This week’s caption reads:

BERLIN, GERMANY JUNE 16: Heavy iron doors between different rooms during a media event on June 16, 2026, at the former Cold War-era Pankstraße subway station, now used as a nuclear fallout shelter. Built in the 1970s, the bunker offers sleeping accommodations for 3,339 people, has independent water and electricity supplies, and is hermetically sealed off from the outside world by massive steel doors. The bunker will be open to the public as part of guided tours of Berlin’s underground. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has rekindled German authorities’ interest in providing nuclear fallout shelters in the event of war. (Photo: Carsten Koall/Getty Images)

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The post Bunker Talk: Let’s Talk About All The Things We Did And Didn’t Cover This Week appeared first on TWZ.

The Navy’s Office of the Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Aviation (PAE-A) has released a video montage of Blackbeard undergoing flight testing, seen in the social media post below. The service confirmed that it had at least begun test-loading the missiles onto F/A-18E/F Super Hornets in a presentation at the Tailhook Association’s annual convention last month. Now we know the program has moved ahead substantially from that point.

The company behind Blackbeard, defense start-up Castelion, has received several multi-million-dollar contracts from the Navy just this year explicitly to support integration of the weapon onto the Super Hornet, as well as otherwise accelerating its development. In its daily contracting on September 14, the Pentagon announced the Navy had struck yet another deal with Castelion, valued at $43.65 million, “for the manufacturing, assembly, testing, and delivery of the first production lot of 444 All-Up Rounds (AURs), defined as fully functional tactical missiles packaged within specialized shipping and storage containers.”

In terms of what we know today about Blackbeard’s design and capabilities, as we have previously written:

“A profile photo [seen below] at the company’s headquarters reveals a weapon with a ballistic missile-like booster, on top of which is mounted what could be an unpowered hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). A booster brings an HGV to the desired velocity and altitude before releasing it toward its target. The concept is in contrast to air-breathing cruise missiles capable of traveling at hypersonic speeds. Hypersonic speed is generally defined as anything above Mach 5, which larger ballistic missiles also reach in the course of their flights. More precise performance figures for Blackbeard are lacking, but Castelion has previously hinted it could hit targets out to just under 500 miles. Alternatively, the second stage may also have its own motor, allowing it to continue accelerating or sustain high-speed flight. A similar arrangement has been suggested as the propulsion system for the Russian Zircon missile.”

“Both stages of the weapon have cruciform fins, while the upper one features a prominent ‘chine’ line along the length of its body, and a slightly beaklike nose. The trolley on which the weapon is mounted provides some idea of its overall size. The blue stripes seen on each stage normally signify that a munition is an inert, non-explosive round utilized for training or tracking purposes. This would indicate a real (unarmed) missile rather than a dummy or mockup.”

A picture shown at Tailhook had also offered a new look at the front of the missile, exposing what looked to be an aperture on one side of the design’s wedge-shaped nose. As we wrote after that image emerged:

“The apparent apertures are also seen pointed up, but many air-launched munitions do flip down after release.”

“How exactly Blackbeard is guided remains unknown, but a downward-angled aperture at the nose end for a seeker system would make sense for this weapon, which the Navy is pursuing primarily as a new way to target enemy ships. In particular, a wide array of existing anti-ship and land attack missiles, as well as certain anti-air types, have variously shaped apertures in their noses for imaging infrared seekers. Imaging infrared has the benefit of being immune to radio frequency electronic warfare jamming. In addition, it is a passive capability that does not send out signals that can give an opponent advance notice of an incoming attack. Blackbeard’s full guidance package very likely also includes some means of navigating to a target area first, and it could have multiple modes of operation.”

The new flight testing footage released today also underscores the relatively small size of Blackbeard overall. While the Super Hornet is set to be the first operational launch platform, it is very likely to be integrated on other aircraft quickly thereafter. The Navy is acquiring Blackbeard under a program called the Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE).

Requirements for MACE that the Navy put out previously explicitly called for a design compact enough for carrier-based F-35C (and land-based F-35A) Joint Strike Fighters to carry four of them internally. Whether that remains a goal in any way is unclear. Still, being able to carry some number of Blackbeards internally would not only give those jets a hypersonic strike weapon, but one that they could carry in the most stealthy configuration. The Navy also notably does operate the F-35A outside of the test and evaluation community, which might point to air-launched Blackbeards entering service elsewhere in the future. As an aside, the U.S. Army is pursuing a ground-launched version of this missile, as well.

Another critical aspect of Blackbeard is the emphasis on lower cost and the ability to produce the missiles readily at scale. The conflict with Iran has fully driven home long-standing concerns about the depth of U.S. stockpiles of various critical munitions, as well as its ability to replenish them quickly. Blackbeard reflects a larger push across America’s armed forces to add more cost-effective weapons that can be acquired on faster timetables to their arsenals. Bringing in new, smaller companies like Castelion to develop and build these munitions has also been a major point of focus. To put this all in immediate context, in May, the Pentagon announced a framework agreement to buy 12,000 Blackbeards over the next five years.

As mentioned, the Navy’s stated goal now is to reach an early operational capability with Blackbeard by 2028, if not sooner. What the exact fielding plan for those missiles might be is unclear. PAE-A did write “Coming soon to a theater near you” in its post on X containing the video montage, and tagged the official accounts for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). CENTCOM oversees U.S. military activities in and around the Middle East, including ongoing operations against Iran. U.S. military officials have also long touted hypersonic weapons, in general, as key to success in any future conflict in the Pacific, especially a high-end fight against China.

It’s also worth noting here that U.S. military hypersonic missile programs across the services have faced repeated setbacks and delays over the years. This, in turn, has prompted discussion about a worrisome gap emerging in this arena between the United States and its chief global competitors, especially China. It is very possible now that Blackbeard could be the first operational air-launched type in American inventory, depending on how the U.S. Air Force does or does not proceed with its Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program. The Air Force has said previously that it is aiming for HACM to be operational, at least on a limited level, before the end of Fiscal Year 2027, which begins next month.

If nothing else, we have clear evidence that the air-launched version of Blackbeard is now deep in flight testing for the U.S. Navy.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Blackbeard Hypersonic Missile Seen Flying On F/A-18 Super Hornet For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

“It was great to visit Anduril to meet with Palmer Luckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and Origin Robotics,” Rinkēvičs said in a post on X. “Looking forward to complete acquisition of Barracuda long-range missiles and [Latvian-U.S.] defense industry cooperation.”

The statement does not specify the precise Barracuda variant involved, the number of missiles Latvia intends to acquire, the expected delivery schedule, or the value of the prospective purchase. We have reached out to Anduril for more details.

A likely candidate weapon is the Barracuda-500M, one member of Anduril’s family of autonomous, jet-powered cruise missiles, alongside the Barracuda-100M and -250M variants. Official descriptions put its range at more than 500 nautical miles, with a stated speed range of approximately 190 to 500 knots. The missile can be air-launched, for which it has received the official U.S. military designation AGM-189A. But with only a handful of utility biplanes and helicopters in its inventory, Latvia would acquire the surface-launched version, designated SLB-500M.

The announcement points to a potentially significant expansion of Latvia’s precision-strike capabilities as NATO’s eastern flank continues to build out longer-range conventional fires.

Latvia has already ordered the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which will be fired from M142 HIMARS launchers. The system is expected to enter Latvian service in 2027 and has a maximum range of about 186 miles.

Latvia’s ATACMS capability will give the country a foundation for ground-launched precision fires, but the broader European trend is toward significantly greater reach.

Ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems capable of hitting targets at between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers (620 and 1,242 miles) or more are an emerging target for several European NATO members. France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom are pursuing combinations of indigenous development and foreign procurement to address this requirement.

Latvia’s neighbor Poland, for example, has been building a layered long-range strike architecture combining JASSM/JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles with HIMARS and ATACMS. Warsaw’s ambitions are extending toward ground-launched weapons with ranges potentially reaching 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) and the country has previously expressed openness to hosting U.S.-owned nuclear weapons on its territory, too.

Latvian interest in Barracuda fits into the same larger transformation in European conventional strike capabilities.

For NATO’s Baltic members, the logic is particularly straightforward, with mobile, ground-launched weapons providing an additional means of striking military targets at depth without requiring control of the air over the launch area.

The potential Barracuda acquisition would represent another step in a broader European shift toward deep precision strike, a term increasingly used to describe conventional weapons capable of holding targets hundreds or thousands of miles away at risk.

Deep precision strike is widely acknowledged as an increasingly important European capability gap. European NATO members have historically relied heavily on air-launched cruise missiles and other aircraft-delivered weapons, while ground-launched long-range systems have been comparatively scarce.

The deterioration of the European security environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, together with the 2019 collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, are important factors behind renewed European interest in long-range conventional strike.

A key driver behind Europe’s push for longer-range conventional strike is the desire to build a credible deterrent capable of holding targets deep inside Russia at risk, potentially including Moscow. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has demonstrated the strategic value of being able to impose costs at significant distances, while also underscoring the importance of having sufficient stocks of precision weapons. For NATO’s eastern flank, systems such as the ground-launched Barracuda could therefore provide not just another fires capability, but an additional means of imposing costs on an adversary without relying exclusively on airpower.

Importantly for Latvia, the emerging European approach is not limited to large air forces. NATO’s prospective deep-strike requirements are likely to place significant emphasis on mobile ground-launched systems because they can be dispersed and offer survivability advantages while avoiding the cost and vulnerability associated with relying exclusively on aircraft or ships as launch platforms.

That makes systems such as the surface-launched Barracuda particularly relevant to countries on NATO’s eastern flank.

Anduril has positioned Barracuda as part of an effort to address what it describes as a shortfall in affordable, producible long-range precision weapons. A prototype surface-launched Barracuda-500 successfully demonstrated its launcher, missile, and booster concept in testing in 2025. Anduril has emphasized that the family is intended to be more producible and affordable than many existing “exquisite” long-range weapons.

The emphasis on production capacity is notable in light of lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine, where both sides have demonstrated the importance of maintaining substantial stocks of precision weapons and relatively inexpensive one-way attack systems.

European governments are increasingly wrestling with the same issue. However, there is a fundamental tension between rapidly filling capability gaps through off-the-shelf purchases and developing indigenous European weapons that can strengthen the continent’s defense-industrial base, which is also a critical political consideration.

Latvia’s emerging relationship with Anduril appears to combine elements of both approaches, by acquiring an American-developed strike capability while simultaneously pursuing industrial cooperation with U.S. defense companies.

There is also a recent European precedent for combining Barracuda procurement with local industrial participation.

In July 2026, Anduril signed a strategic agreement with Polish national maintenance, repair and overhaul provider Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 2 (WZL-2) to establish production of the Barracuda-500M at WZL-2 facilities in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Polish state-owned defence group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa said Poland was the first European country to sign such an agreement with Anduril.

Polish officials have also emphasized the missile’s intended low production cost relative to higher-end U.S. cruise missiles. The planned Polish program is expected to progressively increase Polish content and eventually incorporate broader European elements, including software solutions from Anduril.

Latvia has not publicly detailed whether any Barracuda-related production, assembly, or other industrial work would be conducted in the country.

However, Latvia’s Investment and Development Agency says the country’s defense-technology delegation in the United States is seeking opportunities involving joint development, testing, manufacturing, system integration and supply chains. Origin Robotics is among the Latvian companies participating in that effort.

The broader Latvian delegation includes companies working across unmanned and counter-unmanned systems, communications, electronics, sensors, software, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and manufacturing.

Exactly how Latvia intends to employ Barracuda, how many missiles it plans to acquire, and whether any portion of the system will eventually be produced or integrated in Latvia remain unclear from the president’s announcement.

For now, the development marks another indication that long-range precision fires are moving from a capability concentrated among Europe’s largest military powers toward a broader requirement across NATO’s highly strategic eastern flank.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Latvia To Order Anduril’s Barracuda Cruise Missile For Long-Range Strike Capability appeared first on TWZ.

Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) announced it had awarded a sole-source deal to Anduril, valued at $15,711,445.50, for an unspecified number of Pulsar-Ls, yesterday. This follows a statement of intent the Command put out last month. Anduril first unveiled Pulsar-L, a lightweight addition to its larger Pulsar family of electronic warfare systems, in April 2025.

The Marine Corps had 150 baseline personnel carrier variants of the ACV (or ACV-Ps), as well as 21 command-and-control ACV-C versions, in inventory as of April 2026. The default armament for ACV-P currently is just a single .50 caliber M2 machine gun in a remote weapon station on top of the hull. The service’s goal is to eventually acquire 389 ACV-Ps and 33 ACV-Cs, as well as 152 ACV-30s with new 30mm cannon-armed turrets and 34 ACV-R armored recovery vehicle variants. The ACV family has already supplanted the Marine Corps’ previous fleet of tracked Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV).

“The Anduril Pulsar-L system is a platform-integrated omni-directional SK C-UAS [soft-kill counter-uncrewed aerial systems] with a combined sensor/jammer package that detects, tracks, identifies, and defeats radio frequency-dependent Group 1 and Group 2 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs),” MARCORSYSCOM wrote in a justification for the sole-source contract, which was also released yesterday. “Additionally, the system provides counter positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities.”

The U.S. military definition of a Group 1 drone is any design weighing up to 20 pounds, that is able to fly up to an altitude of 1,200 feet, and that can reach speeds of up to 100 knots. Group 2 is the next tier up, encompassing types with gross weights between 21 and 55 pounds, that can get up to an altitude of 3,500 feet, and hit top speeds of up to 250 knots. Kamikaze drones and other small weaponized types that fall into Groups 1 and 2 are used on a daily basis in Ukraine to attack armored vehicles, as well as unarmored vehicles and personnel. These are threats that have been steadily expanding to other hotspots globally, and that we will come back to later on.

Furthermore, “the Pulsar-L is the only solution capable of being mounted on the ACV to provide a mobile and organic means to effectively and simultaneously execute the entire kill-chain against hostile UASs in the deployed land and maritime/littoral environment while not exceeding the limited ACV space, weight, and power claim allotted to the SK C-UAS solution,” according to MARCORSYSCOM. “This will provide the ACV with an essential defensive capability, directly contributing to increased survivability and force protection while not sacrificing the mobility and operational tempo of the ACV.”

Pulsar-L is already “in use by the Special Operations Command due to the system’s low weight, proven performance in engaging multiple UASs, and simultaneous execution of the full kill-chain while static or on the move,” the justification document adds. “Additionally, it is the only known commercially available system that meets the minimum requirement to rapidly identify and respond to emerging UAS technologies and tactics without frequent updates to predefined threat data libraries. The Pulsar-L is the only solution that uses machine based learning to continually adapt to these ever-changing threats without requiring vendor updates, allowing the warfighters to continually be effective in the fight.”

The latter point here is a particularly important consideration for electronic warfare systems, in general, which need to be able to accurately detect, categorize, and respond to different waveforms to be most effective. The emergence of new waveforms, as well as changes to how existing ones are emitted, together with new tactics, techniques, and procedures, can all negatively impact a system’s performance. Historically, the process of responding to those developments with updates to built-in threat libraries has been lengthy and complex. The conflict in Ukraine has shown that the cycle of new developments in the electromagnetic spectrum and then the need for new countermeasures can be regularly measured in weeks.

The U.S. military has been heavily investing in so-called cognitive electronic warfare capabilities to help automate and otherwise accelerate various aspects of this process. The ability of a particular electronic warfare suite to adapt autonomously in real-time, even in the middle of operations, has been viewed as the absolute ‘holy grail’ of this concept, which you can read more about here. How exactly Pulsar-L leverages machine-learning and artificial intelligence to this end, and the speed with which it can adapt to changing threats, is still not entirely clear.

Regardless, “there is an unusual and compelling need for the rapid deployment of SK C-UASs to forward-deployed ground units as Marines currently lack the ability to conduct self-defense against emerging UAS threats,” the justification document stresses. “Failure to deliver this capability places Marines at unnecessary risk, potentially leading to mission failure and loss of life, and hampers the Government’s ability to keep them safe during forward deployments.”

MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the sole-source deal to Anduril does not otherwise elaborate on the urgent requirements that drove the deal, which it says were only formalized on April 7. That is notably roughly a week after the United States and Israel first launched major combat operations against Iran, which is a prolific developer and user of various tiers of weaponized drones. There is no explicit confirmation of any link, but Iranian drones, as well as missiles and other capabilities, have been a real threat to U.S. forces in the region. We have also just gained more insights recently into how forward-deployed Marine Corps elements contributed to those operations. Counter-drone capabilities would also be especially critical in any future amphibious landing operation, wherever it might occur.

All that being said, threats posed by armed Group 1 and 2 drones are not at all limited to Iran and the Middle East, nor are they new. They are only likely to become a more ubiquitous feature in the hands of nation-state armed forces and non-state actors in conflict zones globally as time goes on. The nature of these threats is also expanding significantly in scale and scope, especially when it comes to more automated targeting capabilities, thanks heavily to the increasing democratization of AI-driven technologies, something TWZ has explored in depth in the past.

A number of other significant developments in this arena have emerged from the conflict in Ukraine, where electronic warfare systems are heavily employed against drones. This includes the introduction of physical fiber-optic control links that cannot be jammed, as well as the use of mesh-like and often ad-hoc networks to increase resiliency.

The fighting in Ukraine has also underscored the threat that even small kamikaze drones pose to armored vehicles, including types that are far more heavily protected to start with than the Marine Corps’ ACVs. As mentioned, Ukrainian forces have been sidelining their M1 Abrams and other main battle tanks in the face of constant drone attacks.

MARCORSYSCOM’s justification for the Pulsar-L order makes clear that this is just one part of a larger plan to boost the ACV’s defenses.

“Marine Corps program of record for SK C-UAS is planned to initiate in FY27,” the document mentions toward the very end. “The components of this future program will be procured through full and open competition as it is expected that advanced non-kinetic and SK defeat technologies should be mature by this time.”

Marine Corps officials have also talked in the past about integrating active protection systems (APS), which could be blended together with C-UAS capabilities, and other defensive features to the service’s ACV fleet.

“We’re constantly looking at what the next generation of APS is and how we can get that onto the [ACV] platform in a lightweight form factor,” Chris Melkonian, the Marine Corps’ Program Manager for Advanced Amphibious Assault (PM AAA), told TWZ and other attendees at the annual Modern Day Marine exposition in April.

Improved “situational awareness, that’s kind of a gateway to counter-UAS, in terms of the ability to sense your environment,” Melkonian also highlighted at that time. “Take all that video on board and then be able to feed that into [a] counter-UAS system.”

Additional “overhead protection right now is a critical thing that we’re working on right now for this platform,” he added. The practice of adding on anti-drone armor screens on armored vehicles (and now other platforms), especially to protect against top-down attacks, first emerged in Russia in the lead-up to the all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the installation of this kind of so-called ‘cope cage’ type armor has now become a global trend, including in the U.S. military.

The U.S. Marine Corps is also pressing ahead with a larger vision to field several tiers of counter-drone capabilities at all levels of its forces, to better protect everything from static installations at home and abroad right down to individual squads.

When it comes to the Marine Corps ACV fleet, the rush order for Pulsar-Ls is an important new step in boosting those vehicles’ defenses against threats that exist now. At the same time, drones are increasingly calling the role of armored vehicles in future conflicts into question.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Marines Rushing To Equip Amphibious Combat Vehicles With New Anti-Drone Jammers appeared first on TWZ.

Steve Trimble, Aviation Week‘s defense editor and friend of TWZ, was first to report the disappearance of the former NASA SR-71, also known by the tail number 844, at Armstrong. That facility is collocated with Edwards Air Force Base in California. Trimble’s piece says that satellite imagery shows the jet has not been seen since at least May 17. The aircraft in question, which originally carried the U.S. Air Force serial number 61-7980, was the last Blackbird produced and the last one to fly, taking to the skies for the final time in 1999.

“The current disposition of the aircraft is unclear, but Aviation Week sources suggest that the aircraft was moved into a hangar earlier this year for an inspection,” according to the story. “The presentation and the disappearance of the display SR-71S with the 844 tail number for NASA raises the possibility of a return-to-flight program after a more than 26-year-long hiatus.”

The presentation mentioned above is the one NASA’s Isaacman gave last week at the annual All-In Summit in Los Angeles, California, during which he shared the SR-71-esque silhouette.

“In the service of the first A [aeronautics] in NASA, we are rebuilding our X-plane fleet. The X-59 is researching quiet supersonic flight, but it’s just the beginning,” he said at that time. “As NASA recommits to flight test and works alongside industry to push the boundaries of airframe and propulsion design, it will not be long before NASA once again is flying as high and as fast as we had in decades past, and then even more.”

Isaacman has made expanding NASA’s X-plane fleets a top priority since taking charge of the agency last year.

“You sure that’s a Blackbird?” the NASA administrator said during a live interview that immediately followed his remarks after the image was brought up, but did not offer any further clarification.

“NASA has a long history of building and flying experimental aircraft that push the boundaries of what is possible,” NASA told TWZ directly when asked for more information. “As Administrator Isaacman has said, we want to see more X-planes flying in the years ahead, developing the technologies that will allow us to fly higher, farther, and faster than we have in decades. We look forward to sharing more as those efforts progress.”

We have reached back out to NASA in light of Aviation Week‘s report.

As we wrote in our initial reporting on Isaacman’s comments:

“As for bringing a Blackbird back into operation for high-speed testing, which is now at the forefront of military aeronautics (and civilian to a lesser degree) after decades of being sidelined, that would be a very challenging operation. The SR-71s are long retired and have been placed in museums and other display areas. While the Pentagon could technically claw some of them back from their ‘on loan’ status, reconstituting even one of them would be a major undertaking as the entire support ecosystem that once sustained them has been gone for decades. Still, having a Mach 3+ capable jet for testing would be a highly relevant tool in a new age of high-speed flight exploration.”

“On the other hand, building a new test aircraft that aims higher and faster than the SR-71, but may be based on its ‘DNA,’ is certainly possible. Such an aircraft could leverage material science, avionics, flight controls, and engines that are seven decades more modern than its progenitor. Technology demonstrators in this class could also already exist in the classified domain. NASA could possibly assume ownership of one after the Pentagon declassifies it, as well.”

“Regardless of how such an exotic aircraft is obtained, one of the biggest differentiating factors could be that a NASA aircraft is piloted by a human onboard, instead of it being a drone, but an uncrewed aircraft is possible too.“

Aviation Week‘s report today notes that tail number 844 would probably be the best available candidate for returning to flight status. In addition to being the last produced and the last to fly, NASA previously upgraded it, including with “an automated digital flight and inlet control system to virtually eliminate the Blackbird’s problem of violent engine unstarts at high speed.” It has also been sitting in a controlled area in the Mojave Desert that is great for preservation.

It is also worth pointing out here that Isaacman is personally aware of the time and resources it takes to reconstitute high-end vintage military aircraft. He founded private ‘red air’ aggressor firm Draken International, making him once the owner of the world’s largest private air force stocked with old jets. His own private collection includes a demilitarized, ex-Ukrainian two-seat MiG-29UB that he flies regularly. He has also been working to restore a former Royal Air Force swing-wing Panavia Tornado F2 interceptor, which would be the most complex private military jet flying, if or when it returned to working condition.

At the same time, the SR-71 is in a completely different category, having been the very definition of a high-demand, low-density asset even at the very peak of its service life with the Air Force. Only 32 of these jets were ever built, and they were notoriously complex and expensive to operate and maintain. The aircraft’s Pratt & Whitney J58 turbojets ran on JP-7 fuel that is no longer in regular production. After 9/11, the possibility was raised of returning a Blackbird to service to support the Global War on Terror, but doing so was projected to cost between $40 and $45 million – and that was just two years after 844’s last flight.

There is also a possibility, in line with Isaacman’s comments last week, that 844 could re-merge in a substantially different, reworked form. There is even the potential it could be retrofitted for uncrewed, or at least pilot-optional, flight. Any such conversion effort would also be a major undertaking, as would sustaining the resulting bespoke jet. As we noted earlier, NASA could also use the SR-71 at Edwards to help inform other future designs.

At the same time, maybe this is all a coincidence and the SR-71 in question is getting some other form of TLC, but its months-long absence is certainly a curious development in light of the current push for new X-planes under Isaacman’s leadership.

Update: 11:00 PM ET –

NASA has now provided TWZ with the following statement in response to our queries for more information about SR-71 tail number 844:

“NASA has a long history of pushing the boundaries of experimental aviation, and we continue to explore opportunities to build on that legacy. As Administrator Isaacman has said, we want to see NASA flying higher, farther, and faster than we have in decades. We recognize the interest in the SR-71 and its remarkable history at NASA but have no additional information to share regarding the aircraft at this time.”

Update: 9/25/2026 ET –

It has come to our attention that NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman made additional comments regarding the SR-71 at the EAA AirVenture airshow in July.

“There was a time that a lot of the technology that you see demonstrated here in the F-22 Raptor, like thrust vectoring controls, fly-by-wire, was pioneered by NASA. This is during the days when we had X-planes that included the SR71 Blackbird,” Isaacman said during a speech at the event. “We’re rebuilding our X-plane uh portfolio. We’re going higher, we’re going faster, until we blur the lines between in and out of the atmosphere, and that’s underway right now.”

“I’d say that NASA intends to field an exciting, inspiring, and technologically useful portfolio of X-planes, and I want us to go higher and faster than we’ve ever gone before,” he added during a subsequent question-and-answer session when asked specifically about any plans for a new crewed hypersonic aircraft or a successor to the SR-71. “We’ll see if we can pull anything off in the next handful of years, but, yeah, that is an area of great interest from a developmental perspective.”

Isaacman’s full speech at EAA AirVenture 2026 and the subsequent question-and-answer session are contained in the video below. The SR-71 comes up at 7:35 and 36:35 in the runtime.

The SR-71 also came up during a separate panel discussion at the AirVenture show, which included Isaacman.

“What aircraft that you haven’t flown would you like to try?” a member of the audience asked.

“SR-71 Blackbird,” Isaacman chimed in first without any hesitation.

The other panelists agreed.

“Do you have the power to bring that back then, Jared? That’s the next question,” the panel’s moderator added.

“That’s classified,” Isaacman responded.

The full panel discussion can be found in the video below. The exchange above starts at 1:00:50 in the runtime.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post An SR-71 Blackbird Has Vanished (Updated) appeared first on TWZ.

TWZ obtained the image of the ship in question, which was taken on September 10, from Vantor. Since then, it has also received an overall coat of gray paint, pointing to future service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It is some 669 feet (204 meters) long and around 98 feet (30 meters) at its widest. In terms of basic length and width, the vessel being built now is very roughly comparable to China’s Type 071 amphibious warfare ship. However, it appears to be much taller overall than the Type 071.

The new ship has been under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai since at least April. This yard produces a variety of naval vessels, including surface combatants and amphibious assault ships, as well as commercial designs.

The September 10 image, which shows the ship from the stern, is interesting for a number of reasons. It notably confirms that the design not only has a well deck, but that it is sized around what looks to be a large cradle-like platform visible in the shot. The very roughly 164-feet (50-meter) long rectangular platform has an arch-shaped structure at one end and two teardrop-shaped ones at the other, as well as six pillars, three on each side, in between. The teardrop-shaped structures, in particular, point to the platform being at least a semi-submersible, as they would help with stability and otherwise guide the flow of water while being pulled along.

The satellite image also clearly shows six large struts extending from the top of the stern end of the superstructure, each one which is paired with a shorter strut, for a total of 12. Earlier this month, independent naval analyst H.I. Sutton, who tracks undersea warfare developments in particular, posited that these struts could be used to lower a platform or some other similar structure below the hull of the ship. He also assessed that they could be used as part of a larger system capable of moving payloads between decks internally. This would help account for the configuration of the core superstructure, especially how high it is all the way from the front to the back. Overall, signs point to the inside of the superstructure being largely hangars and other open work spaces, allowing for multiple large UUVs to be carried and supported. Individual UUVs would be launched and recovered, one at a time, via the cradle.

In making his assessment, Sutton drew specific attention to a previously shown rendering of a proposed Chinese scientific research vessel with a roughly similar strut-based system at the stern for deploying submersibles and other large payloads. However, on that design, the system was entirely exposed rather than contained with an extended superstructure.

The platform seen immediately behind the ship being built at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard aligns with Sutton’s assessment about the purpose of the struts. At the same time, launches and recoveries could also be conducted in a more traditional manner via the well deck. The design of the cradle-like platform would seem to suggest the latter option is at least part of the plan.

The general idea of launching and recovering payloads through the bottom of the hull of a ship, including through moon pools, is hardly new. As another point here, Russia is known to have highly specialized mothership submarines that can carry crewed midget submarines and large uncrewed submersibles attached underneath their hulls, and that are also capable of launching ultra-long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed torpedoes. The idea of deploying and retrieving large UUVs via well decks using cradle-like systems is something being explored by other navies globally, including in the United States. All that being said, a large specialized ship built for the purpose of launching and recovering very large underwater vehicles in an operational capacity is unique.

The image from September 10, as well as other recent views of the ship, highlight other features that are now taking shape. This includes a large opening on the starboard side, which could be for launching and/or recovering lifeboats or other watercraft, or moving payloads to and from the pier while docked, as well as a multi-pronged mast on top of the bridge. An additional part of the ship’s superstructure extends behind the bridge area, and there is what looks to be a hangar inside. There is no attached helipad present now, but one could well be added later on somewhere on top of the superstructure. Many naval auxiliaries, as well as commercial ships designed for offshore support and other specialized tasks, have open helipads on raised frames attached to different parts of the superstructures.

Though there is growing clarity about the ship’s design, many questions do remain about the full breadth of its intended purpose. In Sutton’s view, the PLAN has a need, just in general, for a dedicated mothership to support its growing uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) fleets. The PLAN is pursuing various tiers of UUVs to perform a host of different missions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as mine-laying, special operations support, and even launching direct attacks on enemy vessels. Larger and larger UUV designs have been steadily emerging in China, which could require more specialized launch and recovery options to be feasibly employed operationally, especially from other vessels at sea. Deployment and retrieval at sea could, in turn, support very long duration missions far from China’s own shores.

“With smaller UUVs, even up to 20 meters like the AJX-002 and HSU-100 paraded in Beijing last year, they are road mobile. Truck mounted cranes should be sufficient for getting them in and out of the water making operations much simpler. With these latest, much larger XXLUUVs [extra-extra large uncrewed underwater vehicles] however, China will start to need dedicated port facilities,” Sutton wrote previously on his website. “Until now China has been using floating docks to house the two XXLUUV prototypes being tested on Hainan. One of these docks was purpose built while the other may have been taken up from general use.”

“This arrangement also has a significant drawback: each floating dock can only carry a single XXLUUV,” Sutton added. “Or if more than one, then they both need to be placed in the water at the same time. Because the whole dock floods, there cannot be one undergoing maintenance while another is being launched or recovered.”

A mothership vessel able to discreetly deploy and recover large uncrewed and crewed submersibles and other large payloads underwater could be tasked with more specialized missions, including cutting cables, retrieving objects from the seabed, and other kinds of undersea espionage. There is overlap here with more benign roles, such as submarine rescue, salvage, and even deep-sea scientific research. There is also the matter of servicing an expanding array of Chinese underwater infrastructure, including sensor and communications networks. As something of a corollary, Russia’s spy ship Yantar is officially described as an oceanic research vessel. In China, the line between military and non-military assets and capabilities, including ships, is often very blurry, to begin with, as TWZ regularly highlights. This dichotomy was observed right at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard around the end of last year after pictures of a commercial cargo ship being used to showcase a new family of containerized weapons, sensors, and other systems went viral online.

It is also worth pointing out that the boxy and largely enclosed design of the ship now being built at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard will inherently make it difficult to observe any activities onboard. This will have the additional knock-on effect of helping keep any payloads, as well as the crew, shielded from the elements. This could be valuable for operations in harsher locales, including waters in and around the Arctic, an ever-more strategic part of the world where China is working to be more engaged.

We also do not know if the apparent mothership vessel is intended to be a one-off or part of a larger class. It could be a stepping stone to broader plans or be part of an already extensive fleet of bespoke naval auxiliaries, as well as unique ostensibly commercial vessels, in service in China today. The PLAN’s aforementioned UUV ambitions will bring along significant test and evaluation requirements, as well as the need to support actual future operations.

If nothing else, evidence is only growing that the new ship under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard is intended to serve, at least in part, as a mothership for large submersible drones.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post China Appears To Be Building A Mothership For Large Uncrewed Submarines appeared first on TWZ.

In a live television interview Thursday night Paris time, French President Emmanuel Macron said he was sending an unspecified number of troops and equipment to the Saudi Arabia to protect the Yanbu energy hub, located on the Red Sea.

“This is the agreement we have finalized ​with ⁠the Saudis,” Macron explained. “We are going to send ⁠military resources, that is to ​say, soldiers, radar systems and defense ⁠systems, to protect this site — ⁠not ​to get us involved in any conflicts, but to ⁠protect this site.”

The French leader did not elaborate on the exact equipment he would send, how many troops, or when they would arrive. Nor did he address what would happen if French personnel were killed or injured or equipment damaged or destroyed. We have reached out to the French Embassy for further details. Based on his mention of radars and seeing that the threat to Saudi oil infrastructure is almost entirely from aerial attacks from drones and missiles, these will likely be air defense forces.

The decision was prompted by repeated Houthi missile and drone attacks as well as suspected strikes from Iranian-backed militias in Iraq on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure. Yanbu in particular is a key installation. As we have explained in the past, Saudi Arabia has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities around the Persian Gulf.

Before Macron’s announcement on Thursday, the Houthis claimed they had carried out two more waves of attacks on Saudi targets, including one on the Saudi Aramco facility in Yanbu, “using a number of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones.”

In addition, the Houthis claimed they struck Riyadh.

There was no immediate Saudi confirmation of an attack on the Saudi capital. Saudi civil defense did not issue an emergency alert for Riyadh on Thursday.

Earlier in the day, the Houthis said they struck “enemy command and control centers, operations rooms, weapon depots, missile launch platforms, and military sites belonging to Saudi-led enemy formations in Jizan,” a Red Sea port city.

“The Saudi-led military coalition in Yemen said on Thursday that it had shot down six ballistic missiles fired by the Iran-backed Houthi militia, in what appeared to be one of the largest cross-border attacks by the group since its conflict with Saudi Arabia [flared back up],” The New York Times reported.

The missiles were aimed at the Saudi cities of Taif and Yanbu, Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki, a spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, claimed on X. “Escalations and violations by the terrorist Houthi militia will be dealt with firmly,” he stated, without specifying where the missiles were intercepted.

TWZ cannot independently verify any of these claims.

Today’s attacks are the latest in the escalating conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM) and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as critical energy terminals on that body of water and Saudi refineries. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that carries oil to the Red Sea to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. The East-West pipeline reportedly reopened after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.

The stark reality facing Macron is that if Saudi oil infrastructure and transport nodes near the Red Sea are destroyed or the pipeline that feeds it is shut down for months the last major oil lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — will be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.

Iran has already severely curtailed the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz since the U.S. and Israel attacked it on Feb. 28. The movement of oil has been further impeded by a U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. However, transits have been increasing as of late, thanks in large measure to U.S. military escorts that U.S. Central Command claims have allowed more than a billion barrels of crude to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Still, the traffic is far below what it was before the war broke out.

Having both the Strait of Hormuz largely closed and energy exports out of the Red Sea shut down simultaneously is a nightmare scenario. By Thursday evening Eastern time, the per-barrel price of Brent crude oil shot up to nearly $107, according to OilPrice.com. It had fallen below $100 per barrel just two days earlier.

Given all this, the French president sought to offer reassurance about oil supplies, according to France 24.

“He said he had carried out ‘intense diplomatic activity,’ meeting in recent weeks with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Nigeria, all hydrocarbon suppliers, to ensure France keeps receiving the same volumes,” the publication noted.

“We have replenished gas stocks and also oil stocks” for the months ahead, the French president also said.

Macron’s decision follows one by the U.K.’s  Royal Air Force (RAF) on Tuesday to deploy one of its Voyager aerial refueling jets to help Saudi Arabia defend against Houthi attacks. As with the French move, it is a response to concerns about the flow of oil.

“Escalating tensions in the Gulf could have negative consequences here in the UK—such as rising prices, disruptions to energy supplies, and increased costs for British businesses,” the U.K. Defense Ministry (MoD) explained in announcing the deployment. “The Houthis pose a threat to stability in the Middle East; therefore, it is in the UK’s national interest—economically and in terms of security—that they do not succeed in their aims.”

“We unequivocally condemn Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, and our position is clear: both Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government have the right to self-defense,” the ministry added. 

The jet will operate from a U.K. air base in Cyprus and will begin air-to-air refueling operations in the coming days, the BBC reported.

The French and British deployments contrast decisions by the U.S. and other nations not to get involved with the Saudi-Houthi fight.

Last week, Trump turned down a direct plea from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom’s de facto leader, to attack the Houthis. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey, which signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, have yet to provide any direct military aid. The pact holds that an attack on one is considered an attack on all; however, it doesn’t stipulate exactly what actions should be taken.

The security situation in Yemen has drastically deteriorated since the launch of Epic Fury after the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter.

The Houthis have been directly attacking Saudi Arabia over claims that the kingdom has imposed a blockade on them. Beyond that, the mostly dormant civil war between the Houthis and internationally recognized Yemeni government forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, reignited in the wake of operation Epic Fury. The Houthis have made large territorial gains in the renewed conflict, including capturing the port city of Mokha and two key islands in the Red Sea. This has strengthened the Houthi hold on the BAM. You can read more about that in our story here.

The civil war in Yemen erupted in 2014 and expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis. The fighting between Saudi-led forces and the Houthis largely abated after a tenuous ceasefire took hold in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict, which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. The United Kingdom was another significant player in that air campaign.

Meanwhile, exacerbating concerns about the flow of oil from the Red Sea, “a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader warned Thursday that Iranian forces and their Houthi allies in Yemen could respond to any new U.S. attacks by opening ‘a new front’ in its war with the U.S. by targeting energy supplies in the Red Sea,” CBS News reported.

The statements came after U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday once again threatened Iran.

“Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before?” Trump asked rhetorically. “Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly, never giving them a chance to kill and destroy people and countries again?”

Trump added that he believed he would make a peace deal with Iran after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, which will decide the control of Congress.

As we noted yesterday, with gasoline and diesel price increases damaging the economy, the war and Trump’s handling of it have been unpopular with voters.

The fact that France is sending forces to Saudi Arabia is an ominous development and another indication that the current spate of unrest that began with Epic Fury does not appear to show any signs of ending anytime soon.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com 

The post France Sending Forces To Help Defend Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Oil Facilities appeared first on TWZ.

So, what does all this mean? Let’s put it in perspective.

The parts in question were being shipped by UPS from Australia to the United States in late May, according to people familiar with the matter cited by Bloomberg. The components from a Royal Australian Air Force F-35A were being sent to the United States for inspection and possible repair or disposal.

F-35 sustainment procedures explicitly cover the movement of F-35 parts, including unserviceable components, through the program’s logistics network. The U.S. Air Force’s transportation guidance directs F-35 shipments outside the Defense Transportation System to follow approved Joint Program Office procedures. In other words, moving an unserviceable Australian F-35 component to the United States for inspection, repair, or disposition is consistent with the normal sustainment process.

What is highly unusual is where this particular shipment ended up. F-35 components moving through an established international logistics system apparently stopped in South Korea, and were then routed to Hong Kong. Chinese authorities subsequently took possession of the parts and have not returned them, according to the sources cited by Bloomberg.

“For security reasons, we can’t discuss the status of specific shipments or our shipping procedures,” Lockheed Martin told us in response to a request for clarification about the incident. The company added that it “follows all U.S. regulations established by the Department of War and regulated by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) regarding the shipment of aircraft components. Our teams handle every shipment with the utmost diligence and safeguards to ensure the integrity of the F-35 program and the security of our allied partners.”

The Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office has acknowledged a “shipment issue” involving F-35 components and said U.S. authorities and industry partners are working to recover them and investigate what happened.

Lockheed Martin, UPS, and the Pentagon have not publicly provided a detailed account of how the shipment was diverted or what happened to the parts after they reached Hong Kong.

Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles also confirmed that Canberra was aware of the incident and was working with the United States and Lockheed Martin.

Marles has sought to play down the potential security implications of the components, saying his understanding was that the shipment did not contain sensitive equipment or sensitive parts. That does not by itself answer the more specific question of what could potentially be learned from these particular pieces of an F-35. After all, not every physical component of an F-35 is necessarily highly classified or capable of revealing meaningful information about the aircraft’s design. At the same time, a cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door involve structures, materials, interfaces, tolerances, and treatments that all have to work within the aircraft’s low-observable design. If radar-absorbing material or other specialized treatments remain on the components, that could potentially make them far more sensitive from a technological exploitation standpoint.

The condition of the parts is also unknown. We do not know how much of their coatings or other treatments remain intact, whether Chinese authorities have examined them, or what information could actually be extracted from them in their current state.

Above all else, there is little specific information in the public domain about what F-35-related technical information Chinese intelligence already has acquired over the years, what physical components or materials it may already possess, or what additional information could be gained through espionage, cyber operations, industrial access, observation of deployed aircraft, or other means.

Without these facts, it is impossible to gauge what damage could have been done by this loss. Still, viewed in a vacuum of those unknowns, simply having an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door in Chinese possession represents a significant loss of control over sensitive physical hardware — there is no way around that reality — and the severity of that loss could be substantial depending on the physical state of the parts.

The circumstances are particularly sensitive because, as we mentioned in the opening of this article, China has pursued multiple avenues for acquiring information on the F-35 for many years, with publicly documented cases involving cyber operations, technical information, supply chains, and human expertise. Some aspects of China’s subsequent stealth aircraft designs have also prompted comparisons with U.S. aircraft, although claims that China simply ‘cloned’ entire aircraft are not supported by the available evidence.

China And The F-35: A History Of Espionage

In 2014, U.S. authorities charged Chinese businessman Su Bin with conspiring with two other Chinese hackers to break into the computer systems of U.S. defense contractors. Prosecutors alleged that the group targeted information on aircraft including the F-35 and F-22. The alleged hacking campaign ran from 2009 to 2013.

Su Bin later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nearly four years in prison. The Justice Department’s 2026 case against former Air Force fighter pilot Gerald “Runner” Brown connects the two cases. Prosecutors allege that Brown used a co-conspirator to negotiate his work training Chinese military pilots with Su Bin.

Brown, a retired U.S. Air Force major who spent more than 24 years in the service, subsequently worked as a contract simulator instructor training U.S. military pilots on the A-10 and F-35. In February 2026, the Justice Department charged him with providing and conspiring to provide unauthorized defense services to Chinese military pilots.

According to the criminal complaint, Brown traveled to China in December 2023, where he allegedly began training People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) personnel. Prosecutors say he also answered questions about the U.S. Air Force for three hours on his first day in China. Brown has been charged, and the allegations have not been adjudicated. He is one of multiple former Western aviators alleged to have provided training services and/or intelligence to Beijing.

The Honeywell case provides yet another example, this time involving the defense industry’s supply of technical information.

In 2021, the State Department reached a $13-million administrative settlement with Honeywell over alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Honeywell had voluntarily disclosed alleged unauthorized exports and retransfers of ITAR-controlled technical data.

The case involved 71 engineering drawings containing dimensions, geometries and layouts for manufacturing castings and finished parts used across multiple aircraft, engines and military systems. The State Department said the unauthorized exports and retransfers involved Canada, Ireland, Mexico, China, and Taiwan.

Among the systems covered by the drawings were components associated with the F-35 and F-22. The case did not allege that Honeywell deliberately sought to provide China with sensitive military technology; rather, it concerned alleged violations of export-control requirements.

There has also been a physical supply-chain precedent.

In 2022, F-35 deliveries were temporarily halted after the Pentagon discovered that a magnet in the aircraft’s Honeywell-built turbomachine pumps —which provide critical power functions to the jet — contained a cobalt and samarium alloy produced in China. The material itself was not considered a security or flight-safety threat, but the discovery demonstrated how difficult it can be to maintain complete visibility over a global supply chain involving thousands of companies and multiple tiers of subcontractors.

Taken together, these cases demonstrate several different pathways through which China has appeared in the F-35 security story: cyber theft, unauthorized technical-data transfers, supply-chain exposure, and alleged exploitation of former Western military expertise.

The Hong Kong incident would add another major category: physical access to actual F-35 components.

These are only some of the publicly documented examples. There is no public way to know the full extent of information or physical material Chinese intelligence may have acquired over the years, but is very likely far larger in scope than what is available in the open source.

Chinese Access Concerns Have Shaped F-35 Export Policy

The security issues surrounding the F-35 are significant enough that concerns about China have affected not only how the United States protects F-35 technology, but where Washington is willing to export the aircraft in the first place.

The proposed sale of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates became deeply entangled in U.S. concerns about Abu Dhabi’s growing military and technology relationship with China.

Washington had approved a potential package involving 50 F-35As, but U.S. officials and lawmakers expressed concerns about Chinese intelligence activity and technology in the UAE. Among the broader concerns were Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and the possibility of Chinese military or intelligence access to facilities associated with advanced U.S. weapons. A Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report later cited the potential presence of Chinese intelligence collection capabilities and military facilities in the UAE as risks to the proposed F-35 sale.

The issue has now resurfaced with Saudi Arabia.

The State Department recently approved a potential $24.3-billion sale to the Kingdom involving 48 F-35s and associated equipment. But U.S. intelligence agencies have reportedly warned that China’s military and technology relationship with Saudi Arabia could create opportunities for Beijing to obtain sensitive F-35 information.

According to reporting based on U.S. officials familiar with intelligence assessments, a Defense Intelligence Agency report raised concerns about Chinese military access to Saudi bases, Chinese technology in Saudi telecommunications infrastructure, and whether secure facilities could be maintained for F-35 operations. The assessments also questioned whether Saudi Arabia would limit contact between Chinese military and intelligence personnel and F-35-related sites.

What Could The Components Reveal?

As we noted earlier, there is no way to gauge the intelligence impact of the loss at this stage. The central unknown of what China already knows about the F-35, and what it may already have in its possession — especially related to these components — is the key variable here.

Regardless, an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door can provide information that cannot otherwise be easily obtained and gives a different level of fidelity in terms of material exploitation than what construction data and blueprints alone could.

The F-35’s low observability is the product of an extremely complex combination of airframe shaping, construction materials, external coatings, manufacturing tolerances, speciality apertures, and more.

A canopy is a particularly demanding part of any stealth aircraft. It has to satisfy optical and structural requirements while also controlling radar reflections. The cockpit is historically a major source of radar reflectivity, including the pilot’s helmet. Therefore the canopy’s materials, construction, interfaces, and specialized treatments can be critical to the aircraft’s overall low-observable performance, and especially from the critical frontal aspect.

The F-35’s canopy has been an ongoing work in progress for many years. It has had chronic material issues, especially when it comes to delamination. Multiple iterations spread over two decades have recently resulted in a major improvement of the issue. The tight balancing act of keeping the canopy transparent enough, while controlling the F-35’s stealthy signature and having that mix of materials be robust enough to last for a reasonable amount of time has been a major investment for the program. If the canopy is of a later variation, that loss alone could be substantial and could help China with their own low-observable canopy development programs even if they already had original information on the F-35’s canopy original design dating back years.

The F-35’s weapons-bay door has its own sensitivity issues. It is effectively a major section of the aircraft’s outer shell, with its structure, edges, interfaces, tolerances and treatments all having to function without creating unacceptable radar signatures. Its construction and material attributes can be reasonably extrapolated for the rest of much of the F-35’s outer mold-line. Above all else, if the radar absorbent material remained intact on the door, that would signify a major loss when viewed without any understanding of what China already knows about the F-35’s radar absorbing surface treatments. Historically speaking, RAM technology is among America’s closely guarded material sciences secrets.

For the time being, Australian officials have said they do not understand the parts to be sensitive. The investigation will ultimately have to establish what the components actually contain and what could be learned from them.

The incident comes at a moment when China’s own stealth fighter efforts are undergoing an extraordinary expansion.

The PLAAF is now operating the J-20, China’s first operational fifth-generation stealth fighter, in increasingly large numbers. The smaller J-35 is also moving toward broader service, including a carrier role for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

China has also moved into what Western observers generally describe as sixth-generation fighter development.

Two new tailless combat-aircraft designs emerged publicly in December 2024. One is the large Chengdu aircraft commonly referred to as the J-36, while the other is associated with Shenyang and is variously called the J-XDS or J-50. Both have continued flight testing and yielded several prototypes with individual refinements.

The exact capabilities and eventual operational roles of these aircraft remain uncertain. They are developmental designs, not established operational equivalents of the F-35 or other sixth-generation systems. However, China is clearly building an increasingly broad ecosystem of fifth- and next-generation low-observable combat aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed. In the latter category is a growing number of stealthy drones, including long-endurance types.

China didn’t likely need physical access to an F-35 canopy or weapons-bay door to develop the J-20, J-35, or its next-generation aircraft. But additional information about how a mature Western stealth aircraft handles materials, coatings, interfaces, manufacturing, and the integration of those elements can still have great potential value to an industry developing its own systems. This includes technologies intended to counter the U.S. combat aircraft and their low-observable characteristics.

The F-35 has been produced in large numbers, is operated by a growing coalition of countries, and has been subjected to years of testing and operational experience. Its low-observable design represents decades of accumulated U.S. research and industrial know-how. At the same time, the global scale of the program inevitably makes control over sensitive information more complicated. More aircraft, more maintainers, more industrial partners, and more international logistics mean more points at which information and physical hardware have to be controlled. Over time, a program of this size will see an erosion in its secrets, but a major loss can drastically accelerate what should be a more gradual and controlled decline in security.

The potential intelligence value of the components also has to be considered in the context of foreign material exploitation, or FME. Major military powers maintain dedicated capabilities to recover, examine and characterize foreign weapons, aircraft, sensors, materials and other equipment. The objective is not necessarily to reproduce an entire system. More important is determining how something is built, what materials and manufacturing techniques are used, how individual components perform, and where industrial strengths or limitations may lie.

That is why countries have historically gone to extraordinary lengths to recover even crashed or damaged pieces of sensitive military hardware. The bigger the prize, the more risk an intelligence service would be willing to take in order to realize a recovery.

The sensitivity surrounding the physical remnants of an F-35 is not new. When a Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-35A disappeared over the Pacific in 2019, the search quickly became more than a rescue operation. U.S. and Japanese forces mounted an extensive effort to locate the wreckage, with U.S. Navy P-8A aircraft and a destroyer joining the search. TWZ noted at the time that even scattered F-35 wreckage could expose valuable technological secrets, while the aircraft’s location on the seabed raised the prospect of an underwater espionage and recovery operation.

That concern has also been evident in subsequent F-35 recovery operations. In 2022, the U.S. Navy recovered an F-35C from roughly 12,400 feet in the South China Sea after a carrier landing accident, removing the possibility that the aircraft could be accessed by another country.

Unanswered Security Questions

At this point, there is no public evidence that the Hong Kong diversion was a deliberate Chinese intelligence operation, although it is certainly possible. It is also unclear whether Chinese authorities have examined the F-35 parts or what level of new and useful information has been recovered from them.

If, as reported, Chinese authorities have taken possession of the parts and have not returned them, that would be an extraordinary development. If the diversion was genuinely the result of a shipping or logistics error, the outcome would itself be extraordinary. It would raise serious questions about the security controls surrounding the movement of F-35 hardware even without evidence of deliberate interference.

The timing is also notable. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Washington this week for a state visit with President Donald Trump, with the two leaders meeting amid broader disputes involving technology, security, and the future of U.S.-China relations. Whether the F-35 shipment comes up directly in those discussions is not known, but it would be an obvious subject for U.S. and Chinese officials to address through diplomatic channels.

For now, however, the central question remains how the parts got there. Until that is answered, we won’t know if this was a simple logistics failure or a deliberate intelligence operation. And beyond that, what China already knew about the components it now may have in its possession — a question we may never truly get an answer to.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post F-35 Canopy And Weapons-Bay Door Loss To China: Separating Fact From Fiction appeared first on TWZ.

Though the operation is still ongoing, the success of Vivaldi began long before any troop movements, Kudryashov explained in an editorial he published in Ukrainian Pravda.

“After the Third Army Corps was formed, we changed the command system of its subordinate units,” he noted. “Some brigades came to the corps after very heavy fighting, with losses, manning problems and, most importantly, eroded trust in their leadership.”

Third Army Corps Commander Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletsky “then set out one of our key principles: a commander must be responsible for the entire cycle, from training a soldier to the result on the battlefield,” Kudryashov pointed out. “In some places that meant replacing a commander. In others it meant restructuring a staff or strengthening the NCO chain. In some cases we had to build, almost from scratch, processes that on paper should have been working long ago.”

At issue was changing the culture from a more rigid Soviet-era model, with a cumbersome chain of command, to a modern, more flexible one better suited for the current conflict.

“A modern commander has to handle an enormous flow of information and make decisions quickly,” the deputy commander proffered. “He has to understand what unmanned systems, logistics, reconnaissance and adjacent units can do, while not smothering initiative at lower levels with endless approvals. An army where every decision takes hours to travel up and down the chain loses to an army that makes the same trip in minutes.”

Once those changes were put in place, the Third Army Corps had to first stop Russian advances in the sector before it could move forward.

“When the corps took over its area of responsibility, our first task was not an offensive,” the officer said. “We had to stop the situation from deteriorating and stabilize the forward edge.”

“The enemy was pressing. In some sectors our combat formations were losing cohesion,” he underscored. “The Russians were actively using infiltration tactics: small groups seeped between positions, massed in our rear, threatened logistics and gradually eroded the defensive line.”

“We had to stabilize the forward edge and stop the infiltration,” Kudryashov said. “We had to rebuild command, put in commanders capable of making decisions, form new teams and reconstitute units. We had to set up the surveillance-and-strike system and sustain the front line. We had to stockpile ammunition, drones and other resources, understand the enemy, and plan the next step before the previous one was finished. Only after that could we move forward.”

By June, the corps was able to secure the front “in the sector from Borova to Lyman and eliminate the enemy’s infiltration zones,” Kudryashov continued. “That sounds less impressive than the word ‘offensive,’ but no offensive ever happens without it.”

“You cannot plan a complex operation if you don’t know where your forward edge will be tomorrow,” the deputy commander extrapolated. “You cannot build up forces if your logistics are constantly under threat. And you cannot form a strike group if your units are always forced to patch new breaches. So the first phase of ‘Vivaldi’ was not an advance at all. It was creating the conditions that made an advance possible in the first place.”

Once the front was stabilized, the next step was shaping the battlefield for the offensive. The corps’ unmanned systems units went to work against Russian logistics, striking a pipeline and depots. That forced the enemy to change its fuel and lubricant supply routes.

“The operation also involved the corps’ brigades, its reconnaissance and unmanned units, and attached forces from the SSO (Special Operations Forces), GUR (Defense Intelligence) and DPSU (State Border Guard Service),” the deputy commander said. “To counter infiltration, a joint headquarters was set up to coordinate special and reconnaissance units at the tactical level under a single concept.”

“In my view, this is one of the main characteristics of modern war,” he further stated. “It is not 10 strong units that each fight well on their own. It is 10 different elements that start working as one system at the right moment.”

The influential, Kremlin-connected Rybar Telegram channel has acknowledged Ukrainian gains in this sector.

“In the first half of summer, Russian units gradually advanced in Lyman,” Rybar wrote this morning. “However, in August, the enemy launched counterattacks and, by the first week of September, regained some positions, and also began attempts to recapture Shandryholovo and Zarechnoye.”

“The enemy did not inflict significant losses on Russian troops, as the concentration of units of the West group of forces in the salient remained relatively low,” Rybar added. “However, later, the UAF deployed reserves to launch an offensive towards Zherebets in order to align the front along the water barrier and return it to the configuration of the end of 2025.”

Though the battle is still in flux, Kudryashov said there are lessons the rest of the Ukrainian military should heed.

“Winning one battle is not yet winning the war,” he said. “The enemy is learning too. He changes tactics, looks for weak spots and tries to scale what works for him.”

“So our task is to be faster, not only in physically moving forward but also in our ability to see, think, decide and put into practice what delivers results,” the deputy commander avowed. “And to do everything possible so that our soldiers pay the lowest possible price for every next kilometer of Ukrainian land.”

The Latest

On the battlefield, in addition to the gains Ukraine has made near Lyman, it has also largely been able to hold off Russian advances across the front lines. Here are some key takeaways from the latest Institute for the Study of War assessment of frontline operations:

• Sumy: Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission east of Sumy City, and they continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against frontline settlements in northern Sumy Oblast to set conditions for future offensives.

• Kharkiv: Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Borova, Kupyansk and Velykyi Burluk directions on Sept. 21 and 22 but did not advance.

• Donetsk: Ukrainian forces reportedly continue counterattacks in the Lyman direction, including southeast of Lyman, as Russian forces are attempting to use redeployments to stabilize the area. Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka and toward Mykolaivka and Fedorivka Druha on Sept. 21 and 22 but did not advance. During this period, they also tried to advance in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions but made no gains, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in both areas.

• Zaporizhia: Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Kherson: Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 22.

In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly this afternoon, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for Russia to end its war and said it was paying a heavy price — and exacting a terrible toll — for little territorial gain.

“This ridiculous and never-ending war with Ukraine must be ended,” the Ukrainian leader urged. “I do not know a single world leader who would say otherwise. I do not know anyone who is openly for this war, except one man.”

He was referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Ladies and gentlemen, for almost five years now, Russian generals have been trying to carry out Putin’s crazy order to seize our eastern land, the Donetsk region,” Zelensky continued. “And just this year, from January through August, the Russian army lost 248,964 people on the battlefield in Ukraine in eight months. Twenty-one countries in the world have smaller populations… than the number of Russian troops lost in just eight months.”

“It’s madness, but they still keep going there to die because that is what Putin wants,” Zelensky suggested. “After losing so many people, Russia managed to capture just over 1,000 square kilometers of our land this year, and we have already liberated a significant part of it. Russia is a country that already has 17 million square kilometers of its own land without any Ukrainian territory, by the way. So to add another 1,000 square kilometers, Putin is paying with 248 people for every kilometer. Does anyone still think that he is reasonable? And moderate?”

“Russia’s leader, Patient Zero, the man from whom this war began and spread into the world, becoming the largest war in Europe since World War II, will inevitably leave this war,” Zelensky proffered. “But the longer Putin is able to wage war, the more evil he will leave behind in this world. Today, nothing in war works the same way it did, by the way, in 2022, except the courage of people.”

Russian missile and drone barrages have “caused damage, but they didn’t break us,” the president proclaimed. “We build our defense. What is really difficult for us now is Russian ballistic missiles and their new jet-powered Shaheds — Iranian technologies.”

“Just imagine this: since the beginning of this year, Russia has already used more than 2,100 missiles of different types again against us, against Ukraine, our people and our children,” Zelensky stated. “More than 950 of them were ballistic missiles. In eight months of this year, Russia used 63,000 attack drones of different types against Ukraine, our people, and more than 7,700 of them were jet-powered Shaheds, truly destructive and very dangerous weapons. Just think about it. The Russians launch jet-powered Shaheds every hour, every hour, against our cities, our economy, our infrastructure. Our combat aircraft are fighting them 24/7, and this is part of Russia’s strategy to create a new threat every hour, to make life harder for the economy and to disrupt people’s lives, and to stop children from being able to study, to study at school.”

Speaking at the Sixth Summit of the International Crimea Platform in New York on Wednesday, Zelensky said the return of Crimea is a condition for any return to normal relations with Russia.

“Disrespect for international law began in 2014, when Russia entered Crimea,” the Ukrainian leader stated. “There can be no full return to normality without Crimea, the restoration of security, the protection of people and lives, the release of prisoners held by Russia, and a return to the fundamental principles of international law. Territorial integrity matters, state sovereignty matters, and human lives matter. And Russia must learn this.”

Tuesday, Zelensky met with U.S. President Donald Trump.

Among the topics of their three-hour meeting were a path to end the war and a renewed discussion about the licensing of Patriot air defense interceptors so they can be built in Ukraine. The country is struggling to defend against Russian ballistic missiles because of the dearth of these munitions.

“Just had a positive and productive meeting with President Trump on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly,” the Ukrainian leader stated on X. “Both the United States and Ukraine want this senseless Russian war to end before winter. We discussed possible de-escalation steps that could pave the way to diplomacy.”

“I am grateful that, in parallel with this, our teams continue to work on launching the production of Patriot interceptor missiles in Ukraine,” Zelensky noted. “This is exactly what will help protect lives if Russia rejects negotiations and continues to rely on ballistic terror against our people this winter and beyond. We also discussed other bilateral and multilateral issues, including the winter air defense package for Ukraine. Thank you to President Trump, his team, and all the American people for their support.”

For his part, Trump said negotiations about Patriots are ongoing but offered no commitments.

“We’re talking about that,” Trump stated. “We’ll be talking about that now. If you would have come in at the end, we would have had an answer. But we’ll be talking about that. I mean, we talk about it all the time. Very capable people, really amazingly capable people.”

This isn’t the first time the two leaders have talked about a Patriot licensing deal. The issue came up back in July. As we noted at the time, such a deal faces big challenges.

First of all, it could face bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles, like getting congressional approval. Major security concerns exist, not just by having license production of a very sensitive weapon in Ukraine but also having to do with whatever facility will perform the work, which would become a top target for Russia. Even if they got the clearance to move forward, delivery of new weapons will still take years due to the time it takes to build the facility and to source long-lead components.

Even Lockheed Martin, one of the world’s biggest arms makers, currently produces only about 650 PAC-3 MSE interceptors a year, or just shy of two per day. However, under a contract with the Pentagon inked in January, Lockheed is committed to boosting Patriot PAC-3 MSE annual production to 2,000 in the years to come.

You can read more about the headwinds a Patriot licensing deal would face, even if it were to come to fruition, in our initial story here.

Ukraine’s president also confirmed that “Kyiv is ready to agree to an energy truce on the condition that Russia does not attack its energy, electricity and heating infrastructure as well as its water supplies,” CNBC reported. “Trump has previously called on Ukraine to stop targeting Russian oil refineries with drone strikes, which he says are ‘hurting the world’ as fuel supply disruptions from the Ukraine and Iran wars propel U.S. diesel prices to a record high.”

Ukraine’s repeated attacks on Russian oil infrastructure is having a major impact.

“Russian refinery throughput fell to 3.8 mb/d, its lowest level in more than 20 years and roughly 30% below a year earlier,” according to a recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA). “Reported gasoline output is down by 20% compared with 2025 levels, while diesel production is estimated to have fallen by nearly 30%, prompting the government to restrict fuel exports to protect domestic supplies.”

Amid the U.N. General Assembly meeting, strikes by both sides continued.

“At least 16 people were killed and 59 others injured in Russian attacks across Ukraine over the past day, as Russia launched several waves of ballistic missiles at Kyiv overnight,” the Kyiv Independent reported, citing local authorities.

“Two people were killed and eight others injured in Kyiv, where Russian ballistic missiles struck the capital in three waves overnight,” the publication added. “Residential buildings, a maternity hospital, energy, and logistics infrastructure were among the sites damaged, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.”

“Russia launched 282 attack drones of various types overnight, including jet-powered drones, as well as Zircon anti-ship missiles and Iskander-M, S-400, and KN-23 ballistic missiles,” the news outlet stated, citing the Ukrainian Air Force. “Ukrainian air defenses shot down 227 aerial targets, including 219 drones, four Zircon missiles, three ballistic missiles, and one Banderol munition. Strikes were recorded at 13 locations, while debris from downed targets fell at 10 locations.”

Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy infrastructure continued.

“Over the past 24 hours, two oil refineries were hit – one in Bashkortostan and one in the Samara region. There were also strikes in the Black Sea,” the Ukrainian Defense Ministry stated on X. “We are taking the war back to where it came from. We are bringing peace closer for Ukraine. I thank the units involved for their precision.”

In an effort to defend against Ukrainian attacks, Russia continues to use netting to protect its energy facilities. You can see a recent example in the video below.

Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Zelensky this morning “signed an Agreement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation under the Drone Deal format,” the Finnish Defense Ministry said in a statement. “It will enable defense materiel cooperation between the two countries.”

“The agreement will enable Finland and Ukraine to transfer technology and knowledge, pursue research, development and innovation cooperation and promote joint manufacturing and drone technology development between their industries,” the MoD stated. “Another objective is to simplify administrative processes, for example regarding the granting of export authorizations, to make the transfer of defense materiel and technologies between the two countries as efficient as possible.”

With electronic warfare interfering with how drones controlled by radio frequencies operate, Ukraine is testing a new system of small radio beacons placed on the ground that allow drones to navigate without GNSS — including missions deep inside Russia. While many systems might not need this fix, some of the lower-end drones might.

Ukraine is testing and scaling this technology as part of a layered navigation system designed to keep drones autonomous in heavily jammed environments.

“The concept is quite simple,” the BBC wrote. “If the enemy jams the signal coming from above—specifically from GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) satellites, which determine the precise coordinates, speed, and time of any object on Earth—then specific points must be created to provide that same signal from below.”

The idea is to guide the drones by triangulating their location.

“To achieve this, special small devices—radio beacons—are either installed on the ground or air-dropped across a specific area. Their coordinates are known; thus, when a drone flies through the area, it receives coordinate data and signal transmission timing from several beacons. From there, it is a matter of basic geometry: the UAV calculates its own spatial position using data on the distance to the beacon and its altitude above the ground.”

In the age of robots, uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) are playing a larger role in combat. The following video shows one UGV rescuing another one by pushing it back on its wheels.

That’s it for now.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Inside Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi That Sees Its Troops Gaining Ground In The East appeared first on TWZ.

Nearly 70 airmen assigned to Nellis gathered along the flight line to salute the aircraft as it departed. The final takeoff closes a chapter that began in 1977, when the first A-10 arrived at the base, which subsequently became a major center for developing and refining the aircraft’s operational employment.

Over the decades, Nellis-based units worked on the A-10’s software, avionics, and precision weapons capabilities, while the U.S. Air Force Weapons School’s 66th Weapons Squadron trained more than 300 A-10 weapons officers through approximately 100 classes. Many of the tactics in the A-10’s playbook emanated from the base.

The A-10’s departure consequently represents more than the retirement of another aircraft from a Nellis ramp. It also marks the end of a dedicated training and institutional ecosystem that developed around an aircraft specifically designed for close air support.

Earlier this year, Jamie Hunter of TWZ visited the U.S. Air Force A-10 Weapons Instructor Course as it was in the process of closing down, as documented in these exclusive videos:

The Air Force is now attempting to carry at least some of that expertise into a force built around multirole fourth- and fifth-generation fighters.

“We are maintaining the culture of the A-10 by involving as many other fighter communities involved in the close air support mission,” Lt. Col. Ridge Flick, commander of the 66th Weapons Squadron, said. “We are also training F-15 Eagle, F-35 Lightning II and F-16 Fighting Falcon pilots to take on some roles we have had in combat search and rescue.”

The A-10 was developed specifically for close air support, with its design emphasizing survivability at relatively low altitude, weapons employment against ground targets, and the ability to persist in the vicinity of friendly forces. In contrast, the F-16C/D and F-15E/EX were developed primarily as multirole fighters, while the F-35 combines strike, air-to-air, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and networking capabilities with a low-observable design.

Rather than replacing the A-10 with a single successor, the Air Force is therefore distributing elements of its former mission set across several aircraft and communities. The service insists its close air-support capability is not being reduced as the Warthog fleet retires, but at the very least the transition does represent a significant change in how that capability is generated and employed.

Regardless, the USAF’s claim that the impact of losing the heart of the A-10’s braintrust will not dramatically impact key mission sets in a negative manner has been viewed with extreme skepticism by some. It’s not uncommon for subject matter experts to believe the close air support and ‘Sandy’ aircrew recovery mission braintrust that the Warthog community represents is a far bigger loss than the aircraft itself, and that the USAF is not prepared to preserve this critical expertise, regardless of the service’s stated intentions.

The end of A-10 operations at Nellis also put what may be the final nail in the A-10’s coffin, as reconstituting these operations would be very challenging and costly. All this points to the Warthog being on its final glide path to retirement, once and for all.

You can read all about this controversy in our past special feature linked here.

Beyond the redistribution of Nellis’s A-10 pilots, the transition is also affecting the maintainers who supported the base’s A-10 fleet. Airmen assigned to the 757th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron’s Thunder Aircraft Maintenance Unit are being reassigned to other squadrons and airframes, including the F-35 and F-16. The Air Force is consequently moving not only personnel, but also decades of experience maintaining an aging and structurally demanding aircraft into programs supporting newer fighters.

For Staff Sgt. Eva Kehn, a weapons load crew chief with the 757th AMXS, the end of the A-10 era has an especially personal dimension because of her family’s connection to the aircraft and to aviation.

“Working on the A-10 is meaningful to me because that is something that I share with my grandfather,” Kehn said. “I’m very excited to have that new chapter and bond over that again with my grandfather.”

Kehn is transferring to an F-35 unit at Nellis, where that connection will continue in a different form. Her grandfather is now a civilian F-35 instructor, giving the two an opportunity to remain professionally connected even as the A-10 disappears from the installation.

Master Sgt. Aaron Edmonds, an aircraft section chief with the 757th AMXS, is also moving on from the Warthog after spending the past five years maintaining the aircraft. Edmonds previously worked on the F-16 earlier in his career and will now return to the Viper community.

“It’s a bittersweet moment,” Edmonds said. “I enjoyed my time with the A-10, but I’m excited because this departure marks the closing of one chapter and the start of another.”

Edmonds said the experience gained on the A-10 should be carried into the next aircraft rather than left behind with the airframe. “The advice I would give airmen who are transitioning from one airframe to another is to be open-minded, willing to learn and carry on the great work ethic from your previous aircraft over to your new one,” he said.

With the A-10 no longer present at Nellis, at least some of the expertise attached to it is being incorporated into a fighter force in which other aircraft types can contribute to the close air support mission in very different ways. An F-35, for example, can use its sensors and networking capabilities to identify and share information about targets and the battlespace, and it can go where other fighters can’t. An F-15 can contribute heavier weapons and longer endurance, among other capabilities, depending on the mission. This is not exactly new, either, as all types of aircraft provided CAS during the Global War on Terror-era, although the masters of exactly how to do it and how to execute the critical airborne forward air control (FAC-A) mission existed in the A-10 community. Still, the resulting force will be considerably different from the one centered on the Warthog, even where the underlying requirement to support troops on the ground remains.

As noted, the A-10’s retirement now looks to be gathering pace, despite repeated efforts to keep the A-10 in service and recent employment in combat operations in the Middle East. The Pentagon has granted three Warthog squadrons a reprieve to continue operating through 2030. In July, a bipartisan group of Congressmen introduced a bill that, if passed and signed into law, would require the Air Force to keep flying the jets through Fiscal Year 2033. Still, the aircraft’s eventual fate appears increasingly clear, with growing numbers heading to the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) boneyard in Arizona for storage, including the last one from Nellis.

The ongoing retirement of the A-10 is bringing a fundamental change in how the Air Force organizes and executes the missions for which the Warthog became synonymous. Nellis will remain an important center for developing those capabilities, even though the aircraft around which that expertise was built is no longer part of the equation.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post The A-10 Era Is Over At Nellis AFB appeared first on TWZ.

During the demonstration, held by the Republic of China Army (ROCA) at a training area in Tainan today, the vehicle reportedly engaged a moving target at approximately 0.75 miles and a stationary target at around 0.6 miles. It also fired against targets positioned 90 degrees to the side of the vehicle while operating on a gentle slope, demonstrating the gun system’s ability to engage targets while the vehicle is positioned on uneven terrain.

The vehicle subsequently fired its 7.62mm coaxial machine gun simultaneously with its main gun as part of a scenario intended to demonstrate engagement of multiple targets, including simulated amphibious assault vehicles.

An apparent weapon malfunction was also recorded during the demonstration. One of the 105mm rounds initially failed to fire, according to reports. The crew waited approximately two minutes in accordance with safety procedures before reloading the weapon, after which the vehicle fired normally. Maj. Gen. Chen Chien-chung, head of Taiwan’s Arsenal 202, the Production and Manufacturing Center of the Armament Bureau, said an investigation would be conducted into the misfire.

Despite the incident, the demonstration provided an important look at a vehicle that Taiwan is developing specifically around the country’s geography and battlefield requirements, including a potential amphibious invasion by the Chinese PLA.

A new direct fire support variant of the Clouded Leopard 8×8 infantry fighting vehicle was first publicly displayed at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in 2023. It passed initial combat readiness testing with the ROCA in October 2023, and it was authorized for mass production in April 2024.

The production configuration has undergone significant changes since then.

Its height has been reduced by approximately 12 inches, bringing the overall vehicle height to below 9 feet 10 inches. Its turning radius has also been reduced from 36 feet to 26 feet. The reduction in turning radius was achieved by providing steering to three pairs of wheels, rather than two pairs on the earlier configuration.

Those changes are especially relevant to Taiwan, where large sections of the island feature restrictive terrain, dense urban development, narrow roads, drainage channels, and other obstacles that can limit the movement of heavy armored vehicles.

Taiwanese officials specifically highlighted the system’s suitability for culverts and urban areas, as well as the challenging terrain of Hualien and Taitung on the island’s mountainous east coast.

The vehicle’s principal weapon is a 105mm gun. The weapon can fire the general-purpose ammunition already developed for tank guns, in addition to ammunition developed specifically for the new system. The ROCA displayed armor-piercing, anti-personnel, and training ammunition during the demonstration. The gun also offers useful ammunition commonality with Taiwan’s older, but still active M60A3 and CM11 tanks.

That compatibility potentially gives the vehicle access to an existing ammunition ecosystem while allowing Taiwan to develop specialized rounds for its particular requirements.

Against a PLA assault, the 105mm system would provide mobile direct firepower against amphibious vehicles, armored personnel carriers, fortifications, and other ground targets, complementing Taiwan’s heavier tanks and other anti-armor weapons. Its wheeled configuration also allows the vehicle to rapidly reposition along Taiwan’s road network, giving commanders a mobile source of direct firepower that could respond to amphibious landings and reinforce threatened sectors.

The system falls into the same broad category as other modern 8×8 mobile gun systems, including Italy’s Centauro family and Japan’s Type 16 Mobile Combat Vehicle.

Less successful was a mobile gun system version of the U.S. Army Stryker, also with a 105mm gun, but the service divested that in 2021 because of problems with its dated cannon and autoloader. The U.S. Army then received the M10 Booker Combat Vehicle. Armed with a 105mm main gun, the Booker is a tracked vehicle with a much higher degree of armor protection and off-road mobility, but this, too, was canceled in 2025, amid cost and weight increases.

A wheeled 105mm gun system can provide substantial direct-fire capability while offering advantages in road mobility and potentially lower logistical demands. It also lacks the combination of protection, cross-country mobility, and heavy armament associated with a tracked main battle tank.

For Taiwan, this kind of vehicle provides a comparatively compact armored platform able to move rapidly between positions and bring heavy direct firepower to areas where larger vehicles could face mobility constraints.

If fighting reaches Taiwan’s cities, the ROCA regularly trains for the challenges of urban warfare. The service has also demonstrated unusual measures to conceal and protect its armored vehicles, including disguising tanks and other vehicles as scrap piles or civilian construction equipment to complicate PLA targeting.

The vehicle’s development is also being influenced by the threat of battlefield drones. Taiwanese military officials say the system is expected to receive additional counter-drone capabilities before entering mass production. One planned modification is an anti-drone cage around the vehicle.

More ambitious changes could involve the installation of a larger-caliber automatic weapon. Reportedly, the vehicle could eventually receive another machine gun or larger-caliber automatic cannon, with the 30mm M230 chain gun identified as one possible option. The proposed weapon could use canister-type ammunition designed to disperse numerous fragments against small drones.

Adding dedicated counter-drone equipment to the mobile gun system would therefore give the vehicle another role beyond direct engagement of conventional ground targets.

The prominence of counter-drone measures in the planning of the vehicle also reflects the increasingly contested environment in which Taiwan’s armored forces would have to operate. In a conflict with China, armored units have to operate under the threat of persistent surveillance and attacks from a wide range of uncrewed systems, making concealment, mobility, dispersion, and organic counter-drone capabilities very important to any change of survival. Questioning just how long any armor would last in a full-on invasion scenario is absolutely relevant. As we have seen in Ukraine, the drone threat alone has sidelined even the most capable armor. At the same time, Taiwan is working toward its own drone-heavy battlefield doctrine, part of a broader plan to turn the island into a “hellscape” for any invading force.

Overall, the September 23 demonstration offered a useful glimpse into the thinking behind Taiwan’s indigenous armored vehicle program.

As part of a wider modernization of ROCA armor, the service has also received 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, broadly equivalent to the M1A2 SEPv3 version — or System Enhancement Package version 3 — which you can read more about here.

With production of 178 series examples of the new vehicle scheduled to begin in 2027, Taiwan’s new 105mm mobile gun system is moving toward becoming a significant component of the island’s domestically produced armored fleet.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post This Is Taiwan’s New 105mm 8×8 Mobile Gun System appeared first on TWZ.

The J-36 first broke cover, along with another next-generation tailless tactical jet design generally referred to as the J-XDS, back in December of 2024. There are understood to be at least four, and possibly five, J-36 prototypes flying now. A number of significant changes between prototypes have already been observed over the past two years, as you can read more about here.

The most recent video of a J-36 test flight, seen in the social media post below, began circulating online yesterday. The footage shows the aircraft coming in to land, providing good general views of the uniquely three-engined jet with its two-seat, side-by-side cockpit configuration, especially from the rear aspect. What is seen underscores a previously observed total revision of the exhausts from a trough style to a two-dimensional thrust-vectoring configuration akin to what is found on the U.S. F-22 Raptor. This and other significant changes to the design, including the addition of divertless supersonic intakes (DSIs) all around, not just on top, first emerged last year. The clip also offers a good reminder of just how wide the aircraft is overall.

As this particular J-36 passes by, it can be seen to have a lighter-colored radome, as well as at least one relatively large lighter-colored section on top of the dorsal air intake. A similarly colored radome was first spotted on what is said to be the fourth prototype back in July. This coloring could point to the installation of actual radar in the aircraft’s nose. In TWZ‘s first in-depth analysis of the J-36 back in 2024, we assessed that the jet’s very broad radome area could house an absolutely massive primary array.

The lighter section on top of the fuselage could be an aperture for a conformal antenna tied to a beyond-line-of-sight communications and data-sharing suite. In 2024, we posited that the heavyweight J-36 could serve as an intelligence-gathering and communications relay platform in addition to performing tasks more typically associated with tactical combat jets. Reliable and multi-faceted connectivity would be key for employing the J-36 as an airborne controller for advanced air combat drones, as well.

Another J-36 flight testing video that emerged on Monday, seen below, offers an additional view of the top of the jet, showing multiple lighter-colored sections that would appear to be additional conformal apertures for various antennas. There is a lighter-colored rectangular outline painted around part of the intake on top of the center of the fuselage, as well. The jet’s full paint scheme includes lighter-colored leading and trailing edges, which are critical structures on low-observable (stealthy) designs that often contain additional antenna arrays. Overall, the two-tone coloring is very much in line with what is seen on operational J-20 fighters in Chinese service today. The original J-36 prototype, at least, has notably worn a splinter-type camouflage paint scheme.

Whether or not the two recent video clips show the same J-36 prototype is unclear. The possibility has now been raised that Chengdu may be using a single serial number (36011) on at least some of the J-36 prototypes, a decision that could have been made for counter-intelligence and/or deliberate misinformation/disinformation purposes.

Much still remains unknown about the current or expected future capabilities of the J-36. Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) did have a placard at its booth at the 14th China International Defence Electronics Exhibition earlier this month that has prompted questions about whether the jet could be equipped with a laser directed-energy weapon. Chengdu falls under the umbrella of AVIC, which is a state-run enterprise. The Chinese-language placard in question describes a “laser weapon tracking system” with a power rating of “*00” kilowatts and a weight of “less than” 837.7 pounds (380 kilograms), per a machine translation. The way the power rating is written appears to mean that it is in the hundreds of kilowatts, which would put it firmly in a class capable of doing physical damage to objects, such as incoming missiles and drones.

Furthermore, an associated graphic shows a turreted system and a computer-generated rendering of a J-36 projecting a beam. The render appears to be from a video that depicts a J-36 using a laser to destroy other aircraft. Another computer-generated video that shows a J-36 using retractable lasers to shoot down incoming missiles has been circulating online since at least last year.

It is not immediately clear how official either of the clips depicting laser-armed J-36s might be, or whether they at all reflect real planned capabilities. The full placard presented at the China International Defence Electronics Exhibition, as seen in the video below, shows a variety of different laser systems, and not just for aerial applications.

The fielding of operational laser directed-energy weapons capable of inflicting any real physical damage has historically proven to be very challenging, and even more so within the size, power-generation, and cooling constraints presented by modern combat jets. As an example, the U.S. Air Force spent roughly a decade working on a podded laser weapon system that tactical jets could use to swat down incoming missiles under its Self-protect High Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) program. In 2024, the service confirmed SHiELD had “concluded” without achieving its goal of an actual flight test. That same year, the Air Force cancelled plans to test a laser weapon system on an AC-130 gunship.

Despite important U.S. strides more recently when it comes to fielding ground-based and naval laser weapon systems, “there’s nothing that’s on the shelf right now that we are ready to put onto an airplane,” U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Douglas Wickert, the commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), told TWZ and other outlets just last week at a roundtable at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference on Tuesday. “The solid-state lasers and the power density and the different ways that you actually – there’s actually a lot of secret sauce in that. How do you make the beam, and how do you form the beam, and how do you pulse the beam, and all that’s in development.”

‘There’s development of the laser itself, but now the power and thermal management system has progressed so much that we can provide the power needed,” Dr. Michael Gregg, head of AFRL’s Air Warfare Directorate, said at the same roundtable. “We’ve also had new designs and engines that we know have the power … to direct that power in certain areas. So, from a system perspective, it’s much more feasible because everything has matured over the last decade.”

China has certainly made substantial investments of its own in laser and other directed-energy weapon capabilities across domains in recent years, and this is clearly an area of interest for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in general. When it comes to the J-36 specifically, TWZ has explicitly highlighted in the past how the three-engine configuration could be particularly useful for producing sufficient power to support a host of advanced and electricity-hungry sensors and other capabilities, including directed energy weapons.

Larger questions remain about the exact set of roles the J-36 is expected to fill, as well. The basic design is certainly optimized for straight-line performance, combat radius, and payload rather than maneuverability and agility. The jet has already caused a significant amount of debate just when it comes to taxonomy, as it does not seem to fit inside traditional definitions of ‘fighters’ and ‘bombers,’ something we have explored in detail previously.

“According to Yang Wei – chief designer of the J-20 –, the new [J-36] fighter can penetrate heavily defended airspace that the J-20 and comparable F-22s or F-35s must avoid, placing it a generation ahead,” Andreas Rupprecht, an analyst specializing in Chinese military aviation and TWZ contributor, wrote in a post on LinkedIn last week. “With lower RCS [radar cross section], high speed, and the capacity to control more drones, it could act as a node and command center for systems including J-20s and, especially, unmanned aircraft, while attacking high-value targets from stand-off range with long-range weapons.”

“The type could therefore represent a new class of ‘fighter,'” he added. “Online terms include ‘theater-level deep-penetration command combat aircraft’ and ‘high-performance fighter,’ analogous to a cruiser ranking above a destroyer within the Navy. Recent evidence gives this theory new weight and warrants continued monitoring.”

The J-36, as well as the J-XDS, reflect a larger burst of next-generation air combat developments in China in recent years. This includes an array of new crewed and uncrewed aircraft designed for operations from bases on land, as well as from the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) growing fleet of aircraft carriers and big-deck amphibious assault ships. The Chinese aviation industry’s development of a growing array of flying-wing uncrewed aircraft, some of which are very large, has been particularly notable.

In turn, there is something of an emerging gap between these developments and the pace at which the U.S. military is moving along similar lines, at least publicly. Boeing’s sixth-generation F-47 for the U.S. Air Force is not expected to take to the skies for the first time until 2028, though preceding demonstrator designs have been flying for years already. The U.S. Navy still has yet to officially announce a winner of its F/A-XX next-generation carrier-based fighter competition, and the current timeline for that program producing an operational aircraft is unclear.

As an aside, based on what has emerged publicly to date, there are signs that the F-47 may reflect a distinctly different design philosophy that puts greater emphasis on maneuverability compared to the J-36, and even likely the J-XDS. As mentioned, the J-36 certainly seems much more focused on payload, range, and level flight performance. In July, TWZ published a deep dive exploring why the U.S. Air Force would pursue a sixth-generation fighter with rear-swept wings, canards, and other features despite steady trends in the opposite direction visible in Chinese designs and ones elsewhere globally.

Regardless, U.S. officials have downplayed questions about China’s gaining ground in the air combat arena, or even surging into the lead in certain areas, in the past. “Chinese sixth-generation aircraft are in the nascent stages of development and expected to be operational by 2035,” the Pentagon wrote in its most recent annual report on military and security developments in China, which was published in December 2025.

In the meantime, the J-36’s design is already steadily being refined, and the total fleet of prototypes has been growing, offering new insights into the aircraft’s expected capabilities and roles.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post China’s Recent J-36 Heavy Stealth Tactical Jet Testing Offers New Insights Into Its Evolving Design appeared first on TWZ.

As we have frequently documented, the ubiquity of drones has changed the nature of combat, especially when it comes to artillery. Not only can drones hold artillery positions at risk, many are cheaper than shells and easier to produce at scale. Most types are also precision guided munitions capable of hitting moving targets with pinpoint accuracy and can also provide battlefield surveillance. However, they are not a panacea, especially amid the cat-and-mouse game of electronic warfare countermeasures and improving kinetic and passive defenses.

In a recent interview with the Ukrainian Oboronka news outlet, Lt. Col. Vitalii Korniienko, commander of the 7th Artillery Brigade, talked about the changing nature of artillery warfare. Korniienko, whose unit is part of the Ukrainian National Guard, explained what is being done to keep his array of domestically produced Bogdana 155mm systems, donated weapons like M777 howitzers, remaining Soviet-era 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled howitzers and other guns, relevant. Here are some takeaways from that discussion.

How The Game Changed

“Guns used to be massed at positions to create an ‘artillery wall’ and a barrage of fire,” the lieutenant colonel said. “That practice is gone now. So, how effective is artillery today? We can create an artillery barrage, but what is the point of mindlessly churning up the earth? I’d rather send 20 FPV drones to destroy the target. The cost of that mission is $20,000.”

“Alternatively, I could fire 200 shells, but the cost would be astronomical,” he pointed out. “Plus, if we fired 100 shells from a gun in a single day, it likely wouldn’t survive until evening. The sky is full of drones; every shot gives away the position, leading to detection and an attempt to dismantle it using every available means. Nowadays, a typical mission involves a series of up to 10 shots. First, 3–5 shells for ranging, followed by fire on the target. That’s a minimum of five shells, with each costing at least $2,000.”

What Does The Drone-Artillery Brigade Do Differently?

“It is a concept of ours that was approved: combining artillery and drones within a single brigade,” Korniienko said. “Drones take out enemy artillery and logistics, while our guns provide cover for the infantry, destroy targets, and pin the enemy down in their dugouts. This way, we mitigate the limitations of both systems and boost overall effectiveness.”

“Our primary operations are focused within the corps’ area of ​​responsibility—targeting positions 10 kilometers deep or farther behind enemy lines. Of course, we will also engage closer targets if requested by the brigade holding the defense. In addition, we are shifting logistics tasks from pickup trucks to ground-based robotic systems. They are already transporting ammunition to drone and artillery positions, as well as food and fuel for generators.”

What Artillery Can Do That Drones Can’t

“Let’s be honest: 95% of strikes right now are carried out by drones,” Korniienko explained. “Yet, we cannot simply abandon artillery. The focus of our operations has shifted from merely striking the enemy to destroying, suppressing, and halting the actions of assault groups and armored columns—and the need for that remains as critical as ever. There are tasks that only artillery can handle.”

“For instance, we currently have several enemy targets in the Kupyansk sector that drones cannot reach due to electronic warfare (EW) interference, while slow fiber-optic drones are simply shot down,” the officer noted. “What do we do? We call in artillery. Nothing affects its shells. Fog, strong winds, snow, or headwinds—it makes no difference to artillery; it will operate regardless.”

Preparing Artillery For The Modern Battlefield

“At the beginning, both we and the Russians might have had two or three guns at a single position,” Korniienko proffered. “The enemy was doing this as late as 2023. Then it tapered off, because if you deployed six guns, an hour later they’d be gone. No one drives out into an open field anymore. Today, a gun wouldn’t even make it to the position without being spotted.”

As a result, the artillery crew’s deployment “is prepared in advance,” the officer stated. “First, anti-aircraft drone teams ‘clear’ the sky above the site of enemy reconnaissance assets. The position itself is a fully underground-dugout caponier with well-camouflaged access routes. We put a lot of effort into ensuring the artillery doesn’t get destroyed. Losing a gun is a huge blow to us.”

Short Range Versus Long Range Shells

“There is currently an ongoing debate about phasing out ‘short’ shells and switching entirely to long-range variants,” the officer stated. “This is intended to protect artillery from drone strikes.”

“What exactly is a ‘short’ shell, and should we stop using it?” he asked rhetorically. “The M107 155mm round is what is known as a ‘short’ shell. It is inexpensive and mass-produced; all our allies—and even our own country—manufacture it. We have sufficient stocks of them for combat operations. While accurate, its range is limited to 14–18 km, depending on the propellant used.”

Long-range options “include the M795 and its foreign equivalents,” Korniienko explained. “These are longer, heavier, and significantly more expensive. With high-quality propellant, they can reach 30 km, or even further if equipped with a base-bleed unit. However, both these shells and the necessary propellants are in short supply.”

“I do not believe abandoning the M107 is the right move,” the officer suggested. “Long-range shells cause faster barrel wear and compromise position concealment; firing a long-range charge produces a massive burst of flame from the muzzle—visible for kilometers at dusk or dawn.” “Besides,” he added, “18 km is a respectable range. If the gun is positioned 15 km back, it still has a 3-km margin to spare. That is sufficient for engaging frontline infantry. In my view, the ideal mix for most brigades would be 60% long-range shells and 40% standard M107 rounds.”

Big Versus Small Guns

“I operated 105mm guns in the Serebryanka area, on the Kharkiv axis,” Korniienko noted. “Based on intercepted communications, the enemy thought it was a mortar and searched for it within a five-to-six-kilometer range. But the howitzer was positioned eight or nine kilometers away and fired out to 10–12 kilometers.”

“There is almost no muzzle flash, just a bit of dust,” he added. “The shell arrives, and the enemy doesn’t even hear the sound of the shot. It’s compact and lightweight—you can transport it on a pickup truck. So yes, it would be useful.”

“I’d also like to see the development of 203mm artillery; why move away from that caliber?” the officer wondered aloud. “Our ‘Pion’ systems fire a massive 100-kilogram shell capable of punching through at least two floors of a building or a bunker. And it’s reasonably accurate, too. You wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end when guns like that are firing at you. Overall, I believe we need competition. Right now, the ‘Bogdana’ is evolving under wartime conditions, which is good. But in a few years, momentum could stall. They might just keep producing the same system without significant upgrades because there’s no incentive to innovate. Yet, the nature of war doesn’t stand still.”

Wary Of Asian Shells

“We have a wide range of shells from different countries, and the ones coming from the West are fine,” Korniienko said. “However, their counterparts produced in certain Asian countries… the quality is frankly poor.”

“What is wrong with them?” queried Korniienko, who did not name the country in question. “On paper, the shell weight is listed as 46 kilograms, but when we weigh them, we find 46.9 or 45.4 kg. And that half-kilogram difference—give or take—has a huge impact on where the shell lands.”

As a result, “we no longer trust the standard firing tables provided with the shells; instead, we compile our own for each manufacturer. We weigh every batch and sort them by weight so that the difference between the ‘piles’ is minimal, ensuring a reasonably tight grouping. I can’t afford to make a mistake that causes a shell to land 2 kilometers off-target—right where our infantry guys are positioned. I should add that our artillerymen are actually wary of shells from one specific country. There have been instances where they tore off the muzzle brake or even caused the barrel to burst. A barrel burst is a disaster.” 

Homegrown Is The Best

Korniienko said his unit was one of the first to test the Bogdana system, adding that he prefers it to other guns.

“We tested them and provided feedback to the manufacturer, which was then used to refine the design,” he explained. “It is a solid gun now, and it is my preferred choice. It might not be the absolute best, but I am very satisfied with the support and service.”

“If there’s a breakdown, the gun is back in position within a day or two,” he pointed out. “For instance, a gun broke down today, and we needed a repair team from the manufacturer. I know I’ll have it fixed by the day after tomorrow. They arrive in the morning, and by midday, the gun is ready. Then it takes another day or two to get it back to the position. That is very fast.”

That’s a very different experience than what he sees with donated weapons like the U.S.-made M777.

“As for the Western partners helping us—we are deeply grateful,” the officer avowed. “However, by the time you actually receive a part—say, a sensor—the gun might have been sitting idle for six months. And you can’t try to fix it yourself, because that would void the warranty.”

While artillery may no longer be the reigning weapon of war, as far as Ukraine is concerned, it has not been relegated to the dustbin of history yet either.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post The Evolving Role Of Ukraine’s Artillery In The Age Of Drones appeared first on TWZ.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), using publicly available open-source information. Check out our last report here.

Abraham Lincoln Departs Guam, Continuing Her Journey Home

The USS Abraham Lincoln is currently conducting routine operations at an undisclosed location in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility (AOR), presumably steaming east en route to her homeport at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego. After leaving Thailand on September 6 following a five-day liberty port call, Lincoln topped off the Petersen Jr. in the Gulf of Thailand and linked up with two Royal Australian Navy frigates for joint training in the South China Sea. Publicly available flight tracking data shows the carrier transited the Balabac Strait eastbound around September 13, and the Surigao Strait northbound two days later to enter the Philippine Sea. After going dark for a few days, she resurfaced in Guam and moored at Kilo Wharf over the weekend.

“Due to the brief nature of the logistics stop, the crew were afforded on-base liberty to access base services and attend a Navy Entertainment-sponsored concert,” CSG-3 spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Tyler Barker wrote in an email to Stars and Stripes. The carrier took on stores, mail, and equipment, according to Barker, and 13 Fleet and Family counselors are now aboard to run return-and-reunion classes but “the crew and ship remain focused and ready.”

A homecoming date has not been announced publicly. Unless Lincoln makes another stop (in Hawaii, for example) or conducts additional training on the way, she should arrive in early October just shy of Ford’s record. The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Daryl Caudle, said in June that Lincoln would likely shift her homeport to Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton in Washington state, which aligns with TWZ’s reporting that she is expected to begin a Drydocking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA) after returning stateside. The timeline for the DPIA is unclear.

George Washington and George H.W. Bush Project Power In The Middle East

The American public got a rare look at ongoing combat operations aboard the USS George Washington when two reporters embarked earlier this month. Fox News’ Trey Yingst and CBS News’ Tom Hanson reported live from the flight deck, as F-35C Lightning IIs and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets launched behind them, in hits that aired September 11 to 14. The only other publicized media embark since the war began on February 28 went to CNN’s Pamela Brown, who reported on the conditions aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln while the flattop was still in theater.

“Last weekend, the aircraft carrier came under Iranian missile attack; the first of three attacks on US warships in the last week alone,” Yingst said, indicating it was the USS George Washington, and not the USS George H.W. Bush, that was targeted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in early September. The Navy declined to comment when TWZ asked which carrier was targeted after Iranian state media claimed the strike had been successful. “We’re pretty much employing all our capabilities right now,” Washington’s commanding officer (CO), Capt. Nicholas DeLeo, told Yingst.

“The GW is surrounded by four to five guided-missile destroyers at any moment,” Yingst also reported. He flew out to USS Shoup, positioned off the starboard side at the time, to make the point and speak with the warship’s CO. Shoup is the only destroyer officially confirmed to be part of CSG-5. “My ship is in charge of coordinating defense amongst the various other units, allocating defensive assets to it, be it potentially a missile to shoot something down or just aircraft to go identify and monitor the picture,” Capt. William Buford said. Based on that description, Shoup’s CO appears to be coordinating Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) for the strike group, a question we’ve been asking the Navy to confirm. TWZ understands additional destroyers operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR are also escorting Washington, but a U.S. official declined to say which ones.

Hanson asked DeLeo about the recent IRGC ballistic missile threat targeting Navy ships in the region. “We have a variety of ways to protect, both offensively and defensively, a Navy ship, and we employ all these methods,” he told the network. “It’s something that we train to.” Hanson also pressed the commander of CSG-5, Rear Adm. Jeff Heames, on whether he was concerned about the munitions stockpile, a dynamic TWZ detailed in a special feature yesterday. “Of course we’re concerned about the expenditure to some degree, but I have no concerns locally at my level here,” Heames replied.

In addition to Washington, Bush is still working the blockade from the Arabian Sea, nearly six months into her deployment. As of CENTCOM’s latest social media update on September 21, U.S. forces in the region had redirected 110 commercial vessels to ensure “total compliance” with the blockade. More than 50 ships “supporting humanitarian efforts” have been allowed through, according to the command. CENTCOM recently stopped publishing the number of ships boarded, seized, or disabled kinetically.

Ronald Reagan Rejoins the Fleet

The USS Ronald Reagan is officially back. The Navy, in a recent statement, confirmed the flattop “returned to the fleet capable and mission-ready.” The carrier had been out of action since March 2025 for a DPIA at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington state and completed four days of sea trials in early September. While the Navy does not comment on upcoming deployments due to operational security, current speculation points to a spring 2027 deployment, but that is not confirmed.

Reagan is the only carrier currently homeported at Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton in Washington. Previously, she was America’s only forward-deployed carrier based in Yokosuka, Japan, until swapping hulls with the USS George Washington in 2024. USS Nimitz was stationed at Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton before circumnavigating South America to Naval Station Norfolk this summer, where she is being used primarily for training before deactivation in 2027. The yet-to-be-commissioned PCU John F. Kennedy, the second and newest Ford class supercarrier, is slated to homeport in Washington state no earlier than 2029.

U.S. Navy Big Deck Fleet At A Glance

Overall, three U.S. carriers are deployed (with one heading home), one is preparing to deploy in the near term, three are working up in various states of readiness, three are in current or upcoming maintenance, and one is being used primarily for training before deactivation next year. One amphibious ready group is deployed, one is forward-stationed and in port, four are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io or @ianellisjones

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: September 23, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.

Videos captured of the incident show the aircraft porpoising at a slow speed and high angle of attack, before the pair ejected. The Hawk appears to narrowly miss homes before impacting the countryside and bursting into flames, with thick black smoke visible afterward.

Local police said the two pilots were being treated for minor injuries and that there were no reports of wider damage or additional casualties. Emergency services, including Coastguard and Wales Air Ambulance helicopters, responded to the scene.

The crash occurred near RAF Valley, where the RAF operates its Hawk T2 advanced jet trainers as part of fast-jet pilot training. The station is home to No. 4 Flying Training School. The Telegraph reports the incident happening “shortly after takeoff.”

The Royal Air Force confirmed that the incident involved one of its Hawk T2s flying out of RAF Valley.

“An investigation is under way and we will not comment further at this time,” the RAF said.

Wreckage from the aircraft has been located at the crash site. Police have asked the public to avoid the area while emergency services remain at the scene.

The circumstances surrounding the crash, including what caused the aircraft to go down and the nature of the flight, have not yet been established.

The Hawk fleet has experienced previous technical issues.

In 2022, engines were removed from service amid concerns over potential in-flight failures, while the 28-aircraft RAF Hawk T2 fleet was temporarily grounded in January 2023 following an engine-related incident at RAF Valley.

In 2024, then-Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton said he wanted to replace the Hawk T2, citing problems with its engines and support and concerns about the reliability of the training capacity it provided. The Hawk T2 is due to be retired by 2040.

Those previous issues are not known to be connected to Wednesday’s crash.

Update: 2:09 PM ET –

The Royal Air Force has issued a new update on the mishap today:

“Following an incident involving an RAF Hawk T2 aircraft today, both pilots are receiving medical treatment. Their families are being supported.”

“The RAF has decided to temporarily pause Hawk T1 and T2 operations, as a precautionary measure, whilst investigations are ongoing.”

Update: 4:25 PM ET –

A video taken by an onlooker outside the perimeter fence at RAF Valley shows the ill-fated Hawk T2 taking off, with flames beginning to appear during the takeoff roll.

Update: 9/24/2026 –

The Royal Air Force has shared a new update on yesterday’s crash, which is as follows:

“Both pilots are doing well, they are in extremely good spirits and [are] expected to make a full recovery.”

“A formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident is now underway and as a precautionary measure, the RAF has temporarily paused Hawk T1 and Hawk T2 flying operations.”

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Video Shows RAF Hawk T2 Trainer Crew Ejecting Before Jet Crashes (Updated) appeared first on TWZ.

The silhouette, accompanied by the tagline “Rebuilding our X-plane portfolio,” was among the backdrops for Isaacman’s remarks at the annual All-In Summit in Los Angeles, California, last week.

The SR-71’s iconic shape is defined by its long, sword-like profile, pronounced chines, and deeply swept wings, and huge spiked engine nacelles with canted fins on top. Its distinctive geometry is reflected in the silhouette, which shows a broad, highly blended aircraft from an unusual head-on angle.

“In the service of the first A [aeronautics] in NASA, we are rebuilding our X-plane fleet. The X-59 is researching quiet supersonic flight, but it’s just the beginning,” the head of NASA told attendees. “As NASA recommits to flight test and works alongside industry to push the boundaries of airframe and propulsion design, it will not be long before NASA once again is flying as high and as fast as we had in decades past, and then even more.”

Isaacman’s full speech at the All-In Summit, as well as his remarks during a live interview that followed immediately afterward, are contained in the video below. The high-speed aircraft silhouette is first seen at around the 12:40-mark in the runtime, and is then further discussed at around the 28:39-mark.

Chamath Palihapitiya, co-host of the All-In Podcast and one of the hosts of the summit, asked Isaacman directly about the silhouette during the fireside chat after his speech.

“You showed a picture of the [SR-71] Blackbird up there,” Palihapitiya said at one point, before Isaacman interjected.

“You sure that’s a Blackbird?” Isaacman said.

“Well, ok. What was that picture you showed up there?” Palihapitiya asked.

“Like I said, NASA is getting back in the business of flying high and fast again,” Isaacman said in response, and declined to further elaborate.

Whether or not the silhouette reflects a real design that is in development now is unclear. TWZ has reached out to NASA for more information.

Though the Mach-3+-capable SR-71 is primarily remembered as a Cold War-era intelligence-gathering aircraft, NASA operated several Blackbirds in support of aeronautical research efforts for years. The agency was actually the last operator of the type, flying SR-71s until 1999.

Lockheed Martin openly pitched a successor to the SR-71, dubbed the SR-72, in the late 2010s. There was even talk of building a flying fighter jet-sized demonstrator to prove out key technologies.

Discussion about the SR-72, or a further evolution of that concept, resurfaced in the early 2020s after Lockheed Martin helped craft a fictional hypersonic aircraft called Darkstar for the blockbuster movie Top Gun: Maverick.

Exactly where Lockheed’s SR-72 ambitions sit today is unclear. After talking constantly about the potential program for a number of years, it went silent, which could indicate the program had moved forward deep in classification.

NASA has worked with other supersonic and hypersonic X-planes in the past, as well. This includes reusable space planes, as well as aircraft designed to fly within the Earth’s atmosphere.

“I mean, that doesn’t seem like a space vehicle. It seems like an Earth-air vehicle,” All-In’s Palihapitiya noted during his chat with Isaacman about the silhouette he showed.

“Yeah. The first ‘A’ in NASA is our aeronautics portfolio,” Isaacman said in response, before highlighting a host of contributions his agency has made to advanced military and commercial developments over the years. “You know what I want to do? I want to get back to the radical airframe and engine designs like we were always supposed to do.”

As mentioned, Isaacman also highlighted the X-59 Quiet Supersonic Technology experimental test aircraft, or QueSST, at the summit, but made clear the goal is to go well beyond that design. The QueSST jet is the centerpiece of a program now to investigate technologies that could eventually enable commercial supersonic flight over land with a substantially reduced sonic boom.

The X-59 conducted its first supersonic test flight, reaching Mach 1.1, in June. NASA’s test program aims to eventually push the aircraft up to a speed of Mach 1.4. This is significantly below the record-breaking mark of approximately Mach 3.3 that the SR-71 clocked back in the mid-1970s, but it was never designed for extreme speed as testing its sonic signature was its primary goal.

As for bringing a Blackbird back into operation for high-speed testing, which is now at the forefront of military aeronautics (and civilian to a lesser degree) after decades of being sidelined, that would be a very challenging operation. The SR-71s are long retired and have been placed in museums and other display areas. While the Pentagon could technically claw some of them back from their ‘on loan’ status, reconstituting even one of them would be a major undertaking as the entire support ecosystem that once sustained them has been gone for decades. Still, having a Mach 3+ capable jet for testing would be a highly relevant tool in a new age of high-speed flight exploration.

On the other hand, building a new test aircraft that aims higher and faster than the SR-71, but may be based on its ‘DNA,’ is certainly possible. Such an aircraft could leverage material science, avionics, flight controls, and engines that are seven decades more modern than its progenitor. Technology demonstrators in this class could also already exist in the classified domain. NASA could possibly assume ownership of one after the Pentagon declassifies it, as well.

Regardless of how such an exotic aircraft is obtained, one of the biggest differentiating factors could be that a NASA aircraft is piloted by a human onboard, instead of it being a drone, but an uncrewed aircraft is possible too.

Isaacman has been very open about its interest in and support for new X-plane developments. On only his second day on the job, in December of last year, he called for revamping the agency’s aeronautics program and stated that “I’d love to see an expanded X-plane portfolio” during a town hall with NASA staff.

“If NASA has a healthy X-plane portfolio, we should be flying experimental aircraft so routinely that the second flight of a single X-plane is not newsworthy,” he wrote in a post on X in March of this year. “For example, the two NASA X-29 aircraft flew 422 flights between 1984 and 1991. That period also overlapped with the development of two X-31 aircraft, which together flew about 580 times.”

NASA’s proposed FY2027 budget also spelled out rapid, cost-effective flight experimentation as an explicit priority. Budget documents specifically highlight work toward new advances in supersonic and hypersonic flight technologies “that will revolutionize air transportation, strengthen national security capabilities, and position America to lead the future of high-speed flight,” as well.

Furthermore, in April, NASA outlined a new Aeronautics Flight Accelerator (AFA) initiative. At that time, the agency put out a call for “input on technologies, concepts, and flight test campaigns suitable for cost shared maturation leading to flight within the next three years.” Stated areas of interest included “subsonic (including vertical lift), supersonic, and hypersonic flight technologies.”

It is important to reiterate that we still do not know whether the silhouette Isaacman showed at the All-In Summit represents an active development effort and, if so, how mature it might be. Government agencies and contractors routinely use concept art to illustrate an area of research or communicate a future vision. Such artwork does not necessarily correspond to a funded aircraft, an active prototype, or even a specific configuration.

At the same time, under Isaacman, NASA is clearly pushing toward new X-planes. NASA’s X-plane programs have historically served as a way to investigate technologies that conventional aircraft programs were not prepared to risk. The resulting aircraft have explored everything from supersonic and hypersonic flight to unconventional configurations and new propulsion concepts.

At the very least, evoking the visual legacy of the SR-71 Blackbird, coupled with Isaacman’s comments, provides a clear indication that NASA is interested in returning to the high-speed flight regime as part of its future plans.

Update: 2:04 PM ET –

NASA has now provided TWZ with the following statement in response to our queries for more information:

“NASA has a long history of building and flying experimental aircraft that push the boundaries of what is possible. As Administrator Isaacman has said, we want to see more X-planes flying in the years ahead, developing the technologies that will allow us to fly higher, farther, and faster than we have in decades. We look forward to sharing more as those efforts progress.“

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Did NASA’s Administrator Just Tease An SR-71 Blackbird Follow-On X-Plane? (Updated) appeared first on TWZ.

The British action is significant because, while it involves just one tanker, other key Saudi allies have yet to heed the Kingdom’s request for military help specifically to battle the Houthis. Although it’s important to note some assets already deployed to defend against Iranian attacks could be helping with the Houthi threat now.

Last week, Trump turned down a direct plea from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom’s de facto leader, to attack the Houthis. Meanwhile, Pakistan and Turkey, which signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia, have yet to provide any direct military aid. The pact holds that an attack on one is considered an attack on all; however, it doesn’t stipulate exactly what actions should be taken. 

Saudi Arabia, under repeated Houthi missile and drone attacks as well as suspected strikes from Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, is struggling to defend its oil infrastructure. The Kingdom is also facing a challenge supporting the anti-Houthi forces it backs in the Yemen civil war that reignited in the wake of the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran that began Feb. 28.

At issue, beyond protecting the Saudis, is growing concern over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a key chokepoint now largely controlled by the Houthis, who are preventing the Saudis from using it to ship oil. 

Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the Strait, and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as critical energy terminals on that body of water. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that feeds oil to be transferred and shipped via the Red Sea in order to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. The pipeline reportedly reopened today after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.

The stark reality is that if Saudi refineries are destroyed and the pipeline is shut down for months, if not longer, the last major lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — would be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.

Concern over these factors spurred Britain to act, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) noted. It said it was acting on a request from Saudi Arabia and that the jet would “support Saudi Arabia’s defensive operations in aid of the legitimate Yemeni government.”

“Escalating tensions in the Gulf could have negative consequences here in the UK—such as rising prices, disruptions to energy supplies, and increased costs for British businesses,” the ministry explained. “The Houthis pose a threat to stability in the Middle East; therefore, it is in the UK’s national interest—economically and in terms of security—that they do not succeed in their aims.”

“We unequivocally condemn Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, and our position is clear: both Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government have the right to self-defense,” the ministry added. 

The jet will operate from a U.K. air base in Cyprus and will begin air-to-air refueling operations in the coming days, the BBC reported.

The MoD said the Voyager will fly only in support of missions to shoot down missiles and drones, though Saudi aircraft are also bombing Houthi ground positions in Yemen, in part to get at drone and missile launchers and storage sites. Houthi officials have accused the Saudis of killing civilians in some of these attacks.

It should be noted that, more than a decade ago, the U.S. was supporting the Saudi coalition’s previous bombing campaign against the Houthis by providing aerial refueling and intelligence. However, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis ended that in 2018 during the first Trump presidency after growing concerns over the large number of civilian casualties.

The Voyager can only refuel the Royal Saudi Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons, Panavia Tornados, and Italian Air Force Typhoons that have been in the Kingdom since before the fighting with the Houthis broke out, as well as any other similarly equipped allied aircraft. That’s because the tanker only has probe-and-drogue aerial refueling, not the boom required for gassing up other receptacle-equipped aircraft. You can read more about this in our story here.

The Voyager will not be the first British asset to be sent to help Saudi Arabia since the launch of Epic Fury. In March, the U.K. sent its Sky Sabre air defense system and troops to the Kingdom to help defend against attacks from Iran.

“This support builds upon the UK’s existing military contribution to Saudi air defense, which includes the deployment of an air defense system and British personnel to help protect against missile and drone attacks,” the MoD pointed out on Tuesday. “Saudi Arabia and Yemen are steadfast partners of the UK and play a vital role in regional stability. It is in the UK’s interest to safeguard regional stability, protect vital trade and energy supplies, and encourage a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in Yemen.”

The civil war in Yemen erupted in 2014 and expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis. The fighting between Saudi-led forces and the Houthis largely abated after a tenuous ceasefire was signed in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. The United Kingdom was the other significant player in that air campaign.

Tensions, as we noted earlier in this story, reignited in recent weeks after the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. 

On Tuesday, Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Sare’e claimed that Saudi Arabia conducted 19 airstrikes across rebel-held territory in Yemen that involved the latest round of civilian casualties. The Saudis have not directly responded.

As we stated earlier in this story, hours after the U.K. announced it was sending a Voyager tanker to Saudi Arabia, Trump addressed the ongoing conflict with Iran during his speech to the U.N. General Assembly in New York.

The American leader called for international isolation of Iran and repeated his stance that he was at an inflection point on deciding what course to take moving forward. The situation has settled into an uneasy pause interrupted by sporadic Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. It has been weeks since the U.S. last struck Iranian targets.

“Will a deal be made with Iran that lets them rebuild and create a far greater country than it ever was before?” Trump asked rhetorically. “Or do I annihilate the Islamic Republic and do it quickly, never giving them a chance to kill and destroy people and countries again?”

Trump added that he believes he will make a peace deal with Iran after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections, which could decide which party controls Congress. With gasoline and diesel price increases damaging the economy, the war and Trump’s handling of it have been very unpopular with voters.

In a CNN and SSRS poll, released Tuesday, 64% of those responding said the U.S. is not winning the war in Iran, while 36% disagreed. In addition, 78% of participants said Trump is not doing enough to end the conflict with Iran and 22% said he was.

After a bilateral meeting with British Prime Minister Andy Burnham following his UN speech, Trump claimed the Iranians still want to make a deal.

“They want to talk to us,” he said. “They have been talking to us, even today they’ve been talking to us, and the relationship is developing. But we can’t let them – and they understand that – we can’t let them have a nuclear weapon.”

A U.S. negotiating team, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, met with Iranian officials on the sidelines of Tuesday’s U.N. meeting. That sideline session lasted about three hours and went well, according to Trump, who offered no details on the discussions.

For their part, the Iranians said they are willing to negotiate, but on their terms.

“A senior Iranian official said Iran could reopen the Strait of Hormuz to Gulf shipping within seven days if the U.S. fulfilled Tehran’s demands to ease military pressure and lift an American blockade on Iranian ports,” Reuters reported. “The official added that Tehran had conveyed its latest proposal to Washington via mediators last week.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

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On September 14, the Pentagon’s Lead Inspector General (IG) released its first quarterly report to Congress on Operation Epic Fury (OEF), which included aircraft casualties suffered by the U.S. from the beginning of the war on February 28, 2026, through June 30. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) followed the next day with even more detail, assessing the costs incurred during combat operations against Iran with an overview of aircraft losses through August 1, as well as the estimated replacement cost in 2026 dollars. TWZ went a step further, continuing where both reports left off with the help of the OSINT community, to update our previous visualization and tally losses through September 18, incorporating damage from attacks by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on American bases in the Middle East over the past two months. The final accounting can be viewed in the high-definition graphic below.

Drone Fleet Takes The Brunt Of The Blow

America’s MQ-9 Reaper drone fleet has absorbed the bulk of the damage and accounts for the largest single line-item expenditure in the CBO’s letter to the ranking member of the House Budget Committee. According to the Lead IG, “as many as 30” MQ-9A Reaper drones were destroyed in “various circumstances,” while the CBO booked 24 at a unit cost of $30 million (based on the Foreign Military Sales program), which totals $720 million to $900 million in lost equipment. The cost of a fully kitted-out Reaper can approach $50 million, depending on the sensors, weapons, and other mission equipment it carries. The Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach, told the House Armed Services Committee in May that the Reaper was the war’s “most valuable player.”

But both numbers are stale. The Washington Post reported in August that at least 45 Reapers, approximately a quarter of the pre-war fleet, were shot down, crashed, or destroyed on the ground, citing three U.S. officials familiar with the matter. That figure covers MQ-9s lost across the Middle East, including those downed over Iran and by the Houthis in Yemen. The Air Force is on record admitting that the Reaper fleet shrank to 135 airframes as of May, down from an official total of 165 at the start of fiscal year 2026. Another two have been shot down since the Post’s report, according to open-source intel, bringing the total to 47, or more than $1.4 billion based on the CBO’s methodology. While every Reaper lost is expensive, in some cases at least, each would represent a soul, or crew, that may have been at risk in a previous era’s conflict, and no dollar figure captures that trade-off.

General Atomics’ iconic MQ-9A is no longer in production, and the service does not view the newer, in-production MQ-9B as a platform to meet its current needs and cost demands. Instead, it is targeting a replacement with a unit cost of around $10 million (excluding sensors) and pushing to accelerate the program to acquire these lower-cost platforms, dubbed the Massed Modular Aircraft (MMA). “If you don’t like losing an MQ-9A that cost on the order of $50 million, with the sensors, you’re probably not going to like losing an MQ-9B at a higher price point,” Lt. Gen. Christopher Niemi, the Air Force’s Chief Modernization Officer, said at a roundtable in September, according to a report from Air & Space Forces Magazine.

In June, the USAF confirmed to TWZ that after a relatively frantic hunt for additional airframes, it was planning to purchase a number of unused Reapers from General Atomics, which turned out to be fewer than 10. There is no easy answer to this problem, as cheaper alternatives cannot replace all the capabilities provided by pricier platforms. There are several more attritable alternatives in development, such as the General Atomics Wildfire, which the company is building specifically to meet the needs outlined in the MMA program. Swarm Aero’s Gamera is another possible contender.

The Reapers were not the only aerial drones lost. An MQ-4C Triton went down over the Persian Gulf in April after squawking a lost-link code and general emergency on its way back to Naval Air Station Sigonella in Italy. The Navy logged it as a Class A mishap and the cause remains unknown. There are only 20 in the fleet, and at $150 million a pop, the loss represents a significant outflow. Navy budget documents place the unit price higher at $238 million. And, in late May, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that Iran shot down an MQ-1 over international waters. CENTCOM declined to tell TWZ whether it was an Air Force Predator, which is officially out of service, or an Army Gray Eagle platform, and neither appeared in the government reports.

The Crewed Aircraft Tally

In terms of manned aircraft, the KC-135 Stratotanker fleet took the biggest hit. The workhorse aerial refueling tanker is primarily tasked with keeping America’s fighters, bombers, and cargo haulers airborne, and crews have been flying nearly nonstop sorties to support active operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Two were destroyed and up to seven have been damaged, although the Air Force has become relatively efficient at repairing the damaged aircraft enough to fly them home. In a tragic incident on March 12, a collision between two Stratotankers that was “not due to hostile fire or friendly fire,” according to CENTCOM, resulted in the loss of six airmen after one of the aircraft went down over western Iraq.

Three F-15E Strike Eagles were destroyed early in the conflict due to friendly fire over Kuwait, and one was shot down over Iran on April 3, leading to a massive combat search and rescue (CSAR) operation. “Roughly eight” more were damaged in a recent salvo of ballistic missile fire on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, first reported by CBS News and confirmed by Air & Space Forces Magazine, both citing unnamed U.S. officials. President Donald Trump dismissed the reports, telling NewsNation there was “no damage, no nothing.”

The daring CSAR mission to save the two F-15E crew members who ejected inside Iran, one of whom 60 Minutes interviewed on September 13, took place between April 3 and 5. While no American lives were lost during the operation, several aircraft were destroyed, including two MC-130J Commando IIs and four Night Stalker MH-6 Little Bird helicopters (which TWZ was first to report), representing, at north of $400 million, the costliest single operation of the war for aircraft inventory. The mission reportedly included more than 150 aircraft and 92 special operators on the ground deep in enemy territory. The MC-130Js became stuck on a temporary remote airstrip and were deliberately destroyed by American forces to prevent capture, along with the Little Birds operated by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). An HH-60W Jolly Green II was also struck but continued flying. The CBO booked the MC-130Js at $300 million, and the five helos at $122 million.

Two A-10C Warthog close air support jets also took hits. The first, while flying in a “Sandy” escort role during the rescue operation, was hit by enemy fire. “This pilot continued to fight, continued the mission, and then upon exit, flew his aircraft into another country and determined that the airplane was not landable,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dan Caine, said during a presser in April. “The pilot then made the decision to eject over friendly territory, and was quickly and safely recovered.” The second Warthog sustained damage on the ground in Jordan during the IRGC’s latest round of strikes referenced above.

The most expensive single crewed loss was an E-3G Sentry, which is out of production and can only be replaced by the E-7A Wedgetail, a program that the Pentagon recently revived, at a unit cost the CBO estimates to be half a billion dollars. The jet, serial number 81-0005, was struck on the taxiway at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia on March 27, one of just 16 Sentries the service had left after initially deploying six to the theater before the conflict kicked off. The IG report lists it as damaged, but that is generous, considering that photographs and satellite imagery show the plane cut in half with the rear fuselage destroyed. The CBO report is more candid, categorizing the Sentry as lost in battle and assigning a $500 million replacement value. The Pentagon tried to cancel the E-7 program last year, but has since reversed course, after Secretary Pete Hegseth said the department’s mindset “completely changed.”

A handful of other hits round out the tally. A 5th-generation F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was struck by Iranian fire in mid-March and forced to make an emergency landing. As far as we know, this was the first time an F-35 took hostile fire in combat. The following week, a first-person-view (FPV) short-range kamikaze drone successfully targeted a U.S. Army Black Hawk parked at a base outside Baghdad, Iraq. The next month, images circulated by Iranian state media, which TWZ did not independently verify, showed a CH-47F Chinook wrecked on the ground at Camp Buehring in Kuwait. And, in June, an AH-64 Apache was shot down near the Strait of Hormuz.

Recent retaliatory attacks by IRGC forces on U.S. bases have damaged additional aircraft in the weeks following the CBO’s cutoff date. Another four helicopters were hit since September 10, @DefenceGeek, a UK-based OSINT researcher and flight tracker, told TWZ. His team at @MATA_osint reviewed open-source videos and identified them as H-60 models, likely UH-60M/L variants.

The True Cost Explained

Through August 1, the CBO estimated that the losses represented nearly $1.9 billion in 2026 dollars, but that figure only counts hardware the Pentagon “would have to change its plans to replace.” If the department sought funding to replace everything it lost with platforms available today, the true cost rises to $3.3 billion. For example, the A-10C Warthog is no longer being built, and the CBO assesses that if it were to be replaced with an F-35A instead, the price balloons from $0 to $120 million. Similarly, since the F-15E has no active production line, the replacement cost of four F-15EX would total $400 million, compared to $0 on paper. The CBO figure also includes a $500 million charge for a lost THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar, a prized air defense asset, one of only eight radars the Army has for its THAAD batteries. It is (obviously) not an aircraft but counted in the report’s accounting.

Taking into consideration the losses suffered since the CBO’s assessment on August 1, and the cost to repair damaged aircraft, which is not included in the table above, the $3.3 billion figure could top $4 billion. Additionally, CENTCOM told the IG that “hundreds of buildings and structures” were damaged and destroyed at various bases across the AOR, in addition to miscellaneous equipment, sensors, and other installations that were targeted but not included in the estimates. However, these are rough calculations, and the actual outlays will likely differ substantially.

Reports Highlight Strain On America’s Munitions Stockpile

The Lead IG and CBO both address the precarious state of America’s munitions stockpile, which contradicts recent commentary by some senior military officials. The IG reiterated that the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment said the “munitions expenditure in OEF has resulted in strategic inventory shortfalls and revealed industrial base bottlenecks for munitions resupply.” The CBO report goes further, concluding the U.S. has “probably used between one-half and two-thirds of its inventory” of Patriot, THAAD, Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), and SM-6 missiles since June 2025, and states that rebuilding those stocks “would probably take at least five years, even if production was increased.” These numbers generally align with a report earlier this year from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that highlighted the rapid expenditure of critical munitions and how it could affect a future fight against China.

CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper, who is responsible for executing the day-to-day operations against Iran, said he was “not concerned at all” when asked about America’s munitions stockpile during the 60 Minutes segment mentioned above. “We’re well armed and ready for any contingency,” he told Norah O’Donnell. This may be sincere, as the commander overseeing an active war tends to get whatever is required, but other theater-level commanders don’t necessarily share the same sentiment.

Last month, the heads of U.S. European, Pacific, and Southern Commands, as well as the Chief of Naval Operations, each registered a formal “non-concur” in the August 14 Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB), warning that extending their forces’ commitment to the Iran fight risked draining America’s combat power, especially in the Pacific. In an exclusive citing people familiar with the assessment, the Washington Post reported that Adm. Samuel Paparo, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, “disagreed with the level of support he was ordered to continually provide, including an aircraft carrier strike group and naval destroyers.” On social media, the Pentagon’s chief spokesman called the story inaccurate but stated, “Non-concurs are standard. The Secretary sees them constantly.”

Back in 2024, prior to Operation Rough Rider, the Twelve-Day War, Midnight Hammer, and Epic Fury, Adm. Paparo voiced concerns about munitions expenditures, saying, “With some of the Patriots that have been employed, some of the air-to-air missiles that have been employed, it’s now eating into stocks, and to say otherwise would be dishonest.” He continued, “Inherently, it imposes costs on the readiness of America to respond in the Indo-Pacific region, which is the most stressing theater for the quantity and quality of munitions, because the PRC [People’s Republic of China] is the most capable potential adversary in the world.”

The math does not bode well should the U.S. get into a dust-up with China before stockpiles can be replenished. The CBO notes China “has many more ballistic and cruise missiles than Iran had at the onset of Operation Epic Fury,” with a “significantly larger economic base” that “can produce such missiles more rapidly.” As Iran has shown, stationary bases make for easy targets, and U.S. installations in the Pacific that fall under the PRC’s ballistic missile umbrella are exposed, unhardened, and require a high volume of interceptors to defend. “Having used a large portion of its missile defense inventory in combat operations against Iran, DoD now has fewer interceptors on hand to use in a potential conflict with the PRC,” the CBO concluded.

The Pentagon has since announced deals with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to drastically increase Patriot and THAAD production, but that ramp-up will take years to materialize. According to the CBO, “Boosting missile production has historically been a slow process with lags of three to five years between the placement and delivery of new orders. After production was increased, several more years would be required to replace the missiles that have been used in the conflict with Iran.”

The Impact On Deterrence

Aircraft casualties are to be expected in any conflict, especially considering the intensity, scope, and length of operations against a formidable opponent with home-field advantage. Airframes can be rebuilt and stockpiles replenished. But such dynamics impact deterrence in other regions, as America’s own military leaders have said on the record in the past.

“Deterrence is achieved by that ability to demonstrate capability and will, and it comes down to your ability to either impose costs on an adversary or including in response to aggression. And it’s also a big part of defending yourself against missiles and so China is building 800+ missiles per year,” Adm. Paparo explained in a recent interview with Hawaii News Now. “And so the ability to defend that, the ability to impose costs, this gets back to the changing character of warfare with information operations, drone operations, and deep precision strike are much more salient instruments of national power than they’ve been in the past. And to be able to deter is to be able to demonstrate that the risk of armed conflict far outweighs the benefits and part of that is imposing costs and part of that is defending ourselves against those costs.”

TWZ noted many of these questions in February, before the first Tomahawk was fired, and has been reporting on stockpile concerns for years. Now, the Pentagon’s bill for the conflict conservatively sits at over $38 billion, America’s fleet of Reapers is down a quarter, and its bases in the Middle East are battered and could still be targeted. The interceptors that kept the number of aircraft depicted on our graphic from being higher are, by the CBO’s own estimate, years from being replaced – a notable dynamic considering military leaders have suggested China, with a much larger missile arsenal than Iran, could be prepared to move on Taiwan by 2027.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io or @ianellisjones

Author’s note: Special thanks to @DefenceGeek and the team at the Military Air Tracking Alliance (MATA) for assisting with the open-source analysis and battle damage assessment. Be sure to follow them on X at @DefenceGeek and @MATA_osint.

The post Every American Aircraft Lost Or Damaged During The Iran War, Visualized appeared first on TWZ.

The imagery, captured off Toulon during training on September 21, reveals the launcher installed on the ship’s forward starboard sponson. While the specific identity of the vessel is unclear, this represents the first publicly observed evidence that Rampart has moved into shipboard testing.

Naval Group announced in June that the first at-sea firing campaign for Rampart was planned for October aboard a Mistral class ship during the French Navy’s Wildfire counter-drone exercise.

What makes Rampart unusual is its modular architecture. Rather than being built around one missile or rocket, the system uses interchangeable launch modules that can accommodate different weapons. This allows a ship to carry large numbers of relatively inexpensive guided rockets for counter-drone work while retaining the option of using larger and more capable short-range missiles against more challenging targets.

Because the launch modules are interchangeable, the mix can theoretically be changed as the mission or threat environment changes.

The approach is aimed squarely at a problem that has become increasingly important for naval forces: defending expensive ships against potentially large numbers of inexpensive uncrewed systems and missiles without relying exclusively on high-cost interceptors.

Rampart was previously known as the Multi-purpose and Modular Launching System (MPLS). Naval Group unveiled the concept in 2023 as a self-funded development effort and formally presented the Rampart earlier this year.

The launcher uses four interchangeable ammunition modules. Depending on the configuration, Naval Group says that the system can accommodate up to 80 Thales 68mm laser-guided rockets or 48 NATO-standard 70mm laser-guided rockets. Other configurations can carry smaller numbers of short-range missiles (four to six per module, depending on type) or other effectors, including decoys.

The system has already been demonstrated with guided rockets. A January 2026 test involved a Thales 68mm guided rocket, followed by a series of firings at the Canjuers range in southern France in May. Those trials, seen in the video below, included engagements against targets at roughly two miles and a five-rocket salvo.

The relatively small guided rockets are particularly relevant to counter-drone operations. They offer a way of engaging aerial targets with a weapon substantially smaller than a conventional surface-to-air missile, while still providing precision guidance.

As well as rockets, Naval Group has been working with Thales on the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM). Also known as Martlet, the LMM is intended to tackle a range of challenging airborne and surface targets, as you can read about here.

The company has also explored integration of loitering munitions and other missiles, while a separate agreement with the UAE-based EDGE Group covers trials of the SkyKnight surface-to-air missile.

The company has also pursued integration of Poland’s Piorun short-range air-defense missile. This may well be with a view to a potential Polish purchase of Rampart to arm its forthcoming frigates, which you can read about here.

This means the launcher is effectively being developed as an open weapons-integration platform, rather than as a dedicated launcher for one or a small set of particular munitions.

That openness could make Rampart attractive to a wide range of navies. Instead of requiring customers to adopt a completely new missile family, the launcher can potentially be configured around weapons already in their inventories or sourced from their domestic defense industries. A country could therefore buy the common Rampart launcher while retaining control over the effectors it wants to integrate, whether those are guided rockets, short-range missiles, loitering munitions or other systems. At the same time, when it comes to air threats, this is very much a point defense system for close-in engagements, and a last line of defense to complement longer-range and more capable systems.

Naval Group has described the system as capable of operating either autonomously or as part of a ship’s combat system, with a stabilized turret and integrated fire-control equipment.

That integration will be particularly important during the upcoming sea trials. A launcher that works against stationary or land-based targets still has to contend with ship motion, vibration, sea spray, sensor integration, and the compressed timelines involved in defending a moving vessel.

France operates three Mistral class amphibious assault ships, which serve as major aviation, command, and amphibious warfare platforms. Their size and mission make them high-value assets that could face a broad range of aerial threats during operations. Another two vessels were built to the same design for Russia, before being placed under embargo, and then sold to the Egyptian Navy.

Naval Group’s choice of a Mistral for the initial at-sea campaign provides an opportunity to test Rampart under realistic operational conditions while integrating it with an existing French naval combat system.

In its basic form, each Mistral is armed with a pair of Simbad launchers, each of which is fitted with two Mistral short-range surface-to-air missiles. In terms of guns, each of the vessels is armed with two 30mm and two 20mm cannons, two 7.62mm M134 Miniguns, and four 12.7mm machine guns. Adding even a single Rampart launcher provides considerably more options against aerial targets across a wide range of threats — depending on the effectors that are included.

Recent U.S. and allied operations in the Middle East have highlighted the problem of large-scale missile and drone attacks causing forces to expend substantial numbers of interceptors, raising concerns about both magazine depth and the cost of using high-end missiles against lower-cost threats. Directed-energy weapons could eventually provide a way out of that cost-exchange problem, but shipboard laser systems remain in the early stages of operational development. Navies cannot simply wait for them to mature, creating an immediate requirement for lower-cost, high-capacity kinetic options. Rampart’s large guided-rocket capacity and ability to mix different effectors are aimed at exactly that gap.

If Rampart can reliably engage drones with inexpensive guided rockets while retaining the ability to employ more capable missiles from the same launcher, it could offer navies an additional defensive layer between conventional guns and high-end surface-to-air missile systems.

Critically, new effectors could potentially also be integrated as they become available, allowing the system to evolve without replacing the entire turret.

Reflecting the urgency of the requirement, Naval Group’s development path for Rampart has been relatively rapid.

Naval Group has also demonstrated a ground-based Rampart, mounted on a high-mobility truck chassis. This configuration is intended for mobile air defense missions as well as protection of fixed sites, giving the system a role beyond ship self-defense. The truck-mounted version could provide a rapidly relocatable launcher for counter-drone and short-range air-defense missions, while retaining the same basic modular architecture and ability to employ different effectors.

The photographs from Toulon indicate that the Rampart concept is now moving from the range to the French fleet, albeit on an experimental basis. The forthcoming sea campaign will be an important milestone and should provide a better idea of how this system works at sea.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post France’s Modular Rampart Point Defense Launcher Has Gone To Sea appeared first on TWZ.

The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.

The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.

South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.

North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.

North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.

North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.

The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.

Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.

It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.

As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.

Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.

That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.

The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.

The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.

According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.

The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.

Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.

The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.

Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.

Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.

The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.

South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.

Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.

The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.

In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.

A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.

However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.

North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.

Pyongyang says it has flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state.

The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.

Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.

Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.

In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.

Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”

Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”

Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.

What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.

The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy conducted the armed UUV test at the British Underwater Test & Evaluation Center (BUTEC), a maritime test range in Scotland, on September 13. Personnel from the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport Division (NUWC Keyport), as well as unspecified industry partners, also took part, per a U.S. Navy press release.

The test was also carried out under the umbrella of Pillar 2 of the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense cooperation agreement, which was first announced in 2021. AUKUS’ Pillar 2 covers a wide range of advanced technology cooperation, with particular focus on uncrewed platforms and autonomy. Pillar 1 of the agreement centers on support for Australia’s establishment of a nuclear submarine force.

For the September 13 test, the Mk 48 torpedo was slung under the Excalibur UUV. The nearly 40-foot (12-meter) long, 19-metric-ton submersible drone has a large internal payload bay, but it is reportedly not large enough to accommodate the Mk 48, which is the standard heavyweight torpedo in U.S. Navy service today. The 19-foot-long, 21-inch-diameter weapon has been successively upgraded over the years to expand its capabilities and improve its resistance to enemy countermeasures.

The Royal Navy officially unveiled Excalibur, which was developed by U.K.-based MSubs under Project Cetus, last year. The external torpedo launch capability was the result of two additional efforts, called Project Broadsword and Trial Iron, according to the U.S. Navy release.

The September 13 test “successfully validated the mechanical, electrical, and software integration of a U.S. kinetic payload onto an allied autonomous vessel, proving that allied forces can rapidly achieve weapon interchangeability,” the Navy’s release adds. “Approved in February 2026 by the Department of the Navy Rapid Capabilities Office (DONRCO), the project was executed in less than seven months.”

How the Excalibur UUV was controlled during the test and whether the torpedo was launched at a test target of some kind are unknown. TWZ has reached out for more information.

“BROADSWORD is a great example of how AUKUS Pillar II drives interoperability in across the alliance. Demonstrating the launch of a US torpedo from a UK extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV) is an important early step in developing lethality in our undersea autonomous systems,” U.S. Navy Vice Adm. Robert Gaucher, Director of Submarine Programs, did say in a statement. “We look forward to continuing to leverage the AUKUS partnership to keep pushing the potential warfighting advantages of unmanned undersea systems.”

“This successful test marks a historic first for allied undersea warfare,” U.S. Navy Adm. Daryl Caudle, Chief of Naval Operations, also said in a statement. “Proving that we can seamlessly launch a U.S. heavyweight torpedo from a Royal Navy autonomous underwater vehicle validates our shared vision for true interchangeability.

“This is a really important moment in our journey towards building a hybrid navy, which is where the Royal Navy will sail with crewed ships and submarines alongside uncrewed and autonomous vessels,” Luke Pollard, U.K. Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry, separately said in an interview with LBC radio. “It is a substantial increase in our lethality, to show that torpedoes can be fired not just by the Astute class hunter-killer submarines that we have in the Royal Navy, but also now by our uncrewed systems.”

The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy employ various tiers of UUVs operationally today, but primarily for mine-sweeping and reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Future fleets of submersible drones capable of carrying out attacks on other vessels will create entirely new operational possibilities. Operated closely together with crewed surface warships and submarines, torpedo-toting UUVs could be sent ahead into riskier environments and offer an immediate option for engaging any threats they might find. Even a bigger UUV like Excalibur would also be more challenging for opponents to spot and track than a traditional attack submarine.

Excalibur is also in a category of larger and more capable submersible drones that offer significant endurance and higher degrees of autonomy. Adding in the ability to launch torpedoes, in turn, then opens the door to new concepts for employing these UUVs in groups more independently of crewed companions. In the future, for instance, armed Excaliburs or similar UUVs might be deployed to a particular maritime choke point to not just monitor for enemy movements, but actively hold them at risk.

In addition, in general, UUVs offer a way to expand total undersea warfare capacity in a more cost-effective manner compared to acquiring and fielding more traditional submarines. The ability to have more presence below the waves at a lower price point also translates to more persistence across large areas, something that could be especially valuable across the broad expanses of the Pacific, as well as other bodies of water globally. This presents additional targeting challenges and uncertainty for opponents.

“In securing the North Atlantic, especially against those nations that wish to do us harm, like Russia, the ability for us to now say it’s not just where our submarines are that you need to worry about – it is about how we create greater deterrence and question marks in the eyes of our adversary, with uncrewed systems there as well,” U.K. Minister Pollard said in speaking with LBC.

Pollard’s remarks here speak to particular considerations the British government is faced with just in its backyard. This includes the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is the main path through which Russian Navy submarines transit to and from bases in the northwestern end of that country and the Atlantic proper. There is also the English Channel and the nearby Baltic Sea. The Royal Navy has limited capacity with its crewed submarines to monitor this and other critical regional chokepoints. UUVs could then help take pressure off its fleet of just five (of a planned seven) Astute class submarines, helping free those boats up for the myriad other missions they are tasked with, including carrier escort and special operations support.

“By converting commercial and allied uncrewed undersea hulls into high-end strike assets, the partnership drastically alters the cost-exchange ratio in contested maritime environments,” the U.S. Navy’s press release today notes, as well.

There are still many questions still to be answered about future larger UUV operations, including just how they will be deployed and recovered. Video the U.S. Navy released today shows that the torpedo-armed Excalibur was launched into the water in Scotland using a commercial truck-mounted crane. U.S. shipbuilders Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), among others, have been working on new options for launching and retrieving larger drone submersibles from surface warships. External carriage on the hulls of ships and/or submarines might also be an option in the future.

Additional torpedo and other munition options for UUVs beyond the full-size Mk 48 could also be on the horizon. The U.S. Navy has invested heavily in compact and lightweight torpedo designs that could be well suited for employment from underwater drones like Excalibur.

The U.S. Navy says it is working with its international partners on another similar UUV capability demonstration, but this time involving an Anduril Dive-XL, under what is dubbed Project Cutlass. This effort “will tackle advanced payload integration data, command and control architectures, and tactical employment scenarios to further mature uncrewed undersea capabilities,” according to the U.S. Navy’s release.

The Royal Australian Navy is already in the process of acquiring and fielding a militarized version of the Dive-XL, called Ghost Shark. It’s also worth noting that the Dive-XL evolved from the earlier Dive-LD design. The Dive-LD is in at least limited operational U.S. Navy service now, a fact that was revealed by Iran’s capture of one of these submersible drones earlier this month, as you can read more about here.

The U.S. Navy is also continuing to push ahead with plans to field a force of Orca XLUUVs from Boeing. In August, the service announced that an Orca had conducted a 1,000-nautical-mile transit in the Pacific the preceding month as part of the ongoing development of that design.

Other countries are pursuing larger UUVs, as well. China has been making strides in this regard and is in some ways ahead of other competitors globally.

Excalibur’s ability to launch a standard Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo is already an important show of progress now toward a shared goal of a future underwater ecosystem that includes submersible drones that are able to attack other vessels.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Torpedo Fired From Uncrewed Submarine For The First Time By U.S., U.K. appeared first on TWZ.

The pilot is still receiving medical treatment, the wing said in a statement. Emergency response teams are still on the scene. The cause of the incident, which took place about 2:30 p.m. local time, is still under investigation and additional details will be released when available.

The crash happened as the jet was on approach to land at the installation, located in the western German region of Rhineland-Palatinate, according to the New York Post.  

“Following a plane crash in the vicinity of U.S. Air Base Spangdahlem, fire and emergency response teams from the Eifel District of Bitburg-Pruem were dispatched to the scene,” The Associated Press reported, citing the district. 

Images emerged on social media showing smoke rising in the distance.

The F-16 crash at Spangdahlem was the second mishap in a week for USAF F-16s. On Sept. 17, an F-16 from the 149th Fighter Wing at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland in Texas crashed in northern Michigan. The pilot in that incident also ejected.

According to air traffic control (ATC) audio, the pilot’s wingman said at the time of the Michigan crash, “we have a possible mayday. My wingman may have taken a bird.” TWZ cannot independently confirm what caused the crash. The audio continues and offers a fairly dramatic and raw look at how the incident occurred over the air waves.

This is a developing story.

UPDATE: 3:35 PM Eastern –

The 52nd Fighter Wing provided some additional information.

“The aircraft was returning to Spangdahlem Air Base following a routine training flight involving four F-16s when the crash occurred,” the wing stated. “The remaining three aircraft diverted to Ramstein Air Base and landed safely. The pilot of the crashed aircraft ejected safely and received medical care.”

“Emergency response personnel responded to the scene, with local German fire departments and emergency medical services providing support,” the wing added. “German emergency response partners have offered their continued assistance as needed. The 52nd Fighter Wing appreciates the swift response and continued support of our German partners.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post USAF F-16 Crashes At Spangdahlem Air Base In Germany appeared first on TWZ.

TWZ has obtained a new image taken on September 18 of the submarine in question, which is being built at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, from Vantor. Janes reported on this submarine earlier today, based on a separate Vantor image from September 1. The outlet also described the boat as a Type 095, a commonly used, but still unofficial designation. This is something we will come back to later on.

As mentioned, the pumpjet propulsor immediately stands out in both images. This is also understood to be a feature on the Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine, a significantly improved variation on that earlier design, which first emerged in the early 2020s. Compared to traditional exposed propellers and more basic shrouded types, pumpjets offer benefits for quieter operation and efficiencies, especially at higher submerged speeds.

The recent imagery also highlights the submarine’s X-shaped stern plane arrangement. This is not found on the Type 093B, which is considered to be something of a bridge between that class and the next-generation design. Broadly speaking, an X-shaped configuration offers advantages when it comes to enhanced maneuverability, efficiency, and safety, which can be particularly useful in littoral environments. It can also provide benefits when it comes to acoustic signature reductions across significant parts of the submarine’s operating envelope compared to the cruciform stern planes.

Another Chinese submarine design that emerged in 2024, currently referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class, and that is understood to feature a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, also has an X-shaped stern configuration. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it appeared to have sunk in a shipyard.

An X-shaped stern arrangement also looks to be a feature on yet another new class of submarine that appeared at the JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai earlier this year. Initial reports also suggested that the design lacked a traditional sail. However, it has been confirmed that it has a sail, but that is very small proportionally to the overall size of the boat. Truncated sails can offer performance and other advantages, but there are trade-offs.

The image of the submarine that Janes obtained also notably shows an open rectangular-shaped section aft of the sail. The September 18 image that we received from Vantor shows a structure placed over that section of that submarine, obscuring ongoing work on that part of the boat. The Type 095 is widely expected to feature some type of vertical launch system (VLS) array able to accommodate a variety of anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, as well as potentially hypersonic types. The Type 095 is also sometimes referred to as a guided missile submarine, or SSGN, as a result. The open area seen in the September 1 shot could be where the VLS array is set to be fitted. It might also provide access to the reactor compartment or another area of the submarine.

Interestingly, the September 18 image also shows what look to be at least two relatively large circular openings, side-by-side, at the bow end of the submarine in front of the sail, the purpose of which is not immediately clear. There is a possibility these could also be for vertically launching munitions or other payloads. As a point of comparison, U.S. Virginia class nuclear attack submarines, starting with the Block III version, have two large-diameter Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), one in front of the other, in the bow in front of their sails. At the same time, the openings on the submarine in Huludao also appear to be in a position that is very close to where the submarine’s main sonar array would be installed, and they could be tied to that aspect of the design, too.

“I think it’s too early to be sure about the VLS configuration from publicly available imagery. I realize people assume the large rectangular space halfway behind the sail is the VLS, but I am not sure this is the case and I’d caution to jump to conclusions. The space could also be related to work on the reactor compartment,” Alex Luck, a naval analyst who closely tracks submarine and Chinese navy developments, told TWZ. “With Type 093B, the VLS after launch was initially covered with a tarp, and then the installed launchers were readily visible quite quickly during the fitting-out process. The work process may change with these newer boats, but the different appearance during launch and fitting out needs to be considered in that regard.”

“I do expect Type 095 to have a VLS of some sort, but I am not sure as of yet what the configuration would look like, or where exactly it is located,” he added.

The bigger outstanding question may be exactly what type of submarine is currently being built now at the Bohai Shipyard. Based on a review of additional imagery from Planet Labs’ archive, the boat appears to be around 394 feet (120 meters) long. When the first example of what was assessed to be a Type 095 emerged in Huludao in February, it was estimated to have a length of roughly 361 feet (110 meters). The ‘small sail’ design that broke cover earlier this year in Shanghai is also estimated to be some 394 feet/120 meters long based on available imagery, but also looks to be narrower than the boat presumed to be a Type 095 in February.

“One significant question is the nature and difference between the boat launched by Bohai in February, and the two newer hulls launched in late May/early June both by Bohai and at Jiangnan in Shanghai,” Luck, the naval analyst, also told TWZ. “Specifically, we do not quite know whether they are for different operational roles, or rather a two step development for one final configuration of a new SSN. I think the latter is at least plausible.”

“A related question then is what boat we are looking at now with the new imagery, i.e. the February boat or the newer hull Bohai had launched,” he continued. “Without exact and reliable measurements that question for now is unresolved in the public discourse. For now we need more, and more detailed imagery, including of the different boats together, to clarify these aspects.”

“This [September 1] image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We’ve already seen both versions side by side in Bohai,” Luck also wrote on X after Janes‘ published its report.

Regardless, the emergence in recent years of so many new, more modern submarines, and across what appear to be several distinct classes, is significant. It is no secret that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is working to significantly expand the size and capabilities of its submarine force with a clear eye toward extending operations further and further out in the Pacific, at least. In the past, U.S. officials have publicly said the overall quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs.

“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.

In particular, the Type 095, as well as the new Type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, “represent next-generation platforms expected to enter service during the late 2020s through 2030s,” Brookes also wrote at that time. “These submarines will incorporate substantial advancements in nuclear reactor design, sensor performance, weapons integration, and noise quieting technologies.”

Submarine modernization efforts are just one aspect of a larger effort by the PLAN to expand its capabilities above and below the waves. Chinese shipyards have also been producing ever-more capable aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers, frigates, and more in recent years, as well. The pace of China’s construction of new surface ships and submarines has also been growing, creating a particularly significant and still-widening disparity in this regard with the U.S. Navy. This is something that has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.

Work in Huludao, as well as shipyards elsewhere in China, is certainly already revealing interesting new insights into China’s next-generation submarine efforts.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Chinese Next-Generation Submarine Developments Spotted In New Satellite Imagery appeared first on TWZ.

With that being said, the showing off of the MALD wreckage, regardless of its original use case, is something of a reminder that U.S. and Israeli forces are continuing to evaluate Iran’s electronic order of battle, which can include probing activities that leverage deception and decoys to better understand the state of Iran’s air defenses and command and control architecture. This is critical information that needs to be constantly updated for contingency and future potential air campaign purposes.

Iranian sources today reported the destruction of an Orbiter-type reconnaissance drone over the Strait of Hormuz, before the separate imagery emerged showing what appears to be the wreckage of a MALD. It is not yet clear whether the two reports refer to the same incident or separate losses.

The appearance of the wreckage could also shed a light on how the U.S. and Israel can conduct ongoing air operations against Iran, even if kinetic actions have largely slowed to a trickle.

MALD is an expendable store, launched from another aircraft. The ADM-160 family was developed to provide a flexible way of decoying and distracting an enemy’s air defenses, while also adding to the survivability of allied aircraft and standoff weapons. Raytheon won the U.S. Air Force development contract for the current-generation ADM-160B in 2003. The B design is significantly different from the initial A-model from Teledyne Ryan (later Northrop Grumman), the development of which had started in the late 1990s. The B also features a more powerful turbojet engine and possesses greater range.

The ADM-160B is approximately 6.5 feet long, has a wingspan of roughly 5.6 feet when deployed, and is powered by a small turbojet. It has an operational range of around 550 miles.

Rather than carrying a conventional warhead, the MALD carries equipment intended to reproduce the radar signature of specific aircraft or standoff weapons. It can therefore provide additional and often highly enticing tracks for an adversary’s radar operators and surface-to-air missile crews to respond to. It can be programmed to fly intricate routes to better rival the target it is emulating and to provoke the attention of air defenders.

The related ADM-160C MALD-J adds an electronic warfare capability, allowing it to perform stand-in jamming and other forms of active electronic attacks against enemy air defense nodes. Further improved variants of the MALD, which the U.S. Navy has also been acquiring, have since been developed as you can read more about here.

The exact variant involved in today’s incident cannot be established from all publicly available imagery at this stage.

The possibility that the United States had used MALDs against Iran had already attracted considerable attention following Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. strike against Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.

During the operation, U.S. officials described a complex deception plan involving aircraft and other decoy measures designed to prevent Iran from determining the true direction and composition of the attack.

This strongly pointed to MALD as one likely component of that deception architecture.

The opening hours and days of Operation Epic Fury also likely saw MALD employments. ADM-160s have also been used extensively by Ukraine against Russia, primarily for provoking air defense systems into radiating and as penetration aids for cruise missiles.

In the Strait of Hormuz context, the MALD could serve a dual purpose. It could act in its primary role, as a defensive measure for allied aircraft and standoff weapons, drawing Iranian air defense systems away from it and toward the decoy. It can also be used more independently, triggering Iranian defenses and revealing their locations and operating characteristics, as well as the state of Iran’s command and control for those assets. Surveillance platforms, especially those in the air, can then soak up all that signals data. This can then be used to generate intelligence for future operations, and all without putting a person or an expensive piece of equipment at risk.

The unique nature of the current state of the Iran conflict would allow for MALD to be used in this unique manner. While kinetic actions have become sporadic, they are still occurring, so firing a decoy that looks like something much more threatening to Iranian air defenders would not be an unprecedented escalation.

Iran has characterized the incident as a shoot-down. If Iranian forces did successfully engage the MALD, that would represent a real air defense interception of a U.S. deception system, although these are expendable by design. It is equally possible that the MALD malfunctioned or just flew its route and ran out of fuel and crashed, as designed.

The wreckage also does not, by itself, identify the aircraft that launched the MALD.

The system has been integrated with a broad range of U.S. aircraft. In the course of U.S. operations against Iran, we have notably seen Air Force A-10C Thunderbolt II attack jets returning from theater with markings depicting MALD missions.

It is also worth noting that the MALD wreckage has appeared at the same time as reports of unusual, UAP-like objects over Iran, with videos and eyewitness accounts circulating online. Their authenticity and nature remain unclear.

Such reports come amid an increasingly sophisticated use of low-end drones, decoys, and other forms of deception. These kinds of systems can be employed not only to stimulate adversary air defenses, but also to distract populations and probe how information moves out of a denied area. In such an environment, unusual aerial sightings should be viewed with caution — but not necessarily dismissed as irrelevant. We have been talking about how new forms of misdirection and guile will leverage relatively low-end technologies in future conflicts for many years now. While it isn’t clear if this light show in the sky over Iran was such an activity, it is certainly a reminder to keep that possibility in mind.

Meanwhile, the prospect of renewed U.S. strikes is increasingly being raised on both sides. Iran’s central military command said Sunday that it had received information that Washington was preparing to resume attacks, while President Donald Trump told Fox News that he was in a “deciding mode” and was considering further military action alongside economic pressure and a deal.

Trump had also told Axios last week that he was approaching a major decision on whether to resume large-scale military operations, with U.S. forces in the region being maintained at current levels through the end of the year.

Iranian officials have warned that a renewed U.S. attack would trigger retaliation against American forces and interests across the region. At the same time, Qatar and Pakistan are pursuing diplomatic efforts to restart negotiations.

This situation is exactly why keeping as detailed intelligence on the status of Iran’s air defense overlay would be so critical. Building a highly detailed electronic order of battle and maintaining it is critical to the effectiveness of future air operations. There is usually an observable burst of such activity prior to a major operation kicking off, as well. There are also many unseen assets that help with this, from those in space to those in the air and even those under the sea. There have been reports of Israel’s secretive RA-01 stealth flying wing drone being spotted over Iran and of course the U.S. has its own RQ-170 and RQ-180 aircraft, just to name a couple known penetrating assets that are likely highly capable of collecting this information.

Regardless, the U.S. and Israel will have a lot of ‘maintenance’ to do in order to roll back any air defense capabilities Iran has been able to reconstitute should hostilities break out in full again, and a lot of critical intelligence data will need to be up-to-date in order to support such an operation.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post ADM-160 Miniature Air Launched Decoy Wreckage A Reminder Of Ongoing Spying On Iran’s Air Defenses appeared first on TWZ.

The dire messaging, growing louder by the day, is being delivered amid concerns about intensifying hybrid attacks that Russia is using to spread fear throughout the continent, fray the NATO alliance, and make it think twice about continuing support for Ukraine. Intel has increasingly pointed to the possibility that this could culminate in a much more severe operation, one that would be aimed to challenge NATO at its core.

All this is taking place against the backdrop of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine that shows no signs of abating. Kyiv just launched its largest drone attack on Moscow, which is burning on a near nightly basis amid ongoing strikes while Ukraine has introduced a new ballistic missile to its long-range arsenal. Russia for its part continues to try to advance on the ground in the east and south as it carries out daily airstrikes across Ukraine.

“There has definitely been an uptick” in Russian so-called hybrid warfare actions of late, a senior NATO military official told TWZ on Monday morning. “Despite its accusatory statements towards NATO, which remains a purely defensive alliance, Russia remains the aggressor. We see that clearly in Ukraine, where Russia is losing more than just the war it started. It therefore may incorrectly perceive the only way out is through increasing its hybrid campaign. That’s a losing proposition, because we are ready to respond, which we have shown.”

The official’s comments come after the shoot down last week of a suspected Russian drone that entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus and in the wake of recent defensive actions by several European nations.

On Friday, French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters that his country had recently been targeted by Russian hybrid attacks. He ordered “the government to prepare a plan to protect our critical infrastructure” and the “most sensitive” defense industry and technology sites against drone and cyberattacks.”

Macron said the “intention behind it is to intimidate us and to derail the effort to support the Ukrainians. The consequence will be the opposite.”

In addition to Macron’s warnings, the French newspaper Le Monde reported that the French military was carrying out clandestine operations against Russia. However, the unnamed source cited offered no details and TWZ cannot independently verify that claim.

A day before Macron’s statements, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned in a speech to the Polish parliament that Russia is planning hybrid strikes with drones or rockets on European countries supporting Ukraine, including Poland.

The Polish leader offered an assessment about Moscow’s motives similar to Macron’s.

Russia will pretend the attacks are “accidental” in order to “paralyze or at least weaken the motivation of NATO countries” to rush to the defense of the member state coming under attack, The Associated Press noted.

“There is a real risk that drones or other types of projectiles will enter the territory of one or several countries on the eastern flank and even cause destruction,” Tusk cautioned. In July, a Russian AS-23 cruise missile crashed in Poland.

In the face of these growing threats, officials in Lithuania are updating evacuation plans in case of a Russian attack.

“Poland is to be one of the evacuation destinations from the capital,” Žygimantas Solovjovas, head of the Civil Defense Department at Vilnius City Hall, told Polish Radio. 

Evacuation should begin before a direct threat arises, Solovjovas stressed. “Vilnius residents should not assume that they will flee the city along an evacuation route while under fire,” Solovjovas explained, adding that in such a situation, one must seek shelter. 

“One of the reasons for preparing this plan was to get residents accustomed to the idea that this should be a controlled process,” he noted. “If we allow chaos to ensue, the entire operation will be much more difficult.”

In Germany, where Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said Russia could attack by 2029, hospitals are preparing for a future influx of war-related casualties.

“In a report that gamed out potential scenarios should Russia invade NATO territory, the Bundeswehr calculated that as many as 1,000 wounded soldiers could arrive in Germany each day,” Bloomberg News reported last week. “As the country’s five military hospitals would quickly reach capacity — and the law requires that civilian hospitals help during wartime — the system would likely come under unprecedented strain, and could be forced to triage soldier and civilian care.”

As we noted last week, the alliance writ large is taking action against the growing Russian threats as well. 

NATO’s air commander, U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Jason T. Hinds, told reporters, including from TWZ, last week that he was tasked with implementing two NATO air and missile defense plans. Hinds is also the Air Force’s top officer in Europe, serving as the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe/U.S. Air Forces Africa (USAFE).

Adding to the concerns about Moscow’s actions, Russia’s client state Belarus just wrapped up mechanized and tank battalion training adjacent to the Suwalki Gap. That’s the border between Poland and Lithuania that separates the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad from Belarus. It has long been considered a potential flashpoint for a war in Europe and the training exercise exacerbated concerns that NATO allies are not prepared for a Russian attack there.

Russia is also making some potentially concerning preparations.

The Defense Ministry is reportedly seeking “an additional 16,000 to 20,000 hospital beds for wounded soldiers in the Northwestern Federal District,” according to the Russian Volya Telegram channel. That district is located near the Baltics.

“Military hospitals have been struggling to cope with the influx of wounded since 2023, so the Ministry of Defense is increasingly using civilian hospitals (including maternity hospitals and specialized medical facilities) for its needs,” Volya stated. “Some of these hospitals are being completely repurposed for military use, but more often, civilian hospitals allocate a few departments to treat the wounded, while continuing to provide care for civilian patients in other departments.”

The expansion “will primarily affect regions within the Northwestern Federal District: Karelia, St. Petersburg, Leningrad and Novgorod regions, as well as Smolensk,” which are near the Baltics “and the Moscow regions.”

While Russia is framing this as a way to handle the influx of wounded from the ongoing conflict, Ukrainian analysts see this as a move to prepare for an expansion of hostilities into Europe.

In addition, the Border Service Directorate for St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region announced that from September 16 to September 26, 2026, there would be a restriction on access to the border of the Slantsevsky and Kingiseppsky districts near the Estonian border. 

“These measures aim to prevent violations regarding border regulations, migration laws, and the protection of aquatic biological resources,” the directorate claimed, according to Russian regional officials. 

The new rules prohibit people from being on the shorelines or in small vessels along a portion of the Narva River and from hunting or carrying firearms in the border area. In addition, they forbid the “presence and movement of individuals and vehicles during hours of darkness outside of populated areas within the five-kilometer strip of territory along the state border in the Kingiseppsky and Slantsevsky districts.”

Obviously, the stated reasoning behind this was taken with great skepticism from neighboring Baltic NATO countries who are already on edge.

Though Russia remains bogged down in its war on Ukraine and is suffering heavy losses of personnel and equipment, some European intelligence officials suggest Vladimir Putin could still carry out a small-scale invasion of NATO territory.

“It’s possible,” Michal Koudelka, the head of the Czech Republic’s BIS security service, told The Guardian about a potential Russian thrust into NATO. “It could involve a limited incursion, false-flag provocations, a massive influence campaign,” he told the publication, adding that this scenario could play out in a matter of “months, not years.”

While Russia has been carrying out a range of hybrid actions against Europe for years, including cyberattacks, drone incursions and sabotage, last month’s foiled attack on Germany’s Leipzig-Halle airport is seen in European intelligence circles as an inflection point.

As we previously reported, a drone discovered inside the secured area of Leipzig/Halle Airport during the night of August 4-5, was carrying approximately 1.3 pounds of explosives. It was found close to a Ukrainian-operated Antonov An-124 heavy cargo aircraft used to transport weapons to Ukraine. German authorities blamed Russia for that incident.

“To have an armed UAV drone sent into a busy airport in the middle of Europe … If you have attacks that could result in losses of life or losses of very critical infrastructure that have a huge implication for society, I think that is a gamechanger,” Thomas Nilsson, the head of Sweden’s military intelligence and security service, told The Guardian.

It is unknown at this point whether Putin will decide to expand his hybrid actions against Europe to a more traditional conflict. However, as the attacks increase, officials across the continent are committing greater resources and planning to be prepared should that happen.

At the same time, the heat is only being turned up on Moscow as Ukraine accelerates its long range attacks. Now it has a whole new weapon, one that has been long in the works, to reach into Russian territory with while bypassing most air defenses.

Zelensky has officially unveiled the FP-7 Pelican ballistic missile and said it was used in the attack on Moscow. This is a monumental advance for Ukraine that has lacked modern ballistic missile capabilities since the war started. Still, Ukrainian media has raised doubts about whether the FP-7 — with an estimated operational range of 200-350 kilometers (124-217 miles) — can reach the Russian capital, which is about 450-500 kilometers (280-311 miles) from the Ukrainian border.

However, one expert suggested “that the ballistic weapon may have played an integral role within a coordinated, multi-axis combined strike,” according to the Kyiv Post.

Regardless, even if it can’t hit Moscow, it can hit plenty of other targets and it represents a major escalation in Ukraine’s weapons capabilities.

There is no avoiding the reality that the security situation in Europe is deteriorating, where exactly that leads is unclear apparently to everyone at the moment.

UPDATE: 7:04 PM Eastern –

Airspace restrictions have been imposed over Vilnius Airport due to a suspected “hybrid attack” from Belarus after the detection of what is suspected to be balloons in Lithuanian airspace, airport officials announced.

The restrictions were imposed from 11:45 p.m. local time on September 21 to 02:45 a.m. on September 22, the airport announced on its Facebook page. 

“Aircraft arrivals are temporarily suspended; however, departures are permitted from 12:55 a.m. subject to all safety requirements,” the airport explained. “These restrictions were introduced due to a hybrid attack by Belarus against Lithuania, civil aviation, and the public, involving the detection of navigational markers—characteristic of balloons—in areas posing risks to aviation.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Alarm Bells Ring Across Europe As Security Situation With Russia Deteriorates At Accelerating Pace appeared first on TWZ.

Trump marked the occasion with a ribbon-cutting on the South Lawn, using a pair of oversized gold scissors to sever a red, white, and blue ribbon before shaking hands with White House officials and members of the construction crew. Auxiliary power unit noise from the waiting VH-92A drowned out any remarks Trump may have made on the landing area; he instead posted afterward that the flight was the “maiden voyage” from the newly completed pad. He did not stop to take shouted questions from reporters before boarding for the helicopter’s first flight off the new surface. The VH-92A took Trump to Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, with his final destination New York, where he will be at the UN General Assembly this week.

The VH-92A’s operational limitation in this context had been its exhaust and rotor system. Heat and rotor wash directed downward from the helicopter had scorched and torn up the South Lawn’s turf badly enough that the Marine Corps continued relying on the VH-3D and VH-60N for White House landings even after the VH-92A entered presidential service under Biden in August 2024. Trump has said the newer helicopter is roughly two and a half times more powerful than the airframes it’s replacing — powerful enough, by his account, that a single landing once left “half of the grass…sitting in front of the Oval Office front door.”

For decades, Marine pilots set down on a simple metal disc placed directly on the South Lawn turf — a low-tech solution that worked well enough for the lighter VH-3D and VH-60N, but that pilots occasionally missed, tearing up grass around the marker in the process.

Construction of the new helipad began in late June but hit a snag in early August. As you can read about here, Trump ordered contractors to tear out and redo weeks of work — including a 100-foot-wide carved granite presidential seal that was already taking shape — reportedly over dissatisfaction with the pad’s appearance and the slope of the surrounding lawn.

The South Lawn’s natural grade, reported at up to 20 degrees in places, exceeds FAA heliport guidance calling for landing surfaces to be reasonably level. In the interim, Trump had been using the Ellipse, a park south of the White House, as a temporary landing zone — a workaround today’s flight presumably does away with.

Sikorsky, the Lockheed Martin subsidiary that builds the VH-92A, is financing the helipad project. Trump has said this is intended, at least in part, as compensation for not fully disclosing how disruptive the helicopter’s exhaust characteristics would be. The four-inch-thick granite, quarried in California, has been promoted by Trump as effectively indestructible, with a “million-year” lifespan. That claim, like similar durability promises made about his Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool refurbishment — which reportedly saw paint fade and its liner peel within days — has not been independently substantiated.

The helipad is the latest in a string of exterior additions Trump has made to the White House since returning to office, most notably two roughly 88-foot flagpoles installed on the North and South Lawns in June 2025. Trump said the building had “needed flagpoles for 200 years” since the only flag previously flew from the roof, and described paying for the poles — about $50,000 each — himself.

Landing on the White House lawn is only the most visible of the VH-92A’s issues. TWZ has tracked the $5-billion, 23-aircraft program’s string of setbacks for years.

A 2021 Pentagon testing report found the helicopter failing to meet the reliability, availability, or maintainability thresholds set for it, judging it fit for routine “administrative” runs but not for the emergency contingency missions the role actually demands. Central to that finding were flaws in the aircraft’s Mission Communication System, the secure link meant to keep the president connected to the National Command Authority in a crisis — a system a Pentagon summary said often delayed critical communications at the beginning of contingency missions.

Meanwhile, today’s flight doesn’t necessarily mean the older airframes are done at the White House.

The Marine Corps has said it intends to retire the iconic VH-3D Sea Kings fully this year, but plans to keep flying the VH-60N through at least 2030 for its hot-and-high-altitude performance. This means the ‘White Hawk’ could make occasional South Lawn appearances even with the VH-92A now cleared for routine use.

Whether today’s departure becomes the new baseline, or proves to be a one-off tied to the ribbon-cutting itself, will be revealed in how often the VH-92A — versus the older ‘White Top’ fleet — appears on the pad in the weeks ahead, particularly once the higher-profile test of Chinese Premier Xi Jinping’s state visit arrives.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Marine One VH-92A Makes First Operational Use Of New White House Helipad appeared first on TWZ.

The newly released picture from General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc. division (GA-ASI), seen at the top of this story, shows an FQ-42 in flight together with an F-35A Joint Strike Fighter and an F-15E Strike Eagle. The company has also disclosed the delivery of another Vengeance drone to the Air Force, this time to the service’s main drone operations hub at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.

“The FQ-42 that arrived at Creech will continue regular test and evaluation operations with the Air Force aimed at experimentation with the new aircraft,” according to a press release GA-ASI put out today. “Previous efforts with Vengeance and other GA-ASI jets, including [the] XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing Station and MQ-20 Avenger – have found the trio of combat jets flying in various scenarios that push the boundaries of combat aviation. GA-ASI’s jets have flown semi-autonomously and autonomously with various AI pilots and under collaborative control of human fighter pilots operating F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II jets.”

GA-ASI has previously confirmed that the XQ-67A, an earlier experimental drone TWZ was first to report on, served as a prototype for the development of the FQ-42. The Air Force’s F-22s also look set to be the first operational airborne controllers for USAF CCAs.

As mentioned, the Air Force is steadily working to broaden the scale and scope of testing involving the FQ-42 and FQ-44 to include more and more operationally relevant scenarios. Both types are set to make their first appearance at a large-force employment (LFE) exercise in December, offering a valuable new opportunity for deeper and more realistic integration with crewed fighters.

The Air Force otherwise continues to lay the groundwork for future CCA operations, including through a major round of testing at Creech in July, which TWZ was first to report on. The service is heavily focused now just on figuring out how the drones will be deployed, launched, recovered, supported, and otherwise operated on a day-to-day basis. A dedicated test squadron called the Experimental Operations Unit (EOU), established at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, has been leading those efforts.

Work is also underway to demonstrate tactical capabilities, such as the FQ-44 launching an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) for the first time earlier this year.

“We’re on path right now to do our air-to-air shot coming up here in the near future,” Mike Shortsleeve, Vice President for Strategy Business Development at GA-ASI, told TWZ‘s Jamie Hunter on the floor of the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference last week.

Last week, GA-ASI separately announced a new demonstration of semi-autonomous air-to-air combat capability involving crewed F-5AT Advanced Tiger jets belonging to private adversary air contractor Tactical Air Support, Inc. and an unspecified “CCA test aircraft.” The company did use a picture of an Avenger drone to illustrate the press release. The F-5s and the CCA surrogate were equipped with infrared search-and-track sensors (IRST) during the testing.

“The live exercise proved that a CCA and a manned fighter can collaborate to fuse sensor data from AMS-GRA-compliant sensors to track, engage, and eliminate an airborne target while using a Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) data link to accomplish seamless coordination between the two aircraft,” according to the GA-ASI release.

“The demonstration utilized BLOS communication between the CCA and the airborne F-5, enabling the Advanced Tiger to send data about targets from an AMS-GRA-compatible system. These commands were relayed to the CCA’s TacACE [Tactical Autonomy Ecosystem software] system,” the release added. “This flight showed that many companies’ platforms can interoperate using the plug-and-play government reference architectures ecosystem. The U.S. Air Force isn’t locked into using a single vendor or system.”

GA-ASI has previously demonstrated the ability of MQ-20s flying with podded IRSTs to detect and track aerial targets semi-automatically. Generally speaking, IRSTs look set to be an important sensor for future CCAs, and are particularly relevant in the air-to-air role. As we have written in the past:

IRSTs are especially valuable for helping spot stealthy targets with features designed to reduce their radar cross-sections since they detect and track infrared emissions. By extension, IRSTs are also immune to radio frequency electronic warfare jamming. As passive sensors, they do not emit their own signals that could alert a target to the fact they are being tracked, either. IRSTs can still be used to cue or otherwise be linked to other sensors, including active electronically-scanned array radars. Fusing data from multiple sources can provide higher fidelity tracks of multiple targets, as well as improved situational awareness overall.

Air-to-air combat is expected to be the primary mission set, at least initially, for Air Force CCAs. At the same time, an air-to-ground role for the FQ-42 and FQ-44, and/or other future CCA-type drones the Air Force might acquire, is emerging on the horizon. Anduril has already fit-checked a variety of air-to-ground ordnance on Fury.

As it stands now, the Air Force is looking to have its first operational CCAs in service toward the end of the decade. The service is also presently aiming to have a total fleet of at least 500 CCAs of all types by 2032.

“If we can’t be ready, then certainly you’re not going to have the forces that you need and the numbers that you need going forward. This signifies that mass is certainly important again, but also autonomy is just as important,” General Atomics’ Shortsleeve told us last week in talking about the Air Force’s CCA fleet size target. “So the ability to have these autonomous systems, whether they’re bringing in additional weapons, sensing capability, whatever it is, all of those working in a collaborative environment, whether it’s manned, unmanned teaming, or unmanned and unmanned capabilities, that right there is what’s going to help the warfighter in the future.”

“And when we say autonomy, it’s not just strictly this is going to go off and do its own thing. It’s going to be directed,” he added. “Whether it’s on the ground, in the air, [it] makes no difference to the system itself. It’s going to work hand-in-hand [with humans]. So that human-machine teaming, that’s what they’re really focusing on. There is figuring out how to best use this capability in the advancement of actually having to employ it in [the] real world.”

Though just flying in formation is very different from collaboration with a high degree of autonomy, the new picture of the FQ-42 together with the F-35A and the F-15E is a window into the future teamed operations the Air Force is hoping to build.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post General Atomics FQ-42A Vengeance CCA Now Flying Together With USAF Fighters appeared first on TWZ.

An Eglin AFB spokesperson told us the installation recently lost a drone, but would not confirm it was the same one found by Hot Spots Charters.

“I can confirm that we were doing a test and the test article went down,” the spokesperson told us, declining to provide further details about what kind of drone, when it was lost or the location it went down. They referred us to the Pentagon, which could not immediately provide any additional details. 

“The drone was found by local charter Capt. Daniel Arsenault with Hot Spots Charters,” said Green, who is also an aviation photographer whose work can be found at Aquatic Charlie on social media. “He saw the object at a distance and went over to check it out. When he did, he pulled a good size mahi-mahi out from underneath it, complementing his already stocked cooler full of fish from that morning charter. His passengers helped him haul it aboard.”

“Arsenault and his charter company did all the due diligence possible to notify local agencies of the recovery- and was eventually collected by one of them,” Green added. He did not know which agency.

Images taken of the drone shared with us by Green show that it did not have the engine, propeller or the nose cone/seeker intact. Losing these kind of components is common for impacts into water.

While the Eglin spokesperson offered scant details, the host unit at the installation is the 96th Test Wing, which is the “test and evaluation center for Air Force air-delivered weapons, navigation and guidance systems, command and control systems, and Air Force Special Operations Command systems,” according to the wing’s homepage. It oversees the massive Eglin Gulf Test Range, which “provides approximately 120,000 square miles of overwater airspace, covering the eastern third of the Gulf of Mexico from the Florida panhandle to the Florida Keys. The land range covers 724 square miles and contains 70 specific test and training areas, including an approved depleted uranium test range and the only qualified air-to-ground supersonic range east of the Mississippi River.”

As noted in the opening of this article, the LUCAS drone was used for the first time in combat during the opening day of the Operation Epic Fury war on Iran on Feb. 28. 

“Costing approximately $35,000 per platform, LUCAS is a low-cost, scalable system that provides cutting-edge capabilities at a fraction of the cost of traditional long-range U.S. systems that can deliver similar effects,” Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, a CENTCOM spokesperson, told TWZ when the command stood up Task Force Scorpion Strike (TFSS), the military’s first one-way attack drone unit, back in December. “The drone system has an extensive range and the ability to operate beyond line of sight, providing significant capability across CENTCOM’s vast operating area.”

“LUCAS drones deployed by CENTCOM have an extensive range and are designed to operate autonomously,” CENTCOM added in a press release. “They can be launched with different mechanisms to include catapults, rocket-assisted takeoff, and mobile ground and vehicle systems.”

TFSS falls under the auspices of U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), which oversees U.S. special operations activities across the Middle East.

While we aren’t sure if the drone found by Hot Spots Charters is the one lost by Eglin, it wouldn’t be the first time something like this has happened in Florida. For example, in 2021, beachcombers in Florida’s Palm Beach County found a U.S. Air Force BQM-167A high-performance target drone that washed ashore.

Indeed, the Air Force has a handful of 120-foot boats, the only vessels in its service, to help recover drones after they are shot down during live-fire exercises, or otherwise need to be recovered from these waters. The boats are operated by a contracted crew from Florida Offshore and retrieve around 100 of the drones each year.

The FLM-136’s origins as a target drone are highly relevant here. Counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities are being hotly pursued on all fronts across the U.S. military as the threat from them has ballooned. During the war in Ukraine and multiple engagements with Iran, including Operation Epic Fury, one-way attack drones have proven to be a massive threat that is heavily influencing how wars are fought. As far as Eglin AFB goes, maybe the most high-profile C-UAS development as of late that has emerged from there has been arming USAF fighters with FALCO APKWS laser-guided rockets to shoot down exactly the same kind of threat that the FLM-136 is meant to emulate. This program began in 2019, which TWZ was first to report on, but was finally rushed into service years later as the standoff with Iran went hot. Now there are many other programs aimed at dealing with these same threats, including a more capable “fire and forget” air-to-air APKWS.

LUCAS development is continuing at a high-pace, with its ability to swarm cooperatively with other LUCAS drones — a feature we reported as central to the LUCAS vision when the existence of the program was disclosed — being worked on now. You can read more about this here. These systems need sanitized airspace for development activities, and the vast ranges over the gulf are some of the best in the country for it.

So, it’s not surprising to see an FLM-136 floating in the waters off Eglin AFB. Even in the war with Iran, there were multiple losses of LUCAS drones where they were found intact. These weapons are produced to be risked in large numbers, and some failing, for whatever reason, is just part of the calculus.

We will update this story with any additional details we can find about this drone. Though we don’t yet know for sure where it came from, one thing is for certain, the folks on the Hot Spots Charters boat that found it will always have a good tale about the one that didn’t get away.

UPDATE: 2:38 PM Eastern Sept. 21 –

Eglin Air Force Base provided us with an update.

“On Thursday, Sept. 17, a LUCAS UAS impacted the water during routine scheduled testing on the Eglin AFB Range. The aircraft has been recovered and is back in the Department’s possession.

We do not have any additional details to provide at this time.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Shahed-136 Clone Found By Florida Fisherman, Eglin AFB Admits It Lost A Drone (Updated) appeared first on TWZ.

This week’s caption reads:

2nd Lt. Michelle Lee and Capt. William Yau conduct pre-operational checks inside of a Launch Control Center used for training purposes at Minot Air Force base, North Dakota, Mar. 7, 2022. The 91st Missile Wing contributes to the nation’s strategic defense by sustaining and operating various Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and the associated launch facilities.

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• If you want to talk politics, do so respectfully and know that there’s always somebody that isn’t going to agree with you. 
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• Do not be a sucker and feed trolls! That’s as much on you as on them. Use the mute button if you don’t like what you see.  
• So unless you have something of quality to say, know how to treat people with respect, understand that everyone isn’t going to subscribe to your exact same worldview, and have come to terms with the reality that there is no perfect solution when it comes to moderation of a community like this, it’s probably best to just move on. 
• Finally, as always, report offenders, please. This doesn’t mean reporting people who don’t share your political views, but we really need your help in this regard.

The post Bunker Talk: Let’s Talk About All The Things We Did And Didn’t Cover This Week appeared first on TWZ.

The exercise, Silver Wotan 2026, running between September 14-23, brings together Swedish and German forces across the land, maritime, and air domains. The scenario is built around a Swedish request for allied assistance, with German forces moving personnel and equipment across the Baltic before integrating with Swedish units already defending the island. The operation is testing the entire process of getting allied combat power to Gotland, protecting it during the movement to Visby, and rapidly incorporating it into the island’s existing defensive network.

A video shows troops coming ashore on Swedish CB90 fast assault craft, a type that German soldiers are also trained to operate:

The strategic importance of Gotland has grown considerably following Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024, which was a direct response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Located approximately halfway between mainland Sweden and the Baltic states, the island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea, close to the maritime approaches to the Gulf of Finland and within reach of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Its location gives forces operating from Gotland a potentially significant position from which to conduct surveillance, air defense, and maritime operations, while also making the island an important part of the wider network connecting NATO’s northern and eastern members.

At the same time, Gotland sits within an extremely complex littoral environment, where shallow waters, islands, narrow maritime approaches, and the proximity of multiple states can make both offensive operations and defensive planning more difficult. The region has also been shaped by longstanding Swedish concerns about Russian clandestine activity, including intelligence gathering and other forms of covert or deniable activity. The complexity of the Baltic operating environment can make such activities harder to detect and attribute, adding another layer of uncertainty alongside the more conventional military challenges facing the region.

Geography has long made Gotland important to Swedish defense planning, but its significance has taken on a broader dimension since Sweden joined the alliance. NATO has described the island as strategically important to its freedom of maneuver in the Baltic, while Swedish officials have highlighted its potential role as a hub for military operations and logistics in the region.

The current exercise is designed around the practical difficulties of reinforcing such a position.

Military equipment is being transported by sea to Visby, Gotland’s principal port, including by commercial ferry. In Visby, Swedish and German personnel are securing the harbor and conducting the reception of the arriving force. Among the equipment being moved are air defense systems, while Swedish forces are also operating coastal defense systems armed with anti-ship missiles.

Meanwhile, publicly available flight-tracking data showed German Luftwaffe transport aircraft, including at least one Airbus A400M airlifter, apparently involved in the effort. The commercial airport at Visby has long also been used for military activities related to Gotland and the wider Baltic region.

The movement is supported by Swedish and German naval forces and other aircraft, creating a scenario in which the maritime transit, protection of the port, air operations, and subsequent movement of troops and equipment ashore all form part of the same military problem. Once ashore, the arriving forces have to be moved into position and integrated with Swedish units already responsible for defending the island.

The Swedish Gotland Regiment, P 18, provides the core of the island’s permanent military presence. The regiment, Sweden’s youngest and smallest, has been rebuilding its capabilities since Sweden began expanding its military presence on Gotland. Its forces form the basis of the ground-defense structure into which allied reinforcements would be incorporated.

Swedish coastal defense capabilities are another important element of the drill. Land-based anti-ship missiles provide the island with a means of threatening hostile surface vessels operating in the surrounding waters, giving the defense of Gotland a direct connection to the wider maritime battle for the Baltic. During Silver Wotan, Swedish and German forces are also conducting anti-surface warfare activities alongside the broader reinforcement operation.

Germany is contributing more than 500 troops to the exercise, part of approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr personnel involved, including elements from the army, navy, and air force. The German Luftwaffe has deployed Panavia Tornado aircraft for surveillance, while German naval forces are participating in the maritime component, and German ground personnel are involved in the reinforcement and security activities on Gotland.

The exercise scenario is particularly relevant against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing military presence in the Baltic region.

Russia maintains major military infrastructure in Kaliningrad, including naval, air, missile, and air defense capabilities, while the Russian Baltic Fleet operates from bases in the region. Kaliningrad’s position between Poland and Lithuania gives Moscow a significant military foothold inside the NATO area, while Russian forces and military infrastructure elsewhere along the Baltic add to the complexity of operating and reinforcing allied territory in the region.

The security environment around the Baltic has also deteriorated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has increased its surveillance and military activity in the region, including the launch of Baltic Sentry in January 2025 following a series of incidents involving critical undersea infrastructure. The alliance has subsequently expanded efforts to monitor maritime activity and protect infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

Swedish authorities have stressed that Silver Wotan was planned in advance and is not being conducted in response to a specific imminent Russian threat. The exercise nonetheless reflects the operational environment in which Swedish and NATO planners now have to consider the possibility that maritime and air movements across the Baltic could be monitored, disrupted, or contested.

The exercise also builds on a series of increasingly large Swedish-led activities designed to test the reception of allied forces on Swedish territory. During Aurora 26 earlier this year, more than 18,000 troops from 13 countries participated in operations across Sweden, including the deployment of allied forces to Gotland alongside the Gotland Regiment and Swedish Home Guard. NATO described that activity as an emergency deployment intended to test the reinforcement of the island.

Silver Wotan places a more concentrated emphasis on the Swedish-German relationship and on the movement of an allied force into the island’s existing defensive structure.

Germany’s participation is also consistent with its growing military role in the Baltic and along NATO’s northeastern flank. Berlin is already providing forces for NATO’s forward defense in Lithuania and has increasingly emphasized the ability to move German forces rapidly across northern Europe in support of allied operations.

For Sweden, meanwhile, Gotland has become one of the clearest examples of how NATO membership has changed the country’s defense planning. The island remains a Swedish responsibility, but its location means that what happens there has consequences well beyond Sweden’s territorial defense.

A defended and adequately supplied Gotland provides NATO with a strategically positioned base for surveillance and defensive operations in the Baltic, while the ability to reinforce it demonstrates that the alliance can maintain access to the island even as the surrounding maritime and air environment becomes more contested.

The exercise comes as European allies are being forced to plan for a NATO in which the United States may provide less of the conventional military weight it has supplied for decades. The Pentagon is reviewing the size and posture of U.S. forces in Europe, including the forces and capabilities Washington would make available in a European crisis, while NATO’s top commander has said further U.S. troop withdrawals should be expected as European allies build up their own conventional capabilities.

At the same time, the alliance now describes Russia as its most significant and direct security threat, citing military activity alongside airspace violations, sabotage, cyber operations, and other forms of hybrid pressure. There are also growing concerns that Russia could try something in the Baltics, while it continues to step up its gray-zone activities regardless. NATO officials have warned that Russia could rebuild enough military capacity to pose a more serious conventional challenge to the alliance before the end of the decade.

For Sweden and Germany, the Silver Wotan exercise is a practical test of how quickly European forces can reinforce and defend one of the Baltic’s most strategically important positions. As the security environment grows more contested and Europe prepares for a future in which U.S. forces may not be as readily available, the ability to move allied combat power across the region and integrate it into existing defenses is becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s deterrence.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post German Forces Surge Onto Baltic Island In First-Of-Its-Kind NATO Drill appeared first on TWZ.

As we have frequently reported, the military use of USVs is now proliferating around the globe at an increasing rate. Ukraine has employed sea drones to devastating effect against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet vessels and facilities, forcing the general evacuation of Russian naval assets from occupied Crimea to bases in Russia proper. During Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. used them for the first time in combat, as one-way attack weapons against Iranian targets, to hunt for mines, and for a search and rescue operation to locate the crew of an AH-64 Apache helicopter downed by Iran, as well as general broad-area surveillance and awareness. China is investing heavily in the space, as well, along with many other navies around the globe, both friend and foe.

The following video shows the first U.S. use of a USV as a kamikaze weapon.

“There was a lot in theater that were being used, but it wasn’t something that we went out with,” Col. Chris P. Niedziocha told us when asked if the 31st MEU deployed with USVs. He then answered in the affirmative in response to a question about if MEUs need sea drones on future deployments. He said it is part of the “explosion in robotics and autonomy” being used in combat.

“These systems are incredibly useful and capable,” explained Niedziocha, now director of the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School. “And you say, ‘Hey, you know, [in] the next war, if the first thing you’re putting through the breach isn’t a robot, something’s wrong. You say never send a Marine someplace you haven’t sent a bullet. I think the new way is [you] never want to send a Marine someplace you haven’t already sent a robot. So yeah, we’re embracing [the technology] and we’re not leaders. We’re fast followers in that regime.”

Asked for specific use cases he sees for USVs, the colonel talked about using them before putting Marines ashore.

“I can tell you if you’re doing an amphibious operation, you want to understand what’s waiting beneath the surface in the water column,” Niedziocha noted. “So something can go either with a side-looking sonar array or even forward-looking to demonstrate that there’s nothing there, and the hydrography and bathymetry is what you… need for the operation to be successful.”

Hydrography measures “the shape and features of the shoreline; the characteristics of tides, currents, and waves; and the physical and chemical properties of the water itself,” according to NOAA. Bathymetry, which is part of that, focuses on mapping the depths and shapes of underwater terrain.

These functions are critical for mine detection and determining whether there are man-made or natural obstacles that would impede landing operations. While these missions are largely being performed by the Navy, including with USVs, the Marines are moving toward making that an organic capability. Recently, the Marines announced they were testing a counter-mine USV system. The evaluation was conducted late last month at Camp Pendleton by the Program Manager Combat Support Systems (PM CSS) Explosive Hazard Defeat Team.

The test of the USV was “in response to a littoral capability gap,” according to the media release. “The solution: seek a commercial USV solution that is equipped with integrated autonomous driving and payloads that consist of Sonar, Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras, Line of Sight (LOS) Communications and Acoustic Communications (AComms).”

This was part of the overall effort to develop “solutions that enable increased standoff for Marines to detect, investigate and neutralize threats,” the release added. “The innovation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON) systems will provide Marine EOD Technicians with the confidence to operate in contested environments while preserving combat power, increasing operational reach, and minimizing exposure to explosive threats.”

LEON is a so-called system of systems, using a remotely operated vehicle, diver equipment, an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), a USV, and an Amphibious Unmanned Ground Vehicle to enable “EOD to confirm and mark hazards and obstacles from very shallow water to the beach zone,” the media release added.

While unmanned systems have long been part of EOD operations, “we’re expanding that into maritime systems that allow more endurance and less risk for operators,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Alfredo Andrade, officer in charge, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB). “Some of the conflicts that we are engaged in take a toll on the force, and surging in new forces is costly. It turns into a logistical problem. To preserve the safety and the health of the forces… the USV and the [LEON] program exist to ensure that we have readily available combat power.”

While Niedziocha didn’t address USVs for offensive combat roles, the Marines have evaluated them for that use as well as for logistics, among other functions.

There have been many other tests, as well. Including one just this summer at RIMPAC. These trials saw the launch and recovery of one of Splash Industries’ Typhoon USVs aboard the USS Essex. The ‘Gator Navy’ of amphibious assault vessels that haul Marines and their kit around the oceans is uniquely suited to act as USV motherships. Their well decks allow for easy deployment and recovery of USVs of many sizes and capabilities near seamlessly. So it won’t be surprising if these vessels and the Marines aboard them quickly become staples in the Pentagon’s USV playbook.

Still, the Marines have a long way to go to catch up to how these systems are already being used.

The Houthi rebels of Yemen actually pioneered the operational use of kamikaze USVs years ago and Ukraine has led the way in advancements of these systems. They first employed them as kamikaze weapons, but then added machine guns and rockets and later missiles, which were used to shoot down Russian helicopters and jets. Ukraine has also used them to launch first-person view (FPV) and bomber drone attacks as well as deliver uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) into enemy territory. Last week, Ukraine claimed to have attacked a Russian USV with a USV, marking another first.

You can see that engagement in the following video.

Having recently returned from a six-month deployment that saw the Marine Corps’ first use of its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept in a combat setting during the fight against Iran, Niedziocha has a good sense of the realities of modern warfare. His Marines operated forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) for various aircraft in combat for the first time and set up remote sensing locations.

That a commander like him sees value in USVs is a good sign for progress in the development of these systems.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Marine Colonel Who Led Mideast Combat Deployment Wants His Own Drone Boats appeared first on TWZ.

Should Japan ultimately pursue the capability, it would join an exclusive group of nations operating nuclear-powered submarines. China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are currently the only countries with nuclear-powered submarines in active service. Brazil is already working to join the club, while Australian and South Korean nuclear-powered submarine plans are somewhat longer-term.

Japan’s submarine fleet is already regarded as among the most capable conventionally powered forces, and is very much at the forefront of advanced naval propulsion technologies. Even with that considerable expertise, however, developing and sustaining a nuclear propulsion capability would represent a huge challenge, requiring expertise and infrastructure far beyond those needed to build Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines.

Koizumi’s comments do not represent a decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, nor do they indicate that Japan has begun a procurement program. They do, however, mark a significant evolution in the country’s public debate over submarine propulsion and point to a growing willingness within the Japanese defense establishment to consider capabilities that were previously largely outside the mainstream of defense planning.

Currently, Japan operates one of the world’s most capable conventional submarine fleets, centered on increasingly sophisticated diesel-electric boats equipped with air-independent propulsion and advanced lithium-ion batteries. These submarines are well suited to operations around Japan and the country’s surrounding waters.

The JMSDF currently operates 22 conventionally powered submarines, maintaining the force structure established in the 2010s while progressively replacing older boats with the more capable Taigei class. Five Taigei class submarines are now in JMSDF service, with additional boats in the pipeline.

Nuclear propulsion, however, would offer substantially greater endurance and sustained underwater speed, allowing Japanese submarines to conduct longer-range operations across the broader Western Pacific with minimal support. This is a requirement that is becoming increasingly relevant as Tokyo’s strategic focus expands beyond its immediate maritime approaches.

China’s rapidly expanding naval force, including its growing submarine fleet and increasingly distant maritime operations, is forcing Tokyo to consider how it would monitor and potentially counter Chinese forces farther from the Japanese archipelago. A nuclear-powered attack submarine could remain submerged for extended periods without the endurance limitations imposed by conventional propulsion, making it particularly useful for long-range surveillance, tracking, and sea-denial missions.

Japan’s debate is also unfolding alongside a significant development in neighboring South Korea. Seoul has confirmed plans to develop a new class of nuclear-powered submarines, a move that could add further momentum to an emerging undersea competition in Northeast Asia. South Korea’s decision is particularly relevant to Tokyo because it demonstrates that nuclear propulsion is no longer merely a theoretical capability for U.S. allies in the region. While the missions and strategic priorities of the Japanese and South Korean navies are different, both countries face the challenge of operating in waters increasingly contested by China and North Korea.

The development could also create new opportunities for Japan to work more closely with Australia and the other AUKUS partners. Australia is in the process of acquiring its own conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability under AUKUS Pillar I, with U.S. and U.K. nuclear-powered submarines also scheduled to operate from Australia. Japan has separately been identified as a potential partner for AUKUS Pillar II, which covers advanced capabilities and technology cooperation.

A Japanese decision to pursue SSNs could eventually create a much deeper basis for cooperation with Australia, including submarine interoperability, undersea warfare, workforce and technical expertise, infrastructure, sustainment, and potentially aspects of the industrial base. Analysts have already examined how Japan could fit into the wider AUKUS submarine ecosystem as Australia’s nuclear-submarine program develops.

A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine with a robust capacity to launch land attack cruise missiles would also be a powerful component in the country’s emerging “counterstrike” posture, which is increasingly centered on acquiring the ability to strike targets at longer ranges.

Japan has already begun deploying domestically developed long-range missile systems, including the Upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, while also acquiring the U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missile.

An SSN would potentially add a highly survivable, mobile platform to this emerging strike architecture, allowing Japan to position long-range weapons farther from its home territory and complicating an adversary’s efforts to locate and neutralize them. That could be particularly valuable in a conflict in which Japanese air bases, missile batteries, and other fixed infrastructure were under attack.

The potential SSN requirement also fits with Japan’s expanding expeditionary ambitions. As the JMSDF converts its Izumo class helicopter destroyers to operate F-35B fighters, giving Japan a more credible carrier aviation capability, nuclear-powered attack submarines could provide a valuable escort for these increasingly important surface groups. Their speed, endurance, and ability to remain submerged for extended periods makes SSNs particularly well suited to accompanying carrier forces on longer-range deployments and supporting contingencies farther from Japanese waters.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is highly significant that nuclear propulsion was effectively excluded from Japan’s conventional defense debate for decades. More recently, however, Japanese defense officials and policymakers have begun examining whether future submarines will require a different propulsion system. The issue is now one that can be discussed openly at the ministerial level.

Nevertheless, pursuing a nuclear-powered submarine program would come with huge challenges.

Building and operating nuclear-powered submarines would require Japan to establish an entirely different industrial, regulatory, and training infrastructure. The vessels would also be considerably more expensive and complex to build and operate than Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines. Tokyo would have to resolve questions involving nuclear regulation, reactor technology, maintenance facilities, crew training, and the handling of nuclear material.

There would also be a significant political dimension. Although naval nuclear propulsion is fundamentally different from possessing nuclear weapons, any move in that direction would inevitably receive scrutiny in a country whose postwar security policy has been shaped by its experience with nuclear weapons and its longstanding non-nuclear principles.

For those reasons, Koizumi’s statement should be viewed less as an announcement of a Japanese nuclear-submarine program than as evidence that the political barrier to discussing such a program is falling.

The next question is whether the Japanese government will move from keeping the option open to actually studying a nuclear-powered submarine design, propulsion technology, and acquisition pathway in detail.

If it does, the consequences could extend well beyond Japan’s submarine fleet. A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine capability would represent a major enhancement of Tokyo’s ability to operate across the Western Pacific and could alter the undersea balance between Japan, China, and the United States’ other regional allies. At the very least, the idea is one that is now part of wider discussions at the highest levels.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Japan Opens The Door To Acquiring Nuclear-Powered Submarines appeared first on TWZ.

The General Atomics Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Squadron of the Year award for 2025 was presented to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference on Tuesday, at which TWZ was in attendance. The AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies works together with General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc. division (GA-ASI) to recognize an Air Force drone unit in this way each year.

“The RPA Trophy is awarded annually at the USAF level for outstanding performance of active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard … squadrons in achieving persistent attack and/or reconnaissance over the preceding calendar year,” the Mitchell Institute told TWZ in a statement. “Squadrons are judged on performance across their specified mission sets, exercise participation, and squadron and individual achievements.”

The institute sent an additional statement regarding this year’s particular award to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron, which is as follows:

“Through relentless combat support, operational agility, and enterprise leadership, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron – known as the Blackbirds – has set the standard for the remotely piloted aircraft community and strengthened the Joint Force’s intelligence advantage. In 2025, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron conducted intrusive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions across three areas of responsibility, filling critical intelligence gaps and disrupting enemy networks. In the face of urgent deployment requirements, the squadron demonstrated exceptional agility, rapidly pivoting resources to establish forward operating locations and execute critical missions under severely compressed timelines. The Blackbirds’ accomplishments paved the way for future remotely piloted aircraft capability, distinctly identifying them as the Air Force’s most outstanding RPA squadron.“

Larry Stutzriem, the AFA’s Executive Vice President, while presenting the award to representatives of the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron ahead of a panel at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

“In 2025, the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron conducted 87 ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] missions across three different AORs [areas of responsibility], filled critical intelligence gaps, and disrupted enemy networks,” Stutzriem said. “On the unit mobility side, the Blackbirds executed 7.2 million dollars worth of airlift in six movements across four combatant commands, moving 250 tons of personnel, top secret material, and equipment to provide low-observable RPA support for a critical Secretary of War-directed mission.”

“With their deployments, the Blackbirds demonstrated exceptional agility under extremely compressed timelines,” he added.

Furthermore, during 2025, the squadron “also executed six large force exercises to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures; validated joint force tactical objectives in land and maritime environments; and provided combat-relevant training,” according to Stutzriem. “Instructors and evaluators graduated the largest ever combat mission-ready class, 30 percent ahead of schedule, and accelerated mission-ready status 33 percent, while increasing total unit aircrew by 26 percent.”

Though Stutzriem noted that the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron provided “low-observable RPA support,” no explicit mention was made of the RQ-170. Whether or not the squadron may now operate other kinds of low-observable (stealthy) drones is unknown. As mentioned, to date, the Air Force has only confirmed that Sentinels are assigned to two units, the other being the 44th Reconnaissance Squadron. Both the 30th and 44th are assigned to the 432nd Wing at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. Between 20 and 30 RQ-170s, in total, are understood to be in the Air Force’s inventory.

What three specific AORs the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron operated in during 2025 is also not known.

However, at least one, and possibly two, RQ-170s took part in the mission to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro in January of this year, as you can read more about here. It’s very likely that the Sentinels were tracking Maduro ahead of the operation. In December 2025, Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) had also made a post on X that included a picture of an individual wearing a name patch with the silhouette of Sentinel and the sleeve insignia of the 432nd Wing, prompting questions about whether the drones were operating in the region. The post was subsequently deleted.

Further in the past, RQ-170s are also known to have been deployed to the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Pacific. The Sentinel first emerged publicly in Afghanistan in the late 2000s, prompting the U.S. military to confirm its existence in 2009. Sentinels are notably understood to have surveilled Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in the lead-up to the raid that led to his death in May 2011.

Later in 2011, one of the drones infamously went down in Iran while presumed to be on a mission to monitor aspects of that country’s nuclear program. With that in mind, it is possible, if not extremely probable, that RQ-170s likely played a role in relation to the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on Iranian nuclear sites last year. Sentinels could have provided direct surveillance over the sites in question, as well as collecting post-mission bomb damage assessments and other intelligence. These are exactly the kinds of missions the drones were designed for and that operators have trained for.

A satellite image available through Apple Maps, seen below, also shows an RQ-170 at Naval Air Station Sigonella in Italy, likely in the 2023-2024 timeframe, based on the state of construction visible elsewhere at the base. It is not known how many Sentinels were deployed to Sigonella and for how long. The Apple Maps image does lend some credence to earlier reports that these drones may have flown missions in the Black Sea region, gathering intelligence on Russian forces on the heavily defended, occupied Crimean Peninsula, between 2022 and 2023.

Overall, the RQ-170 does still appear to be a go-to for performing penetrating tactical reconnaissance missions, especially when there is a need to provide persistent surveillance in denied areas, resulting in extremely important intelligence collection.

Again, it is important to reiterate here that we do not know if the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron operates any other stealthy drones beyond the RQ-170, or has in the past. A very stealthy high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) surveillance and reconnaissance drone commonly and unofficially referred to as the RQ-180, or an evolution thereof, burst into the public eye in March after it was spotted landing in broad daylight at a base in Greece. Much about the drone, including what units are involved in its operation and where the home base of the fleet is, as well as the reasons for its deployment to the region, has yet to emerge. It does seem unlikely that the 30th would have taken on operation of the RQ-180, which is a larger strategic reconnaissance-focused platform compared to the smaller, tactically-minded, and less exquisite RQ-170. This is also just one example of what could still be lurking in the classified realm.

Whether or not the awarding of the 2025 RPA Squadron of the Year trophy to the 30th Reconnaissance Squadron might now point to a new willingness to talk about that unit’s activities and/or the RQ-170 remains to be seen. Regardless, the award and its description are yet more reminders of just how important the Sentinel remains nearly two decades after it first appeared.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post New Details About Secretive RQ-170 Sentinel Drone Squadron Shared With New Award appeared first on TWZ.

This employment of EABO for Epic Fury is a highly significant development. After years of progressively evolving the EABO playbook, it was no longer an experimental exercise. This meant that Marines were forward deployed in a contested area in a region where established bases were taking heavy fire from Iranian missile and drone barrages. Troops were killed in some of these attacks and U.S. aircraft, buildings and equipment were damaged and destroyed across the Middle East. Pushing aircraft from the MEU, as well as the joint force, to FARPs (forward arming and refueling point) would have been a relevant asset preservation tactic as well as one that would help accelerate combat operations, and it’s exactly what EABO is meant to do.

The 31st MEU’s six-month deployment began in January in the Pacific, before the unit was ordered to the Middle East in March, returning to Okinawa, Japan, in July. That’s where it is stationed as the USMC’s only continuously forward-based MEU.

“This was the first time we were able to implement EABO in combat operations since the concept was created for the force,” Capt. Steven J. Keenan, a USMC spokesperson, told us. “We have practiced it many times, but this was a first for supporting a Joint Force named operation with forward FARPs and forward bases that supported joint ops and combat power sustainment.”

EABO was first introduced in 2020 by then-Commandant Gen. David Berger in his Force Design 2030 plan for the future of the Corps. It was created with a fight against China in mind, especially utilizing small Pacific islands. The idea is to have highly mobile, low-signature forces deployed forward in austere, contested or potentially contested maritime locations. The mission is to “support sea control operation, conduct sea denial operations within the littorals, contribute to maritime domain awareness, provide forward command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-targeting capability and forward sustainment,” according to the Marines.

The news of the first activation of the EABO concept in combat came Wednesday during a media roundtable with Col. Chris P. Niedziocha, who commanded the 31st MEU during its deployment to the Middle East in support of Operation Epic Fury. Now director of the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School, Niedziocha discussed EABO and a range of other operations during that deployment, including boarding vessels during the blockade of Iranian ports.

The 31st MEU was embarked aboard the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which consisted of the America class amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans, and Whidbey Island class dock landing ship USS Rushmore. You can read more about the ARG/MEU and its assets in our initial story about the deployment to the Middle East here.

“You’re starting to see this has been validated,” the colonel said of the EABO concept during the roundtable TWZ attended virtually. “It’s still nascent, but we actually, for the first time, demonstrated what we thought we were able to do, which I think is pretty exciting. And then things like forward arming and refueling to extend the operational reach of aircraft and expeditionary reloading, and then the ever-present logistic challenge of doing something like that. So that’s pretty significant.”

“We successfully implemented critical Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), establishing sensor expeditionary advanced bases and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) where none existed,” the colonel added. “Through our forward logistic elements, we proved that an agile Marine Air-Ground Task Force can sustain itself and generate ready, lethal power in contested maritime environments, directly setting the theater for follow-on joint forces.”

One of the objectives of the FARPs was to reduce reliance on the Marines’ fleet of KC-130 aerial refuelers and serve as jumping-off points for its F-35B Lightning II fighters.

“There was all manner of tankers all the time, but the FARP is to extend the operational reach, and if you can do it, you reduce the load on that,” Niedziocha noted. “Because there’s some aircraft that are basically for expeditionary austere operations, especially the F-35B,” the Marine Corps’ variant of the aircraft designed for short take off and vertical landing. 

“There are some trade-offs associated with the Bravo,” Niedziocha pointed out, using a slang for the jets. “There’s less internal fuel, but you have the lift [system], which gives you the option to do these kinds of things. So, the goal there was to walk that fine line between providing the full sortie over wherever you needed it, and keeping the ships far enough away to make them as survivable as possible.”

In addition to the F-35Bs and other aircraft organic to the 31st MEU, the FARPs were also used by Army helicopters, Keenan told us. Imagery posted on the Pentagon’s image distribution site also showed U.S. Army Gray Eagle drones and Marine MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft were included.

Niedziocha did not provide details about where the FARPs were set up, but a U.S. defense official told us they were “disaggregated throughout the Middle East.” The official declined to provide further information, citing operational security concerns since they are still being used.

“Throughout the deployment, the Tripoli ARG and 31st MEU successfully conducted over 1,600 mishap-free flight hours of combat aviation missions, including precision strikes, transporting 800,000 pounds of cargo, and moving 5,000 personnel,” a 31st MEU overview of the deployment explained. “The units also provided sustained combat support to joint force operations by delivering critical intelligence and refueling over 300 aircraft ashore and underway.”

The colonel also didn’t provide details about the sensor expeditionary advanced bases. According to the Marines, “a sensing expeditionary advanced base (SEAB) brings together coastal surveillance radars, electronic sensors, and Marines ashore to extend maritime domain awareness, complementing the radars and sensors already at work aboard naval ships off the coast.”

“When SEAB systems identify surface vessels in nearby sea lanes, small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) operators launch their platforms to visually identify and track the contacts,” the Marines added. “Sensor data and imagery are transmitted in real time across the blue-green command network to decision-makers.”

This capability could have been used to track Iran’s remaining fleet of small boats that it has used to harass shipping and mine the Strait of Hormuz, as well as larger vessels trying to transport oil. Other sensors, like radars and counter-drone systems, could also help identify incoming threats and provide general situational awareness. The EABO concept was employed as part of the 31st MEU’s larger role in supporting the blockade and mine clearance efforts.

The 31st MEU interdicted four vessels during the deployment, three of which led to boardings. On April 19, Marines boarded the MV Touska; on April 28, the MV Blue Star III; and on May 19, the MT Celestial Sea.

The Touska was boarded after USS Spruance fired multiple 5-inch rounds, targeting the engine room and disabling the vessel’s propulsion. The crew of the vessel was retained for about two weeks before being repatriated.

Niedziocha told us that none of the crews offered any resistance.

“At two in the morning, when 30 Force Reconnaissance Marines fast rope onto your vessel, [you are] just compliant with a capital C. They did exactly what they were directed to do. The overmatch that you put onto that vessel is pretty surprising. And then there’s overwatch provided by UAS and manned aircraft, so you create this bubble around the vessel. So yeah, they complied.”

You can see the Touska being boarded in the following video.

Two years ago, as the EABO concept was maturing, TWZ was invited to get an exclusive look at how an advanced EABO concept would be put into action, including how squadrons operated the F-35B out of an austere combat environment while generating combat sorties. It was an unprecedented and exclusive peek into the EABO playbook and what a real fight in the Pacific with the USMC’s most advanced fighter aircraft could actually look like. You can read about that in our story here. It appears the operations in the Middle East mirrored this exercise closely.

Now back in Japan, the ARG/MEU is getting ready for a new deployment, said the colonel.

“We got back to Okinawa, I think July 22nd, and they had already begun their workup cycle in earnest to be on the water in early January to go out and do another Iron Fist [training exercise] with the Japanese, and then long periods of a crisis response,” said Niedziocha, who relinquished command in August before moving on to his new role. “Just being there, present in the First Island Chain to partner with your allies, demonstrates the resolve and commitment to deter whatever needs deterring.” 

As noted earlier in this story, the EABO concept was designed with a Pacific fight in mind. Its first combat employment in the Middle East clearly offers lessons that can now be adapted to enhance EABO operations globally.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post USMC Used Its Expeditionary Operations Playbook In Combat For First Time During Epic Fury appeared first on TWZ.

A spokesperson with the Michigan Department of Military and Veterans Affairs told the station that “the F-16 is a part of the 149th Fighter Wing from Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland in Texas.” 

Video emerging on social media showed what is claimed to be the wreckage of the aircraft in flames.

According to air traffic control (ATC) audio, the pilot’s wingman said, “we have a possible mayday. My wingman may have taken a bird.” TWZ cannot independently confirm what caused the crash. The audio continues and offers a fairly dramatic and raw look at how the incident occurred over the air waves.

We have reached out to the 149th Fighter Wing, the Michigan Department of Military and Veteran Affairs, the Grand Traverse County Sheriff’s Office and the Grand Traverse County Emergency Management Office for further details.

A shelter-in-place order was issued by Grand Traverse County Emergency Management for residents near the plane crash.

“Shelter indoors, close windows/vents,” the order stated. “Follow instructions from emergency personnel. More information to follow. This shelter in place applies to residents in the indicated area ONLY.”

This is a developing story.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post F-16 Crashes In Michigan appeared first on TWZ.

The proposed deal, worth an estimated total cost of $24.3 billion, was announced as the Kingdom is in the midst of a fierce fight against the Houthi rebels of Yemen. It marks a major policy shift, with Washington previously being unwilling to export the advanced stealth fighters to Arab states and will likely serve as a reminder at a very challenging time for the Saudis of the unique security capabilities that only the U.S. can provide them.

In addition to the jets, which will be conventional takeoff and landing variants, Saudi Arabia has requested 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines, support and other items.

Despite concerns from Israel that providing Saudi Arabia with the advanced fighters will tip the balance of power in the region, the proposed sale of this equipment and support “will not alter the military balance in the region,” the State Department noted. 

The United States has a requirement to maintain Israel’s so-called qualitative military edge, which essentially guarantees that Israel will be prioritized for advanced U.S. weapons ahead of Arab states in the region. Among these advanced weapons, the stealthy F-35 is highly prominent.

You can read our past feature about the wide-ranging impacts of an F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia here.

“This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major non-NATO ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Gulf region,” the State Department wrote. “The proposed sale will improve Saudi Arabia’s capability to deter current and future threats by strengthening its homeland defense, and improving interoperability with U.S. forces, and other regional and NATO forces.  The proposed sale will also augment Saudi Arabia’s operational aircraft and enhance its air-to-air, and air-to-ground self-defense capability.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.”

In November, “President Trump approved a major defense sale package, including future F-35 deliveries, which strengthens the U.S. defense industrial base and ensures Saudi Arabia continues to buy American,” according to the White House.

Trump has pushed for closer ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia and wants the Kingdom to join the Abraham Accords initiative. This is a set of agreements that establish normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and different Arab states. Doing so would be a major breakthrough, following the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and others.

A Saudi F-35 deal was also discussed under the Biden administration, as part of a broader deal that sought to normalize the Kingdom’s relations with Israel.

This is a developing story.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

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According to Aviation Week, the company has proposed an aircraft called the F-16G, an enhanced derivative of the F-16 Block 70. The proposed configuration reportedly incorporates conformal fuel tanks, 600-gallon wing tanks, an infrared search-and-track (IRST) system, a Sniper targeting pod, and a drag chute. All of these features have appeared on previous F-16s in one form or another. Lockheed is positioning the new version as a potential replacement for USAF F-16 units whose existing aircraft are approaching the end of their useful lives.

The Air Force, for its part, says that it has not yet settled on either the requirements or the options for addressing the problem. As it stands, the service has not committed to buying any new F-16s. The proposal is nevertheless notable because it follows an earlier round of discussions in which the Air Force was already examining whether a new-build F-16 could help address the growing fighter gap.

In December 2025, Inside Defense reported that the Air Force had reached out to Lockheed Martin about pricing for Block 70 F-16s — the current export standard. The conversations were described as exploratory, with no firm procurement plan, but the reporting established that the idea had moved beyond a purely theoretical discussion. One congressional aide told the publication that officials were looking at ways to “plug their holes” as part of their future force-structure planning.

A new Viper variant based on the Block 70 would be cheaper than replacing an aging F-16 with an F-35, while allowing the Air Force to retain much of the infrastructure, training, and experience associated with the existing aircraft. This is a major advantage as the F-35’s unique infrastructure and support requirements are a costly addition to the aircraft’s base price tag. An even bigger factor is unrelated to acquisition and bed-down costs: a Block 70 is far cheaper to sustain and operate over its service life than an F-35, a difference that compounds significantly across a fleet. 

The idea of a new Viper buy had already reached the highest levels of Air Force leadership several months earlier.

In May 2025, Sen. Tom Cotton asked then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin about the possibility of buying a U.S.-configured “Block 80” F-16 if Congress provided additional funding. Allvin did not endorse the proposal, but he did not dismiss it either, saying he needed to examine the time required to adapt the Block 70 design, where a U.S. aircraft could fit into Lockheed Martin’s production line, and what the industrial base could support. He also noted that the existing Block 70/72 line was already heavily occupied by foreign military sales.

At the same hearing, Allvin acknowledged the broader force-structure logic, saying the Air Force needed both the high-end capabilities required for an Indo-Pacific fight and other fighters that “may not need to be as sophisticated as our fifth-generation, sixth-generation.” He also emphasized that the first increment of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) was intended to augment rather than replace crewed fighters like the F-16.

Taken together, the developments show that the concept has remained alive through the Air Force’s evolving force-structure debate.

The Numbers Game

At first glance, the idea of buying new F-16s for the Air Force in the late 2020s might seem puzzling. The F-16 entered U.S. service in the 1970s, and the Air Force stopped buying new examples for itself more than 20 years ago. The established plan has been to replace the legacy F-16 fleet with the F-35A. For a long time, the service’s stated ambition was ultimately an all-stealth tactical fighter force — but that vision has already largely melted away as budget, operational and industrial-capacity realities have set in.

Today, the fighter fleet is still far older on average than it needs to be and legacy fourth generation types, minus a handful of new F-15EXs, are now well over 20-years old at the youngest. The oldest of these aircraft are increasingly challenging and costly to support. Meanwhile, the F-35 has had its fair share of successes and challenges, but replacing all of the USAF’s oldest fighters with JSFs in a timely and efficient manner, and operating those aircraft over future decades, looks increasingly problematic. The F-47 is also on the horizon, but that aircraft fits a different capability set more aligned with the F-22 than the F-16 and will come at a much higher cost than any fighter currently being procured.

Above all else, the problem is that the Air Force’s fighter challenge is one of numbers.

The service’s 2025 long-term fighter force-structure assessment concluded that it needed 1,558 combat-coded manned fighters by 2035 to reach what it considers a low-risk operational posture. The Air Force had only 1,098 fighters in its inventory as of May 2026, below the statutory minimum of 1,145.

At the same time, the service is trying to retire old aircraft, expand F-35A procurement, introduce the F-47, acquire additional F-15EXs, and field large numbers of CCAs. Those programs address different requirements, but they all compete for money, industrial capacity, personnel, and infrastructure.

For the Air Force, the question has not simply been whether the F-16 remains militarily useful, but also whether the aircraft provides a possible answer to a capacity shortfall, while also dealing with delays in F-35 deliveries, and the retirement of the A-10, blowing another hole in the inventory. Meanwhile, some older F-16s that had been expected to leave the fleet are instead receiving upgrades, including a new radar and electronic warfare suite, to keep them flying longer.

That creates a difficult transition period. The Air Force wants to retire aging fighters, but it also needs to keep enough aircraft available while their replacements arrive. The F-16 keeps reappearing because it offers a way of addressing at least part of that problem with a very well known commodity and without requiring every legacy fighter to be replaced by an F-35 or F-15EX.

The Production Line Matters

There is another reason the F-16 procurement idea refuses to disappear: Lockheed Martin already has an F-16 production line operating in the United States.

The Greenville, South Carolina, facility was established to produce Block 70/72 aircraft for foreign customers and is now the world’s only F-16 production facility. The Air Force helped establish the line as part of its broader effort to sustain the F-16 industrial base through foreign military sales. The line moved there after the massive Lockheed Martin plant at Fort Worth, Texas — where the F-16 had been built for decades — transitioned fully over to F-35 production.

So, buying new F-16s would not require reviving a dormant production line or spinning up an entirely new aircraft program. The basic manufacturing infrastructure already exists, and the additional work required for a U.S.-specific aircraft may end up being minimal — potentially amounting to little more than taking an existing Block 70 and tweaking it, rather than a large-scale new engineering, testing, and weapons-integration effort.

The Air Force has been aware of that possibility for years. In 2021, then-Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Will Roper argued that the service should consider the new F-16 production line as part of its capacity solution. Roper specifically pointed to the upgraded capabilities available from the South Carolina production line.

However, Greenville is not an empty production line waiting for a U.S. customer. Lockheed Martin’s F-16 facility already has a substantial Block 70/72 backlog for foreign operators, with the company reporting more than 100 aircraft in the queue and continued potential for additional international orders. It’s also unclear how much the facility could realistically be expanded, since it was designed around a relatively more modest foreign military sales production volume rather than the kind of surge a large U.S. order could require. Still, the USAF could step in and buy up open slots, which would also ensure the line stays open for the foreseeable future, which has major strategic and industrial protection benefits.

That brings us back to Gen. Allvin’s question in May 2025 about where a U.S. aircraft could fit on the production line. Even if the Air Force decided to buy the jets, it would have to compete for production capacity with an established international order book while developing whatever U.S.-specific configuration, testing, and integration work it requires.

This Is Not Your Dad’s F-16

The proposed F-16G is also significant because it is not simply another upgraded F-16C/D like the USAF already has.

Lockheed’s proposed configuration reportedly would add conformal fuel tanks and 600-gallon wing tanks, along with an IRST, and the latest Sniper targeting pod, as well as a drag chute. All of these systems are already fielded and available today rather than requiring new development.

Those additions point toward an aircraft intended to provide even more basing flexibility, range, persistence, weapons and sensing capability than the current F-16, which had already grown into a medium-weight fighter years ago. That is relevant to how such an aircraft might actually fit into the future Air Force.

A contemporary F-16 is already a very different proposition from the aircraft that entered U.S. service decades ago. Modern AESA radars, electronic warfare systems, digital architecture, datalinks, advanced cockpit interfaces and weapons have substantially expanded its capabilities. The proposed F-16G would push that evolution further, but, like the F-15EX, it would still occupy a different part of the spectrum from the F-35 and whatever eventually emerges from the F-47 program.

That distinction could be useful in a larger force. An F-35 provides capabilities, particularly its combination of stealth and advanced sensor fusion, that an F-16 can never reproduce. But the Air Force does not conduct every mission in the most heavily defended portion of an adversary’s airspace. Homeland defense, training, defensive counter-air, a range of strike missions, and operations in permissive or partially contested environments don’t necessarily require the same characteristics as a penetration mission against an integrated air defense network. In a major conflict, no fighter will fight alone, either. Far from it. Operation Midnight Hammer, the B-2 strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, provides a salient example here, with F-16s flying deep into the country along with F-22s and F-35s, to clear the way for the B-2 strike force. By now, the Air Force is well-versed in leveraging the total-force fourth-and-fifth-generation mix, and it has discovered that they complement each other in unique ways that can be an advantage, not just compensation for lack of capability.

As far as the drag chute, that is a highly relevant addition to the USAF’s F-16 capability set. The chute would allow for the F-16 to better execute Agile Combat Employment (ACE), which includes operating from austere airfields within the enemy’s weapons engagement zone. The F-16 can get off the runway pretty quick, but landing is a different story. The chute can help greatly in this regard.

There is no question that an F-16 is not a replacement for an F-35. But it could help the Air Force better allocate its limited inventory of increasingly expensive fifth-generation and future sixth-generation aircraft while also maintaining a much larger overall fighter fleet.

CCA Changes the Calculus for Fourth-Gen Jets

One factor that is easy to overlook is Collaborative Combat Aircraft. CCAs are not just a complement to fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, they can also breathe new relevance into fourth-generation types like the F-16. Pairing stealthy, and even optionally expendable CCAs with a fighter like the F-16G could substantially boost its survivability and lethality by pushing sensing, shooting, and some of the risk forward onto uncrewed platforms, extending the F-16’s combat relevance even into higher-end scenarios where it would otherwise be at a disadvantage. In that sense, CCA may end up being arguably as relevant to fourth-generation aircraft as it is to fifth-generation ones.

In other words, CCAs are a positive factor in the F-16G’s business case.

While the F-22 and F-35 are slated to get CCAs first, the F-16G can be built ready to interoperate with them, which could be a massive force multiplier to what would be the most affordable crewed tactical asset in the inventory. CCAs can eventually be used to also help augment F-16Gs operating in a homeland defense mission and other more mundane roles as well.

The Guard Argument

New Block 70s could make particular sense for the Air National Guard.

The Guard continues to operate F-16s in large numbers, meaning that its personnel, facilities, simulators, and maintenance infrastructure are already built around the aircraft. A new-build F-16 could therefore replace an aging F-16 without requiring the same organizational transition associated with converting a unit to an entirely different fighter, and especially a highly complex fifth-generation type with all its unique support requirements.

That has financial implications beyond the aircraft itself. Replacing an existing F-16 squadron with Block 70s would reduce construction costs and training requirements because much of the existing infrastructure and expertise could be retained.

The Air Force would still have to pay for the aircraft and sustainment, but it would not be starting from scratch in terms of operating infrastructure, while the modernized fourth-generation capabilities of an F-16G would still mark a step forward for the Guard over its older F-16s.

It’s worth noting there has also been discussion of replacing more aging F-16s with additional F-15EXs instead. That path, however, is more expensive on both the acquisition and operating-cost side, and it would still require units to convert to a different airframe rather than simply recapitalizing in place.

Viper Refreshed

A new F-16 offers a fresh and highly mature airframe — one with a full service-life ahead of it, on the order of 12,000 flight hours without the need for structural upgrades — double that of the original F-16. This is compared to existing F-16s in the inventory with the decades of wear and fatigue already accumulated on them, with structural upgrades keeping them in the air. That difference in remaining structural life is arguably the single biggest advantage a new-build aircraft has compared with extending an existing one.

Dumping more money into existing F-16s is becoming questionable. Service life extensions and technical upgrades can only go so far and supporting these jets is becoming harder as parts dry up and suppliers who made them are long gone. A new airframe would give the Guard many decades of highly efficient service and the piece of mind for future force planning that goes with it.

Also, just like F-15EX, the development of the Block 70 F-16 has already been paid for largely by foreign customers over many years. It is as off-the-shelf of a solution as it gets and that is a very attractive proposition to an air arm trying to balance its books.

Above all, F-16 sustainment and operating costs run far below the F-35’s — a gap that already holds true even with older F-16s, and one that would widen further with new-build jets.

The Argument Against Simply Buying More F-35s

One seemingly obvious alternative would be to accelerate F-35A procurement. But the F-35 is not simply another fighter that can be substituted one-for-one whenever an F-16 reaches the end of its service life. That would also be difficult to do in practice. F-35A production is effectively capped and there are dense order books, and the well-documented troubles with the Block 4 upgrade are a huge factor pushing the Air Force to look at alternatives like the F-16G in the first place.

The Air Force’s current force-structure plans call for significantly more fighters overall, while the service is simultaneously pursuing F-35As, F-15EXs, and the F-47.

Among the reasons why a modernized F-16 might be considered alongside those programs are concerns not only about the cost of those aircraft, but also about the timing of F-35 deliveries, something that has been disrupted by well-publicized problems with Joint Strike Fighter upgrades. At the same time, keeping older F-16s active through upgrades is an increasingly unattractive way of managing the shortfall.

The issue is therefore less about choosing the F-16 instead of the F-35 than about deciding whether the Air Force should use both aircraft for different portions of the force structure.

The service is already doing something along these lines with the F-15EX. It has accepted that a modernized fourth-generation aircraft can have a role alongside the F-35 and the F-22, rather than requiring every new fighter to be stealthy.

A new F-16 would extend that logic to a lower-cost segment of the fleet, potentially allowing the Air Force to use F-35s where their particular capabilities are most valuable while maintaining additional capacity with a less expensive aircraft.

What Could Happen Next?

Even if Air Force leaders conclude that the F-16G makes operational sense, Congress would still have to decide whether it is worth funding.

The December 2025 reporting identified the central problem: lawmakers would want the service to demonstrate that buying new aircraft is preferable to continuing to upgrade the F-16s it already owns. They would also have to weigh the proposal against the F-35 and CCA programs.

If an existing F-16 can be kept operational with a relatively inexpensive upgrade, a new aircraft has to justify its acquisition cost and the additional long-term sustainment burden. But if maintaining an increasingly old F-16 fleet doesn’t save large sums of money over the long haul, the new Block 70 variant begins to look more compelling.

There remains a substantial gap between Lockheed Martin pitching the F-16G and the Air Force actually buying it. The service told TWZ that it is “in the initial phases of analyzing options for the next Future Years Defense Program.” The Air Force spokesperson added: “At this stage, we have neither defined the precise mission requirements nor the spectrum of options that could fill it.”

That is consistent with the status described by Inside Defense nine months earlier. At the time, the Air Force had no plans to procure Block 70s, and the discussions with Lockheed were described as exploratory. Even if senior officials ultimately favored the aircraft, Inside Defense reported that the program could not appear in the Future Years Defense Program until at least fiscal 2028 because the FY2027 budget process was already too far along.

The F-16G therefore remains a proposal rather than a program. But the persistence of the idea is itself significant. It should be noted that the F-15EX buy emerged out of very similar machinations, with the benefits proving to be undeniable.

The new proposal would let some Guard and Reserve units swap their F-16s for vastly improved F-16s — the same logic that drove the F-15EX buy — while also keeping the Greenville line hot, which is a significant benefit in its own right. And it accomplishes both in the most efficient way possible: not just in acquisition cost, but in sustainment cost, which is really the more problematic burden of the two. In the end, this points to another glaring reality check for the all-stealth-force concept, a vision the Air Force has effectively already abandoned.

The Air Force has spent years describing the F-35 as the replacement for its F-16 fleet, yet it now has to contend with aging F-16s, delayed or constrained fighter production, a larger stated requirement for total fighter capacity, and the lengthy transition toward the F-47 and uncrewed combat aircraft. In that environment, a new-build F-16 provides an option that sits between extending legacy aircraft and buying the most sophisticated — and expensive — fighters available.

Regardless, there are so many priorities facing the force right now, buying new F-16s will be a challenge at every turn, but that doesn’t mean it won’t become too compelling of a proposition to accept. Still, many will argue that every dollar should be invested in higher-end fighter and uncrewed platforms that are more survivable against America’s primary pacing threat, China. That country is rapidly evolving its own air arm with stealth fighters and advanced uncrewed aircraft. Stepping back to the F-16 while facing down such a threat can appear to be counterproductive when taken at face value. At the same time, the F-16 is already slated to stay in the inventory by the hundreds for decades to come, which does take some of the bite out of that argument.

In the end, it is remarkable that the F-16 was supposed to have left the U.S. fighter equation years ago. Instead, every time the Air Force looks closely at the gap between the fighter force it has and the force it says it needs, the aircraft somehow finds a way back into the conversation.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post New-Build F-16s For The USAF Is An Idea That Won’t Go Away, For Good Reason appeared first on TWZ.

The new framework agreement announced today “is critical to ensuring long-term demand signals flow to key suppliers, allowing Lockheed Martin and the munitions supply chain to invest in manufacturing capacity, workforce, and production efficiencies,” according to a Pentagon press release. “It establishes a framework for future Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) of JATM, executing congressional authority to secure the nation’s highest-priority missile systems.”

“This agreement forms the foundational agreement for a multiyear procurement contract, pending Congressional approval, that provides long-term demand to strengthen and expand the defense industrial base for the program,” according to a separate release from Lockheed Martin.

In response to questions from TWZ, the Pentagon declined to comment on the projected number of JATMs covered under this agreement, as well as estimated costs and delivery schedules.

U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors are expected to be the first types to fly operationally armed with AIM-260s. Integration on other platforms, such as variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the Air Force’s forthcoming F-47 sixth-generation fighter, is expected to follow. JATM, which is designed to have the same general form factor as the existing AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), has been discussed as part of the arsenal for the Air Force’s future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones, as well.

The releases today from the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin confirm that the new framework deal also includes planned foreign military sales of AIM-260s. Australia, one of America’s top allies, is the first confirmed international customer for the JATM, and plans to integrate the missiles on its F/A-18Fs, F-35As, and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare jets. The Royal Australian Air Force’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat CCA-type drones, initial versions of which are already capable of firing AIM-120s, might be another AIM-260 launch platform in the future.

The AIM-260 remains in development, with the Navy and Air Force test communities supporting that work.

“We are accelerating weapons development from high-end air dominance weapons like the JATM to hypersonic strike systems like the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile,” Air Force Brig. Gen. Mark Massaro, head of the Air Force Test Center (AFTC) at Edwards Air Force Base in California, told TWZ and other outlets at a media roundtable yesterday. The roundtable took place at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

“We’re actively testing JATM, and it’s progressing along its program path. In test, we are working through the development stages there,” Massaro added. “So, we’re testing it in [sic] the ground with models, like I mentioned. We’re testing it in the air on aircraft. So, from a performance standpoint, I’ll hold on to that from an operational security perspective. But we’re happy seeing where it’s going, and we expect that to be a key piece of capability for our warfighters to have.”

“Just from a testing perspective, we’re always looking at making sure that we’ve got the throughput,” he added when asked if he could talk about challenges or other issues AFTC has run up against in work on the AIM-260. “So, from a test perspective only, infrastructure and throughput to make sure that we can get things out … and make the testing happen. But I’m not, from a capabilities perspective, worried about the system.”

It is unclear when the first operational AIM-260s may begin entering the U.S. inventory. When the program was first disclosed to the public in 2019, the stated goal was to start fielding the missiles in 2022. There were also reports in late 2025 that funding issues had caused a three-month delay, based on a fact sheet distributed to some members of the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. The committee later said that the information was incorrect.

Work to date on JATM has been conducted under a heavy veil of secrecy, with the existence of the program only being announced in 2019. The first public glimpse of the missile only emerged in May of this year. Beyond the aforementioned size requirement and that the new missile will offer significantly greater engagement range over the AIM-120, details remain limited. Readers can learn more about what we do know so far here.

What is clear is that the growing reach of Chinese air-to-air missiles has been a key driver behind the JATM program, with Air Force officials having explicitly mentioned the PL-15 in the past. China continues to pursue even longer-ranged and otherwise more advanced air-to-air missiles, as you can learn more about in this past TWZ feature. The Air Force has previously raised the prospect of a general threat ecosystem that includes anti-missiles with ranges of up to 1,000 miles emerging by 2050.

The AIM-260 is not the only longer-ranged air-to-air missile known to be in development in the United States, either. In 2024, the Navy revealed it had begun fielding an air-launched version of the surface-launched Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), called the AIM-174B Gunslinger, at least on a limited level. Just in August of this year, the service disclosed the existence of another very long-range air-to-air missile, the AIM-424 Malice, which has already reached the flight testing phase of development.

An Air Force spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine last month that the service was “closely following” the Navy’s work on the AIM-424. In June, the Air Force itself shared details about another potential future air-to-air missile, dubbed the Air Force Long Range Weapon (AFLRW), including a target requirement for a maximum range of at least 1,000 nautical miles.

Based on past experiences with public disclosures about the AIM-260, AIM-174B, and AIM-424 programs, additional work on advanced longer-range air-to-air missiles is certainly ongoing in the classified realm.

Today’s announcement about the new framework agreement, together with Brig. Gen. Massaro’s brief update yesterday, makes clear there is a continued commitment to JATM amid a still-growing field of new, longer-range air-to-air missiles.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Pentagon Cuts New AIM-260 Air-To-Air Missile Production Deal, Testing Accelerating appeared first on TWZ.

The discussion about the damaged tanker took place during a panel at the Air & Space Forces’ Air, Space and Cyber Conference that TWZ is attending. The tanker in question was damaged as it was preparing for a mission, explained AMC commander Lt. Gen. Daniel H. Tulley.

“A KC-135 ops crew is in the jet,” he said. “KC-135 maintenance team is about to launch this jet. Unexpected Alarm Red [an attack warning]. Everyone jumps in a bunker.”

After the barrage, the airmen emerged from their bunkers and checked out the plane.

“That aircraft is smoking,” Tulley said. “There are holes in it, and it’s a fully loaded KC-135. Two hundred thousand pounds of jet fuel. Took 48 hours for that [fuel] to be drained out of that aircraft. In the meantime, first on the scene was I think the pro super [production superintendent] and the expediter. They immediately began to collect the fuel… They start to patch the holes. They start to fix all the systems. Long story short, they were eventually able to get that plane to make a transoceanic flight back home to be fully repaired.”

Tulley did not say where the attack took place. However, as we have previously reported, five tankers were reportedly damaged in an Iranian long-range strike on Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia on March 14. That was later confirmed in a Department of War Inspector General report released earlier this week.

You can see two of the shrapnel-damaged KC-135s as they passed through the UK on the way home in the following photographs shared with us by aviation photographer Andrew McKelvey. We do not know if either of these is the one discussed by Tulley.

Lt. Gen. Linda Hurry, Commander of Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), followed Tulley’s comments with additional details about the repair work.

“I’ll pick right up on that because it was our aircraft battle damage repair team that was actually able to patch their aircraft back together to get it back to Tinker [Air Force Base in Oklahoma] that can put it completely back where it needed to be,” she noted. Tinker is home to the Expeditionary Depot Maintenance (EDMX), which is “responsible for maintaining the Air Force’s sole source for Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) rapid repair capabilities for the entire tanker and bomber fleets,” according to the Air Force.

“So with Operation Epic Fury, we’re asking those questions: What can we sustain for how long? And it begs a question about regeneration,” Tulley further explained. “You know, our new teammates have regeneration as part of their doctrine, so readiness in contact is the way we’re approaching this. What can we do to improve how we generate capability while under fire, in contact, persistently in an extended or protracted conflict? Lots of great examples of work being done to get after this. General Hurry’s team has brought a lot of capability forward at Mildenhall Air Base.” 

One example of how this has worked has been repairing damaged aerial refueling booms in the U.K. instead of all the way back to the U.S., Tulley highlighted. The booms, which extend from the back of tankers so that receiving aircraft can get their gas, can be damaged by the process, especially during combat refueling.

“I think we turned 30 booms instead of bringing them all the way back to the states,” Tulley noted.

Repairing battle damage is certainly a unique situation for AMC airman, but keeping hundreds of the command’s tankers and cargo aircraft moving at such a high rate prior to and during the war was a huge undertaking that was helped by new maintenance concepts. The Air Force sent maintainers and parts to bases in Europe to drastically speed up major maintenance that would have demanded the aircraft return stateside.

“We moved some maintenance actions forward, so they didn’t have to – the aircraft didn’t have to go all the way back to the states,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach said during his keynote speech earlier this week. “We put some of them in Europe, so they could get through some normal safety inspections that were either due or deferred. Got those done, and the aircraft doesn’t have to go all the way back to the states. They can go somewhere in Europe, get the thing done, and then get right back to the flight. And so, those measures by Air Mobility Command paid dividends in the readiness of our mobility fleet.”

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), which maintains the service’s fleet of strategic bombers and its ICBM force, did something similar at RAF Fairford in the U.K., AFGSC commander Gen. Stephen L. Davis explained.

“It’s a complex problem,” said Davis. “I would say in the past we probably didn’t do this the right way. When we thought a conflict was kicking off, the first thing we do is start sending bombers forward, and that actually consumes our readiness. So I think we got it right during OEF.”

“We pushed maintainers and support personnel forward to RAF Fairford, and then we actually took the bombers, we loaded them up in CONUS [Continental United States]. We took them to the Middle East. They actually did a mission. They employed, deployed, conducted a combat mission, and then landed at Fairford. And then for the next, well, I guess they’ve been there for now six-plus months.”

“They’ve been conducting nearly daily operations out of there,” Davis proffered. “When bombers are back at home base, they build readiness. When we deploy it forward, they consume readiness. And then, as [Gen. Hurry] said, we’re getting great support in terms of parts, in terms of supplies, and in terms of forward depot support. So that fleet remains healthy.”

Being able to do as much repair and maintenance work as close to the front lines as possible will be hugely important in any future fight against China, and, unfortunately, repairing battle damaged aircraft will be necessary too. Clearly, the Air Force has learned some very important lessons from Epic Fury.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post How The Air Force Patched Up A Shrapnel-Damaged KC-135 appeared first on TWZ.

The product is SkyCourier UX, a drone version of the Cessna 408 SkyCourier that has flown for FedEx, foreign special operations forces and small remote commercial airlines during its six years of active service. TWZ previously covered how the SkyCourier would likely end up taking on military applications when it was first announced, which you can read here.

A partial full-size model on the show floor at the Air & Space Forces Association’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference in Washington, D.C., this week showed a nose that opened with hydraulics to a cargo bay in lieu of a cockpit. We have seen this same front door conversion concept for uncrewed cargo-carrying helicopters as of late. This allows for easy loading of outsized cargoes without specialized equipment, according to the company, though it does not increase the payload. Like the original SkyCourier, it’s good for about 6,000 pounds, or three standard containers.

The form factor of the uncrewed SkyCourier variant is otherwise identical to its crewed counterpart, with twin turboprops, a high-wing configuration and an aluminum body. 

As with the base SkyCourier, a major advantage of the aircraft is its optimization for loading and carrying standard pallets. This means that cargoes don’t necessarily have to be downloaded, broken up and repackaged for movement to forward positions. This is a big logistical advantage and can speed the flow of critical supplies to where they are needed most. 

The aircraft’s range is about 900 nautical miles, which the makers say suits it well for Pacific island-hopping, allowing for refueling stops on austere runways. It can take off on runways as short as 3,300 feet and land in just 2,500 feet, according to a spec sheet.

The Textron/Merlin collaboration aims to differentiate itself with proven capability in the missions it intends to fulfill, along with the ability to roll out a new drone variant fast and one it can sustain consistently. Bob Gibbs, Textron’s vice president of special missions sales, told reporters in a Monday briefing that the conventional SkyCourier was now fulfilling new orders, not previously announced, to deliver modified aircraft to foreign nations for medical evacuation, casualty evacuation and environmental protection.

“The aircraft’s being operated literally from the Arctic to the Amazon,” Gibbs said. “There are three different island nations in the Pacific that have airline fleets of them. We support our aircraft in 170 countries around the world. So, just like a Cessna Caravan or a Beechcraft King Air, they’re ubiquitous. You find them anywhere, and we support them anywhere in the world.”

While the 900-mile range can’t take the loaded-up aircraft the nearly 2,000-mile stretch between the first and second island chains, Merlin and Textron executives said they don’t need to accomplish that to make it effective.

“This is the ability to disperse the forces among the second island chain … to do the island-hopping to be able to get to, whether it’s Palau, Tinian, Saipan, pick your various islands there,” Kyle Kremer, a retired Air Force major general who now advises Merlin, said. “With the range that it has, it has the ability to agilely move through there” and connect logistics pipelines.

The autonomy package, Merlin Pilot, is already in use under a $105 million U.S. Special Operations Command contract to develop autonomy for the C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft. It’s been flown aboard four different single and multi-engine airframes, the company says. A promotional web page for Merlin Pilot shows tanker-class and commercial cargo applications with developing and future capabilities.

Merlin has also teamed with the Air Force to develop an AI copilot for KC-135 tankers that can decrease crew workload and even possibly fly the aircraft on its own in the future. TWZ reported on planned tests for these autonomy-enabled tankers in 2024, with the flights set to begin the following year.

However, the Air Force has not confirmed the completion of any flight tests for the effort since. And on Wednesday, Lt. Gen. Daniel Tulley, commander of Air Force Mobility Command, appeared to confirm that the tests had never taken place.

“There’s some companies out there who have offered to develop things where they can bring a carry-on kit onto old KC-135s and other aircraft, but we haven’t seen them test those successfully,” he said. 

He added that autonomy technology may lack the maturity needed for tanker missions.

“An optionally manned or an unmanned tanker at range, [at] the ranges we needed to operate at. It’s a very large aircraft, and we’re not yet to where we’re employing fully autonomous large aircraft. But the technology, I would say, is there and rapidly getting there,” he said.

Tulley did stress that the Air Force saw a need for unmanned aircraft in the last-tactical-leg delivery.

“I’m wrestling with that as we develop an AMC strategy,” he said. “There is absolutely room for some sort of autonomous or other small light lift capability, and that’s just one domain in the air, right? This could be by sea, could be by land, but there is absolutely some requirement for distribution from those major points of debarkation.”

In addition to autonomous takeoff, landing and navigation, and protection of the flight envelope, Merlin Pilot, the company says, has digital copilot human-machine teaming characteristics that include pilot health monitoring, gaze tracking and fatigue detection; pilot incapacitation and contingency response; and flight monitoring and assistance.

Some of Textron’s new features are making light steps toward autonomy already. Gibbs pointed out that the company’s Cessna Citation Gen3 business jets now include standard Garmin auto-land technology.

“Obviously, it’s a different scale than what Merlin’s doing as far as automation,” he said. “But … as we develop new products, we try to future-proof them, and so that’s where you get this nice transition between us.”

The SkyCourier can cost up to $8.5 million, depending on modifications, and while the SkyCourier UX sports GPS-denied navigation and the ability to seek different flight paths to avoid danger, it doesn’t have other built-in defenses. For contested logistics missions, it’s not clear how much risk the services are willing to tolerate for a relatively small logistics payload capability. Kremer maintained, though, that a drone of this size could be a mission-saving capability when dispatched to austere locations. And, in a Pacific conflict, it may reduce demand on already-stretched C-130 transports, now the smallest platform capable of carrying standard containers and long overtasked.

“If you can’t get the spare tire, if you can’t get the component, that small thing where you need it in these dispersed operations, they don’t keep the big logistic supply chain built up in these locations,” Kremer said. “You have to be able to get it where you need it, when you need it, and that’s what this provides.”

Nonetheless, the Air Force has a clear appetite for a capability like this. Last year, it signed a $17.5 million contract to put a Reliable Robotics autonomy package on a Cessna 208B Caravan. 

On Monday, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach reiterated the Air Force’s interest in unmanned aerial logistics platforms.

“We’re doing testing on them,” he said in response to an audience question. “We believe that there’s some value in that as well. It certainly could be valuable in the Pacific with the ranges that we’re talking about, and so we’re looking at several different options and evaluating them. But I would say nothing, no program of records just yet, but [we’re] certainly taking a look at some demonstrators and the like to see what’s available to us.”

Notably, China has made significant advancements in developing logistic drone capabilities, with reported successful flight tests of massive heavy-lift uncrewed aircraft, including a 7-ton cargo plane that’s currently the world’s largest uncrewed freighter to take flight. Among them is China’s CH-YH1000, a medium-altitude cargo drone developed by the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics that boasts, like SkyCourier UX, a hatch in lieu of a cockpit for ease of flat-pallet loading up to a weight of 1.2 tons. These are just some of an increasing number of similar systems being developed in China that aim to take the crew out of lower-end logistical missions over short, medium and long distances.

Though Textron and Merlin have yet to build a SkyCourier UX prototype, Merlin CEO Matt George emphasized that the company had chosen to partner with Textron because they could start delivering aircraft fast.

“You’ll see over the course of the show a lot of concept aircraft. You’ll see a lot of renders. You’ll see a lot of people who have big empty factories all around the country,” he said. “But I also want to be very clear about the fact that none of this matters without production … There’s 14,000 Americans working in Wichita, Kansas, on a production line where these aircraft, at least in the crewed configuration, are coming off the production line. So when we talk about capability, we’re talking about that capability and bringing that capability to bear soon, rather than in the future.”

Next in the development process, executives say, will be an optionally piloted version of SkyCourier that will allow users to develop comfort with the platform and open the door to further iteration. 

The Textron/Merlin team is also leaving its options open in terms of which U.S. military customer might find its platform most useful.

“I hope [the Army and Air Force] fight over it,” Gibbs said.

Contact the editor: Tyler@twz.com

The post Cessna Cuts Cockpit Out Of SkyCourier Cargo Hauler For Uncrewed Logistics appeared first on TWZ.

“Information moves so fast that leader decision times have compressed from weeks down to days down to seconds,” explained Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his keynote speech at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Conference that TWZ is attending. “In the future fight, advantage will go to the side who can see first, who can understand first, decide first, and act first, and along the way, be a learning organization, and no factor is accelerating change as fast as artificial intelligence and advancing cyber capabilities.”

“AI is here now, and it’s already changing the way militaries see, sense, decide, and act across the joint force,” the chairman proclaimed.

The first example Caine used to highlight these changes took place on June 8. After the Apache went down, “U.S. CENTCOM launched a rapid, responsive joint search and rescue effort to recover the crew. That response drew on the totality of the joint force, and ultimately was required to use enabled unmanned vessels to participate in the rescue of downed U.S. service members for the first time ever.”

As we noted in our previous coverage, CENTCOM deployed “a U.S. Navy Corsair unmanned surface vessel,” the command’s spokesman told us at the time.

The ability to pull off that rescue mission “did not appear overnight,” Caine pointed out. “It came from the men and women of Task Force 59, CENTCOM’s forward-leaning unmanned joint maritime unit who spent the last several years testing, integrating, and operationalizing unmanned systems and AI in one of the most demanding and kinetic environments on Earth right now.”

“What helped make this possible was not a bunch of general officers and flag officers,” Caine continued. “What made this possible was a bunch of entrepreneurial sailors and members of the joint force on watch floors, at piers, managing networks of unmanned systems across thousands of miles of water, and using AI to turn massive amounts of data into a crisp, clear, perfect maritime picture that allowed us to go grab those two soldiers in the water.”

The second example Caine shared about the use of AI “points in the other direction, not how quickly we are using these tools, but how quickly these tools are changing the threat.”

In Ukraine, “we see first-person view drones operating in heavily contested EMI [electromagnetic interference] environments. Some now using AI-enabled computer vision to continue to drive towards targets, even when there’s no GPS or the links are cut. That gives small units affordable precision and shows how quickly software and autonomy are changing what is possible at the tactical edge, and the results are stark.”

The use of AI to enable lower-end drone warfare is a topic TWZ has been among the first to point out.

“In certain locations on the front line of troops right now, the life expectancy of a new Russian recruit arriving on the front lines is as little as 20 to 30 minutes,” Caine added. “Think about that. This is what happens when low-cost precision is fielded fast, adapted quickly, and scaled across the battlefield.”

“The price of lethal exchange is decreasing day over day,” the chairman noted. “One wonders what the future of close air support looks like, but I am comforted by the fact that each and every one of you are in this room thinking about that. Taken together, these examples from the Straits of Hormuz to the front lines in Ukraine show how quickly technology is changing the character of war, and this means our joint force needs to do two things at one time.”

“[W]e need to prepare the joint force to win in this kind of conflict,” the general stated. “We have to assume from now on that our formations will be hunted by autonomous systems, jammed across the spectrum, and tracked in real time, and we have to transition the joint force to be prepared to fight and win our future war by generating and delivering lethality at scale with an agile, optimized, high-low mix of combat capabilities to give the young members of the 2.8-million member all volunteer joint force the tools that they need before they need them.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com 

The post Apache Crew Rescue Highlights Need For AI In Combat Says Joint Chiefs Chairman appeared first on TWZ.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Daniel Tulley, head of Air Mobility Command (AMC), shared new details about future airlift and aerial refueling efforts, with TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) 2026 Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

On the airlift side, the Air Force’s stated plan to date is to replace both the C-17A and C-5M Galaxy with a single Next-Generation Airlift (NGAL) platform, starting in the mid-2040s. Separately, the service is pursuing what could be a family of future aerial refueling capabilities under what is now called the Advanced Tanker Systems (ATS) program. Very broadly speaking, ATS presents a path toward what might come after the retirement of the aging KC-135 tanker fleet, though those aircraft are still expected to keep flying for years to come. The Air Force is also moving to further expand its fleet of newer KC-46A tankers in the interim, but persistent technical and other issues with that design continue to present hurdles.

At the roundtable today, Lt. Gen. Tulley was asked explicitly about restarting C-17 production. The manufacturer of those aircraft, Boeing, shuttered that line in 2015. The company also just marked the 35th anniversary of the design’s first flight yesterday.

“Heck yeah, but with a caveat, right?” Tulley said in response. “So we were just asking this question over the course of last week, and it’s in the context of next-generation airlift. So we are about to embark on the Analysis of Alternatives to replace the C-17 and replace the C-5. All options are on the table.”

“There’s always the option to service life extend the C-17, but the [production restart] question came up,” he continued. “I’ve heard this my entire career. Once we terminate an assembly line, can we ever bring it back? Does somebody store all the machinery and the dies and whatnot, and can you bring that out? So we’re asking that question.”

“But then whatever that answer is from the vendors, what will be the price tag associated with that?” he added. “You have to ask yourself, okay, is rebuilding a C-17 even if you make improvements – and there’s a loose analogy with the C-130J, [a] much more modern, capable variant of the C-130E [author’s note: the C-130J evolved more directly from the C-130H variant] I first learned to fly – if you do that with the C-17, is that the best move? Or are there new technologies that we can incorporate into it so that it can defend itself, so that it’s connected, it’s networked, it does all the things that maybe the current C-17 doesn’t do?”

“We’re looking into it as part of the Analysis of Alternatives. I’m hopeful that we’ll get to answer that question.”

In June, the House Armed Services Committee also directed the U.S. Air Force to prepare a formal briefing on the matter of new C-17 production in a report accompanying a draft of the annual defense policy bill, or National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), for Fiscal Year 2027.

The RAND Corporation did conduct a detailed, independent analysis more than a decade ago that assessed the costs and complexities that could come from Boeing building more C-17As, as well as other variants and derivatives of the design. RAND’s conclusion was that any of the courses of action would require billions of dollars of new investment and entail risks, as you can read more about in more detail here.

Foreign participation in a new C-17 production run could help at least defray costs. Australia, Canada, India, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom all currently fly Globemaster IIIs. The Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative, a multinational arrangement with several European members, as well as the United States, also operates three of these aircraft.

Boeing told TWZ directly in June that unnamed C-17 operators had been reaching out about the prospect of restarting the production line, and that the company was “encouraged” by those discussions.

As Lt. Gen. Tulley stressed, there are significant questions about whether buying new-production C-17s, even with substantial improvements, is not only feasible, but a good use of resources. The Air Force’s Globemaster III fleet today continues to prove itself to be critical to the U.S. military’s ability to project power globally, and is in very high demand right now, especially amid the ongoing conflict with Iran.

The Air Force’s desire to replace both the C-17 and C-5, which are very different aircraft in form and function, could still easily lead the service down a different route. Boeing is not the only one looking at future NGAL opportunities. Another company, Radia, has been very actively pitching a clean-sheet design that is physically bigger than either the C-17 and the C-5, and that is geared toward greater operational flexibility, at the Air Force. Radia is targeting a first flight of its aircraft, called Windrunner, by the end of the decade, but it is still in a very aspirational stage at present.

Many questions also still remain about how the Air Force will ultimately proceed on the next-generation aerial refueling front.

“So thinking beyond the current KC-46 buy and the program extension, whatever that next tanker looks like, our Advanced Tanker System, it’s got to be connected. It’s got to be able to defend itself,” Lt. Gen. Tulley said at the roundtable. “But it begs the question: does it need to be manned? Could it be optionally manned? Could it be autonomous? Or is there a family of solutions maybe that would answer that question? So I do not believe that it has to be manned.”

The AMC head was responding to a specific question about how autonomy could play into the Air Force’s future aerial refueling plans, which included a reference ot the U.S. Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray tanker drone. The Navy just announced its first low-rate initial production contract for MQ-25s on Monday.

“I think you’re seeing that with the MQ-25 and the Navy’s work, but then, how do we, the U.S. Air Force, bring that to bear in scope, scale, and range?” Tulley continued. “An optionally manned or an unmanned tanker, at range, the ranges we need to operate at, it’s a very large aircraft. And we’re not yet to where we’re employing fully autonomous large aircraft, but the technology, I would say, is there and rapidly getting there if it’s not.”

The MQ-25 is another Boeing product, and that company has shown a rendering of a larger, land-based derivative in the past. Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works has also put forward several advanced tanker concepts in the past, including stealthy and potentially uncrewed designs.

“We will be going after how to make the tanker survive,” William Bailey, the Air Force official currently performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, had also told TWZ and other outlets at a separate roundtable at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference yesterday. Bailey was responding to a direct question about whether the service was moving away from the idea of a stealthy tanker as part of the ATS plan.

“So, lots of work around what do we do in the future for our tankers, and we spent a pretty dedicated effort to go through and look at what do we think those design solutions could look like,” Bailey also said. “We looked internally. We went out to industry, had those guys come back with their thoughts on how to provide a more survivable aircraft.”

“The stuff that was coming in for me might have been an incremental improvement, but [it was] not clear that that represented the next step, the next phase,” he added. “What you’ll see is we’ll take our efforts, and we’ll look at, hey, if the real question is tanker access, then let’s not constrain ourselves to just the aircraft itself and trying to make a stealthy tanker. We need a tanker to have access, so we’ll talk about all those systems that it would take to protect that tanker.”

Bailey said the question of operational “access” applied to next-generation discussions, as well.

As is the case with the Air Force’s airlift fleets, the service tankers are in high demand due to the conflict with Iran and other current operational requirements. Stress on the existing tanker force, compounded by the ever-advancing age of the KC-135s, has been a steadily growing point of concern for years now. U.S. military officials have long been drawing attention to the limits of available aerial refueling capacity to meet even routine peacetime demands. The Air Force, as well as the U.S. Navy, have also expanded their use of contractor-owned and operated tankers to perform certain non-combat aerial refueling missions to help ease this strain.

In the meantime, the Air Force is still pursuing upgrades for its existing airlift and tanker fleets, with heavy focus on increased network connectivity and improved self-protection capabilities.

Greater connectivity “can be a game changer, and it has been a game changer in Operation Epic Fury [against Iran],” Lt. Gen. Tulley said at today’s roundtable. “The ability for air crews to communicate, to coordinate tanker orbits and rendezvous, to pass threat information, to save lives and save aircraft has been everything we expected it to be and more.”

“We have MAF NEXUS that we’re pursuing. The goal is to have this on all mobility aircraft, whether they’re future-built and it’s incorporated, or it’s an add-on capability to existing aircraft,” he continued. “It brings edge compute, the ability to then employ AI [artificial intelligence] and much more computing core power forward on the aircraft, and it does network with the rest of the joint force and the Air Force’s battle management system.”

When it comes to new options for protecting existing tankers, “nothing’s off the table,” the AMC boss added. “Whether it’s [in the] electromagnetic spectrum, whether it’s kinetic self-defense, a layered approach, we’re looking at everything to come up with what might be the best system. But it’s got to be a system that we can afford, and it’s got to be one that we can put on all the aircraft we have and the ones we’re about to build.”

Using Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) or other types of drones to help provide localized defense for airlifters and tankers could be another option. The Air Force has already experimented with this, at least to a degree.

The Air Force is otherwise still clearly continuing to shape its future airlift and aerial fueling visions. As part of that work, the service is now at least considering the possibility of rebooting C-17 production.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post USAF Assessing Feasibility Of Restarting C-17 Production As Part Of Its Future Airlift Vision appeared first on TWZ.

Speaking yesterday at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Symposium that TWZ is attending, Lt. Gen. Jason T. Hinds, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, U.S. Air Forces Africa, and NATO’s Allied Air Command, and Chief Master Sgt. Joshua J. Wiener, USAFE-AFAFRICA’s command chief, discussed how the command is preparing for an eventual European role in the U.S. Air Force’s planned fleet of hundreds of CCAs.

The issue is particularly significant for USAFE, which operates a fraction of the fighter force it maintained in Europe during the Cold War, even as many of its NATO allies contend with shrinking fleets of crewed combat aircraft. This comes against a backdrop of deepening tensions with Russia and the emergence of new kinds of threats. Autonomous aircraft that can augment crewed fighters could provide the alliance with additional combat mass without requiring a corresponding increase in the number of crewed aircraft and personnel permanently based in Europe.

“I’m excited about what CCAs have in store for the Air Force,” Hinds said, pointing to recent comments from the Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink, including the aim of having at least 500 CCAs in service by 2032.

He added that European interest in these kinds of platforms is already growing.

“I think you’re going to see a lot more interest from other nations inside Europe about what is America doing with CCAs and how they can join this party, if you will,” Hinds said.

Germany is “heavily involved,” he said, while Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands are also showing interest.

In the case of Germany, we have previously explored how that country is looking to procure CCAs by 2029. Sweden, too, recently unveiled a concept for a high-end, stealthy CCA-type drone, while the Dutch are looking to become more closely alligned with U.S. Air Force CCA efforts.

USAFE is currently using two broad operational scenarios to explain to allies how CCAs could fit into NATO’s force structure.

The first is defensive. A CCA could operate as part of an integrated air and missile defense network, potentially engaging one-way attack drones or cruise missiles without the need for expensive crewed fighters.

The second is offensive. In that scenario, autonomous aircraft could help suppress or destroy integrated air defense systems and potentially attack fielded forces during an effort to repel a hostile incursion into NATO territory.

Allies are interested in both missions, Hinds said, and want the ability to incorporate CCAs into their own force designs. Interestingly, only yesterday, Anduril shared photos of its YFQ-44A Fury configured with air-to-ground weapons, underscoring the fact that the CCA could take on an air-to-ground role in the future in addition to its current air-to-air focus.

That kind of interest has already prompted work at the NATO level. Hinds pointed to a study by the Joint Air Power Competence Center, the alliance’s airpower think tank based in Kalkar, Germany, examining how NATO members could employ CCAs in a modular fashion, including issues such as sustainment, training, and exercises.

“It was a pretty long paper, but the nations wanted it,” Hinds said.

Initial experimentation is expected to take place in the United States, but European experimentation could follow, including by Sweden and potentially other NATO members.

At the same time, European countries are not simply waiting for an American CCA to arrive.

The United Kingdom has launched its own Storm Fighter CCA program. Germany is pursuing a separate loyal-wingman effort, while the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan are meanwhile jointly embarked on the Global Combat Air Program, or GCAP, which is intended to produce the Tempest next-generation crewed fighter and associated uncrewed systems.

The proliferation of national programs raises an obvious question: How does NATO prevent a growing fleet of autonomous aircraft from becoming a collection of incompatible national systems?

Hinds said the answer starts with commonality.

“The first and foremost thing is we want to strive for commonality,” he said. “Commonality means we don’t even have to worry about interoperability.”

Where common equipment is not possible, however, USAFE wants interoperability built into national systems from the beginning.

“Interoperability by design” is the preferred approach, Hinds said, with NATO data standards and other requirements incorporated before a system enters service rather than retrofitted later.

The good news for USAFE is that NATO already has extensive experience establishing common standards for interoperability, covering everything from tactics and procedures to communications, datalinks, weapons employment, and other technologies. That existing framework gives the alliance a foundation for integrating increasingly diverse national systems without requiring every member to field identical equipment.

Hinds did warn that some countries have previously acquired equipment that was not compatible with NATO systems, leaving them with the choice of paying to modify their own equipment or forcing the alliance to adapt its systems around it.

That problem becomes particularly important as autonomous aircraft are connected to increasingly complex sensor and weapons networks. Even more important is the requirement for a baseline command-and-control network for CCAs themselves, allowing different platforms to manage them seamlessly.

The ability to share and control CCAs across a complex battlespace is already emerging as both a major opportunity and a significant integration challenge. The U.S. Air Force and Navy, for example, have made clear that their respective CCAs are being developed with the ability to be controlled seamlessly across services, pointing toward a future in which autonomous aircraft need not remain tied to the service or platform that launched them.

Hinds described a potential kill chain in which an F-35 detects a target, passes the information to another node in the network, and a ground-based system operated by another NATO country ultimately launches the weapon.

In such an architecture, the aircraft, sensor, command-and-control network, and weapon do not necessarily have to belong to the same country.

As an example, Dutch F-35s, operating in Europe, have used a data-exchange system to transmit targeting coordinates to Israeli-made PULS (Precise and Universal Launch System) rocket artillery. The system, developed by Lockheed Martin is known as Keystone, and you can read more about it here.

USAFE is making “significant advances” in areas including cross-servicing, cross-loading, and cross-flying allied aircraft, Hinds said, all of which are intended to make multinational operations more seamless.

The same philosophy applies to weapons.

“We want to have all the fires, right? Whether it’s U.S. built or built inside European nations,” Hinds said.

That could prove increasingly important as European countries expand domestic production of missiles, drones, and other weapons alongside their aircraft programs.

The growth of GCAP and other European defense programs comes amid broader debate over how much Europe should depend on U.S. military equipment.

But Hinds rejected the idea that allies developing indigenous aircraft and autonomous systems necessarily signals a move away from American equipment.

“No, I don’t,” he said when asked whether allies were moving away from U.S. systems.

Instead, Hinds characterized the trend as an expansion of the transatlantic defense-industrial base.

Sweden was one example he cited. The country, which recently joined NATO, continues to produce new military equipment, including Gripen fighters, while those aircraft are already being operated by NATO members.

Swedish Gripens are currently leased to Hungary, and other countries are considering the aircraft, Hinds said.

The broader trend toward co-manufacturing and co-production is also something he welcomed.

“I’m seeing a lot of discussions about co-manufacturing and co-production, and I welcome those discussions as well,” Hinds said.

That approach could become increasingly important as NATO tries to expand its available combat power without relying exclusively on additional U.S.-built platforms.

For USAFE, the objective is to ensure that whatever aircraft NATO countries develop or purchase can plug into a common architecture, sharing data, receiving targeting information, drawing on common logistics networks, and contributing weapons effects across national boundaries.

For a U.S. Air Force command that has spent decades trying to cover Europe with far fewer fighters than it once had, hundreds of autonomous wingmen, whether American-built or allied, could provide a significant way to generate additional combat mass.

Senior U.S. Air Force officials are now working to ensure that the networking, weapons integration, logistics, and command-and-control architecture will be in place once those aircraft start to come online.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post How The USAF Is Preparing For European Allies To Join The Collaborative Combat Aircraft Club appeared first on TWZ.

A video of what Ansar Allah says is the successful shootdown of the F-15 shows the typical ground-based forward-looking infrared (FLIR) systems we have seen in use by air defenses in Yemen previously, and, more recently, in Iran.

After a period of relative calm following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks, with Houthi forces making significant advances against Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around the strategically important coastal areas of Marib and Taiz. The group has also stepped up missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while strangling the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The Houthis have further declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, directly challenging one of Riyadh’s key energy-export routes.

Prior to the release of imagery, earlier today the Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree claimed that Houthi forces had shot down a Saudi F-15 while it was conducting operations in support of Saudi-backed forces in Marib. Saree said the aircraft was engaged by a locally manufactured surface-to-air missile, although he did not identify the weapon. Reuters likewise reported that the Houthis had claimed the shootdown but that the claim had not been independently verified.

Saree also claimed that Houthi air defenses subsequently engaged formations of Saudi F-15s and Eurofighter Typhoons that entered the area while attempting to locate the downed aircraft. According to the Houthi account, those aircraft were forced to withdraw. That portion of the claim has likewise not been independently verified.

Saudi Arabia has not, at the time of writing, publicly acknowledged the loss of an F-15. Reuters reported that the Saudi-led campaign had intensified considerably in recent days, with Saudi aircraft striking targets across Yemen while the Houthis have launched missiles and drones toward Saudi territory.

The aircraft appears to be an F-15SA, the most advanced variant of the Eagle operated by the Royal Saudi Air Force. Specifically, it appears to be tail number 5539, assigned to the 55th Squadron based at King Khalid Air Base.

The Royal Saudi Air Force received 84 of the new-build F-15SA. Meanwhile, the 68-strong fleet of earlier F-15S aircraft has been upgraded locally to a similar standard, also known as F-15SR (for Saudi Retrofit). Aircraft 5539 is understood to be among the latter.

The reported shootdown highlights the continuing threat posed by Houthi air defenses, which have proven considerably more capable and difficult to suppress than their improvised appearance might suggest.

As TWZ has previously detailed, the Houthi air-defense network includes mobile surface-to-air missile systems, repurposed infrared-guided R-73 and R-27 air-to-air missiles, and Iranian-derived systems such as the Saqr/358.

Of particular concern is the group’s use of passive infrared sensors for detection, tracking, and missile cueing. Unlike conventional fire-control radars, these sensors do not provide an aircraft’s electronic-warfare systems with an early warning that it has been detected or targeted. TWZ has noted that this combination of mobility and passive sensing can create a difficult problem even for highly sophisticated combat aircraft, with the Houthis having previously demonstrated the ability to threaten U.S. crewed and uncrewed aircraft.

That capability does not mean that Houthi air defenses constitute a conventional, integrated air defense network comparable to those operated by major state militaries. However, they can still be effective through a combination of concealment, mobility, passive detection, unconventional employment of missiles, and the difficult operating environment over Yemen.

Previous Saudi aircraft losses attributed to Houthi air defenses during the Yemen war from 2015 to 2022 include several helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and drones. Total Saudi losses to all causes in the conflict amount to around a dozen helicopters, five jets, and as many as 30 drones. A Saudi F-15 crashed in the Red Sea at the start of the war in 2015 and Eagles were also reportedly engaged and damaged by Houthi surface-to-air missiles in 2018, although they returned safely.

Video footage that emerged in 2021 shows Saudi troops on the ground watching an F-15 swoop in a relatively low level to knock down a Houthi Qasef-series suicide drone:

In the past, Houthi forces have come close to engaging U.S. F-35s and have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to bring down MQ-9 Reaper drones. If the Saudi F-15 loss is ultimately confirmed, determining precisely how the aircraft was detected, tracked, engaged, and hit could therefore provide valuable insight into how this unusual air defense architecture is being employed against Saudi and other combat aircraft.

As we discussed at the time, the clear risk posed by Houthi air defenses is likely the main factor behind Saudi employment of a Chinese-made short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) in the current fighting with Yemen.

The timing of the reported shootdown is also notable. It comes amid a sharp escalation in the conflict, with Saudi Arabia conducting air operations against Houthi positions in Yemen and Ansar Allah launching missiles and drones toward targets inside Saudi Arabia. Reuters reported that the Houthis had attacked the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu and a southern airbase at Khamis Mushait, while Riyadh has reported intercepting Houthi drones.

The F-15 incident also follows a separate confrontation over an alleged Houthi drone attack near Mecca. Saudi authorities said their air defenses intercepted and destroyed a Houthi drone south of Mecca before it entered the restricted airspace over the city. The Houthis denied targeting the holy city.

Meanwhile, there are reports that U.S. officials met representatives of the Houthis in Oman over the weekend, with the Houthis apparently telling the U.S. officials that they had no intention of attacking American vessels and that they remained committed to the 2025 ceasefire with ​the United States unless they stepped in on behalf of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom reportedly requested exactly this in recent weeks but was denied.

For the moment, the most that can be established from the available imagery is that a Saudi F-15 was destroyed, with Ansar Allah claiming responsibility.

This is a developing story and will be updated as additional imagery, official statements, or other independently verifiable information becomes available.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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