888, Buchach, Ukraine) is a famous Jewish writer whose life and work are closely connected with Ukraine. The events of his most famous novels, “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night,” for which he received the Nobel Prize in Literature, take place in his native Buchach and its surroundings.

In Ukrainian Buchach

To date, not many of Agnon’s works have been translated into Ukrainian, but interest in them is growing in Ukraine, which means that Ukrainian readers are in for an acquaintance with his books.

The Nobel Prize in Literature laureate of 1966 “For his profoundly original narrative art with motifs from Jewish folk tales.” He became the first laureate of one of the Nobel Prizes representing Israel. He wrote in Hebrew and Yiddish.

The influence of the Talmud on Shmuel Agnon’s work was significant. He was born as Shmuel Yosef Halevi Czaczkes in July 1887 in Buchach, now Chortkiv district of Ternopil region. His father, Shalom Mordechai Halevi Czaczkes, was a rabbi and fur trader, knowledgeable in the Torah and Talmud, and often explained them to the local Jewish community.

Shmuel’s mother, Esther Farb, and grandfather, Yehuda Farb, were also educated people. Shmuel attended a cheder and received a good home education, studying Yiddish, Hebrew, German, and Ukrainian languages, as well as the Talmud under his father’s guidance.

Starting to write early, at the age of 8, Shmuel published stories in local newspapers. At 19, he moved to Lviv and worked in a Jewish newspaper. In 1907, his first novella “Forsaken Wives” was published, which in Hebrew sounds like “Agnon,” becoming his pseudonym and official surname since 1924.

Palestine and Berlin

In the same year, Agnon went to Palestine, and then to Berlin, where he wrote, lectured, gave private Hebrew lessons, and published works in the newspaper Jude.

He was supported by patron Zalman Schocken, who provided a five-year scholarship for organizing an anthology of Jewish literature and writing new works. Agnon’s works were published in German at Schocken’s publishing house in Berlin.

Love Against All Odds

In Berlin, Shmuel Agnon found true love — Esther Marks, or “dear Esterlein,” as he called her. The girl’s father was against their marriage, but they married anyway, and the ceremony was conducted by Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg.

They had a daughter, Emuna (“faith”), and a son, Shalom Mordechai, whom they called Hemdat (“soul’s desire”) at home.

Three Destroyed Homes

In 1924, the family moved to Jerusalem. The move was preceded by tragedy: the writer’s house in Hamburg burned down, destroying the library and manuscripts, including the novel “The Community of the Ever-Living.”

Agnon decided to return to the Promised Land. He moved to Jerusalem first, and a year later called for Esther and the children. In 1927, an earthquake occurred in Jerusalem.

“The disaster did not destroy our souls,” Agnon wrote, “only the house we lived in.”

Two years later, in 1929, the new Agnon home in Jerusalem was looted during Arab riots. “Esterlein,” he wrote to his wife, “we need to start everything anew: the house is ruined, things are stolen or broken. But… do not grieve and do not think about it.”

World Fame and the Nobel Prize

Agnon gained world fame in the late 1940s when his works began to be published in English. In 1966, Agnon became the first writer writing in Hebrew and Yiddish to receive the Nobel Prize for the novels “The Bridal Canopy” and “A Guest for the Night.”

In his speech, he noted that he draws inspiration from spiritual literature.

“Keep Quiet! Agnon is Working!”

Israel is proud of its Nobel laureate. When a construction site was opened in the Talpiot area, Mayor Teddy Kollek installed a sign saying: “Keep quiet! Agnon is working!” European critics compared him to Marcel Proust, James Joyce, and William Faulkner.

Agnon wrote in various genres but was wounded by the fact that many of his readers became victims of the Holocaust. His last novel, “Just Recently,” set in Palestine during the Second Aliyah, is dedicated to the catastrophe of European Jewry.

Memory of the Writer

Shmuel Agnon died of a heart attack on February 17, 1970, in Jerusalem at the age of 82. He was buried on the Mount of Olives, and his apartment became a memorial museum.

In his native Buchach, which he last visited in 1930, a monument was erected in his honor, a street is named after him, and a bas-relief of the writer adorns the entrance to the local “ART-Court.”

There has been no literal uprising in Russia yet. There are no protesting sailors on the streets, and the Black Sea Fleet command has not turned against the Kremlin.

However, something unusual has happened in the Russian information system: pro-military Telegram channels, which for years justified the war against Ukraine, have begun openly accusing officials and military leadership of failing to protect their own fleet.

The trigger was a series of Ukrainian strikes conducted from July 6 to 15, 2026. Over nine days, Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces claimed to have hit 116 ships in the Azov Sea, after which the operation moved to the Black Sea, where on the night of July 14-15, another 20 Russian ships were struck.

Nine days that changed the situation in the Azov Sea

Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi, known by the call sign ‘Madyar,’ reported that Ukrainian units consistently attacked Russian tankers, bulk carriers, tugs, ferries, and other vessels involved in transportation between the Azov Sea, the Volga-Don Canal, the Kerch Strait, and the Black Sea.

The goal was not necessarily to sink every vessel. The Ukrainian side aimed to disable ships, force crews to abandon them, and leave damaged vessels adrift without the ability to continue operations.

Special attention was paid to the so-called feeder fleet — small and medium tankers that deliver petroleum products from Russian river and Azov ports to larger tankers waiting in the Black Sea.

Strikes on such a system can disrupt several logistics chains at once:

• fuel delivery to occupied Crimea;
• supply of Russian military facilities;
• export of petroleum products;
• transportation of grain and other agricultural cargo;
• movement of ships between the Don, Azov, and Black Seas.

Reuters notes that the exact location and timing of each strike shown by the Ukrainian military could not be independently verified. The number 116 is also based on Ukrainian command data and does not mean that all these ships were sunk. However, subsequent navigation restrictions, satellite images, and admissions by Russian regional authorities confirm that the operation had real consequences.

Russia itself closed key maritime routes

On July 10, 2026, Russian border services effectively halted passage through the Azov-Don Canal — a shipping route connecting the Don River with the Azov Sea.

Simultaneously, shipping companies received notification that applications for passage through the Kerch Strait from 18:10 local time would not be accepted. The Russian side did not specify the duration of the restrictions.

The Kerch Strait is the only maritime exit from the Azov Sea to the Black Sea. The Azov-Don Canal, in turn, connects the Azov Sea with Russia’s internal waterways system.

As a result, commercial vessels could move within the Azov Sea but could not normally leave it through the Kerch Strait or go through the canal towards the Don and Volga. Russian authorities did not officially announce a complete closure of the area, but industry sources confirmed the presence of restrictions.

Satellite images show a sharp change in maritime traffic. On June 6, 2026, more than 40 ships were waiting to pass near the Kerch Strait. In images from July 11, only a few ships remained in the same area.

Reuters examined more than 30 satellite images and noted that before the start of the Ukrainian campaign, ship clusters near the strait were regularly observed. After the restrictions were introduced, the usual picture disappeared.

According to the Institute for the Study of War, the number of Russian ships in the Azov Sea decreased from 267 on June 30 to approximately 120 by July 11 — about 55%. Some ships left before the routes were closed, some may have turned off their transponders, and damaged ships were sent for repair or remained in the area.

Russian grain exports were hit

The Azov Sea is important for Russia not only from a military standpoint.

Up to a quarter of Russia’s wheat exports pass through the ports and routes of this region. The Rostov region and Krasnodar Krai are among Russia’s main grain-producing regions, and nearby ports are used for exporting grain, sunflower oil, and other goods.

After information about navigation restrictions emerged, Euronext wheat prices rose by almost 4%, reaching a six-week high.

On July 14, 2026, the Minister of Agriculture and Food of the Rostov region, Anna Kasyanenko, acknowledged that the region, along with exporters, began working on alternative routes for grain export due to ‘temporary difficulties’ with navigation in the Azov Sea.

The Russian Federal Ministry of Agriculture simultaneously claimed that the events would supposedly not affect the domestic market and the country’s export capabilities. But the very fact of urgently seeking bypass routes shows that the problem has gone far beyond military reports.

Redirecting cargo to rail or distant ports means additional costs, a shortage of wagons, overloading of transport infrastructure, and increased delivery times. Even if Russia can partially restore exports, its cost inevitably rises.

The destruction of the ‘Izumrud’ and questions to Russian command

A separate symbol of this campaign was the destruction of the Russian border patrol ship of the second rank ‘Izumrud’, belonging to the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Service.

The Ukrainian Navy reported that the ship was attacked near Novorossiysk by a marine drone Sargan-3000. According to Ukrainian data, there were casualties and injuries among the crew.

On July 14, 2026, the Ukrainian Navy published a satellite image of the damaged ship near the quay wall. The Ukrainian side stated that the image confirms the destruction of the ‘Izumrud.’ Russia did not provide detailed official information about the ship’s condition.

This ship was already known in Ukraine.

On November 25, 2018, the ‘Izumrud’ participated in a Russian operation in the Kerch Strait when Russian forces attacked Ukrainian military boats ‘Berdyansk’ and ‘Nikopol,’ as well as the tug ‘Yany Kapu.’ At that time, 24 Ukrainian sailors were captured.

Almost eight years later, the ship that participated in that operation itself became the target of a Ukrainian marine drone.

Even Kremlin supporters began asking questions

It was the strike on the FSB ship that caused an especially sharp reaction in the Russian pro-military community.

A military blogger associated with the Kremlin publicly asked why the entrance to the port was not blocked by protective nets and why Russian forces could not detect Ukrainian drones in advance.

He also accused officials of insufficient attention to protecting Russian ports from marine and aerial drones.

Another Russian milblogger posed an even more unpleasant question for the command: how did Ukrainian devices manage to approach the FSB ship unnoticed and strike near one of the most important basing areas of the Russian fleet.

The Institute for the Study of War notes that such criticism does not come from the Russian opposition but from people who support the war and demand that the Kremlin conduct it even more harshly. Therefore, their outrage cannot be considered an anti-war protest.

This is a different type of conflict — a clash between Russian propaganda, which for years told of the country’s complete security, and the reality in which Ukrainian drones reach ships, ports, and logistics facilities far from the front line.

The Black Sea became the next stage

After the active phase of the operation in the Azov Sea was completed, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces shifted strikes to the Black Sea.

On the night of July 14-15, 2026, according to Robert Brovdi, another 20 Russian ships were attacked:

• 17 oil tankers;
• two gas carriers;
• one tug.

Brovdi stated that the previous phase with 116 targets in the Azov Sea was completed, and the new phase will focus mainly on the Black Sea.

Thus, Russia faced not isolated attacks but a consistent campaign covering the entire connected maritime system: internal waterways, the Azov Sea, the Kerch Strait, occupied Crimea, and the Black Sea.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the attacks ‘terrorism’ and stated that Ukraine’s actions allegedly go beyond piracy.

The Ukrainian side responds that the targets are ships and vessels that support the Russian military machine, ensuring the transportation of fuel, petroleum products, and other resources used to continue the war.

Robert Brovdi responded to Lavrov with the phrase:

‘No piracy, Lavrov — just business. Your bloody business.’

Reuters quotes a source in the Russian shipping industry who compared the ships in the Azov Sea to targets before a firing squad and suggested that soon there may be almost no undamaged ships left in the area. Several grain carriers attacked on July 13 and 14, according to industry sources, caught fire.

Why this story is important for Israel

For Israel, events in the Azov and Black Seas have not only military significance.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest exporters of grain and sunflower oil. Any prolonged restrictions on maritime trade can affect global prices, insurance rates, freight costs, and supply routes to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The first consequences have already manifested in the European wheat market, although it is too early to assert that the July campaign will lead to a long-term increase in food prices in Israel.

The strategic aspect is no less important.

Ukraine demonstrates that relatively inexpensive unmanned systems can paralyze ship movement, force the enemy to close straits and canals, and pose a threat to a larger fleet without classical sea superiority.

For Israel, which simultaneously faces threats from drones, missiles, attacks on maritime routes, and attempts to disrupt trade through the Red Sea, the Ukrainian experience is of particular interest.

NANews — Israel News views the events not as a story of a sudden ‘rebellion’ by Russian propagandists, but as a sign of a deeper crisis.

The Kremlin promised that the war would not approach Russian cities and ports. Now Russian ships are burning in the Azov Sea, an FSB ship is destroyed near a base, exporters are seeking bypass routes, and war supporters are asking where the protection they were told about four years ago has gone.

The Ukrainian operation has not yet completely destroyed Russian maritime logistics. There is no independent confirmation of the defeat of each of the claimed 136 ships.

But the main result is already clear: Russia is forced to change routes, restrict its own navigation, and spend more resources on protecting ports that were recently considered a safe rear.

And the public panic of pro-military Russian channels shows that marine drones hit not only ships.

They destroy one of the Kremlin’s main myths — the myth of a state capable of controlling the sea, protecting its own territory, and continuing the war against Ukraine with impunity.

But in reality, this approach often becomes the most costly mistake.

In Israel, the pension system is arranged so that a person can have several different sources of future income: state old-age benefits, a pension fund, Bituach Menahalim, Kupat Gemel, Keren Hishtalmut, severance pay, old savings from previous employers, and additional insurance or pension programs. Some of this money people remember, some they have long forgotten, and some programs they only learn about after a professional review.

And here arises the main question for those who have already turned 60 or are approaching this age: can one already start receiving a pension from the pension fund and continue working?

The answer may be unexpected. In some cases — yes, this possibility is indeed worth checking. But this does not mean that everyone over 60 should urgently start receiving payments. For one person, such a step may increase family income today, while for another — decrease future pension, affect taxes, or create problems for the family in the future.

Therefore, the right question is not “am I entitled to a pension?” but rather: what is beneficial in my specific situation?

Pension in Israel is not a single button and not a single payment

For many Russian-speaking Israelis, the word “pension” sounds like something singular: reached the age, submitted documents, started receiving money. But in Israel, everything is more complicated, and because of this, people often get confused.

There is an old-age benefit from Bituach Leumi. This is a state payment that depends on age, insurance record, income, and other conditions.

There is a pension fund — money that has been accumulated over the years from employee and employer contributions. These funds are not the same as the Bituach Leumi benefit and operate under different rules.

There is severance pay — a compensatory part that may be related to dismissal, job change, and pension savings. Sometimes a person perceives this money as a “free amount” that can simply be taken, but such a decision can affect the future monthly pension.

There is Keren Hishtalmut, Kupat Gemel, old pension programs, additional insurances, and savings that may have remained from previous workplaces. This is especially common for people who have changed employers several times in their lives, worked part-time, were self-employed, or moved between cities and fields of employment.

That is why before retiring, it is important not just to ask an acquaintance “how was it for you?” but to gather a complete picture.

• How many pension programs do you have?
• Where are the savings located?
• What amount is already there?
• What commissions do you pay?
• What is the forecast for the monthly pension?
• What will happen if you start receiving payments now?
• What will change if you wait a few more years?
• How is all this related to taxes, spouse, heirs, and future living standards?

Until these questions are answered, any decision will be more of a guess than planning.

Why the age of 60+ requires a separate check

In Israel, there is the concept of early retirement age. For many pension issues, the age of 60 becomes an important point because it is after this age that in some cases, one can consider starting to receive payments from the pension fund.

But this is not an automatic right “for everyone” and not a universal advice.

Imagine a typical family in Israel. The husband is 63 years old, the wife is 59. The husband continues to work, receives a salary, and the family is used to planning expenses around the current income. They know that there will be a pension someday, but are not sure when exactly to start the process, what documents are needed, and whether it makes sense to check something in advance.

After a professional review, it may turn out that the pension fund already allows considering a monthly payment, even if the person continues to work. For the family, this may mean additional income now: money for current expenses, helping children, treatment, rent, mortgage, trips, or just a more peaceful life.

But for another family with a similar age and similar salary, the calculation may show the opposite. If you start receiving money too early, the future pension may become lower. If you incorrectly handle severance pay, you can worsen the long-term picture. If you do not consider the tax, the amount “on paper” will not be the same amount that actually comes to the account.

That’s why the topic of 60+ is so sensitive: you can’t work by template here.

The same question — “receive now or wait?” — can have two different correct answers for two people.

The pension fund is not Bituach Leumi

One of the most common confusions arises between Bituach Leumi and the pension fund. People say “pension,” but mean completely different things.

Bituach Leumi is the national insurance system. The old-age benefit is related to state rules, age of entitlement, income checks in certain periods, and insurance record.

The pension fund is savings that were formed through work. Money was transferred there from the salary and employer contributions. These funds may be related to pension payments, severance pay, insurance part, and the chosen pension route.

If a person mixes these two topics, they may incorrectly assess their situation. For example, they may think: “I am not yet receiving Bituach Leumi, so there can be no pension yet.” Or vice versa: “Since I am soon entitled to an old-age benefit, the pension fund will do everything itself.”

In practice, it doesn’t work that way.

Bituach Leumi benefits and payments from the pension fund need to be considered separately, and then look at the overall picture of family income. Only then can you understand how much money a person can actually receive per month, what amounts will be gross, what net, what will happen with the tax, and how income will change after stopping work.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency regularly raises such topics precisely because for Russian-speaking families in Israel, this is not an abstract financial theory, but a question of everyday life: paying for housing, maintaining income levels, not losing rights, and not signing documents whose consequences will be difficult to correct later.

Where people most often lose money

The most common mistake is not checking pension savings at all. A person sees deductions in the payslip, knows that “something is there,” but does not understand in which fund the money is, what investment route is chosen, how much maintenance costs, and what the forecast for the future pension is.

The second mistake is waiting for dismissal or official retirement age to open documents for the first time. By this time, some decisions may already be less flexible, and there is much less time left for calm preparation.

The third mistake is withdrawing severance pay without calculation. At first glance, this seems logical: the money is accumulated, so it can be used now. But in Israel’s pension system, the compensatory part is often linked to the future pension, and its withdrawal can significantly reduce the monthly payment in old age. Sometimes a person receives a lump sum today but loses much more in the future.

The fourth mistake is looking only at the “gross” amount. The pension payment may look attractive in calculation, but after taxes and other conditions, the real amount will be different. Therefore, it is important to understand not only the size of the possible pension but also how much a person will actually see in the bank account.

The fifth mistake is not considering the spouse. When starting to receive a pension, a person can choose conditions that will affect what their spouse will receive after their death. This is not a technical detail, but one of the most important family decisions in pension planning.

There is another serious problem: many people rely on someone else’s experience.

Someone says: “I started receiving — and everything is great.” Another says: “Don’t touch anything until 67.” A third advises withdrawing severance pay because “money should be in hand.” But someone else’s story does not replace calculation because each person has different savings, record, income, spouse’s age, health, tax situation, and work plans.

What you need to know before making a decision

If you are already 60 years old or this age is approaching, the first thing to do is not to urgently submit documents and not withdraw money, but to check the whole picture.

You need to understand how many pension programs are open in your name.

Sometimes a person has an active fund from the last employer and one or more old funds that they have long forgotten about. It happens that money is in different places, and without checking, it is impossible to see the full amount.

It is important to find out what monthly payment can be received now and what the forecast will be if you wait a few years. The difference can be significant, especially if the person continues to work and contributions to the pension fund continue to be made.

Separately, you need to check severance pay. This is one of the most sensitive blocks because the decision on compensations can affect future pension, tax benefits, and the overall structure of payments.

The tax issue is no less important. Pension in Israel can have tax consequences, and before starting payments, it is worth understanding what exemptions or benefits may be available, what documents need to be prepared, and how not to create unnecessary tax burden.

It is also necessary to discuss the family part in advance. What will the spouse receive? What guaranteed payments can be chosen? What will happen to the money if the person starts receiving a pension and then passes away in a few years or even earlier? These questions are unpleasant to discuss, but they protect the family from severe financial surprises.

A good pension review should give a person not a beautiful advertising phrase, but a clear answer: what options are there, what are the advantages, what are the risks, and what is more beneficial right now.

Can you work and receive a pension at the same time

In some situations, a person can indeed continue to work and simultaneously receive payments from the pension fund. For Russian-speaking Israelis, this often becomes a revelation because many are sure: the pension starts only after dismissal.

However, it is important not to confuse possibility with recommendation.

If the pension fund allows starting the payment, this does not mean that the decision is automatically beneficial. You need to look at how much money is accumulated, what the size of the monthly payment will be, whether pension contributions from the current work will continue, how the future pension will change, what will happen with taxes, and how it will affect the family.

Sometimes it may indeed be beneficial for a person to start receiving part of the pension income now. For example, if the family needs additional monthly income, if there are large expenses, or if the calculation shows that waiting does not give a significant advantage.

But sometimes it is better to wait. Especially if the person earns well, continues to actively save, does not need additional payments now, or can get a stronger pension picture in a few years.

The main thing is not to make a decision based on emotions.

Pension after 60 in Israel is not a question of “can or cannot.” It is a question of balance between today’s money and future stability.

Why an article on this topic is important specifically for Russian-speaking Israelis

The Russian-speaking audience in Israel often faces several barriers at once.

One barrier is language. Even if a person speaks Hebrew, pension documents, tax forms, and fund explanations can be written in such a way that it is difficult to understand the meaning without a specialist.

The second barrier is the habit of comparing the Israeli system with the country from which the person came. But the Israeli pension system works differently, and old ideas can hinder here.

The third barrier is distrust. People are afraid that they will be “sold something,” so sometimes they do not check anything at all. As a result, instead of caution, there is inaction, and inaction in the pension topic can also cost money.

The fourth barrier is a late start. Many begin to deal with the pension only when they are tired of working, have fallen ill, lost their job, or faced a sharp drop in income. But pension decisions are better made not under pressure, but in advance, calmly, and with calculation.

Therefore, the goal of such a review is not to force a person to urgently sign something. The goal is different: to see the facts.

Where is the money?

How much is there?

What rights are there?

What risks are there?

What actions are better not to take without calculation?

And what option might be reasonable for this family?

When a check is especially needed

It is worth checking pension savings if you are already 60 years old, continue to work, and do not know if you can receive payments from the fund alongside your salary.

This is also important if you have changed jobs several times, are not sure where old pension programs are located, do not know if you have severance pay, or have never looked at a pension forecast.

It is worth checking the situation separately if you are thinking of quitting, retiring early, withdrawing compensation payments, helping children with a large sum, or paying off debts with pension money.

Such decisions may be understandable on a human level, but financially they require calculation. Money that seems “free” today may turn out to be part of future monthly income.

A check is also needed for those who help parents. Very often, it is the children who seek information for mom or dad because parents do not want to deal with personal accounts, are afraid of Hebrew, or do not understand what documents are needed.

If parents are 60+, they work or have recently worked, they may have pension rights that the family simply does not know about.

What to do now

If you are already 60 years old or this age is approaching, do not wait until the situation becomes urgent. It is much more reasonable to find out in advance what pension savings you have, whether you can already consider a monthly payment, how it will affect the future pension, and what tax issues need to be checked before signing documents.

It is important to emphasize: it is not about everyone immediately starting to receive a pension. It is about not living blindly.

Sometimes a check shows that a person can increase monthly income now.

Sometimes it shows that it is better to wait.

Sometimes it helps find old savings.

Sometimes it warns of a mistake with severance pay.

Sometimes it just gives the family peace of mind: now it is clear what is there, what is not, and what to prepare for.

In detail about retirement in Israel, pension funds, Bituach Leumi, severance pay, and important checks before making a decision can be read here: https://nikk.agency/vam-60-v-izraile/

For a person 60+, such information may not just be a useful article, but the beginning of a normal financial review before an important life stage.

Pension in Israel is not just about age. It is about documents, savings, taxes, family, work, and decisions that can affect income for many years.

Therefore, the most reasonable first step is not to guess, but to check.

For the Israeli audience, there is a particularly important detail in this poster: the tour starts from Israel.

The first concert is scheduled for November 10, 2026 in Tel Aviv, at the Reading 3 club.

The next day, November 11, 2026, the band will perform in Haifa, at the Theatron Hatzafon hall.

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

Why this tour starts with special meaning

Boombox is one of the most recognizable Ukrainian musical phenomena of the last two decades.

The band was founded in 2004 and became known for its combination of rock, hip-hop, soul, and live stage energy.

But after February 2022, Boombox’s story gained another dimension.

The band’s leader, Andriy Khlyvnyuk, became one of the voices of Ukrainian resistance.

His a cappella performance of “Oh, the Red Viburnum in the Meadow” on Sophia Square in Kyiv became a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle and gained viral popularity far beyond the country’s borders.

This song was picked up by musicians, volunteers, artists, and ordinary people in different countries.

Thus, the Ukrainian melody turned into an international flash mob supporting Ukraine.

Therefore, “Dronotour ’26” is not just a concert route.

It’s a meeting with a band for whom music, stage, donations, merch, and public voice have become part of one big story — a story of help, memory, resistance, and connection with Ukraine.

Boombox concerts in Israel

Tel Aviv — November 10, 2026

The first concert of “Dronotour ’26” will take place in Tel Aviv.

Venue — Reading 3.

The UNOW page for this date lists the starting ticket price — from 249 ILS.

For Israel, this is the main start of the tour: it is from Tel Aviv that the entire Boombox route through European countries begins.

Haifa — November 11, 2026

The second Israeli concert will take place in Haifa.

Venue — Theatron Hatzafon.

The tour page lists the starting ticket price — from 219 ILS.

For northern Israel, this is a separate important date because Haifa traditionally gathers a large audience connected with Ukraine, Ukrainian culture, and the Russian-speaking scene without political slogans, but through music, memory, and personal experience.

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

Route of “Dronotour ’26” by cities

Bratislava — November 19, 2026

After the Israeli concerts, the tour will continue in Bratislava.

Venue — MMC.

This date opens the European part of the route after the start in Israel.

Frankfurt — November 21, 2026

The next stop is Frankfurt.

The concert will take place at Haus Sindlingen.

Germany occupies a prominent place in the tour route: several German cities are included in the Boombox poster.

Stuttgart — November 22, 2026

In Stuttgart, the band will perform at LKA Longhorn.

This date follows immediately after Frankfurt and continues the German block of the tour.

Düsseldorf — November 24, 2026

The concert in Düsseldorf is scheduled at Stahlwerk.

In the tour poster, this city is listed as one of the key stops in Germany.

Bremen — November 26, 2026

In Bremen, Boombox will perform at Aladin Music-Hall.

The route in Germany continues almost throughout the second half of November, showing the scale of the band’s audience outside Ukraine.

Dresden — November 27, 2026

The next date is Dresden.

Venue — Club Tante JU.

For Ukrainian listeners in Germany, such concerts often become not only a musical evening but also a meeting of the community, friends, and people with a shared memory of home.

Hanover — November 29, 2026

In Hanover, the concert will take place at Kulturzentrum FaUST.

This date closes another stage of the German part of the route before Hamburg.

Hamburg — November 30, 2026

The last November concert of the tour is announced in Hamburg.

Venue — Grosse Freiheit 36.

After Hamburg, “Dronotour ’26” will move to the December part of the route.

Dublin — December 2, 2026

Boombox will start December in Dublin.

Venue — Opium.

The band’s message separately emphasized that the route goes “from Israel to Germany, from England to Poland, from Ireland to Slovakia and the Czech Republic.”

Dublin just becomes the Irish point of this big tour.

London — December 3, 2026

In London, Boombox will perform at Electric Brixton.

The British date follows immediately after Dublin and is part of the December block of the tour.

Prague — December 5, 2026

In Prague, the concert will take place at SaSaZu.

The Czech Republic became one of the countries on the route where the Ukrainian audience has been particularly noticeable since 2022.

Krakow — December 7, 2026

The Polish part of the tour will start in Krakow.

Venue — Klub Studio.

The UNOW page for this date lists the starting ticket price — from 179 PLN.

Warsaw — December 9, 2026

The final date of the poster is Warsaw.

The concert will take place at Progresja.

The tour page lists the starting price — from 199 PLN.

It is Warsaw that concludes the announced route of “Dronotour ’26”.

What Boombox is bringing to this tour

The tour description states that Boombox will present the maxi-single “Zhiviy“.

The program will also include songs from various albums of the band.

Boombox formulated this very precisely: they will bring a new maxi-single on tour, enhanced by compositions under which listeners grew up, and under which their children are now growing.

This is an important detail.

Boombox has long ceased to be a band of one generation.

For some listeners, this is the music of student years and first concerts.

For others, it is the voice of wartime, a symbol of support for Ukraine, and a reminder that culture can also be a form of resistance.

The band separately addressed listeners with a request to buy tickets in advance, as well as to prepare money for donations and merch.

Therefore, the name “Dronotour” in this poster sounds not like an ordinary marketing move, but as a continuation of the line in which concerts help gather support for Ukraine.

Where to see details and buy tickets

Tickets, prices, cities, and venues are published on the UNOW tour page.

Before purchasing, it is worth carefully checking the city, date, venue, and ticket category.

For Israel, two dates are currently listed in the poster:

November 10, 2026 — Tel Aviv, Reading 3

November 11, 2026 — Haifa, Theatron Hatzafon

Details and tickets are published on the tour page on UNOW: https://unow.com.ua/tour/boombox-eu/

For NAnews readers — Israel News this is one of the main Ukrainian music posters of autumn 2026 in Israel.

Because “Dronotour ’26” starts here — from Tel Aviv and Haifa.

Cosmetologist in Haifa: how Sol Clinics helps skin look fresher, younger, and more well-groomed

When someone types the query “cosmetologist Haifa” into Google, it almost always reflects more than just a desire to “do something for the face.”

More often, there is a specific problem behind it.

• The skin has become dull.
• Wrinkles have appeared.
• The facial contour has become less defined.
• Sun-induced pigment spots have become more noticeable.
• Acne persists, even though the teenage years are long gone.
• After acne, traces, scars, or uneven texture remain.
• The skin has lost density.
• A double chin has appeared.
• The body has become swollen, and cellulite is more noticeable.

At this moment, a person needs not a random salon or a “magic procedure,” but a specialist who will calmly assess the skin condition, explain what is happening, and offer a clear action plan.

This is the approach of Sol Clinics — a cosmetic center for face and body in Haifa.

Here, the focus is on cosmetologist consultation, computer skin diagnostics, hardware cosmetology, care procedures, and personalized program selection for face and body.

More about Sol Clinics: https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

The center has been operating since 2016 and is located at: Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check-Post.

Cosmetic center in Haifa: why it is important to start with skin diagnostics

The main mistake in cosmetology is choosing a procedure by name.

A friend did RF-lifting — so I need it too.

Someone praised IPL on Instagram — so it will solve any pigmentation.

The ad said “rejuvenation” — so the procedure suits everyone.

In practice, everyone’s skin is different.

One client has a problem related to age-related loss of tone.

Another has issues with acne and inflammation.

A third has pigmentation after sun exposure.

A fourth has sensitive skin, rosacea, or couperose.

A fifth has swelling, lymph issues, cellulite, and sagging body skin.

Therefore, a good cosmetologist in Haifa should start not with selling a procedure, but with the question: what exactly is happening with the skin and what result does the person want to achieve.

At Sol Clinics, the first visit revolves around consultation, computer skin diagnostics, and selecting an individual plan.

This is especially important for Israel, where the skin faces strong sun, humidity fluctuations, air conditioning, stress, hormonal changes, and aging processes daily.

Cosmetology in Haifa is not just about beauty.

It’s about proper care, prevention, recovery, skin tone, and a safe approach to procedures.

What problems most often lead to a cosmetologist

People rarely come to a cosmetologist with an abstract phrase: “I want to do something.”

Usually, the request is much more specific.

“What to do about wrinkles?”

“Why does my face look tired?”

“How to remove pigment spots?”

“Can the facial contour be tightened without surgery?”

“Why have pimples reappeared after 30?”

“What helps with post-acne?”

“How to remove a double chin?”

“Are there procedures for cellulite?”

“How to prepare the skin for summer?”

“Can IPL be done in Israel?”

On the Sol Clinics website, the main problems clients address include skin aging, pigmentation disorders, double chin, dull complexion, rosacea, dermatitis, wrinkles, acne, scars, blackheads, sagging skin, and cellulite.

These are exactly the requests most often sought by residents of Haifa, Kiryat, Nesher, Tirat Carmel, Akko, and northern Israel.

Hardware cosmetology in Haifa: when a cream is not enough

Home care is important.

Good cleansing, SPF, hydration, restoring the skin barrier, the right serums, and regularity really matter.

But there are conditions where home care alone is no longer enough.

If the skin has lost tone, pronounced wrinkles have appeared, pigmentation has become denser, acne has left marks, the facial contour has changed, and cellulite does not respond to creams, a person begins to seek hardware cosmetology in Haifa.

Sol Clinics offers various directions in aesthetic and hardware cosmetology: RF-lifting, IPL rejuvenation, IPL for acne, IPL for pigmentation, mesotherapy, MesoStrip, pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, cellulite therapy, working with skin tone of the face and body.

The main point of this approach is not to prescribe one trendy procedure to everyone.

The point is to select a method for a specific problem.

NAnews — Israel News notes: an advertising article about a cosmetic clinic should be useful for the reader. Therefore, it is important not just to list procedures, but to explain in which cases a person starts looking for a cosmetologist and what questions to ask before booking.

RF-lifting in Haifa: when the skin loses tone

One of the most frequent requests is RF-lifting Haifa or RF-lifting face in Haifa.

This procedure is often sought by people who notice that their skin has become less dense, the face looks tired, contours have softened, wrinkles, jowls, or a double chin have appeared.

RF-lifting is a hardware method used to work with skin tone, facial contour, and age-related changes.

Advertising texts often promise too much: “minus 10 years,” “lift without surgery,” “permanent result.”

Such writing is incorrect.

It is more accurate to say honestly: RF-lifting can be part of a rejuvenation and skin care program, but the number of procedures, frequency, areas of impact, and expected result should be determined after consultation.

Who RF-lifting may be relevant for:

• for women and men after 30–35 years;
• with reduced skin tone;
• with changes in facial contour;
• with fine and medium wrinkles;
• with a double chin;
• with sagging skin;
• with a desire to improve the appearance of the face without surgical intervention.

It is important to understand: RF-lifting is not a replacement for plastic surgery and not a universal solution for all age-related changes.

But for many clients, it is a convenient way to start systematic work on skin quality.

IPL rejuvenation in Haifa: pigmentation, vessels, and complexion

In Israel, the topic of pigmentation is especially relevant.

Sun, age, hormonal changes, pregnancy, post-acne, insufficient SPF protection — all this can lead to the appearance of spots on the face.

Therefore, queries like “IPL Haifa”, “IPL rejuvenation Haifa”, “pigmentation removal Haifa”, “facial pigmentation Israel”, and “how to remove sun spots” are very important for a cosmetic clinic.

IPL can be used in programs aimed at improving complexion, addressing signs of photoaging, pigmentation spots, and vascular manifestations.

But here it is especially important not to act randomly.

Pigmentation can vary.

Some spots are related to the sun.

Others are due to hormonal changes.

Still others are from acne scars.

Fourth ones can worsen with improper care or aggressive procedures.

Therefore, before IPL, it is important to understand the skin type, nature of pigmentation, season, contraindications, skin’s reaction to the sun, and home care.

For Israel, a separate question is whether procedures can be done in the summer.

The answer should not be universal.

It all depends on the specific procedure, skin condition, phototype, level of pigmentation, client’s lifestyle, and readiness to strictly use SPF.

That is why a consultation with a cosmetologist in Haifa is not a formality but an important step before the procedure.

Acne and post-acne: when a cosmetologist is needed, not random store-bought care

Acne is not just a teenage issue.

In adult women and men, inflammations can appear after 25, 30, 35, and even after 40 years.

The reasons can vary: hormonal changes, stress, diet, improper care, comedogenic cosmetics, skin barrier disruptions, climate, sweat, sunscreen, skin diseases.

Therefore, the query “acne treatment Haifa” or “cosmetologist for acne Haifa” often means: the person is already tired of trying pharmacy creams, TikTok advice, and random masks.

With acne, it is important not to traumatize the skin even more.

It is necessary to understand if there are active inflammations, comedones, enlarged pores, blackheads, painful elements, acne marks, scars, or post-acne.

At Sol Clinics, the directions include working with acne and IPL therapy for acne.

Such a topic requires a careful approach: it is impossible to promise “we will completely cure acne” because acne can have medical causes and sometimes requires a dermatologist’s involvement.

But a cosmetologist can help build a competent care routine, select procedures, reduce the severity of inflammations, work with acne consequences, and explain what should not be done at home.

What clients with acne usually fear:

• that it will get worse after cleaning;
• that the procedure will leave marks;
• that the skin will be overdried;
• that inflammations will intensify;
• that the cosmetologist will press everything indiscriminately;
• that no one will explain the cause of the problem.

Therefore, the article, page, and consultation should speak calmly to the person: first diagnosis, then plan, then careful work.

Pigmentation in Israel: why spots return

A separate big topic is pigmentation in Israel.

Even if a person has had a good procedure, spots can return if the skin is not protected from the sun.

That is why working with pigmentation is not just IPL or a cosmetic procedure.

It is also daily discipline: SPF, protection renewal, caution with actives, avoiding aggressive self-care, understanding seasonality.

Frequent queries:

• pigmentation Haifa
• pigmentation removal Haifa
• sun spots on the face
• melasma Israel
• how to remove brown spots on the face
• skin lightening Haifa
• IPL for pigmentation Haifa

These queries are especially important for the audience that has moved to Israel and faced a new climate.

Skin that previously reacted normally to the sun in another country may develop spots faster in Israel, lose moisture, and react to active products.

Therefore, a cosmetologist in Haifa must consider not only age and skin type but also the local climate.

Mesotherapy in Haifa: when the skin lacks freshness and recovery

The query “mesotherapy Haifa” is usually entered by people who notice that their skin has become duller, drier, thinner, or tired.

Mesotherapy can be discussed as part of a program to restore skin quality, improve appearance, work with dull complexion, fine wrinkles, dehydration, uneven texture, and age-related changes.

But here too, one should not approach it with a template.

One client needs mesotherapy.

Another needs skin barrier restoration first.

A third needs work with acne.

A fourth needs competent home care and SPF.

A fifth needs a combined program.

Therefore, Sol Clinics emphasizes selecting procedures after consultation.

For the client, this is especially important because they are not required to understand the difference between mesotherapy, RF lifting, IPL, or facial cleansing.

The specialist’s task is to explain in simple terms what is suitable for their situation.

Facial cleansing in Haifa: a basic procedure often where care begins

Many clients start not with RF or IPL, but with a simple query: “facial cleansing Haifa”.

This is an understandable and widespread entry into cosmetology.

A person sees blackheads, enlarged pores, comedones, dullness, uneven skin, a feeling of dirtiness, or a tired facial appearance.

But even facial cleansing should not be the same for everyone.

Skin can be dry, oily, sensitive, prone to inflammations, with couperose, with rosacea, with active acne, or with a disrupted barrier.

Therefore, it is important that the cosmetologist not just “cleans the face” but understands the skin condition and chooses the appropriate method.

Good facial cleansing is not aggression.

It is a careful procedure after which the person understands how to care for their skin further.

Pressotherapy and lymphatic drainage in Haifa: body, swelling, cellulite

The Sol Clinics website works not only with the face but also with the body.

And here, important queries are:

• pressotherapy Haifa
• lymphatic drainage Haifa
• cellulite Haifa
• anti-cellulite procedures Haifa
• flabby body skin
• cavitation Haifa
• cold laser lipolysis Haifa

Many people come to body procedures not because they want an “ideal figure” but because they feel swelling, heaviness, decreased tone, changes after weight gain, sedentary work, stress, low activity, or age-related changes.

Pressotherapy and lymphatic drainage can be part of a body care program aimed at a feeling of lightness, working with swelling, improving skin appearance, and supporting anti-cellulite programs.

It is important not to promise the impossible.

Cellulite is a complex aesthetic problem that depends on the structure of subcutaneous fat, hormonal background, metabolism, activity, diet, and skin condition.

But hardware procedures can be part of a comprehensive approach, especially if the person is ready to work with the body systematically.

Russian-speaking cosmetologist in Haifa: why language matters

For many residents of Israel, the query “Russian-speaking cosmetologist Haifa” is as important as the name of the procedure.

Cosmetology is an area where a person must clearly explain what bothers them.

When did the spots appear?

What procedures have already been done?

Was there an allergy?

How does the skin react to the sun?

What products are used at home?

Is there pregnancy, lactation, chronic diseases, medication intake, or skin sensitivity?

What is the person afraid of?

What result do they consider acceptable?

When the specialist and client speak a common language, the consultation becomes calmer and more precise.

That is why for the Russian-speaking audience of Haifa, Kiryat, Nesher, and northern Israel, Sol Clinics can be a convenient option: the person receives not only the procedure but also an explanation without a language barrier.

NAnews — Israel News notes: for Russian-speaking Israelis, services where you can receive a professional service and simultaneously understand what exactly is being done to you, why it is needed, and what limitations exist are especially important.

The first visit to a cosmetologist in Haifa: what is important to ask

The first visit is not just “to schedule a procedure”.

It is a moment when the client should get answers to important questions.

What is my skin type?

Why have wrinkles, spots, acne, or a dull complexion appeared?

What procedure do I really need?

Can it be done in the summer?

How many procedures will be needed?

When will the effect be visible?

Are there any contraindications?

What should not be done after the procedure?

What home care is needed?

Do I need to change SPF?

Can procedures be combined?

What to do if the skin is sensitive?

The Sol Clinics website currently lists a promotion: first visit — 268 shekels.

The first visit includes a cosmetologist consultation and computer skin diagnostics.

There is also an offer: bring a friend — and you both receive a gift.

It is better to check the current conditions directly on the website or by phone, as promotions may change.

Booking and details:

https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

Cosmetologist at Check Post: convenient for Haifa, Krayot, Nesher, and Tirat Carmel

For a cosmetology center, not only procedures, equipment, and specialists’ experience are important, but also the location.

Sol Clinics is located in Haifa at:

Histadrut, 44, Check Post

For Haifa residents, this is a clear and convenient city point.

Check Post is well known to those who live or work in different areas of the city: on Carmel, in Hadar, in Neve Sha’anan, in the Lower City, in the Mifratz Haifa area, and near industrial and commercial zones.

It is convenient to visit for a cosmetologist consultation, skin diagnostics, or a procedure without turning the visit into a separate half-day trip.

But the location of Sol Clinics is important not only for Haifa itself.

Check Post is located so that it is convenient to reach from nearby cities in northern Israel.

For residents of Krayot — Kiryat Bialik, Kiryat Motzkin, Kiryat Yam, and Kiryat Ata — this can be a practical option when a nearby cosmetologist is needed, but you don’t want to go to the center of Haifa or look for a clinic far from the usual route.

For Nesher residents, Sol Clinics is also in an accessible area.

You can book a consultation, RF lifting, IPL, mesotherapy, facial cleansing, pressotherapy, or body procedure without a long journey across the north.

For residents of Tirat Carmel, Akko, Haifa suburbs, and the northern coast, Check Post also remains a convenient point: you can come after work, on the way for errands, before a meeting, or on a day when there is already a trip to Haifa.

This is especially important for those looking not just for a cosmetic procedure, but a place where you can calmly discuss skin condition and get a clear care plan.

Acne, pigmentation, wrinkles, post-acne, dull complexion, double chin, cellulite, swelling, or skin laxity — all these topics require not haste, but careful consultation.

For Russian-speaking clients, the language of communication is also important.

When a person can explain their problem without tension, talk about previous procedures, allergies, skin reactions to the sun, or home care, the consultation becomes more accurate and calm.

Therefore, Sol Clinics at Check Post can be considered a convenient cosmetology center not only for Haifa residents but also for those coming from Krayot, Nesher, Tirat Carmel, Akko, and other cities in northern Israel.

Address:

Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check Post

Website – https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

How to understand what procedure you need

You don’t need to choose between RF, IPL, mesotherapy, pressotherapy, or acne treatment on your own.

The best way is to start with diagnostics.

But you can understand the direction in advance.

If you are concerned about the face contour, double chin, skin laxity, and age-related changes — it is worth discussing RF lifting and rejuvenation programs.

If you are concerned about spots, uneven tone, sun marks, vascular manifestations — it is worth discussing IPL and pigmentation care.

If you are concerned about acne, comedones, inflammations, post-acne — it is worth discussing the acne treatment program.

If the skin is dull, dry, tired, dehydrated — it is worth discussing care procedures, mesotherapy, and home care.

If you are concerned about cellulite, swelling, heaviness, body laxity — it is worth discussing pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, and body hardware programs.

If a person does not know what they need, that’s normal.

That’s what a cosmetologist consultation is for.

Why Sol Clinics might be of interest to those looking for a cosmetologist in Haifa

Sol Clinics combines several important factors.

The center is located in Haifa, in the Check Post area.

It has been operating since 2016.

Offers procedures for face and body.

Focuses on consultation and skin diagnostics.

Works with age-related changes, acne, pigmentation, cellulite, dull complexion, skin laxity, and other aesthetic requests.

Offers hardware procedures: RF, IPL, pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, mesotherapy, and other directions.

For Russian-speaking clients, another important point: you can explain the problem clearly, without stress, and without feeling unheard.

In cosmetology, this matters.

Because it’s about the face, skin, appearance, and trust.

Contacts Sol Clinics

Sol Clinics — cosmetology center for face and body in Haifa

Address: Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check Post

Website: https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

Before booking, it is worth clarifying current promotions, schedule, procedure costs, and consultation availability.

FAQ: frequently asked questions about a cosmetologist in Haifa

How to choose a cosmetologist in Haifa?

It is important to look not only at the procedure price but also at the approach. A good cosmetologist starts with a consultation, assessing skin condition, contraindications, lifestyle, previous procedures, and client expectations. It is especially important that the specialist explains what exactly they offer and why.

Which is better: RF lifting or IPL?

These are different procedures for different tasks. RF lifting is more often discussed for loss of tone, changes in face contour, wrinkles, and skin laxity. IPL is more often associated with pigmentation, complexion, vascular manifestations, and photoaging. The choice depends on the skin condition.

Can IPL be done in the summer in Israel?

This question needs to be resolved individually. In Israel, the sun is active most of the year, so before IPL, consultation, skin assessment, understanding risks, and strict SPF protection are especially important. The procedure is not suitable for everyone and not always in the summer period.

How many RF lifting procedures are needed?

The number of procedures depends on age, skin condition, area, severity of changes, and client goals. The course should be selected by a cosmetologist after consultation.

Does a cosmetologist help with adult acne?

A cosmetologist can help build care, select procedures, work with inflammations, comedones, post-acne, and skin quality. But if acne is related to medical reasons, a dermatologist may be needed.

What to do with pigmentation spots after the sun?

First, you need to determine the type of pigmentation. After that, a cosmetologist can offer a care program, procedures, and a home scheme. In Israel, a mandatory part of working with pigmentation is regular SPF.

Can a double chin be removed without surgery?

In some cases, hardware procedures can help improve skin tone and the appearance of the chin area. But the result depends on the cause of the problem: skin, fat tissue, anatomy, age, and lifestyle.

What is pressotherapy?

Pressotherapy is a hardware procedure associated with lymphatic drainage and body impact using compressed air. It is often discussed for swelling, a feeling of heaviness, cellulite, and body care programs.

How much does the first visit to a cosmetologist in Haifa cost?

At the time of preparing the material, the Sol Clinics website lists a promotion: first visit — 268 shekels. It is better to clarify the current price and conditions before booking.

Where is Sol Clinics located?

Sol Clinics is located in Haifa at: Histadrut, 44, Check Post.

Is there a Russian-speaking cosmetologist in Haifa?

For Russian-speaking clients, Sol Clinics is convenient because you can discuss skin condition, procedures, contraindications, and expectations in a clear language.

What procedures help with a dull complexion?

It depends on the cause. Possible care procedures, mesotherapy, work with dehydration, skin renewal, home care, and SPF. The procedure should be selected after diagnostics.

What to do with post-acne?

Post-acne can manifest as spots, scars, uneven texture, and enlarged pores. A cosmetologist can offer a program that considers the type of traces, inflammation activity, and skin sensitivity.

What procedures help with cellulite?

Sol Clinics offers body directions, including pressotherapy, lymphatic drainage, and hardware anti-cellulite programs. But cellulite requires a comprehensive approach, not one universal procedure.

How to book at Sol Clinics?

More about Sol Clinics: https://cosmetology.nikk.co.il/

The center has been operating since 2016 and is located at: Haifa, Histadrut, 44, Check Post.

And then four years passed — and the surname Golenkov suddenly began to sound like the names of people who do the “impossible” in one moment. Not in a movie. Not in a retelling. In a real playoff match, where you have one chance — and that’s it.

How “Maccabi” from Haifa knocked out “Barcelona”

The meeting took place on February 4, 2026, at the “Gyirmót” stadium in the city of Győr, Hungary — “Maccabi” was the nominal host.

Regular time ended 2:2. But looking at the dynamics, it was a game where emotions and pressure built up in waves.

First, “Barcelona” led 1:0 — after an own goal by Gaist Arad. It seemed: everything was going according to the usual scenario, the Catalan school, control, pace.

But in the second half, “Maccabi” turned the match around. On the 70th minute, Liam Luska scored, and on the 81st — Liam Karagola. 2:1 — and there was already a feeling that the sensation was really close, just a few minutes away.

And yet “Barcelona” equalized at the very end: on 90+1 a penalty was converted by Guille Fernandez. 2:2 — and the match went to a penalty shootout.

A penalty shootout where one person became the story

Penalties are always about nerves, but in youth football, it’s also about pure psychology: who faltered, who endured, who suddenly turned out to be older than their age.

The series ended 3:1 in favor of “Maccabi”. And the key fact of this night sounds like this: goalkeeper Mark Golenkov saved three consecutive penalty kicks.

Three in a row. In a match against “Barcelona”. In the playoffs of a European tournament.

After such an episode, any team becomes a story, and any goalkeeper — a name that is remembered. Because goals — yes, are scored every week. But three consecutive saved penalties at a crucial moment — that’s a rarity that instantly becomes a legend in sports.

Who is Mark Golenkov

In this story, it’s important not only “what he did” but also “where he came from”.

Name in Hebrew: מרק גולנקוב
Date of birth: July 2, 2008.
Place of birth: Kyiv, Ukraine
Citizenship: Israel and Ukraine
Position: goalkeeper
Team: Maccabi Haifa U19

In Israel, his youth trajectory sounds like this:

• Hapoel Beer Sheva (2022–2023)
• Maccabi Haifa (since 2023)

A separate detail that explains a lot: since the age of 15, he has been living alone in the Maccabi Haifa sports boarding school. This means — discipline and regime not “at will”, but as the only way to survive in competition.

Another fact: he signed a three-year contract extension with the club and is designated as a player of Maccabi’s youth team and the Israeli youth national team. For a 17-year-old goalkeeper, this is not just a “checkmark”, but a signal: the club sees him as a project they are ready to invest in.

Why a goalkeeper becomes a symbol of such sensations

In matches against clubs of Barcelona’s level, you can have a great game, you can even score two, you can hold the score — but in the end, it often comes down to one moment. And this moment is almost always related to the one who stands last.

Penalties are a personal duel: the kicker against the goalkeeper. Without the help of partners. Without tactics. Without “covering the flank”. Your choice and his shot.

And that’s why Golenkov’s story quickly spread through the media: it’s simple, like a sports parable. “A guy from Haifa stopped the empire.” People love such formulations not because they are pompous, but because they are accurate in feeling.

The Ukrainian trace that now sounds different

Just yesterday, one could say: “yes, he’s from Kyiv, yes, he moved.” But today the Ukrainian part of the biography looks not like a background, but a foundation.

In this thread, there are two Ukrainian episodes — and both are important.

Childhood years at FC “Zirka” (Kyiv)

Mark Golenkov started playing football in Kyiv, at the children’s and youth school of the club “Zirka” (Kyiv). Already at an early age, he showed himself as a talented goalkeeper. In October 2015, seven-year-old Golenkov participated in the II International Mini-Football Tournament “Children’s Dreams” in Transcarpathia, where he represented the “Zirka” (Kyiv) team. According to the results of the competition, Mark was recognized as the “best goalkeeper” (7 years old) of the tournament, and his team won bronze medals.

In the following years, the young goalkeeper continued to play for “Zirka” in various children’s tournaments.

One of the most significant achievements was the Brașov Indoor Cup 2017 – a major international youth futsal tournament. The “Zirka” (Kyiv) team became the winner of this tournament, and Mark Golenkov again received an individual award as the best goalkeeper (9 years old) of the competition (this was reported in the organizers’ social media reports). These successes at an early stage of his career confirmed Golenkov’s reputation as one of the most promising young goalkeepers of his age.

Transition to the “Dynamo” academy (Kyiv)

Successful performances for “Zirka” attracted the attention of leading academies. In his teenage years, Mark Golenkov joined the training system of FC “Dynamo” (Kyiv).

By the fall of 2021, he was already playing for the “Dynamo” U-14 team in the Elite League of the Ukrainian Youth Football League (UYFL). In particular, on November 6, 2021, Golenkov started in the lineup in the match “Dynamo” (U14) – OK im. I. Piddubny (U14), playing to a clean sheet and helping the Kyiv team win 2:0. This result allowed the Dynamo U14 team to advance to the next stage of the Elite League from the first place in the group. Golenkov regularly appeared in the goal for his team, including in crucial matches — for example, against peers from the “Shakhtar” academy.

Playing for the “Dynamo” academy, Mark continued to progress. Although at the UYFL level individual awards for goalkeepers are rarely given, his reliable play was often noted by coaches. The official “Dynamo” website published match reports mentioning Golenkov in the lineup, confirming his role as the main goalkeeper of the U14 team.

A bit broader: why this story is not only about sports

For the Israeli audience, this victory resonates also because it’s a recognizable biography for hundreds of thousands of people.

Jews from Ukraine in recent years have gone through what is hard to describe in one phrase: anxious gatherings, moving, a new school, a new language, a new circle of friends, a new sense of home. And almost always — an attempt not to lose oneself along the way.

Sports in such stories often become not a “hobby”, but a lifeline. It gives structure, schedule, clear rules: here’s the coach, here’s the team, here’s your role. You may be confused in everyday life, but on the field, you understand again who you are.

Therefore, Golenkov’s story is not just about a “talented goalkeeper”. It’s an example of how a teenager from Ukraine, raised in Kyiv’s football culture, found a new path in Israel and did not dissolve in the move. On the contrary — he reached a level where his surname was heard beyond the country.

And here is another important detail, very “Israeli”: Haifa is a city where repatriation has always been part of the air. Here, they are used to the fact that a person can come from another world and in a couple of years become one of their own. Not by passport — by actions.

Why this match is important for “Maccabi” and the entire Israeli school

Yes, it’s the Youth League. But such games are a showcase of future lineups.

When an Israeli team knocks out “Barcelona” precisely in the format of “nerves, shots, goalkeeper”, it speaks of two things:

First: “Maccabi” has a generation that is not afraid of big names.
Second: Israel has a growing goalkeeper who can handle pressure — not in theory, but in the toughest playoff format.

And this is no longer a “beautiful episode”. It’s a statement. Such matches change how you are viewed. Scouts, coaches, opponents. Even your own — start expecting repetition.

What’s next: the main challenge begins after the sensation

The match with “Barcelona” made Golenkov a headline. But football life is tough: one evening can raise you to a level of expectations that you then have to meet for years.

For a goalkeeper, this is especially painful. A goalkeeper’s mistake is visible to everyone, it cannot be “hidden” under successful passes. And after three saved penalties, people will expect you to always be “that one”.

And yet, in this story, there is something that inspires calm: the chain of facts from the thread shows that Golenkov’s character has been building for a long time. Children’s tournaments. Ukrainian school. Matches at the level of “Dynamo” U14. Moving. Life in a boarding school. Competition in Israel. And now — an evening when you didn’t falter against “Barcelona”.

It doesn’t look like a coincidence. It looks like a result.

NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency will follow how this story develops further. Because when a guy appears in Haifa who saves three consecutive penalties against “Barcelona”, — it’s not just about football. It’s about Israel, about repatriation, about the Ukrainian trace, and about how quickly a teenager can become a symbol of an entire night.

And it seems, this is just the beginning.

“Every Jew is a messenger of the Almighty to restore the connection of the people of Israel with their tradition and roots. This is the duty of every Jew, regardless of their personal level of Torah knowledge. Even if your knowledge is not great, go out and share it with those who have not yet received it.”

For the Israeli reader and for Jews around the world, it is important to understand one basic thing in the story of Menachem Mendel Schneerson: his connection with Ukraine is not a decorative footnote, but the starting point of his entire biography. The Lubavitcher Rebbe was born on April 18, 1902 in Nikolaev, grew up in Yekaterinoslav, now Dnipro, and came from a family deeply embedded in the Jewish leadership of the south of present-day Ukraine, before passing through Warsaw, Berlin, Paris, and New York to become the seventh Chabad Rebbe and one of the most influential figures in modern Jewry.

If you look at the biography not from the end, but from the beginning, its route looks extremely specific.

April 18, 1902 — birth in Nikolaev; 1909 — the family’s move to Yekaterinoslav after his father, Rabbi Levi Yitzchak Schneerson, was appointed city rabbi; March 1915 — bar mitzvah in Yekaterinoslav; November 1928 — wedding in Warsaw; 1933 — Paris; June 23, 1941 — arrival in New York; January 17, 1951 — official assumption of the role of the seventh Rebbe; June 12, 1994 — end of earthly life. This sequence is important not only for the dates. It shows that the “American Rebbe” grew out of a specific Ukrainian Jewish space.

The Ukrainian roots of this story are much deeper than just a place of birth.

Nikolaev in this biography is not a random city from the metrics.

On his maternal side, Schneerson’s grandfather, Rabbi Meir Shlomo Yanovsky, was the chief rabbi of Nikolaev. On his paternal side, his father, Rabbi Levi Yitzchak Schneerson, became the rabbi of Yekaterinoslav in 1909 and later the chief rabbi of the city, where he served for decades. Thus, the future Rebbe grew up not just in a religious family, but in a home that was at the very center of Ukrainian urban Jewish life at the beginning of the 20th century.

That is why Ukraine for him is not only the geography of birth but also the first school of public leadership. Chabad.org directly links the Rebbe’s childhood with the family’s move to the large Ukrainian city of Yekaterinoslav, where his father became the spiritual leader of the local community.

By his bar mitzvah in 1915, Menachem Mendel was known for his scholarship and piety, and the family environment itself combined strict religious tradition, communal responsibility, and intellectual openness.

There is also a more dramatic Ukrainian line.

In the early Soviet years, his father became one of the most prominent religious figures of Jewish USSR. After the departure of the sixth Rebbe from the USSR in 1927, Rabbi Levi Yitzchak essentially became the most prominent direct heir of the early Chabad Rebbes on Soviet territory until he was arrested in 1939. Menachem Mendel later spoke of him as a man who took responsibility for spreading Judaism in this country. For the topic of Ukraine, this is fundamental: the Schneerson home in Dnipro was not just a home of scholars, but a home of resistance to the spiritual devastation of Jewish life.

Another strong, though less known, Ukrainian stroke concerns the family during the war years. Materials from the Jewish community of Dnipro directly state that Dov-Ber Schneerson, the Rebbe’s brother and the second son of Rabbi Levi Yitzchak, was among the victims of the Nazis on the territory of a psychiatric hospital in Igren near Dnipro. This is an important point: Ukraine in the history of the Schneerson family is not only a homeland and community but also a space of personal family tragedy.

From Yekaterinoslav to New York

After the Ukrainian stage, Schneerson’s biography enters the European and then the global dimension. In November 1928, he married Chaya Mushka, the daughter of the sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe Yosef Yitzchak Schneerson, in Warsaw. After that, he lived and studied in Berlin, and in 1933 moved to Paris. This European phase is no less important than the Ukrainian one: it explains why the Rebbe’s personality combined not only Hasidic depth but also an interest in science, technology, modern culture, and languages.

He left Europe already in the pre-war catastrophe. On June 12, 1941, he and his wife boarded the ship Serpa Pinto in Lisbon, and on June 23, 1941, on the 28th of Sivan 5701, arrived in New York. Almost immediately after arrival, his father-in-law, the sixth Rebbe, appointed him to head Chabad’s social and educational programs. This was not yet a formal position as head of the movement, but it was here that his organizational revolution began.

Formal leadership came later.

After the death of the sixth Rebbe in 1950, Menachem Mendel Schneerson long resisted accepting the title, but eventually, on January 17, 1951, became the seventh Rebbe of Chabad-Lubavitch. Sources agree on the main point: it was after 1951 that Chabad began to transform from a relatively small Hasidic environment into a global system, and the Rebbe himself became a central figure for hundreds of thousands of followers and millions of people who perceived him as a spiritual authority far beyond the narrow Chabad circle.

What exactly he organized Chabad, not just “expanded” it

Here it is important not to slide into the general formula “he made Chabad global.”

In fact, the mechanism was quite specific. Immediately after arriving in the USA, the Rebbe was put in charge of the educational and social direction of the movement’s work. This work was carried out through Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch — the educational center, through Machne Israel — the structure of public and religious mobilization, and through Kehot — the publishing center. The Rebbe himself said in the early 1950s that his father-in-law “chose him” for the implementation of the tasks of Merkos and Machne Israel, and these institutions should not be allowed to weaken.

In other words, under him, Chabad became not just a school of ideas, but a system of institutions.

The second element is the emphasis on education.

Even in early letters and speeches around Merkos, the focus is constantly on schools, including for girls, on youth circles, on literature, on teaching not only “our own,” but also the widest possible Jewish circle. Even before he became Rebbe, this logic was already visible: building a living network of schools and educational centers instead of passively waiting for people to return to tradition on their own.

The third element is shlichut, that is, the system of emissaries.

The Rebbe did not build a centralized pyramid only from Brooklyn. He built a network of emissary families who went to specific cities and countries and opened local centers there. The Chabad House is the nerve center of all the educational and public programs of the shaliach, and the Rebbe constantly demanded the expansion of existing centers and the opening of new ones where Jews live. Therefore, the network grew not as an abstract brand, but as thousands of local homes, schools, synagogues, dining rooms, youth programs, and crisis assistance.

The fourth element is the ability to translate Hasidic tradition into the language of the modern world.

Already after 1951, the Rebbe spoke about the role of American Jewry, about personal responsibility, about historical mission, and at the same time did not limit the work to one country. His early steps to strengthen the network in North Africa, and then a broader deployment of the global system, show that he thought of Chabad not as a community “for its own,” but as a global infrastructure of Jewish presence.

The result is known quantitatively. According to Chabad.org, today 4,900 emissary families work through 3,500 institutions in 100 countries and territories. And the US Congress in the 1994 Gold Medal Act directly spoke of a center of “more than 2,000 educational, social, and rehabilitation institutions” that grew around his work. This is an important figure for your text: the global Chabad network is not a metaphor, but an institutional fact.

What Ukraine remembers about him today

Ukrainian memory of Menachem Mendel Schneerson is not based on random publications, but on documents, city toponymy, archival editions, and living community practice. And this is fundamentally important for such an article: Ukraine remembers him not only as a global Rebbe but also as its native son, whose biography begins in Nikolaev and continues in Yekaterinoslav, now Dnipro. This memory is especially noticeable today in two cities — Nikolaev and Dnipro, and in each of them, it is fixed in its own way.

The first and strongest layer of memory is archival. The State Archive of the Nikolaev Region published a register of metric books, which directly states that the book of the Nikolaev synagogue with birth records for 1902–1903 is stored as fund 484, inventory 1, case 1486. This is not yet the published birth record of Schneerson himself, but it is an accurate archival roadmap to it. For serious research, this is a key argument: Ukraine preserves not only the memory of the Rebbe but also the documentary fabric of his origin. That is why the conversation about his connection with Ukraine relies not on retellings, but on real archival funds. Here your initial archival framework is also very important.

The second layer is memorial-research. In 2019, the State Archive of the Nikolaev Region presented the book “Our Fellow Countryman Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson. The History of the Lavat-Yanovsky-Schneerson Family in Nikolaev”. The official page of the archive directly states that the book outlines the biographies of three generations of the Lavat-Yanovsky-Schneerson family, “whose fates were closely connected with Nikolaev,” and gives a brief outline of the life and spiritual activity of the Seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe. This is a very strong detail: it is not about a private brochure of enthusiasts, but about a publication that the state archival institution itself brings into the public space. That is, Ukraine not only knows that Schneerson was born in Nikolaev but also formalizes it as part of its own local history.

The third layer is urban toponymy, that is, memory inscribed not on an archival shelf, but on the everyday map of the country. In Nikolaev, Schneerson Street exists as an active city address object: this is visible from the official materials of the Nikolaev City Council’s Department of Education, where “vul. Schneersona (Karl Liebknecht)” is mentioned. For the article, this is important not only as a formal fact of renaming but also as a sign that the Rebbe’s name has become part of everyday city reality — not external, but local, Nikolaev name. In your archival text, it is separately recorded that the renaming refers to February 19, 2016 and is formalized by a city order.

But if Nikolaev primarily preserves the place of birth and archival memory, then Dnipro today preserves already living and active memory of Schneerson. Here his name is present not only in stories about the family but also in the urban environment. The Dnipro History Museum has a separate page about Menachem Mendel Schneerson Street, where the date of renaming is indicated — November 26, 2015. On this museum page, a detailed biographical reference is given: birth in Nikolaev, the family’s move to Yekaterinoslav, his father’s service in the city, the beginning of leadership in Chabad in 1951, and Schneerson’s role in creating the emissary institution. This is not only internal religious memory but part of officially accessible urban historical navigation.

Even more importantly, Schneerson’s name in Dnipro exists not as a museum plaque, but as part of active Jewish infrastructure. The official page of the Jewish Lyceum No. 144 named after Levi Yitzchak Schneerson indicates its address as 1 Menachem-Mendel Shneerson St., Dnipro, and also reminds that the school moved to this street back in 1993, when the former Minin Street received a new name. This means that Schneerson’s name is embedded not only in memory but also in the everyday educational life of the Dnipro Jewish community. Every day it exists there as a real school address, not just as a memorial formula.

The fourth layer is community memory, and here Dnipro is especially indicative. In April 2025, a farbrengen was held in the “Alter Shul” synagogue on the occasion of the 123rd anniversary of the birth of Menachem Mendel Schneerson. The community material states that the event was dedicated specifically to the anniversary of the birth of the Seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe, and Rabbi Adam Smilyansky separately reminded that it was thanks to the Rebbe that his personal shaliach in Dnipro became Shmuel Kaminetsky, who created the modern community of the city. That is, the memory of Schneerson in Ukraine here lives not only as respect for the past but also as an explanation of the origin of the very modern Dnipro Jewish world.

In January 2026, Dnipro again marked this memory in an even more large-scale form. A large farbrengen dedicated to Yud Shevat was held at the Menorah Center, dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the moment when Menachem Mendel Schneerson assumed leadership of the Jewish people and the title of Lubavitcher Rebbe. The DJC publication emphasizes that at this evening, the chief rabbi of Dnipro, Shmuel Kaminetsky, told how he arrived in the city in 1990 by direct order of the Rebbe to revive Jewish life. This is a very important link: in Ukraine, Schneerson is remembered not only as a person of the past but also as someone whose decisions continue to work through current rabbis, schools, and institutions.

There is also another level — educational. Already on February 1, 2026, special events were held at the Dnipro Jewish Lyceum for Yud Shevat, where students were reminded that it is on this date that the Sixth Lubavitcher Rebbe is remembered and the beginning of the leadership of the Seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson is celebrated, “whose teachings continue to inspire the Jewish people around the world today.” This is an especially strong stroke: the memory of him in Ukraine is transmitted not only through adults and archivists but also through the school environment, that is, it becomes part of the upbringing of a new generation of Ukrainian Jews.

Therefore, it is most correct to formulate it this way. Ukraine today remembers Menachem Mendel Schneerson in several modes at once. Nikolaev preserves him as an archival fact, family history, and city name. Dnipro preserves him as part of its city map, active educational infrastructure, and living religious memory. And this is perhaps the most important conclusion: the memory of Schneerson in Ukraine is not reduced to one memorial plaque or one archival reference. It exists simultaneously in documents, in books, on the city map, in street names, in school addresses, in farbrengens, in school programs, and in the language of the modern community.

Chabad in modern Ukraine

Modern Chabad in Ukraine is not one center and not one loud surname, but a branched network of communities, schools, synagogues, humanitarian projects, and emissary rabbis who began arriving in the country immediately after the collapse of the USSR.

It was in the 1990s that one after another, the shluchim of the Lubavitcher Rebbe arrived in Ukraine, and from that moment not just “the revival of religious life” began, but the systematic restoration of Jewish infrastructure: from kindergartens and schools to community centers, yeshivas, programs for helping the elderly, and supporting families. For understanding the legacy of Menachem Mendel Schneerson, this is fundamental: his Chabad model did not remain an American or Israeli story but literally returned to the land where his childhood and youth passed.

The main support center of this network became Dnipro. It was here in 1990 that the Rebbe sent Rabbi Shmuel Kaminetsky and his wife Chana as his emissaries. Since then, Kaminetsky has become one of the central figures of Jewish revival in Ukraine. His arrival in Dnipropetrovsk effectively opened a new era for the city community: a large institutional structure began to be built around him, which later turned Dnipro into one of the strongest Chabad centers in Eastern Europe. On the Ukrainian Chabad map, Dnipro is not just one of the cities, but a factual organizational hub from which educational, humanitarian, and coordination processes have been going on for many years.

At the same time, the northeastern line began to be built. In Kharkiv since September 1990, Rabbi Moishe Moskowitz has been living and serving. His arrival is associated with the beginning of the return of the choral synagogue and the restoration of school and community infrastructure. For the Kharkiv community, this was not just the arrival of a new spiritual leader, but the start of a real institutional assembly of the community after the Soviet break. In Zhitomir in 1992, simultaneously with the return of the synagogue, the family of the young rabbi Shlomo Wilhelm arrived. Over time, Zhitomir became one of the main centers of the western and central Ukrainian Jewish space, and Wilhelm himself became one of the notable figures in the Chabad and educational life of the country. These two lines — Kharkiv and Zhitomir — clearly show that Chabad in Ukraine was not built only around the capital or around Dnipro. It immediately grew as a network of strong regional communities.

A special place is occupied by Kyiv, where several important figures and directions must be distinguished. On the one hand, the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine indicates that Rabbi Raphael Rutman became the Rebbe’s emissary in Ukraine in 1993, and in Kyiv participated in the creation of two schools and a junior rabbinical college. This is a very important line of institutional construction: it is about the Kyiv educational base of Chabad, which began to take shape already in the first post-Soviet years. In the capital today, there is also the Kedem community, headed by Pinchas Vyshedsky, who previously worked in Donetsk. That is, Kyiv is not one center, but a node where different Chabad lines, communities, and leaders intersect.

On the other hand, separately and necessarily in this section, Moshe Asman must be named. He is associated with the Kyiv Chabad environment and with the Brodsky Synagogue, which in recent years has become one of the most notable symbols of Jewish life in the capital. Asman is one of the most public and recognizable figures of Jewish Ukraine, especially after the start of the full-scale war. It is through him that the Kyiv line of Chabad has gone far beyond the internal community life: into humanitarian work, into international appeals, into the public representation of Ukrainian Jewry. He cannot be simply placed in line with city rabbis as another regional emissary. In the modern Ukrainian reality, Asman is already a separate metropolitan and national level.

The southern and central direction of the network also developed in stages.

In Zaporozhye, Rabbi Nochum Ehrentreu, after working in Minsk and Dnipro, was appointed chief rabbi of the region in 1997. In Kremenchug, Rabbi Shlomo Salamon came to Ukraine in 1998 and became the rabbi of the city. In Odessa, one of the key leaders of the south became Rabbi Avraham Wolff: from 1992 to August 1998, he was the rabbi of Kherson, and then in August 1998, he headed the Odessa United Jewish Community. This biography is especially indicative because it demonstrates not static, but movement within the Ukrainian Chabad network: emissaries worked in one city and then moved to another, strengthening already larger centers.

After this, the network continued to expand in the early 2000s. In Poltava, Rabbi Yosef Segal has been living and serving since July 4, 2001. In Krivoy Rog, Rabbi Leron Edery has been working since 2002. In Chernivtsi, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Glitshtayn was sent to Bukovina as the chief rabbi of the Chernivtsi region in 2003, and already in 2004, he organized the creation of the community and the restoration of the synagogue. In Sumy, Rabbi Yechiel Levitan moved in 2004 and became the chief rabbi of the city. All these names are important not as a directory for the sake of a directory, but as proof of scale: by the early 2000s, Chabad in Ukraine was no longer a series of separate missions, but a stable national system of presence.

One cannot forget about the east of the country. In Luhansk, Rabbi Shalom Gopin arrived in 1999, after which a school, kindergarten, and other programs were opened in the region. This is especially important in historical perspective: Chabad in Ukraine managed to take root even in those regions that later found themselves at the epicenter of war and occupation. Therefore, the modern map of Chabad in Ukraine is not only a map of active synagogues but also a map of lost, evacuated, or destroyed centers, behind which there are still specific shaliach families and decades of work.

If you put this picture together as a whole, the main thing is visible. Chabad in modern Ukraine is a network that was built in waves: 1990–1992 gave the first key cities — Dnipro, Kharkiv, Zhitomir; 1993–1999 strengthened Kyiv, Zaporozhye, Kremenchug, Odessa, Luhansk; 2001–2004 expanded the presence to Poltava, Krivoy Rog, Chernivtsi, and Sumy. And next to this broad regional map stands the special Kyiv figure of Moshe Asman, who represents not just one city center, but the public face of a significant part of Ukrainian Jewry in wartime.

This is how this section should sound: not as a general paragraph about “the revival of Chabad,” but as a living map of people, families, cities, and dates. Because in the Ukrainian case, Chabad is primarily a network of specific emissaries who came to specific cities and for years rebuilt Jewish life.

Kyiv and Moshe Asman: a separate line within modern Jewish Ukraine

If Dnipro in the history of modern Chabad in Ukraine is the main institutional center, then Kyiv and Moshe Reuven Asman is a completely different, separate level.

Asman is important not only as a city rabbi and not only as a person associated with the Brodsky Synagogue. He has become one of the most notable public figures of Jewish Ukraine in general: from a religious, humanitarian, media, and partly diplomatic point of view. And that is why in the text about Chabad in modern Ukraine, he cannot be left in the status of “another Kyiv rabbi.”

His biography itself explains why he stands out so much from the general row. According to his official office, Moshe Asman was born in 1966 in Leningrad, in his youth was associated with the movement of Soviet refuseniks, and in his teenage years was even publicly named by the Soviet press as “an enemy of Soviet power.” In 1987, he was able to leave for Israel, where he studied at a Chabad yeshiva, later served as a chaplain in the IDF, and worked with the Children of Chernobyl project, helping children from the Chernobyl zone. For the Israeli reader, this is especially important: Asman is not only a Ukrainian rabbi but also a person with Israeli experience, who then returned to the space of the former USSR as a religious leader and organizer.

The key date for the Ukrainian plot is 1995.

It was then, according to the official biography of his office, that Asman was sent to Kyiv to return the historic Brodsky Synagogue to the Jewish community and to reassemble a full-fledged community life around it. The synagogue was built in 1898, lost for religious life during Soviet times, and after the collapse of the USSR became an object of struggle for return to the Jewish community. Asman did not come there to a ready-made platform: the theater still remained in the building, there was no full-fledged community infrastructure, and the task was not just to “open the synagogue,” but to turn it into a real religious and public center of Kyiv.

This is a very important point. In the case of Asman, the Brodsky Synagogue is not just a place of service. It is his main Kyiv project and symbol.

After the theater left the building in 1997, Asman led the restoration work, and three years later the synagogue reopened. He directly explained his plan this way: he did not want to build a “European museum synagogue,” he wanted to make a Jewish home and a Jewish community center. It is this formula that makes him a special figure: he envisioned the Kyiv community not as a facade religious institution, but as a living center capable of gathering people, returning them to practical connection with Judaism, and building a system of assistance, education, and identity.

Around the Brodsky Synagogue under Asman, not only a prayer but also a social environment grew.

Since 1995, he and his family have been restoring Kyiv’s Jewish life through community programs, school education, food for the needy, religious services, and assistance infrastructure. Even if part of these formulations comes from his own team, independent media confirm the general vector: the Brodsky Synagogue under Asman became not just a place of worship, but a full-fledged center of the Kyiv Jewish community. This is important for the section on modern Chabad: here the typical Chabad logic is visible — not separately “rabbi,” separately “synagogue,” separately “social assistance,” but all at once, in one node.

After 2014, his role became even wider. It was after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas that Asman created the Anatevka settlement near Kyiv — as a place for Jewish families who became internally displaced persons.

The project was named after the famous shtetl from the world of Sholem Aleichem, but it was rooted in Ukrainian reality: it was not a literary decoration, but a real response to the wave of forced relocation. In Anatevka, houses, a wooden synagogue, schools, and space for hundreds of people appeared. For understanding the scale of Asman’s figure, this is very important: he turned out to be not only a rabbi of a city synagogue but also the creator of a separate community settlement for Jews displaced by the war from their usual lives.

After the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, it was this ability to quickly translate the religious community into emergency rescue mode that made Asman one of the most notable figures of Jewish Ukraine. The Brodsky Synagogue, serving the Kyiv Chabad-Lubavitch community, became a transit point for Jews fleeing from combat areas, and Asman himself was the person behind the evacuation efforts. His official office today states that the structure under his leadership helped evacuate more than 40,000 Ukrainians and continues to conduct large-scale humanitarian work; this figure is best presented as an estimate of his office, but the fact of wide evacuation and humanitarian activity is confirmed by independent publications.

It was during this period that Asman stepped out of the framework of a purely religious leader and became the media face of a significant part of Ukrainian Jewry.

Over the past three decades, he first led the Kyiv community, and then became a notable figure already at the national level; during the full-scale war, he traveled to the front line, made international appeals, visited Washington, and abroad raised the issue of Russian aggression against Ukraine. His frontline trips, viral support videos, and his role as a person who made the community a center of assistance not only for Jews but also for civilian structures and those in need in general. For your article, this is the strongest stroke: Asman is not a cabinet rabbi and not an internal communal administrator, but a field, military, humanitarian, and public leader.

There is also another important aspect — his place in the system of military and public representation.

In April 2023, the ceremony of appointing Rabbi David Milman as a chaplain for Jewish servicemen of Ukraine took place precisely in Asman’s office in the Brodsky Synagogue. This is symbolic: Asman’s Kyiv platform has become not only a place of prayer and assistance to refugees but also a point from which Jewish religious life intersects with the Ukrainian army and the state system of military service. For the section on Chabad in modern Ukraine, this is a very valuable detail because it shows how the community has integrated into the reality of a warring country.

That is why Moshe Asman in the section on modern Chabad in Ukraine is better written about not in one line, but as a separate phenomenon. He combines several roles at once: a Chabad rabbi by origin and school, the restorer of the Brodsky Synagogue, the creator of the Kyiv community center, the initiator of Anatevka, the organizer of evacuation and humanitarian assistance during the war, and one of the most notable international voices of Ukrainian Jewry. If Dnipro gives Chabad in Ukraine its institutional backbone, then Asman’s line gives it a metropolitan, public, and in many ways human face.

Why this is important right now

For Israel and world Jewry, the story of Schneerson is not only the story of one genius but also the story of how Jewish life can return from almost complete destruction.

Nikolaev, Yekaterinoslav, Soviet persecutions, war, exile, emigration — all this could have remained only a tragic tale of a lost world. But in the case of Schneerson, something else happened. From the Ukrainian Jewish experience grew a global religious network; and decades later, this network itself returned to Ukraine — already in the form of rabbis, schools, communities, and memorial work.

That is why the formula can be harsh and clear: Menachem Mendel Schneerson is not just a great Jewish leader born on the territory of present-day Ukraine. He was a man whose family, spiritual, and early public biography grew out of the Ukrainian Jewish space; and his legacy today is again present in Ukraine both as memory and as a living institutional network.

“Local historians did not know where these artifacts of Jewish heritage in Ukraine had disappeared to until 2023, when they discovered photographs of the stolen items on the official website of the ‘Museum of the History of Jews in Russia’.

Like ‘We didn’t steal — we saved’, notes Shimon Briman, comparing this to the same twisted logic by which the Russian army comes to ‘save’ Ukraine and Ukrainians with missiles and turning Ukrainian cities into ruins.

There is the most prestigious global organization of museums and museum professionals in the world — ICOM, the International Council of Museums headquartered in Paris. In mid-June 2024, at the annual meeting of ICOM’s governing bodies, ICOM Ukraine President Anastasia Cherednichenko spoke, reports Shimon Briman.

The representative of Ukraine demanded in the strongest terms to stop the gradual return of Russia to ICOM. Previously, back in 2022, the Russian Federation was suspended from participating in ICOM projects because this aggressor country was looting Ukrainian museums and destroying treasures of Ukrainian cultural heritage during the barbaric war against Ukraine.

Shimon Briman, in an article on “Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter” also notes that the list of stolen or destroyed by Russia should include objects of Jewish heritage in Ukraine.

The most high-profile story in this area is related to the theft and illegal export to Russia of two unique artifacts from the Ternopil region, writes Shimon Briman. This happened in the summer of 2014, at the beginning of Russian aggression, but it became known only recently.

At that time, unknown criminals stole three-hundred-year-old carved doors from the Chortkiv synagogue. Around the same time, unique relics disappeared from the ancient synagogue in Pidhaitsi — a baroque white stone carved decoration of a niche from the prayer hall and a carved plaque with the inscription “These are the gates of the Lord — the righteous shall enter through them” (Psalm 118).

Local historians did not know where these artifacts had disappeared to until 2023, when they discovered photographs of the stolen items on the official website of the ‘Museum of the History of Jews in Russia’.

This private museum was founded in Moscow by businessman Sergey Ustinov. The museum’s website states that it seeks to reconstruct a comprehensive picture of Jewish life in the territory of the Russian Empire and the USSR. It also states that the most important way to replenish the collection is through expeditions by staff in Russia and Eastern Europe.

The stolen ancient doors and stone slab from Chortkiv and Pidhaitsi were presented in Moscow at the exhibition “Challenge to Oblivion”.

Thus, from the point of view of Moscow museum workers, gangster raids on Ukrainian synagogues are “expeditions to replenish the collection”, and the brazen display of stolen items from Ukraine in Moscow is called “saving from oblivion”.

Like “We didn’t steal — we saved”, notes Shimon Briman, comparing this to the same twisted logic by which the Russian army comes to “save” Ukraine and Ukrainians with missiles and turning Ukrainian cities into ruins.

Shimon Briman writes that in Chortkiv and Pidhaitsi there were thefts, corruption, and vandalism against historical objects. As a result, artifacts from two synagogues were stolen. These synagogues are on the list of national historical monuments, and their artifacts could not be legally removed — only through corruption and vandalism, which was done at the request of the Moscow museum.

Local authorities in the Ternopil region showed indifference to the fate of these ancient synagogues. Although the Ukrainian authorities lack the funds to maintain the condition of these ancient buildings, this does not justify the illegal export of artifacts to Russia, Briman emphasizes.

The discovery of stolen Jewish relics in a Moscow museum in 2023 caused outrage among Judaica and art specialists from Ukraine, Israel, and the USA. They appealed to the ministries of culture and foreign affairs of Ukraine to raise the issue of returning the stolen artifacts at the international level.

Briman writes: “The dismantling and export of these artifacts abroad directly contradicts Ukrainian law. These actions are criminal, and both the customers and the executors should be held accountable for them.” Artifacts from the synagogues in Chortkiv and Pidhaitsi have enormous historical and cultural value that cannot be compensated. The illegal export and exhibition of these artifacts in Russia is part of the aggressor’s large-scale crime — the deliberate destruction and looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage, concludes Briman.

Shimon Briman writes that the actions of stealing artifacts from synagogues in Chortkiv and Pidhaitsi damage Ukraine’s relations with foreign partners, including Israel. It also gives Russian propagandists the opportunity to use the topic of Ukrainian-Jewish past to undermine Ukraine’s international image. The authors of the letter, signed by many well-known scholars, demand the inclusion of the owner of the “Museum of the History of Jews in Russia” Sergey Ustinov in the sanctions lists.

Briman notes that the attempts of the Moscow museum to justify the theft sound immoral. He emphasizes that the cities of Chortkiv and Pidhaitsi in the 17th-18th centuries had nothing to do with the “history of Jews in Russia”, as they were part of the Polish Kingdom. This act is a neocolonial appropriation of someone else’s heritage to strengthen Moscow’s imperial status.

Shimon Briman writes this text as a reminder that the Russian regime throughout its aggression against Ukraine seeks to destroy not only Ukrainian but also Jewish heritage in Ukraine. In the future, in his opinion, the list of reparations from Russia in favor of Ukraine should include the two stolen Jewish artifacts.

Original: Shimon Briman (Israel) – Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter.

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Exactly three years ago, the Defense Forces liberated Kherson. On November 11, 2022, Ukrainian troops entered the city, where they were greeted by locals with blue and yellow flags — the very ones that had been hidden from the occupiers. These fearless people immediately showed Putin’s army that it had come to the wrong place on tanks: “Kherson is Ukraine.” Many of them remain in the city today and do everything to ensure that, despite daily shelling by Russia, Kherson continues to live. Glory to all who fight! We remember those who gave their lives in battles for Ukraine.

Symbol of liberation: how the ATB truck appeared in the city

On the same day, November 11, 2022, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine entered liberated Kherson, residents saw an unexpected symbol of life returning on the streets — a truck with the logo of the Ukrainian retailer “ATB.”
The vehicle moved through the central streets, and people with flags waved at it and cried. This moment was captured on video, which spread across the country.

Everyone who saw the truck was joyful and confident that this was indeed the end of the occupation, even though Defense Forces units were only entering the outskirts of the city. Therefore, after some time, locals with blue and yellow flags were already waiting for Ukrainian defenders in the city center.

According to 24 Channel, behind the wheel was Eyal Israeli — an immigrant from Israel who has been living in Ukraine since the early 2000s.
When Russian troops left the city, he returned the truck stolen by the occupiers and drove through the streets with a Ukrainian flag.

Eyal and his friends drive around the city in the ATB truck, stopping at every billboard to remove the posters left by the Russians. “Kherson forever with Russia” — a fiction that disappears piece by piece from the streets to the cries of “Glory to Ukraine” and “Putin is a h***o!” On the billboards remain only the firmly glued pieces — the torn remnants of the “Russian world.”

We have already written about Eyal Israeli in the article – “Superhero ‘like from ‘Fauda” in the war against Russia: Israeli veteran on the banks of the Dnipro“

Eyal Israeli — the man who returned the symbol

According to colleagues and locals, Eyal had long worked in logistics and was a partner of the ATB network in the region.
During the occupation, he refused to leave the city, helped residents, and on the day of liberation — simply took and returned the truck.

Some Ukrainian publications write that in Israel he served in special units and from the first days of the invasion helped Ukrainian military with intelligence and volunteering.
But for the residents of Kherson, he became not a scout, but a person who first opened the streets for life and flags.

“Eyal heard a lot about how Ukrainians are called ‘neo-Nazis’ and now he already knows that he saw Nazis in Ukraine while he was in occupation. While the Russians were in the city, he did everything to make their life unbearable. And when collaborators stole ATB trucks, Eyal decided he would return them. And now he drives around the city in one of them. And on it is the first Ukrainian flag that appeared in Kherson. The first banner of freedom on the truck of the company that Eyal will always be grateful to, because in Kherson he was hired by ATB long ago without knowing the language — they taught him and did everything so that he could work.”

“On the streets, Eyal is now met by joyful and surprised people. Those who have not yet seen the military in the city were definitely sure that Kherson was free if ATB had already entered here. The truck drove into Freedom Square. There are no military here yet, but there are already people waiting for them. All in flags. Seeing the truck, the crowd began to chant ‘ATB! ATB!’, and when men in balaclavas got out of it, people thought they were military and chanted ‘AFU!’. But it was not them yet. Or rather, they were not yet in the center.”

Why this story is important

• Liberation is not only about the army and weapons, but also the courage of citizens who believe and act.
• The truck of the store chain became a symbol of the return to normalcy — food, work, life.
• An Israeli who decided to stay in a Ukrainian city during the occupation showed how the destinies of people from different countries unite in the struggle for freedom.
• For Ukrainians and the Jewish diaspora, this story is an example that true loyalty to a country is measured not by a passport, but by actions.

Strength in people

Kherson residents continue to live under daily shelling, but blue and yellow flags still hang on the houses.
The ATB truck that day became a sign that life is returning, and the people are unbroken.

This story remains in the memory of millions: not only as a video with flags but as proof that liberation always begins with one decisive person.

What you need to know about the liberation of Kherson?

• Kherson was the only regional center of Ukraine that the Russians occupied after the start of the full-scale invasion.
• After a long operation by Ukrainian troops, the Russian defense collapsed, causing the enemy to begin a panicked retreat to the left bank of the Dnipro, where they entrenched. Now Kherson is separated from the occupiers by the river and islands where battles are taking place. The city is under daily artillery fire, MLRS, KABs, and especially drones.
• Recently, Angelina Jolie visited Kherson. This happened despite the fact that Kherson is currently one of the most dangerous cities in Ukraine.

NANews — News of Israel and Ukraine.

This biography (Ukr.) was compiled by Israeli author Shimon Briman on the website Ukrainian Jewish Encounter. He writes about Frankfurt without romanticizing — as a person who spoke equally confidently in the language of chemistry, agricultural practice, and state decisions. And that is why in Ukrainian agricultural history, Frankfurt has a figurative nickname: the network of scientific centers around Kyiv was later called the “Temple of Solomon” — not in a religious sense, but as a metaphor for a “built system” that survived the change of eras.

Who is Solomon Frankfurt — briefly, but to the point

Solomon Lvovich (Shlomo Meirovich) Frankfurt was born in 1866 in Vilno (now Vilnius). He received a European education and a doctorate in chemistry in Zurich, researching sugars in plants — a topic that directly intersects with Ukrainian beet growing and the sugar industry of the early 20th century.

But an “imperial career” for a Jewish scientist at the end of the 19th century often did not depend on abilities. Briman cites a telling episode: in 1898, Frankfurt was denied a professorship at the Moscow Agricultural Institute precisely because of his religion. In simple terms, it sounds like this: the road to universities is closed — so science must find a way through practice.

And Frankfurt found this way in Kyiv.

Kyiv: the laboratory from which the system grew

Moving to Kyiv was a turning point for Frankfurt. In 1901–1920 (Briman highlights this period as the most productive), he worked where science meets real production: sugar factories, agrochemistry, seed quality, yield.

Frankfurt headed the agrochemical laboratory of the Kyiv Agricultural Syndicate and began promoting what today seems obvious but was then new managerial thinking: seeds should not just be bought and sown, but checked, compared, improved, standardized. Science should measure results, not serve beautiful reports.

Briman emphasizes that from this laboratory over time grew a functioning scientific center at the specialized Institute of Agriculture. That is, it is not about a “flash of talent,” but about creating an institutional base: structure, people, methods, a habit of experimentation.

Experimental fields and fertilizers: work not in theory

Frankfurt did not confine himself to office chemistry. According to Briman, he participated in creating a network of experimental fields in several provinces — to test ideas not on paper, but in soil and weather. This is important: Ukraine is vast and diverse, and universal recipes in agriculture work poorly.

A separate direction was work with mineral fertilizers. At that time, it sounded like a “modernization tool” — an opportunity to increase yield and stabilize product quality. In the text, Frankfurt appears as a person who explained to producers and landowners: yes, it’s money, yes, it’s technology, but without it, the agro-economy will lag behind.

Briman essentially shows a “transition model”: from agriculture as a tradition — to agriculture as an industry where decisions are confirmed by data.

Myronivka and “Ukrainka”: when selection becomes part of the country

One of the key episodes is the organization in 1909 of the Central Research Station for Sugar Beet Culture near Myronivka. Briman writes that the station was supported by local sugar manufacturers: this is an important link between science and business, without which infrastructure usually does not survive.

Later, based on these initiatives, the Myronivka Breeding Station (today — the Institute of Wheat) appeared. And here Briman gives a detail that catches even people far from the agricultural topic: Frankfurt is credited with the authorship of the idea of naming the winter soft wheat variety “Ukrainka 0246.”

This is not a trifle. The name of the variety is a symbol that “Ukrainian” can be not only a political declaration but also a specific product of science: grown, tested, distributed.

Frankfurt and Ukrainian statehood: a choice that was not “neutral”

Briman shows Frankfurt as a person who did not hide from politics — although he was not a political tribune. During the Ukrainian revolution, Frankfurt participated in creating professional and scientific structures, worked in commissions, and dealt with what often remains behind the scenes: the institutional design of the industry.

The text contains a thought that Briman formulates harshly and without embellishments:
“He believed in Ukrainian statehood more than many Ukrainians” — writes Briman.

Separately noted is the work under the Hetman government, where Frankfurt dealt with agriculture and food issues and participated in preparing agricultural legislation. That is, it was not “sympathy in words,” but involvement in managerial routine: documents, norms, rules.

Negotiations of 1918: economic diplomacy and sugar

There is also an international layer. Briman cites the position of historian Ruslan Piroh: Frankfurt twice represented Ukraine in complex economic negotiations with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918. The essence — the Ukrainian side defended economic conditions, including a fair price for Ukrainian sugar.

Briman emphasizes: it was not a “symbolic trip,” but negotiation work where each figure had political weight.

The text also mentions Frankfurt being awarded a German order — as a marker of recognition of his role in these contacts.

Emigration and World ORT: continuation of the Ukrainian biography in the world

After the defeat of the UNR, Frankfurt, according to Briman, refused to cooperate with the Bolsheviks and emigrated at the end of 1920. Then another part of life begins — but it logically continues the first: building a system, only now at an international level.

For decades, Frankfurt worked at World ORT — an organization engaged in technological education and support for artisans and farmers. Briman lists the cities and stages of ORT’s European work, and then the move to the USA. From 1947, Frankfurt became the president of World ORT.

He died in 1954 and was buried in New York State. But the Ukrainian trace in his biography did not disappear: Briman builds the line so that the reader sees — the experience of creating agricultural infrastructure in Ukraine became part of his broader, global project.

Why “Temple of Solomon” sounds especially poignant today

The metaphor “Temple of Solomon” Briman associates with the assessment of academician Viktor Vergunov: it is about the agricultural scientific centers of Ukraine created by Frankfurt, which worked even after him. The meaning of the metaphor is in the built “architecture of science”: when the system continues to function, even if the creator is long gone.

The finale with Briman is modern and very direct: he reminds that Jewish school No. 141 in Kyiv, operating under the aegis of ORT, is experiencing a difficult military winter — with shelling, power, and heat outages. The story of a person from the early 20th century suddenly turns out to be close to the reality of 2026.

Main conclusions for the section “Jews from Ukraine”

Frankfurt is an example of a Jewish intellectual who became part of the Ukrainian modernization project not with slogans, but with infrastructure.

His contribution is not one “loud idea,” but a habit of scientific verification, standardization, and systematic experimentation in agriculture.

During the Ukrainian revolution, he made a conscious choice in favor of Ukrainian statehood and worked in real managerial mechanisms.

His subsequent work at World ORT shows the continuation of the same logic: education, applied skills, community support — through institutions, not declarations.

Text: Shimon Briman (Israel). https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/uk/hram-solomona-bilya-ki%d1%94va-yak-%d1%94vrejskij-vchenij-prosuvav-agroindustriyu-ukra%d1%97ni/

The author is grateful to the employee of the World ORT Archive in London, Jennifer Brunton, for assistance in finding materials and providing a photograph of Solomon Frankfurt.

The Jewish Detachment left a significant mark in history as a symbol of bravery and solidarity between two peoples.

In honor of the commander Solomon Laynberg, a street in Lviv was named after him.

In 2013, it was proposed to establish a monument to the “Jewish Detachment” in Ternopil, but the project was suspended due to the war in Donbas.

The Jewish Detachment (official name – “Shock Detachment of the 1st Corps of the Galician Army”) within the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) became an important element in the struggle for Ukraine’s independence in 1919. This unit became a bright example of cooperation between two peoples — the Ukrainian and the Jewish, striving for freedom and independence during the war, and we are telling its story in our regular section Jews from Ukraine.

Political Situation and Jewish Involvement

At the beginning of the 20th century, Jews made up about a quarter of the population of Lviv, and most of them were actively involved in social and political life. Lviv had many Jewish lawyers, doctors, and students. Despite relative safety in Galicia, Jews still suffered from Polish discrimination, which forced them to cooperate with Ukrainians in the struggle for independence.

With the formation of UNR and ZUNR, Jews faced the necessity of deciding whether to support Ukraine’s fight for independence. Despite the cultural autonomy offered by these states, many Jews chose neutrality.

UNR (Ukrainian People’s Republic), formed in 1917, sought Ukraine’s independence but faced numerous challenges — Bolsheviks, Whites, and Polish forces.

Meanwhile, ZUNR (Western Ukrainian People’s Republic), formed in 1918 in Galicia, sought to preserve Ukrainian identity and independence but was quickly absorbed by Polish forces. Both of these states not only recognized cultural autonomy for Jewish communities but also gave them the opportunity to participate in state affairs.

The Union of UNR and ZUNR

Union, or the unification of UNR and ZUNR, took place on January 22, 1919, and became a symbol of the desire for unity of Ukrainian lands. This act was an important step toward the creation of a unified independent Ukrainian state. However, in practice, the union turned out to be complicated. ZUNR ultimately remained under Polish control, and Ukrainian authorities of UNR faced numerous internal problems, which prevented the Union from leading to a long-term consolidation. In 1920, Polish forces finally established control over Galicia, and ZUNR was integrated into the Polish state. Nevertheless, Union remained an important symbol of unity for the Ukrainian people and continued to influence Ukraine’s national ideology in the years to come.

Union was not instantaneous. After November 9, 1918, UNRada formed the Temporary State Secretariat headed by K. Levitsky, and the “Temporary Basic Constitution” on the state independence of Ukrainian lands from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, declaring ZUNR on the territory of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. On November 13, the new coat of arms — a golden lion on a blue background — and the flag — blue and yellow — were approved.

At the same time, against the backdrop of military actions and Polish aggression, on November 11, the ZUNR forces were forced to leave Przemysl, which became a base for Polish forces’ attack on Lviv. A few days later, in mid-November, Romanian troops captured Northern Bukovina, and on November 22, Polish forces took Lviv.

By December 1, the ZUNR delegation signed a preliminary agreement on union with UNR. On January 22, 1919, at Sofiyskaya Square in Kyiv, the act of reunion of UNR and ZUNR took place. However, in reality, the union was postponed until the convening of the Constituent Assembly (which never occurred).

The Fate of UNR After the Union

After Union in 1919, UNR continued the struggle for independence but faced serious internal and external challenges. The Ukrainian army actively fought the Bolsheviks and tried to hold its territories against Polish aggression. Poland, strengthening its control in Galicia, captured the territory of ZUNR, and in 1920, it completed its victory on this front.

In April 1918, after the German occupation, Pavlo Skoropadsky became the Hetman of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and declared the creation of Ukrainian State — an authoritarian monarchist state. His rule was supported by Germany but faced resistance from Ukrainian socialists and nationalists who opposed dependence on foreign powers. After the German capitulation in November 1918, Skoropadsky was overthrown, and power passed to the Directory.

Directory was formed in November 1918 in response to the overthrow of Skoropadsky. It was a collective executive body composed of five leaders, including Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petliura, and other political figures.

Directory represented a more democratic and radical form of government, aimed at mass support among peasants and workers.

The main goal of the Directory was to create an independent Ukrainian state, without dependence on foreign powers such as Germany.

Directory faced several problems: internal disagreements among its leaders, an unstable political situation, and threats from Poland, Bolsheviks, and other external enemies.

However, it resisted both internal and external threats, despite military defeats.

Directory actively fought against Bolsheviks and Whites, trying to restore Ukraine’s independence.

However, in 1920, the Bolsheviks won, and Ukraine (UNR) became part of Soviet Russia.

Creation of the “Jewish Detachment”

“The Jewish Detachment”, officially known as “Shock Detachment of the 1st Corps of the Galician Army”, was formed in June 1919 during the Chortkiv Offensive (operation). It became an independent operational military unit of the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian Galician Army and played an important role in defending Ukrainian territories from Polish and Bolshevik troops.

The creation of the detachment was supported by the Jewish National Council of Ternopil, which authorized Solomon Laynberg to approach Colonel Osip Mykytka, commander of the 1st Corps of the UGA, with a proposal to form a Jewish military unit. Laynberg suggested gathering several hundred Jews from Ternopil to create a fighting unit that would become part of the Galician army.

Colonel Mykytka agreed to this proposal, and an order to form the detachment was signed. Among the commanders of the unit, in addition to Jews, were also senior Ukrainian officers. Thus, the Jewish Detachment became a symbol of the union between two peoples — Ukrainians and Jews, who fought for Ukraine’s independence.

Formation and Training

The detachment was formed in the village of Ostapye, located in the Pidvolochysk district of Ternopil region. Intensive training of soldiers began here. The unit consisted of about 1200 fighters, including riflemen, officers, as well as sappers, telephone operators, and cavalry. A feature of the detachment was the large number of intellectuals and experienced soldiers among the fighters, which allowed for the formation of a combat-ready and disciplined unit.

It is also worth noting the engineering skills of the commander — Solomon Laynberg, who, using his knowledge, created a radio station for effective communication between army units, which significantly improved coordination in combat conditions.

Furthermore, the detachment was provided with all the necessary equipment — uniforms, weapons, ammunition, forage, and food — from the 1st Corps of the UGA, which indicates its importance in the context of military operations.

Combat Path of the Detachment

On July 14, 1919, the detachment participated in battles with Polish troops at places such as Maxymivka, Romanove Selo, and Zherebky, covering the retreat of Ukrainian troops across the Zbruch River. In the following days, the detachment actively participated in battles against the Bolsheviks. It captured Mikhaylpole, defended Proskuriv (now Khmelnytsky), Vinnytsia, Fastiv, and Berdiansk.

Despite heavy losses, the detachment continued its participation in military operations, taking part in the Kiev offensive in August 1919.

Reasons for Disbandment

“The Jewish Detachment” was disbanded at the end of 1919 for the following reasons:

1. Epidemic and Losses: The epidemic of typhus and shigellosis killed about 60% of the detachment’s personnel, weakening the unit.
2. Lack of Resources: After several military operations, there was a shortage of weapons, ammunition, and food, which made it impossible to continue fighting.
3. Military Reorganization: Due to changes in the strategy of the UGA, the detachment was integrated into other parts of the army.

Why Jews Joined the Ukrainian Army

Jews who joined the “Jewish Detachment” saw their role in defending Ukrainian independence for several reasons:

1. The Idea of National Liberation: Despite striving to create a Jewish state in Palestine, many Jews saw supporting Ukraine as a chance to ensure the security of Jewish communities.
2. Solidarity with Ukrainians: In Galicia, there was a close connection between the Jewish and Ukrainian people, which strengthened their alliance in the fight for independence.
3. Response to Pogroms: In response to the pogroms in Lviv in 1918, when Polish forces carried out mass reprisals against Jews, many Jews decided to join the ranks of the Ukrainian army to defend their land.

Legacy and Memory

“The Jewish Detachment” left a significant mark in history as a symbol of bravery and solidarity between two peoples. In honor of its commander Solomon Laynberg, a street was named in Lviv. In 2013, a proposal was made to install a monument to the “Jewish Detachment” in Ternopil, but the project was suspended due to the war in Donbas.

Officially, the Jewish unit ceased to exist. On November 17, the UGA and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia signed a separate peace treaty. The Ukrainian army came under the command of Anton Denikin. The “Whites” were notorious for their extreme anti-Semitism. Some Jewish fighters refused to fight. Nearly a hundred soldiers broke through to Odessa, where, together with members of the local Jewish fighting group, they seized a ship and sailed to Palestine, where they continued to fight for a Jewish state.

Some stayed in Soviet Ukraine, while others returned to Galicia, which by then was under Polish control.

What happened to Solomon Laynberg afterwards is unknown. According to one version, he returned to Ternopil and was killed by the Poles the following year. According to another, he stayed in Soviet Ukraine, became a member of the Communist Party, served in the Red Army, and soon moved to Moscow. He was arrested twice. In 1938, he was executed in Leningrad.

The phenomenon of “The Jewish Detachment” can be compared to the Jewish Legion, which fought in the British army against the Turks in Palestine, with the difference that the Jewish fighters of the detachment fought not for their own country but for the independence of Ukraine.

NAnews and the “Jews from Ukraine” series

The article about “The Jewish Detachment” in the Ukrainian Galician Army highlights the important role of Jews in the fight for Ukraine’s independence. It is an example of solidarity and joint struggle between Ukrainians and Jews against external threats, where Jews actively participated in the creation of the Ukrainian state.

In the series “Jews from Ukraine“, we uncover the contribution of the Jewish community to Ukraine’s history, emphasizing their important role in the national struggle. NAnews – Israel News continues to cover these events, preserving the memory of solidarity and mutual understanding between the two peoples.

From the author on September 12, 2025:

“How an Israeli🇮🇱 commando from ‘Fauda’ fights for Ukraine🇺🇦, performing feats of such magnitude that a Hollywood action movie could be made. I doubted until I received a letter from SBU officers describing his merits.

One of Eyal’s most fantastic yet real achievements is the destruction of 49 Russian combat helicopters worth a billion dollars in one day. One of my most important and fascinating materials in recent years.”

BRIEFLY: what the story is about

• An Israeli veteran, referred to in Ukraine as “like from ‘Fauda'”, fights on the side of Ukraine.
• Lived in Kherson for many years; since 2022 — underground, intelligence, frontline work.
• Main point: the real bridge Israel—Ukraine is built by people and their decisions, not just agencies.
• We provide a summary for readers in Israel and direct them to Shimon Briman’s originals.

Who he is

At the center of the article is Eyal Israeli, a 52-year-old Israeli who lived in Kherson for many years and has special training; after 02/24/2022 he stayed in the city, joined the territorial defense, and then under the auspices of the SBU formed a small reconnaissance and sabotage group in occupied Kherson.

The described episodes include collecting and transmitting coordinates of Russian forces, adjusting strikes, countering collaborators, helping military families and hospitals, and on the day of Kherson’s liberation, the first Ukrainian flag was raised on his refrigerator truck.

The hero then acts in conjunction with the Ukrainian Marine Corps intelligence and the SBU, engages in launching and repairing reconnaissance drones; after the Kakhovka HPP explosion, he helps evacuate people by boat under fire.

The text emphasizes his open Israeli identity (IDF/FAUDA patches, Israeli flag, Hebrew), as well as mentions of bureaucratic difficulties (denials of assistance as “non-citizen”, attempts to obtain citizenship) and received threats after publications.

And yes — the article separately describes an episode with the airfield near Chornobaivka in early March 2022: the hero filmed enemy equipment from the roof of a high-rise building, transmitted the coordinates to the Ukrainian side, after which the object was fired upon.

“Fauda”, but without takes

In the series, there is a second take and soundtrack. On the ground — there is not.
The camera does not wait for convenience. And sometimes the best tactic is not to go outside at all.

Why this matters to Israelis

To see not a “distant” war, but people who act according to values familiar to us. Responsibility, restraint, helping one’s neighbor — this is immediately recognizable.

What the diaspora feels

Some help humanitarianly, some with words and connections, some with deeds.
And many see in him not a legend, but an example.

Where the media’s place is

We keep the focus on the Israel—Ukraine connection without myth-making. Facts, context, respect for safety and details.

Bureaucracy and reality

Queues and formalities do not disappear even for those who have done much.
It’s unpleasant, but that’s how wartime is structured. The work continues — without fanfare.

What this story teaches

Not to wait for applause. To keep the rhythm. To remember why it all started — for life and dignity.

Read the original by Shimon Briman (three languages)

We deliberately do not retell verbatim. Go to the author — there are live details and the voice of the primary source.

Ukrainian (LB.ua):
https://lb.ua/society/2025/09/12/695803_supergeroy_z_faudi_viyni_proti.html

Russian (NEWSru.co.il):
https://www.newsru.co.il/press/12sep2025/eyal_briman.html

English (The Jerusalem Post):
https://www.jpost.com/international/internationalrussia-ukraine-war/article-867213

NAnews Conclusion

This is not a plot about a series. It’s about school, discipline, and the choice of one Israeli who became part of Ukraine’s defense.

The bridge Israel—Ukraine is built by such people, not just protocols.

For NAnews — Israel News this is an important sign: solidarity has a face, a voice, and concrete actions. We recommend reading Shimon Briman’s originals in full — there you can hear that very “live timbre” that is best seen with your own eyes.

In 1734, the founder of Hasidism settled in Tovstom Israel ben EliezerIt is believed that It was here that he received his second name, Baal Shem Tov (abbreviated as Besht) and became known as a tzaddik and healer.

In his new article “Ukraine Incognita” revealed little-known facts about the Jewish history of the village of Tovste (Ukrainian: Товсто), which is in the Ternopil region. For those interested — here it is on the map.

This village is not as well known to travelers as Zalishchyky, Gorodenka or Chortkiv, but, according to researchers, it is no less interesting and definitely deserves attention.

In Hasidism this is called the “Besht's revelation.”that is, the moment when he revealed to people his true face as a great tzaddik.

Hasidic traditions describe it this way:

“Then he (Israel ben Eliezer) settled in the holy community of Tlusta, where he was also a melamed (teacher in a cheder – religious school), and could not gather a minyan in his home, but received people and prayed with them.

He wore a “tuzlik” (Ukrainian) (a woolen bag for salt), and his toes stuck out of the holes in his shoes, because he was very poor. He used to immerse himself in the mikvah even in the month of Tevet (December-January according to the Gregorian calendar), and sweat would come out in drops the size of peas. Then people began to come to him, but he did not want to receive them.

One day, a madman or madwoman was brought to him, and he refused to let them in. At night, he was told that he had turned 36. In the morning, he began to count and discovered that this was indeed true. He accepted the madman, cured him, and left his occupation as a melamed, taking my father-in-law, of blessed memory, as a sofer. People from different places began to come to him.”

The term “baal-shem” was used by the people to refer to a person who knows the hidden name of God, has the power and means (“kelim”) with which he can address the Almighty. In another meaning, among Kabbalists, “baal-shem” is someone who uses the formulas of magic (practical Kabbalah) and natural remedies for healing. Baal Shem began as a professional healer, combining the knowledge of a doctor, psychologist and folk healer. He treated infertility, mental illness, exorcised demons and devils, and made amulets and potions.

Besht lived in Tlust (as Tovsta was called until 1944) almost until his move to Medzhybizh.

Hasidic traditions should be treated with great caution, as they contain many frankly fabulous and logical inconsistencies. But the fact remains that Hasidism, as a new religious movement, originated in Tovstom.

By 1930, the local Jewish community numbered 2,600 people, more than two-thirds of the entire population of the village. But by 1939, it had significantly decreased to 1,196 people.

The German occupation put an end to the history of the Jewish community of Tlusty. The Nazis created a ghetto in the village, where, in addition to locals, they drove Jews from neighboring Zalishchyky, Horodenka, Yagilnitsa, Chortkiv and others.

On May 27 and June 6, 1943, the entire population of the ghetto was exterminated in two mass executions. Taking into account the executions of previous years, almost 5,000 people were tortured in the village in total.

Traces of this tragedy can be seen in the old Jewish cemetery. In addition to the mass graves of the tortured, there are bullet holes on the matzevah gravestones.

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Among the signatories are the memorials of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Babi Yar, Buchenwald, Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, Stutthof, Westerbork, and the House of the Wannsee Conference.

The authors of the document demand to ensure the programmatic, organizational, intellectual, and financial independence of memorial institutions. In their opinion, places of memory should have the opportunity not only to tell about the crimes of the past but also to openly respond to modern manifestations of anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia, dehumanization, and hate speech.

Ukraine is represented among the signatories by the National Historical and Memorial Reserve “Babi Yar”.

Among the 32 signatories, there is not a single institution from Russia. Why?

In the list of organizations that signed the declaration on July 15, 2026, there is not a single Russian museum, memorial complex, or research center. Meanwhile, there are sites of mass killings from the time of Nazi occupation on Russian territory, including the Zmievskaya and Petrushinskaya ravines, Palmnicken, memorials in Mineralnye Vody, Krasnodar, and Bryansk region.

There is no official explanation for this absence yet. The publication by Auschwitz-Birkenau includes the text of the declaration and a list of 32 participants but does not specify who formed this circle, whether invitations were sent to Russian institutions, and whether the organizers received refusals. It is also not reported whether other memorials will be able to join later. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that institutions from Russia were officially excluded precisely because of the war.

However, the political and institutional context is obvious.

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, relations between the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum and official Russia were effectively severed. In January 2023, the museum for the first time did not invite Russian representatives to the anniversary of the camp’s liberation, directly explaining the decision by Russian aggression against a free and independent Ukraine.

The Russian delegation did not receive an invitation to the central ceremony of the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz on January 27, 2025. The museum director, Piotr Cywiński, explained that the event was dedicated to liberation and the value of freedom, and the presence of representatives of a state conducting an aggressive war would look cynical. He also reminded that among the Red Army soldiers who liberated the camp in 1945, there were not only Russians but also Ukrainians.

In February 2025, Putin called the absence of the Russian side at the anniversary ceremony “strange” and “shameful.” Thus, by the time the declaration appeared on July 15, 2026, there was already a long-standing public conflict between one of its main participants and disseminators — the Auschwitz-Birkenau museum — and the Russian authorities.

The content of the declaration itself also makes the participation of Russian state institutions politically sensitive. The document requires that memorial sites maintain programmatic and intellectual independence from national, regional, and local authorities, be able to critically assess contemporary political processes, and not be subjected to budgetary pressure.

For many Russian memorials, which are under the jurisdiction of regional authorities, municipalities, or state museums, independently signing an international statement demanding independence from political power could require coordination with the founders. This is a likely organizational factor but not an officially confirmed reason.

A simpler explanation cannot be ruled out: the declaration was prepared not as an open document for all memorials in Europe but within a certain network of institutions already connected by joint projects and professional contacts. The list does not include not only Russia but also memorials from Belarus, the Baltic states, Hungary, Romania, Greece, and several other countries. Therefore, the 32 signatories do not represent all European places of memory.

Nevertheless, the absence of Russian organizations is particularly noticeable. Russia constantly emphasizes the role of the USSR in the defeat of Nazism and the liberation of Auschwitz, yet no Russian institution was among the memorials that demanded to protect historical truth from political and budgetary control.

The most correct conclusion is as follows: there is no direct evidence of an official ban or refusal by Russian organizations yet, but their absence occurs against the backdrop of an open conflict between Auschwitz-Birkenau and the Russian authorities, the war against Ukraine, and the fundamental requirement of the declaration for the independence of historical memory from the state.

What 32 European memorials demanded

The document was titled “European Memorial Sites: Core Declaration”. Its full text was published on July 15, 2026 by the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, after which the declaration was disseminated by other institutions, including the Babi Yar Reserve. The signatories remind that memorials created on the sites of camps, places of mass shootings, deportations, prisons, and extermination centers are not just museums.

Here it is – https://www.auschwitz.org/en/museum/news/european-memorial-sites-core-declaration%2C1851.html

These are material witnesses to the crimes that shaped the post-war Europe.

As the generation of Holocaust survivors, former inmates of Nazi camps, and direct witnesses of World War II fades away, the responsibility for preserving the evidence passes to archives, researchers, museums, and memorial complexes.

The authors of the declaration highlight several main tasks of memorial institutions:

• preserve verified historical facts;
• conduct independent scientific research;
• counter denial and distortion of Nazi crimes;
• help society understand the connection between the past and the present;
• respond to anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia;
• warn about the danger of dehumanizing certain peoples and social groups;
• preserve the right to critically assess political processes.

The formulation that memorial sites should remain spaces for “complex questions” is particularly important.

This means that their task is not limited to organizing ceremonies, conducting tours, and preserving buildings. Memorials should have the opportunity to speak about collaborationism, the responsibility of state institutions, the participation of the local population in crimes, societal indifference, and propaganda mechanisms — even when such topics are inconvenient for the current authorities.

Independence from authorities at all levels

The declaration explicitly states that memorial institutions must have programmatic independence from political power — local, regional, national, and European.

Their intellectual and practical autonomy should not become the object of political or budgetary pressure. The formulation is of fundamental importance.

Many European memorials are state-owned or receive a significant portion of their funding from state budgets. Authorities can influence them through the appointment of leadership, approval of programs, allocation of funds, changes in the composition of supervisory boards, or reduction of funding.

The signatories effectively declared: state support should not turn into the right of the state to determine which pages of history are allowed to be studied and shown to visitors.

Financial dependence is especially dangerous in cases where researchers raise questions about the role of national administrations, police, political movements, or individual public groups in the persecution and extermination of people.

The declaration does not contain examples of specific interference and does not name any government. However, the very need for a collective appeal by 32 institutions indicates that the participants consider the problem of political pressure to be pan-European.

Babi Yar represents Ukraine

Ukraine is represented in the declaration by the National Historical and Memorial Reserve “Babi Yar”.

It is important that this refers specifically to the state reserve, not the private Holocaust Memorial Center “Babi Yar”.

The State Historical and Memorial Reserve was established by a resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 308 on March 1, 2007. The complex of monuments in the Babi Yar ravine was transferred to the management of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine. On February 4, 2010, by a decree of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko No. 258/2010, the reserve was granted national status. The decree emphasized the significance of Babi Yar for perpetuating the memory of the victims of Nazi persecution. Ukraine’s participation in the declaration means the inclusion of the state reserve in the united voice of leading European places of memory.

Babi Yar placed its signature alongside Auschwitz, Dachau, Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, and other symbols of Nazi crimes.

33,771 people in two days

Babi Yar is one of the main symbols of the so-called Holocaust by bullets — the mass extermination of Jews in occupied territories through shootings near cities and settlements.

German troops occupied Kyiv on September 19, 1941.

On September 28, 1941, announcements were posted throughout the city ordering all Jews of Kyiv and its surroundings to appear the next morning at a designated place, bringing documents, money, valuables, and clothing.

People were not informed that they were being led to their deaths.

During September 29 and 30, 1941, units of Einsatzgruppe C, with the participation of other German formations and collaborators, shot 33,771 Jewish men, women, and children in Babi Yar. This figure was recorded by the Nazi structures themselves and is confirmed by materials from Yad Vashem and UNESCO. Mass killings in Babi Yar continued even after September 1941.

According to the National Reserve, during the German occupation, more than 100,000 people were killed here. Among the victims were Jews, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war, underground fighters, hostages, psychiatric hospital patients, Ukrainian nationalists, and representatives of other groups. For the Israeli audience following the Ukrainian-Israeli agenda together with NAnews — Israel News, Babi Yar’s participation in the European declaration holds special significance.

This is a reminder that the history of the Holocaust is not limited to the territory of death camps in occupied Poland. Hundreds of thousands of Jews from Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and other territories of the USSR were exterminated near their own cities, towns, and villages.

Babi Yar is under enhanced UNESCO protection

On December 12, 2024, the UNESCO Committee for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict granted the National Reserve “Babi Yar” temporary enhanced protection.

This status provides the highest international level of immunity for a cultural object from attack or use for military purposes.

UNESCO separately noted that Babi Yar is one of the largest sites of mass killings during the “Holocaust by bullets” and has international significance for preserving memory and understanding the history of the Holocaust. The provision of protection occurred during the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine.

However, the declaration of July 15, 2026 does not directly mention the Russian invasion. The document also does not refer to any specific political events, conflicts around the leadership of memorials, or specific cases of funding cuts.

Therefore, it cannot be asserted that the declaration was adopted in connection with one specific incident.

Full list of 32 memorial institutions that signed the declaration

The joint declaration of July 15, 2026 was signed by 32 memorial institutions from nine European countries.

Poland

1. Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum.
2. Museum of the Martyrdom of the Citizens of Wielkopolska Fort VII.
3. Gross-Rosen Museum in Rogoźnica.
4. Museum of the Former German Extermination Camp Kulmhof in Chełmno nad Ner.
5. KL Plaszow Memorial Museum in Kraków.
6. Stutthof Memorial in Sztutowo.
7. Martyrs’ Museum in Żabikowo.

Ukraine

8. National Historical and Memorial Reserve Babyn Yar.

Germany

9. Death March Memorial in Below Forest.
10. Bergen-Belsen Memorial.
11. Memorial to the Victims of the Euthanasia Murders Brandenburg an der Havel.
12. Brandenburg-Görden Prison Memorial.
13. Buchenwald Memorial.
14. Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial.
15. Flossenbürg Concentration Camp Memorial.
16. Memorial and Museum Jamlitz in Lieberose.
17. Memorial Leistikowstraße Potsdam.
18. Mittelbau-Dora Memorial.
19. Neuengamme Concentration Camp Memorial.
20. Memorial Museum Ravensbrück.
21. Memorial and Museum Sachsenhausen.
22. House of the Wannsee Conference Memorial and Educational Site.
23. Wolfenbüttel Prison Memorial.

Czech Republic

24. Hodonín u Kunštátu. Memorial to the Holocaust of the Roma and Sinti in Moravia.
25. Lety u Písku. The Memorial to the Holocaust of the Roma and Sinti in Bohemia.

France

26. Maison d’Izieu.
27. Internment and Deportation Memorial – Royallieu Camp.

Netherlands

28. Camp Vught National Memorial.
29. Memorial Center Camp Westerbork.

Austria

30. Memorial Site Hartheim Castle.

Belgium

31. Kazerne Dossin.

Italy

32. Fossoli Foundation — Fossoli Foundation.

Thus, the largest group among the signatories is represented by memorial institutions from Germany — 15 organizations. Seven institutions from Poland signed the declaration, two each from the Czech Republic, France, and the Netherlands. Ukraine, Austria, Belgium, and Italy are each represented by one memorial institution.

The full list shows that institutions associated with various forms of Nazi crimes have joined the declaration: concentration and extermination camps, mass shootings, deportations, prisons, ‘death marches’, persecution of Roma and Sinti, killings of people with disabilities, and the destruction of Jewish children.

The presence of Auschwitz, Babi Yar, Dachau, Buchenwald, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Westerbork, and the House of the Wannsee Conference in one list gives the declaration a special pan-European weight. These institutions represent different countries and different pages of history, yet they have come forward with a unified demand: historical memory should not depend on political conjuncture, government composition, or decisions on state funding.

This is the main meaning of the document, which NANews — Israel News draws attention to: the independence of memorial institutions is necessary not for the sake of the museums themselves, but for society’s ability to recognize the mechanisms of hatred before they once again lead to mass violence.

Why the declaration appeared right now

The authors speak of ‘growing challenges to democracy and peace’, but deliberately do not name specific countries or political forces.

European societies are experiencing a generational change. There are fewer and fewer direct witnesses of the Holocaust and Nazi persecutions. At the same time, the influence of social networks is growing, where historical facts often give way to propaganda, conspiracy theories, and politically convenient interpretations.

In these conditions, memorials become the last institutional keepers not only of documents but also of the physical space of crimes.

Camp barracks, gas chambers, execution sites, prison cells, railway platforms, and personal belongings of the deceased cannot be replaced by political speeches or commemorative ceremonies.

That is why the signatories demand the right to independently determine the content of research, exhibitions, and educational programs.

The declaration of July 15, 2026 is not only an appeal to governments.

It is an appeal to journalists, educators, public organizations, politicians, and visitors to memorials.

Its main idea is that the memory of Nazi crimes should remain a living social institution capable of asking uncomfortable questions of the present.

Babi Yar, Auschwitz, Dachau, and other places of memory warn: when historical facts begin to depend on political conjuncture and budgetary decisions, not only the past is at risk.

The ability of society to timely recognize the repetition of old mechanisms is at risk — the search for internal enemies, dehumanization of people, spread of anti-Semitism, justification of violence, and the gradual destruction of democratic constraints.

The German newspaper Die Zeit on July 12, 2026 published a large article titled “Der Tod von oben” — “Death from Above.” Its authors Kai Biermann, Hauke Friederichs, and Olivia Kortas described how drones have changed the war in Ukraine and created a huge strip of almost continuous surveillance along the front line.

According to Die Zeit, in some areas, the depth of this dangerous territory already reaches 40 kilometers and continues to grow. The publication also provides an estimate: about ten drones per square kilometer may be in the air simultaneously.

This does not mean that the entire territory 40 kilometers from the line of contact is completely deserted. There remain positions, observation posts, small infantry groups, and supply routes. However, any movement of a car, armored vehicle, motorcycle, or group of servicemen can be detected by a reconnaissance drone, after which an FPV drone, heavy bomber, or artillery is directed at the target.

How the “death zone” grew from 10 to 50 kilometers

The expansion of the zone occurred gradually and directly depended on the range of drones, the appearance of relays, the development of fiber optic systems, and the increase in the number of devices at the front.

March 3, 2025: Ukraine launches the “Drone Line”

March 3, 2025 The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine officially announced the launch of the “Drone Line” project. The initiative was to unite the most effective drone system units and create a permanent strip of destruction in front of Ukrainian positions.

An additional 4.6 billion hryvnias was allocated for the development of the project. The funds were intended for the purchase of drones, vehicles, electronic warfare equipment, and mobile group equipment.

Initially, it was about a controlled zone with a depth of approximately 10–15 kilometers, where Russian troops could not advance without significant losses.

July 17, 2025: Reuters describes the first outlines of the new war

In a Reuters article from July 17, 2025, the dangerous strip was estimated at about 10 kilometers on each side of the line of contact.

Even then, Ukrainian military personnel reported that large equipment was quickly detected by drones. Therefore, the Russian army began to use small groups of two to six people, motorcycles, ATVs, and light vehicles more often.

The mass concentration of armored vehicles necessary for a classic breakthrough of the front was becoming increasingly dangerous: a column could be detected even before it reached the line of attack.

In August 2025, Volodymyr Zelensky estimated the depth of such a zone at approximately 10–20 kilometers from the front line. However, in the following months, the range of drones continued to increase.

February 2, 2026: ten drones per square kilometer

The estimate of ten drones per square kilometer appeared not only in Die Zeit.

February 2, 2026 Estonian Defense Forces staff officer Major Taavi Liyas stated in an interview with ERR that in some saturated areas of the front, about ten drones per square kilometer could be in the air.

Most of them are not strike drones but reconnaissance devices. They stay in the air longer, monitor roads, plantings, and destroyed settlements, and after detecting movement, call in FPV drones or bomber drones.

Liyas also reported that artillery had to be moved further from the front line. If earlier guns could be placed four to six kilometers from the front, now they are kept about 10–12 kilometers away, almost at the limit of effective range.

According to him, it is practically impossible to secretly assemble a large armored group unless reconnaissance drones, communication, and enemy targeting means are suppressed in advance.

It is important to understand that ten drones per square kilometer is not an official average value for the entire front line. This is an estimate of drone density in the most active directions.

Tanks have not disappeared, but the traditional armored warfare has ended

Reuters on February 24, 2026, on the fourth anniversary of the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, published a report from the Kharkiv region.

Ukrainian tank platoon commander Valentin Bogdanov said that his captured Russian T-72 remains camouflaged most of the time. In fact, the tank is used as a stationary artillery piece, as going out into open terrain almost inevitably attracts FPV drones.

This does not mean the complete disappearance of tanks. Armored vehicles continue to be used in urban areas, in difficult weather, and during certain mechanized operations. However, their role has sharply decreased, and massive armored attacks have largely been replaced by the actions of small infantry groups.

According to Reuters, along the front line stretching about 1200 kilometers, thousands of reconnaissance and strike drones were present daily. The share of losses related to drones increased from less than 10% in 2022 to a figure that in certain directions in 2025 could reach 80%.

NAnews — Israel News notes: statements about the complete “disappearance of armored vehicles” are exaggerated. It is more accurate to say that drones have deprived tanks of their former freedom of movement and forced both sides to completely restructure the use of heavy machines.

Evacuation takes several days instead of an hour

Drone warfare has changed not only offensives but also medical assistance.

In the same Reuters report from February 24, 2026, the head of one of the military hospitals in the Kharkiv region, Vyacheslav Kurny, reported that the average evacuation time for the wounded in some areas exceeded three days.

Military medicine traditionally relied on the “golden hour” principle: it was believed that a seriously wounded person should be delivered to doctors within about 60 minutes. In the modern zone of destruction, a vehicle or armored vehicle sent for the wounded can itself become a target.

Therefore, ground robots and heavy cargo drones are increasingly used for evacuation, delivery of water, food, and ammunition. Only in January 2026, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, ground unmanned complexes completed more than 7000 missions.

Spring and summer 2026: the zone continues to expand

April 9, 2026 The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported that more than 1000 crews are participating in the “Drone Line” project.

The officially declared depth of constant destruction was 10–15 kilometers. According to the department, the project’s units hit every fourth recorded target on the front. During the winter period, they were credited with hitting more than 30,000 Russian servicemen, and in March alone — more than 10,500.

These are official Ukrainian military data, so it is impossible to independently verify each claimed target. However, they show the scale of the transition from individual operator groups to a centralized system of drone warfare.

May 23, 2026 Reuters wrote that the standard zone of increased danger reached about 15 kilometers on both sides of the front, that is, about 30 kilometers in total width.

Ukrainian military personnel reported that heavy Vampire drones are used not only for attacks but also for delivering water, food, and medicine to areas where it is too dangerous to send people or vehicles.

June 12, 2026 Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine David Aloyan, speaking at a drone summit in Latvia, reported that in certain directions, the depth of the destruction zone reaches 50 kilometers.

According to him, where the density of reconnaissance and strike drones is especially high, a vehicle can be detected and destroyed within minutes.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Alexander Mishchenko gave a more cautious estimate — from 20 to 40 kilometers. He emphasized that drones make large offensive operations significantly more difficult, as it is impossible to gather troops unnoticed in one area.

That is why the figure of 40 kilometers provided by Die Zeit on July 12, 2026 looks realistic. But it applies to certain directions and cannot automatically be transferred to the entire front.

Why advancement is measured in tens of meters per day

The American Center for Strategic and International Studies — CSIS — in a report from July 1, 2026 linked the slowdown in hostilities to minefields, fortifications, artillery, and the saturation of the front with drones.

According to CSIS, in the first half of 2026, the average speed of Russian advancement was:

• about 50 meters per day near Kostiantynivka;
• about 70 meters per day in the Pokrovske direction;
• about 90 meters per day in the direction of Sloviansk.

For comparison: during the maneuver phase of the war in 2022, individual groups could advance 3000–7000 meters per day.

Analysts note that both sides now cannot, without enormous risk, gather enough infantry and armored vehicles within a more than 20-kilometer zone for a rapid operational breakthrough. Instead, the Russian army tries to infiltrate with small groups that occupy individual plantings, buildings, or positions.

NAnews — Israel News emphasizes: drones have not made the war less bloody. They have made it more fragmented. Instead of rapid offensives, thousands of small skirmishes, attacks, and infiltration attempts occur, each of which can cost human lives.

The next stage — drones that do not need a connection with the operator

Artificial intelligence is already used at the front, so calling it exclusively the “next stage” is not entirely correct.

Back on March 25, 2024 Reuters reported that Ukraine and Russia are developing drones with computer vision. Such a device can recognize a target, capture its image, and continue the attack without constant connection with the operator.

A regular FPV drone can be stopped by jamming the radio channel. But if the drone has already captured the image of a vehicle, tank, or other target, the onboard system can independently adjust the flight on the final segment.

November 29, 2025 Reuters described a Ukrainian unit’s strike on a presumed Russian tank at a distance of about 20 kilometers.

After the operator indicated the target, the software helped the drone keep it in the frame. Even after losing connection, the device could continue the flight autonomously.

The Ukrainian side states that the final decision to attack should be made by a human. AI is used for recognition, tracking, and targeting, not for independently choosing people to be destroyed.

By the end of November 2025 Ukraine deployed dozens of such systems, with individual solutions already installed on thousands of drones. Developers admitted that the effectiveness of computer vision depends on weather, lighting, camouflage, and image quality.

What the appearance of a 40-kilometer zone means

The “death zone” is not a continuous desert where no one can be.

Military personnel continue to serve on its territory, observation posts operate, rotations are conducted, and cargo is delivered. But the risk sharply increases as one approaches the line of contact.

The main change is that the front has ceased to be a narrow strip of trenches. It has turned into a deep territory of constant surveillance, which can begin tens of kilometers from the immediate site of battles.

Drones have forced headquarters, warehouses, artillery, and command posts to move back. They have made the evacuation of the wounded more difficult, limited the use of tanks, and made the unnoticed preparation of a classic large offensive almost impossible.

But technological advantage does not remain constant. Each new means of protection leads to the emergence of a new method of attack: electronic warfare led to the spread of fiber optic drones, anti-drone nets to repeated attacks along the same route, and the loss of radio communication accelerated the development of autonomous targeting.

Therefore, the publication Die Zeit from July 12, 2026 describes not a completed technological revolution, but another stage of it. The boundary of the “death zone” continues to move away from the front line, and the war is increasingly turning into a confrontation of reconnaissance systems, algorithms, and mass-produced unmanned machines.

The main idea of the material is simple and harsh: even if the media agenda changes, Russia’s war against Ukraine has not stopped for a single season, and the Jews of Ukraine remain among those who “hold the line” since 2022, going through winter after winter.

Drone reconnaissance commander from Nikolaev: “fight for your country”

One of the key figures in the report is Moshe Bizsemov, the commander of a small group of reconnaissance drones. He has been serving in the Ukrainian army since 2018 and witnessed the phase of battles often associated in Ukraine with the war in Donbas after 2014. Bizsemov is a resident of Nikolaev, a father of two, and was supposed to complete his service in April 2022, shortly after the full-scale invasion began.

However, circumstances unfolded differently. At the moment when his unit came under attack, Bizsemov was in the process of being discharged. Many of his soldiers were captured in Mariupol, and as noted in the material, seven had not been released at the time of publication. He extended his contract and remained in service. When asked about his motivation, the answer is extremely short: “fight for your country.”

The report also highlights another detail: Bizsemov was wounded at the beginning of the war and had grounds to leave the service with an honorable discharge. Instead, he continued working specifically in drone reconnaissance — where the price of a mistake is measured not in statistics but in human lives on the ground.

BMP driver and “the man who stopped”: the story of Andre Chernecki

The second figure is Andre Chernecki, a driver of an armored vehicle (BMP). The text states that he has been serving since March 22 (the year is not specified in the material) and has gone through some of the bloodiest episodes of the war, including Bakhmut. Chernecki fought there twice, with one rotation, according to him, lasting seven months.

The strongest fragment of the report is an episode that Chernecki recounts as an illustration of a choice made “inside the war.” Returning from the Bakhmut direction and already about a kilometer from a safe area, he noticed a Ukrainian soldier trapped by debris in a destroyed building. According to protocol, the armored vehicle should not stop: the risk is too high for the crew and equipment. Chernecki stopped.

He ran out, bandaged the wound, and then effectively amputated the destroyed limb that was holding the soldier under the rubble, after which his team loaded the wounded onto the armored vehicle. The material emphasizes: by this act, he put himself and his people at risk, but he believed that otherwise, the soldier would have been “left behind,” and then almost certainly forgotten.

Chernecki speaks about his Jewish identity directly and without embellishment. He did not hide that he was Jewish and perceived it as part of his service: “if you represent a people — you must keep the bar higher.” He notes that he was wounded three times and explains why he continues to fight: so that no one can say that Jews do not fight.

Not everyone is on the front line — and this is also part of the truth

The Jerusalem Post text does not romanticize. It states directly: as among other citizens of Ukraine, among Jews, there were those who did not go to fight — who hid at home, fearing mobilization, or tried to avoid conscription. One of the Jewish leaders admits regret about this part of reality, but other community representatives emphasize: there are many servicemen, it’s just difficult to name the exact number.

The reason lies in the structure of the community and society. Some are actively involved in Jewish life and are visible, while others live outside community frameworks, and even people who usually “keep their finger on the pulse” may not know about their service.

The cost of war: the dead, the wounded, returning and dying on position

The report lists specific cases of losses among Jewish fighters. One of them is Tzvi-Hirsch (Grisha) Zvergazda, a cook and father of two. He died in June in the Kherson direction. The article notes his dream — to open a kosher restaurant in Odessa and someday receive a Michelin star.

Around the same time, Andrey Korovsky, a 32-year-old Chabad school teacher, died. He was a drone operator, had previously returned to service after a combat wound, and died on the front from a heart attack. In this fragment, the “rear” side of the war is especially noticeable: even when a person does not die from a bullet or shrapnel, the war continues to wear down the body.

Another hero is Maksim Nelipa, a 44-year-old Ukrainian actor and TV presenter. The material states that he left television at the beginning of the invasion and went to fight, and in May he was killed in battle. A separate detail strengthens the Ukraine-Israel connection: according to the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine, Nelipa’s son was at that time fighting as part of the Golani Brigade in Gaza and received news of his father’s death right on duty.

How many are there: assessment of losses and scale of participation

There is no official “Jewish statistics” for the Ukrainian army, and the report emphasizes that the numbers vary. But an estimate by Jewish representatives is provided: since 2022, the number of Jewish citizens of Ukraine who died in the war may range from 100 to 200 people, with dozens dying just last year. Against this background, another estimate is heard: now about twice as many Jews serve in the army as those who have already died.

This is not accounting and not a dispute over numbers. Rather, it is a marker that we are talking not about isolated stories, but about a noticeable layer of society that bears the same cost of war as the rest.

The role of communities: funerals, family assistance, chaplain on the front line

An important block of the report is about how Jewish structures in Ukraine take on what would be taken for granted in peacetime. The Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine (FJCU) reports that it helps organize Jewish funerals together with Chabad emissaries, supports families financially, and conducts prayers and Kaddish readings for the deceased.

The article also mentions Hungarian Jewish volunteer Binyamin Aser — an example of how the war attracts people to Ukraine from abroad, and the issue of a dignified burial becomes part of humanitarian work.

The work of military chaplain, Rabbi-Lieutenant Yakov Sinyakov, associated with FJCU, is described separately. He visits the trenches, brings soldiers sweets “the taste of home,” distributes books of psalms to those who ask, talks to recruits who see the front for the first time and do not always cope psychologically. Sinyakov has a master’s degree in psychology, and the material emphasizes that he knows how to “connect” with people not through slogans, but through human conversation.

His thought is also presented, explaining the moral complexity of war: some soldiers find it difficult to accept the very idea of killing, but in the “reality of evil,” he says, protecting family and country makes this choice inevitable.

Why this is important for Israel

The report includes a phrase of gratitude to Israel for accepting Ukrainian refugees at the beginning of the war. But the key meaning is broader: for the Israeli audience, Ukraine increasingly becomes an “external topic,” while for people on the front line, it is a matter of life and death, without pauses for changes in the news cycle.

The story of Jewish fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is simultaneously about Ukraine and about Israel: about shared memory, about the reaction to violence, about family ties that ended up on both sides of the fronts and borders, and about how war tears apart “ordinary life” in the most unexpected places — from Nikolaev and Kherson to Holon and IDF bases.

That is why such texts are important not as an emotional gesture, but as a document of the time: names, facts, direct words of people who fight, bury, return after injuries, and go back to positions. In the Russian-speaking Israeli agenda, this layer of reality must remain visible — and this is exactly what NAnews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency works for.

Original from January 15, 2026, The Jerusalem Post (Eng.) report by journalist Michael Starr:

https://www.jpost.com/international/internationalrussia-ukraine-war/article-883460

This time, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, entered the information battle. The occasion was a remark by former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk about the possible name ‘Rus’.

“So, has the Kyiv regime already abandoned the ‘Ukrs’? Now they are ‘Rus’?” Zakharova inquired.

The joke was supposed to show Kyiv’s confusion, the crisis of Ukrainian identity, and another ‘split’ within Ukraine. However, as a result, Russian propaganda primarily demonstrated its own inability to read sentences in full.

Because there was no decision to rename Ukraine. There was no bill, presidential decree, government initiative, or even a political campaign.

There was a hypothetical question from a journalist. There was a conditional answer from a former diplomat. And there was the Russian information machine, which once again needed to urgently defeat its own invention.

How the word ‘if’ disappeared on the way to Moscow

The interview with Borys Tarasyuk was published by RBC-Ukraine on July 14, 2026. The conversation mainly concerned Ukraine’s relations with Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, historical conflicts, and obstacles to the country’s accession to the European Union.

The journalist recalled North Macedonia, which had to change its state name to resolve a dispute with Greece, and asked whether Ukraine might face similar demands from neighbors.

Tarasyuk responded very clearly: no one is demanding that Ukraine change its name.

And only after that did he add that in a hypothetical situation, he would propose the name ‘Rus’, as he considers it the original name of the Ukrainian state and the heritage of Kievan Rus.

In normal journalism, this phrase would sound something like this:

‘Tarasyuk: no one is demanding to rename Ukraine, but hypothetically I would propose the name ‘Rus”.

But Russian propaganda is arranged differently. The conditional ‘if’ is an unnecessary detail for it, hindering the production of sensation.

Therefore, the word ‘if’ first disappeared from the sentence. Then the phrase ‘no one is demanding to change the name’ disappeared. After that, the personal reflection of the former minister turned into ‘Kyiv’s idea’. And a few hours later, Russian media already reported that ‘Kyiv authorities wanted to rename Ukraine’.

This is how the information conveyor works: at the entrance is a real quote, and at the exit is a convenient opponent that can be ceremoniously defeated.

The former minister suddenly became the ‘Kyiv regime’

Russian media treated Borys Tarasyuk’s status especially touchingly.

He indeed headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine twice and has extensive diplomatic experience. But at the time of the interview, Tarasyuk did not hold the position of head of the Foreign Ministry and did not represent the current Ukrainian government.

Moreover, on August 20, 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky relieved him of his duties as Ukraine’s permanent representative to the Council of Europe. The corresponding decree is published on the official website of the president.

But for Russian propaganda, this does not matter.

As soon as any former Ukrainian official utters a phrase suitable for a headline, he instantly turns into ‘Kyiv’, ‘Kyiv authorities’, or ‘Kyiv regime’.

Apparently, by the same logic, any statement by a former Russian minister should be considered a new state course of the Kremlin. But for some reason, Russian state media are in no hurry to use their own rules against Russia itself.

Zakharova argued with a character invented by Russian propaganda

After the necessary processing of the quote, Maria Zakharova appeared on the scene.

TASS reported that the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry reminded the ‘Kyiv authorities’, who allegedly wanted to rename the country, that they used to consider themselves heirs of the mythical ‘Ukrs’.

Here, Russian propaganda performed an especially beautiful somersault.

First, it attributed to the Ukrainian authorities a proposal that the Ukrainian authorities did not make.

Then it declared Ukrainians ‘Ukrs’.

After that, it decided that Ukraine allegedly abandoned the name invented by Russian propagandists.

And finally, it mocked Kyiv for a contradiction entirely created within the Russian information system.

This is no longer just a dispute with a straw man. This is a full-fledged state theater of one actor, where the propagandist independently writes the opponent’s lines, independently gets outraged by them, and independently declares themselves the winner.

NAnews — Israel News notes: Zakharova’s phrase says much more about the Russian attitude towards Ukrainians than about Ukraine’s position.

The word ‘Ukrs’ is not an official self-designation of the Ukrainian people. It is a mocking designation that has been spread for years precisely in the Russian propaganda environment.

The Ukrainian state could not ‘abandon’ this word because it never accepted it.

With the same success, one could ask why the French suddenly stopped calling themselves ‘frogs’, or why Americans no longer consider themselves ‘pindos’. The answer is obvious: offensive nicknames exist primarily in the mind of the one who uses them.

Propaganda lost its own historical line

But the main problem for Zakharova lies even deeper.

For years, Russian state propaganda has claimed that Russia and Ukraine are supposedly ‘one people’, that Ukrainian identity is artificial, and that the historical heritage of Rus belongs to Moscow.

And suddenly, when a Ukrainian diplomat talks about Ukraine’s right to the heritage of Rus, the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry responds: ‘Now they are Rus?’

It turns out to be quite awkward.

If Ukrainians, according to the Kremlin, are part of some ‘single Russian people’, why does Zakharova find it surprising that a Ukrainian politician refers to the history of Rus?

If Ukrainians have no relation to Rus, then on what basis does the Russian government continue to talk about ‘one people’?

Russian propaganda simultaneously tries to prove two opposing ideas:

Ukrainians are ‘actually Russians’, so Ukraine has no right to separate statehood.

Ukrainians have no right to call themselves heirs of Rus because Rus supposedly belongs exclusively to Russia.

Both constructions are used alternately — depending on which one is more convenient to pronounce in a particular television program.

Logic in this case is considered an unnecessary luxury.

No one is renaming the state — but propaganda is already having fun

The story becomes even more absurd if we recall the legal side of the issue.

The name of Ukraine is related to the provisions of the Constitution. A real renaming of the country would require a complex constitutional procedure.

At the same time, Article 157 of the Constitution of Ukraine establishes that the Constitution cannot be changed under conditions of martial law or a state of emergency. This has been repeatedly confirmed by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

So even if such an initiative did appear in Ukraine, it would be impossible to implement it under current conditions.

But discussing real legal procedures is not interesting to Russian media.

It is much more convenient to create a picture in which the ‘Kyiv regime’ woke up in the morning, urgently decided to abandon Ukraine, chose a new name for itself, informed a former minister about it, and immediately received a witty response from Zakharova.

This construction has nothing to do with reality, but it is perfectly adapted for distribution in Telegram channels and television talk shows.

NAnews — Israel News notes another characteristic detail: Russian media were almost not interested in the content of Tarasyuk’s interview itself.

He spoke about problems in Ukraine’s relations with neighbors, Polish-Ukrainian historical disputes, the need for compromises for EU accession, and how the Kremlin uses conflicts between European states.

But from the large conversation, one conditional phrase was extracted.

Because discussing the complex relations between Ukraine and Europe is difficult. It requires facts, context, and at least minimal respect for the reader.

And writing ‘Ukraine decided to rename’ is much easier.

When propaganda tries too hard

Russian propaganda constantly strives to present Ukraine as a state without its own history and identity.

However, every time Ukrainians discuss their own history, Moscow starts to get nervous.

If Ukraine recalls Kievan Rus — it is declared ‘theft of Russian history’.

If Ukraine emphasizes its own national identity — it is accused of ‘artificial separation’ from Russia.

If Ukrainians talk about a European future — it is called ‘rejection of roots’.

If Ukrainians talk about their own roots — they are told that these roots have already been privatized by Moscow.

As a result, Russian propaganda finds itself in a trap it built itself.

It wants to simultaneously deny the existence of an independent Ukraine and be outraged by every manifestation of Ukrainian independence.

Therefore, Zakharova’s response looks less like mockery of Tarasyuk and more like a symptom of its own ideological confusion.

The Russian Foreign Ministry tried to joke about the ‘crisis of Ukrainian identity’, but accidentally demonstrated a crisis of the Russian propaganda manual.

What actually happened

No renaming of Ukraine is happening.

Former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk was answering a hypothetical question about possible demands from neighboring countries during negotiations on joining the European Union.

He stated directly that no one is demanding that Ukraine change its name.

After that, Tarasyuk added that personally, in a conditional situation, he would propose the name ‘Rus’.

Russian media removed the conditional context from his response, turned the personal opinion of a former diplomat into an initiative of the current government, and passed the resulting construction to Maria Zakharova.

Zakharova, in turn, mocked Ukrainians for rejecting a word that Ukrainians never called themselves.

The whole story took less than a day.

First, Russian propaganda invented an event.

Then it spread it itself.

Then it reacted to it itself.

And in the end, it congratulated itself on the victory.

A rare case when the information machine simultaneously acted as the author of the news, the source of indignation, the main commentator, and its own victim.

In Israel, the 29th day of the month of Tammuz, the day of his death, has been declared Jabotinsky Day. In 2025, it falls on the evening of Thursday, July 24, 2025 – Friday, July 25, 2025.

Jabotinsky’s advocacy laid the foundation for the modern State of Israel, and his vision continues to shape Jewish identity to this day.

Why This Day Matters for Israel and Ukraine

The 29th of Tammuz is a special day in the Jewish calendar, when speeches are heard across the country, memorial candles are lit, and Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s legacy is discussed. People far from politics might wonder: why even remember this man?

But look closer — and you’ll immediately realize: thanks to people like Jabotinsky, we have Israel as we know it. His ideas about national dignity, self-respect, and respect for others still resonate not only for Jews, but for everyone fighting for the right to be themselves.

Interestingly, this day often becomes a reason for personal memories. The older generation recalls how families used to argue about Jabotinsky’s views, while young people, reading his biography, are surprised: it turns out he supported Ukrainians even in the early 20th century, when it was neither popular nor safe.

Odessa Roots and Political Instinct: The Beginning of the Journey

Born in Odessa, a city where Jewish, Ukrainian, Greek, Russian, and Armenian destinies mixed in a unique way, Jabotinsky learned early to listen to and understand other perspectives. His childhood was filled with the ringing of trams and the cries of street vendors in different languages, in courtyards where boys would sometimes fight, sometimes become friends. Maybe that’s why he became a committed opponent of any kind of national hatred.

When, in 1907, Jabotinsky ran for the Russian Empire’s parliament from the Volyn province, he had to build bridges between Jewish and Ukrainian voter groups from scratch. Back then, this seemed like an impossible task: distrust, stereotypes, pressure from the authorities… Yet even after losing, he was not disappointed — instead, he began to speak publicly that only together can minorities break the imperial machine of oppression.

Friends and contemporaries recalled that after this defeat, Jabotinsky became much closer to Ukrainian intellectuals. He read Ukrainian poetry, was interested in folk songs, even tried to understand dialects. For him, Ukrainians were never “younger brothers” — he saw them as equal partners.

Putin vs. Common Sense: Why Deny Ukraine?

Why does the Kremlin so fear Ukrainian identity? You can search for explanations for a long time, but essentially, it boils down to this: acknowledging the existence of Ukraine makes imperial claims meaningless. Putin’s 2021 article and his ongoing rhetoric are an attempt to impose the “same old song”: Ukrainians supposedly invented by the Bolsheviks, there is no nation, and anyone who disagrees is an enemy.

But as early as 1911, Jabotinsky publicly stated: “Ukrainians are a people, a separate nation, and that’s the only way to view them.” He didn’t just say this at rallies — but in articles for different audiences, in Russian, Yiddish, and Ukrainian.

Jabotinsky understood Ukrainian and could get by in conversation, but he was not a native speaker and did not speak publicly in Ukrainian. He was fluent in Russian, Hebrew, Yiddish, Italian, French, and several other languages. He learned Ukrainian through practical communication and interest in culture, but did not use it as a language for political speeches or articles.

• Contemporaries noted that he “could support a conversation in different Ukrainian dialects,” understood linguistic features, but did not write or publish materials in Ukrainian.
• Most of his texts on Ukrainian topics were written in Russian or Hebrew, sometimes in Yiddish.

Friends recalled that Jabotinsky easily found common ground with Ukrainians — sometimes even using Ukrainian words or phrases in conversation to win over his interlocutor.

This debate with imperial thinking was personal — he could not accept the idea of “dissolving” people in a faceless mass.

Let’s remember, Jabotinsky loved genuine public debates — and was not afraid of tough topics. He argued with intellectuals like Pyotr Struve, passionately insisting that every people has its own path, and no one has the right to turn diversity into a monotonous imperial “porridge.” In life, he could easily argue in the street, in an editorial office, or even at a banquet — if it was about people’s right to be themselves.

Quotes That Cannot Be Forgotten

Jabotinsky was no armchair theorist. His writings are always full of life and directness. Here are a few of his thoughts that still resonate today:

• “Behind these cities (Ukraine) rolls a continuous, almost thirty-million-strong Ukrainian sea…” An ordinary trip from Odessa to Kharkiv or Poltava was not just a route for him, but a real study: where “khokhly” live, where “katsapy,” why they don’t mix, and what is the secret of Ukrainian distinctiveness.
• “Shevchenko… is a vivid symptom of the national and cultural vitality of Ukrainianism…” He studied the poet’s biography, read his poems in the original language, could spend hours explaining to friends why Shevchenko is not just a writer, but a symbol of the nation.
• “Ukrainian parties recognize the right of Jews to national culture…” For Jabotinsky this was a matter of principle. He knew Ukrainian intellectuals, communicated with socialists, debated with radicals — but always noted: a real Ukrainian patriot will not demand that a Jew abandon his language or traditions.
• “I know well this type of Ukrainian nationalist-intellectual…” This is not just a friendly recognition, but also a subtle rebuke to those who try to portray Ukrainians as enemies of Jews — Jabotinsky’s real experience fully refutes such myths.

Political Father of Likud: Why This Line Remains Unbroken

Few people remember that Jabotinsky was not only an ideologist, but also a practical leader of the Zionist movement, leaving a mark not only in Israel, but in the fate of real families. Benzion Netanyahu, the father of the current Prime Minister of Israel, in his youth was the assistant to Jabotinsky’s personal secretary. He absorbed these views and passed them on to his son. At political meetings in Israel, people still recall how Benzion could quote Jabotinsky from memory — in arguments with opponents and even in daily conversations.

Many Likud leaders consider Jabotinsky their teacher, and his ideas the standard of true political courage. Even those who did not always agree with him admitted: this was a man who was not afraid to go against the tide. Hence, the question for the current leadership of Israel: will they have the courage to look at Ukraine through his eyes, and not through the prism of temporary interests or pressure from powerful states?

One can imagine a hypothetical conversation between Jabotinsky and today’s politicians:

— Are you sure that true strength is in denial, not in acknowledging the truth?
— Why not recall old lessons and build alliances with those who follow their own path, not copy someone else’s history?

The memory of Jabotinsky is also an internal challenge for every Israeli.

When Myths Are More Dangerous Than Rockets: Why the Kremlin Fights the Past

How many times in recent years have Ukrainians heard from Kremlin propagandists: “You don’t exist,” “Your history is fiction,” “Your language is artificial”? But if you believe this, it turns out that peoples can be “canceled” by a simple decree, and borders — erased from the map. That’s why Kremlin propaganda is so obsessed with history: don’t recognize Ukraine — and any crime becomes justified.

Jabotinsky understood this mechanism perfectly. He traveled a lot around Ukraine, talked to ordinary people, observed how villages lived where, on one side of the river — Ukrainians, on the other — Russians. No one mixes, no one forgets their customs. It’s such details that give a real understanding of the national question, which cannot be seen from a Moscow office.

No wonder his texts have so many vivid ethnographic descriptions: costumes, wedding traditions, kitchen conversations, even household anecdotes. History, according to Jabotinsky, is not just dates and wars, but, first of all, people, their speech, their habits, and their ability to support each other in difficult times.

What the Memory of Jabotinsky Teaches Us Today

Today, the memory of Jabotinsky is not only a state ceremony but also a conversation in every family that remembers that freedom is never final. In Israel, people often recall how he gathered all sorts of people around him, argued passionately, but always remained open to dialogue. His lesson is simple: “True self-respect begins with respect for others.”

His life is an example of how you can be a Jew, a Ukrainian, a European — and not lose your essence. He dreamed of a state where everyone has a place, where languages are not forbidden but preserved, where history is not a reason for war, but for seeking understanding.

In these days, when people once again discuss who is with whom and against whom, it’s worth recalling that a hundred years ago there was someone who could say what others were afraid to even think. Maybe now his experience is more important than ever.

Main conclusions for those who want to see beyond the headlines

The memory of Jabotinsky is a challenge for every generation: if you’ve forgotten why rights and freedoms are needed, read his texts, talk to those who still remember his lessons. History is always on the side of those who are not afraid to be honest — with themselves and with others.

Details of the program were reported on July 15, 2026, by the local news site Haifa news haifaru. Israeli doctors will perform a series of complex surgeries on the patients, related to the reconstruction of the eye socket and facial tissues after severe injuries. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian medical team will participate in the treatment and adopt methods that are planned to be applied in Lviv in the future.

Thus, it is not only about helping seven specific people. The project is intended to become the foundation for creating Ukraine’s own system of treatment, eye prosthetics, and rehabilitation for patients with the consequences of mine-explosive, shrapnel, and other severe injuries.

From the arrival of the delegation to the start of operations

The Ukrainian delegation arrived in Israel on July 5, 2026, as part of cooperation with the UNBROKEN rehabilitation project.

Initially, it was reported that Ukrainian patients would undergo examinations and eye prosthetics at the Bnei Zion Medical Center, and doctors from Lviv would gain practical experience in oculoplasty and recovery from severe facial injuries. The main task of the program was stated to be the transfer of Israeli technologies to Ukrainian specialists, rather than organizing a one-time medical mission.

Now the project has moved from the organizational stage directly to treatment.

7 victims arrived in Haifa with injuries sustained during the war. Details about their identities, the nature of their injuries, and their affiliation with military or civilian structures are not publicly disclosed for understandable medical and ethical reasons.

It is known that the patients will require complex reconstructive interventions. Depending on the nature of the injury, they may include the restoration of the eye socket, eyelids, tear ducts, surrounding tissues, and preparation for the installation of an individual eye prosthesis.

The medical direction of the project is associated with Dr. Yoav Verdizer, a specialist at Bnei Zion in oculoplasty, orbital surgery, eyelids, and tear ducts.

Dr. Verdizer’s cooperation with Ukrainian specialists did not start now. As early as 2024, he visited Ukraine as part of a joint program between Bnei Zion and the organization Lev Echad, consulting patients and participating in the development of assistance for people with severe eye and facial injuries. At that time, the doctor emphasized that the goal of the project is to restore the quality of life and hope for the future to the victims.

What eye prosthetics means

It is important to understand that a regular eye prosthesis does not restore lost vision.

Its task is to restore the appearance of the eye and face, maintain the correct shape of the eye socket, protect tissues, and reduce the physical and psychological consequences of the injury.

Before installing the prosthesis, the patient often requires several operations.

Surgeons must restore damaged tissues, form the eye socket, eliminate the consequences of inflammations, and prepare the site for the future individual prosthesis. After healing, an ocularist specialist creates an artificial eye taking into account the shape of the face, the size of the eye socket, and the color of the healthy eye.

Modern eye prostheses are not just cosmetic products. They help fill the space left after tissue loss, support the anatomical structure of the face, and can significantly improve a person’s psychological state. Medical specialists also note their importance for long-term physical and social rehabilitation.

For a person who has sustained a severe injury in the war, such treatment means the opportunity to freely leave the house again, communicate, work, and not perceive their own reflection as a constant reminder of the trauma experienced.

Israeli knowledge should work in Ukraine

Along with the patients, three Ukrainian doctors and one nurse from Lviv arrived in Haifa.

They will be present during examinations and operations, familiarize themselves with Israeli methods of reconstructive surgery, learn to work with a damaged eye socket, and participate in preparing patients for prosthetics.

This is a fundamental part of the program.

Seven operations can change the lives of seven people. Trained doctors returning to Ukraine with new knowledge will be able to help dozens and hundreds of patients.

In Lviv, it is planned to create a specialized direction, and in the future, a medical center for eye prosthetics, working with the use of Israeli experience and with the support of specialists from Haifa. Such a center will allow Ukrainians to receive complex assistance closer to home, without the need to organize an expensive trip abroad each time.

The war has already led to a huge number of severe eye and facial injuries. They are caused by rocket and drone fragments, artillery shells, explosive waves, building debris, and mine-explosive injuries.

After saving a life, an equally complex path of recovery begins. It can last for months and even years, requiring several surgical interventions, prosthetics, psychological help, and social adaptation.

Therefore, the transfer of technologies is not an addition to treatment, but one of the main results of the entire program.

Who participates in the project

The organizer of the medical internship and cooperation with Bnei Zion was the Israeli humanitarian organization לב אחד — Lev Echad — ‘One Heart’.

Representatives of Israeli Friends of Ukraine joined the delegation’s accompaniment and volunteer support. The project was also assisted by the Embassy of Ukraine in Israel, the Ukrainian ambassador Yevgeny Korniychuk, consul Alex Zernopolsky, and the Ukrainian volunteer center ‘Razom’ from Haifa.

NANews — Israel News | Nikk.Agency has already reported on the arrival of the Ukrainian delegation and plans to create an eye prosthetics direction in Lviv.

New information shows that the project has not remained at the level of statements: patients are in Haifa, Ukrainian medics have begun training, and Israeli specialists have started practical medical work.

This is exactly the format of international assistance that can maintain significance for many years.

Diplomats help establish connections. Volunteers accompany patients and solve organizational issues. Israeli doctors perform operations and share experience. Ukrainian specialists gain knowledge that will then work within Ukraine.

The connection between Haifa and Lviv, built not on statements

For Ukraine, the project means the emergence of an additional opportunity to restore people after some of the most severe consequences of the war.

For Israel, it is an opportunity to transfer accumulated experience to a country where the need for reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation continues to grow.

Israeli medicine is well acquainted with treating people after terrorist attacks, explosions, combat injuries, and mass emergencies. This experience cannot simply be transferred in the form of instructions or textbooks. Ukrainian doctors need to see operations, participate in decision-making, and work alongside Israeli colleagues.

That is why the arrival of the medical team from Lviv is no less significant than the treatment of seven patients.

NANews — Israel News notes: real Ukrainian-Israeli cooperation is manifested not in protocol photographs, but in such projects — when a specific person receives help, a doctor gains knowledge, and a medical system capable of continuing this work independently appears in Ukraine.

The seven patients who arrived in Haifa are seven human stories behind the general statistics of the war.

For each of them, surgery at Bnei Zion can be a step towards restoring their face, confidence, and normal life.

And for Ukrainian medicine, this project can become the beginning of a direction that will help significantly more victims in the future.

Dozens of American refueling planes stationed at Ben Gurion Airport occupied parking spaces needed by passenger airliners. When the United States, due to a new escalation with Iran, halted the withdrawal of its planes and returned additional aircraft to Israel, the Airports Authority warned of possible cancellations of civilian flights.

The most serious scenario involved the cancellation of about ten flights a day starting from July 23, 2026. Approximately 50,000 airline tickets per month were at risk.

Transport Minister Miri Regev attempted to limit the number of American planes, but the decision caused sharp dissatisfaction with the US Army’s Central Command. By July 15, the ban on refueling landings was lifted, and Israeli agencies began seeking a new compromise.

Why American planes are at Ben Gurion

Refueling planes allow combat aviation to conduct long operations far from their own bases. They refuel fighters and bombers directly in the air, increasing their range and flight duration.

American refuelers began arriving in Israel during the US’s preparation for a possible operation against Iran. The first large groups of transport planes and refuelers were spotted at Ben Gurion in February 2026.

After the expansion of hostilities, the number of American planes sharply increased. By mid-June, about 74 American refuelers were at Ben Gurion Airport. They occupied a significant portion of the parking spaces intended for passenger planes.

It was not just about a few temporarily arrived aircraft. In fact, a large logistical base for American aviation was created at Israel’s main civilian airport.

For the US, stationing planes in Israel has obvious advantages. Ben Gurion has the necessary infrastructure, maintenance equipment, fuel supplies, and crew accommodation capabilities. Moreover, from Israel, American aviation can more quickly engage in operations related to Iran and the Persian Gulf.

However, the same advantages turned into a serious problem for civilian aviation.

Large military planes occupy parking spaces needed by airlines between landing and the next departure. They also require ground services, refueling, and escort. When performing military tasks, such aircraft may receive operational priority, further complicating the schedule of passenger flights.

In June, the entire summer season was at risk

The first major crisis arose in mid-June.

On June 15, it was reported that 74 American refueling planes were at Ben Gurion. Israeli authorities considered a plan to first move 20 aircraft to Israeli Air Force bases and relocate or withdraw another 17 by early July.

At that moment, the trips of millions of passengers were at risk. The Airports Authority had to allocate takeoff and landing times for airlines for July and August but could not guarantee the necessary number of parking spaces.

Preliminary estimates changed with the situation. Initially, there were talks of possible problems for 2.4 million passengers during the summer season. Then the cancellation of up to 400,000 tickets in July was discussed. After the start of the withdrawal of American planes, the estimate was reduced to about 100,000.

On June 16, six refuelers flew from Ben Gurion to the Ramon base. In the next stage, the Americans planned to withdraw about 20 more planes. US Army representatives warned that refuelers might return to the region if the operational situation required their presence.

By early July, the situation seemed resolved. Dozens of American planes left civilian parking spaces, and foreign airlines were able to increase the number of flights.

This period saw a noticeable increase in passenger traffic. In July 2026, about 2.3 million passengers were expected to pass through Ben Gurion, compared to 1.67 million in July 2025. About 14,500 takeoffs and landings were expected for the month.

But a new escalation between the US and Iran changed the plans.

Americans halted the withdrawal and returned planes

On July 8, it became known that the US began returning refuelers to Israel and other Middle Eastern areas that had previously been relocated to Europe.

The decision was related to a new exchange of strikes between the US and Iran. In Israel, meetings were simultaneously held with the participation of Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir, intelligence, air force, and operational management leaders. Israeli military maintained constant contact with the Pentagon and the US Army’s Central Command — CENTCOM.

By July 14, the American side halted further withdrawal of refuelers from Ben Gurion. By the end of the week, about eight more planes were supposed to leave the airport, but this plan was frozen.

Moreover, on the night before the decision, four additional refuelers arrived in Israel. According to Israeli media, after this, there were 33 American planes at Ben Gurion. Other reports indicated 34 refuelers stationed in total at Ben Gurion and Ramon Airport.

The difference of one plane was likely explained by the fact that some aircraft used the airport only for refueling and did not remain there permanently.

Airports Authority Director General Sharon Kedmi sent a letter to the Director General of the Ministry of Transport Moshe Ben-Zaken.

Kedmi warned that if the agreed plan for the withdrawal of planes was not fulfilled, a serious shortage of parking spaces for civilian airliners would arise at Ben Gurion from July 23.

According to his estimate, the airport would have to cancel about ten flights daily. This could affect approximately 50,000 airline tickets over the month.

The risk arose during the busiest period of the year. On most weekdays in the second half of July, more than 80,000 passengers were expected to pass through the airport.

On July 16, about 91,000 passengers were expected, and on July 26, approximately 90,000. The monthly maximum was planned for July 30: about 94,000 passengers and 560 takeoffs and landings in one day.

For Israelis, this meant that the dispute between government agencies and American military could directly affect long-planned vacations, family trips, and returns from abroad.

Miri Regev closed the airport to new refuelers

On July 14, Transport Minister Miri Regev ordered a temporary ban on the landing of additional American refueling planes at Ben Gurion.

Regev stated that no more than 20 American refuelers should remain at the civilian airport. The rest of the planes, she said, should be stationed at Israeli Air Force bases.

The minister emphasized that hundreds of thousands of Israelis had already purchased tickets for summer flights, and the state was obliged to ensure their execution.

At the same time, it was not about a complete closure of airspace to American aviation. One plane received permission to land after the restriction was introduced because it needed refueling and did not intend to stay at the airport.

NANews — Israel News notes: formally, the dispute was not about the right of American planes to operate from Israel, but about the number of aircraft that could permanently occupy civilian parking spaces at Ben Gurion.

However, CENTCOM perceived Regev’s decision as a threat to the operational capabilities of the American group.

Senior representatives of the US Central Command appealed to the leadership of the IDF and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The American side stated that the restriction hindered the fulfillment of military tasks during the escalation with Iran.

Representatives of the Israeli security system effectively supported the US position.

One senior military official called the American demand justified and stated that refuelers are a strategic asset of the US in the region and an integral part of the joint preparation of Israel and the United States for possible actions against Iran.

The ban was lifted, but the final decision has not yet been made

On the morning of July 15, the Airports Authority issued a new order to air control units: landings of American refueling planes at Ben Gurion were again permitted.

Thus, the restriction introduced the day before effectively lasted less than a day.

The US demanded the lifting of the ban on the landing and parking of refuelers due to the ongoing escalation around Iran. Israel agreed to meet this demand, despite warnings from the Airports Authority about possible reductions in civilian flights.

Miri Regev announced after negotiations that the “refueler saga” was over. According to her, by next Tuesday, July 21, 2026, the number of American planes permanently stationed at Ben Gurion should be reduced to the agreed 20.

Some of the remaining aircraft are expected to be moved to Israeli Air Force bases.

However, the Ministry of Defense almost immediately clarified that the final decision has not yet been made and consultations are ongoing. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded that the agencies resolve the issue.

Therefore, it is too early to talk about the complete resolution of the crisis.

At the moment, American refuelers can continue to land at Ben Gurion for operational tasks. The main question is how many of them will remain on permanent parking spaces and whether the parties will be able to free up the necessary spaces by July 21-23.

Why this dispute is more important than an ordinary parking problem

The story with American planes shows how closely civilian life in Israel is connected with military events in the region.

Ben Gurion simultaneously became the country’s main international airport and an important platform for American military aviation.

For the security system, the presence of refuelers means the ability to quickly support operations against Iran, protect American forces, and ensure aviation operations over long distances.

For civilian aviation, the same planes mean occupied parking spaces, the inability to add flights, and the potential cancellation of tens of thousands of tickets.

NANews — Israel News notes that the government is trying to maintain two strategic directions at once: cooperation with the US during the conflict with Iran and uninterrupted connection of Israel with the outside world.

The compromise implies that American aviation will continue to use Israel, but most of the planes will be stationed at military facilities rather than the main passenger airport.

For travelers, there is no message yet about mass flight cancellations. However, the threat will only disappear after the actual reduction in the number of American planes at Ben Gurion.

The key dates remain July 21, when the number of permanently stationed refuelers should decrease to 20, and July 23, when, according to the Airports Authority’s warning, an acute shortage of civilian parking spaces could begin.

Until then, the situation remains dependent on the development of the conflict with Iran and the decisions of the American military command.

Abba Hushi played a key role in the formation of modern Israel. His contribution to the development of Haifa, where he was mayor from 1951 to 1969, will forever go down in history.

Abba Khushi, a famous Israeli politician and public figure, was born on May 23, 1898 in the city of Turka, Lviv region, Ukraine (at that time – Austria-Hungary).

His real name is Abba Schneller. He was born into a middle-income Jewish family. Mother, Liba, grew vegetables and fruits, and stepfather, Alexander Shneler, was a haberdasher. The family raised six children.

From childhood, Abba showed curiosity and a penchant for learning. He graduated from cheder, then attended high school, where he studied Latin, Greek, German, Ukrainian, Polish and Hebrew. His dream was to become a doctor, and he even signed his notebooks as “medical student.” However, the First World War ruined his plans, forcing the family to fight for survival.

Participation in the Jewish movement in Poland

After the end of the war and his return to Turku in 1918, Abba faced new challenges. Turka found itself under the control of Poland, where anti-Semitism was gaining strength. This prompted young Abba to join “Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir” – Zionist youth movement.

Organization “Ha-Shomer ha-Tza'ir” was engaged in protecting the Jewish population from pogroms. Under the leadership of Abba and his associates in Turk, attacks on Jewish families were stopped. They created a Jewish guard force that protected the community while pogroms continued in other cities in Poland.

On August 4–5, 1918, the “Ha-Shomer ha-Tza’ir” conference was held in Turk, where Abba spoke as one of the leaders of the movement. It was here that he first expressed his desire to emigrate to Palestine to build a Jewish national home.

Literary talent and inspiration

In 1920, at a conference in Lvov, Abba Khushi publicly read his poem “In Galilee, in Tel Hai” for the first time. It was dedicated to Yosef Trumpeldor, a hero of the Jewish resistance in Palestine. This work inspired many young people to repatriate.

Abba Khushi was not only an activist, but also a poet, his words instilled hope in the hearts of Jewish youth who dreamed of returning to their historical homeland. His participation in Hashomer HaTza'ir was an important step in the formation of his leadership qualities.

Emigration to Palestine

In the spring of 1920, Abba and his comrades emigrated to Palestine. The first years of life in the new land were difficult: Khushi worked on road construction, led labor battalions and participated in creating the infrastructure of the future state.

However, his connection with Ukraine remained forever. Abba returned to Poland and Ukraine several times to raise funds to purchase land and establish kibbutzim in Israel. He also inspired Jewish youth to immigrate by talking about the importance of the Jewish state.

Abba Hushi in the history of Israel

The Power and Meaning of Hashomer HaTza'ir

The Hashomer HaTza'ir organization played a key role in protecting the Jewish population of Ukraine in the early 20th century. Thanks to the efforts of Abba Hushi and his associates, many Jewish communities were spared the tragedies that befell other regions.

On the website NAnews – Israel News you will find more materials about the contribution of Jews from Ukraine to the formation of Israel.

Haifa under the leadership of Abba Khushi

In 1951, Abba Khushi was elected mayor of Haifa, and his reign lasted almost two decades. These years became a turning point for the city, which, under his leadership, became one of the leading cultural and economic centers of Israel.

Abba Khushi's main achievements in Haifa:

1. Creation of the University of Haifa

   Education has always been a priority for Abba Khushi. He was at the forefront of the creation of the University of Haifa, which became an important academic center in Israel.

2. Museums and cultural institutions
   • The Museum of Japanese Art was founded.
   • The Mane-Katz Museum, a famous Israeli artist, was created.
   • Theaters and cultural venues are supported.
3. Infrastructure and transport
   • The Carmelite Line, Israel's first and only underground railway, was built, connecting the city's districts and making Haifa more accessible.
4. Residential and cultural areas

   During his reign, new districts were built, including Neve Sheananwhere the Culture and Leisure Center later appeared, named in his honor. This center includes:

   • Hall for cultural events with 500 seats.
   • Lecture hall for 100 seats.
   • Classrooms and gyms.
5. Economic development

   Abba actively supported industry and trade, which helped create jobs and attract investment to Haifa.

Recognition and legacy

Abba Hushi left Haifa as a city that became an example for other municipalities in Israel. His influence was not limited to infrastructure and culture. He always believed that the most important task was the integration of new repatriates. Thanks to his efforts, many Jews who arrived from Europe and Arab countries were able to find their home in Haifa.

Abba Khushi died on March 24, 1969.

Conclusion

The story of Abba Khushi is an example of how ties between Ukraine and Israel become the basis for great things. His childhood in Turk, participation in Hashomer HaTza'ir, and helping to defend the Jewish communities of Ukraine shaped his leadership skills, which he later used to build modern Haifa.

Read more about prominent Jews of Ukraine and Israel on the website NAnews – Israel News.

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But what exactly are they studying?

• Do yeshiva students really read the Torah all day?
• Why are the books of the Prophets almost not taught in some ultra-Orthodox educational institutions?
• How does a Lithuanian yeshiva differ from a Hasidic, Sephardic, or religious-Zionist one?
• And can it be said that people who dedicate their lives to “studying the Torah” are actually studying the Talmud predominantly?

There is no definitive answer, as there is no unified program for all yeshivas in Israel. Under one name, completely different educational systems are hidden.

What is called the Torah in the religious environment

First of all, it is necessary to understand the terms.

In everyday language, the Torah usually refers to the Pentateuch of Moses — the first five books of the Hebrew Bible: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.

But in traditional religious language, the word “Torah” is used much more broadly.

It can mean the Written Torah, the entire TANAKH, the Oral Torah, the Talmud, Midrash, Halacha, the commentaries of medieval rabbis, Kabbalah, and all subsequent rabbinic literature.

Therefore, when a representative of the Haredi world says that a young man “sits and studies the Torah,” it does not necessarily mean that he is reading stories about Abraham, the Exodus from Egypt, or King David.

Most often, it refers to the study of the Gemara — the main part of the Talmud — along with the commentaries of Rashi, Tosafot, and later rabbinic authorities.

Within the framework of the traditional worldview, the study of the Talmud is not opposed to the study of the Torah. The Talmud is considered the most important part of the Oral Torah, without which it is impossible to correctly understand the Written.

How the path of a Haredi yeshiva student is arranged

The educational path of a Haredi boy usually does not begin with a yeshiva, but with a cheder or Talmud Torah — a religious elementary school.

There, the child learns to read in Hebrew, becomes acquainted with the Pentateuch, Rashi’s commentaries, the Mishnah, the basics of Halacha, and gradually begins to study the Gemara.

The older the student becomes, the more the Talmud occupies his schedule.

After the bar mitzvah, around 13–14 years old, the boy enters a yeshiva ketana — a “small yeshiva.” It roughly corresponds to the upper grades of school, but its program may almost entirely consist of religious subjects.

Around 17–18 years old, the student moves to a yeshiva gedola — a “large yeshiva.” There, the study becomes more independent, and the young man can remain in the yeshiva until marriage.

After the wedding, some continue to study in a kollel — an educational institution for married men.

The Israel Democracy Institute characterizes yeshiva ketana and yeshiva gedola as virtually all-encompassing educational spaces. Classes continue from morning until late evening, and the main subject is the Gemara. In some yeshiva ketana, the school day ends no earlier than 9:00 PM.

What a typical day in a yeshiva looks like

The school day is divided into several large periods, called “seder” — the order of classes.

Usually, there is a morning seder, an afternoon seder, and an evening seder.

Most of the time, students study in pairs — chavrutas.

A chavruta is not just joint reading. Two students analyze the text, translate Aramaic expressions, try to reconstruct the line of reasoning, argue, ask questions, and check each other’s arguments.

Therefore, it is usually noisy in the yeshiva hall. Students are not required to silently listen to the teacher. On the contrary, loud debate is considered part of the process.

After independent work, a rabbi or teacher conducts a shiur — a lesson during which he offers his own analysis of a Talmudic topic.

A student may not have the usual school notes, homework, and regular exams. Especially in large Lithuanian yeshivas, education is built around personal discipline, reputation, relationships with teachers, and the ability to independently analyze the text. Studies of the Haredi system note that in many such institutions, there is no unified program with clear measurable goals, mandatory assignments, and standard exams.

What is the Gemara and why does its study take so much time

The Talmud consists of the Mishnah and the Gemara.

The Mishnah is a systematic collection of legal rulings and discussions, formed approximately at the beginning of the 3rd century.

The Gemara is a multilayered discussion of the Mishnah, recorded mainly in Aramaic. It contains legal disputes, explanations of biblical verses, parables, stories about sages, medical views, discussions about prayer, family law, property, sacrifices, damages, holidays, and dozens of other topics.

At the same time, the Talmud is not like a modern textbook.

It rarely offers a simple question and a ready answer. One topic can suddenly transition into another, and the final decision is sometimes found in later halachic codes.

To understand one page, a student must establish:

• who exactly is speaking;
• to which era the statement belongs;
• whether it is a law or an assumption;
• on which biblical verse it is based;
• whether it contradicts another place in the Talmud;
• how it was understood by medieval commentators;
• what practical decision was made by later authorities.

Therefore, even a small fragment can be studied for several days.

What is on a page of the Talmud

In the center of a traditional page is printed the text of the Mishnah and the Gemara.

Next to it is the commentary of Rashi — Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki, who lived in France in the 11th century. Without Rashi, it is extremely difficult for a beginner student to understand a significant part of the Talmud.

On the other side of the page are the Tosafot — the commentaries of medieval rabbis from France and Germany.

If Rashi often helps to understand the immediate meaning of the text, then the Tosafot compare different tractates and ask complex questions: why does it say one thing here and another elsewhere? Can two contradictory statements be reconciled? Does one Talmudic dispute not refute another?

Then students turn to the Rishonim — medieval authorities, among whom are Rambam, Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, and Rosh.

After them, they study the Acharonim — rabbis of a later period.

Thus, a student works not with one book, but with a huge library of texts written over many centuries.

Iyun and bekiut: two ways to study the Talmud

There are two main modes of study in yeshivas.

Iyun — in-depth analytical study.

Students can spend weeks analyzing a few pages, comparing commentaries, formulating contradictions, and trying to understand the principles hidden behind a specific dispute.

The main goal of iyun is not to cover as much text as possible, but to learn to think within the Talmudic system.

Bekiut — faster and broader study.

In this mode, a student tries to cover a significant amount of the Talmud without dwelling in detail on each contradiction.

In some yeshivas, the main indicator of level is the ability for deep iyun. In others, more attention is paid to the volume of material covered, repetition, and memorization.

Do Haredi yeshivas study the TANAKH

The answer depends on which yeshiva is being discussed.

In classical male Lithuanian Haredi yeshivas, systematic study of the books of the Prophets and Writings indeed usually occupies a very small place or is absent.

It is assumed that the main knowledge of the Torah and the TANAKH should have been acquired in childhood.

In practice, this often leads to a paradoxical situation: a young man may analyze a property dispute recorded in Aramaic in the tractate Bava Kamma in detail, but poorly remember the sequence of events in the books of Judges, Kings, or Chronicles.

However, the statement that Haredim do not read the Written Torah at all is incorrect.

The weekly Torah portion is read publicly on Saturdays, holidays, Mondays, and Thursdays. Biblical passages are constantly present in prayers. The Pentateuch with Rashi, Psalms, holiday texts, and commentaries related to the TANAKH are studied.

But liturgical reading or quoting individual verses is not the same as the sequential study of the entire TANAKH as a single historical, literary, and religious corpus.

Why the Talmud became more important than the books of the Prophets

This situation arose for more than one reason.

First of all, the Talmud became the foundation of rabbinic Judaism after the destruction of the Second Temple.

It is through rabbinic literature that the rules of the Sabbath, prayer, kashrut, marriage, divorce, holidays, blessings, and everyday behavior are determined.

The TANAKH tells about the history of the people of Israel, kings, prophets, wars, the Temple, agriculture, and life in the ancient Jewish state.

But modern religious practice is based not only on the literal text of the Bible but on how this text was interpreted by the Mishnah, the Talmud, and subsequent generations of rabbis.

In addition, in the Eastern European Jewish world, knowledge of the Talmud became the main indicator of a man’s intellectual and social status.

An expert was not someone who could retell all the books of the Prophets, but someone who could independently analyze a complex sugya — a Talmudic discussion.

The yeshiva gradually became not a school of general Jewish education but a specialized academy of Talmudic analysis.

Did the Volozhin yeshiva create the modern system

The Volozhin yeshiva is often called the “mother of Lithuanian yeshivas.”

It was founded by Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin at the beginning of the 19th century and became a model of a centralized educational institution where hundreds of young men could constantly study the Talmud regardless of the local community.

Yeshivas existed before, so Volozhin cannot be called the first yeshiva in Jewish history.

However, it indeed became the prototype of the modern Lithuanian model: a long school day, concentration on the Talmud, the high status of independent analysis, and the formation of a special world of yeshiva students.

In 1892, the authorities of the Russian Empire ordered the closure of the yeshiva. Formally, the reason was the failure to comply with the requirements for state control and the teaching of secular subjects.

The popular version that the leadership categorically refused to teach the Russian language and consciously preferred closure simplifies the more complex conflict between the yeshiva and the imperial power. Subsequently, the Volozhin yeshiva reopened but never regained its former status.

Was the yeshiva a response to the Haskalah

The modern Lithuanian system was formed during the spread of the Haskalah — the Jewish Enlightenment.

Supporters of the Haskalah paid great attention to the language of the TANAKH, grammar, European sciences, history, and the immediate meaning of the biblical text.

For part of the traditional society, this created a threat. Independent study of the Bible without rabbinic commentaries could be associated with secularization, academic biblical studies, a Christian approach to Scripture, or a rejection of the authority of the Oral Torah.

However, to say that yeshivas appeared solely out of fear of science or biblical criticism is incorrect.

Yeshivas existed long before the Haskalah. The modern Lithuanian model became a response to a broader crisis of traditional society: the weakening of communities, modernization, changes in the economy, the spread of secular education, and the emergence of new Jewish movements.

What is said in “Pirkei Avot”

In the tractate “Pirkei Avot,” a well-known sequence is indeed given:

“At five years old — to Scripture, at ten — to the Mishnah, at fifteen — to the Talmud.”

But this phrase does not mean that after fifteen years a person should stop studying Scripture.

Moreover, in the tractate Kiddushin, it is said that a person should divide their study time into three parts: a third dedicated to Scripture, a third to the Mishnah, and a third to the Talmud.

Later commentators tried to reconcile this principle with real practice.

One explanation was that the Babylonian Talmud already includes all three elements: biblical verses, the Mishnah, and Talmudic analysis. Therefore, its study can be considered simultaneous study of Scripture, the Mishnah, and the Talmud.

It was this understanding that helped justify the concentration of the curriculum around the Gemara.

Are all Haredi yeshivas the same?

No.

Even within the Haredi world, there are significant differences.

Lithuanian yeshivas

The main focus is on the Gemara with Rashi, Tosafot, Rishonim, and Acharonim.

Separate classes on Mussar — ethical and spiritual self-improvement — are often held.

Study of the TANAKH is usually limited, and secular subjects in classical yeshiva ketana may be almost absent.

Hasidic yeshivas

In Hasidic educational institutions, the Talmud and Halacha are also studied, but more time is devoted to the teachings of a specific Hasidic dynasty, the instructions of its Rebbe, Hasidic stories, customs, and spiritual preparation.

In different communities, the ratio of these disciplines can vary significantly.

Chabad yeshivas

In the Chabad system, a significant part of the school day is devoted to Chassidut — Chabad Hasidic philosophy, including the ‘Tanya’ and Maamarim.

The historical schedule of ‘Tomchei Temimim’ could provide for seven hours of Talmud and Jewish law and another four hours of Hasidism per day.

Additionally, in Chabad, there is a daily cycle of Chitas: Chumash with Rashi’s commentary, Tehillim, and ‘Tanya’. Therefore, describing the Chabad system as exclusively Talmudic would be particularly inaccurate.

Sephardic yeshivas

In the Sephardic world, the Gemara remains the most important subject, but often more attention is paid to practical Halacha and the decisions of Sephardic authorities.

The Jerusalem yeshiva ‘Porat Yosef’, for example, defines the Gemara and Halacha as central parts of its program.

The Sephardic tradition may differ from the Lithuanian in its method of analysis, pronunciation, system of authorities, attitude towards Kabbalah, and greater attention to practical rulings.

What is studied in religious Zionist yeshivas

Religious Zionist yeshivas differ significantly from classical Haredi ones.

The Talmud also occupies a central place in them, but alongside it, the TANAKH, Halacha, Jewish philosophy, history of Jewish thought, works of medieval authors, and writings of rabbis associated with religious Zionism are systematically studied.

In the yeshiva ‘Har Etzion’, the basis of the program is called the traditional study of the Talmud, supplemented by in-depth study of the TANAKH, Halacha, and Jewish philosophy. The yeshiva’s leadership emphasizes that these disciplines are not a secondary addition but a necessary part of a complete Jewish education.

In ‘Merkaz HaRav’, alongside the Gemara, Jewish thought, ‘Kuzari’, works of Maharal, and writings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook are studied. In institutions associated with this direction, TANAKH, Halacha, and the basics of faith may be regularly taught.

Yeshivas where the entire TANAKH is studied

In some religious Zionist institutions, the study of the TANAKH occupies a particularly important place.

In programs associated with the yeshiva ‘Maale Gilboa’, students may go through two chapters of the TANAKH daily and participate in an in-depth class once a week.

This regime allows for a relatively short time to sequentially read the entire TANAKH, rather than being limited to weekly Torah portions and texts read on holidays.

Teachers at ‘Maale Gilboa’ use literary analysis, study the structure of the narrative, and discuss the relationship between traditional faith and modern biblical studies.

This direction shows that a deep religious attitude towards the TANAKH does not necessarily imply a rejection of historical, literary, or linguistic questions.

What is a hesder yeshiva

A separate group consists of hesder yeshivot.

In them, religious education is combined with service in the Israel Defense Forces.

A student spends part of the program in the yeshiva, part in the army, and then returns to studies.

In such institutions, the Talmud, Halacha, TANAKH, and Jewish philosophy are usually studied. At the same time, questions of the state, army, society, citizen responsibility, and the religious significance of Israel’s existence are discussed.

For a Haredi yeshiva, the ideal space is often the autonomous world of the Beit Midrash, as separated as possible from the outside society.

For a religious Zionist yeshiva, the connection between text, state, army, and social life can be part of the religious education itself.

How are biblical heroes viewed in yeshivas

The TANAKH portrays its heroes not only as impeccable symbols.

Abraham fears and doubts. Jacob deceives his father. Moses gets angry. David commits actions that raise serious moral questions. Kings wage wars, prophets argue with God, brothers betray each other, and family stories are filled with jealousy and conflict.

In the traditional system, these episodes are usually studied through the commentaries of the sages.

The rabbinic tradition warns against judging biblical characters by the standards of an ordinary modern person.

Therefore, a hero’s action may be explained as a subtle mistake of a righteous person, a test, or an event whose significance is revealed only through Midrash and the Oral Torah.

In part of the religious Zionist world, there is an approach sometimes called ‘TANAKH at eye level’. Its supporters consider it permissible to talk about real human conflicts, weaknesses, and mistakes of biblical heroes.

Opponents fear that such reading erases the distance between the modern reader and the greatest characters of Jewish tradition.

Thus, the debate is not only about the number of TANAKH lessons but also about how exactly it is allowed to be read.

Are there prayers, rabbis, and Jews in the TANAKH

Sometimes one can hear the assertion that the world of the TANAKH is completely unlike modern religious Judaism: it supposedly lacks prayers, synagogues, rabbis, and even the word ‘Jew’.

Partially, this observation is true, but it cannot be understood literally.

There are many prayers in the TANAKH: the prayer of Hannah, the prayer of King Solomon, the prophets’ appeals to God, and the entire book of Psalms.

The word ‘Yehudi’ — Jew or Jewish — appears in the later books of the TANAKH, particularly in the book of Esther.

At the same time, the familiar modern system of synagogues, daily fixed prayers, rabbis, yeshivas, and detailed halachic regulation indeed developed mainly later.

The TANAKH describes a world of the Temple, prophecy, royal power, tribes, wars, and agriculture.

Talmudic and rabbinic literature reflects another era — the life of the Jewish people after the loss of political independence and the destruction of the Temple.

Do girls study the Talmud

A classical yeshiva is primarily a male educational institution.

Haredi girls usually study in schools and seminars where the program may include TANAKH, Halacha, Jewish history, ethics, preparation for family life, and secular subjects.

In many Haredi women’s institutions, systematic study of the Gemara is absent.

In the religious Zionist and modern Orthodox world, the situation is different. There are women’s midrashot and programs where women study the Talmud, Halacha, and rabbinic literature in depth.

Therefore, the question ‘what is studied in yeshivas’ is almost always simultaneously a question about the gender division of religious education.

Can one graduate from a yeshiva and have poor knowledge of the TANAKH

Yes, it is possible.

Especially if it is a classical Haredi yeshiva where a student has specialized for many years in a limited number of Talmudic tractates.

He may possess outstanding skills in textual analysis and simultaneously have incomplete knowledge of some biblical books.

But this does not mean that the student is uneducated.

It is about a different type of education and a different system of priorities.

From the perspective of modern secular education, the program may seem extremely narrow.

From the perspective of the yeshiva world, the ability to analyze the most complex texts in Hebrew and Aramaic for many years, compare dozens of commentators, and independently construct legal arguments is considered the highest form of scholarship.

So what is really studied in the yeshivas of Israel

The most accurate answer is:

In classical male Haredi yeshivas, especially of the Lithuanian direction, most of the day is spent studying the Babylonian Talmud with the commentaries of Rashi, Tosafot, medieval and later rabbis.

In Hasidic yeshivas, the Talmud is supplemented by the teachings of a specific Hasidic tradition, spiritual discussions, and the works of its leaders.

In Chabad, significant emphasis is placed on Chassidut, ‘Tanya’, Chumash, and daily study cycles.

In Sephardic yeshivas, alongside the Gemara, practical Halacha and the decisions of Sephardic authorities are especially important.

In religious Zionist yeshivas, much more attention is paid to the TANAKH, Jewish philosophy, the works of Rabbi Kook, and questions of the state, society, and military service.

Therefore, the phrase ‘yeshivas only study the Talmud’ contains both a part of the truth and a serious distortion.

It accurately conveys the center of the program of many Haredi male yeshivas but does not at all describe the entire diversity of religious education in Israel.

The main paradox indeed exists: the TANAKH retains the highest sacred status, but in some of the most prestigious yeshivas, direct study of the books of the Prophets and Writings is given much less time than complex Talmudic discussions.

However, this is not the result of a simple ‘cancellation’ of the Jewish Bible.

We are faced with the result of centuries of development of rabbinic Judaism, in which the Written Torah is perceived through the Oral, and the highest intellectual art becomes not the retelling of biblical history, but the ability to independently enter into the debate of the sages, which has continued for almost two thousand years.

The camp will be held on Fridays — July 10, 17, and 24, 2026 — at the Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, located at Yirmeyahu / ירמיהו 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo. Each meeting will last from 11:00 to 14:00.

For Ukrainian families in Israel, this is not just another summer activity for the child. It is an opportunity to spend part of the holidays in a warm environment where children can meet, play, create, communicate, and feel connected to two important worlds at once — Ukraine and Israel.

What is “Bright Summer”

Organizers describe the camp as a series of thematic meetings during the summer holidays. The idea of the project is to create a safe, friendly, and lively space for children where they can find new friends from the community, try their hand at creativity, participate in team games, and simply have a good time among peers.

Participants can expect creative workshops, active and team games, activities for acquaintance and interaction, a light snack, and an atmosphere where the child feels comfortable being themselves.

It is particularly important that the organizers consciously make a small group — about 12–15 children. This format allows attention to be given to each child, without turning the camp into a noisy mass platform where someone quickly gets lost or stays on the sidelines.

For parents, this is especially important: in the summer in Israel, many families are looking not just for “where to take the child for a few hours,” but a place that is warm, calm, understandable in terms of values, and close in cultural environment.

When and where the camp will take place

The Ukrainian children’s camp “Bright Summer” will be held in Tel Aviv on three Fridays in July:

July 10, 2026
July 17, 2026
July 24, 2026

Time of each meeting: 11:00–14:00.

Venue — Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv, ירמיהו 22 / Yirmeyahu 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo.

The event organizer is Ukrainian Meetings in Israel, a community that has long been creating a space for Ukrainian families in Israel. Now special attention is being paid to children — those who especially need communication, movement, creativity, and a sense of belonging during the summer holidays.

Why this is important for Ukrainian families in Israel

After moving, war, adaptation, and living between languages, children often lack their understandable circle. Israel provides safety and new opportunities, but it is important for children to maintain the Ukrainian part of their identity — not through heavy conversations, but through friendship, games, creativity, songs, shared memories, and simple summer meetings.

That is why the format of “Bright Summer” seems especially relevant. It is not a school lesson or an official event. It is a light summer program where a child can communicate, get to know other children, participate in activities, and feel that the Ukrainian community in Israel is not only adult meetings, news, and help, but also children’s joy.

For NAnews — News of Israel, such events are also important because they show the lively side of the Ukrainian-Israeli community. Behind big topics — war, politics, repatriation, security — there is the ordinary life of families, children, parents, and local initiatives.

The summer camp in Tel Aviv is just such a story: small in scale, but very human in meaning.

What will be in the program

Organizers promise participants:

• creative workshops;
• active and team games;
• activities for acquaintance and interaction;
• a light snack;
• a safe and friendly atmosphere;
• a space for communication for children 7–12 years old.

Details about the program of each meeting, the daily schedule, the team, participation conditions, frequently asked questions, and the registration form are published on the camp’s website. Parents can view the information and register their child on the project page: https://sites.google.com/view/bright-summer-camp

The number of places is limited, as the group is small. Organizers advise not to delay registration if the family plans to participate.

Event poster

Event: Ukrainian children’s summer camp “Bright Summer”

City: Tel Aviv

Dates: July 10, 17, and 24, 2026

Time: 11:00–14:00

Venue: Ukrainian Cultural Center in Tel Aviv

Address: Yirmeyahu / ירמיהו 22, Tel Aviv-Yafo

Age: children 7–12 years old

Group: up to 12–15 children

Organizer: Ukrainian Meetings in Israel

Registration and details: https://sites.google.com/view/bright-summer-camp

Summer for children should not only be a time without school, but also a time of new acquaintances, discoveries, movement, and joy. In July 2026, Ukrainian families in Israel will have another opportunity to give children just such a summer — bright, warm, friendly, and connected with Ukraine.

For readers of NAnews — News of Israel, this event can be seen as part of a broader picture: the Ukrainian community in Israel not only preserves memory and responds to the events of the war but also builds everyday life in which children have their place, their circle, and their summer stories.

Over eight days, participants familiarized themselves with modern life in Israel, visited historical and natural sites, met with Israeli educators, local authorities, security personnel, and community members who have experienced difficult events in recent years.

The international program took place in Israel from July 7 to 14, 2026 under the leadership of the educational division of KKL — Keren Kayemet Le-Israel, also known as the Jewish National Fund.

Ukraine among 26 countries — but the names of the participants have not yet been announced

The Israeli publication Yeshuvnik reported that representatives from the USA, Canada, Germany, France, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and other countries participated in the annual seminar.

Thus, the participation of the Ukrainian delegation is officially confirmed by the organizers.

However, KKL and Israeli media have not yet reported how many educators came from Ukraine, which cities and educational institutions they represented, nor have they published their names.

It is only known that among the 209 participants were teachers, directors, and leaders of Jewish schools, as well as specialists in formal and informal Jewish and Zionist education.

For Ukraine, participation in such a seminar is of particular importance.

Ukrainian Jewish schools and communities continue to operate under conditions of full-scale war, air raids, forced family migration, and partial transition to distance learning.

Therefore, the opportunity for direct communication with colleagues from Israel and other countries becomes not only a professional exchange but also a way to maintain the connection of Ukrainian Jewish youth with Israel, Jewish history, and international communities.

The very fact of the presence of representatives from Ukraine shows that Ukrainian Jewish education remains part of the global Jewish space even under the conditions of ongoing Russian aggression.

What was included in the educational program

The seminar was not an ordinary familiarization trip but a week-long educational program across different regions of Israel.

Participants visited natural, archaeological, and historical sites, learned about the work of KKL, met with educators, security personnel, municipal leaders, and local residents.

Special attention was paid to communities affected after the terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war.

Educators were told not only about the consequences of the tragedy but also about the restoration of Israeli settlements, mutual assistance, the return of residents, and the work of educational institutions in crisis conditions.

The organizers aimed to show participants modern Israel not only through media reports and political debates but through direct meetings with people.

Educators were to see a country that simultaneously faces military, social, and educational challenges and continues to restore affected communities.

For many foreign teachers, such meetings become the basis for future lessons and conversations with students.

NANews — News of Israel notes that educators often become the main source of systematic knowledge about Israel for children in the diaspora.

The perception of Israel by the next generation of Jewish youth depends on the materials and personal stories they bring home.

Education after October 7

The official program of the American delegation allows for a more detailed understanding of the main directions of the international seminar.

Participants were offered lectures, discussions, and practical sessions dedicated to teaching Jewish history and Zionism after October 7.

The program also included familiarization with KKL educational materials, visits to Jewish National Fund sites, historical places of the Jewish people, and participation in volunteer work.

The issue of how to talk to children and teenagers about Israel in conditions of war, rising anti-Semitism, and harsh international debates was separately considered.

For educators, this is a challenging task.

They need to talk about the terrorist attack, hostages, casualties, and war, but at the same time not turn the study of Israel solely into a conversation about violence and tragedy.

That is why the organizers included topics of Israeli society’s resilience, mutual responsibility, community restoration, ecology, the country’s history, and modern educational work in the program.

KKL also provided educators with materials they could use after returning to their own schools.

American participants, for example, had previously committed to preparing educational projects for their educational institutions in collaboration with JNF-USA representatives.

They were expected to talk about the trip on social media, speak to their community, and incorporate the experience gained into school programs.

These conditions apply directly to the American delegation, but they show the general approach of the organizers: the seminar should continue in the form of lessons, events, and projects after the participants return home.

Educators are called ‘messengers of Israeli history’

KKL Chairman Eyal Ostrinsky stated that the decision of hundreds of Jewish educators to come to Israel during a difficult period is an expression of trust, responsibility, and shared destiny.

According to him, educators become a kind of ‘messengers of Israeli history’ in their communities.

Direct acquaintance with the country, its people, and the values of Zionism should provide them with tools for educating the next generation of the Jewish people.

KKL emphasizes that such educational programs help strengthen ties between Israel and Jewish communities in the diaspora.

The task is not only to transmit knowledge.

Participants from different countries get to know each other, discuss teaching methods, and have the opportunity to create joint educational programs.

After the seminar, they return to their countries with materials, personal impressions, and contacts of colleagues.

For representatives of Ukraine, this experience can be especially important, as Ukrainian Jewish schools are simultaneously part of Ukrainian society, the international Jewish space, and the system of relations between Ukraine and Israel.

Ukrainian educators participate in KKL programs not for the first time

The participation of the Ukrainian side in the KKL international seminar has a long history.

In July 2023, a similar program was attended by 250 educators from 22 countries and 27 educational institutions.

At that time, KKL separately reported that Ukraine was represented by 14 teachers.

One of the participants was Ukrainian educator Natala Androshenko.

She said that materials from previous KKL seminars were used in her school in geography, ecology, history, Jewish tradition lessons, and in the study of nature.

According to her, such classes helped students become closer to Israel and better understand Zionism.

Androshenko also noted the value of communication with directors and educators of Jewish schools from different countries.

There is no confirmation that she participated in the 2026 seminar.

However, her story shows how the knowledge gained by Ukrainian educators in Israel is subsequently used in working with children in Ukraine.

This practical result is one of the main meanings of the program.

Educators do not just visit Israel but return to their schools with ready-made methodological materials, new contacts, and personal stories.

For NANews — News of Israel, the participation of Ukrainian representatives in the seminar is also important as an example of the ongoing dialogue between Israel and Ukraine at the level of education and Jewish communities.

Such connections do not always receive noticeable attention in major media, but they are the ones that form long-term relationships between countries.

Political statements change, governments argue, but the work of teachers with children continues for years.

What remains unknown

KKL confirmed the presence of representatives from Ukraine but did not publish the composition of the delegation.

At the time of publication, the following are unknown:

— the exact number of participants from Ukraine;

— their names and positions;

— the cities they represented;

— the names of Jewish schools and organizations;

— the separate program of the Ukrainian group;

— the topics or projects that Ukrainian educators plan to implement after returning.

Therefore, it cannot yet be asserted that a certain number of Ukrainian teachers or representatives of specific organizations arrived in Israel.

But the very fact of Ukrainian participation is confirmed by both the Israeli publication and the KKL announcement.

From July 7 to 14, 2026, representatives of Ukraine, along with educators from 25 other countries, studied Israel’s experience, exchanged educational practices, and discussed how to preserve the Jewish identity of the next generation in a world that has become even more complex and divided after October 7.

Hapoel Jerusalem officially announced the departure of the Ukrainian on July 14, 2026.

“Dima, thank you very much for your dedication, commitment, and fight in every minute spent on the court. We wish you great success in the future,” reads the farewell message from the Jerusalem club. The Israeli sports channel Sport5 emphasizes that Skapintsev leaves the team after one season and that his departure is another element of a large-scale roster overhaul.

At the same time, this is not about a scandal, disciplinary conflict, or early termination of the agreement.

In August 2025, Skapintsev signed a one-season contract with an option to extend for another year. Hapoel decided not to use the option provided by the agreement, so the cooperation ended after the first season.

From the NBA and G League to Jerusalem

Dmitry Skapintsev was born on May 12, 1998, in Cherkasy. The height of the Ukrainian basketball player is about 216 centimeters. He plays as a center and is capable of covering the position of a power forward.

Before moving to Israel, Skapintsev went through an unusual path for a Ukrainian basketball player.

He played in Ukraine and Lithuania, after which he went to the USA. Skapintsev spent most of his American career in the NBA G League, where he played for the farm teams of the New York Knicks, Boston Celtics, and Portland Trail Blazers.

On December 23, 2023, the New York Knicks signed a two-way contract with Skapintsev. The Ukrainian played two games in the NBA regular season, getting a few minutes of playing time, and then returned to the G League.

In the 2024/25 season, Skapintsev averaged 9 points, 7.9 rebounds, and 2.7 assists in the G League. At the time of his transition to Israel, he was considered a physically powerful center with experience in training and games in the North American basketball system.

Hapoel’s head coach Yonatan Alon noted his toughness, rebounding ability, decision-making under the basket, and potential to strengthen the team in the paint after signing the Ukrainian.

However, Skapintsev failed to become a stable player in the main rotation in Jerusalem.

“I don’t fully understand my role”

Problems with playing time became noticeable during the season.

In February 2026, Skapintsev admitted that he did not fully understand his role in Hapoel. According to the Ukrainian, at the beginning of the season, he received more minutes, but later his participation in games decreased.

The center explained that he tries to do everything he can to return to a stable rotation. At the same time, he noted that the head coach preferred players he had worked with for more than a year.

These words help to better understand the club’s subsequent decision.

Skapintsev’s departure cannot be called a surprise solely because of his statistics. The Ukrainian was useful in rebounding and rim protection but did not secure a stable role in the team and rarely spent significant stretches on the court.

At the same time, Hapoel did not officially name the player’s professional performance as the reason for not extending the contract. In the farewell message, the club, on the contrary, emphasized his attitude to work, dedication, and fight.

What the official statistics show

Ukrainian sports media publications presented different figures regarding Skapintsev’s performances in Israel.

Football24 reported that in 14 Israeli championship games, the Ukrainian averaged 6.1 points, 2.1 rebounds, and 0.6 assists.

However, the official statistics of the Israeli Basketball Super League show different results for the regular season:

• 14 games;
• 8 starts;
• 16.9 minutes on the court;
• 5.4 points;
• 5.8 rebounds;
• 0.5 assists;
• 1 block;
• 0.6 steals per game on average.

Skapintsev made 66.7% of his two-point shots and 71.4% of his free throws. In total, he scored 75 points and grabbed 81 rebounds in the regular season.

Thus, the figure of 2.1 rebounds provided by the initial Ukrainian source does not match the data from the Israeli league. Rebounding was one of the most noticeable strengths of the Ukrainian center.

In the playoffs, Skapintsev participated in two more games. On average, he scored 5.5 points and grabbed 3.5 rebounds in 13.5 minutes.

In the EuroCup, the Ukrainian played 15 games. His stats were 4.4 points, 3.2 rebounds, and 0.3 assists in about ten minutes of playing time.

Considering the Israeli championship, playoffs, EuroCup, and Winner Cup, Skapintsev played about 34 official games for the Jerusalem club.

Not a failure, but not a breakthrough

Skapintsev’s first season in Israel is hard to call a failure.

When the Ukrainian received playing time, he regularly helped the team in rebounding, created physical pressure under the basket, and used his height advantage. The figure of 5.8 rebounds in 16.9 minutes in the regular season confirms that the center remained quite effective in a limited stretch.

But the modern Hapoel, aiming for leading positions in Israel and Europe, needed a player who could either consistently play in the starting lineup or become a key element of the second unit.

Skapintsev found himself between these roles.

He started in eight regular-season games but spent less than 17 minutes on the court. In the EuroCup, his playing time was even less — about ten minutes. This meant that the coaching staff did not consider the Ukrainian as the team’s main center.

As noted by NAnews — News of Israel, in this case, it is more accurate to talk not about the failure of the Ukrainian basketball player, but about the mismatch of his playing qualities with the role the coaching staff was ready to offer him.

Hapoel began a major overhaul

The decision not to extend the contract with Skapintsev was made against the backdrop of significant changes in the Jerusalem club.

In the Israeli regular season, Hapoel finished third, winning 18 out of 26 games. In the playoffs, the team reached the semifinals, where they lost to Hapoel Tel Aviv in a series with a score of 0:3.

In the EuroCup, the Jerusalemites took first place in their group but ended their performances in the quarterfinals. In the decisive match, Hapoel lost to the Turkish Turk Telekom with a score of 90:91.

After the end of the season, Yonatan Alon, who had led Hapoel for three years, left the team.

Experienced Serbian specialist Sasha Obradovic was appointed as the new head coach. The club’s management announced its intention to build a team capable of competing for all Israeli titles and potentially entering the EuroLeague.

Against this backdrop, Skapintsev’s departure looks like part of the overall restructuring of the roster to meet the new coach’s requirements.

The club has already started signing new basketball players, including front-line players. Therefore, the decision to forgo the option in the Ukrainian’s contract is likely not related to one specific game or episode but to the formation of a new team model.

Hapoel has not officially confirmed this, so it is a conclusion drawn from the sequence of the club’s personnel decisions.

The Ukrainian stayed in Israel during the escalation

Skapintsev’s behavior during the security escalation in Israel deserves special attention.

In June 2026, several foreign basketball players from Hapoel decided to leave the country. Skapintsev was among the legionnaires who stayed in Israel after the club’s management provided players with additional security guarantees.

For the Ukrainian basketball player, the topic of war and security holds special significance.

Back in February, Skapintsev said that he studied the situation in Israel before moving. He emphasized that what was happening in the country at that time could not be compared to the full-scale war in Ukraine.

The decision to stay with the team in a difficult moment partially explains why Hapoel specifically mentioned the Ukrainian’s dedication, commitment, and fight in the farewell address.

One of the best matches for Ukraine — before leaving the club

It is symbolic that the announcement of Skapintsev’s departure from Hapoel came shortly after one of the center’s best matches for the Ukrainian national team.

On July 2, 2026, Ukraine defeated Georgia with a score of 95:76 in a nominally home match of the 2027 World Cup qualification held in Riga.

Skapintsev started in the starting five, scored 17 points, and grabbed 14 rebounds, achieving a double-double. Thanks to this victory, the Ukrainian national team advanced to the second stage of the World Cup qualification ahead of schedule.

This match showed that the Ukrainian remains capable of being a noticeable and productive basketball player with sufficient playing time and a clear role on the court.

Therefore, leaving Hapoel should not be perceived as the end of his career at a high level.

Skapintsev is 28 years old — for a center, this is an age when basketball players often reach the peak of their physical capabilities and professional stability.

What will happen next

After Hapoel’s refusal to use the extension option, Dmitry Skapintsev became a free agent.

At the moment, the new club of the Ukrainian center has not been officially announced.

Considering his NBA and G League experience, performances in the EuroCup, playing for the Ukrainian national team, and rare physical attributes for European basketball, Skapintsev may interest teams from the championships of Israel, Turkey, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, or other European countries.

The main question for the Ukrainian will be not only the level of the next club but also the role they can offer him.

The season in Jerusalem showed that Skapintsev is capable of effectively rebounding and protecting the space under the basket, but he needs stable minutes and the trust of the coaching staff.

For NAnews — News of Israel, this story is important not only as another transfer news.

Dmitry Skapintsev became one of the few Ukrainian basketball players in recent years to play simultaneously in a leading Israeli club, a European tournament, and the Ukrainian national team.

He leaves Jerusalem without scandal and public mutual claims. Hapoel thanked the Ukrainian for his professionalism and fight, and Skapintsev himself gets the opportunity to find a team where his height, experience, and play under the basket will be used much more actively.

50 Years Later: A Reminder from Israeli Diplomacy

On November 10, 2025, the Israeli Foreign Ministry published a message:

“Today marks the 50th anniversary of the adoption of the disgraceful UN Resolution No. 3379 (XXX). On the night of November 10-11, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution by 72 votes in favor, 35 against, and 32 abstentions, declaring Zionism a form of racism.

The Soviet Union, with the support of Arab states, finally achieved its goal.”

For Israel, it was not just a diplomatic blow — it was a moment when the false Soviet myth received the UN’s seal.

In his speech, Israeli representative Chaim Herzog publicly tore up the text of the resolution, declaring that “persecutions will only strengthen Zionism.”

How Moscow Fabricated the Narrative

The Israeli Foreign Ministry directly reminded how Moscow laid the foundation of anti-Zionism:

“The first significant attempts to link Zionism with racism, and particularly with fascism (which in the USSR became synonymous with Nazism), on the international stage were made by Moscow in 1964. At that time, in response to a proposal to include condemnation of anti-Semitism in a resolution on racial discrimination, Soviet representatives unofficially threatened that they would be ‘forced’ to bring their amendment condemning Nazism, fascism, and Zionism to general discussion.”

Later, in 1965, the USSR fulfilled its threat and introduced an amendment to the UN equating anti-Semitism and Zionism:

“The Soviet Union, fulfilling its previous year’s threat, introduced the following amendment: ‘UN member states condemn anti-Semitism, Zionism, Nazism, as well as any manifestations of colonial policy and ideology, national and racial hatred, and pledge to do everything possible for their speedy elimination.’”

“Subsequent attempts to bring the condemnation of anti-Semitism to the UN General Assembly always encountered counter-attempts from the USSR to condemn Zionism,” the Israeli Foreign Ministry statement said.

From Ideological Campaign to Diplomatic Blackmail

The break in relations with Israel lifted all restrictions on comparing Zionism with racism, and the USSR embarked on large-scale propaganda.

“Over 8 years (1967–1975), more than 120 books and brochures were published, aimed at ‘revealing’ the racist nature of Zionism. Not only Marx but also Hitler and Goebbels were called as witnesses,” notes the Israeli Foreign Ministry.

In December 1973, with Moscow’s support, an amendment appeared in the UN condemning “Israeli Zionist imperialism,” and in 1975, the Third Committee of the UN supported an anti-Zionist resolution prepared by Arab countries.

“As a result, personal and state terror from Arab states, fueled by Moscow, bore fruit: on October 17, 1975, the Third Committee adopted resolution A/C.3/L.2519 condemning Zionism,” the Foreign Ministry publication states.

After the adoption of Resolution 3379, the USSR perceived it as international legitimization of its anti-Zionist line.
In Soviet propaganda of the 1970s-80s, a huge number of publications appeared where:

• “Zionism” was presented as an ideology of Jewish world domination, closely linked with US imperialism;
• Israel was depicted as a “racist military outpost” of the West in the Middle East;
• the term “Zionism” was used as a veiled form of anti-Semitism.

Propaganda was conducted through all channels — from films to academic works of the Academy of Sciences. In special publications, like the journal “Asia and Africa Today”, Israel was systematically equated with apartheid and colonialism.

For the USSR, it was not a fight against Israel but a tool for controlling the Middle East and Africa.
Under the slogan of “anti-racism,” the Soviet Union built political alliances and sold weapons to dozens of Arab regimes.

1991: Repeal Without Repentance

Only on December 16, 1991, Resolution 46/86 repealed the assertion of “Zionism as a form of racism.”
But in Russia, anti-Zionist rhetoric survived the USSR.
In the newspapers of the 90s, they still wrote about the “Zionist lobby,” and in the UN, Moscow played the role of a “balancing factor,” using the old Soviet lexicon.

Nevertheless, at the level of rhetoric, nothing changed:

• Russian newspapers of the 1990s (especially of a patriotic and nationalist nature) continued to use the phrase “Zionist lobby”;
• in textbooks and media, the term “Zionism” was often presented as something “aggressive” and “anti-Arab”;
• some former Soviet diplomats and journalists continued to claim that “the repeal of the resolution was a mistake under US pressure.”

After 2022: “Zionism = Nazism” — A New Turn in Kremlin Rhetoric

With the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Moscow returned to the Soviet method of ideological inversion: accusing others of what it does itself.
Now the role of “global evil” in Kremlin narratives is shared by two targets — Ukraine and Israel.

The formula has changed, but the essence remains the same:

• Israel is accused of “double standards” and “supporting neo-Nazis in Kyiv”;
• the word “Zionism” is once again used in the rhetoric of Russia’s allies — Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorists — as a synonym for aggression;
• federal TV channels and propagandists broadcast claims like: “Israel copies Nazi methods”, substituting historical meanings and distorting the memory of the Holocaust.

In reality, the Kremlin itself is building around itself a axis of anti-Zionism and anti-Ukrainianism, where old Soviet narratives and new geopolitical alliances have merged.
Russia uses the UN and diplomatic platforms of the “Global South” to once again instill the myth: Israel is the “oppressor,” Ukraine is the “puppet,” the West is the “source of evil.”

This scheme works as an ideological weapon:
in the Arab world, it legitimizes an alliance with Iran and Hamas,
inside the country — justifies repression and anti-Western mobilization,
and in relation to Ukraine — creates a pseudo-historical justification for aggression.

Fifty years ago, on November 10, 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted the disgraceful Resolution No. 3379, declaring Zionism a form of racism. This lie, spread by the USSR and its allies, dealt a heavy blow to Jews worldwide and Israeli diplomacy. But the truth prevailed — in 1991, the resolution was repealed.

Today we must remember: anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.

This phrase today sounds like a warning: when lies become diplomacy, the path to aggression begins.
Exactly what Russia is doing in relation to Ukraine — accusing it of “Nazism” and “Russophobia” to justify occupation, destruction, and killings.
Thus, Moscow repeats the model of the USSR of the 1970s, when anti-Zionism was used as a shield for anti-Semitism, and now anti-Ukrainianism has become a cover for war crimes.

“New Slogans” of Old Ideology

Modern Russian anti-Zionist formulas almost literally repeat Soviet ones, but the mask has changed.
Then they spoke of “colonialism,” today — of “globalism.”
Then they fought against “Israeli imperialism,” now — against “Western neo-Nazism.”

The same method, the same addressee — the Arab world, African countries, and now also the “Global South.”
Russia tries to implant its agenda in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and African media, portraying Israel and Ukraine as part of a “Western conspiracy.”

Conclusion: Lies Do Not Die If Not Exposed

The USSR began by imposing the idea of “Zionism = racism” on the world.
Modern Russia, in alliance with Iran and anti-Israeli forces, continues to exploit the same narrative — only under new slogans:
now it is “fighting neo-Nazism,” “denazification,” and “protection of traditional values.”

Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on — in the propaganda plots of Russian media, in the speeches of diplomats, and in the strategic alliance with Iran, which openly calls for the destruction of Israel.
What was once called “anti-Zionism” today returns as a policy of total denial of the right to exist — both for Israel and Ukraine.

Israel will always oppose attempts to once again defame Zionism and rewrite history. We remember and will not allow the past to be repeated.

That is why the Israeli reminder of the disgrace of 1975 is not just history.
It is a warning to both Kyiv and Jerusalem:
lies, not condemned in time, return in a new form,
and once again serve as justification for aggression.

Formally, Resolution 3379 no longer exists, but its spirit lives on in Moscow’s statements and in the Kremlin’s alliances with the same circle of states that were “warmed up by Moscow” half a century ago.

The Russian attack on Sumy continued practically all night and morning.

Initially, Russian forces used a cluster munition against a private housing area, then attacked city gas stations and residential buildings with drones, and around 09:00 began dropping guided aerial bombs on the regional center.

According to the head of the Sumy Regional Military Administration, Oleg Grigorov, Russian aviation carried out six strikes with guided bombs on the territory of the Sumy community.

One of the aerial bombs hit near medical facilities — in an area with heavy movement of people, cars, and public transport. The other five strikes, according to preliminary data, targeted infrastructure facilities.

Three dead, among the injured — a 16-year-old teenager

Initially, authorities reported three dead and seven injured. However, as people sought medical help, the number of injured increased to 17 people.

Among the injured is a 16-year-old boy.

He and two other seriously injured individuals underwent surgery. The remaining injured were examined by doctors, and some people were discharged from hospitals after receiving medical assistance.

Among the dead are confirmed a man and a woman.

The third deceased suffered such severe injuries that specialists could not even determine the person’s gender immediately after discovering the body. The identities of all the deceased are being clarified.

Oleg Grigorov called the incident another deliberate strike by Russian forces on the civilian population.

At the epicenter of one of the explosions were civilians and transport. This means that the Russian side could not have been unaware of the consequences of using a heavy aerial bomb in a busy urban area.

The bomb fell near the sidewalk

Journalists from the local publication ‘Kordon.Media’, who worked directly on the scene, reported that one of the Russian aerial bombs hit a flowerbed near the sidewalk.

In the nearby buildings, the blast wave shattered windows. Cars near the impact site were damaged.

After the first explosions, eyewitnesses reported a fire and burning cars. Medics, rescuers, police, and utility services were working on the scene.

The exact names of the medical facilities were not disclosed by the authorities for security reasons.

It has also not been officially reported which specific modification of guided aerial bombs was used by Russian aviation. In the regional administration’s reports, the munitions are referred to as guided bombs.

The air raid alert lasted from early morning

The air raid alert in the Sumy district was announced around 05:12.

The military warned of the threat of Russian drones and the possible use of guided aerial bombs.

The first powerful explosions, associated with a series of strikes with guided bombs, sounded around 09:00. For more than 30 minutes afterward, city residents continued to hear explosions.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported several times about the launches of aerial bombs towards Sumy, including repeated launches.

Thus, people were under the threat not of a single strike, but of a prolonged series of aerial attacks.

For the border regional center, this creates an especially dangerous situation: the distance to the launch site is small, and the time between the warning and the possible impact of the bomb can be extremely short.

Before the aerial bombs, the city was attacked by drones

The strikes with six guided bombs were a continuation of attacks that began at night.

Russian FPV drones and ‘Molniya’ type drones struck gas stations in the Kovpakovsky and Zarechny districts of Sumy.

As a result of one of the hits, a 63-year-old suburban minibus driver received severe multiple injuries. The man was hospitalized.

A fire broke out at one of the gas stations, which was extinguished.

Around 07:20, a Russian drone hit a residential building in the Kovpakovsky district.

A fire started in the house, the roof of the building and the garage were damaged. In the neighboring house, the blast wave shattered windows.

There was no one in the attacked house at the time of the hit. However, in the neighboring building, there was an elderly immobile woman. She was taken to the hospital with an acute stress reaction.

About an hour later, another Russian drone struck nearby, causing a new fire.

Cluster strike on the evening of July 14

In fact, the current attack on Sumy began on the evening of July 14, 2026.

According to preliminary conclusions of specialists, Russian forces shelled the outskirts of the city with a long-range multiple launch rocket system, using a cluster combat element.

The strike hit a private residential area.

At least ten households were damaged. Seven residents of Sumy were injured in the attack, including an 11-year-old boy.

Two adults — a 30-year-old man and a 59-year-old woman — received severe injuries.

Unexploded cluster elements were found in the affected area. Explosive technicians examined the area and neutralized the found munitions.

The use of cluster elements in a residential area poses a threat not only during the shelling itself.

Unexploded parts of munitions can remain on streets, in yards, near houses and cars, turning into delayed-action mines for residents and rescuers.

The third deadly airstrike in less than two weeks

The attack on July 15 was already the third heavy strike with guided aerial bombs on Sumy in less than two weeks.

Strike on July 11

On July 11, during the day, Russian aviation dropped three guided bombs on the Zarechny district of Sumy.

One of the strikes hit a road and a public transport stop. Another hit an infrastructure facility.

As a result of the attack, five people died immediately after the strike, including a 13-year-old girl. Later, a 48-year-old woman who received critical injuries died in the hospital.

Thus, the number of dead increased to six people.

A total of 44 injured required medical assistance. As of July 14, 17 injured remained in hospitals, including four children. Two adults were in serious condition.

The blast wave damaged residential high-rise buildings, hundreds of windows and balcony structures, cars, and civilian infrastructure facilities.

Strike on July 3

On the evening of July 3, Russian forces also attacked Sumy with guided aerial bombs and drones.

One of the bombs hit the central part of the city — in the area of a high-rise residential building, a store, and a road where many people were present.

Four civilians were killed: two men, a young woman, and her five-year-old daughter.

The deceased woman’s older daughter was injured and hospitalized.

According to updated data, 36 people were injured. Twenty high-rise residential buildings, three private houses, and three non-residential buildings were damaged.

Sumy is being turned into a constant zone of aerial terror

The strikes on July 3, 11, and 15 show that these are not isolated random hits.

Russian forces are consistently using guided aerial bombs, drones, multiple launch rocket systems, and cluster munitions against the regional center.

The targets and impact zones include roads, public transport stops, residential buildings, gas stations, medical facilities, and other civilian infrastructure.

In just the three mentioned guided bomb attacks in Sumy, at least 13 people have been killed, and dozens of civilians have been injured.

NAnews — Israel News highlights: what is happening in Sumy should be considered not only as another front-line report.

This is a systematic use of powerful aerial munitions against a large city where families continue to live, hospitals operate, public transport runs, and people are forced to go out on the streets daily.

The Israeli audience is well aware of how important early warning systems, protected spaces, and the time available to the civilian population after an alarm signal are.

However, in the case of guided aerial bombs, Sumy residents often have only a few minutes, sometimes even less, to find a safe place.

After the strikes on July 15, rescue and medical services continued to work at the impact sites. Authorities warned residents not to approach damaged areas due to the risk of new attacks and the possible presence of unexploded munitions.

NAnews — Israel News continues to monitor updates on the condition of the injured and the consequences of the Russian attack on Sumy.

The data on the number of dead and injured may be updated.

They don’t promise a loan — they help you get it: a fair alternative to bank rejections appeared in Israel

If you’ve ever tried to get a loan from an Israeli bank — you know what it means: endless forms, BDI, “we’ll call you back later” and eventually — silence. It’s especially difficult for new repatriates, those working unofficially, or those with even small debts in the past.

And when it comes to buying a car? Even more “fun.”

Against this backdrop, private companies began to appear, promising to “help” — but often taking money upfront, doing nothing, and disappearing.

However, there are exceptions. One of them is GBT Global, which, according to client reviews, actually supports people through to the end of the process, does not charge in advance, and operates officially.

What they do — in short

GBT Global is not a bank or a “financial broker.” It’s a team that helps people get loans, car loans, and refinancing, and deal with poor credit history. They work without upfront payments and only charge if the client actually receives funds.

Learn more on the
GBT Global website

The company helps people who face:

• rejections due to BDI,
• unstable income,
• lack of documents and guarantors,
• accumulated debts,
• wish to leave the country and “clear everything”,
• other situations.

How it works: 7 steps

1. The client contacts them — by phone, website, or WhatsApp.
2. Initial consultation: why the loan is needed, amount, terms.
3. Specialist collects basic info — BDI, debts, income.
4. Analysis: is there a chance? What programs are available?
5. If agreed — work begins: document collection, application submission.
6. Upon success — the client gets approval and then funds.
7. Only then the service is paid.

What they actually help with

• Personal loans: for daily needs, education, medical expenses;
• Car loans: new and used vehicles;
• BDI clearing: correcting errors, legal support;
• Refinancing (mashkantaot): combining debts at lower rates;
• Bankruptcy: legal path to resolve debts;
• Emigration prep: loans and BDI rehab before moving abroad;
• And more.

So who are they?

Learn more on the
GBT Global website

According to public sources, GBT Global previously worked as part of a financial analysis division associated with the Bank of Israel. Today — it’s an independent private company.

Among their partners are well-known companies like:

• מימון ישיר — https://my.5555.co.il
• קפטן קרדיט — https://captaincredit.co.il

What clients say

“The bank said no — they helped.”
“Not a cent upfront.”
“They explained everything calmly.”

These kinds of reviews are common on social media and forums.

GBT Global doesn’t make promises — but at least they don’t charge before delivering results, and that already sets them apart.

Bottom line

GBT Global isn’t a magic button — but it’s a real chance. Especially for those who have been told “no” everywhere else.

Here they treat you like a person — and you only pay if it works out.

Learn more on the
GBT Global website

This is not an ordinary creative evening and not a standard meeting with an artist.

In the program, Filippenko combines literature, theater, personal memories, and a conversation about time — the very time that for many people was divided into “before” and “after” after February 24, 2022.

For the Israeli audience, this visit is important not only as a cultural event. Filippenko is an artist with a significant Soviet and Russian biography, but recent years have added another context to his name: a public anti-war stance, departure from Russia, support for Ukraine, and continued performances beyond the official Russian stage.

Where and when will Alexander Filippenko’s performances take place in Israel

The tour schedule covers four cities in Israel. All performances will start at 19:00.

Netanya

October 7, 2026, Wednesday
Hechal HaTarbut – Auditorium
4 Raziel St.

Ashdod

October 9, 2026, Friday
Matnas Duna-Yud
90 Keren Kayemet LeIsrael St.

Haifa

October 11, 2026, Sunday
Rappoport Hall
138 HaNasi Ave.

Tel Aviv

October 13, 2026, Tuesday
Tel Aviv Museum – Recanati Hall
27 Shaul HaMelech Ave.

Tickets

Tickets – are already available for purchase via the link

For Netanya, Ashdod, Haifa, and Tel Aviv, such evenings usually become not just part of the program but a meeting point for different audiences: people who remember Filippenko from cinema and theater, repatriates from Ukraine, the Ukrainian community in Israel, viewers for whom the topic of culture after the war is no longer neutral.

What is ‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’

The program ‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’ is structured as a monologue and personal conversation with the audience. Alexander Filippenko takes the stage not only as a performer of texts but as a person who lives these texts together with the audience.

The evening will be composed of prose, poetry, theatrical memories, and life stories. The program includes excerpts from Nikolai Gogol’s ‘Dead Souls’, Mikhail Zoshchenko’s works ‘The Steamboat’ and ‘Product Quality’, Sergey Dovlatov’s ‘The Reserve’, Boris Pasternak’s ‘Christmas Star’, as well as poems by Semyon Kirsanov, Yuri Levitansky, and Zhenya Berkovich.

The intonation itself is important here. Filippenko has long been known as an actor who can work on the edge of grotesque, irony, and tragic depth. His manner is not limited to beautiful reading of the text: he turns literary material into a living scene, where behind every word lies experience, memory, and inner freedom.

A special place in the program will be occupied by the artist’s personal stories — about filming in two versions of ‘The Master and Margarita’, working with Sergey Yursky, Alexei German, Sergey Loznitsa, and other directors. For the audience, this is a chance to hear not only famous texts but also the backstage story of an era, told by a person who was its direct participant.

Filippenko: why this evening sounds different

Alexander Filippenko was born on September 2, 1944, in Moscow. He graduated from MIPT, then the Shchukin Theater School, worked at the Taganka Theater, the Vakhtangov Theater, the Mossovet Theater. His filmography includes more than a hundred works, including ‘Visit to the Minotaur’, ‘Hard to Be a God’, ‘The Master and Margarita’, ‘Our Armored Train’, ‘Throw’, ‘Steps of the Emperor’, and other films.

At the same time, the Ukrainian trace in his biography is also noticeable.

Filippenko acted in films and TV projects related to Ukrainian cinema and Ukrainian studios: ‘Bumbarash’, ‘Born by the Revolution’, ‘The Last Resort of Kings’, ‘The Black Arrow’, ‘The Bridge Through Life’, ‘The Pit’, ‘A Woman for All’, ‘I Am Alone’.

For many viewers, he is remembered as one of the most striking performers of ‘dark side’ roles in Soviet and post-Soviet cinema. Filippenko played characters with sharp, almost grotesque energy: Koschei the Immortal, Death, Koroviev, and Azazello in versions of ‘The Master and Margarita’. Later, the wide audience also remembered him for the role of Andrey Zabaluev in the series ‘Poor Nastya’.

But today, Filippenko’s biography is read not only through the list of roles.

Back in March 2014, after the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea, he, along with a number of well-known Russian figures in science and culture, expressed disagreement with the Russian government’s policy in Crimea. This position was outlined in an open letter.

In 2018, Filippenko also supported Ukrainian director Oleg Sentsov, who was in Russian custody.

After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the artist openly spoke out against the war. Ukrainian and emigrant media reported that his departure from Russia was related to his political position. The Mossovet Theater did not renew his contract in 2022, and concerts in Russia began to be canceled.

In his interview with DW, Alexander Filippenko stated that for him, February 24, 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine, is one of the most shameful days in his life. He left his native country without hesitation and settled with his family in Lithuania.

The actor stated that he is ashamed of Russia and does not want to return to a country where dictatorial times have returned, against which he spoke out even during the USSR.

Moreover, Alexander performed a concert in Vilnius, where all proceeds from ticket sales were directed to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The actor also criticizes Russian propaganda and disinformation about the war.

A special symbol was his photograph in an embroidered shirt, published on Ukrainian Embroidery Day. In the caption, the artist recalled Kyiv, the Dovzhenko studio, chestnuts, friends, coziness, and warmth. For many, this gesture was important precisely because it came from a person whose professional life had been associated with the Russian stage for decades, but who did not hide behind it after the start of the war.

Together with his family, he lives in Vilnius (Lithuania) and is engaged in volunteer activities, participating in fundraising to help Ukrainians.

After moving to Europe, the artist did not stand aside and actively helps to raise funds for Ukrainians affected by the war.

The artist speaks sharply about dictatorial regimes and has repeatedly stated that he does not intend to return to Russia.

In a number of publications, it was also reported that Filippenko performed literary concerts in Europe, and the proceeds from certain events were directed to help Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In addition, the actor criticized Russian propaganda and disinformation about the war.

For NAnovosti — Israel News – Nikk.Agency, Alexander Filippenko’s visit to Israel looks not only as a point on the cultural program. This event is at the intersection of theater, memory, war, and personal choice. In Israel, where a large Ukrainian community lives and many people are connected with the culture of the former USSR, this context is especially acute.

The name of the program ‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’ in this sense sounds almost biographical. It is a question not only literary but also human. Where is the exit for an artist when the familiar country becomes a source of war? Where is the road if the old stage closes and silence becomes a form of consent?

Filippenko answers this not with a slogan, but with a stage. Literature. Voice. Memory.

That is why the Israeli performances in October 2026 may become more than just a tour of a famous actor. For some viewers, it will be a meeting with a master of theater and cinema. For others, an evening about the price of personal position. For others, an opportunity to hear how classical literature suddenly begins to speak about today without direct political declarations.

‘Where is the Exit? Where is the Road?’ — a question that each viewer may hear in their own way. But in Alexander Filippenko’s story, it has already received a specific continuation: not to be silent, not to return to a convenient role, and to go where the word can still sound free.

Tickets are already available

The tour schedule covers four cities in Israel. All performances will start at 19:00.

Netanya

October 7, 2026, Wednesday
Hechal HaTarbut – Auditorium
4 Raziel St.

Ashdod

October 9, 2026, Friday
Matnas Duna-Yud
90 Keren Kayemet LeIsrael St.

Haifa

October 11, 2026, Sunday
Rappoport Hall
138 HaNasi Ave.

Tel Aviv

October 13, 2026, Tuesday
Tel Aviv Museum – Recanati Hall
27 Shaul HaMelech Ave.

Tickets

Tickets – are already available for purchase via the link

“Bright memory to Maksym Bulygin.
We remember. We respect. We will not forget.
Baruch Dayan HaEmet – Blessed is the True Judge“, – from the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine.

On January 20, 2026, in Zhytomyr, a commemorative event was held dedicated to the unveiling of a memorial plaque for Maksym Bulygin — a graduate of the private lyceum “Or Avner!, who died on June 10, 2024, defending Ukraine. The ceremony was attended by parents, relatives, students, teachers, and representatives of the city’s Jewish community.

Maksym Bulygin was a serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a volunteer who decided to defend the country from the first months of the full-scale war. The memorial plaque, installed on the walls of the lyceum where he studied, became a sign of respect and gratitude from the community and the educational institution, as well as a reminder of the price Ukraine pays for freedom and independence.

Memorial ceremony at the school where he studied

The unveiling of the memorial plaque took place in a restrained and focused atmosphere. For the Or Avner lyceum, this event holds special significance: Maksym was not an abstract hero but a student of this school, a graduate who was well remembered here.

During the event, words were spoken about his life path, character, choices, and courage. Those present honored Maksym’s memory with a minute of silence. For the school’s students, the ceremony became an important moment of realizing that the war is not a distant news story but a reality that affects their environment, their city, and their school.

Official position of the community

The event was also reported by representatives of the Jewish community of Ukraine. In the published message it says:

Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine:

«🕯 Honoring the memory of the Hero — Maksym Bulygin.

On January 20, a solemn event was held at the private lyceum “Or Avner” in the city of Zhytomyr, dedicated to the unveiling of a memorial plaque for Maksym Bulygin — a graduate of the lyceum who died on June 10, 2024, defending Ukraine.

The event was attended by parents, students, teachers, and guests. Those present honored the memory of the Hero, recalled his life path, courage, self-sacrifice, and the road he traveled for the freedom of his country. This day became a reminder of the price of freedom and of those who gave the most valuable thing for it — their lives.

Bright memory to Maksym Bulygin.

We remember. We honor. We will not forget.

Baruch Dayan HaEmet — Blessed is the True Judge».

Biography and personal history

Maksym Bulygin was born and raised in Zhytomyr. He had Ukrainian citizenship, and by nationality, he was a Ukrainian Jew — this information is indicated in the Ukrainian Wikipedia and is confirmed by his biography and participation in the life of the city’s Jewish community.

He was the only child in the family. He attended a Jewish kindergarten, later, after graduating from the Chabad lyceum “Or Avner” (where his grandmother worked as a teacher for 25 years), he entered Vocational School No. 18, where he obtained the profession of “Cook-Baker”.

He was a diligent student, sang in the choir, found a long-term hobby — chess (backgammon). From childhood, he was an active member of the Jewish community of Zhytomyr. From 2019 to 2021, he served in the Ukrainian army, serving as a rifleman. After demobilization, he worked at “Nova Poshta”, first as a loader, later becoming a scanner.

On February 24, 2022, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Maks received a summons and immediately stood up to defend his native Ukraine. He fought in various formations. Shortly before his death, he was in the ranks of the 117th Separate Mechanized Brigade. He served for 2.5 years in the east — Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Zaitseve, and beyond. He almost died several times.

In 2024, Maksym was transferred to another battalion, offered to become a UAV operator, he mastered this specialty, and when he went on his first combat mission, he did not return. UAV operator Maksym-Wolf Bulygin heroically died on June 10, 2024, during a combat mission to defend Ukraine from Russian aggressors in the village of Robotyne, Zaporizhzhia region, when the occupiers dropped explosives on his position.

A year before his death, Maksym found a beloved, they set a wedding date for the end of June, the defender agreed on leave, but two weeks before the desired day, he died.

“Grandma’s boy”

Behind the official formulations and biographical references lies the personal side of Maksym’s life, which his relatives talk about. Maksym’s grandmother, Tatyana Lipinska, recalls:

“He called himself ‘grandma’s boy’.”

This simple phrase sharply contrasts with the image of a soldier and emphasizes the human dimension of his fate. For the family, Maksym was not only a serviceman and hero but also a grandson, a close person, with a warm attachment to his relatives.

Service and death

On June 10, 2024, Maksym Bulygin died while performing a combat mission in the Zaporizhzhia direction. His death was a heavy blow to his family, friends, and community.

On June 25, 2024, after a traditional Jewish farewell ceremony near the synagogue in Zhytomyr, conducted by Rabbi Shlomo Wilhelm, Maksym Bulygin was buried at the Smolyansky City Military Cemetery.

For personal courage shown in the defense of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, selfless fulfillment of military duty, he was awarded – by Decree of the President of Ukraine dated November 27, 2024, No. 787, the Order of “For Courage” III degree (posthumously).

On June 20, the Chief Rabbi of Kyiv and Ukraine Moshe Asman wrote about Maksym Bulygin’s death on his Facebook page. By the same Presidential Decree No. 787, and the same award, (posthumously) was given to the son of Rabbi Moshe Asman — Samborsky Matityahu.

The significance of the event for the community and the city

The unveiling of the memorial plaque in Zhytomyr is significant not only as a local event. It is part of a broader process of preserving the memory of the fallen defenders of Ukraine — regardless of their origin, religion, or nationality.

Maksym Bulygin’s story refutes propagandist myths about the alleged “detachment” of national minorities from the defense of Ukraine. The country’s Jewish community has been involved in the defense from the first days of the war — on the front lines, in volunteering, in humanitarian aid.

Memory as responsibility

At the Or Avner lyceum, they emphasize that the memorial plaque is not only a sign of mourning but also an element of educational work. It will remind students of the real fates of the school’s graduates, the price of decisions, and that freedom does not exist by itself.

Maksym’s story is the story of a person who made a choice and remained true to it until the end. For his school, city, and community, this choice became part of the collective memory.

“We remember everyone who holds the sky above us”

“We remember everyone who holds the sky above us” — this formula, voiced during the ceremony, became the unofficial conclusion of the event. The memorial plaque on the walls of the lyceum is a reminder of a specific life, a specific fate, and a specific loss.

Maksym Bulygin will forever remain in the memory of his family, teachers, classmates, and the Zhytomyr community. His name is inscribed not only on the school walls but also in the modern history of Ukraine — a history that is being written here and now, at the cost of human lives. It is precisely such stories, behind which stand real people and real losses, NANews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency consider important to preserve and tell, so that the memory of the fallen defenders does not turn into a dry line of the chronicle.

“Borsch is not just food, it is a symbol of tradition, sustainability and family warmth,” – this is how he describes his work Igor KulakovIsraeli writer, journalist and descendant of a tzaddik.

His book “My book about borscht” is a deep dive into the history, recipes and cultural significance of Ukraine's most famous dish.

Book, available in English and Ukrainianx, has already aroused interest among lovers of cooking and Ukrainian culture living in Israel and abroad.

Who is Igor Kulakov: descendant of a tzaddik, writer, journalist and popularizer of Ukrainian culture

Igor Kulakov is more than just a writer and journalist. This is a man with a deep history, who has absorbed the tragic and inspiring pages of the past of his people. As a descendant of a tzaddik, he carefully preserves the memory of his roots, while actively working to promote Ukrainian and Jewish culture in the modern world.

His life and work are a bridge between Ukraine, Israel and the whole world.

Jewish roots: memory of tragedy and fortitude

Family of Kulakovs has its own history from Tsaddik Rabinovich, who lived in the village of Trilesy, Fastovsky district. This tzaddik, as a spiritual leader, was a significant figure for the local Jewish community. However, the history of Igor's family is full of tragedies associated with pogroms during the Civil War and the Holocaust.

During the Civil War, the tzaddik was killed during a pogrom, and his daughter Sheindl and her husband Mordechai Sowa became victims of Nazi repression. They were shot in Kyiv on September 29, 1941, their bodies found rest in a mass grave near Babyn Yar.

These tragic events became not only part of Kulakov’s family history, but also a source of his inspiration for preserving memory and promoting the ideas of tolerance and cultural exchange.

Ukrainian roots: the path to creativity and self-realization

Born in the city of Obukhov, Ukraine, Igor Kulakov absorbed the rich cultural environment of his homeland from childhood. In 1991, he graduated from the Faculty of Philology of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, where he received training as a philologist and teacher of Russian language and literature. This period marked the beginning of his literary journey.

Already in 1997, his works were published in the anthology “Young Wine”, and in 2000 Igor took first place in the international prose competition “Rozvorush Our Blood.” These achievements strengthened his confidence as a writer.

Literary and journalistic recognition

Igor Kulakov is a prominent representative of Ukrainian literature and journalism, whose works have not only earned recognition, but also contributed to the development of cultural and public discussions. His work is distinguished by its relevance, depth and desire to preserve the national heritage.

Main achievements:

• “Young Wine” (1997) — Kulakov’s works were included in the anthology of modern Ukrainian poetry, which was the first step towards literary recognition.
• International prose competition “I will destroy our shelter” (2000) — Igor took first place, demonstrating a unique style and approach to prose.
• Competition “Israel and Ukrainian-Israeli relations through the eyes of journalists” (2018) — victory in this competition emphasized his contribution to strengthening ties between Ukraine and Israel.
• PRESSZVANIE (2018) — third place in a prestigious journalistic category for an article in K.Fund Media on IT and telecommunications topics.
• The work “Donetsk triptych” – nomination in the 2018 “Missy Legends” competition, organized by the Litnet platform and the publishing house “Summit Book”.

Significant publications:

• Igor’s works have been published in leading Ukrainian literary and journalistic publications, including “Ukrainian Seeding” and others.
• In 2016, he created the first Jewish publication jewish.org.ua in Ukrainian, which became an important contribution to the development of media related to Jewish culture.

Books:

• “Radio Ukraine” (2024) – a book dedicated to modern challenges and achievements of Ukraine, received positive reviews from readers and critics.
• “My book about borscht” (2025) – a synthesis of history, cuisine and cultural heritage, emphasizing the role of traditional dishes in strengthening national identity.

The works of Igor Kulakov serve not only as a source of inspiration, but also as a platform for understanding complex historical, cultural and social topics.

A new stage in Israel: a bridge between cultures

After moving to Israel, Igor Kulakov became an active participant in cultural life.

Living in Rishon Lezion, he continues to write and share his knowledge.

About the book “My book about borscht”

“My book about borscht” is more than a cookbook. This is an exploration that combines the history, recipes and cultural heritage of Ukraine. In his book, Igor Kulakov tells how borscht became an integral part of Ukrainian identity, maintaining its significance even in the modern world.

Main topics of the book:

• History of borscht. The path from ancient times to the present day.
• Recipes. More than 50 variations, including traditional, vegetarian, kosher and fusion.
• Cultural significance. Borscht as a symbol of family traditions and sustainability.
• Tips from chefs. Practical recommendations for creating the perfect dish.
• Interesting additions. Borsch according to zodiac signs, unique combinations and traditional drinks.

The book demonstrates how borscht unites generations and transmits a cultural code, preserving the spirit of Ukrainian tradition.

What makes borscht a symbol?

Borscht has long gone beyond the kitchen and become a symbol of the cultural identity of Ukraine. This dish is associated with home, family and communication. In Israel, borscht is also popular thanks to the many immigrants from Ukraine who have preserved the tradition of preparing this dish.

My Borscht Book shows how food can bring people together, regardless of their background. It is a cultural bridge that strengthens the connection between peoples living in Israel and beyond.

Table: What you will find in the book “My Book about Borscht”

Where can I buy the book?

The book “My Book about Borscht” is available on Amazon in two languages:

• English version
• Ukrainian version

This book will be an excellent gift for those who are interested in cooking, culture, or want to learn how to cook borscht following proven recipes.

Why is borscht important for cultural exchange?

Israel and Ukraine have a long history of interaction. For many Israelis with Ukrainian roots, borscht has become a symbol of connection with their homeland. Igor Kulakov’s book emphasizes how even through food you can preserve culture, strengthen identity and find common ground between different peoples.

Our website NAnews – Israel News talks about similar initiatives, helping readers learn more about cultural traditions and strengthen the connection between Ukraine and Israel.

Conclusion

“My book about borscht” by Igor Kulakov is not just a book, but a real cultural project that combines food, history and traditions. Borscht becomes a symbol of sustainability, family warmth and cultural identity that goes beyond the kitchen and becomes part of the national heritage.

For those interested in gastronomy and history, this publication will be a real discovery. Read more about similar initiatives on our website NAnews – Israel News and stay up to date with the most interesting events.

By the way, you can listen to the maestro live, buy his book and enjoy his borscht on January 29, 2025 at Borshch party in Jaffa.

…

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Leo Motzkin (Aryeh Leib) was born in 1867 in Brovary, Kyiv province of the Russian Empire. In this small town, near Kyiv, he received a traditional Jewish education. In the late 19th century, Brovary had a large Jewish community.

Jewish Community of Brovary: History and Tragic Events

Brovary, a small town near Kyiv, has deep historical roots and significant Jewish heritage. Before World War II, it had one of the largest Jewish communities in the region. Jews began settling in Brovary in the second half of the 19th century, gradually migrating from the west after the partition of Poland. According to 1891 data, Jews made up 23.3% of the town’s population (888 people). Most were engaged in trade and crafts, actively participating in the town’s life. Brovary had a synagogue, Jewish schools, and public organizations.

The period from 1917 to 1921 was tragic for the Jewish community. During the revolution and civil war, Jews were subjected to brutal pogroms organized by various military formations: Denikin’s troops, Skoropadsky’s haidamaks, the Red Army. Many perished, and some residents left the town, emigrating to Kyiv or other safer places.

The Jewish population gradually decreased. If in 1923 there were 646 Jews living in Brovary, by 1939 their number had decreased to 458 people. World War II played a tragic role in the community’s history. From 1941 to 1943, almost all the town’s Jews perished on the fronts or were killed during the Nazi occupation. As a result of these events, the Jewish community of Brovary practically disappeared.

In the post-war years, a small part of the Jews returned to the town. In 1989, about 360 Jews lived there, but by 1999 only 110 people remained. The main reasons for the decrease were emigration to Israel and other countries, as well as the lack of conditions for community development.

Today, there are almost no direct traces left of the once numerous Jewish community in Brovary. However, its history lives on in the memory of descendants and those interested in the heritage of the Jewish people. Preserving this memory is important for future generations so that the rich culture and traditions of Brovary’s Jews are not forgotten.

To Berlin for Knowledge: A New Stage of Life

After completing his primary education, Leo Motzkin went to Berlin, where he studied mathematics and philosophy. It was in Berlin that his active public activity began. He became one of the founders of a scientific society that united students supporting the Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) movement.

With the emergence of Theodor Herzl and the beginning of the Zionist movement, Motzkin became an active participant. He was a delegate to the First Zionist Congress in 1897 and advocated for a clear formulation of the movement’s goal — the creation of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel.

First Trip to Eretz-Israel

On behalf of Theodor Herzl, Motzkin went to Eretz-Israel to assess the state of Jewish settlements. In his report, he criticized the settlement methods used by Baron Rothschild and the Hovevei Zion movement and insisted on the need for political negotiations with the Ottoman Empire.

This trip became a turning point in his activities. He realized that without political support, the creation of a Jewish state would be extremely difficult.

Important Steps on the International Stage

During World War I, Leo Motzkin headed the Copenhagen branch of the Zionist Organization. After the war, he became one of the founders of the Committee of Jewish Delegations at the Paris Peace Conference, where he defended the interests of world Jewry.

With the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, he was the first to raise the issue of discrimination against German Jews at the League of Nations level. When this issue was removed from the agenda, Motzkin refused to cooperate with the organization but continued to provide political and financial support to the Jewish population of Germany.

Table: Key Stages of Leo Motzkin’s Life

Memory of Leo Motzkin

Leo Motzkin died in 1933 in Paris. His remains were reburied on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem in 1934. In memory of the outstanding figure, the Israeli city of Kiryat Motzkin was founded in 1934, named in his honor.

In 1933, it was decided in Haifa to create a new residential area for middle-class families. It was to be located outside the city but close enough for residents to commute to work daily. A plot of land in the Zevulun Valley was chosen for this purpose.

The new area was named after Aryeh Leo Motzkin — a well-known Jewish public figure and one of the founders of the World Zionist Congress. Thus, Kiryat Motzkin was founded in 1934 by Polish Jews. The first residents of the area were merchants and independent craftsmen.

The territory where the new settlement was located turned out to be sandy and swampy. The lands were undeveloped and dangerous due to the risk of malaria. Settlers were offered 400 plots of land on installment. The first residents had to work hard to turn the undeveloped area into a comfortable place to live. Thanks to their efforts, the area earned the nickname “Green Island”.

By 1940, the population of Kiryat Motzkin had already reached 2,000 people, and on June 11, 1940, a local council was established. Over the years, the area continued to develop. In 1976, when the population exceeded 25,000 people, Kiryat Motzkin officially received city status.

Kiryat Motzkin became a symbol of the memory of a man who dedicated his life to the struggle for Jewish equality, the promotion of Hebrew, and the creation of a Jewish state.

Conclusion

The story of Leo Motzkin is a story of the struggle for the rights of the Jewish people, the promotion of Hebrew, and the creation of a Jewish state. His contribution to the development of world Jewry is hard to overestimate.

Now, as you walk the streets of Kiryat Motzkin, remember that his name is associated with a person whose ideas and efforts laid the foundation for many of modern Israel’s achievements.

We, the team at NANews – News of Israel, are proud to share such important stories that unite the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples.

Read more stories about outstanding Jews connected with Ukraine and Israel in our section “Jews from Ukraine“ on the NANews website – #євреїзукраїни

But amid the destruction, losses, and anxiety, there are also stories that inspire — especially for the Jewish community, both in Ukraine and in Israel.

One of the largest portals for the ultra-Orthodox audience in Israel, “בחדרי חרדים” (Behadrei Haredim), on June 20, 2025, published two stories from Kyiv that vividly reflect how Putin’s aggression affects Jewish life in Ukraine.

On one hand — the shelling and destruction of a Talmud Torah building in Kyiv.

We already reported about this on June 10, 2025 — in the photo — a burned Hanukkiah thrown by the explosion, Kyiv, Artem Business Center, Hlybochytska 4, June 10, 2025

On the other hand — the personal story of a Ukrainian soldier who, after witnessing the death of his comrades, discovered his Jewish roots and decided to undergo brit milah (circumcision).

These two events are about pain and hope, about war and faith, about sacrifice and choice. They touch on the deepest levels of how Jewish Ukraine experiences the war — and why it matters for Israel.

A soldier who became Jewish not by blood, but by choice

A young Ukrainian man, a musician and sound engineer by profession, was invited to a studio where a song for the Jewish community of Kyiv was being recorded. The project was coordinated with the participation of Rabbi Yaakov Bleich, whose work includes dozens of Jewish initiatives across the country.

During the recording, choir members noticed a kippah on the sound engineer’s head. The question came half-jokingly: “Are you Jewish by any chance?” The answer turned out to be unexpectedly serious:

“Yes, I’m Jewish. But I’m completely secular. I don’t know anything about religion. I just know I’m Jewish, so I wear a kippah.”

That initial interaction with the Jewish community did not go any further. The young man went to the front lines. But fate had already prepared a turning point that would bring him back to his true self.

Pain, explosion, and rebirth: how tragedy became a choice

A few weeks later, while on a combat mission with fellow soldiers, a Russian missile hit their position. It was one of the many shellings that Putin’s army relentlessly carries out on Ukrainian soil. Several of his comrades were killed instantly, and others were seriously wounded. He miraculously survived — with a hand injury, but alive.

This moment was life-changing. Having experienced fear, pain, and death firsthand, he realized he needed to rethink his life. While in the hospital, he told Avraham Bleich, the son of the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine:

“With God’s help, I want to begin getting closer to Judaism.”

A week later, in a modest yet moving ceremony, he underwent brit milah. It was not just a formality. He took the name Moshe — in honor of Moshe Rabbeinu, as he explained: “Moshe gave the Torah, and now I want to accept it.”

This story is not just about a religious act. It is a story of inner transformation, one that happens not in a synagogue, but against the backdrop of war, under the sound of sirens, when a person searches for meaning to hold on to.

While some choose faith, others lose their home: the Talmud Torah attack

At the same time, a Russian missile struck the Talmud Torah building in Kyiv. Before the war, it was a place of education for children from Kyiv’s Jewish community, including students from the Chabad movement and others connected to Rabbi Bleich’s educational programs. The building, a spiritual home for dozens of families, was completely destroyed.

Photos from the site show severe destruction: collapsed walls, destroyed classrooms and prayer halls. Study materials, religious books, ritual objects — all buried under rubble.

“We are witnessing not just the destruction of buildings, but of spiritual centers. The destruction in Kyiv echoes what we experience in Israel from Iranian attacks. But in these moments, we see more Jews returning to their roots, despite everything,” said Rabbi Yaakov Bleich.

A shared front: Israel, Ukraine, and spiritual resistance

The website NAnews – Israel News emphasizes that such stories must not be overlooked. Because they concern what is most essential — the preservation of Jewish identity, even in the midst of total war. When a young man undergoes circumcision, despite his injury and recent trauma, it is an act of inner resistance, an act of faith, an act of belonging to the Jewish people.

When Jewish schools are destroyed — it’s not just about walls. It’s about how Russia attacks not only Ukraine but Jewish roots, education, and the future.

These moments make the closeness between the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples all the more evident. In recent years, cooperation between the communities of both countries has intensified. And the way Ukraine protects its Jewish institutions — even during war — is an example to the world.

Conclusion: Moshe’s path and a destroyed school — two faces of one war

A soldier no one had known became a symbol of spiritual rebirth. He didn’t just survive — he returned to his roots and became Moshe.

And the destroyed Talmud Torah in Kyiv became a symbol that the enemy destroys not only buildings, but meaning itself. But Jewish life continues — even under fire.

The website NAnews – Israel News will continue to report on such stories. Because in them lies the truth about war and faith, about the line between loss and rediscovery.

As promised, we continue our discussion of a Jew from Ukraine – Ze'ev Jabotinsky. #jewsukraine

📝 The biography of Vladimir Zeev is really full of interesting facts, so today we are publishing the second of two posts about him. — First see – Jews from Ukraine: Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky.

👦🏻 Childhood and youth: Vladimir Jabotinsky was born into a Jewish family in Odessa. Thanks to his literary abilities and knowledge of languages, already at the age of 18 he became a foreign correspondent for the newspapers “Odessky Listok” and “Odesskiye Novosti”, working first in Bern (Switzerland 🇨🇭) and then in Rome (Italy 🇮🇹).

📚 Literary heritage: In addition to his political activities, Jabotinsky was a famous writer, translator and publicist. He created novels, autobiographical works, translated the poetry of Edgar Allan Poe into Hebrew, edited the weekly magazine “Svitanok”, and also wrote an autobiographical novel “Five”, describing the life of a Jewish family in Odessa.

💡 Interesting fact: Jabotinsky refuted Russian fakes about Ukrainian anti-Semitism a hundred years ago. For example, about Simon Petliura he said:
“I grew up with them, together with them I fought against anti-Semites and Russifiers – Jewish and Ukrainian. Neither I nor other thinking Zionists can be convinced that such people can be considered anti-Semitic.”

📌 Memory: 55 streets in Israel are named after Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky. Residents and visitors of the central part of the country are well aware of one of them – Jabotinsky Street, which is an important transport route connecting Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bnei Brak and Petah Tikva.

🇮🇱 In Israel there is also the Jabotinsky Institute, the Jabotinsky Prize for achievements in literature, as well as Jabotinsky Day, celebrated annually on Tammuz 29 according to the Jewish calendar.

🇺🇦 Since 2022, Zhabotinsky Street has appeared in Kyiv, not far from the Nivki metro station. A mural dedicated to Jabotinsky was also created in Odessa.

Photo materials:

1. Portrait of Jabotinsky
2. Jabotinsky Street in Israel
3. Mural in Odessa
4. Street in Kyiv

This article was prepared specifically for the site NAnewswhere you will find even more interesting stories about prominent Jews of Ukraine, such as Vladimir Jabotinsky.

Veda section @davidkrutonog — Jew from Ukraine and founder of a marketing agency tlv.agency

Leave a comment in Telegram channel NAnews ↓ — Israel News

Key points from the conversation in text version (Ukr.): https://www.ukrainer.net/tetiana-nepypenko-idysh/

The key framework of the conversation is formulated simply and strictly: Yiddish is not a “language somewhere alongside Ukrainian history,” but part of the fabric of this history, because before World War II, millions spoke Yiddish in Europe, and in the territory of modern Ukraine, there were towns and villages where Yiddish was not a marginal code but an ordinary everyday reality — the language of family, trade, press, theater, and literature. Nepypenko separately articulates the scale of the loss: the Yiddish-speaking community in Ukraine sharply decreased due to the Holocaust and Soviet repressions, and after the creation of Israel, Yiddish in the state project was pushed aside as “diasporic” — in favor of Hebrew.

Yiddish and Hebrew are not “two variants of one,” but two different language systems

One of Nepypenko’s first specific theses sounds like a “reality check”: before arguing whether “it is one literature or two,” one must acknowledge the basic fact — these are two different languages. She distinguishes them not by emotion or politics, but by linguistics: Hebrew is Semitic, Yiddish is Germanic. Yiddish, even being a Jewish language, is structurally closer to Germanic languages like English or German than to Hebrew. From this, she draws a direct conclusion: if the languages are different and belong to different families, then their literary traditions are independent, with their own periods of development and internal disputes.

A typical doubt arises separately in the conversation: “Is Yiddish alive today?” Nepypenko responds with a figure she emphasizes as her verified estimate: about 700,000 people worldwide actively use Yiddish, teach it to children, and produce content — including children’s books. This is not “revival at the club level,” but the life of the language in the community.

“There is academic Yiddish and there is Hasidic Yiddish” — and these are really two different conversational realities

She then introduces an important distinction, without which it is easy to make a mistake: conditionally, there are two large zones — Yiddish of the ‘Yiddishists’ (academic, cultural, educational environment) and Yiddish of Hasidic communities. They are mutually intelligible but noticeably differ in phonetics and speech habits; within Hasidic Yiddish, there are also dialects.

The most specific place here is the explanation of linguistic changes “live.” Nepypenko gives an example with grammar: in Yiddish, as in German, there are articles by gender, but in one of the variants of Hasidic Yiddish, articles gradually lose their semantic load, and she associates this with the influence of English, which tends towards simplification and analyticity. Meanwhile, YIVO teaches standard Yiddish with a literary norm — and the question of how the “norm” and “living dialects” will diverge remains open: time will tell.

Why Yiddish was long called a “jargon” and a “women’s language” — and why this was not a linguistic but a social label

The conversation contains a lot of specifics about how Yiddish was denied the status of “full-fledged” for years. Nepypenko says: the transition to recognizing Yiddish as a language of culture dates back to the early 20th century — a period when marginalized languages in Europe generally “came to light,” which were previously denied high status.

But the main thing is that she argues against the myth that Yiddish “was always just a spoken jargon without literature.” Nepypenko explains: there were translations and retellings of religious texts in Yiddish; the practice of retelling the Tanakh and adaptations of the Pentateuch into Yiddish, which were made, among other things, for women — because women often did not have access to formal religious education and knowledge of biblical Hebrew. From this arises an entire genre — women’s prayers in Yiddish, sometimes composed by the women themselves, in a more “earthly,” colloquial language. Nepypenko adds an important detail of meaning: this “grassroots” form gave greater freedom — to speak with God not only formulaically but humanly, in one’s own words.

Where Yiddish came from and why “it’s not just a dialect of German”

Nepypenko separately articulates what is often simplified: “Yiddish = German, just funny.” She calls such a formula erroneous. Yes, in the history of Yiddish, there is a stage when it looks like a “Judeo-German” language: Jewish communities took the Germanic base and recorded it in Jewish script. But then begins an independent history.

She describes one of the most recognized hypotheses of origin: the formation of Yiddish is associated with the Rhine region, i.e., the territory of modern North Rhine-Westphalia; over time, Yiddish separates, and by the 12th–13th centuries, it can be considered a separate language, not just “rewritten German.”

To show that Yiddish has a “long writing tradition,” Nepypenko provides specific examples of medieval texts: among literary samples, there are, for example, adaptations of Arthurian plots, where Talmudic motifs are layered, as well as Yiddish tales where Aesopian and Talmudic lines intertwine. Her logic here is very clear: this is not “translation for the sake of translation,” but the birth of new literature from the layering of different cultural sources.

Ukrainian trace in Yiddish: Slavicisms, Hebraisms, and the “plasticity” of the language

One of the most substantive parts of the conversation is about the mutual influences of languages and why Yiddish is “rooted” in specific lands. Nepypenko explains that the vocabulary of Yiddish is largely built on two major layers:

• Hebraisms — words related to religious life, ethnographic realities, holidays, what she calls “holy speech”;

• Slavicisms — the result of contact between the Ashkenazi community and the local population of Eastern Europe.

And very importantly: she does not reduce Slavicisms only to Ukrainian, noting that borrowings also came from Polish and Belarusian, and later the influence of Russian increased. That is, Yiddish in her description is a language that “knows how to absorb” and live at the intersection, while remaining itself.

There, it is also discussed how Yiddish copes with modernity: Nepypenko talks about the constant replenishment of dictionaries with new words and the debate on what a dictionary should be — descriptive or prescriptive. For Yiddish, in her view, the prescriptive role is especially important today: previously, the norm was formed by schools and the everyday educational environment, and when this environment is scarce, dictionaries partially take on the function of “suggesting how to speak and where to find a new word.”

Why “Hebrew was revived, not Yiddish”: Zionism, Galut, and doikayt — “hereness” as a language ideology

Another specific node of the conversation is the explanation of the choice of Hebrew as the language of the future state. Nepypenko names the ideology directly: it is Zionism, for which Hebrew as a revived language was to become the language of the state that was yet to be created.

And Yiddish, in her words, carries a different perspective: life in the diaspora, in exile (Galut), and from this grows the idea of doikayt — “hereness.” Nepypenko deciphers doikayt not as romance but as a politico-cultural principle: to live and organize “where you were born and where generations lived,” to achieve visibility, voice, active participation, and improvement of one’s position on the spot, rather than abandoning local reality for the sake of a single “correct” geography.

Why specifically Chernivtsi and Ukraine: the 1908 conference and the debate on the “Jewish language”

When it comes to the status of Yiddish, Nepypenko brings out a very specific historical marker: the Chernivtsi Conference of 1908, which became an important milestone in the history of Yiddish and Yiddishism. In her retelling, it was a platform where cultural and political Jewish figures of different views gathered — supporters of Hebrew, supporters of Yiddish, and those who believed that one “Jewish” speech was not enough. There, they debated what to consider the Jewish language and its status, and as a result, Yiddish was recognized as one of the Jewish languages and full-fledged.

Nepypenko connects this topic with the name of Yitzhok Leibush Peretz: she mentions his reflections on what Yiddish literature lacks, and the key word there is “tradition”: tradition needs to be built and supported.

To the question “how Ukraine became a cultural center,” her answer is grounded: these are historical and geographical factors, the division of Ukrainian territories between empires, the different status of languages and communities in different political regimes, and — very practically — the biographies of many authors originating from towns and villages in the territory of modern Ukraine. At the same time, she honestly speaks about competition: in Austria-Hungary, Yiddish often yielded to German, which was the language of education and high culture, and this influenced the trajectories of writers who had to “break through” the German environment.

Shtetl as a “closed world” and why the youth moved to big cities

A separate specific part of the conversation is what a shtetl is and why it is so important for Yiddish culture. Nepypenko explains the shtetl not as a “cozy place from postcards,” but as a form of community life — closed, with a centuries-old established order.

She provides an important historical fact about legal restrictions in the Russian Empire: until 1905, Jews were prohibited from settling in large cities (except for certain categories, like certain merchants), so in general, the Jewish population concentrated in small towns. Against this backdrop, she describes the “great exodus” of Jewish youth in the early 20th century: the movement to cities is explained by both pragmatism (education, work, the opportunity to “be in civilization”) and internal rejection of an overly closed world.

In her formulation, the shtetl is not just geography, but a social shell that, in times of upheaval, begins to press on the younger generation.

Ukrainian-Jewish cooperation during the years of the Ukrainian People’s Republic: language status and institutions

For the audience in Israel, this fragment is especially important because it breaks the usual “black-and-white” set of clichés about the early 20th century. Nepypenko discusses the period of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and talks about specific institutional steps: under the government of Symon Petliura, there was a separate Ministry of Jewish Affairs, and in one of the universals of the UPR, national autonomy was mentioned; the Jewish population was proclaimed autonomous, and rights were granted to it.

And another very precise moment: Nepypenko notes that Yiddish was recognized as one of the officially recognized language lines of the UPR — along with Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian (she adds “if I’m not mistaken,” and this is important as a tone: she does not pretend to read from a paper, but speaks as a researcher who remembers the structure but does not play at absolute infallibility). She directly uses this example as an argument in the debate that the UPR cannot be described only through accusations of anti-Semitism: at the level of law and cultural initiatives, there were forms of cooperation and recognition. At the same time, she does not idealize the period: she emphasizes that the window was short — about a year, and already from 1918, the expanded rights were gradually curtailed.

And here is a remark important for our editorial logic: NAnews — News of Israel | Nikk.Agency in recent years regularly returns to stories where “Ukrainian” and “Jewish” cannot be separated onto different shelves. The conversation about Yiddish makes this especially clear: language is not a symbol, but a testimony of shared history on specific land.

“Kyiv Group” and translations: how cultural exchange worked in the 1920s

When Nepypenko moves on to literature, she does not limit herself to general words “there were poets.” She names the “Kyiv Group” of Yiddish authors as a primarily territorial phenomenon: at a certain period, these writers lived and worked in Kyiv, communicated, and were acquainted with each other, but at the same time remained very different stylistically.

She provides specific connections and routes: an important point becomes Berlin during the Weimar Republic, where Lev Kvitko and David Bergelson worked and lived for several years, and Berlin itself is described as one of the centers of Jewish book publishing — both in Yiddish and Hebrew. There also emerges a specific example of a “bridge” between Ukrainian and Yiddish: Kvitko publishes a translation of Ukrainian folk tales, and they are illustrated by El Lissitzky, associated with Kultur-Lige.

Speaking of translations, Nepypenko emphasizes: the initial steps were taken by Ivan Franko, but the truly active process unfolds in the 1920s — before Soviet unification and socialist realism “ground down” cultural diversity. As specific names of translators, she mentions Pavlo Tychyna, Maksym Rylsky, and others; she separately recalls Vasyl Atamaniuk, who in 1923 in Kyiv releases a small anthology of “new Jewish poetry,” and around this remains intrigue: it is not entirely clear where and how he learned Yiddish and how exactly he worked with texts. Nepypenko shows the “human mechanics” of translations: much relied on personal contacts, friendship, mutual assistance.

She provides an especially illustrative example of editorial “assembly” of a translation: there are cases when one person made a literal translation, and another refined the poetic form. In this context, the connection between Mykola Zerov and Alexander Her is mentioned: Her made the “literal translation,” and Zerov polished the translation.

Soviet repressions and the disappearance of public Yiddish

The conversation then becomes harsher — and again with specifics. Nepypenko answers the question about censorship and speaks directly: what unites many authors of this environment is censorship, repression, and silence, and then a situation where Yiddish ceases to be heard and published.

She describes several blows to Yiddish literature: the first round of repressions in the early 1930s, then the war and the Holocaust, and then — a new, “decisive” blow, associated with the history of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee: mass repressions, exiles, and murders. Nepypenko formulates the outcome without embellishments: for most of the authors discussed, the professional and life trajectory ends by the 1950s. As a specific name of a repressed writer, she mentions Der Nister, who was persecuted, among other things, for accusations of a “too symbolist” manner.

What exists today: grassroots initiatives and the example of Sweden

When the conversation returns to modernity, Nepypenko does not paint “instant revival.” She talks about the real situation: there are programs, summer schools, and various initiatives — but more often as internal efforts of universities, cultural centers, or small communities of Yiddishists; there are only a few periodicals, and they rely on the resources of the community itself.

And to show what state support might look like, she gives the example of Sweden, where Yiddish is recognized as an official minority language line; there is a Yiddish publishing house, and translations of large mass texts — like Harry Potter and The Lord of the Rings — have been published in Yiddish. For her, this is not a “curiosity,” but proof of viability: the language can be present in both high culture and popular culture — if there is an institutional environment for it.

Why this episode is important for the Israeli audience — without slogans

In the conversation, Nepypenko constantly returns the topic to a simple thought: Yiddish is not the language of an abstract “diaspora in general,” but of specific places and specific people. It is rooted in cities and towns where generations lived side by side, argued, learned, traded, translated, and built cultural institutions. And when today in Israel Yiddish sometimes sounds like a “language of the past,” this episode offers a different perspective: the past here is not museum-like, but human — and directly connected to Ukrainian history, including its complex political periods, short windows of recognition, and long stretches of suppression.

The most precise conclusion of the episode is not about “nostalgia” and not about “identity for the sake of identity.” But about infrastructure: a language lives when it has schools, books, a stage, translation, the right to publicity — and when society recognizes it as part of a common history, not a foreign whisper “in the kitchen.”

Key points from the conversation in text version (Ukr.): https://www.ukrainer.net/tetiana-nepypenko-idysh/

At one time, humorous images of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg wearing an embroidered shirt were popular on Ukrainian social networks.

The combination of American-Jewish Zuckerberg and a traditional Ukrainian shirt looks funny, although in fact it is possible. After all, the ancestors of FB’s “father” come from Ukraine, namely from the Lviv region.

Historians have found evidence of the Ukrainian-Jewish roots of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg. As part of the study of archival records, it became known that his ancestors came from the city of Rozdol, Lviv region.

Ukrainian-Jewish origins of Mark Zuckerberg's family: archival finds

History of ancestors: discovery of archival documents

Historical research published on the website “JewishNews“, revealed that the roots of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg stretch to Western Ukraine. The discovery became possible thanks to the work of Ukrainian historian Oksana Lobko within the framework of the project “Mandri Rozdilski”. Archival records from Lviv and Warsaw showed that Zuckerberg's ancestors lived in the city of Rozdol, located 40 kilometers from Lviv.

Road to America: how the Zuckerbergs left Ukraine

Research shows that Zuckerberg's great-grandfather, Isaac Zuckerberg, was born in Rozdol in 1866. As JewishNews points out, his parents, Sender and Ruhel Grunshtein, were engaged in trading activities and had 11 children. The family bore the surname Zucker, which after emigrating to the United States was changed to Zuckerberg – which translates as “sugar mountain” (Ukrainian “tsukrova gora”, “sugar” in Ukrainian “tsukor”).

The family emigrated to America at the end of the 19th century, and according to archival data, Isaac left Europe at the age of 27, arriving in New York in 1893. At that time, the family had already adapted their surname to American pronunciation, which was one of the steps towards assimilation in the new country.

“Mark Zuckerberg’s ancestry in Ukrainian lands highlights the multifaceted history of the Jews of Ukraine and their contribution to world culture,” quote NAnews“.

Zuckerberg family tree

The path of the Zuckerberg family continued through a generation: one of Isaac’s sons, Max, married a native of the Ternopil region – Mana (Minni) Wiesenthal, a native of the village of Skala-Podilskaya. Their son Jack became Mark Zuckerberg's grandfather.

Archival finds: evidence of Ukrainian roots

An important confirmation of the Ukrainian origin of the Zuckerberg family was an archival document found in the newspaper “Gazeta Lvivska”. He points out that in 1902, the district court of the city of Nikolaev tried to find Isaac Zuckerberg in connection with the death of his mother Ruhel Grunshtein. This recording became another significant evidence of the family ties of the founder of Facebook with Ukraine.

“These archival finds add a new layer to the historical picture of Jewish life in Ukraine and show how far and deep the roots of this culture go,” Jewish News emphasizes.

Possible connections with other cities

Historians have also hypothesized that the Zuckerberg family could be connected to other cities in Western Ukraine. In particular, it is assumed that the ancestors could have come from Drohobych, where the Zuckerbergs also lived. However, there is no exact confirmation of this information yet, and the research is ongoing.

The significance of the discovery for Ukrainian-Jewish history

The research, conducted with the participation of Oksana Lobko, opened an important page in the history of the Jewish people on Ukrainian soil. The story of Zuckerberg's ancestors is not only an interesting fact about the famous entrepreneur, but also part of a larger picture showing the significant influence of the Jewish community in Ukraine.

What does he think? NAnewssuch finds help strengthen cultural ties and remind us of the centuries-old history of the Jewish presence on the territory of Ukraine.

Leave a comment in Telegram – NAnews channel↓

Each of them founded or led a world‑class company: Jan Koum was one of the creators of WhatsApp, Leonid Radvinsky turned OnlyFans into a global phenomenon, Michael Polsky founded Invenergy LLC in the “green” energy sector, and Max Levchin co‑founded PayPal and now runs Affirm.

This is reported in a publication by Forbes. By the number of billionaire immigrants, Ukraine ranked 9th among 41 countries.

From Kyiv’s Courtyards to Global Heights

How Their Stories Began in Ukraine

• Jan Koum was born in February 1976 on the outskirts of Kyiv. In the family of an electronics engineer there were no trendy computers, but there were radios that the boy would take apart and reassemble. In a school BASIC club he wrote his first programs to send text messages over a local network.
• Leonid Radvinsky was born in the early 1970s in Odesa, near the famous Privoz Market. Together with his mother he sold souvenirs to tourists, calculating profit and bargaining for every dollar. These lessons in commerce and the ability to connect with people laid the foundation for his entrepreneurial drive.
• Michael Polsky was born in 1947 in a rural area of the Kharkiv region. In his free time he built wind turbine models from bicycle spokes and tin cans, dreaming of an energy future. After technical college he worked at a power plant, where he first encountered the ideas of alternative energy.
• Max Levchin was born in July 1975 in Kyiv into a family of historians. At school he became passionate about chess and the Pascal programming language. By organizing a “Young Programmer” club, Max not only deepened his algorithmic knowledge but also learned to share expertise and build teamwork.

In the Emigration Lab — A Step West

Each of them took the risk to leave their homeland and go to the United States with minimal resources:

1. Jan Koum arrived in 1992 with his mother and grandmother under a repatriation program. For the first years he worked as a cleaner and barista to pay for his studies at San Jose State University.
2. Leonid Radvinsky settled in Chicago on a humanitarian visa, graduated from Northwestern University, and began working in internet marketing.
3. Michael Polsky was invited as an energy specialist in 1976. With $500 in his pocket, he got a job as an electrician, and twenty years later founded his own company, Invenergy.
4. Max Levchin obtained political asylum in 1991, moved to Memphis, and by the end of the decade had co‑founded PayPal.

Breakthroughs and Achievements

• WhatsApp by Jan Koum and Brian Acton amassed over 2 billion users in a few years, and its sale to Meta netted Koum over $16.9 billion.
• OnlyFans by Leonid Radvinsky became a platform generating over $1.3 billion in annual revenue and awarded him personal dividends of over $1 billion.
• Invenergy by Michael Polsky executed projects worth more than $7 billion, including wind and solar farms across America.
• Affirm Holdings under Max Levchin’s leadership became a key player in fintech, and Levchin’s net worth is estimated at approximately $2.1 billion.

How They Stay Connected to Ukraine Today

• Jan Koum supports several educational programs and grants for IT camps in Kyiv, aiming to inspire a new generation of programmers.
• Leonid Radvinsky donated $5 million in 2022 to humanitarian aid for Ukraine, affected by military conflict.
• Michael Polsky speaks at European energy conferences promoting green economy practices in Eastern Europe.
• Max Levchin organizes student exchanges between Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and American universities, supporting young engineers.

On the NAnews – Israel News website, we share how mutual support and knowledge exchange strengthen bridges between Israel and Ukraine.

Conclusions and Significance

• Childhood interests — whether radio electronics or chess — can lead to global discoveries.
• Emigration tests resilience: courage and adaptability turn challenges into opportunities.
• Maintaining cultural roots and caring for one’s homeland create synergy between innovation and tradition.

These stories from NAnews inspire Israeli startups and show that by combining diaspora experience and technology, we can reach new heights.