The investigation into the serious mid-air incident involving an Air India flight from Phuket to Delhi has taken a major turn, with the Pilot-in-Command reportedly failing a second, confirmatory drug test. The development comes days after the aircraft experienced a sudden loss of altitude during the flight, leaving several passengers and crew members injured and prompting a wider investigation by India’s aviation authorities.

The captain had initially returned a non-negative result during post-flight screening for psychoactive substances. Since preliminary screening tests can require further laboratory confirmation, the pilot’s sample was subsequently subjected to confirmatory analysis. That second test has now reportedly returned positive. The latest development significantly raises the regulatory and safety concerns surrounding the incident.

Confirmatory test raises fresh questions

The initial drug screening had prompted the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) to take both pilots off the flying roster while the matter was investigated. At that stage, authorities had stressed that the preliminary result required confirmatory testing before any definitive conclusion could be drawn.

The second test is significant because it is intended to establish whether the initial screening result can be corroborated through further laboratory analysis. According to a report published on Tuesday, the confirmatory test of the Pilot-in-Command has now returned positive, with the substance identified as marijuana. However, the precise details of the test and the regulatory findings are yet to be fully disclosed by the authorities.

The development does not, by itself, establish that the pilot was intoxicated or impaired while operating the aircraft. A positive toxicology result can establish the presence of a substance or its metabolites, while determining whether a pilot was actually impaired at a particular point in time requires a broader assessment. Nevertheless, the result represents a serious regulatory issue because flight crew are subject to strict rules governing psychoactive substances and fitness to operate an aircraft.

The incident has therefore raised questions about whether the pilot complied with the applicable aviation safety requirements and whether any substance detected in the sample could have had a bearing on his fitness to fly.

Pilot faces removal from flying duties

Following the initial non-negative test, the DGCA had already taken both pilots off the roster pending the outcome of the investigation. The confirmatory positive result is expected to further strengthen the regulatory action against the Pilot-in-Command.

Under aviation safety protocols, pilots who test positive for prohibited psychoactive substances can face suspension of their flying privileges and further medical and regulatory evaluation. Depending on the circumstances and the applicable findings, rehabilitation or de-addiction measures can also form part of the process before a pilot is considered for a return to flying duties.

The captain is therefore unlikely to resume operational flying while the regulatory process is underway. The final consequences for his licence and employment will, however, depend on the findings of the DGCA investigation and the applicable rules.

Air India and aviation authorities under scrutiny

The development has considerably heightened scrutiny of Air India’s safety protocols. The incident is already being treated as a serious aviation occurrence, with the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) tasked with examining what happened aboard the aircraft.

The Ministry of Civil Aviation and the DGCA have maintained that passenger safety remains their highest priority. The ministry has also indicated that there will be no compromise on safety standards as the investigation proceeds.

Air India, meanwhile, has been drawn into a high-level review of the incident. The airline’s CEO has been summoned for meetings with senior officials from the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the DGCA amid the continuing investigation. The airline had earlier said that it was aware that the post-flight screening had been conducted but that the test results had not initially been shared with it. (NDTV)

The scrutiny is particularly significant because the drug-test issue is only one component of a broader investigation into the flight.

Technical failure also being investigated

While the pilot’s confirmatory test has added a new dimension to the case, investigators are also examining whether technical problems contributed to the aircraft’s sudden loss of altitude.

Reports have pointed to possible multiple hydraulic-system failures on the Airbus aircraft, with the investigation looking into whether technical malfunctions played a role in the incident. This is important because the drug-test findings should not automatically be treated as an explanation for the aircraft’s behaviour. Investigators will have to establish the precise sequence of events using aircraft data, cockpit information, maintenance records and other evidence. (Outlook India)

French aviation investigators and Airbus representatives are also expected to assist with the probe. Their involvement could help investigators determine whether any aircraft-system malfunction, including possible hydraulic problems, contributed to the incident.

The AAIB’s investigation will therefore have to establish whether the event was primarily caused by technical failures, crew-related factors, environmental conditions, or a combination of circumstances.

Incident involved sudden altitude loss

The Air India flight, operating from Phuket to Delhi, encountered a severe mid-air event during its journey and reportedly lost around 300 feet of altitude. Several passengers and crew members were injured in the incident, triggering immediate regulatory scrutiny.

The aircraft subsequently landed safely in Delhi. The DGCA classified the occurrence as a serious incident and initiated regulatory action, while the AAIB was tasked with conducting the detailed investigation.

The investigation is now taking place on two parallel tracks: one examining the conduct and fitness of the flight crew, and the other examining the aircraft and operational circumstances surrounding the sudden altitude change.

What happens next?

The DGCA is expected to provide further clarity on the confirmatory test, including the substance detected and the regulatory action that will follow. Authorities will also have to determine whether the test result has any connection with the events that occurred during the flight.

At the same time, investigators will continue examining the aircraft’s technical systems, flight-data records and other evidence to determine what caused the sudden loss of altitude. Airbus and French aviation experts are expected to assist in this aspect of the investigation.

For now, the positive confirmatory test places the Pilot-in-Command under serious regulatory scrutiny. However, the final findings on the Phuket-Delhi incident will depend on the outcome of the complete investigation, including the technical evidence and the assessment of the pilot’s medical and regulatory status.

The case has consequently emerged as a significant aviation-safety test for both Air India and India’s aviation regulator, with the authorities under pressure to establish exactly what happened aboard the aircraft and ensure that appropriate accountability follows.

Whenever the subject of Indian aero-engines arises in public discourse, one name almost invariably dominates the conversation: Kaveri. For years, the GTX-35VS Kaveri has served as a convenient shorthand for the country’s struggles in high-performance propulsion. Commentators, defence analysts and even casual observers have repeatedly pointed to its long delays, shortfalls in thrust and eventual delinking from the Light Combat Aircraft programme as evidence that India remains incapable of mastering the “crown jewel” of aerospace technology.

This narrow focus has fostered a persistent sense of national underachievement. The narrative of failure has overshadowed a quieter, broader reality: India has been steadily building a diversified portfolio of aero-engines that now spans fighters, helicopters, unmanned systems, cruise missiles and smaller platforms. Far from a single stalled programme, the country is experiencing a genuine renaissance in propulsion technology, one that draws lessons from Kaveri’s difficulties while expanding capability across multiple thrust classes and applications.

The Kaveri story itself deserves accurate telling before the wider picture comes into view. In the mid-1980s, as India embarked on the ambitious Light Combat Aircraft project that would become the Tejas, planners recognised that true self-reliance demanded an indigenous powerplant. In 1986 the Defence Research and Development Organisation was tasked with the effort; formal sanction followed in 1989 with an initial budget of roughly ₹382 crore and a target completion date of 1996.

The Gas Turbine Research Establishment in Bengaluru was charged with designing a low-bypass afterburning turbofan capable of approximately 81 kN wet thrust. Early progress appeared promising. The Kabini core ran for the first time in 1995, and the first full prototype began ground testing the following year. By the late 1990s, several engines were under evaluation.

However, reality proved more stubborn. International sanctions on India after the 1998 nuclear tests restricted access to critical materials and testing facilities. Persistent problems with high-temperature metallurgy, turbine blade life and overall thrust-to-weight ratio slowed development. High-altitude trials in Russia in the 2000s revealed further shortfalls. By September 2008, the engine had been formally delinked from the Tejas programme so that the aircraft could proceed with the proven General Electric F404.

The original Kaveri engine never fully met its fighter-class performance targets, yet the programme was never simply abandoned. More than three thousand hours of testing, nine prototype engines and four cores generated invaluable design experience, manufacturing know-how and a cadre of specialists. That hard-won foundation has since been redirected into derivative and parallel efforts that are now yielding tangible results.

The Dry Kaveri and the Stealth Future

The most immediate descendants of the original Kaveri form a family of engines tailored to different operational needs. Rather than abandoning the core, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) decoupled the engine from its afterburner section to create the ‘Dry Kaveri’. Generating approximately 46 kN of dry thrust, this engine has now resolved the legacy core issues and achieved stability.

Its destiny is no longer the Tejas, but the shadowy realm of uncrewed warfare. Optimised for unmanned platforms, it has been selected as the powerplant for the Ghatak stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle. Because stealth drones prioritise internal payload, low radar cross-sections, and range over afterburning supersonic dashes, the Dry Kaveri’s specifications are a perfect fit. Godrej Aerospace has taken on series production, which delivered the first unit in 2025 and followed with additional engines for the certification campaign.

Parallel work continues on afterburning variants collectively referred to as Kaveri 2.0. An initial configuration using the existing afterburner is expected to deliver around 73 kN, while a new afterburner module and an uprated core aim for 80–85 kN or potentially higher wet thrust in the 90 kN class. Flight trials on a modified Tejas Limited Series Production airframe are planned, and the engine is being positioned as a possible future indigenous option for Tejas variants once certification is complete. Lightweighting measures, including titanium alloy blisks, and the progressive introduction of single-crystal turbine blades, are improving the thrust-to-weight ratio that earlier versions lacked.

A New Engine

While the Kaveri family continues to mature, India has launched a far more ambitious high-thrust programme for its fifth-generation fighter. The Advanced High Thrust Class Engine, targeting an initial 120 kN of thrust with growth potential to 140 kN, is intended primarily for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) Mark 2. The Gas Turbine Research Establishment retains design authority. An Expression of Interest has been issued for an Indian Development-cum-Production Partner that will manufacture and assemble the engines, with plans for eighteen development units over a decade.

Negotiations with France’s Safran have advanced significantly. This month the joint-venture proposal, promising complete technology transfer including the critical hot section and full Indian intellectual-property ownership, reached the Cabinet Committee on Security. Alternative offers from Rolls-Royce have also been received. Supporting infrastructure is expanding: a 130 kN twin-cell test bed near Bengaluru is under construction, and plans exist for high-altitude facilities and flying test beds converted from Su-30MKI airframes. The programme represents a deliberate shift from pure indigenous development of the most complex classes toward structured collaboration that still keeps strategic control in Indian hands.

Beyond the fighter-class efforts, a range of smaller but operationally vital made-in-India engines has reached advanced stages.

HTFE-25: The Versatile Workhorse

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has pursued its own complementary programmes through its Aero Engine Research and Design Centre. The HTFE-25 is a 25 kN-class low-bypass turbofan suitable for basic and advanced trainers, small business jets and large unmanned aerial vehicles. Two core engines and a technology demonstrator have already been built. The core had reached 99.5 per cent of design speed during acceleration trials earlier this year. Certification is targeted within the next four to five years, with potential application on the Intermediate Jet Trainer.

Crucially, HAL did not stop at dry thrust for HTFE-25. By integrating a basic afterburner, the HTFE-25 is projected to reach approximately 40 kN of maximum thrust. This unlocks a massive strategic possibility: re-engining the Indian Air Force’s ageing SEPECAT Jaguar strike fleet. Long considered underpowered by its original Rolls-Royce Adour Mk.811 engines, the Jaguar fleet could gain a lethal new lease on life with twin afterburning HTFE-25s, bypassing the exorbitant costs of stalled foreign upgrade proposals.

The HTFE-25 project began in 2013–14 as an internally funded initiative by HAL, with an initial goal of completion within approximately six years. The core engine achieved its first successful run on 14 December 2015, witnessed by then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. en.wikipedia.org

By 2019, two core engines had been produced and collectively completed 339 test runs. These tests demonstrated cold starts at 14°C using spark igniters and 100% maximum core speed both with and without inlet guide vane (IGV) modulation. Work on a basic afterburner configuration was also initiated.

Progress faced delays due to issues such as testing infrastructure, procurement challenges, component manufacturing including intermediate gearboxes, and technology gaps. A full technology demonstrator later completed initial runs, with acceleration trials reaching about 55% of design speed by mid-2024. A new design and test facility at AERDC, inaugurated in 2023, helped accelerate efforts.

The HTFE-25 prioritises a compact size, competitive thrust-to-weight ratio, and efficiency suitable for subsonic and transonic regimes typical of trainers and UAVs. Its modular core supports potential growth, including an afterburning variant that could approach higher thrust levels of around 40 kN for light combat or unmanned combat applications.

The HTFE-25 engine is targeted for advanced military trainers such as the HAL HJT-36 / IJT-36 Yashas. It is also suited to large UAVs (including concepts in the Combat Air Teaming System or CATS family), small business jets, and other light aircraft. In single-engine form, it suits aircraft in the roughly 5-tonne class, while twin-engine installations extend to the 9-tonne class. This versatility positions it for both military and potential civil/export markets where India currently lacks a fully indigenous option in this thrust class.

Development of the program has built indigenous expertise in compressor aerodynamics, combustor design, hot-section materials and cooling, precision manufacturing, and advanced testing—foundational capabilities for more ambitious future engines. The HTFE-25 is not India’s final destination in aero-engine development, but it is a critical proving ground—building the design, manufacturing, and testing foundations needed for future fighter and advanced unmanned platforms.

HTSE-1200: Securing the Vertical Lift

Perhaps the most consequential of HAL’s indigenous programmes is the Hindustan Turbo Shaft Engine (HTSE-1200). Developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited through its Aero Engine Research and Design Centre in Bengaluru, the Hindustan Turbo Shaft Engine-1200 is a 1200 kW-class powerplant designed specifically for helicopters in the three-to-six-tonne weight category. While larger fighter-engine programmes often capture public attention, the HTSE-1200 addresses a more immediate and widespread operational need. India operates and plans to operate large fleets of light and medium helicopters across the Army, Air Force, Navy and civil sectors. Ensuring that these platforms are not permanently dependent on foreign engines has become a strategic priority, and the HTSE-1200 is central to that goal.

The programme was formally launched in December 2015 when then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar inaugurated the design and development effort alongside the parallel HTFE-25 turbofan project. HAL undertook the work with internal resources, drawing on decades of experience gained through licensed production and co-development of engines such as the Artouste, TM333 and, most significantly, the Shakti (Ardiden 1H1) developed jointly with Safran. The first run of a technology demonstrator core took place on 12 February 2018, achieving 76 per cent of design speed. Since then the engine has accumulated hundreds of test hours, progressively climbing the performance ladder.

Technically, the HTSE-1200 is a free-power-turbine turboshaft optimised for shaft power delivery rather than pure thrust. It features a two-stage centrifugal compressor delivering a pressure ratio of approximately 11.2 and a mass flow of around 4.25 kg/s. An effusion-cooled annular combustor manages high turbine entry temperatures, reported in the region of 1493 K. The gas-generator turbine and free power turbine extract energy to drive the output shaft at approximately 6000 rpm. Physical dimensions of the engine are compact: length of 1.30 metres, diameter of 0.55 metres and a dry weight of about 235 kg.

Maximum power output is rated at 1200 kW (roughly 1 600 shaft horsepower) at sea level, with the ability to operate across ambient temperatures from –50 °C to +55 °C and up to altitudes of around seven kilometres. These figures place it in the same performance band as contemporary engines such as the LHTEC CTS800, MTR390 or Safran Arrano, making it suitable for both single-engine installations on lighter platforms and twin-engine configurations on heavier ones.

Development has proceeded through distinct jet-mode and power-mode prototypes. The jet-mode engine has been used primarily for core validation and component testing, while the power-mode configuration incorporates the free turbine and reduction elements required for helicopter drive trains. Additive manufacturing has been employed for several critical parts, including the radial straightener, diffuser and rear bearing support, which have been evaluated under operational conditions. Directionally solidified and single-crystal turbine blades, developed with support from the Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory, have been incorporated to improve high-temperature capability and component life. High-altitude trials have already been completed in both cold-weather and hot-weather conditions at Leh, South Pullu and Khardung La, confirming starting and running behaviour in the thin air of the Himalayas, an essential requirement for Indian operations.

By 2024 the core had achieved 100 per cent design speed, and sea-level trials were successfully concluded. After that fabrication of an initial batch of five near-production-standard engines was launched. The engine is planned to be installed on older Dhruv prototypes for in-flight evaluation before full certification, currently targeted for completion in 2026.

A particularly significant recent development is the commencement of an indigenous Full Authority Digital Engine Control system for the HTSE-1200. Until now, engines in this class have typically relied on FADEC units supplied by established Western manufacturers. Developing the digital control system in-house closes one of the last major technology gaps. FADEC provides precise management of fuel flow, acceleration schedules, temperature limits and protective functions across the entire flight envelope. For a helicopter engine that must handle rapid power demands during manoeuvring, high-altitude starts and emergency conditions, an indigenous FADEC not only improves performance and reliability but also removes a potential source of export-control restrictions. The system is being developed in parallel with the mechanical maturation of the engine so that both can be certified together.

The engine will power HAL’s existing and future helicopter families. In single-engine configuration, the HTSE-1200 is suited to the 3.5-tonne Light Utility Helicopter. In twin-engine layout it can equip the five-to-eight-tonne Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand, and potentially future derivatives or the Indian Multi-Role Helicopter once that programme matures. There has also been discussion of adapting the core into a turboprop configuration for fixed-wing trainers such as the HTT-40, offering a route to replace the currently imported Honeywell TPE331. The modular nature of the gas generator makes such a conversion technically feasible with the addition of a suitable reduction gearbox and propeller accessories.

The strategic value of the HTSE-1200 extends beyond any single platform. India faces projected demand for several thousand helicopter engines over the coming decades. Continued reliance on foreign sources creates both cost and supply-chain vulnerabilities. By developing an indigenous alternative, HAL gains the ability to control production rates, implement upgrades without external approval, and offer life-cycle support from Indian facilities.

In the context of India’s aero-engine efforts, the HTSE-1200 occupies a pragmatic middle ground. It is less glamorous than a 120 kN fighter engine, yet far more immediately relevant to the large numbers of helicopters already in service and on order.

Aravalli: Powerplant for Next-Gen Helicopters

The Aravalli engine is a new-generation high-power turboshaft being jointly designed and developed by SAFHAL Helicopter Engines Private Limited, a joint venture between Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Safran Helicopter Engines of France. Named after the majestic Aravalli mountain range that stretches across western and northern India, the engine symbolises the nation’s determination to achieve Aatmanirbharta in critical aero-engine technologies.

In August 2024, HAL signed an airframer contract with SAFHAL to commence the joint design, development, manufacture, supply and support of this advanced engine. It has been specifically selected to power the Indian Multi-Role Helicopter, a 13-tonne medium-lift platform under development by HAL for the Indian Armed Forces, as well as the Deck-Based Multi-Role Helicopter, a 12.5-tonne naval variant intended for the Indian Navy. Both helicopters are expected to operate in highly demanding environments ranging from the scorching deserts of Rajasthan to the high-altitude regions of Ladakh and the challenging conditions of maritime operations.

The Aravalli is designed to deliver between 3,500 and 4,000 shaft horsepower, placing it among the most powerful engines Safran has developed to date. Leveraging the combined expertise of HAL and Safran, the engine will incorporate cutting-edge technologies to ensure superior performance, reliability, fuel efficiency and operational flexibility. Initial prototypes of the IMRH may fly with existing Safran engines while the Aravalli completes its development cycle, with full integration planned for later production batches. Entry into service is targeted for the early 2030s.

This programme builds upon a long and successful partnership between HAL and Safran that began with the Artouste engines powering the Chetak and Cheetah helicopters and continued with the Shakti family of engines for the Advanced Light Helicopter, Light Combat Helicopter and Light Utility Helicopter. The Aravalli marks a significant elevation of this collaboration, moving from licensed production and co-development of earlier engines to true joint design of a next-generation powerplant.

Beyond military applications, the engine holds promise for future civil roles such as offshore operations, utility services and VVIP transport, along with associated maintenance, repair and overhaul activities. By mastering the design and production of a high-power turboshaft of this class, India is taking a decisive step towards reducing dependence on foreign suppliers for medium-lift helicopter propulsion and strengthening its overall aerospace and defence industrial base. The Aravalli thus stands as both a technological milestone and a strategic enabler for India’s growing indigenous helicopter fleet.

Manik: Homegrown Power for Missiles

The Manik engine, formally known as the Small Turbofan Engine or STFE, is an indigenous small turbofan developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment under the Defence Research and Development Organisation in Bengaluru. Designed as a compact, efficient propulsion system delivering around 4.5 kilonewtons of thrust, it serves primarily as the powerplant for India’s subsonic cruise missiles and holds promise for various unmanned aerial vehicles.

This twin-spool bypass turbofan, developed without an afterburner, was created to replace imported engines that earlier powered platforms such as the Nirbhay series. It incorporates advanced features including a full-authority digital engine control system, a wide-chord fan, a mixed-flow compressor, and the capability for mid-air starting using pyro devices. Weighing approximately 100 kilograms, the engine is optimised for reliable low-altitude, long-endurance flight at subsonic speeds, making it well suited for precision strike and loitering missions.

The Manik has already demonstrated its performance in several successful flight tests of the Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile and the Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missile. BrahMos Aerospace has undertaken limited series production, delivering batches of engines for trials and integration, while plans are advancing for larger-scale manufacturing involving both public sector units and private industry partners. This expansion aims to meet the growing demand for cruise missiles across the Indian Armed Forces and to support potential applications in medium-weight unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

An uprated 10 kN variant has been proposed for larger unmanned systems such as medium-altitude long-endurance drones and collaborative combat aircraft. In parallel, GTRE designed a 350 kg thrust-class expendable turbojet specifically for one-time-use applications. The first production unit, manufactured by Hyderabad-based Azad Engineering, was delivered in July 2026. Intended for cruise missiles, jet-powered loitering munitions, target drones and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, the engine marks a significant industrial milestone: a complete indigenous jet engine built by a private firm to a government design.

By mastering the design, development and production of this engine, India has taken a significant step towards self-reliance in critical defence propulsion technology. The Manik not only reduces dependence on foreign suppliers but also strengthens the foundation for future indigenous engines that can power more advanced missiles and drones, thereby enhancing the nation’s strategic capabilities under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative.

PTAE-W: Upgraded Turbojet for CATS Warrior UCAV

The PTAE-W is an upgraded indigenous turbojet engine developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited through its Aero Engine Research and Development Centre in Bengaluru. It represents a refined evolution of the earlier PTAE-7, originally designed as the Pilotless Target Aircraft Engine to power the DRDO Lakshya series of unmanned target drones.

The original PTAE-7 was conceived in the early 1980s as India’s first fully indigenous small turbojet and completed its development by the mid-1980s, with successful remote-controlled trials announced in 2001. It featured a four-stage axial-flow compressor with a transonic first stage and a single-stage turbine, delivering reliable performance for short-duration target practice missions. Building upon this proven foundation, the PTAE-W incorporates substantial modifications to meet the more demanding requirements of modern unmanned combat aerial vehicles. In its current form, the PTAE-W is a single-shaft lightweight turbojet measuring 1.27 metres in length and 330 millimetres in diameter while weighing approximately 65 kilograms. Its core comprises a four-stage transonic axial compressor, a single-stage turbine, an annular flow combustion chamber fitted with sixteen fuel burners, and an advanced Full Authority Digital Engine Control system.

These enhancements have raised the thrust output to 380 kilogram-force, or roughly 3.7 kilonewtons, with a specific fuel consumption of 1.15 kilograms per kilogram-force per hour. The time between overhauls has also been extended to one thousand hours, significantly improving operational endurance and reliability.

The engine is primarily intended to power the HAL CATS Warrior, an indigenous loyal-wingman unmanned combat aerial vehicle designed for reconnaissance, electronic warfare and precision strike roles alongside manned fighters. In a twin-engine configuration, the PTAE-W provides the necessary redundancy and balanced thrust for a platform with a maximum take-off weight of around 2.1 tonnes.

Notably, a loyal wingman is an unmanned combat aerial vehicle designed to operate in close coordination with manned fighter aircraft, functioning as a semi-autonomous or fully autonomous teammate that extends the capabilities of the pilot. These drones can perform high-risk missions such as reconnaissance, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defences, or precision strikes, while remaining under the supervisory control of the manned aircraft. By absorbing threats and sharing sensor data in real time, the loyal wingman enhances situational awareness, multiplies combat power and reduces risk to human pilots, representing a key element of modern manned-unmanned teaming concepts being pursued by several air forces worldwide, including India’s Combat Air Teaming System.

The first successful ground run of the twin PTAE-W installation took place on 21 November 2024 at HAL’s Bengaluru facility, lasting approximately fifteen minutes and validating performance, fuel systems and integration. Subsequent testing has included extensive fault-free endurance runs exceeding two hundred hours, confirming the engine’s robustness for the intended mission profiles.

By adapting a decades-old indigenous design into a modern, digitally controlled powerplant suitable for combat drones, HAL has demonstrated incremental yet meaningful progress in aero-engine technology. The PTAE-W not only reduces dependence on imported propulsion systems for unmanned platforms but also strengthens India’s overall capability in the rapidly expanding domain of autonomous aerial combat systems under the broader vision of Aatmanirbharta.

Thus, despite the well-discussed setback in the Kaveri engine program, HAL and DRDO continue to build the foundational pillars of India’s heavy aerospace propulsion, from stealth UCAVs and rotary fleets to the fifth-generation AMCA fighter engine.

This article is Part 1 of a three-part series on aero engine programs in India, exploring the public sector workhorses, private startup disruptions, and extreme metallurgical breakthroughs shaping the future of Indian aerospace propulsion. In Part 2 of this series, we turn our attention to the agile, heavily capitalised private sector, where homegrown start-ups and precision manufacturing giants are unveiling indigenous turbofans, diesel-capable micro-jets, and cruise missile engines that are rapidly rewriting the rules of Indian defence technology.

Islamo-leftist propaganda rag The Wire has a penchant for villainising Hindus and giving communal spin to almost every incident wherein the victim happens to be a Muslim. The left-liberal cabal vilifying Kanwariyas has become an annual ritual. On 10th August, The Wire published a report with a carefully crafted headline, “24-Year-Old Muslim Man Dies After Alleged Assault by Kanwariyas in UP, Booked For Attempted Murder of Auto Driver.” It claimed that a Muslim mini-truck driver Mohammad Azeem (24) died at a hospital due to injuries caused during an attack on 31^st July by Kanwariyas in Uttar Pradesh’s Hapur.

Road accident, assault, counter-complaints and The Wire’s selective emphasis on Kanwariyas

The Wire played the shrewd game of selective emphasis on Kanwariyas in the headline even as the dispute began after a road accident in which Mohammad Azeem’s mini-truck collided with a parked autorickshaw belonging to one Mohammad Farhan (19). Farhan’s auto rickshaw was booked by four Kanwariyas, Ankit, Lokesh, Manish, and Shivam.

The collision occurred near the Shiva Dhaba under the Garhmukteshwar Police Station precinct. The Wire report claimed that after the accident, Kanwariyas dragged Azeem and brutally assaulted him, leaving him severely injured.

The Wire report says that Mohammad Azeem was rushed to a hospital in Meerut and later transferred to Delhi. Azeem, who went into a coma, succumbed to his injuries at a Delhi hospital on 4th August without ever regaining consciousness.

The Islamo-leftist rag’s reporter Omar Rashid deliberately did not lay equal emphasis on the alleged involvement of Mohammad Farhan in thrashing Mohammad Azeem.

Notably, the police have reportedly made no arrests but have confirmed that deceased Mohammad Azeem’s father, Intezar, has filed a complaint against Mohammad Farhan and the four Kanwariyas. In his complaint, the deceased person’s father named Farhan, the four Kanwariyas, and two unknowns. All residents of Bajheda Khurd village.

Intezar alleged that after the collision of Azeem’s mini-truck and Farhan’s parked auto rickshaw occupied by the Kanwariyas, Farman and the passengers dragged Azeem out and assaulted him.

Mohammad Farman was also critically injured and under treatment at AIIMS Trauma. In a counter-complaint, Farman’s father Imran accused Mohammad Azeem of deliberately running over his mini-truck with the intention to kill him. Azeem was not alone in his Tata mini-truck.

“Mohammad Azeem deliberately rammed Farman, who was standing roadside, knocked him down, and then intentionally drove over him a second time with wheels over abdomen and chest, with intent to kill, and fled. Farman suffered severe injuries, including those on the head, ribs, spine, and abdomen. His spleen and intestines ruptured and were surgically removed, causing permanent disability,” Imran’s complaint reads.

The FIR says that Farman is in a coma at AIIMS Trauma Centre / JPNA Trauma, New Delhi, after initial treatment at Saraswati Hospital, Pilkhuwa. Local police noted details and prioritised treatment.

The Garhmukteshwar Police Station SHO has said that because Mohammad Azeem is dead, the police are processing closure of the FIR against him.

In both the Hindi report and its English equivalent, The Wire placed selective emphasis on Kanwariyas, portraying them as the main assailants, even as the FIR names Farman as the primary accused alongside the four Kanwariyas in the complaint lodged by Azeem’s father, Intezar.

While in its report copy, The Wire subordinated Farman and placed Kanwariyas in the spotlight as the actors who killed the ‘sole breadwinner of a poor Muslim family’, they withheld any mention of Farman in the headline.

Despite it being a case of a road collision that turned into a serious assault between two vehicle parties, and not a one-sided ‘Kanwariyas killed Muslim man’ incident. With its sinister headline, The Wire not only made Azeem’s death about Muslim victimhood but also furthered the lies that Hindu Kanwariyas are by default violent and out to target Muslims.

Even if it is assumed that Kanwariyas joined Farman in assaulting Azeem, it would be a crime. However, The Wire effortlessly and without any factual basis communalised the incident despite there being no reported religious motivations demonstrated by either party in attacking each other.

The Wire, however, was not the only Hinduphobic portal to push this communal ‘Kanwariyas killed Muslim man’ bogey. The Hindu also reported the matter with a similar “Driver dies days after assault by group of kanwariyas in Uttar Pradesh; FIRs give conflicting accounts” headline.

Similarly, Muslim Mirror, another Islamist rag notorious for peddling fake Muslim victimhood and spreading hatred against Hindus, reported the incident in question with a headline, “UP: Muslim driver Azeem dies days after Kanwariyas attack him in Hapur.”

Another Islamist propaganda outlet, Maktoob Media, also blamed Kanwariyas alone for Azeem’s death and published the headline, “Muslim driver dies after coma following Kanwariya assault in UP’s Hapur; 7 booked for attempt to murder.”

The Wire and other Islamo-leftist portals are selectively giving a communal colour to the incident and downplaying Mohammad Farman’s alleged role in the incident even as the police are still investigating the matter. Apparently, for the Islamo-leftist media, a Muslim deceased and mention of Hindu Kanwariyas alone is enough to concoct a ‘Kanwariyas killing Muslims’ bogey.

The same Islamo-leftist cabal either downplays the religious identity of Muslims when Muslim mobs pelt stones at Kanwar Yatra processions out of sheer hatred towards Hindus, somehow blames Hindus only for their misery, or skips reporting such incidents altogether.

The Wire’s selective framing villainising Kanwariyas as anti-Muslim appears to be a part of a broader pattern to vilify Kanwariyas and, by extension, Hindus to further the ‘Muslim minorities under threat’ bogey. Recently, an Islamist Maulana Sajid Rashidi had called Kanwariyas ‘terrorists’.

It was May 2025. There was no complaint from a child in Aizawl, Mizoram. His family did not approach the police. However, thousands of kilometres away, pieces of a digital trail were already sitting inside systems built to detect the sexual exploitation of children online.

On 30th May 2025, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered a case against an unidentified accused over allegations of the creation, collection, possession and dissemination of sexually explicit material involving children. Just four days later, on 4th June, CBI officers searched a residence in Aizawl. They seized the suspect’s electronic devices.

The investigation did not remain limited to finding prohibited images and videos on those devices. According to the CBI, forensic examination revealed material that indicated that a minor had also been sexually assaulted. The agency stated that the material was corroborated using INTERPOL’s International Child Sexual Exploitation database and CyberTipline reports submitted by Google to the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, or I4C.

The digital trail eventually helped the investigators identify and locate the child. The CBI arrested one accused in Aizawl on 9th June. More importantly, a child who had apparently never approached the police was identified and rescued from further harm.

The Aizawl case needs a deeper discussion, as it became a criminal investigation involving a search, seized devices, forensic examination and an arrest. However, before moving forward, it is essential to understand how material circulating through the internet became visible to a technology company’s child-safety system in the first place.

The answer to this question lies in an international detection infrastructure that operates largely outside the view of an ordinary internet user.

An abusive image uploaded through an account in India may already have been identified somewhere else in the world. A technology company may be able to recognise another copy through a mathematical fingerprint of the image. If the material has never been identified before, artificial intelligence and other automated classifiers may flag it for specialised review. A user may report it. In other circumstances, suspicious activity involving an account or network can provide the first signal.

Where applicable, the resulting information can enter reporting systems such as the CyberTipline operated by the US-based National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, or NCMEC. India has formally received NCMEC CyberTipline reports since the National Crime Records Bureau signed an agreement with the organisation on 26th April 2019.

And the volume is enormous. In 2025, NCMEC associated approximately 1.93 million CyberTipline reports with India. But that figure does not mean 1.93 million children were abused, 1.93 million offenders were identified, or 1.93 million criminal cases existed. NCMEC itself warns that CyberTipline reports and reported files measure reporting activity and cannot be used as a proxy for the number of victims, crimes or police investigations.

It is important to understand the distinction because abusive material has a characteristic that makes the numbers particularly difficult to understand that the material can survive online long after the original abuse is over.

An image can be copied. A video can be redistributed. The same material can appear through different accounts, on different services and at different points in time. One victim’s material can therefore produce thousands, or even far more, individual detections without representing thousands of different victims. In simple words, a single incident can turn into thousands of tipline reports but, in the end, it must be seen as a single incident.

Meta showed the scale of this duplication when it examined child exploitative material it reported during October and November 2020. More than 90% was the same as, or visually similar to, previously reported material. Copies of only six videos accounted for more than half of the material in that sample.

That is why some of the most important technology used against child sexual abuse material is not designed to “look” at every image in the way a human reviewer would. Instead, it can recognise the digital fingerprints of material that has already been identified.

To understand how an online signal involving India can eventually become useful to Indian law enforcement, the first step is therefore to understand what child sexual abuse material is, what technology companies are actually detecting and what their systems can, and cannot, establish.

What exactly are CSAM and CSEAM?

CSAM, or child sexual abuse material, can be defined as an image or video depicting the sexual abuse of a child. It is not merely another category of illegal pornography. CSAM records real abuse and the material potentially documents an offence against a child. Its continued circulation can also perpetuate the exploitation long after the original recording was created.

While CSAM is a widely used term internationally, in India, the Supreme Court emphasised the use of the term CSEAM, or child sexual exploitation and abuse material. In its judgment in Just Rights for Children Alliance vs S Harish on 23rd September 2024, the apex court rejected the expression “child pornography” as inadequate and endorsed the use of CSEAM.

The court said the older terminology could trivialise the seriousness of the offence by associating such material with pornography involving consenting adults.

How CSEAM is detected in India-linked cases and the role of tech platforms

An image or video involving the sexual abuse of a child in India does not necessarily have to be discovered first by an Indian police officer. It may be detected when it appears on the systems of a global technology company, matched with material already identified elsewhere in the world, flagged by an automated classifier or reported by another user. Information connected to that detection can then travel through an international reporting system before reaching Indian authorities.

The scale of that India-facing system is substantial. In 2025, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) recorded 19,33,900 CyberTipline reports against India as the relevant country, comprising 17,69,595 referrals and 164,305 reports classified as informational. Among individual countries listed by NCMEC, only the United States had a higher total. However, these figures are not a count of Indian victims or offenders, and NCMEC cautions that geographic attribution can be affected by proxies, anonymisers and other technical factors. A report can also have connections with more than one country.

India has had a formal connection with this system since 2019. On 26th April that year, the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) signed an agreement with NCMEC to receive CyberTipline reports concerning online child sexual abuse material and exploitation linked to India. The Union government said that, as of 31st March 2024, more than 69.05 lakh CyberTipline reports had been shared with the concerned States and Union Territories under this mechanism.

This is where the technology behind the system becomes important. An abusive file uploaded from India may be one that has already appeared thousands of times elsewhere. It may instead be material that a platform has never encountered before. In other cases, suspicious behaviour surrounding an account may provide the first signal. Each requires a different form of detection.

One victim’s material can circulate for years

Once an image or video enters circulation, copies can be uploaded repeatedly across accounts and platforms. The same material can consequently generate numerous detections and reports even though it concerns the same underlying act of abuse.

Meta showed this duplication problem through an analysis of material it reported to NCMEC during October and November 2020. The company found that more than 90% of the child exploitative content was the same as, or visually similar to, previously reported content. Copies of only six videos accounted for more than half of the material it reported during that period.

NCMEC provides an even more striking example. In its 2025 CyberTipline report, it said material depicting one child victim had been circulating for around 20 years and had appeared more than 1.4 million times in submissions to NCMEC.

This explains both the enormous numbers generated by online detection systems and the importance of recognising previously identified material automatically. It would make little sense to require a human reviewer to repeatedly rediscover the same abusive image every time another copy surfaced.

It also explains why figures describing “reports”, “files”, “accounts”, “URLs” or “content removed” should never casually be converted into the number of victims or offenders.

There is no single scanner watching the internet

There is no universal CSAM detector through which every file uploaded by an Indian internet user passes. Detection depends on the service being used and its technical architecture. Material can appear on social-media platforms, video-hosting services, cloud-storage products, search engines and other consumer internet services. Users can report content themselves, while companies can also use automated safety technologies.

For an India-linked case, detection can broadly begin through three routes.

The first is known material: imagery that has previously been identified and is appearing again.

The second is previously unknown material: content that is not already represented in a known-CSAM database but which automated systems identify as potentially abusive.

The third involves account, behavioural or network signals: activity suggesting potentially exploitative conduct even where a known-image match was not the original trigger.

The systems can also feed into one another. New material identified today can subsequently become known material, allowing future copies appearing in India or elsewhere to be detected automatically.

How hashing recognises material already identified elsewhere

The easiest way to understand hash matching is to think of a digital fingerprint. When material has already been identified as CSAM, technology can produce a mathematical representation of it known as a hash. A participating service can then compare the fingerprint of material encountered on its systems against fingerprints of known abusive material.

This means, for example, that an image uploaded through an account associated with India need not previously have been investigated by an Indian police force. If the underlying imagery has already been identified elsewhere and its hash is available to a platform, the service may be able to recognise the reappearance.

One of the best-known technologies used for this purpose is PhotoDNA. Microsoft developed it with Dartmouth College in 2009. PhotoDNA creates a digital signature from an image and compares it with signatures of previously identified illegal child sexual exploitation imagery.

Importantly, PhotoDNA is not facial-recognition software. Microsoft explicitly says it cannot identify a person or an object in an image. Nor can a PhotoDNA hash be reversed to recreate the original image.

That is an important distinction in understanding what technology can prove. A PhotoDNA match can help establish that imagery corresponds to known material. It cannot tell police who uploaded it, identify the child simply from the hash or establish who was operating an account at a particular time.

Google uses the same broad principle. It says previously identified CSAM can be automatically flagged through hash matching, while its CSAI Match technology allows participating organisations to identify re-uploads of known abusive video material.

But the obvious question is: who decides what enters a known-CSAM database in the first place?

Google says it obtains hashes from trusted sources, including NCMEC and the Internet Watch Foundation. It also independently reviews purported CSAM hashes before confirmed material is incorporated into its own detection systems. NCMEC separately operates a hash-sharing programme through which participating companies can access fingerprints of identified material.

By the end of 2025, NCMEC said it was sharing more than 12.1 million hashes with 78 electronic service providers participating voluntarily in its hash-sharing initiative. Google, meanwhile, reported that it had cumulatively contributed more than 3.58 million CSAM hashes to NCMEC’s database. This produces an international detection network. Material first identified in one jurisdiction can eventually become recognisable when another copy appears on a participating service being used from India.

What happens when the material has never been seen before?

Hash matching has a basic limitation. It cannot find an image by comparing it with a known fingerprint if nobody has previously identified that image. Technology companies therefore use other automated systems to look for potentially new material.

Google says it combines hash matching with artificial intelligence. Its AI systems can flag previously unseen material displaying patterns similar to confirmed CSAM. Google says each new image flagged through this process is reviewed by trained personnel before it is reported as CSAM.

The conceptual difference is straightforward. Hash matching asks: “Does this correspond to something already known?” An automated classifier asks something closer to: “Does this previously unseen material have characteristics suggesting that it falls within the prohibited category?”

Meta has similarly said that it uses artificial intelligence and machine learning, alongside matching technology, to find child-exploitation material and detect potentially inappropriate interactions and other signals involving children.

For an Indian investigation, however, an automated finding is a starting signal rather than the end of the evidentiary process.

A machine flag cannot establish beyond dispute who created a file, who knowingly stored it, who uploaded it or whether the registered owner of an account was the person using it at that time. Those are separate questions which may require investigation, subscriber information, device examination and digital forensics.

In short, machine detection is not a criminal conviction.

Human reviewers remain part of the system

The enormous volume of material makes automation indispensable, but the major platforms do not describe the process as being completely automated.

Google says its detection technologies are supported by specialised content reviewers and subject-matter experts with backgrounds including law, child safety, advocacy, social work and cyber investigations. The company also says counselling, specialist resources and other measures are provided because reviewing potentially abusive material carries an obvious psychological burden.

Human review also provides an important safeguard against incorrect enforcement. Microsoft’s 2025 transparency figures are particularly useful here. The company said it actioned 22,651 consumer accounts associated with child sexual exploitation and abuse imagery, including grooming, across hosted consumer services during the year. Yet 15.08% of accounts actioned were reinstated following appeal and further review.

That does not make automated detection pointless. It demonstrates why platform enforcement, and criminal proof cannot be treated as the same thing. A company can disable an account because its systems and reviewers conclude that platform rules have been violated. That decision may later be reversed on appeal. A criminal prosecution in India must independently satisfy the requirements of Indian law.

Google similarly provides an appeal mechanism for users whose accounts are disabled following CSAM enforcement and says a member of its child-safety team reviews such challenges.

Detection is not limited to looking at images

Some of the more sophisticated child-safety systems do not begin with the contents of an individual file at all. Platforms can examine signals surrounding accounts and networks. These can include reports from users, links associated with prohibited material, repeated policy violations or activity connecting accounts exhibiting suspicious behaviour.

Meta said in July 2026 that it uses technology to identify accounts showing potentially suspicious activity relating to children. It also said that its AI systems can detect suspicious off-platform links when those links appear alongside other signals of child exploitative activity.

This has produced India-specific enforcement. Meta said that, during the six months preceding its July 2026 disclosure, its systems had removed 160,000 accounts in India after advanced AI tools identified suspicious off-platform links in combination with other indicators of child exploitative activity. Those numbers are Meta’s own platform-enforcement figures and do not mean 160,000 Indian offenders were identified or 160,000 criminal cases were registered. They describe accounts removed under the company’s systems and policies.

The detection landscape can therefore be understood as three layers:

Content recognition: Is this known material?

Content classification: Does previously unseen material appear potentially abusive?

Behaviour and network analysis: Is surrounding account activity displaying signals associated with exploitation?

From a platform somewhere in the world to an Indian reporting system

This is the point at which a global technology system begins to intersect with Indian institutions.

Under US law, covered electronic service providers are required to report specified suspected forms of child sexual exploitation they become aware of to NCMEC’s CyberTipline. NCMEC also accepts reports from members of the public, while non-US companies can voluntarily register to make reports.

NCMEC reviews incoming reports and attempts to determine the location relevant to the incident so that the information can be made available to an appropriate law-enforcement agency. It describes its CyberTipline as effectively serving as a global clearing house because US technology companies have users around the world.

A CyberTip can contain more than an alert saying that a prohibited image was found. Google says a report can, depending on the circumstances, contain information relating to the responsible user, the child, the content and other contextual facts. NCMEC says a report classified as a referral usually contains enough information for potential law-enforcement action, such as user information, imagery and a possible location for a child or offender.

For India, the formal bridge was created through the NCRB-NCMEC agreement signed on 26th April 2019. The Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre also states that the arrangement was created to receive CyberTipline reports concerning CSAM related to India.

Meta says that when it becomes aware of apparent child exploitation, it reports through NCMEC in compliance with applicable law. For India specifically, the company says it ensures that such material is reported by NCMEC to India’s National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal on Meta’s behalf.

India also has its own citizen-facing reporting mechanism. The Cyber Crime Reporting Portal was originally launched in September 2018 as a centralised facility for reporting child sexual abuse material and rape or gang-rape related content. The revamped National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal was launched in August 2019 and expanded the system to other categories of cybercrime, with a continued special focus on offences against women and children.

What happens after such information reaches an Indian agency, which State or UT receives it, when verification begins and what turns a digital lead into an FIR are separate questions. Those form the subject of the next part of this series.

India is one of the largest destinations for CyberTipline reports

The global numbers help place India’s 1.93 million reports in perspective.

NCMEC received 21.3 million CyberTipline reports in 2025. Electronic service provider reports contained 61.8 million images, videos and other files, including 29.4 million images and 26.3 million videos. NCMEC said 77% of CyberTipline reports that year involved uploads of CSAM or other child sexual exploitation by users outside the United States.

India alone was associated with 1,933,900 reports in NCMEC’s 2025 country table. Of these, 1,769,595 were categorised as referrals, while 164,305 were informational reports.

NCMEC explains the distinction this way. A referral contains sufficient information for potential law-enforcement action, while an informational report may contain insufficient information or involve material that has become viral and has already been repeatedly reported.

NCMEC explicitly warns against treating these figures as a measure of the prevalence of child sexual abuse in a country. They are not the number of victims, not the number of offenders, not the number of investigations opened and not a comprehensive measurement of the amount of CSAM circulating in a jurisdiction.

That warning is especially important when reporting India’s high numbers. A large CyberTipline count can reflect platform usage, reporting practices, repeat circulation of the same material and the ability to determine a geographic nexus. It cannot simply be presented as “1.93 million cases of child abuse in India”.

What Meta, Google and Microsoft are finding at scale

Meta said that globally it removed 36 million pieces of child-exploitation content from Facebook and Instagram during 2025 and automatically removed more than four million suspicious accounts. During October to December 2025 alone, it removed 13 million pieces of child sexual exploitation content, more than 96% of which it said was detected proactively before anybody reported it.

India is not merely present somewhere within those global figures. Meta’s July 2026 disclosure specifically highlighted the removal of 160,000 India-linked accounts in the preceding six months through systems looking at suspicious off-platform links in combination with other exploitation signals.

Google’s transparency data for July to December 2025 show 862,284 CyberTipline reports to NCMEC and enforcement against 365,597 accounts globally for CSAM violations. Of the content reported to NCMEC during that period, 97.68% was detected through automated systems. India appears first in Google’s displayed list of the top ten countries associated with CSAM-related account enforcement during that six-month period, although the company does not publish the individual India count on that dashboard.

Google also reported and blocked 264,371 CSAM-related URLs from appearing in Search during the second half of 2025. It stresses that blocking a result from Google Search is not the same as removing the underlying material from the third-party website hosting it.

Microsoft reported 111,931 CyberTipline reports to NCMEC during 2025. Across hosted consumer services including OneDrive, Outlook, Skype and Xbox, it actioned 237,391 pieces of content and 22,651 consumer accounts associated with child sexual exploitation and abuse imagery, including grooming. Microsoft said 99.73% of that actioned content was detected through automated technologies.

These figures should not be directly compared as though Meta, Google, Microsoft and NCMEC were measuring the same thing.

A CyberTipline report is not the same as a piece of content. A piece of content is not the same as an account. An account is not necessarily an offender. And none of these units automatically equals a victim or criminal case.

Not every platform can detect the same thing

Another misconception is that because Meta, Google or another large technology company operates in India, it can automatically inspect everything communicated through every one of its services.

Different products have different architectures. Publicly hosted social-media content, a file stored in a cloud account, a search result and private communications are not technically identical environments. What a provider can detect depends on what information is available to it and how the relevant service is built.

This becomes particularly important when discussing encrypted communications. The existence of child-safety systems on one service should not be used to imply that a company necessarily has identical technical visibility across every product it owns.

The same caution applies to the capabilities of individual detection technologies. PhotoDNA does not identify offenders. Hashes do not prove who was holding a device. Classifiers do not establish intent. An account-registration name does not by itself establish who performed an upload.

Microsoft expressly states that PhotoDNA cannot identify people or objects. Google likewise describes its automated systems as mechanisms for detecting and flagging content, supported by human review and subsequent reporting processes.

Once criminal responsibility becomes the question, investigators may need to establish who controlled the account, who possessed the device, what data can be recovered, where the upload originated and whether the necessary ingredients of an offence under Indian law can be established.

That boundary is critical because a technology company detects and reports. A court determines guilt on evidence.

Generative AI is creating a new problem for an old detection system

The detection ecosystem was built largely around identifying and limiting the redistribution of material depicting or derived from child sexual abuse. Generative artificial intelligence has complicated that model.

Google says its systems are designed to detect child sexual abuse and exploitation material including AI-generated CSAM. Its approach includes hash matching, AI classifiers and human review, while its generative-AI safety systems also attempt to block requests seeking the creation of exploitative material.

NCMEC’s 2025 figures show why the issue can no longer be treated as theoretical. It received more than 400,000 reports involving a generative-AI nexus that year, including more than 182,000 reports involving people possessing, generating or attempting to generate AI-related CSAM.

But AI-generated material raises separate questions about synthetic depictions, manipulated images of real children, Indian legal definitions, evidentiary issues and the obligations of AI companies. Those questions go far beyond how traditional hash-matching systems work and will be examined separately in the fourth part of this series.

Technology can identify the signal, but it cannot answer the case

The extraordinary scale of the detection infrastructure means an India-linked file can potentially be recognised without an Indian police officer having previously seen it.

A hash can reveal that imagery corresponds to material already identified elsewhere. AI can surface potentially new material. Human reviewers can assess what machines flag. Behavioural systems can identify suspicious accounts and networks. NCMEC can receive a platform’s report and determine that the information has a geographic connection with India.

India’s own institutional link to that global system has existed formally since the NCRB-NCMEC agreement of 2019. In 2025 alone, NCMEC’s data associated nearly 1.93 million reports with India.

But none of these systems can conclusively answer the questions that ultimately matter in a criminal case.

• Who produced the material?
• Who uploaded or circulated it?
• Who actually controlled the account?
• Where did the underlying abuse occur?
• Can the child be identified?
• Is the child still at risk?
• What evidence exists on the suspect’s devices?
• And can Indian investigators establish the offence in court?

Those questions require law enforcement.

A platform detection therefore becomes significant not merely when prohibited material disappears from a screen, but when the digital information surrounding it can help investigators move towards a child who needs protection or a person suspected of committing an offence.

For India, that is where the next stage begins. A CyberTip or other online alert reaches the Indian system, is routed to the relevant police agency, is examined against available digital information and, where sufficient grounds exist, begins the journey towards an FIR, forensic investigation and arrest.

This article is the first part of OpIndia’s 4-article series on CSEAM.

Pune Police have registered an FIR against a UK-based Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cardholder for attempting to induce people to embrace Christianity during a religious gathering, in one of the first cases registered under Maharashtra’s new Freedom of Religion Act.

The accused, a resident of Manchester, has been booked under relevant provisions of the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, and the newly enacted Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act, 2026, a Pune Police official said on Monday, 10th August.

The case was registered at Khadak police station after the accused attended a religious programme at a Marathi church in Guruwar Peth and addressed devotees.

According to the preliminary investigation, the accused used terms associated with Hindu religious traditions, including “kirtan”, “Sant” and “Mauli”, while speaking at the gathering. Police alleged that he spoke about following the path of devotion to Jesus and made statements that created misconceptions about Hindu temples and deities.

Police said the statements were made with the intention of misleading people and inducing them to embrace Christianity.

UK national made claims that illnesses could be cured by invoking the name of Jesus

According to the police, the accused made claims that illnesses could be cured and rainfall could occur by invoking the name of Jesus. Investigators have said that such statements were intended to attract Hindus and people belonging to other faiths towards Christianity.

A Khadak police station official said that OCI cardholders are permitted to attend prayer meetings and participate in religious functions. However, they cannot preach, conduct kirtans or deliver religious discourses without obtaining the requisite permission.

“We have booked the person and further probe is on,” the officer said.

First FIR under Maharashtra’s new Freedom of Religion Act

The UK national’s case comes days after Pune Police registered the first FIR under the Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act, 2026.

The first case was registered on 5th August against a 22-year-old man from Uttar Pradesh who was accused of asking a minor girl, with whom he was in a relationship, to convert from her religion. The case was also registered under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act because the girl is a minor.

According to police, the accused and the girl were from the same village in Uttar Pradesh and had later moved to Karnataka and then Pune. The accused was booked under Sections 3 and 9(2) of the new law and was arrested before being remanded to judicial custody.

Section 3 prohibits conversion, attempted conversion, or aiding and abetting conversion through means including coercion, fraud, allurement, misrepresentation, force, threat or undue influence. Section 9(2) provides for imprisonment of up to seven years and a fine of up to Rs 5 lakh when an offence under Section 3 involves a minor.

What is Maharashtra’s Freedom of Religion Act?

The Maharashtra Freedom of Religion Act, 2026, was notified on 31st July and came into force on 1st August.

The legislation defines unlawful conversion to include conversion through allurement, coercion, deceit, force, misrepresentation, threat, undue influence or other fraudulent means. It also includes certain forms of alleged brainwashing through education among the methods that can constitute unlawful conversion.

“Allurement” has been defined broadly and can include money, gifts, material benefits, employment, free education, promises of marriage, a better lifestyle or claims of divine healing.

The law also provides a procedure for people who voluntarily wish to change their religion. A person intending to convert has to submit a declaration to the District Magistrate or designated authority at least 60 days before the proposed conversion. Religious institutions conducting conversion ceremonies are also required to provide prior notice.

The legislation provides enhanced punishment where alleged unlawful conversion involves minors, women, members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and persons of unsound mind.

It also contains provisions relating to marriages conducted for unlawful conversion and provides for assistance and rehabilitation for victims.

The Congress on Monday, 3rd August, claimed that around 94,000 government schools have been shut down in India over the past decade, and used the figure to attack the Narendra Modi government’s education record. Sharing the claim on X, the party wrote, “Aise Padhega India”, suggesting that the closure of government schools reflects the government’s failure to provide education.

Aise Padhega India? pic.twitter.com/eZGEF2Xk9q

— Congress (@INCIndia) August 3, 2026

The figure of 94,000 government schools, however, does come from government data cited in a recent NITI Aayog analysis. But presenting it on its own gives only one part of the story. The NITI Aayog report presents a much more nuanced picture of what has happened to India’s school education system between 2014-15 and 2024-25.

The report shows that while the number of government schools has fallen sharply, India has also witnessed a decline in the school-age population, lower overall enrolment, an increase in private schooling and a rise in the number of teachers. Several states have also merged or consolidated schools with very low enrolment in an effort to pool resources and provide better facilities.

In other words, the fall in the number of government schools cannot simply be presented as evidence that the government has stopped focusing on education. The data points towards a larger structural change in the country’s school education system.

Congress highlights school closures, but leaves out the larger picture

The Congress’s social media post focused on the decline in government schools and the impact it could have on children’s access to education. There are legitimate concerns around school closures, particularly in rural, tribal and economically weaker areas where a government school may be the only accessible educational institution for children.

However, the NITI Aayog analysis itself asks a larger question: should the success of school education be measured simply by the number of schools, or by whether children have access to a properly resourced school that can provide quality education?

This distinction is important because not every school closure means that children have been left without a school. In several states, schools with very few students have been merged with larger institutions so that teachers, classrooms, laboratories, libraries, sports facilities and other resources can be used more effectively.

The data also shows that the total number of schools in India has not fallen by 94,000. The decline in the total number of schools is much smaller. The country had around 15.16 lakh schools in 2014-15, compared with around 14.71 lakh in 2024-25, a fall of roughly 45,000. The sharp decline was mainly in government schools, while the number of private unaided schools increased.

Therefore, using the 94,000 figure without explaining the demographic and structural changes behind it presents only part of the picture.

What does the NITI Aayog report actually say?

According to the NITI Aayog analysis, the number of government schools declined from around 11.07 lakh in 2014-15 to 10.13 lakh in 2024-25, an 8% fall. During the same period, the number of private schools increased from around 2.88 lakh to 3.39 lakh, an increase of about 18%.

The decline in government schools happened alongside a fall in the number of children enrolled in schools. Overall school enrolment fell from 26.95 crore in 2014-15 to 24.69 crore in 2024-25, a decline of around 2.26 crore students or nearly 8%.

Government school enrolment also declined. The share of students enrolled in government schools fell from around 54.3% in 2014-15 to 49.25% in 2024-25. At the same time, the share of students in private schools increased from 31.7% to 38.8%.

The shift towards private education is therefore another important part of the story. Parents’ changing preferences, urbanisation and migration, along with demographic changes, have contributed to the changing school landscape.

The NITI Aayog analysis identifies three broad reasons for the fall in overall enrolment: “demographic shifts, particularly falling fertility rates leading to a smaller school-age population”, “the effects of school consolidations” and challenges in retaining students at higher levels of education.

India has fewer children entering school

One of the biggest factors behind the changing education landscape is India’s demographic transition.

India’s fertility rate has fallen significantly over the past few decades. The total fertility rate, which was above three in the early 1990s, has now fallen to around two, below the replacement level of 2.1.

This means that fewer children are entering the school system every year. Rising female literacy, urbanisation, better healthcare, wider access to family planning, delayed marriages and changing family aspirations have all contributed to smaller families.

As the number of school-age children declines, schools with very low enrolment become increasingly common. Some schools that once had more than 100 students may now have only a few dozen, or even fewer.

Running separate schools with very low enrolment can also create another problem. A school may have only one teacher handling multiple classes and several subjects. Such schools may technically provide access to education but may struggle to offer subject-specific teaching, peer learning, sports and other activities.

Why are schools being merged?

The NITI Aayog report points towards “consolidation and rationalisation measures” as one of the reasons for the decline in government schools.

Several states have merged schools with low enrolment into larger institutions. A NITI Aayog project launched in 2017 also focused on merging and reorganising low-enrolment schools in states including Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha.

The National Education Policy, 2020, has also promoted the idea of school complexes and clusters, where schools can share teachers, infrastructure and other resources.

The argument behind consolidation is that a larger, properly equipped school can provide a better educational environment than several extremely small schools with only one or two teachers.

However, this does not mean that every school closure is automatically beneficial. The report also acknowledges the risks involved. If a school is merged with another institution located several kilometres away, children may have to travel longer distances. This can particularly affect young children, girls and students living in remote, tribal or disadvantaged areas.

This is why school consolidation has to balance quality, accessibility and equity.

Teachers increased despite fewer schools

Another important part of the data is the number of teachers.

While the number of schools and students declined, the number of teachers increased from around 90 lakh in 2014-15 to more than one crore in 2024-25. This indicates that the decline in the number of schools has not simply been accompanied by a reduction in the teaching workforce. In fact, teacher availability has improved at the national level.

However, the national average hides significant differences between regions. Some rural schools still have only one teacher and very few students, while some urban schools face overcrowding.

The challenge, therefore, is not simply to increase or decrease the number of schools. It is to ensure that schools have enough qualified teachers and resources while remaining accessible to children.

The bigger problem is keeping children in school

The NITI Aayog analysis also identifies another major challenge: retaining children beyond Class 8.

The secondary level has been described as the “most fragile link” in the schooling cycle. The Gross Enrolment Ratio at the secondary level is 78.7%, compared with more than 90% at the primary and upper-primary levels. At the higher-secondary level, it falls further to 58.4%.

The report points out that nearly four out of every 10 children who enter school do not continue until the higher-secondary stage.

One reason is that the Right to Education (RTE) Act guarantees free and compulsory education only up to the age of 14. After Class 8, families may have to bear more of the cost of education, which can become a major barrier for children from poorer households.

The structure of schools can also create problems. Only around 5% of India’s schools offer continuous education from Classes 1 to 12. Children often have to shift schools after Class 5, Class 8 or Class 10 depending on what is available in their area.

The NITI Aayog report notes that this “fragmentation without any established linkage between schools for transitioning” can make it harder for students to continue their education.

At the same time, there has been progress in some areas. Primary-level dropout has fallen sharply from around 4% in 2014-15 to just 0.3% in 2024-25. At the secondary level, dropout has also declined from 17.86% to 11.5%, although it remains the highest among the major stages of schooling.

So, is the closure of government schools a crisis?

The decline of nearly 94,000 government schools is a real figure and deserves scrutiny, particularly where closures or mergers make it harder for children to reach school. But the data does not show that schools are being shut simply because the government is no longer interested in education.

India is going through a demographic change, with fewer children entering school. At the same time, many families are increasingly choosing private schools. States have also been merging schools with low enrolment to pool teachers and infrastructure.

The bigger question is whether these changes are improving education or creating new barriers.

School consolidation can make sense when it gives children access to better teachers, laboratories, libraries, sports facilities and a stronger peer-learning environment. But it can become harmful if children, particularly girls and those from poor or remote communities, are forced to travel long distances or drop out because the nearest school has been closed.

Ultimately, the success of India’s school education policy cannot be judged only by how many schools exist. It should be measured by whether every child can safely reach a well-equipped school, receive quality teaching and continue education beyond Class 8.

On one hand, while the country is celebrating the 150th anniversary of this timeless creation and the central Modi government is giving it respect equivalent to the national anthem and encouraging the collective singing of all its verses from the Red Fort to the entire country, on the other hand, the attitude of the Congress party remains the same today as it was during the freedom struggle.

This character of Congress has not changed even after decades. Whenever there is talk of singing Vande Mataram in its entirety or honouring it, Congress and its appeasement-driven allied parties stand in opposition.

The opposition that recently surfaced from Kerala has once again proven the extent to which hatred is filled within Congress leaders regarding the national song Vande Mataram, where its leaders are not hesitating to say that even if they are shot, they will not sing the full Vande Mataram.

The Full ‘Vande Mataram’ will resonate from the Red Fort, but fierce opposition from Congress in Kerala

On the historic occasion of India’s 80th Independence Day (15 August 2026), an unprecedented scene is going to be witnessed.

As part of the 80th Independence Day celebrations, for the first time ever, the National Song 'Vande Mataram' would be sung from the ramparts of Red Fort: Defence Ministry pic.twitter.com/tWNYJrdnho

— ANI (@ANI) August 10, 2026

According to information provided by the Ministry of Defence, for the first time in history, all the verses of the entire Vande Mataram will be sung upon the Prime Minister’s arrival at the ramparts of the Red Fort.

This year, the main theme of the Independence Day celebrations has been kept as ‘150 Years of Vande Mataram’ and ‘Youth Power for Developed India@2047’. Under this, as per the guidelines of the Ministry of Home Affairs protocol and the National Implementation Committee, the collective singing of all 6 verses of the national song is being ensured across the country.

Even on the invitation cards, its complete lyrics have been printed so that all citizens can sing along. But while the entire country is ready to witness this historic moment, the UDF-supported politics of Kerala and Congress leaders have opened a front against it.

Controversy erupted after Kerala Chief Secretary Vishwanath Sinha issued a circular on August 6, giving administrative instructions to sing Vande Mataram completely during Independence Day programs.

As soon as this directive came, panic spread between both the ruling party and the opposition in Kerala. Kerala Health Minister K Muraleedharan explicitly stated that all verses of the national song would not be sung during government programs in the state and only the traditionally sung initial two verses would be performed.

Going even further, senior Congress MP Rajmohan Unnithan made a controversial statement, saying, “We cannot accept the full singing of Vande Mataram in this lifetime. Even if Narendra Modi threatens to shoot us, ‘Vande Mataram’ will not be sung in full.”

He went on to allege that the Governor and Raj Bhavan are indulging in politics to weaken democracy. This entire sequence of events has exposed that for the Congress government and its leaders, the full singing of the national song is not an administrative directive, but an issue against which they are ready to go to any extent to oppose.

Why is there a problem with the final verses?

Opposition to the full singing of Vande Mataram is not new; rather, a long history of appeasement is hidden behind it. In the first two verses of Vande Mataram, the natural beauty of the land of India- Sasya Shyamalam, Malayaja Sheetalam, Sujalam, Sufalam- is venerated, to which no one has an objection.

The problem for opponents begins from the subsequent verses. In the later verses, Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay depicted Bharat Mata as Durga, Lakshmi, and Saraswati and invoked the motherland as the power of Goddess Durga holding Shashtra in ten hands (Dasha Praharana Dharini).

In Kerala, the stand of Congress, CPI(M), and their political ally Indian Union Muslim League has always been that the latter parts include invocations, symbols, and religious imagery related to Hindu deities.

They have argued that in a secular state, verses containing such religious symbols should not be made part of official national singing. In reality, this opposition is not ideological but purely the mathematics of vote bank and appeasement.

To please Muslim fundamentalists, Congress and its leftist allies always crafted a narrative that the latter lines are against the principle of ‘Monotheism’ (one God).

Under the pressure of this Muslim League and fundamentalist vote bank, the UDF and Congress politics led by VD Satheesan appear subdued even today. CPI(M) and Pinarayi Vijayan also immediately started politics over this and accused the government of bowing down to the Sangh Parivar’s political agenda.

It is the result of this appeasement politics that advocating for pruning and making the country’s national song incomplete is being done openly by Congress even today.

Bankim Chandra’s timeless creation and Vande Mataram’s contribution to the freedom struggle

Vande Mataram is not merely a song; it is the life force of India’s freedom movement and the immortal voice of patriotism that ignited the flame of revolution in the hearts of crores of Indians.

This timeless creation was composed by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay on 7 November 1875 and was later included in his famous novel ‘Anandamath’. The time this song was composed was when British rule was expanding its roots in India and Indians were being pressured to sing the British national anthem ‘God Save the Queen’.

Bankim Chandra composed Vande Mataram, proclaiming the sovereignty and power of his motherland as a response to this colonial cultural imposition by British rule. Composed 150 years ago, this song united the entire country in no time.

In 1896, at the Calcutta session of the Indian National Congress, Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore himself set it to tune and sang it for the first time. After this, during the Partition of Bengal (1905), it became the biggest slogan and symbol of Indian resistance against the British.

During the freedom struggle, from heroines like Matangini Hazra to revolutionaries like Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, and Sukhdev, countless revolutionaries chanted Vande Mataram while facing British police batons and kissing the gallows.

This song became a symbol of India’s national unity, pride, and self-respect against colonial slavery. But the same song that inspired lakhs of youth to sacrifice themselves for the freedom of Mother India is being rejected by Congress leaders today.

Nehru and Congress’s hatred: How the National Song was made incomplete

This hateful and compromising character of Congress regarding Vande Mataram is not new, but its roots are hidden in the historical blunders of Jawaharlal Nehru and the then Congress leadership.

In 1937, when provincial elections were held in the country and Congress governments were formed in several states, the Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah raised strong objections to the singing of Vande Mataram.

In the pursuit of appeasing Jinnah and placating the Muslim League, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress leadership made a severe compromise with the national song.

At the 1937 Kolkata session, under the presidency of Nehru, the Congress passed a resolution to accept only the first two verses of Vande Mataram and to remove the remaining verses from official programs.

The logic given was that the later verses mention Hindu deities, which could hurt the sentiments of non-Hindus. This was the biggest beginning of appeasement politics in India’s freedom movement.

Moving forward, when it came to choosing the national anthem in the Constituent Assembly, Jawaharlal Nehru flatly refused to make Vande Mataram the national anthem.

He argued that the tune of Vande Mataram was not such that it could be played on a band or presented internationally as a national anthem. The song that had united the country in the freedom struggle could not get the status of the main national anthem due to this attitude of Nehru and the Congress, and it was cut down and limited to just two lines.

Dr Rajendra Prasad’s vision and Modi government’s Historic initiative

Contrary to this attitude of the Congress, India’s first President, Dr Rajendra Prasad, was the biggest proponent of full honour for Vande Mataram.

On 24 January 1950, the final day of the Constituent Assembly, Dr Rajendra Prasad made a historic statement clearly declaring that while ‘Jana Gana Mana’ would be the National Anthem of India, ‘Vande Mataram’, which played a historic role in the freedom struggle, would also be given equal status and honour as ‘Jana Gana Mana’.

However, subsequent Congress governments put this sentiment and order of Dr Rajendra Prasad on the back burner. For decades, Vande Mataram remained neglected, and controversies continued to be raised regarding its singing.

Years later, the central government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi resolved to bring Dr Rajendra Prasad’s vision into reality on the ground. On the occasion of the national song completing 150 years, the Modi government decided to organise a special 10-hour discussion in Parliament on its history, significance, and contribution, where Prime Minister Modi himself initiated the debate.

Not only this, the central government brought ‘The Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2026’ in Parliament, which has been passed by the Rajya Sabha. Through this bill, Vande Mataram has been given legal and constitutional status equal to the national anthem.

Now, insulting Vande Mataram or creating an obstacle in its singing will be considered a serious criminal offence, providing for a jail term of up to 3 years and a fine.

Congress’s hateful attitude being exposed even today

Today, as the country celebrates the 80th anniversary of its independence and 150 years of Vande Mataram, the difference between nationalism and appeasement stands fully exposed.

On one hand, the current Modi government is committed to restoring lost constitutional honour to national symbols, the sacrifices of freedom fighters, and the sacred hymn Vande Mataram; on the other hand, Congress continues on its old path of appeasement.

The statement of the Congress MP in Kerala saying ‘Shoot us, but we will not sing the full Vande Mataram’ is not an accidental remark.

It is an extension of that decades-old mindset of Congress where vote bank politics is placed above national pride and respect for the national song.

The cycle of neglect and truncation towards Vande Mataram that started with Jawaharlal Nehru continues even in the era of Rahul Gandhi and his associates today.

This clearly proves that years passed, decades passed, power equations changed, but the character of Congress did not change. The Congress still harbours hatred for the national song that shook the foundations of the British during the freedom struggle.

While the echoing of the full Vande Mataram from the Red Fort is a symbol of self-respect and national renaissance for 140 crore Indians, the opposition to it by Congress proves that for them, the agenda of appeasement remains greater than the national interest even today.

A criminal complaint filed before the Delhi Police has sought registration of an FIR against Jamia Millia Islamia Registrar Prof. Md. Mahtab Alam Rizvi and other persons involved in his appointment as Associate Professor, subsequent promotion as Professor and eventual appointment as Registrar of the Central University.

The complaint, accessed by OpIndia, alleges cheating, forgery, use of forged documents, falsification of records, criminal conspiracy and abuse of official position. The allegations are based on documents obtained through the Right to Information Act, official records and material said to be available in the public domain.

The complaint has been filed by Bhupendra Pal Singh Chamar, the International President of the World Dalit Council (Viswa Dalit Parishad) and an alumnus of Jamia Millia Islamia. He has asked the police to investigate not only Rizvi but also officials and members of the university’s Screening Committee, Selection Committee and Executive Council who processed or approved his appointment despite questions over his eligibility.

At the heart of the complaint is the allegation that Rizvi did not meet the mandatory eligibility requirements applicable to the post of Associate Professor under the University Grants Commission’s 2010 regulations. The complainant specifically disputes the manner in which Rizvi’s previous professional experience was treated for the purpose of satisfying the prescribed eligibility criteria.

Dispute over MP-IDSA experience

One of the principal issues raised concerns Rizvi’s experience at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), formerly known as the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. According to the complaint, the experience claimed did not constitute teaching or research experience equivalent to that required for the post of Assistant Professor, which the complainant says was required under the applicable UGC regulations. 

The annexures, viewed by OpIndia, contain an RTI application seeking information from the Defence Ministry concerning Rizvi’s employment at MP-IDSA. The application asks whether the institute had a classroom-teaching component, what positions Rizvi held there, the nature of his work, whether his position was teaching or purely research, whether he was assigned classes, and what his pay scale was when he joined and when he left.

A separate RTI request sought information on Rizvi’s work experience and pay scale before he joined IDSA as a Research Assistant in Level 6 under the Seventh Central Pay Commission on June 21, 2007. It also sought details regarding his service between November 2016 and February 2017, including whether he was on deputation, the leave he took, when he applied for leave or a no-objection certificate to join Jamia, whether there was any break in his service between November 2010 and February 6, 2017, and his final pay level at the time of resignation.

The records show that the MP-IDSA RTI request was disposed of on October 9, 2025, with a reply from the institute cited as letter No. MP-IDSA/A/792/2009. The complaint relies on this documentary trail as part of its broader contention that Rizvi’s employment history requires verification.

Questions over experience in Ethiopia

The complaint also raises questions regarding experience that Rizvi claimed at the State Civil Services University in Ethiopia. The complainant questions the period of the engagement, continuity of service and, crucially, whether such experience could legally be counted towards the mandatory eligibility requirements for the Associate Professor post.

The complaint does not merely characterise these issues as differences in interpretation of service records. It alleges that discrepancies in the candidate’s qualifications and experience may have resulted in material facts being concealed or misrepresented before the competent authorities.

Alleged inconsistencies in CVs

Another significant allegation concerns different versions of Rizvi’s Curriculum Vitae hosted on Jamia Millia Islamia’s official website. The complaint says these versions contain material inconsistencies relating to qualifications, experience and service particulars. According to the complainant, these inconsistencies raise the possibility of suppression, alteration or manipulation of material facts in connection with the appointment.

The allegation is particularly significant because the recruitment process itself required applicants to provide documentary evidence supporting their qualifications and experience. The Jamia recruitment material attached to the complaint states that candidates were required to submit attested copies of degrees, diplomas and marksheets, with references to experience and published work. It further states that applications without necessary supporting documents or properly attested experience certificates were liable to be rejected. 

The same recruitment instructions stated that applicants were required to submit an Academic Performance Indicator score card backed by documentary evidence and that applications without the required API documentation would not be considered for shortlisting.

UGC rules cited in the complaint

The annexures include the UGC Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2010.

For the post of Associate Professor, the regulations specify, among other requirements, a good academic record with a PhD, a Master’s degree with at least 55 per cent marks and a minimum of eight years of teaching and/or research experience in a university, college or accredited research institution/industry, excluding the period spent obtaining the research degree. The regulations also refer to contributions to the subject through publications and educational innovation.

The complaint’s central argument is therefore that the character and duration of Rizvi’s previous employment need to be examined against these specific requirements rather than simply counted as generic professional experience.

The regulations also prescribe a formal selection process. The annexures state that Selection Committees are to be constituted in accordance with the UGC framework, while the recruitment process is required to assess candidates on their merits and credentials.

Selection and subsequent career progression

Jamia’s recruitment advertisement of July 12, 2016 invited applications for several teaching posts, including an Associate Professor position at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. The advertisement identified one Associate Professor post at the centre.

The annexures accessed by OpIndia contain Executive Council records concerning the selection process. The March 10, 2017 minutes of the Jamia Executive Council record consideration and approval of recommendations arising from Selection Committee meetings held on February 1 and 2, 2017. It specifically records the direct recruitment of faculty members under the MMAJ-Academy of International Studies, including the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution. The table identifies Md. Mahtab Alam Rizvi as the selected candidate for one Associate Professor, Non-Plan post at the Nelson Mandela Centre.

This is important because the complaint does not allege merely that Rizvi was subsequently promoted without scrutiny. It contends that the foundation of his academic career at Jamia itself requires investigation. The complainant argues that if the initial Associate Professor appointment was obtained through suppression of material information or false declarations, the subsequent promotion to Professor under the Career Advancement Scheme and eventual appointment as Registrar would also require examination. 

The complaint specifically points to the role of officials who processed the appointment. It asks investigators to examine whether members of the Screening Committee, Selection Committee, Executive Council and other responsible officers knowingly approved the appointment despite the alleged eligibility problems. 

From Professor to Registrar

The allegations assume greater significance because Rizvi subsequently became Registrar of Jamia Millia Islamia, a statutory position with substantial administrative, financial and regulatory responsibilities. The complaint describes the Registrar’s office as a statutory public office and argues that questions surrounding the eligibility and recruitment of its occupant therefore cannot be treated merely as a private employment dispute.

A Jamia notification dated March 12, 2025 records that Prof. Md. Mahtab Alam Rizvi assumed charge as Registrar on March 12, 2025, following an appointment letter dated March 11, 2025. The notification was circulated to senior university officials as well as the Ministry of Education, UGC and other authorities.

The complainant argues that an alleged irregularity at the entry point could have consequences extending years later into a statutory office. The complaint therefore seeks an examination of the complete chain, from the original application and supporting documents to the Selection Committee’s deliberations, subsequent Career Advancement Scheme promotion and eventual appointment as Registrar.

Police investigation sought into records.

The complaint emphasises that many of the records necessary to establish or disprove the allegations are not in the complainant’s possession. These include original application forms, experience certificates, recruitment correspondence, digital records, website archives, Selection Committee proceedings, Executive Council proceedings, service books and electronic communications.

The complainant argues that these records are held by Jamia and other public authorities and therefore asks the police to secure and preserve them. The complaint specifically warns of the possibility of alteration or tampering with electronic records and official documents and seeks immediate investigation.

It invokes provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, alleging offences including cheating, forgery, use of forged documents, falsification of records, furnishing false information to a public authority, criminal conspiracy and abuse of official position. The complaint repeatedly qualifies these as allegations requiring investigation and says that the offences would arise if the alleged acts are established.

What the complaint seeks

The complainant has ultimately requested registration of an FIR and strict legal action against Rizvi and other persons found to have participated in the alleged wrongdoing. The complaint also asks that investigators examine the role of university officials who may have facilitated, approved or failed to properly scrutinise the appointment. 

The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether Rizvi’s professional experience should be counted differently for academic eligibility. The complaint alleges a potentially much wider failure of the recruitment and verification process, one involving candidate records, institutional scrutiny and decisions taken by university authorities.

However, the allegations contained in the complaint are not themselves a finding of criminal guilt. Whether Rizvi actually failed to meet the applicable eligibility criteria, whether any information was deliberately suppressed or falsified, whether the CV discrepancies arose from administrative reasons, and whether any university official knowingly facilitated wrongdoing are matters that would have to be established through examination of the original records and, if an investigation is ordered, through due process of law.

What the documents do establish is that the complainant has placed a substantial documentary record before the police and has sought a criminal investigation into Rizvi’s appointment history. The annexures include the relevant UGC eligibility framework, Jamia’s recruitment material, Executive Council records concerning the 2017 selection, a 2025 notification recording Rizvi’s assumption of the Registrar’s office, and RTI correspondence concerning his previous employment. The complaint now puts the focus on whether these records, when independently verified against the original files held by Jamia and other authorities, disclose merely an administrative or eligibility dispute, or the criminal misconduct alleged by the complainant.

On 10th August, a Special NIA Court in Gujarat’s Ahmedabad rejected the regular bail plea of Dr Syed Ahmed Mohiuddin, the main accused Jihadi in the 2025 ISIS ricin terror plot case.

Appearing for Syed Ahmed Mohiuddin, advocate K.M. Dastoor argued that his client was innocent and had been falsely implicated. The defence said the material on record did not establish his links with any terrorist organisation or show that he intended to harm people. It also argued that Mohiuddin did not know what was inside the bags in which weapons were found and had no knowledge of the process of preparing ricin.

Court finds prima facie material against accused

Special Judge (NIA) Hemang R. Rawal said the case involved serious charges under Sections 16, 17, 18, 18-B and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Arms Act.

The court said the investigation had produced prima facie material against the 2025 ISIS ricin terror plot accused Jihadi Mohiuddin and a chargesheet had been filed in the case.

The court noted that Mohiuddin, who is a doctor, was accused of setting up a laboratory at his Hyderabad home without the required permission. Investigators said ricin was prepared there using castor seeds and chemicals. The court observed that, given his medical background, it could not be said that he was completely unaware of the nature of ricin, a highly toxic biological toxin with the potential to cause mass deaths.

Prosecution says doctor worked with handler

Opposing the bail plea, Special Public Prosecutor M.G. Kapadiya told the court that Mohiuddin was facing a serious prosecution and had travelled towards Mehsana carrying three pistols and 30 live cartridges without a licence. The prosecution said this, along with other evidence, showed his involvement in the wider conspiracy.

The prosecution claimed that Mohiuddin had converted his Hyderabad residence into a clandestine laboratory for extracting ricin from castor beans. His mobile phone, according to the prosecution, contained conversations with a Telegram user identified as Abu Khadija, described as a wanted accused. These conversations included discussions about obtaining acetone, castor seeds and weapons for preparing ricin.

Notably, Ricin is a highly toxic protein which is derived from the castor bean plant, Ricinus communis. Ricin is not a virus or bacterium; rather, it is a lectin toxic to inhibits protein synthesis in cells. Its consumption can lead to organ failure and quick death. Extraction of ricin involves mashing castor beans, removing the oil, and then chemically processing the remaining mash to isolate the Ricin-rich pulp. Although a sophisticated work, this process requires only basic lab equipment, gloves and acetone.

“Per contra, learned Spl. P.P. has submitted that the applicant-accused is facing serious prosecution. The
learned Spl. P.P. has further submitted that the applicant-accused was travelling to Mehsana carrying three pistols and 30 live cartridges without any license and the said act of the applicant-accused itself speaks about his ill intention. The learned Spl. P.P. has further submitted that the applicant-accused converted his residence into a clandestine laboratory to extract Ricin from castor beans using chemicals, intending to carry out mass casualty attacks in Indian cities,” the court order reads.

The prosecution further told the court that Mohiuddin had agreed to assist Abu Khadija in activities being carried out in the name of a religious cause. He had also sought around US$4 lakh to establish business operations. As part of the wider plan, he travelled to Delhi, where he discussed plans, funding and future operational activities.

The prosecution also said Mohiuddin took an oath on Abu Khadija’s instructions, recorded it and sent the video to the handler. He then tried to expand the network by administering similar oaths to Abdul Vajid and Naved Pamidi. According to the prosecution, he also sent photographs and videos showing the preparation of toxic material to Abu Khadija.

Court lists allegations against Mohiuddin

According to the court’s summary of the chargesheet, Mohiuddin came in contact with Abu Khatija through Telegram in 2025 and agreed to assist him. He allegedly sought about US$4 lakh for business operations and travelled to Delhi in August 2025 to meet an associate and discuss plans and funding.

The court also recorded that Mohiuddin travelled to Ahmedabad in September 2025 and collected Rs 1.90 lakh, described as terror proceeds, from a pre-designated location near Chhatral in Mehsana. He later recorded an oath and shared it with his handler, while similar oaths were administered to other individuals as part of efforts to expand the network.

The chargesheet further states that Mohiuddin procured castor seeds, oil-extraction equipment and chemicals such as acetone. The court noted the prosecution’s case that these materials were used to prepare ricin at a laboratory at his Hyderabad residence. The chargesheet describes ricin as a highly toxic biological toxin listed in Schedule-I of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The court also recorded that Mohiuddin had arranged to receive additional funds and materials and planned to visit Ahmedabad in November 2025, where he received advanced weapons for a terrorist act. Based on these allegations, the court said the accusations were serious and prima facie showed his involvement in the case.

Mohiuddin was aware of the ricin terror plot; he knew that the bags contained weapons

The court rejected the defence argument that the ISIS ricin terror plot accused Syed Ahmed Mohiuddin did not know about the weapons. It pointed to the recovery of three pistols, 30 live cartridges, Indian and US currency and a bottle containing four litres of castor oil. The judge said the material in the chargesheet indicated that Mohiuddin was acting on the instructions of Abu Khadija and that the weapons were obtained for an improper purpose.

The court also said the records indicated a conspiracy involving Mohiuddin, Abu Khadija and other accused persons.

“Thus, the allegations levelled against the applicant-accused seem to be serious in nature, and prima facie reveal the involvement of applicant-accused with the offence in question,” the court stated.

The Special NIA Court further highlighted that since the accused Syed Ahmed Mohiuddin is a doctor, “it cannot be said that he was absolutely unknown to the material prepared by him in the nature of Ricin, a toxic biological toxin, which is having potential of mass killing. Further, the existence of a lab at the residence of the applicant-accused without there being any license/permission from a competent authority, prima facie speaks about the ill intention of the applicant-accused.”

The court also noted that accused ISIS ricin terror plot accused jihadi Mohiuddin had allegedly travelled to different locations including Delhi and Ahmedabad, to meet operatives and collect concealed consignments, and further recovery of three pistols, thirty live cartridges, Indian and US currency and a bottle containing four litres of castor oil from the applicant-accused prima facie “reveals that the intention on the part of the applicant-accused was not holy or for any human cause,” the court noted.

Citing the chargesheet, the Special NIA Court noted that accused Dr Syed Ahmed Mohiuddin was in contact with the wanted main accused and was acting as per his instructions, leading to the preparation of Ricin and further the procurement and holding of weapon pistols. The court, thus, rejected Defence’s claim that Mohiuddin was unaware of the bags and their contents (weapons).

“The recovery of weapon from applicant-accused prima facie 10 reveals that the said weapon was obtained for oblique purpose and therefore, the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the applicant-accused that applicant-accused had no knowledge about the bags and contents thereof, deserves no acceptance at the hands of this Court,” the court said.

“Further, the video recovered from mobile phone of accused No.1 also speaks about the ill intention on the part of applicant-accused and does not reveal that the applicant-accused was moving towards the holy path and doing good to humanity,” the court added.

Considering the seriousness of the accusations and the restrictions imposed by Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, Special Judge Hemang R. Rawal refused to grant bail. The court rejected the application without any order as to costs.

“Considering the aforesaid and rigors of section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities ( Prevention) Act, this Court deems it fit not to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction vested with this Court in favour of the applicant-accused, and hence, the present application is hereby rejected with no order as to costs,” the court ordered.

Case background

The case emerged after the Gujarat ATS arrested three men in connection with an Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP)-linked network. Investigators said members of the group had conducted reconnaissance of crowded markets and religious or organisational sites in Ahmedabad, Delhi and Lucknow while gathering information that could be used for a possible terror attack.

Mohiuddin, a doctor from Telangana who studied medicine in China, was arrested with firearms, ammunition and castor oil. Investigators said he was trying to prepare ricin from castor seeds at his Hyderabad residence. The ATS also traced his communication with an Afghan handler linked to ISKP, while the investigation continued into funding, other members and possible links to a wider network.

For the last twenty years, India’s strategic thinking has been locked on one place, the ‘Indo-Pacific.’ The Quad, and freedom of navigation patrols and the long naval watch on China near the first island chain. That focus made sense, and it was the right call.

But north of everything Delhi has been watching, a second theatre has been quietly opening up, not replacing the Indo-Pacific, just running alongside it.

The Arctic is now warming three to four times faster than the rest of the planet, according to recent assessments from the World Meteorological Organisation and America’s NOAA. A WMO report found the Arctic is set to warm more than three and a half times faster than the global average between 2025 and 2029, while NOAA’s own tracking shows Arctic annual air temperatures have been rising nearly three times faster than the global mean since 1980. And the Northern Sea Route, once the exclusive territory of Soviet icebreakers and polar explorers, is turning into real, usable infrastructure. Ice doesn’t wait for foreign ministries to give it permission before it melts.

The question is no longer whether the Arctic matters to India. It’s whether India will simply watch this new route open from the shore or step in and help build it.

A theatre made by ice, not ideology

The Arctic theatre isn’t being shaped by alliances or ideology. It’s being shaped by physics. Arctic sea routes could cut the distance between Northern Europe and Asia by as much as 40 per cent compared with the traditional path.

And this isn’t just theory. In 2024, Rosatom reported nearly 37.9 million tonnes of cargo moving along the Northern Sea Route, a record. There were also a record 92 transit voyages that pushed transit cargo past 3 million tonnes. Rosatom’s director general said in October 2025 that he expected roughly 20% more cargo the following year.

The real picture is a bit more layered than that headline suggests. When the final 2025 numbers came in, total NSR cargo had actually slipped to about 37 million tonnes, down slightly from the year before. Russian consultancy Gecon called it a second straight year of decline in overall volumes. But the transit segment, the part of the route that competes directly with Suez, carrying goods from China toward Europe, told a different story. It hit a record 103 voyages carrying about 3.2 million tonnes. One container ship, the Istanbul Bridge, even reached the English port of Felixstowe in just 20 days, against the 40-50 days a Suez or Cape route usually takes.

Western shipping majors have mostly stayed away. Maersk, CMA CGM and Hapag-Lloyd have pulled back because of sanctions risk, and even China’s COSCO hasn’t sailed the route since 2022. But the specific lane that matters most to India’s calculations, the one linking Asia to Europe, is the one growing fastest.

The monsoon is written in the ice

Here’s the part of the story no other Indo-Pacific power can tell. Try asking Tokyo, Canberra, or Hanoi how the Arctic affects their monsoon. They’ll look at you blankly. Ask Delhi, and they’ll show you the data, less Arctic ice means unpredictable rains for millions of Indian farmers.

Scientists at India’s National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, working with South Korea’s polar institute, have traced how shrinking sea ice in the central Arctic and the Barents-Kara Sea is reshaping the Indian monsoon. When sea ice concentration falls in the central Arctic, rainfall drops over western and southern peninsular India but rises over north-western and central India, a redistribution, not simply less rain overall. M. Ravichandran, Secretary at the Ministry of Earth Sciences, has called climate-resilient infrastructure and deeper research into this Arctic-monsoon link a policy priority. 

A monsoon that waters more than a billion people is being rewritten, one melting season at a time, in a sea most Indians will never see. That isn’t a metaphor. It’s a data point. It means India’s Arctic stake isn’t mainly about trade or minerals. At its core, it’s also existential, in a way no ally’s is.

A claim older than China’s

When China called itself a ‘near Arctic state‘ in its first official Arctic white paper in January 2018, it presented the region as a new frontier opening up for Asian powers. India’s claim to a seat at the table is older, by almost a century.

India’s link to the Arctic goes back more than a hundred years. It was one of the original high contracting parties to the Svalbard Treaty, signed in Paris in February 1920. India signed as part of the British Empire’s overseas dominions, alongside Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. China only joined the same treaty five years later, in 1925.

That’s exactly the reason when Union Minister Jitendra Singh released India’s first Arctic policy, ‘India and the Arctic: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development,’ in March 2022. He traced India’s Arctic engagement back a century, to that 1920 signature in Paris. It’s a fair reply to anyone who calls India a late entrant just playing catch-up to Beijing. But it shouldn’t be stretched too far. Signing a treaty in 1920 is not the same as owning an icebreaker in 2026. A serious case for India’s Arctic role has to hold both truths at once, the century-old legal claim at the table, and the very real capability gap that still exists today.

Slow and steady: How India got here

Line up the dates, and you’ll see it. India was late to the paperwork, but early to the ground game.

Himadri, India’s Arctic research station in Svalbard, opened in July 2008. Five years later, India became an Arctic Council observer, sitting at the table with China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. The formal Arctic Policy didn’t arrive until March 2022, fourteen years after Himadri. But by then, India was already deepening its presence. In December 2023, Delhi launched its first winter science expedition to Himadri, pushing the station toward year-round operations.

But the Arctic wasn’t the only piece moving. In September 2019, Prime Minister Modi visited Vladivostok for the Eastern Economic Forum, the first Indian Prime Minister to set foot in Russia’s Far East. There, he announced a $1 billion line of credit for development projects in the Russian Arctic and launched India’s ‘Act Far East’ policy. It was a signal, India wasn’t just watching the Arctic from Svalbard. It was building a corridor to reach it. That corridor became the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, launched in November 2024. A direct sea link between Indian ports and Russia’s Far East, cutting transit times by up to 16 days compared to the traditional route via Suez. In December 2025, during Putin’s visit to New Delhi, India and Russia formalized the connection: the Chennai-Vladivostok corridor would link directly to the Northern Sea Route, creating a continuous maritime axis from the Indian Ocean to the Arctic.

The logic is simple. Vladivostok is India’s gateway to the Arctic. From there, Indian ships can access the Northern Sea Route, Russian Arctic ports like Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, and the resource-rich Far East. In July 2024, Russia’s Far East and Arctic Development Corporation signed an MoU with the Indian Chamber of International Business in Vladivostok to foster joint investment projects. In December 2025, the two countries committed to intensifying trade and investment cooperation in the Far East and the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.

In May 2025, Indian representatives joined the seventh BRICS Working Group on Ocean and Polar Science and Technology in Brasília. And in May 2026, at the Third India-Nordic Summit in Oslo, the first Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Norway in 43 years, the Nordic states welcomed deeper Indian involvement in polar research.

Call it what you want. It’s not a sudden pivot. It’s fifteen years of small, deliberate steps. Easy to miss if you’re looking at one year at a time. Hard to explain away once you see the whole line. Himadri in 2008, Vladivostok in 2019, Arctic Policy in 2022, Chennai-Vladivostok corridor in 2024, BRICS polar roadmap in 2025, and Nordic Summit in 2026. India wasn’t waiting for permission. It was building the path, one step at a time.

The Russia opening

Since 2022, the other seven Arctic Council states have frozen Russia out of formal cooperation as the region’s security architecture shifted decisively toward NATO. That left Moscow looking outside the traditional Arctic club for partners, and it found two, China and India.

In December 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow was building dedicated Arctic working groups with both countries, naming India specifically as a priority partner in developing the Northern Sea Route. That wasn’t just talk. Weeks earlier, in October 2025, Russia had signalled strong interest in India’s inclusion in the Arctic Council as part of a push for deeper NSR cooperation. Then, during President Putin’s state visit to New Delhi in December 2025, India and Russia concluded a formal agreement on training Indian seafarers for polar shipping operations. The two sides also opened talks on jointly constructing four Arctic-class vessels worth roughly $750 million, sitting alongside India’s own $8 billion shipbuilding incentive package already under way.

This is the same structural gap India has already exploited in energy markets since 2022, buying discounted Russian oil while the West looked away. Except this time the asset isn’t a tanker. It’s an entire ocean.

None of this means picking Moscow over Washington or Tokyo. It means strategic autonomy doing what it’s supposed to do, keeping a door open that everyone else’s has shut. The Arctic Institute has pointedly asked why India has not worked more closely with fellow democracies in the Arctic, instead opting for closer cooperation with a regime the other seven Arctic states have largely cut off. That tension is real, and a serious case for India’s Arctic policy has to name it rather than talk around it.

Parliament enters the Ice Age

On 30 July 2026, an Indian parliamentary committee did something no Indian institution had done before. It put the Arctic and Antarctic at the centre of a foreign policy report, not a footnote to science policy. The Standing Committee on External Affairs, chaired by Congress MP Shashi Tharoor, tabled ‘India’s Role and Presence in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions’ in the Lok Sabha during the Monsoon Session. The committee had adopted the report nine days earlier, after hearing from the Ministry of Earth Sciences, the Environment Ministry and the Ministry of External Affairs. Tharoor called the subject ‘rather obscure’ but said the polar regions are far more important than people think.

Its central recommendation consisted of India appointing a ‘polar ambassador’ to pursue polar diplomacy more effectively and push for full member status of the Arctic Council. The committee noted that all Arctic Council states, and most non-Arctic observers including Japan, China, Singapore and South Korea, already have such a position. It went further. It recommended a quadrilateral agreement among India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, the Council’s four Asian observers, to strengthen Asia’s collective voice, and noted that development of NSR shipments between India and Russia is being actively pursued, alongside India’s Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, operational since November 2024. It also recommended the government buy polar research vessels, citing a shortage of icebreaker ships as a real constraint on India’s polar work.

Perhaps most striking is what it asked India to become, not just a scientific observer of the Arctic, but the voice of the Global South inside its governance.

The Hard truths

A serious case for India’s Arctic role has to start by admitting what it still lacks. India doesn’t yet have a dedicated Arctic class icebreaker of its own. It leases and borrows what it needs, which is exactly why the committee’s call to buy polar research vessels matters. The December 2025 talks with Russia on jointly building four ice-class ships are a real first step toward closing that gap. But they remain talks, not ships already delivered. India also runs just one permanent Arctic station, while China has poured far more into polar infrastructure and icebreaking capacity in the thirteen years since both countries became Arctic Council observers together.

And there’s the question the Arctic Institute has already asked in public. Why has India built its Arctic strategy so heavily around Russia, instead of coordinating more closely with fellow democracies that are just as close to the Arctic, like Japan or Norway?

The honest answer is strategic autonomy, not sentiment, and partly economics, the same discounted oil logic that has shaped India’s Russia policy since 2022. India has kept open a channel that almost no other major democracy still has. That channel may prove valuable precisely because it’s scarce. But it is also a wager that India can keep close ties with Moscow, Tokyo and Washington all at once, indefinitely, without ever being forced to choose.

What Delhi should do now?

The parliamentary committee has basically handed India a clear to-do list. Five things on it stand out as the most important.

Get the ships built

A proper Arctic capable ship (Polar research vehicle) is the single most practical and fundamental demand on that list. The conversations with Russia about four icebreaker ships have to turn into signed contracts, not stay as talking points. 

Here’s the awkward reality. Russia operates the world’s biggest nuclear icebreaker fleet, and the only nuclear-powered ones anywhere, while India still has none. Back in December 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov confirmed discussions on building four non-nuclear icebreaker ships in India, valued at more than ₹6,000 crore. Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, is already looking at Indian shipyards, both public and private, for the work. This isn’t simply about purchasing ships. It’s about joint construction, transferring technology, and training Indian crews for polar operations.

Connect the Arctic to the routes India already runs

Formally tie the Northern Sea Route into the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor. That way, the whole thing looks like a natural extension of India’s existing connectivity plans rather than a sudden new idea. 

The INSTC already links India, Iran and Russia by sea, rail and road, and it brings cargo from St Petersburg to Mumbai down to about 25 days instead of the usual 40 via Suez. The Chennai-Vladivostok corridor, which started running in November 2024, gives Indian ports a direct east-west line into Russia’s Far East. Add the Northern Sea Route, and you suddenly have a continuous path from the Indian Ocean up through Vladivostok, into the Arctic, and out toward Europe. Rosatom is actively inviting Indian involvement in NSR projects and offering priority access to icebreaker escorts and ports.

In December 2025 India and Russia signed several maritime MoUs that treat the INSTC, the Chennai-Vladivostok corridor and the Northern Sea Route as one connected network. The committee isn’t asking Delhi to invent anything fresh. It’s simply asking it to join up the lines it has already drawn.

Move from buying cargo to owning a share

 Stop limiting yourself to shipping Russian Arctic oil and start taking an equity stake in the projects, the same way ONGC Videsh has done in other places. A pure customer has no real voice while an investor does.

Since 2021 ONGC Videsh has been discussing a minority stake in Russia’s Vostok oil project, which holds an estimated 44 billion barrels of high quality crude, and in the Arctic LNG-2 project on the Gydan peninsula. Gazprom Neft first invited ONGC Videsh into its offshore Arctic work as early as 2017. Even further back, in 2012, ONGC Videsh was already looking at Russian Arctic blocks with ExxonMobil and ENI. India has put about $16 billion into Russian oil and gas overall, but most of that money sits in Siberia and the Far East rather than the Arctic itself.

The committee’s message is straightforward. India needs to shift from buyer to partner. Ownership gives you influence over pricing, production and access. Just buying the oil leaves you dependent on the seller’s terms.

Create a group that doesn’t wait for the Arctic Council’s approval 

The Arctic Council has been largely frozen since 2022, when the other seven members suspended work with Russia after the Ukraine invasion. In that situation the committee’s idea of a quadrilateral with Japan, South Korea and Singapore looks more practical in the short term than waiting for all eight Arctic states to agree on anything. All four countries are Asian observers on the Council. All four run polar research programmes. All four want Arctic access without getting stuck in the Russia-West standoff. Japan already has two icebreakers. South Korea has one. Singapore has none, but it is a major shipping hub. India also has none, yet it already operates Himadri in Svalbard, is expanding its research presence, and currently holds the BRICS chair.

Such a quadrilateral would not replace the Arctic Council. It would simply work around the blockage, concentrating on joint research, shared logistics, and coordinated positions on the Northern Sea Route, data exchange and climate monitoring. The committee is not telling India to walk away from the Council. It is telling Delhi to stop sitting around waiting for the Council to thaw.

Make full use of the BRICS chair while India still holds it  

India has the BRICS presidency through 2026, exactly when Arctic issues and Global South concerns are starting to overlap. That is a concrete, time limited tool, not some vague future chance, and it vanishes the moment the chairship ends. 

In May 2025 the BRICS Working Group on Ocean and Polar Science and Technology held its seventh meeting in Brasília and approved a five-year plan for joint polar research. Russia, Brazil, South Africa and China all have their own Arctic or Antarctic interests. Brazil runs an Antarctic station. South Africa has a Southern Ocean programme. China operates two Arctic stations and an icebreaker fleet. India’s 2026 presidency is the moment to lift polar cooperation from a working-group topic to a summit priority.

India should use the BRICS chair to present itself as the voice of the Global South in Arctic affairs. That means treating the Arctic not only as a resource zone but as a climate zone, one where melting ice in the far north already influences monsoon patterns across the Global South. It means pressing for technology sharing, joint research and fairer access to polar resources. And it means acting now, while the gavel is still in Delhi’s hands. Once the chairship ends, that lever is gone.

Conclusion: Passenger or pilot

None of this means India has to walk away from the Indo-Pacific, or pick Moscow over its other partners. It simply asks Delhi to stop treating the Arctic as a side hobby for scientists, and start seeing it for what the ice has already decided. It is a live strategic theatre, one that carries a monsoon, a shipping lane, and a century-old claim to a seat at the table. The ice isn’t going to wait for any committee to meet again.

The route is opening. The monsoon is already shifting. And for the first time, Delhi has a clear parliamentary mandate to act, not just watch from the sidelines. India’s claim to the Arctic didn’t begin this year. It began in Paris, in February 1920. The only question left is whether, in 2026, India finally starts behaving like it.

Passenger, or one of the pilots? Customer, or partner? The ice is melting.