The meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on the steps of Hyderabad House was much more than a routine diplomatic photo opportunity. When Prime Minister Modi referred to Takaichi as his “younger sister,” the gesture symbolised the growing trust and warmth between the two nations. Today, the India–Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership has evolved beyond diplomatic declarations and is emerging as one of the strongest strategic partnerships shaping Asia’s changing political landscape. However, this meeting appears to have significantly heightened concerns in Beijing.

The visit generated the greatest unease in China. This was clearly reflected in the reporting of the Global Times, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By attempting to link the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to India with a trivial and unsubstantiated controversy over ‘tap water,’ the publication demonstrated that China’s state media increasingly resembles a social media troll rather than a serious journalistic institution.

The Global Times’ Propaganda: A Decline in Chinese Journalism

The Global Times claimed that members of the Japanese delegation neither drank tap water in India nor even used it for rinsing their mouths, and instead relied on bottled water. However, the report appears less like factual journalism and more like an attempt to construct a political narrative through propaganda. Such targeted media campaigns have been employed repeatedly by Chinese state media in the past.

In reality, it is not unusual for foreign delegations to carry their own drinking water or arrange for special meals during official visits. Such practices are generally part of established security, health, and diplomatic protocols. Interpreting them as an insult to the host country is both inaccurate and misleading.

History offers a comparable example. In 1902, when Maharaja Sawai Madho Singh II travelled to London, he carried approximately 4,000 litres of water from the Ganga River in two massive silver urns. His decision was motivated by religious faith rather than any intention to offend Britain. At the time, the world viewed this as an expression of cultural and religious devotion.

Against this backdrop, creating controversy over the Japanese delegation’s use of bottled water appears to be a weak and unconvincing argument. It raises no legitimate questions about India’s image; instead, it suggests that the Global Times sought to transform a routine diplomatic protocol into a political controversy.

The newspaper attempted to portray the Japanese Prime Minister’s decision not to drink tap water as an insult to India. However, this claim withstands neither journalistic scrutiny nor common sense.

Across the world, it is standard practice for foreign delegations to follow predetermined health and security protocols during official visits. Associating such measures with a nation’s dignity or prestige reflects an effort to advance a political narrative rather than present objective facts.

For this reason, the Global Times report appears more like propaganda than journalism. It also reflects a broader tendency within China’s political communication framework to portray personal preferences, institutional protocols, or security-related decisions as political statements. The primary objective of such reporting seems less about informing the public and more about shaping a particular perception.

What Is the Real Reason Behind China’s Unease?

China’s discomfort is not merely the result of a diplomatic meeting. The deeper reason is that the relationship between India and Japan has evolved far beyond traditional friendship. The two countries are now rapidly expanding cooperation in defence, technology, economic development, and the Indo-Pacific strategy. It is this growing strategic partnership that has become a source of concern for China.

1. Defence and Strategic Cooperation: A Growing Challenge for China

India and Japan are growing closer than ever in the field of maritime security. The two countries have agreed to jointly develop the UNICORN (Unified Complex Radio Antenna) naval radio antenna system for the Indian Navy. The project is expected to significantly strengthen the Navy’s operational capabilities, particularly in stealth operations.

At the same time, India’s Act East Policy and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision are complementing each other. The objective of this partnership extends beyond strengthening relations with Southeast Asian nations and seeks to integrate India’s northeastern states with Asia’s economic and strategic networks.

To advance this objective, the two countries established the Act East Forum (AEF), through which Japan has been making substantial investments in roads, bridges, and connectivity projects in states such as Assam, Meghalaya, and Mizoram.

One of the most significant examples is the Dhubri–Phulbari Bridge across the Brahmaputra River. This infrastructure project is expected to transform the economic landscape of Northeast India by improving the movement of people and goods, facilitating trade, and creating new investment opportunities across the region.

Its significance, however, extends beyond economic development. Improved road and transport connectivity will enable India’s northeastern region to connect more directly with Southeast Asia. This will accelerate the implementation of India’s Act East Policy while simultaneously strengthening the country’s strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The shared objective of India and Japan is to reinforce a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Such cooperation naturally increases pressure on China’s expanding military activities in the region.

Although India and Japan face different security challenges, many of their concerns stem from the same source, which is China’s increasingly assertive behaviour.

For India, the principal challenge lies in China’s military activities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the growing pressure on the disputed border. For Japan, one of the most significant strategic concerns is the security of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, where China has consistently sought to expand its territorial claims and military presence.

Consequently, the security interests of India and Japan have become increasingly complementary. Both countries recognise that peace and a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific can only be maintained through strong strategic cooperation among regional partners.

It is within this broader strategic framework that the roles of India and Japan in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) have steadily expanded. Together with the United States and Australia, the Quad supports a free, open, secure, and rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific.

China, however, views the grouping as a significant strategic challenge to its expanding maritime influence and regional ambitions. As a result, the Quad has evolved beyond a diplomatic forum into an important security framework aimed at maintaining the regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

2. Semiconductors and Supply Chains: Reducing Dependence on China

India and Japan are also rapidly expanding their cooperation in the technology sector. Both countries are working together in strategically important areas such as semiconductors, electronics, and critical minerals to reduce global dependence on Chinese supply chains.

One notable example is Renesas Electronics’ semiconductor project in Sanand, Gujarat, valued at approximately ₹7,600 crore, along with growing Japanese investments in India’s northeastern region. These initiatives are widely regarded as components of a broader strategy to diversify global manufacturing and supply chains.

If these efforts prove successful, multinational companies may gain a strong alternative to China for advanced manufacturing and technology production.

3. Economic Cooperation: Toward a New Economic Powerhouse in Asia

India and Japan are also exploring mechanisms to expand bilateral trade using their respective national currencies, the Indian Rupee (INR) and the Japanese Yen (JPY). The objective is to simplify commercial transactions while strengthening economic cooperation.

The two countries are examining the possibility of establishing direct INR–JPY trade, thereby reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar for bilateral transactions. Such an arrangement would do more than facilitate trade. It carries significant strategic implications by helping both countries reduce exchange-rate risks, lower transaction costs, and strengthen their economic sovereignty.

For this reason, the prospect of direct Rupee–Yen trade is increasingly viewed as an indicator of India’s expanding role in the global economy and its strengthening position within the evolving international financial system.

From China’s perspective, this development is particularly significant. India represents one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing consumer markets, while Japan remains a global leader in advanced technology and high-end manufacturing. If the strengths of these two countries are effectively combined, they have the potential to reshape Asia’s economic and strategic landscape.

The Pillars of the India–Japan Partnership

The relationship between India and Japan is no longer confined to diplomacy alone. It is expanding rapidly across multiple sectors, including investment, technology, clean energy, and the future economy. This is why the partnership is increasingly regarded as one of the most significant strategic relationships for both countries.

1. Investment and Economic Cooperation

India and Japan have set ambitious goals to elevate their economic partnership over the coming years. While the earlier target was 5 trillion Japanese yen in investment, discussions are now underway to increase this figure to 10 trillion Japanese yen (approximately US$68 billion) over the next decade.

India is already home to 11 Japanese Industrial Townships (JITs), demonstrating that Japanese companies view India not merely as a consumer market but as a long-term destination for manufacturing and investment.

This growing economic engagement reflects a shared commitment to strengthening industrial cooperation and creating resilient supply chains.

2. Partnership in Clean Energy

The two countries are also deepening cooperation in the energy sector. Japan possesses advanced expertise in emerging technologies such as green hydrogen, while India is implementing its own National Green Hydrogen Mission to accelerate the transition toward clean energy.

If bilateral cooperation continues to expand, India and Japan could together establish a model for sustainable energy development that may serve as an example for the rest of the world.

3. Technology and the Digital Future

China’s long-standing technological dominance is gradually facing increasing competition. In this changing environment, India’s greatest strengths lie in its software ecosystem, engineering talent, and rapidly expanding digital infrastructure. Japan, on the other hand, remains a global leader in hardware, electronics, and high-precision manufacturing.

The combination of these complementary strengths creates the possibility of developing a Sovereign AI Network, an artificial intelligence ecosystem that is not dependent on any single foreign company or country, but instead is built upon the technological capabilities, data resources, and computing infrastructure of India and Japan.

Such collaboration could eventually lead to the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) that are not exclusively trained on Western datasets but are capable of understanding Asian languages, cultures, societies, and local contexts more effectively.

This would allow India and Japan to move beyond being mere consumers of advanced technologies and emerge as significant contributors to the global development of artificial intelligence.

Beyond AI, the partnership also holds considerable promise in fields such as quantum computing, sixth-generation (6G) telecommunications, and other advanced technologies. Recognising these opportunities, both countries continue to strengthen their digital partnership.

Challenges Facing the Partnership

Like every major strategic partnership, India–Japan relations also face practical challenges. Several issues remain unresolved, including achieving a more balanced bilateral trade relationship, differences in foreign policy approaches, particularly regarding Russia, and legal and regulatory complexities surrounding the transfer of advanced defence technologies.

Despite these differences, both governments continue to develop institutional mechanisms designed to encourage investment, facilitate technology sharing, and strengthen industrial collaboration. As a result, many analysts believe that the India–Japan partnership will continue to grow stronger in the coming years.

A Bitter Reality for China

China appears reluctant to recognise that the international system is no longer unipolar. Today’s world is increasingly multipolar, with several major powers shaping the global order.

India is no longer simply a large consumer market; it is emerging as a major global power. Against this backdrop, the Global Times’ emphasis on the so-called ‘tap water controversy’ is nothing but a reflection of China’s growing anxiety over its diminishing strategic influence.

At the same time, India and Japan are rapidly advancing the strategy of friend-shoring by relocating critical industries, supply chains, and investments to trusted partners that share political stability, transparency, and strategic confidence.

The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent geopolitical tensions demonstrated the risks of excessive dependence on a single country for essential goods and manufacturing. Learning from this experience, India and Japan are working together to establish supply chains that are more secure, diversified, and resilient during future crises.

Against the backdrop of Japan’s technological excellence, symbolised by its high-speed bullet trains, and India’s expanding economic influence, China’s growing concern appears understandable.

Together, India and Japan possess the potential not only to balance China’s expanding regional influence and unilateral strategic ambitions but also to shape the future global agenda. Their partnership represents more than an economic arrangement; it is increasingly emerging as a new strategic security framework for Asia.

China’s Concerns, Strategic Realities, and the Road Ahead

China’s state-run newspaper, Global Times, appears unable or unwilling to recognise how rapidly Asia’s strategic landscape is changing. India is steadily progressing toward becoming one of the world’s largest economies, and with this economic rise, its global strategic role continues to expand.

At a time when India and Japan are broadening cooperation in critical sectors such as defence, space exploration, and advanced technologies, it is only natural that their partnership will have implications for the broader Indo-Pacific region.

One notable example is the Lunar Polar Exploration Mission (LUPEX), under which India and Japan are jointly working toward the exploration of the Moon’s polar regions. At the same time, collaboration in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and resilient supply chains continues to deepen.

These developments constitute precisely the kind of transformation that concerns China. If India and Japan succeed in building credible alternatives in strategic sectors such as defence, space technology, high-tech manufacturing, and semiconductors, they could challenge China’s long-standing dominance in several critical industries.

Against this backdrop, some analysts interpret the emphasis on issues such as the ‘tap water controversy’ as an indication that China is attempting to divert attention away from more substantive strategic and economic developments.

At the same time, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has faced increasing criticism in recent years over concerns related to debt burdens, project viability, and geopolitical influence in several participating countries. In contrast, the India–Japan partnership, with its emphasis on transparency, rules-based cooperation, and technology-driven development, is increasingly being viewed as an alternative model for regional growth in Asia.

Challenges: A Realistic Assessment

The India–Japan partnership is not without its practical limitations. China’s Belt and Road Initiative remains one of the world’s largest infrastructure and financing programs. In terms of capital investment and the number of projects, India and Japan have yet to match their scale.

Similarly, issues such as legal complexities surrounding defence technology transfers and bilateral trade imbalances continue to present challenges. However, the objective of India and Japan has never been to replicate the Belt and Road Initiative. Instead, their approach emphasises infrastructure that is transparent, financially sustainable, beneficial to local economies, and free from unsustainable debt obligations.

In recent years, several BRI projects have encountered difficulties arising from excessive debt, escalating costs, political resistance, and limited economic returns. Consequently, many developing countries are increasingly seeking not only financial investment but also reliable, transparent, and long-term strategic partners.

The geopolitical environment has changed considerably. China may eventually need to move beyond its traditional revisionist approach and acknowledge the emerging framework of regional cooperation.

Indeed, the foreign policies of India and Japan are not identical. Japan’s security architecture has long been anchored in its alliance with the United States, whereas India follows a policy of strategic autonomy, seeking to avoid formal alignment with any single geopolitical bloc. Their distinct responses to the Russia–Ukraine conflict are an illustration of these dissimilarities.

Nevertheless, the success of a strategic partnership should not be measured by whether two countries agree on every international issue. Rather, its true strength lies in their ability to cooperate consistently on areas of shared strategic interest.

In the case of India and Japan, this shared foundation is evident. Their interests converge on several critical issues, including responding to China’s growing assertiveness, preserving a free and rules-based Indo-Pacific, strengthening secure supply chains, advancing semiconductor manufacturing, promoting emerging technologies, and building reliable long-term economic partnerships.

For this reason, despite differences over issues such as Russia, bilateral cooperation has continued to expand in areas including defence collaboration, the Quad, semiconductor development, the Act East Forum, digital partnerships, and infrastructure development.

The strength of the India–Japan partnership therefore, does not rest upon any single international crisis. Instead, it is built upon multiple pillars of shared strategic interests, making it increasingly resilient and well-positioned for the future.

On 5th June, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas rejected reports claiming that Bhutan had turned down an offer of E20 petrol from India. In a post on X, the Ministry clarified that Indian Oil Marketing Companies had made no such offer and that there was no proposal to export E20 petrol to Bhutan.

Fact Check

Claims that Bhutan declined an offer to import E20 petrol from India are incorrect.

No such offer has been made by the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs), and there is no proposal for export of E20 petrol to Bhutan.

Please rely only on official information from… pic.twitter.com/sqyAcEIvbw

— Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas #MoPNG (@PetroleumMin) July 5, 2026

The misleading claim originated in The Bhutanese, a newspaper founded and edited by Tenzing Lamsang. The report claimed that Indian OMCs, including IOCL, BPCL and HPCL, had offered E20 petrol to Bhutan, but the country had resisted the supply over infrastructure and fuel-quality concerns.

After Indian media outlets picked up the claim, the Petroleum Ministry issued its clarification and advised people to rely on official communications.

Lamsang’s own document did not prove his claim

Following the clarification, Lamsang defended his newspaper and shared a response received from Bhutan’s Department of Trade. He claimed that the document confirmed that Indian OMCs had offered E20 during technical meetings and that Bhutan had declined it.

1/2
Since people have tagged me to this tweet, please find the written response by the Department of Trade of the Bhutanese Govt confirming to me an offer was made by Indian OMCs & the Department requested the OMCs to supply normal petrol.
My verbal interviews confirmed it too. https://t.co/X2AMVOIieC pic.twitter.com/DVBy8WvPcm

— Tenzing Lamsang (@TenzingLamsang) July 5, 2026

However, the document said no such thing. It merely stated that Bhutan was not importing E20 and had requested Indian suppliers to continue providing conventional petrol for as long as it remained available. Bhutan also sought advance notice of any future transition so that dealers could upgrade old underground tanks and other infrastructure.

The response confirmed Bhutan’s concerns and preparations. It did not confirm that India had made an offer that Bhutan subsequently rejected. Lamsang therefore turned a precautionary request from Bhutan into a supposed diplomatic rejection of an Indian proposal.

His attempt to defend the report using a document that did not support its central claim raises questions about whether the story was designed to manufacture the appearance of friction between India and Bhutan.

"Bhutan Won't Buy Ethanol-Blended Petrol"

This half truth was spread by anti-Hindu, anti-India Tenzing Lamsang, who has repeatedly incited hatred against the Hindutva IT cell.

He has also been siding with Islamist and claimed that Buddhist monasteries lie buried beneath temples… pic.twitter.com/Sfv9qCFOeW

— OpIndia.com (@OpIndia_com) July 5, 2026

Who is Tenzing Lamsang

Tenzing Lamsang is the founder and editor of the Bhutanese newspaper The Bhutanese. His social media history shows that criticism of the Narendra Modi government, Indian institutions and India’s regional conduct is not new for him.

On 2nd May 2019, following the Lok Sabha elections, Lamsang wrote, “The biggest loser of India’s 2019 polls is the Election Commission of India’s credibility and its hard won regional and international reputation.” He added that the Election Commission had been reduced to the status of the CBI, which supposedly followed “the whims of the party in power”.

Lamsang wanted to portray India’s constitutional institutions as compromised merely because an election was not unfolding according to the expectations of Modi’s opponents. He repeated this line several years later without offering evidence of institutional capture.

On 6th May 2026, he claimed, “The signs were there earlier, but what has become crystal clear from the West Bengal polls is that India no longer has an autonomous Election Commission or an independent Supreme Court.” He declared that the “institutional capture of power is complete”.

The sweeping accusation did not identify any judgment, order or legal provision establishing that either institution had surrendered its independence. Political disagreement with an election result or a court decision does not prove institutional capture.

Modi’s popularity reduced to an anti-Muslim conspiracy

On 31st May 2021, Lamsang reacted to a survey listing the abrogation of Article 370 and the Supreme Court verdict on the Ram Mandir among the Modi government’s major achievements.

He wrote, “So Modi is most popular for removing the special status for a largely Muslim state and the Supreme Court decision to allow a temple to be built on a destroyed Muslim mosque. Thinking hard here to spot the common thread in his popularity.”

Through this framing, he attempted to reduce two complex constitutional and historical issues to supposed hostility towards Muslims. Article 370 concerned the constitutional status and complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir. The Ram Mandir was built after a Supreme Court judgment based on documentary, archaeological and legal evidence. Presenting both merely as attacks on Muslims erased their wider legal and historical context.

Comparing Modi-era India with the Emergency

On 19th December 2019, Lamsang wrote, “For all her flaws, Indira Gandhi had the decency to actually declare that an Emergency is in effect.”

The post suggested that India under Modi was facing conditions comparable to the Emergency, when fundamental rights were suspended, opposition leaders were imprisoned and the press was censored. Criticism of the government, political protests and adverse media coverage were all continuing openly when Lamsang posted the remark, undermining his own attempt to suggest an undeclared Emergency.

A day earlier, on 18th December 2019, he had shared images of foreign newspapers covering protests in India and asked, “What was that about India now being more respected abroad than before?” He added that such headlines were usually reserved for “China, North Korea, Iran” and claimed that India’s “troll army” could only respond by abusing foreign journalists.

He wanted adverse Western coverage of protests to be treated as proof that India had become an international pariah. Foreign newspaper headlines, however, are neither impartial measures of diplomatic standing nor evidence that India resembles authoritarian regimes.

Targeting India over Ram Mandir and historical disputes

On 21st May 2022, just days after a Shivling was discovered during the court-mandated survey of the disputed Gyanvapi structure, Lamsang wrote that if Buddhists asserted legal and historical claims, “a lot of temples and mosques in India will be in trouble”. He referred to temples allegedly built over Buddhist monasteries and mosques later constructed over those temples, adding, “Surveys will provide the evidence.”

The timing and framing appeared aimed at diluting the Gyanvapi dispute and other cases involving temples destroyed or occupied during Islamic invasions by introducing broad, unverified counterclaims. Legal disputes over religious sites are determined through evidence concerning specific properties. They cannot be dismissed through sweeping equivalences.

Pushing an unverified motive in Surya Chauhan’s murder

On 3rd June 2026, Lamsang claimed that Surya Chauhan had harassed Asad’s sister and that Asad had repeatedly asked him to stop before murdering him. He attributed the claim to Surya’s neighbour, described as “a Hindu youth”, who had reportedly spoken to “a Hindu journalist”. He had quoted propagandist and anti-Hindu Karishma Aziz for this post.

Surya Chauhan was a Class 11 student who was attacked in Khora on Bakrid. According to one of his friends, Asad had called Surya to the spot before surrounding him with his associates. Before the assault, Asad reportedly asked Surya whether he had ever seen a goat being slaughtered in the halal manner and said that he would show him. Surya was then allegedly stabbed multiple times. CCTV footage showing a group of youths attacking him also surfaced. He was taken to hospital but succumbed to his injuries on Friday afternoon.

Instead of restricting himself to the known circumstances of the attack, Lamsang circulated a motive that was not backed by any police finding cited in his post. He relied on a second-hand account while repeatedly highlighting the religious identities of the neighbour and the journalist, apparently to lend credibility to an otherwise unverified claim.

His old thread portrayed India as a regional bully

Lamsang’s hostility towards India’s regional position was particularly visible in a thread posted on 19th June 2019. He claimed that India’s idea of a friendly neighbourhood was “complete domination/monopoly” and said that South Asian countries had invited China to counterbalance India.

Thread

India’s idea of a ‘friendly neighborhood’ is to have complete domination/monopoly in the neighborhood with no foreign powers as it was used to for many decades.

Bhutan is a unique case but much of South Asia has unsurprisingly invited in China to counterbalance. https://t.co/WkGfbFvUzI

— Tenzing Lamsang (@TenzingLamsang) June 19, 2019

He described Indian concerns about neighbouring countries moving towards China as a reaction to Indian “loud mouths”. He compared Indian and Chinese economic and military capabilities, argued that India faced Pakistan and China on two fronts and claimed that even India’s partners did not support it during the Doklam confrontation.

Now knowing your arrogant demeanor you may say ‘Hey Doklam was about safeguarding Bhutan’s disputed border with China.’

Not really.

China has made past various incursions on Bhutanese side but not a peep from India.

This time it affected your chicken neck so all the noise.

— Tenzing Lamsang (@TenzingLamsang) June 19, 2019

He further claimed that India acted at Doklam not to defend Bhutan but because Chinese activity threatened India’s strategically important “chicken neck”. The thread repeatedly cast India as arrogant, weak and dependent on Bhutan while presenting Chinese expansion in South Asia as a defensive response to Indian conduct.

Seen alongside his latest E20 story, the pattern is difficult to miss. A routine Bhutanese request for continued conventional petrol supplies was converted into “Bhutan rejects India”. When the Indian government corrected the claim, Lamsang’s own evidence failed to substantiate it. His past posts show why such framing may have appealed to him, as it fits his longstanding attempt to depict the Modi government as authoritarian and India as an overbearing regional power.

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas of the Government of India has denied reports by a section of Bhutanese media claiming that Bhutan has said no to E20 petrol exported from India. In a post on its official X account, the Ministry clarified that no such offer has been made by Indian Oil Marketing Companies, and there is no proposal whatsoever for the export of E20 petrol to Bhutan. The Ministry has advised the public to rely solely on official communications from itself and the OMCs rather than unverified reports.

Fact Check

Claims that Bhutan declined an offer to import E20 petrol from India are incorrect.

No such offer has been made by the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs), and there is no proposal for export of E20 petrol to Bhutan.

Please rely only on official information from… pic.twitter.com/sqyAcEIvbw

— Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas #MoPNG (@PetroleumMin) July 5, 2026

The claim by The Bhutanese

This clarification directly addresses a report published by The Bhutanese, which claimed that Bhutan had turned down offers of E20 petrol from Indian OMCs including IOCL, BPCL and HPCL. The article said that the Department of Trade of the Royal Government of Bhutan had confirmed that Bhutan is not importing E20 and had resisted such supplies due to concerns over fuel quality, compatibility with older underground storage tanks, and risks of water seepage in Bhutan’s hilly terrain.

The report published last week claimed that Indian OMCs are offering E20, but Bhutan is resisting the offer. It stated, “It has been learnt that Indian Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) have been offering to supply E20 petrol to Bhutan, but Bhutan has resisted so far.” As per the report, the govt is concerned that the tanks used by petrol pumps in the country are not compatible with ethanol-blended petrol, and thinks that it may pose challenges in ensuring fuel quality and preventing contamination

It quoted the Department as having requested Indian PSUs and OMCs to continue supplying normal motor spirit as long as it remains available in the Indian market, while seeking advance notice in the event of any future transition to ethanol blends, in case pure petrol becomes unavailable in India, so that dealers could upgrade their infrastructure in time. The report presented this as Bhutan effectively saying no to an ethanol fuel offer from India.

The Bhutanese report, which was published last week, was picked up by several Indian news outlets yesterday and today, leading to widespread circulation of the claim that Bhutan has rejected to buy E20 petrol from India.

Editor defends claim, exposes himself

After India’s fact check clarifying that Indian OMCs have not offered E20 to Bhutan yet, Tenzing Lamsang, editor of The Bhutanese, posted a thread on X in which he stood by his newspaper’s story. He shared a copy of a written response from Bhutan’s Department of Trade, claiming it confirmed that an offer for E20 had been made by Indian OMCs during technical meetings, which was rejected by Bhutan. Lamsang added that his verbal interviews with officials had also verified this account, and he reiterated that The Bhutanese stood by the report based on both written and verbal inputs from official sources, while expressing appreciation for India’s consistent fuel supplies to Bhutan.

1/2
Since people have tagged me to this tweet, please find the written response by the Department of Trade of the Bhutanese Govt confirming to me an offer was made by Indian OMCs & the Department requested the OMCs to supply normal petrol.
My verbal interviews confirmed it too. https://t.co/X2AMVOIieC pic.twitter.com/DVBy8WvPcm

— Tenzing Lamsang (@TenzingLamsang) July 5, 2026

A careful examination of the very statement posted by Tenzing Lamsang himself, however, shows that it does not support the claim of an offer having been made or declined. The official response from the Department of Trade, issued in reply to specific questions from The Bhutanese, begins by stating plainly that Bhutan is not importing E20 petrol fuel. It then explains the technical concerns about ethanol-blended petrol absorbing water due to its hygroscopic properties, the condition of existing old underground tanks, and risks of contamination or performance issues in Bhutan’s terrain.

Crucially, it records that in view of these concerns, the Indian PSUs and OMCs were requested during technical meetings to continue supplying normal petrol for Bhutan as long as such fuel remains available in the Indian market. It further notes that Bhutan has asked for advance notice should India move to higher ethanol blending levels, to allow time for infrastructure upgrades.

The document makes it clear that it was a proactive request from the Bhutanese side for continued supply of conventional petrol and advance notice for preparatory planning for any future change in Indian supply. It contains no reference to any formal offer, proposal or push from the Indian OMCs to supply E20 that was then turned down by Bhutan.

This distinction is significant. The written statement confirms Bhutan’s preference for normal petrol and its infrastructure-related apprehensions, but it does not say that Indian OMCs extended an offer for E20 which Bhutan rejected.

"Bhutan Won't Buy Ethanol-Blended Petrol"

This half truth was spread by anti-Hindu, anti-India Tenzing Lamsang, who has repeatedly incited hatred against the Hindutva IT cell.

He has also been siding with Islamist and claimed that Buddhist monasteries lie buried beneath temples… pic.twitter.com/Sfv9qCFOeW

— OpIndia.com (@OpIndia_com) July 5, 2026

India’s Petroleum Ministry’s position that no such offer was made and no export proposal exists is therefore consistent with the text of the official Bhutanese response. While Tenzing Lamsang has maintained that verbal communications indicated Indian OMCs were raising ethanol-related points in meetings, the documented evidence he himself shared does not corroborate the existence of such an offer.

Therefore, the original article’s claim that Bhutan said no to ethanol fuel offer from Indian OMCs is based on an interpretation that goes beyond what the official written record actually states. Bhutan’s request for assurances on continued normal petrol supply, and for advance notice of any change, reflects prudent planning on its part given its complete dependence on Indian fuel imports and the practical challenges of its storage infrastructure, but this does not mean rejecting an offer that was never extended.

It is interesting to note that while Bhutan is not ready for ethanol-blended petrol yet, Nepal has already prepared for it to cut the cost of imported oil. The Nepal government has allowed Nepal Oil Corporation to blend up to 10 percent ethanol in every litre of petrol, depending on availability. This is a global trend, with oil supply becoming uncertain over global conflicts, governments dependent on imported oil are looking towards using ethanol to partially replace petrol. Therefore, it is possible that Bhutan govt may also mandate the industry to upgrade its infrastructure to use ethanol.

Notably, Bhutan does not have an automobile industry, and most of the vehicles used in the country are imported from India. Which means most of the cars being used in the country are already compatible with E10 and E20 petrol. However, the government is concerned about the petrol pumps, as their tanks and equipment may require upgrades.

It is evident that a normal proactive request by Bhutan to India was wrongly turned into ‘Bhutan said no India’ by The Bhutanese, whose editor, Tenzing Lamsang, is known for his views against the Narendra Modi-led BJP government in India. He has been supporting anti-India forces in India, and speaking against most of the decisions taken by the Modi government. Therefore, the latest report, and then his ‘clarification’, can be seen as his and his newspaper’s attempt to create the impression of a rift between India and Bhutan.

While Indian companies have not offered E20 petrol to Bhutan yet, Tenzing Lamsang created a hypothetical situation of India offering such fuel to Bhutan based on the statement from the Bhutan government to make the claim that the Bhutan govt has rejected the blended fuel. In an attempt to create such a narrative, he asked questions to the Bhutan govt, and used the reply for his propaganda, even though the govt’s response didn’t support his claims.

The Chief Minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, has been able to do the unthinkable: Erase fault lines and friction between the Assamese Hindu and the Bengali Hindu community living in the State.

For decades, Assam kept boiling over ethnic tensions between the Assamese and the Bengali population. Issues like mass migration, religious persecution, demographic change, and economic opportunities have prevented both cohesion and harmony to a large extent.

Himanta Biswa Sarma took an objective approach to draw a much-needed distinction between Bengali Hindu refugees (who migrated to the Indian State to flee persecution) and Bengali Muslim infiltrators (who came to Assam for economic opportunities).

How can someone who came to Assam to protect his religious identity be compared to someone who first created an Islamic nation and then migrated to the Indian State for opportunism? Although such a comparison is untenable, it remained the mainstay of politics in Assam.

But years of political propaganda, aimed at dividing and ruling over the masses, have been decimated under the leadership of Himanta Biswa Sarma.

Through targeted messaging, awareness about the big difference between the two groups and their contribution to demographic change was made crystal clear.

The Assamese Hindu community, which was once made to believe by vested political groups that their Bengali Hindu counterpart is somehow their enemy, is now convinced that there is only one enemy: It is not the refugee but the illegal immigrant who came to the Northeastern State after 24th March 1971 (the cut-off date of the Assam Accord) to reap economic benefits and change its culture.

No single Bengali Hindi in detention camp in Assam: Himanta Biswa Sarma

The matter became crystal clear from a statement of Himanta Biswa Sarma, which he made on Friday (3rd July) at the Indian Express Idea Exchange.

On being asked about D voters in Assam (individuals who are unable to prove Indian nationality with cases pending before the Foreigners Tribunal), he pointed out, “Now, Bengali Hindus’ number has come down below 1 lakh. It was at some point of time it was almost 4.5 lakhs. Tribunals are working, and I think it will be resolved because now the number has become very insignificant.“

The Assam CM pointed out, “There is not a single Bengali Hindu in our detention camp. That is one good news because everything has been resolved. There was no Aadhar card, everyone has got it. Now from 4.5 lakhs, it has come down to below 1 lakh. So the problem is almost resolved. I think this issue will be resolved in 1-2 years because every issue goes to the tribunal and there are disputes in the tribunal. So we are resolving the dispute through a legal process.“

“The number was at some point of time around 12-14 lakhs of both communities (Hindus and Muslims). Today this number has come down to 3.54 lakhs and out of that Bengali Hindus will be below 1 lakh. So this is significantly coming down,” Sarma added.

असम में एक भी हिंदू बंगाली Detention Camp में नहीं है।@IndianExpress pic.twitter.com/GAVgsSJsL1

— Himanta Biswa Sarma (@himantabiswa) July 4, 2026

“But when NRC will be published, I doubt after publishing of NRC the number will jump initially again because many people names will not be there. So that point of time the Bengali Hindu people have to apply under CAA. So this issue is a little complex but we are resolving it,” he concluded.

A change in public perspective and role played by Himanta Biswa Sarma

When the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) was enacted in 2019, there were large-scale protests in Assam. There was an uproar over the possibility of Bengali Hindu refugees, who were undocumented, being granted Indian citizenship. Many political groups in the State also claimed it would nullify the purpose of the Assam Accord, which made every illegal immigrant who came after 16th March 1971 eligible for deportation.

CAA provided a gateway to fast-track citizenship of people belonging to one of the 6 religious groups (Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, Jains and Buddhists) who came to India from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before 31st December 2014 due to religious persecution. Fast forward 7 years, and the cut-off date has been increased to 31st December 2024.

Himanta Biswa Sarma has been able to propagate the message that the Hindu Bengali who was forced to migrate to Assam from East Pakistan/ Bangladesh is different from the Muslim Bengali who came to the Indian State from the other side of the border for economic benefit. Although both are undocumented, one is a refugee while the other is an infiltrator.

As a result, the Assam Accord no longer applies to the Hindu Bengalis refuees, and they are protected under the Citizenship Amendment Act. Himanta Biswa Sarma also made it clear that the National Register of Citizens (NRC) will be implemented in the State and only the ‘infiltrators’ will be put in detention camps until they are deported to Bangladesh. No Bengali Hindu refugee will either be deported or put in detention centres.

Just like Israel is the fatherland of all Jews, India was/ is and will remain the motherland of all Hindus. But to convince the masses, a different magnitude of political will, messaging and policy-making was required in Assam. Himanta Biswa Sarma has been vocal in differentiating between infiltrators and refugees. 

He made the paradigm shift in perspective possible, which was unimaginable 30 years ago. This explains why he received a grand welcome when he visited Silchar in August 2025. Lakhs of Bengalis flocked to catch a glimpse of Himanta Biswa Sarma. The overwhelming reception, warmth and adulation of the public that the Assamese-speaking Chief Minister received on that particular day remains unprecedented in the State’s history.

Ahead of the 2026 Vidhan Sabha election, he received a grand welcome in West Bengal. His speeches were attended by thousands of Bengali voters.

Himanta Biswa Sarma has been unabashed about his Hindu identity and has meticulously worked to unite the community across linguistic and ethnic lines in Assam. The historical differences between Assamese Hindus and Bengali Hindus have healed, and the State has moved in the direction of permanent reconciliation.

The vested groups, which thrived on exploiting fault lines, are watching the development from the sidelines. They have been left dismayed and powerless. All thanks to Himanta Biswa Sarma

Thirty-five years after Sikh man Baljit Singh disappeared from the custody of Chabal Police Station in Punjab, a special CBI court in Mohali sentenced former Punjab Police constable Kashmir Singh to five years of rigorous imprisonment.

The other accused in the case, then SHO Suba Singh, Ravel Singh and Dalbir Singh, were convicted in 2023. Kashmir Singh was on the run for 15 years before being arrested in 2025. Special Judicial Magistrate Karanvir Singh Maju convicted Kashmir Singh of criminal conspiracy, abduction, wrongful confinement and causing hurt to extract information.

Kashmir Singh, who is now 56 years old, received five years under the relevant sections of the IPC. The court also imposed a fine of Rs 10,000 and rejected his request for probation.

What the case is about

The case stemmed from the custodial disappearance of Baljit Singh, a resident of Mallowal Santa village in Tarn Taran district, Punjab. According to the judgment accessed by OpIndia, on 7th August 1991, Baljit and his brother Paramjit Singh travelled by bus to Chabal to purchase manure. When they got down at Chabal bus stand at around 10 am, a team from Chabal Police Station arrived in an unnumbered blue Maruti Gypsy.

Paramjit informed the court that the vehicle was driven by police official Ravel Singh. Then SHO Suba Singh, Dalbir Singh, Kashmir Singh and two other police personnel were inside the Gypsy. He said Suba Singh caught Baljit by the neck and forced him into the Gypsy. Baljit was then taken to Chabal Police Station.

A witness identified as Anoop Singh, who later became the sarpanch of Kambo village, informed the court that he saw police personnel take Baljit into custody and later informed his family.

No formal arrest was recorded. During the investigation, the CBI found that Baljit was neither accused nor wanted in any case. The prosecution said the police detained Baljit over allegations of snatching a woman’s earrings at the bus stand and to extract the names of militants possessing firearms.

Baljit remained in illegal custody for ten days

According to the prosecution, Baljit was kept in the lock-up at Chabal Police Station from 7th August to 16th August 1991. He was never produced before a court, and his detention was not entered in official records.

Baljit’s father, Hari Singh, and brothers, Paramjit, Gurbhag and Dilbagh, repeatedly visited the police station. They brought him food, tea and clothes. Villagers accompanied them on several occasions, but they were never allowed inside the police station. Only Baljit’s father and close relatives were allowed to meet him.

At that time, Baljit’s brother Gurbhag Singh was serving as a Lance Naik in the Indian Army. He was stationed at Pathankot. After learning about the detention, he took leave and returned home. He met Baljit at the police station between 9th and 11th August. SHO Suba Singh told him that Baljit had been detained only for questioning and would be released soon.

On 15th August, Bassan Singh, the brother of Baljit’s wife, accompanied Paramjit to the police station and saw Baljit in the lock-up. Bassan said Baljit asked the family to get him released. It was the last time he saw him.

Relatives said he was tortured in custody

According to Baljit’s relatives, there were visible injuries on his body. Dilbagh Singh informed the court that there were injury marks on his brother’s body and that police personnel had severely beaten him. According to the prosecution, the police personnel tortured Baljit to force him to confess to the earrings-snatching incident and provide information about militants. Surjit Singh alias Fauji, another man reportedly detained illegally at the station, had also stated that Baljit was among the detainees and was beaten by police officials.

According to the CBI, the station had two lock-ups, and there were 20 to 25 people in each of them. Shingara Singh, who was legally arrested in a separate Arms Act and TADA case on 16th August 1991, also spoke about the large number of detainees.

Paramjit said Baljit feared that the policemen would take him out of the station and kill him. The family, however, continued to rely on assurances that he would be released after questioning.

Baljit disappeared on 17th August

When Paramjit went to the police station on 17th August, he did not find Baljit in the lock-up. When the family asked about him, SHO Suba Singh categorically denied detaining Baljit Singh. His reply raised alarm, as several relatives had met Baljit during the preceding ten days.

Surjit Singh said in a statement that Suba Singh and other officials took Baljit away one day and that he was not seen again. Despite repeated efforts by the family, Baljit’s whereabouts were never established.

The family also said police officials tried to stop them from pursuing the case. Paramjit was detained several times in 1991 and 1992. He said he was interrogated and tortured by Suba Singh, Dalbir Singh, Ravel Singh and Kashmir Singh. He was released after Army authorities intervened.

Army officer wrote to the authorities

As Gurbhag Singh was serving with the 22 Punjab Regiment, he approached his Commanding Officer, Colonel Ravinder Singh, for help. The officer wrote several letters to military, police and civil authorities to trace Baljit.

The court record included communications dated 27th August, 11th September, 31st October and 14th November 1991. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar also wrote to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Tarn Taran, on 18th November. Another communication followed in January 1992.

None of the communications produced any information. Years later, the CBI published Baljit’s photograph in The Tribune on 12th February 2007 and Jalandhar Kesari on 14th February. No lead was received.

Baljit’s wife moved the Punjab and Haryana High Court

When Baljit’s family failed to trace him, his wife, Balbir Kaur, filed a Criminal Writ Petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1996. She sought a writ of habeas corpus for the production of her husband.

The petition named senior government and police officials, as well as Suba Singh, Dalbir Singh, Ravel Singh and Kashmir Singh. It said the policemen took Baljit from Chabal bus stand, kept him at the police station for ten days and later denied having detained him.

On 6th April 2005, nine years after the petition was filed, the High Court directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Amritsar to inquire whether Baljit had been taken away by Suba Singh and Dalbir Singh on 7th August 1991.

The CJM submitted the inquiry report on 14th December 2005. The High Court did not accept it. On 27th January 2006, it entrusted the investigation to the CBI.

What the CBI investigation found

Acting on the High Court’s directions, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered the case on 20th March 2006. It recorded statements from Baljit’s relatives, villagers, former detainees, Army officers and police officials. It also obtained the writ petition, the CJM inquiry report, police posting records and the letters sent by Army and civil authorities.

The agency concluded that Baljit had been picked up from the bus stand, illegally confined for ten days and tortured to extract a confession and information. His arrest was never recorded, and there was no case in which he was either an accused or a wanted person.

The CBI found that Suba Singh was the SHO and Dalbir Singh was serving as the additional SHO at Chabal Police Station. On 26th April 2007, it filed a charge sheet against them under Sections 120-B, 365, 344 and 330 of the IPC.

Kashmir Singh and Ravel Singh were not charge-sheeted initially. The investigating officer said Kashmir’s identity could not be firmly established because no Head Constable by that name appeared in the posting record. Paramjit had read the name on the policeman’s uniform but did not personally know him.

Evidence recorded during the trial, however, placed Ravel Singh and Kashmir Singh at the scene. On 19th November 2009, the court summoned both as additional accused under Section 319 of the CrPC.

Three former policemen convicted in 2023

Ravel Singh appeared and faced trial with Suba Singh and Dalbir Singh. On 29th March 2023, the special CBI court convicted all three of criminal conspiracy, abduction, wrongful confinement and causing hurt to obtain information. They were sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment.

The court found that Baljit was abducted from the bus stand, confined without authority and beaten to extract information. It held that the policemen acted in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy.

Balbir Kaur did not live to see the conviction. She died on 6th May 2022, nearly a year before the judgment.

Role of Kashmir Singh

The prosecution said Kashmir Singh was part of the police team that took Baljit away. Paramjit identified him in court as one of the policemen sitting in the Gypsy when Suba Singh caught Baljit and forced him into the vehicle.

Baljit’s brothers also placed Kashmir at Chabal Police Station during the illegal detention. Gurbhag said Kashmir and other policemen told the family that Baljit had been kept only for questioning and would soon be released. Dilbagh said he saw Kashmir at the station while visiting Baljit with food and clothes.

The prosecution also produced official posting records. Former police officer Manmohan Singh proved a list showing that Constable Kashmir Singh, belt number 3956/TT, was posted at Chabal Police Station in August 1991. The record said he was dismissed from service in October 2005.

The court noted that the CBI’s initial uncertainty arose partly because the allegations referred to a Head Constable, while the posting record showed a Constable named Kashmir Singh. It held that the witnesses’ identifications and the official record established his identity and involvement.

Kashmir Singh remained a proclaimed offender for over 15 years

After being summoned in November 2009, Kashmir Singh failed to appear. Non-bailable warrants could not be executed. His father told the serving constable that Kashmir was no longer living at the address given to the court.

He was declared a proclaimed offender on 21st July 2010. He neither challenged the summoning order nor the order declaring him a proclaimed offender, and he did not surrender.

The CBI arrested him on 12th November 2025 and produced him before the court the same day. He remained in judicial custody. Charges were framed against him on 2nd March 2026, and a separate trial followed.

Court rejects Kashmir Singh’s defence

The CBI examined 12 witnesses. Kashmir denied the charges and argued that the agency had not included him in the original charge sheet. His lawyer also questioned the witness identifications and the absence of a test identification parade.

The court rejected the objection over the test identification parade. It said Kashmir had not joined the investigation, had remained a proclaimed offender throughout the earlier trial and had appeared only after his arrest. He also failed to disprove the official posting record or show that his belt number was different from 3956/TT. The defence closed its evidence without examining a witness.

Court refuses leniency

During arguments on the sentence, Kashmir sought leniency. He said he was a first-time offender with no previous criminal record and asked to be released on probation.

The CBI opposed the request. It said Baljit’s disappearance left his dependent wife and four minor children without their breadwinner. It argued that Kashmir was a police official entrusted with protecting citizens but participated in the illegal detention and torture of a man who then disappeared.

The court described the acts as barbaric and held that a lenient sentence would adversely affect society. It sentenced Kashmir to five years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 365, three years under Section 344, three years under Section 330 and two years for conspiracy. All sentences will run concurrently. The period already spent in custody will be set off against the sentence.

Punjab was battling a brutal Khalistani insurgency when Baljit Singh disappeared

Baljit Singh’s custodial disappearance took place at a time when Punjab was passing through one of the bloodiest periods in its history. Khalistani terrorist organisations were carrying out assassinations, bombings and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, police personnel, journalists, political leaders and those who publicly opposed separatism. Hindu passengers were frequently singled out on buses and trains, while Sikhs who resisted the terrorists or supported the Indian state were also murdered. The violence was aimed not only at spreading fear but also at creating a communal divide between Hindus and Sikhs.

One of the prominent early victims was veteran journalist and Hind Samachar Group founder Lala Jagat Narain, an outspoken critic of Khalistani separatism. He was shot dead near Ludhiana on 9th September 1981. Less than three years later, on 12th May 1984, terrorists murdered his son, Ramesh Chander, who had continued the newspaper group’s campaign against militancy. He was returning from an event when gunmen opened fire on him at a busy junction in Jalandhar. Several other editors, employees, newspaper hawkers and agents associated with the group were also targeted during the insurgency.

Public transport became a recurring target. In October 1983, terrorists stopped a bus near Dhilwan, separated six Hindu passengers from the others and shot them dead. In November 1986, gunmen forced Hindu passengers out of a bus in Punjab and killed 24 of them with automatic weapons. On 6th July 1987, armed terrorists intercepted a Haryana Roadways bus travelling from Chandigarh to Rishikesh near Lalru. They fired from both ends of the vehicle, killing 38 passengers, including women and children, and injuring over 30 others. The bus was carrying Hindu pilgrims, though available records describe their destination as Rishikesh, not Vaishno Devi.

On 25th June 1989, terrorists attacked an RSS shakha at Jawahar Lal Nehru Park in Moga. Twenty-one RSS workers were gunned down during the morning gathering. A couple and two police personnel were killed when a bomb planted at the park exploded afterwards, taking the toll to 25. The Punjab government’s official Moga district website records that another 31 people were injured. The attack was designed to provoke communal retaliation, but the RSS resumed its shakha at the same location the following day.

Months later, terrorists entered the hostel of Thapar Engineering College in Patiala during a youth festival. On the intervening night of 10th and 11th November 1989, they opened fire on students sleeping in two rooms. Nineteen students from educational institutions in Kurukshetra and Kanpur were killed, and five others were injured. The victims had travelled to Punjab only to participate in the festival.

The following year witnessed the Abohar Goli Kand. On the evening of 7th March 1990, armed terrorists entered the crowded Sadar Bazaar in the border town of Abohar and fired indiscriminately at shoppers and traders. Initial reports said 22 people were killed and more than 40 were injured. Later accounts placed the death toll at 32 after several of the injured died in hospital. The attack turned an ordinary market into a scene of mass killing within minutes.

The situation remained equally grim in 1991, the year Baljit Singh disappeared. On 15th June, terrorists stopped two passenger trains near Ludhiana and opened fire inside the compartments. An official Union Home Ministry compilation records 74 deaths in the two train attacks, while contemporary media reports gave higher figures. On 26th December that year, terrorists struck another passenger train travelling from Ludhiana towards Ferozepur. They fired at passengers believed to be Hindus, killing 49 people.

Political leaders, police personnel and public officials were also under constant threat. Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh, whose government had overseen the campaign that brought the insurgency under control, was assassinated in a suicide bombing outside the Punjab and Haryana Civil Secretariat in Chandigarh on 31st August 1995. Court records state that 17 people, including Beant Singh, were killed in the explosion.

This was the violent environment in which the police were operating when Baljit Singh was picked up in August 1991. The scale of terrorist violence explains the extraordinary pressure on Punjab Police and the security apparatus during the period. It does not, however, legalise an unrecorded arrest, custodial torture or the disappearance of a person who was neither wanted nor accused in any case.

The release of Shabir Ahmed, one of the main convicts in Britain’s most notorious child sexual abuse case, has triggered widespread protests and renewed anger across the country. After spending 14 years in prison, Ahmed has walked free under an early release scheme, leaving victims fearful and many people demanding that he be deported to Pakistan.

However, the old British immigration law and Pakistan’s past refusal to accept similar offenders have made the issue more complicated. The issue has once again brought attention to one of the darkest criminal cases in modern British history.

Who is Shabir Ahmed, and what were the charges against him?

Shabir Ahmed was born in Pakistan and moved to Britain several decades ago, where he settled permanently. In 2012, a British court identified him as the leader of a nine-member gang involved in the sexual exploitation of vulnerable and underage girls in the town of Rochdale.

The court found him guilty of 30 counts of rape and other serious sexual offences involving minor girls. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison.

During the trial, it came out that Ahmed and the other gang members targeted girls from troubled and poor backgrounds. They gained the victims’ trust by offering free food, cigarettes and alcohol before trapping them in a cycle of repeated sexual and mental abuse.

The victims later told investigators that they were so frightened that they were forced to call Ahmed “Daddy.” The case exposed major failures in Britain’s policing and child protection systems and remains one of the country’s most shocking child abuse scandals.

The victims are scared after the early release of Ahmed from jail

Ahmed was released recently after serving 14 years in prison under Britain’s early release scheme. Although he is no longer behind bars, authorities have placed him under strict monitoring.

He now wears a GPS electronic tag that tracks his movements at all times. He has also been banned from entering Rochdale and nearby Oldham to reduce the risk of coming into contact with his victims.

Even with these restrictions, his release has deeply upset survivors of the abuse. One victim told the media that she fears not only for her own safety but also for the safety of her children. She said the news of Ahmed’s release has reopened old wounds and left many victims afraid to leave their homes.

The anger has also spread to local communities. Protesters have taken to the streets in Rochdale, while groups of local residents have started night patrols, saying they want to help protect victims. Many people believe someone convicted of such serious crimes should not be living freely in society.

The loophole in the 1971 immigration Act that shielded Ahmed

Following his conviction, the British government removed Ahmed’s British citizenship. As a result, he is now legally considered a Pakistani citizen.

Despite that, the government has not been able to deport him immediately because of a provision in the UK’s Immigration Act 1971.

Under the law, Commonwealth citizens who arrived in Britain before 1973 and had legally lived in the country for at least five years are protected from deportation in many cases.

Since Pakistan was a member of the Commonwealth at that time and Ahmed arrived in Britain in the late 1960s, he falls under this legal protection. This has made it difficult for British authorities to remove him from the country, despite the seriousness of his crimes.

The case has led to growing criticism of the old law, with many arguing that it was never meant to protect people convicted of grave offences.

Pressure on Britain as Pakistan refuses to take back convicts

The case has now put the British government under increasing political pressure. Several senior leaders have said that the decades-old immigration law should not be allowed to protect dangerous criminals.

Prime Minister has directed the Home Office to review Ahmed’s case and examine possible legal options. At the same time, lawmakers are discussing a new immigration bill in Parliament that could make it easier to deport people convicted of serious crimes by changing or updating the existing law.

Even if the legal hurdle is removed, another challenge remains. Britain still needs Pakistan’s cooperation to complete any deportation process.

British officials have already held discussions with the Pakistani government, but Pakistan has previously refused to accept similar offenders. Earlier, two other members of the Rochdale grooming gang also had their British citizenship removed, yet Pakistan declined to allow them to enter the country.

Some British politicians have now argued that if Pakistan refuses to accept Ahmed as well, the UK should consider reducing the foreign aid it provides to Pakistan.

For now, Ahmed remains in Britain under strict supervision, while the legal battle over his deportation continues. His release has once again raised difficult questions about public safety, justice for victims, immigration laws and international cooperation in dealing with convicted criminals.

On Saturday, 4th July, Prime Minister Narendra Modi formally inaugurated the integrated refinery-cum-petrochemical complex at Rajasthan’s Pachpadra after touring the sprawling complex. Along with the refinery, he also inaugurated and laid the foundation stone for several other development projects related to urban transport, railways, highways, renewable energy and power transmission. 

Inaugurated the integrated refinery-cum-petrochemical Complex, the HPCL Rajasthan Refinery at Pachpadra today. This landmark project will strengthen India’s energy security, boost domestic manufacturing, generate employment and accelerate economic transformation. It is another… pic.twitter.com/zWuYok3rvZ

— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) July 4, 2026

He dedicated the country’s first greenfield integrated refinery-cum-petrochemical complex to the nation at Pachpadra in Rajasthan’s Balotra district, marking a major milestone for India’s energy sector and industrial development. The massive refinery project, which has been under development for several years, is expected to transform the economy of western Rajasthan and emerge as one of the country’s largest integrated refinery-cum-petrochemical complexes.

PM Modi inaugurates refinery-cum-petrochemical complex at Pachpadra#ITLivestream #Barmer #Rajasthan https://t.co/n8wgHWCaaI

— IndiaToday (@IndiaToday) July 4, 2026

These projects are aimed at strengthening Rajasthan’s infrastructure while boosting industrial growth and employment opportunities in the region.

#WATCH | Balotra, Rajasthan | Prime Minister Narendra Modi flags off refinery production tankers from the Greenfield Refinery-cum-Petrochemical Complex, developed as a joint venture between Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) and the Rajasthan Government, which PM Modi… pic.twitter.com/YHAZSdihQE

— ANI (@ANI) July 4, 2026

PM Modi says India overcame the biggest energy crisis of the 21st century 

Addressing a public gathering after the inauguration, Prime Minister Modi said India had successfully overcome what he described as the biggest energy crisis of the 21st century, triggered by the conflict in West Asia. He credited the country’s success to timely decision-making, strategic planning and India’s growing diplomatic influence.

“The willpower and efforts of the new India of the 21st century have overcome the biggest energy crisis of the 21st century,” the Prime Minister said.

#WATCH | Balotra, Rajasthan | Prime Minister Narendra Modi says, "… The West Asia war has given rise to the biggest energy crisis of the 21st century… The willpower and efforts of the new India of the 21st century have overcome this biggest energy crisis of the 21st century.… pic.twitter.com/05GPA7PXoy

— ANI (@ANI) July 4, 2026

He explained that while many countries struggled with fuel shortages and rising energy prices during the conflict in West Asia, India managed to protect its citizens by taking the right decisions at the right time.

“We assessed the crisis in time, prepared an effective strategy, made balanced use of our national resources and used the strength of our diplomacy to overcome this challenge,” he said.

Taking a swipe at the opposition, PM Modi said that while “some forces” were busy spreading rumours and creating panic during the crisis, his government was working continuously to ensure that the country’s energy needs were met without disruption.

“The work done during that difficult period, the patience shown and the sensitive policy and diplomatic decisions taken by our government will be remembered in history,” he added.

Diplomacy helped India maintain fuel supplies 

The Prime Minister highlighted India’s dependence on imported energy, particularly Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), saying that the country imports nearly 60% of its LPG requirements. He pointed out that the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the West Asia conflict had created the possibility of a major energy crisis across the world.

However, he said India’s diplomatic efforts helped the country avoid serious disruptions.

#WATCH | Balotra, Rajasthan | On fuel shortages in India amid the West Asia conflict, Prime Minister Narendra Modi says, "The country did not recover from such an unexpected challenge merely by chance. The success of the visionary policies we have been implementing for a decade… pic.twitter.com/kubGOCQYGP

— ANI (@ANI) July 4, 2026

“Our diplomatic relations with foreign countries helped us overcome the crisis. During the war, Indian diplomacy displayed its strength,” PM Modi said.

He added that India managed to source fuel from nearly 40 countries despite disruptions in global supply chains.

The Prime Minister also said domestic LPG supplies remained uninterrupted throughout the crisis. Referring to recent government measures, he noted that commercial LPG cylinder prices had been reduced significantly, providing relief to businesses. According to him, the government managed the LPG crisis within just seven days.

PM Modi further revealed that public sector oil marketing companies suffered losses of more than ₹75,000 crore during the global energy crisis. Instead of passing the burden on to consumers, the government absorbed the losses to protect people from the sharp rise in international fuel prices.

#WATCH | Balotra, Rajasthan | On fuel shortages in India amid the West Asia conflict, Prime Minister Narendra Modi says, "Attempts were made to frighten and mislead people. Political games were played. Yet, those with malicious intent did not succeed. Even in remote areas, apart… pic.twitter.com/d9NRkghQ3V

— ANI (@ANI) July 4, 2026

Refinery strengthens India’s journey towards self-reliance

Linking the refinery with India’s vision of self-reliance, PM Modi said true national pride comes only when a country becomes self-dependent.

“Today, from this land, a big step has been taken towards self-reliance,” he said while describing the Rajasthan refinery as an important milestone in India’s journey towards energy security.

The Prime Minister also highlighted the government’s focus on completing projects instead of merely announcing them.

“You know me. The project whose foundation stone I laid is also inaugurated by me,” he remarked, drawing applause from the gathering.

He also inaugurated the new terminal building at Jodhpur Airport and said the modern facility had already become a major attraction on social media.

#WATCH | Balotra, Rajasthan | Prime Minister Narendra Modi says, "… The new Airport Terminal was inaugurated today in Jodhpur. I was noticing on social media that the architecture and interior of the new terminal are all the rage. Rajasthan is visible everywhere. This will give… pic.twitter.com/gcP46qmBHR

— ANI (@ANI) July 4, 2026

Targeting the previous Congress government in Rajasthan, PM Modi said that the refinery project had remained stalled for years before work accelerated after the BJP came to power in the state. He credited the progress to what he described as the “double-engine government.”

A long journey filled with political and technical challenges 

Although the refinery has now become a reality, its journey has been anything but easy.

The project was originally proposed in 2012 and has taken nearly 15 years to reach completion. During this period, it witnessed political controversies, land disputes, repeated delays and rising costs.

The inauguration itself had earlier been scheduled for 21st April this year. However, the event had to be postponed after a fire broke out on 20th April due to a leak in one of the refinery’s processing units.

The refinery was initially planned at Lilana village in Baytu. However, after reports of large-scale land purchases by influential individuals and land speculators, the Rajasthan government shifted the project to Pachpadra, where sufficient government land was available.

The decision sparked major political controversy at the time. Former Baytu MLA Colonel Sonaram Choudhary openly opposed shifting the refinery and accused the then state government of trying to benefit Jodhpur district. The issue even led to protests and political resignations.

One of India’s most advanced refineries

Today, the Pachpadra refinery stands as one of the country’s most technologically advanced refining facilities.

The refinery is a joint venture between Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL), which holds a 74% stake, and the Rajasthan government, which owns the remaining 26%. The complex integrates refining and petrochemical production, with a petrochemical capacity of 2.4 MMTPA.

After an additional investment of over ₹42,229 crore beyond the original estimated cost, the project has become one of India’s biggest industrial investments.

One of its biggest strengths is its Nelson Complexity Index (NCI) of nearly 17, making it one of the most sophisticated high-conversion refineries in the country. A higher NCI indicates that the refinery can process a wide variety of crude oil and convert even low-quality, heavy crude into high-value products such as petrol, diesel and petrochemicals.

The refinery has also become an example of the “Make in India” initiative. Most of its large reactors, processing columns and storage tanks have been manufactured within India. At the same time, advanced control systems and high-pressure compressors have been sourced using technologies from the United States, Japan and several European countries. International experts also contributed to maintaining world-class construction and welding standards.

Since the crude oil transported to the refinery has a wax-like nature, a specially designed heated pipeline has been constructed from Mundra in Gujarat to Pachpadra. Equipped with thermal insulation and heating stations, the pipeline ensures that the crude oil remains at the required temperature throughout transportation.

A major economic boost for Rajasthan

The refinery is expected to significantly change Rajasthan’s industrial landscape.

Until now, Rajasthan has primarily been known as a crude oil-producing state. With the commissioning of this integrated refinery-cum-petrochemical complex, the state will also begin producing value-added products such as polypropylene, polymers and other petrochemical products.

This is expected to attract large investments in downstream plastic, chemical and manufacturing industries, creating thousands of direct and indirect employment opportunities. The project is also likely to strengthen India’s energy security while reducing dependence on imported petroleum products and supporting the country’s broader goal of becoming more self-reliant in the energy sector.

On Friday, 3rd July, The Guardian published an article, written by Hannah Ellis Petersen, titled “‘Give him any award, and he’ll come running’: Narendra Modi racks up honours on overseas trips.” The anti-India British publication highlighted the Indian Prime Minister’s recent visit to Seychelles, where he was conferred with the archipelago’s highest honour.

According to the article, as Narendra Modi touched down in Seychelles over the weekend, the nation swiftly bestowed the “Guardian of the Blue Horizon” award upon him. The report described Modi as “beaming” while accepting the trophy and certificate from Seychelles President Patrick Herminie. However, the publication quickly shifted its focus to critics who claimed the award was marred by several discrepancies.

The core of The Guardian’s critique rested on alleged formatting errors and the timing of the award’s creation. The piece highlighted that the presentation certificate misspelt “republic” as “repubblic” and “Seychelles” as “Seycheeles.” However, the article itself wrote that, on Thursday, 2nd July, the Seychelles foreign ministry responded with a statement claiming that a “working draft” had accidentally been circulated and that an “authentic and duly approved” version had now been issued.

“The Guardian of the Blue Horizon distinction is genuine,” added the foreign ministry.

It further alleged that the distinction had been created a mere three days before Modi’s arrival, making him the sole recipient. To amplify the controversy, the article noted that when the certificate was run through verification software, it was flagged as AI-generated.

The author argued that accolades have become a transactional expectation for Modi’s foreign trips, quoting biographer Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, who claimed the global push for prizes is intended “to convey to supporters and potential converts that Modi is being honoured across the world because of his greatness.”

A pattern of selective focus in Western Media 

This reporting aligns with a broader tendency observed in segments of the Western Media, which frequently adopt a highly critical stance toward India’s political leadership and domestic developments. Publications like The Guardian often dedicate significant editorial space to dissecting the optics of Indian governance, framing routine diplomatic exchanges or national policies through an adversarial lens. 

This intense scrutiny of Global South democracies stands in stark contrast to how these same outlets handle sensitive domestic crises within their own borders, often turning a blind eye to covering the major issues in their home countries. For instance, investigative reporting on deeply entrenched issues in the United Kingdom, such as the grooming gangs. An independent Rape Gang Inquiry Report has revealed that the Muslim rape gangs comprised 87% to 95% Pakistani Muslim men, who raped, exploited and groomed over 250,000 non-Muslim, mostly White girls. This perceived double standard leads to viewing such overseas coverage not as objective journalism, but as a habitual projection of anti-India sentiment designed to overshadow the country’s growing international stature.

The reality behind Seychelles’ National Honours system

Despite the narrative pushed by external critics, the creation of the ‘Guardian of the Blue Horizon’ distinction has nothing to do with Prime Minister Modi himself but is instead rooted in the internal political restructuring of Seychelles. The island nation enacted the National Awards Act in 2022 to establish a formal civilian honours system. Under that framework, the country introduced the Medal of the Republic, the Medal of Honour, and the Medal of Merit to recognise public service and environmental work. The first National Awards ceremony was eventually held in 2023 after the legislation came into force, recognising individuals from different walks of life for public service, environmental work, healthcare, culture, governance and acts of bravery.

Among the recipients were President Wavel Ramkalawan, who received the Medal of the Republic under the provisions of the Act, former President Sir James Mancham, Central Bank Governor Caroline Abel, environmentalist Antonio Constance, singer Joe Samy and several others who had made significant contributions to Seychelles.

At the time, President Ramkalawan had said the country had long recognised Seychellois honoured abroad but lacked a proper system to acknowledge its own citizens. The National Awards were therefore introduced to fill that gap and formally celebrate national achievements.

However, following a recent change in government, President Patrick Herminie’s Cabinet approved the National Awards (Repeal) Bill, 2026, which abolished the previous framework while preserving the validity of past honours. The repeal effectively dissolved the old National Awards Committee, paving the way for a fresh honours system under the current administration.

The available facts demonstrate that the ‘Guardian of the Blue Horizon’ distinction represents a fresh beginning for Seychelles’ renewed honours framework rather than a sudden invention designed to flatter a visiting leader. The Seychelles government clarified that the title formally recognises PM Modi’s global leadership in environmental conservation, climate resilience, and his support for Small Island Developing States (SIDS). 

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) reiterated that the distinction honours India’s commitment to sustainable development and the blue economy. Upon receiving the award, PM Modi dedicated the recognition to global environmental cooperation, stating: “I humbly accept this honour and dedicate it to all those countries that are fighting the challenge of climate change and consider environmental protection their responsibility towards future generations. This is a pressing challenge which we have to overcome together.”

Grateful to the people and Government of Seychelles as well as President Herminie for conferring upon me the ‘Guardian of the Blue Horizon.’

I humbly accept this honour and dedicate it to all those countries that are fighting the challenge of climate change and consider… pic.twitter.com/iI4c7BjnFq

— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) June 28, 2026

Who is Hannah Ellis-Petersen? Examining her anti-India track record

The author of the controversial report, Hannah Ellis-Petersen, serves as the South Asian correspondent for The Guardian and has built a consistent track record of highly contentious reporting on India. 

Her presence at politically motivated domestic protests, such as a recent Jantar Mantar demonstration organised by the Cockroach Janta Party, raises questions about journalistic neutrality. 

Her past coverage includes presenting the humanitarian Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) as a manifestation of the “toxic masculinity of Modi’s Hindutva politics” and labelling the 2020 anti-Hindu Delhi riots as a balanced “clash between Hindus and Muslims,” which downplayed targeted violence. 

From characterising school uniform regulations in Karnataka as a sweeping “hijab ban” to framing the lawful reclamation of historical temple sites as “rewriting India’s history,” her portfolio frequently draws allegations of institutional bias. Furthermore, a fact-finding report by the Centre for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights (CDPHR) on the 2022 Leicester unrest explicitly cited The Guardian for institutional bias and for relying on misinformation rather than verified police accounts.

Hannah Ellis-Petersen also wrote several provocative pieces for The Guardian, where she tried to guilt-trip Hindus for the Ram Janmabhoomi verdict and the Pran Pratistha of the Ram Mandir. She also tried to dilute the significance of the events by referencing the disputed structure that once stood atop the grand Hindu temple. 

The propaganda of Hannah Ellis-Petersen is not limited to shaming the Hindu community or downplaying atrocities committed against them by Islamists. She has authored articles, wherein she dehumanised Hindus participating in Kumbh Mela as ‘Covid superspreaders’ despite no evidence to back her claims.

Ellis-Petersen’s recent journalistic output continues to favour controversial political figures over objective legal analysis. On June 30th, she published a sympathetic profile of Umar Khalid, the prime accused in the larger conspiracy case related to the 2020 Delhi riots. Titled “‘Humanity is a privilege’: Umar Khalid on his six years in an Indian jail without trial,” the piece largely bypassed the specific legal prosecution and evidentiary framework of the case. 

Instead, it painted Khalid as a left-wing rights campaigner and a victim of a government crackdown, using literary references to Dostoevsky and Bhagat Singh to build an emotional narrative. This consistent pattern of choosing sentimentality over legal and historical facts reinforces the view that reports concerning India’s leadership are heavily influenced by preexisting editorial agendas.

Conclusion

The controversy surrounding PM Modi’s award in Seychelles highlights the deep disconnect between localised administrative transitions and international media narratives. While opposition groups and Western correspondents framed the “Guardian of the Blue Horizon” award as a rushed, synthetic honour designed for political vanity, an examination of Seychelles’ legislative history reveals a nation undergoing a comprehensive overhaul of its domestic honours system.

By focusing entirely on typographical errors and relying on polarising commentators, publications like The Guardian often miss the substantive diplomatic and environmental partnerships driving India’s foreign policy. Ultimately, these reports tend to reveal more about the entrenched biases of the correspondents writing them than the actual geopolitical realities on the ground.

In a recently held unilateral international conference on the defunct Indus Waters Treaty held in Islamabad, Pakistan’s Information and Broadcasting Minister Attaullah Tarar said that he ‘proudly’ tells people abroad that Pakistanis are “children of Indus Valley Civilisation”. This supposed pride, however, is as real as its claim that there are no terrorists in Pakistan. The country has recently been called out by UNESCO for undermining the integrity of two Vedic-era sites in Taxila or Takshashila.

UNESCO warns removal from World Heritage Sites list for using cement to ‘conserve’ Vedic-era Taxila sites

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) has formally asked Pakistan to reverse recent ‘reconstructions’ and “unnecessary interventions” at Mohra Moradu, a Buddhist monastery and stupa complex from the Kushan era, and Sirkap, the Indo-Greek city layer. Both these sites are located in the Taxila (Takshashila) archaeological complex in present-day Pakistan’s Rawalpindi district. These sites are UNESCO-recognised World Heritage Sites from the post-Indus Valley Civilisation period (around 2nd century BCE to 5th century CE).

Pakistan, a cultureless Islamic Republic suffering from an identity crisis, long dismissed its pre-Islamic, essentially Hindu past as an age of Jahiliyyah or the era of spiritual darkness that achieved redemption only after the arrival of Islam through Mohammad Bin Qasim.

However, Pakistan resorted to promoting Taxila via its museum projects, heritage initiatives and tourism campaigns, to attract foreign visitors, as a part of the broader agenda to appropriate the Indus Valley Civilisation and its Hindu history, although by either downplaying or extricating its Hinduness.

Pakistan’s desperation for material gains from remnants of the pre-Islamic past of ancient Indian regions that now fall within its periphery lacks required sensitivity in the preservation of the IVC-related and other historical sites.

This is evident from the fact that Pakistan’s Department of Archaeology and Museums used cement and modern masonry at Mohra Moradu and Sirkap, under its ‘conservation’ work. UNESCO has deemed this a violation of internationally accepted methods and principles for preservation of historical monuments and has harmed the authenticity and integrity of the Vedic-era sites.

Consequently, UNESCO recently held a meeting with senior Pakistani government officials and warned Pakistan that if the recent interventions are not reversed at parts of the World Heritage Site and corrective measures are not taken, Taxila would be put on the UN body’s List of World Heritage in Danger.

Highlighting the seriousness of its warning, the UNESCO officials told Pakistan that the organisation earlier removed a World Heritage Site in Germany from the list over improper conservation methods.

The matter first came to the UN body’s notice in March this year after a visitor shared photos and videos with Pakistan’s Permanent Delegate to UNESCO in Paris, showing how the original walls had been replaced with new modern masonry and even had their height increased during ‘conservation’ work. UNESCO took note of the matter; its officials conducted a joint technical visit to the Taxila Museum and other related sites on 12th June, along with Pakistan’s Department of Archaeology and Museums and Ministry of National Heritage and Culture.

Notably, the ancient city of Takshashila is a layered site with deep roots in the Indian subcontinent’s history. The city features in Vedic-era literature, Mahabharat and Buddhist Jatakas as a renowned centre of learning. Taxila later became a hub of Gandharan Buddhist culture, Greco-Buddhist art, and one of the world’s oldest and greatest universities.

Pivoting away from dismissing its pre-Islamic history as an era of ‘Jahilliyah’, Pakistan is feigning love for Indus Valley Civilisation, and appropriating ancient Hindu scholars and warriors as its esteemed ancestors.

While in rhetoric, Pakistan is promoting IVC and Gandharan heritage as ‘ancient Pakistan’, the 78-year-old Islamic Republic has demonstrated historical neglect of the region’s ancient history and its archaeological remnants.

From IVC sites like Mohenjo-daro and Harappa to Taxila and Buddhist sites in the Swat Valley area, the Pakistani governments over the decades have failed to prioritise principled conservation of these historical sites. Neither the absolute Hindu-hating Jihadist military dictators nor the military-backed ‘democratic’ governments cared much about the Indus Valley Civilisation, the pre-Islamic historical sites and their conservation.

The pre-Islamic sites faced neglect and excuses of resource and budget constraints; no such hindrance occurred when it came to protecting and renovating Islamic heritage sites.

In October 2009, the 7th-century CE rock-carved Buddha statue was dynamited and defaced by Pakistan Army-harboured Taliban Jihadis, who also attacked many Kushan-era stupas. The Taliban terrorists drilled holes into the face, shoulders, and feet of the statue, filled them with explosives, and detonated them, destroying the statue’s face and upper body, in an apparent emulation of the 2001 Bamiyan Buddhas destruction in Afghanistan.

Besides Islamic intolerance for even archaeological remnants of Kafirs, locals even looted Buddhist relics and illegally excavated some historical sites in the Swat Valley region and sold the priceless artefacts on the black market.

In many cases, the third or fourth generation converted Muslim descendants of Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists attach no significance to the historicity of archaeological sites and encroach on them.

Not to mention, the Pakistani populace, with tacit backing of their administrations, destroyed countless pre-partition Hindu temples and recently razed a 125-year-old Gurudwara in Panjab’s Farooqabad.

It must be recalled how in 2023, Pakistan, in its bid to erase the region’s Hindu past, demolished the Hinglaj Mata Mandir (temple) in Sindh province.

Pakistan also destroyed the Sharda Peeth Mandir, which is another Hindu shrine along the Line of Control (LoC). Ironically, the ancient Hindu temple was recognised as a UNESCO heritage site, although that status could not save it from Pakistani hatred for Hinduism.

On one hand, Pakistan is rebranding itself as a ‘civilisational state’ and promoting IVC sites as its national pride; on the other, it is destroying or damaging its pre-Islamic archaeological sites. This is when the Pakistani government and a significant section of common people claim to be ‘custodians’ of the Indus Valley Civilisation, although Field Marshal Asim Munir intermittently reminds his countrymen how Pakistani Muslims are different from Hindus in all aspects of life and how they must not forget the divisive and hateful two-nation theory.

Regardless of whether a military dictator is holding the reins of power directly, or through a puppet representative, Pakistan has undergone deeper and deeper Islamisation.

For decades, the Pakistani discourse emphasised descent from Arabs, Turks, Persians, or Central Asians, the ‘Ashraf’ narrative of foreign and ‘pure’ Muslim ancestry.

During the reign of General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan underwent significant cultural and historical rewriting.

The Zia regime, which lasted for a decade, beginning in 1977, modified school curricula for Islamiat and Pakistan Studies to instil and assert an Islamic identity by enforcing a psychological and cultural alignment with Arab history, delineating pre-Islamic roots of the fourth- or fifth-generation converted Muslims whose ancestors were predominantly Hindus.

For over 70 years, Pakistani school curricula, political discourse, media, and even the entertainment industry, to some extent, celebrated Islamic conquests, falsely convincing the Pakistani Muslim populace that they are descendants of ‘warrior races’ like Turks, Arabs, everyone but Hindus, although they were just one DNA test away from discovering the ‘unsettling’ truth. They continue to present Muhammad bin Qasim’s 8th-century invasion of Sindh as a watershed and celebratory moment for Pakistani Muslims.

On one hand, Pakistan is labelling Pāṇini, Chanakya, Raja Purushottama and other historical Hindu Sanatani figures as ‘ancient Pakistanis’, on the other hand, they name their missiles after Ghaznavi, Ghori, Abdali, all Islamic barbarians and invaders. For decades, Pakistani Islamists and politicians discouraged Sarees, Bindi and other such Hindu attire and ornaments merely because of inextricable Hindu influence, dismissing them derogatorily as ‘Hinduana’.

But now, Pakistan has adopted a Janusian approach, wherein it is keeping the country Islamised to avoid broader backlash in a country where even QR-codes can trigger a ‘blasphemy’ row, while also pretentiously embracing the pre-Islamic past and retrofitting facts to appropriate the history of ancient India. It is the same Pakistan that discriminates against the Ahmadiyya sect of Muslims for not being Muslim enough, and kills, rapes, forcibly converts to Islam, and treats its Hindu minorities as subhumans.

None other than Indians know it better that Pakistan’s newfound love for its pre-Islamic past is fake and self-interest driven. Adopting a contradictory approach has been Pakistan’s 78-year-old DNA.

Pakistan’s Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a pork eater, founded Pakistan. An Islamic fanatic, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto portrayed himself as a socialist ‘reformist’, and yet he ostracised Ahmadiyyas from Islam and made Islam Pakistan’s state religion.

Similar was the story of Benazir Bhutto, who the West hailed as ‘liberal’ Iron Lady while Taliban emerged and thrived under her watch. Nawaz Sharif, Pervez Musharraf, and even Imran Khan, all had their own contradictory philosophies when in power, reflecting how opportunism come naturally to Pakistani leaders.

Now Pakistan is promoting Harappa and Mohenjo-daro as national pride, because these IVC sites are more than just archaeological remnants. They are diplomatic assets and economic resources; Pakistan wants to cash in. Pakistan gets UNESCO funding and uses cultural diplomacy to whitewash its global terror hub image. Pakistan is attracting foreign archaeological protection initiatives, including the UK-based Cultural Protection Fund, to preserve ‘ancient Pakistani’ heritage. The move is sinister.

Pakistan is seeking the West’s support for its agenda of securing global recognition as the primary inheritor and custodian of the Indus Valley Civilisation, even as around 60% of IVC sites lie in India. Pakistan aims to dilute India’s ancient civilisational claim and attach the ‘civilisational state’ label to its own name.

OpIndia highlighted earlier how ISPR bots are concocting an IVC versus Indo-Gangetic Civilisation narrative to establish a present-day borders-based rivalry narrative.

Pakistan’s recent ancient India history appropriation manoeuvres are directly linked to the Indus Waters Treaty, the wretched water-sharing agreement signed in 1960, that the Modi government has scrapped indefinitely in response to the April 2025 Pahalgam Islamic terror attack by Pakistan-sponsored jihadis.

Indus is the lifeline of Pakistan, and its agriculture heavily depends on its waters. With the Modi government not budging to Pakistan’s nuclear threats, farcical international court verdicts, and not heeding the desperate pleas of Pakistani officials, the hostile neighbour is playing a narrative game.

Pakistan is selectively embracing, claiming, rather, appropriating only the Indus Valley Civilisation, as evident from its neglect and insensitive ‘conservation’ of Taxila sites since they do not belong to the IVC-era.

This selective embrace seeks global support by building a sympathy-evoking argument that the Indus River is directly linked to the Indus Valley Civilisation, and since the IVC is ‘Pakistani’ heritage, it is legally and morally wrong for India to deprive Pakistan of access to present-day resources linked to its heritage. Pakistan’s whole pivot from ‘we are full Turkish, Arab blood’ to ‘we are children of Indus’ is a pressure tactic in the making.

Over the past few days, a wave of videos has taken over Indian social media showing something that looks straight out of a spy thriller: a person casually pulls out their phone, taps a button, and a moving e-rickshaw a few metres away simply stops. No wires, no contact, but with an app called BAT-BMS. The clips have racked up millions of views, with people filming themselves pranking rickshaw drivers mid-route, and the panic has spread just as fast as the footage.

Predictably, the story didn’t stay contained to e-rickshaws for long. It didn’t take long for a section of X to connect the dots in a very different direction: if a random phone app can shut down a vehicle over Bluetooth, why should anyone trust Electronic Voting Machines?

Cockroach Janta Party posted a sarcastic tweet claiming the same on Thursday, saying, “It’s worth noting that A running e-rickshaw can be shut down with a mobile app, but an EVM cannot be hacked.” The tweet included the emoji for ‘dropping a wildly awkward secret’.

Congress leader Deepak Bishnoi made a similar post, suggesting that EVMs also can be hacked from mobile phone.

“Journalist” Mukesh Kumar Verma posted in Hindi on X, ‘The question was: If a moving E-Rickshaw can be shut down via a mobile app using BAT-BMS, then why can’t an EVM be hacked?’

Several other users on X made similar post, mostly in Hindi, saying it is worth noting that e-rickshaws can be hacked but EVMs can’t be hacked.

EVM is a device central to how India elects its government. Are they truly unhackable? The logic sounds intuitive at first glance. It is also, on closer inspection, built on a foundation that doesn’t hold up. Before we answer the question, “Is it possible to hack an EVM like an e-rickshaw or not?” let us discuss what is actually going on with e-rickshaws because the real story is less about hacking and more about an unlocked door nobody bothered to lock.

What’s Actually Happening

To understand why the “hack” is not really a hack, we need to know three things: What is BMS, why it has Bluetooth, and why that Bluetooth link matters.

The BMS: a battery’s built-in bodyguard

The Battery management system (BMS) is the electronic brain of a rechargeable battery pack. In simple words, every lithium-ion battery pack, the kind increasingly used in e-rickshaws instead of older lead-acid batteries, has a small chip inside, known as a Battery Management System or BMS. Its job is to constantly monitor the battery’s voltage, temperature, and charge level, and cut power immediately if something looks unsafe, like overheating or a short circuit.

This is a genuine safety feature. Without it, lithium batteries would be far more prone to fires and failures. To do this cutting, the BMS uses tiny electronic switches. When the BMS decides power needs to stop flowing, it flips the switch, and the vehicle loses power within milliseconds, not because something broke, but because the system worked exactly as designed.

Why is Bluetooth even involved

Many inexpensive battery manufacturers, a lot of them Chinese producers operating at scale, incorporate Bluetooth into the BMS so owners, technicians and fleet operators can check battery health from a phone instead of physically opening the battery casing. It’s a convenience feature: see charge level, cycle count, temperature, all from an app, without any tools.

One of such an app is named BAT-BMS, app at the centre of the viral videos is one such tool. However, several other similar apps are also being used. It was built by Chinese company Shenzhen Grenergy Technology primarily for solar and off-grid battery systems, not specifically for the vehicles. It just happens to be compatible with the same type of BMS chip that many e-rickshaw batteries use.

Where it goes wrong

Here’s the actual vulnerability: to keep costs down, a large number of these budget battery units are shipped, sold, and installed without ever setting a password on that Bluetooth connection. E-rickshaws are made in India by a large number of local units, and such manufacturers skipped adding proper security features like encryption or password protection on these Bluetooth links while buying BMS units in bulk from China. Dealers rarely configure it, and drivers are almost never told it exists. The result is a battery quietly broadcasting itself over Bluetooth, wide open, to any phone within roughly 15 metres running a compatible app.

This is a classic case of a consumer product cutting corners on security for convenience and price.

So when someone in these viral videos “hacks” an e-rickshaw, what’s really happening is this: their phone finds an unsecured battery management system nearby, connects to it because nothing was stopping it from connecting, and sends the same shutdown command a technician would use for legitimate maintenance. It isn’t bypassing encryption or breaking into a system. It’s walking through a door that was never given a lock.

Notably, the Union Government has already ordered the removal of apps like BAT-BMS and Epoch Li-ion from app stores after their widespread use to disable e-rickshaws remotely. After the videos went viral, BAT-BMS was updated to require a password from the vehicle’s owner to control it. But other apps continued to allow control without permission.

Why “EVM Hack” Doesn’t Follow

This is where the argument falls apart, and it’s worth being precise about why, rather than just dismissing it. EVMs are built on a fundamentally different principle. India’s Electronic Voting Machines are standalone units. They have no Bluetooth, no Infrared, no Wi-Fi, no internet connectivity, and no wireless radio of any kind. This isn’t an oversight; it’s the entire design philosophy. An EVM cannot be remotely accessed because remote access was deliberately engineered out of it from the start. There is no equivalent of the “unlocked Bluetooth door” to walk through, because there is no door at all.

The hardware itself does not even have the ports or chips needed for such wireless communication, which means there is simply no way for someone to reach them through a phone app or any remote method.

There is a reason why EVM votes are counted by viewing the numbers on each EVM, and adding them, because the data from EVM can’t be read from any external device.

Any attempt to tamper with an EVM would require physically opening the machine and making changes inside it. Even this route is blocked by strong election protocols followed by the Election Commission of India. Before every election, the machines go through multiple rounds of checks, including mock polls conducted openly in front of agents from all contesting candidates. Once the machines are sealed and taken to the polling stations, they remain under constant watch by polling agents who represent different candidates.

During counting as well, party representatives are present at every step, and the machines stay sealed until the very end. Any sign of physical interference would be spotted immediately, leading to rejection of that machine’s results and possible legal action. These layered safeguards have been in place for years and have been upheld by the Supreme Court multiple times after detailed examinations.

Trying to say that a vulnerability in a cheap vehicle’s Bluetooth battery module somehow proves EVMs can also be hacked is like arguing that because a bicycle lock can be picked with a simple screwdriver, therefore a bank vault can also be opened with a similar screwdriver.

A weak lock on one product says nothing about a different product with no lock to test. The e-rickshaw vulnerability exists because a specific category of budget battery control hardware shipped with a wireless feature left unsecured. Drawing a line from that to EVMs requires treating “electronic” as if it’s a single, uniform category where a flaw anywhere implies a flaw everywhere. It isn’t. A smart bulb, a laptop, and a pacemaker are all “electronic,” but a vulnerability in one tells you nothing about the others unless they share the actual attack surface: the specific wireless interface, protocol, or access point that was exploited. EVMs simply don’t share the one that failed here.

This is a familiar pattern, not a new one. Every time a viral tech story breaks, a phone hack, a Bluetooth flaw, a data leak, a segment of social media treats it as fresh ammunition for a pre-existing belief, regardless of whether the technical details have anything in common. It’s not really an argument about EVMs at all. It’s an existing narrative looking for its next hook, and the e-rickshaw story happened to be trending at the right moment. The reasoning doesn’t start from the evidence and arrive at a conclusion; it starts from the conclusion and goes looking for evidence that sounds vaguely similar.

That’s the real pattern worth calling out – not just the specific claim, but the habit of reaching for “if X can be hacked, so can Y” without checking whether X and Y share anything beyond both being electronic. It’s a rhetorical shortcut, not an investigation.