Understanding Society

On the Fourth of July

2026-07-04T13:53:16.337-04:00

Selected materials removed from National Park sites at instructions from Trump administration (legal cases underway) (Gemini generated)

It is quite difficult to celebrate the 250th anniversary of our country under the current conditions. The occasion has been hijacked by a president and a political party that have no dignity, no respect for the basic values of our country, no allegiance to our Constitution and the rule of law, and no benevolence for our people, and no respect for the international system and other nations that have been loyal partners throughout times of crisis in the past and present.

Like many Americans, I am ashamed of the lies told every day by our president, the cruelty and lack of compassion he and his administration show to the people of the United States and in other countries, the crassness of his constant efforts at self-promotion in attacking the great monuments of our capital city, and the corruption and massive conflicts of interest shown by the $1.2-$1.5 billion he has gained since taking office through industries he has promoted as president. Even the day of national celebration itself has been hijacked by his party’s Freedom 250 organization, converting the July 4h celebrations into a rally on the president’s behalf.

And yet this sense of shame about our nation’s current leader and his administration does not extend to a sense of disillusionment about our nation itself. My thoughts go first to Abraham Lincoln and the words of his Gettysburg Address on November 19, 1863.

So many lines in this brief speech demonstrate a fundamental contrast to our current president. "The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here" -- can we imagine the current occupant in the White House making such a humble remark? And just a moment later, Lincoln expresses a fundamental aspiration for the nation -- not for himself, not for his followers, not for his party, but for the nation: "That we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth." Lincoln's thoughts in 1863 were for the people of the United States, for the institutions through which their freedom and equality is secured, and for our unity as a democratic people. Have we ever heard the current president make a sincere effort to speak to and on behalf of the whole of the people of the United States, not simply his "base"?

Recall as well the closing lines of Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address in 1861:

I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

Or recall Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speech in the same place as the current “Great American State Fair” has been staged — to a crowd of some 250,000 men, women, and children from around the country on August 28, 1963. What a dignified and affirming set of aspirations were articulated on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial on that day, and what a stunning contrast to the scene on the same location today. Here are a few of MLK's words on that day:

I say to you today, my friends, though, even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream. I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up, live out the true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.”

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood. I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.

Or go back to Susan B. Anthony’s words in 1873 affirming women’s equality and demanding the right to vote for women after her own arrest for the crime of voting in the 1972 U.S. presidential election:

Friends and fellow citizens: I stand before you tonight under indictment for the alleged crime of having voted at the last presidential election, without having a lawful right to vote. It shall be my work this evening to prove to you that in thus voting, I not only committed no crime, but, instead, simply exercised my citizen's rights, guaranteed to me and all United States citizens by the National Constitution, beyond the power of any state to deny.

The preamble of the Federal Constitution says:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

It was we, the people; not we, the white male citizens; nor yet we, the male citizens; but we, the whole people, who formed the Union. And we formed it, not to give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not to the half of ourselves and the half of our posterity, but to the whole people - women as well as men. And it is a downright mockery to talk to women of their enjoyment of the blessings of liberty while they are denied the use of the only means of securing them provided by this democratic-republican government - the ballot.

Think finally of a fearless defender of freedom and the rule of law in the U.S. Senate, Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine. She spoke up against Senator Joseph McCarthy's unconscionable and cowardly attacks on the loyalty of other Americans in these words in June, 1950:

I speak as a Republican. I speak as a woman. I speak as a United States Senator. I speak as an American.

The United States Senate has long enjoyed worldwide respect as the greatest deliberative body in the world. But recently that deliberative character has too often been debased to the level of a forum of hate and character assassination sheltered by the shield of congressional immunity. ...

I think that it is high time that we remembered that we have sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution. I think that it is high time that we remembered that the Constitution, as amended, speaks not only of the freedom of speech but also of trial by jury instead of trial by accusation.

Whether it be a criminal prosecution in court or a character prosecution in the Senate, there is little practical distinction when the life of a person has been ruined.

Those of us who shout the loudest about Americanism in making character assassinations are all too frequently those who, by our own words and acts, ignore some of the basic principles of Americanism:

The right to criticize;
The right to hold unpopular beliefs;
The right to protest;
The right of independent thought.

The exercise of these rights should not cost one single American citizen his reputation or his right to a livelihood nor should he be in danger of losing his reputation or livelihood merely because he happens to know someone who holds unpopular beliefs. Who of us doesn’t? Otherwise none of us could call our souls our own. Otherwise thought control would have set in.

Abraham Lincoln, Susan B. Anthony, Martin Luther King, Jr., Margaret Chase Smith -- these were all Americans with a deep and enduring commitment to the values of equality, freedom, and the rule of law upon which our nation rests. And they all spoke in terms that recalled the language of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. They recognized very clearly the distance still to travel before those values are more adequately realized. In their various ways, they stood courageously in the face of threats, violence, and unsettled times. And they did not stand alone. Countless other leaders, citizens, officials, and ordinary citizens stood up in their own times and places to support equality, freedom, and dignity for all.

The values that we share as Americans are profound, their goals are incomplete, and they are under attack today. The rule of law, the responsibility of government to act justly and in support of the common good, and the political morality of mutual respect and dignity are all threatened by the current administration and its supporters in Congress and in the nation.

So, yes, let us celebrate the 250th anniversary of our nation on this Fourth of July, 2026. Let us embrace with renewed understanding the core values of equality and freedom, dignity and mutual respect, that are fundamental to a democracy that embraces all its citizens. And let us each take the actions that we can to help to ensure that our democracy survives these many challenges.

Poland’s self-limiting revolution in 1980

2026-06-27T19:29:10.827-04:00

Military coup, Poland, December 1981

Poland is an important example of the paths taken by the citizens of satellite states within the former Soviet Union. Soviet domination of the governments of Poland, Hungary, East Germany (GDR), Czechoslovakia, and other satellite states led to uprisings in several states, resulting in violent military interventions by the Soviet Union in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968), as well as threats of intervention and other forms of political pressure against others (Poland in 1956 and 1980-81).

The Polish pathway from Communist authoritarian rule to democracy included the rise of a large mass-based social movement, Solidarity. One telling of the story of the rise of the Solidarity movement is the pragmatic tactics and goals pursued by its leaders, including Lech Wałęsa. By carefully crafting goals and plans around labor union goals rather than an overtly “anti-communist” uprising, the Solidarity movement avoided a violent clash with the Polish military and General Jaruzelski. This is the line of interpretation offered by the Center for Nonviolent Conflict Research in its 2009 report on the movement (Maciej Bartkowski, link). According to Bartkowski, the movement illustrated an intelligent mobilization and marshaling of support from over ten million union members, and it avoided a violent showdown with the armed forces of the state. It was, in other words, a striking success for “people power” in the face of a vastly more powerful military and state apparatus. And it was an outcome worth celebrating by activists and organizations (like the CNCR) who advocate for the power of mass nonviolent action. Bartkowski writes:

With its self-limiting philosophy of nonviolent struggle and the support of the Catholic Church, Solidarity was in a position to consider the offer of negotiations and accept a pacted transition, even though that meant a preservation of the economic and social status of the ruling elites.

But this description uses a phrase that points to the limitations of the Solidarity movement as well, the idea of a “self-limiting” strategy of struggle. This phrase originated in the writings of the outstanding Polish sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis, who was both an observer and a participant in the Solidarity movement and the political struggles it brought about. She was one of Poland’s leading academic sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s, and she was also asked to serve as a member of the Inter-Factory Strike Committee, a small group of advisers to the Solidarity union in Gdańsk about strategies for negotiations with the government. Her book, Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution, was written during and immediately following the rise of the workers’ movement and the imposition of martial law in 1981. It is notable for her objective and clear-eyed account of the movement. She does not romanticize the movement. She had brought an early draft of the book to the United States during an academic visit in 1980, and in 1981 it found a receptive reading at Princeton University Press. Jan Gross, another exceptional Polish sociologist who had emigrated to the U.S. in 1969, agreed to edit the manuscript and to add an historical section providing an account of the background events leading to the emergence of Solidarity, and the book was published by Princeton in 1984. In the editor’s preface to the book Jan Gross describes his reaction to the book as one of the initial readers for the press:

Staniszkis’s book is the best, most original, thought-provoking analysis of an East-Central European society and its politics that I have read in a long time. It goes beyond analyses derived from the totalitarian model approach and it is also more sophisticated than analyses using the interest group approach to study ‘socialist’ societies. The book is an attempt to describe and understand the authoritarian regime in Poland as a sort of corporatist society. As a sociologist of organizations the author succeeds in analyzing an intricate system of mechanisms that have been generated by a social system in order to compensate for irrationalities due to ideological restrictions placed upon it. She has been sensitive to the manifestations of symbolic manipulation in the process of social control and able to analyze such phenomena as simulation of interest group representation or ritualization of periodic crises of the regime. In these analyses she has demonstrated how the system succeeded in incorporating and, as it were, domesticating what would be seen by a less astute observer (or a traditionally thinking social scientist) as developments disrupting and threatening the system’s stability. (x)

Staniszkis describes the core concept of a “self-limiting revolution” in these terms:

Self-limiting revolution. The most striking characteristic of the initial period of the movement’s history was the painful process of cramming that radical wave of protest and class war into a ‘trade union” formula. Nearly all other features of the movement stemmed from this self-limitation of the Polish revolution. For instance, its symbolic politics (which took the form of attacks on local PUWP bosses and did not try to undermine the political institutions as such) provided a peculiar alibi for regional Solidarity leaders who had to pay with their own authority for the policy of moderating the movement, persuaded by its top authorities and experts from the intelligentsia. (17)

Staniszkis’s account differs substantially from that of Alain Touraine, discussed in earlier posts (link, link). Touraine emphasized (or perhaps over-emphasized) the substantial agency and purposiveness of the Solidarity movement, whereas Staniszkis emphasized the structural limitations to which its “pragmatic strategies” subjected it. There were clear limits to the scope of what could be demanded and achieved through the Solidarity social and political mobilization, according to Staniszkis, and this left the authoritarian capacity of the Polish state substantially unchanged. And Staniszkis’s view of the rank-and-file workers who made up the constituency of Solidarity is markedly different from Touraine’s. Touraine regarded Polish workers as having a high level of political consciousness and agency; whereas Staniszkis’s view is that workers were not especially ideological or militant in their support for the union. In her view, the interests motivating a substantial portion of the union members were primarily economic; and in fact, the union had very little concrete economic power (19 ff.). She writes: “Also almost all the victories won by Solidarity during this stage of the conflict were superficial, the ruling group made promises that it did not intend to keep, and hence Solidarity victories were pointless. The deadlock of the self-limiting revolution was also due to the narrow trade-union formula used to label the movement’s activity” (21).

Analysis of a social movement requires providing an account of the motivations and mental frameworks of the potential followers of the movement. Staniszkis considers the content and determinants of “working-class consciousness” in some detail:

Three thresholds must be mentioned when talking about the development of the consciousness of working class in Poland. The first is the barrier created by the limited semantic competence of the workers, which in the past has led to articulation of interests only in restricted, situation-specific, terms. In the first part of this chapter I will try to show how this limited semantic competence made the workers’ protest less efficient. This is a good example of a situation in which the structure of speech (rather than its content) plays an ideological role because it reinforces and stablizes the political system. However, this same limited competence sometimes served as an advantage by reducing the areas of possible communication during negotiations, as a result making the working class less vulnerable to manipulation and in a sense more radical. In this context, I will discuss radicalism as a problem of imagination as well as of attitude and the events of August 1980 as a type of cultural revolution. (113)

She refers also to the barrier of “reification” — the mental attitude according to which “power relations are perceived as painful but natural and without alternative” (113), and what she calls the “peculiar self-image of Solidarity activists” (113).

As suggested by the first barrier, Staniszkis takes a fairly negative view of the role of intellectuals and experts in the Solidarity struggle. She writes of the disconnect between the language and “semantic power” wielded by the intellectuals which rarely resonated with the political consciousness or goals of the rank-and-file union leaders and members. And she suggests that this semantic advantage sometimes worked to derail the more radical demands made by some activists and union leaders.

Most interesting in this chapter is her articulation of how she understands “ideological functions” in a social situation:

By ideological functions of forms of consciousness I mean:

1) their participation in measures to stabilize present social relations;
2) their influence on the opportunities of individuals, social groups, and classes in conflict situations;
3) their impact on the ability to defend against the tensions generated by the system;
4) their role in the techniques of domination and manipulation applied by the ruling group. (115-116)

This is not a theory of the content of an ideology (as Marx attempts to do); rather, it is an effort at diagnosing the “functions” or “social effects” of a social ideology. So the book doesn’t give much attention to what Polish workers thought about the political structures within which they lived, and how they made sense of them. Instead, she places most of her attention on what she calls “semantic competence” — the concepts and vocabulary through which workers, leaders, unionists, farmers, and other members of Polish society expressed their thoughts about the political forces around them.

In fact, she seems to find the concept of “ideology” somewhat vacuous. Instead, she suggests the term “mentality” as a way of framing the “sense-making” thought processes of various segments of Polish society. (She cites Juan Linz’s use of these concepts in his analysis of authoritarianism.)

I use the term “mentality” as a synonym for a framework of cognitive forms actually operative in political life that is action-oriented and loaded with emotions. This term seems more useful in our case than the concept of ideology. (135)

In the end, Staniszkis’s assessment of the impact of the Solidarity movement in Polish political and social transformation is somewhat negative:

It may sound like heresy, but Polish political life and especially the flow of ideas after August 1980 and the creation of Solidarity has been impoverished as a result of the impact of the populist and solidarist perspective pressed upon society by Solidarity. This view contrasts with the segmented, often morally ambiguous but nevertheless less uniform and less aggregated course of society in the 1970s. (145)

And indeed, the military coup and martial law regime of December 1981 provided a striking parenthesis to the idea that Solidarity was a powerful social movement capable of transforming Polish society. She describes the final weeks in November and December leading up to the coup in these terms:

1) Solidarity leaders believed that the power vacuum (the ruling group’s inability to control the real processes in society and the economy) was synonymous with the ruling group’s inability to use repression. Interestingly, this assumption closely paralleled the position of the ruling group itself. Ironically, the latter has also mistaken the ability to repress for an ability to govern.
2) Leaders of Solidarity also assumed that, even if confrontation were to come, the ruling group would begin with mild and legal methods and that its options would be limited by the present form of the institutional regime, with its characteristic situation of stalemate. At worst a “state of emergency” would exist with the delegation of extraordinary powers to the government by Sejm, not a “state of war,” preceded by a military coup. (326)

These were grave mistakes. The Solidarity organization was outlawed and forced underground, its leaders were arrested and imprisoned, and the strategies of mass demonstration and protest were no longer feasible. So the repressive power of the state succeeded in blocking Solidarity as a political force for at least a few years. But Staniszkis argues that internal contradictions within the union itself presented another large obstacle to continued resistance:

Another mistake of Solidarity leaders was rooted in their underestimation of the problems within Solidarity itself. Recent surveys made by the sociological research center of Mazowsze Region” show among members of Solidarity not only a low willingness to strike (even if the right to strike were in danger), but also deep differences within the union, the ambiguous relationship between the rank-and-file members and their national leaders, and, above all, the increasing passivity of Solidarity members. The ruling group appears to have read this evidence much more carefully; especially the data showing the relatively high prestige of the army among Solidarity members as well as their ambivalence toward at least some proposals popular among Solidarity activists. (326-327).

The third mistake of the national leaders of Solidarity was in accelerating a “paper war’’ (an exchange of statements and resolutions) without any real preparation for the eventual consequences of such an escalation of claims. A feeling of strength based on its membership of nearly 10 million was one of the basic reasons for the ‘‘safe game” attitude of most of Solidarity’s leaders. They did not take into account how easily the union could be paralyzed by cutting off communications and arresting activists. (328)

For some reason Staniszkis’s account of this fairly short period of social conflict makes me think of Marx and Tocqueville in their treatment of the events leading up to the June Days in Paris, 1848. Here are Alexander Herzen’s recollections of the class warfare that occurred in the streets of Paris on those days:

I listened to the thunder and the tocsin and gazed avidly at this panorama of Paris; it was as though I was taking my leave of it. At that moment I loved Paris passionately. It was my last tribute to the great town; after the June days it grew hateful to me. On the other side of the river barricades were being raised in all the streets and alleys. I can still see the gloomy faces of the men dragging stones; women and children were helping them. A young student from the Polytechnic climbed up on to an apparently completed barricade, planted the banner and started singing the Marseillaise in a soft, sad, solemn voice; all the workers joined in and the chorus of this great song, resounding from behind the stones of the barricades, gripped one’s soul. . . . The tocsin was still tolling. Meanwhile, the artillery clattered across the bridge and General Bedeau standing there raised his field-glasses to inspect the enemy positions. . . . (From the Other Shore, After the Storm, 46)

Far-right support in Germany

2026-06-26T09:11:09.124-04:00

The question of how the political values and attitudes of young people are formed has come up frequently in recent posts. This question is especially interesting in the case of the rise of far-right parties in Germany, including especially the AfD. What is of particular interest is that there seem to be several divisions at work in Germany when it comes to support for far-right politics and ideologies: region (east-west), gender, sector (urban-rural), and cohort (Gen Z versus millennials and boomers). Answering the question of the mechanisms and cultural/social circumstances that led to the growth of far-right attitudes among young people is urgent if we are to address the threat to democracy that this poses.

Rolf Frankenberger is a research expert at the Institute for Research on Right-Wing Extremism at the University of Tübingen, and his recent report in the Conversation (link) is very interesting. Most striking is the map he reproduces recording support for AfD by municipality in the 2024 European elections in Germany.

The geographical distribution of support for AfD is striking. It is concentrated in precisely the pre-unification states of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Here is a map of East and West Germany from 1980.

To many observers, the most significant change in life for German people in the past fifty years is the reunification of Germany that occurred in 1990. And the lives of young people in the east changed much more dramatically than their counterparts in the west.

Frankenberger wants to understand the mechanisms leading to risinig support for the far right. However, he emphasizes a different factor than the reunification issues: the divide between urban and rural social life.

A new division has emerged as a result between the urban and the rural. The two are more than just forms of settlements – they reflect ideals, values and lifestyles. Those who live in towns and cities lead almost entirely different lives to those who live in the countryside.

Frankenberger pinpoints a clash of cultures as a key to the rise of support for the far right. On his view, rural people are increasingly likely to be mobilized around what has been portrayed as “threats” to their traditional ways of life. Even solar-power windmills are hated, according to Frankenberger, because they disrupt the countryside for the benefit of “modern” urban dwellers. And on the other side of the coin, urban dwellers are better educated, more economically mobile, and less attracted to the ideologies of the far right.

Here is Frankenberger’s presentation of the variation in support for AfD in Baden-Württemberg. In general the region produces a lower level of support for AfD; but Frankenberger emphasizes the variation across the state. Rural areas have produced significantly higher levels of support for AfD than urban areas, even in this state that was part of West Germany in 1980.

And he emphasizes the cultural conservatism of the rural areas in this region.

The Black Forest, the Swabian Forest, and Hohenlohe also have quite strong protestant and evangelical communities, which are strongholds of traditional family life, customs and traditions.

The impact of the university cities in the distribution of political attitudes across this map is visible and extensive. Each university city demonstrates less than 10% support for AfD, with the highest levels of support occurring in rural and forest areas exceeding 25%.

Frankenberger does not address the smoking gun in the first map above, however. This is the stark difference in patterns of support across the earlier political divide between the Federal Republic and the GDR. This divide seems to overshadow the urban-rural differences singled out here and to demand explanation. What accounts for the much higher level of support for far-right parties, including especially the AfD, by citizens from the former GDR? This question demands close attention. Was it deindustrialization? Was it abrupt “modernization” and erosion of traditional village and rural life? Was it an emerging trend in which women had different and better opportunities than men?

Another issue not addressed here is the gender gap in support for AfD in Germany. In recent elections a substantially higher percent of German men support AfD than women (26% against 11% in one recent poll). What explains this gap? Sabine Volk, another researcher at the Tübingen Institute, has addressed the role of antifeminism in the rise of the AfD and its particular intensity in the east in “The AfD and Antifeminism in Germany, 2014–2025: Family First, Trans Panic Second” (link). Again, this disparity between young men and young women in their political attitudes demands explanation.

Underlying all of these disparities is the urgent need to provide an account of the connection between events in the 1990s and the formation of political attitudes and values in German men and women who became adolescents and young adults after reunification.

And there is a second hanging question as well: why have other European countries (for example, Poland, Sweden, Russia, France, the Netherlands, or Italy) developed a cohort of young people in the same generation who seem to embrace very similar far-right political attitudes, even though their formative circumstances were quite different from those experienced in the former GDR region?

Here is a DW profile of one young far-right recruit (link). The video highlights a need for belonging experienced by young men, and offers a discussion of the roots of misogyny and the impact of social media and YouTube right-wing influencers.

Discrimination in employment today

2026-05-28T14:46:26.121-04:00

There is a view in the United States that impactful racial discrimination has declined significantly over time. This view flies in the face of an afternoon’s walk through Detroit, the south side of Chicago, or the Bronx, where racial segregation in housing and the disadvantages that flow from that system are evident. But what is the social-scientific evidence concerning the current situation of race-based discrimination?

This is a question that rigorous quantitative sociologists have studied in the past several decades, and the results are dismal. Consider the research agenda of Lincoln Quillian and his collaborators over that period of time (link). Researchers have studied race-based discrimination in employment using field experiments to test the relative success of equally qualified applicants in thousands of job applications. The experiments take two forms: correspondence tests (where fictitious resumés are paired with equivalent credentials but differing in signals indicating the race of the candidate) and audit tests (where pairs of job applicants played by trained actors are presented for in-person applications or interviews). Here is how Lincoln Quillian describes the procedure for in-person audits:

For in-person audits, researchers send teams of trained actors to apply for the same job vacancies (e.g., Attström 2007; Pager et al. 2009). Each team includes at least one actor belonging to the native or dominant racial group and another from a racial minority group. Teams are assigned equivalent fictitious employment credentials like education, training and previous experience. The majority and minority actors undergo a period of training that involves practice calls to employers, mock interviews and standardizing candidate responses to interview questions (Bendick et al. 2010). Actors are matched based on physical appearance, age and demeanor. In-person audit studies usually rely on at least two signals about the applicant’s race: the applicant’s name in the resume and the applicant’s in-person and physical appearance. (Quillian et al 2020 link : 734)

The experimenter then records the number of candidates by race who are “called back” for a subsequent interview. In an entirely race-blind world we would expect the callback rate to be approximately the same for “white” and “black” candidates; but almost all field experiments with this design show the opposite result.

Quillian and his colleagues conducted a major meta-study of virtually all existing field experiments on employment discrimination. In addition, he and his colleagues assessed the level of discrimination that occurs at the next stage of employment, the step from callback to job offer. In “Evidence from Field Experiments in Hiring Shows Substantial Additional Racial Discrimination after the Callback” Quillian, Lee, and Oliver (link) find that the level of discrimination from callback to job offer is even greater than that between application and callback. “Our results indicate that substantial, additional racial discrimination occurs even after minority candidates make it to the interview stage. Because of this, studies that only use callbacks seriously underestimate the complete extent of discrimination in the hiring process” (734). Here is a summary of their findings:

We begin with a basic meta-analysis of the level of discrimination at different stages. Results of the meta-analysis for each stage are shown in Figure 2 and Table 2 Panels A and B. For our sample of twelve studies, the results indicate that majority applicants receive 53% more callbacks than equally qualified minority applicants on average (discrimination ratio of 1.534; 95% confidence interval of 1.33–1.78).

What happens after the callback? The discrimination ratio for job offers conditional on receiving a callback (i.e., only for applicants who made it to the interview stage) is 1.53418; this indicates that even when both candidates receive an interview, majority applicants still receive about 50% more job offers than comparable minority applicants. Looking at the overall level of discrimination in job offers, majority applicants receive about 145% more job offers than comparable minority applicants (discrimination ratio of 2.450, 95% confidence interval of 1.68–3.57). The difference between the callback discrimination ratio and the unconditional (or overall) job offer discrimination ratio is statistically significant at p < 0.05 (shown in Panel B of Table 2). These results indicate that there is a considerable degree of additional discrimination against racial minorities as they move from callback to job offer. The point estimates suggest that minority candidates experience an average more than twice as much discrimination overall in the job offer outcome as in the callback outcome. (747-748)

Here is a graph summarizing the findings of their meta-analysis of all studies that include callback-job offer data.

Meta-study estimates of employment discrimination

These are striking and apartheid-like conclusions. Here is the most salient point: “Looking at the overall level of discrimination in job offers, majority applicants receive about 145% more job offers than comparable minority applicants”. Out of 1000 white applicants and 1000 equally well-qualified black applicants, close to 2.5 times as many white applicants will receive job offers as black applicants. Assume there are 350 positions to be offered; this implies that 100 black applicants will receive an offer, compared to 250 white applicants — all equally qualified. By any measure, this is an enormous level of discrimination in employment.

What are the mechanisms that underlie these highly discriminatory results? Two observations in the article are suggestive:

Discrimination by employers does not appear to function in a categorical way, in which employers who know the race or ethnicity of an applicant pre-callback automatically rule out minority applicants in favor of equally qualified majority applicants. Instead, racial discrimination in hiring has a probabilistic character across stages of hiring, in which minority applicants are less likely to advance at each stage. (753)

So — no evidence of widespread “categorical” discrimination in these studies. But second, Quillian et al suggest that implicit bias is an important mechanism of discrimination by race, and they note that this factor may be even more important in face-to-face interactions:

The preferences underpinning taste-based discrimination can encompass many specific forms of racism and prejudice. For instance, employers may hold prejudices against racial and ethnic minorities rooted in suspicions of or hostility toward foreign cultural norms, values or attitudes (Pager and Shepherd 2008). On the other hand, biases that affect hiring may be unconscious, as demonstrated by studies of “implicit” racial attitudes. (735)

Many tests for implicit attitudes such as the Implicit Attitudes Test (IAT) use images of individuals from different racial and ethnic groups, which suggests that the general salience of race might be heightened in the context of face-to-face interactions. (736)

This is enormously important research in a time when the pressure on efforts to reduce and eliminate racism is even greater than the Jim Crow years, if that is possible. The field studies reported here, and the meta-analysis offered by Lincoln Quillian and his colleagues, are a wake-up call. The work is highly rigorous, and the results are unambiguous: racial discrimination in employment is substantial today, and it has not decreased over the past twenty-five years.

And what does this say to the young black man or woman leaving high school, community college, or university about their future? It provides a very bleak picture. The idea that the US economy embodies a “meritocracy” in which each individual reaches a level of achievement determined by experience, education, training, and discipline and nothing else is a self-pleasing fantasy for the majority, and a cruel and obvious lie for the minority.

(Here is a very good summary of the recent research methods and findings involved in Quillian’s research in the Harvard Business Review; link.)

A more pluralistic analytical sociology

2026-05-10T10:28:00.004-04:00

A central theme in Rethinking Analytical Sociology is my concern that the founders of analytical sociology presented the field as a general and universally applicable approach to sociological research. Associated with this claim is what I called “ABM fundamentalism” — the view that computational models could and should be applied to all sociological research problems. Against these views, I argued in Rethinking Analytical Sociology that analytical sociologists should take a more pluralistic and collaborative approach to other research methods in sociology, including institutional and organizational sociology and comparative historical sociology.

In March I presented some of these ideas online at the Institute for Analytic Sociology in Sweden, and in April I had the chance to make several specific arguments on this subject to small groups of students and faculty in Como and Torino, with lively discussions following. In Como I focused on the need for a much more nuanced and “thick” theory of the actor, using the example of the US civil rights movement and the current surge of right-wing extremism in many liberal democracies. In Torino I focused on organizations as “meso-level” social entities with dynamic and relatively autonomous causal properties. This is a view rejected by the founders of analytic sociology, who champion a generativist view of the social world that leaves no place for relatively autonomous meso-level social entities. Attributions of apparent causal properties to meso-level structure should ideally be replaced with the individual-level mechanisms that constitute these properties. I argued that this position makes it impossible to explain the sociology of episodes like the Montgomery bus boycott, where dynamic organizations played a crucial role in bringing about the course of events. Doug McAdam’s detailed historical sociology of the period does a great job of uncovering the multi-level dynamics involved over the thirteen months of the ultimately successful boycott, whereas no “generativist” account leading from grievances to a sustained social movement has come close.

The comments I received from analytical sociologists at the Torino talk suggested that I’ve overstated both the commitment to methodological individualism and the rejection of social structures at the heart of analytical sociology. The commentators suggested that practitioners are more open-minded about research methods than I suggest, less committed to generativism, and very open to collaboration with sociologists who proceed from different premises. And agent-based modeling is just a tool, not a way of treating every sociological puzzle.

I don’t think I’ve overstated the core ideas of the “manifesto” of analytical sociology, as put forward by Hedström, Demeulenaere, and Manzo. And Joshua Epstein’s dogmatism about generativist social science stands unparalleled. But I’m very glad to hear that the discussants from the Gen Z generation of sociologists in this tradition are more open to pluralism in methods and approaches. I suggested to them that the time is right for a new manifesto, one which is explicitly open to a range of research approaches. This would mean at least three things: recognizing the need for thicker descriptions of actors, recognizing the causal importance of mid-level social entities like organizations, and abandoning the commitment to generativism as the sole legitimate model of explanation. And most importantly, it would emphasize the synergy that results from collaboration with other research approaches within sociology when treating a complex and extended social process.

As for computational tools like agent-based modeling — perhaps the most an updated manifesto should say about the relevance of agent-based simulation techniques is that they are valuable but limited tools for exploring some of the dynamics of the assumptions we make about inter-agent influence in the setting of mobilization and activization around a set of grievances and demands.

What does this leave from the original premises of AS? It leaves a commitment to empirical rigor, a preference for “theories of the middle range”, an insistence on the importance of discovering causal mechanisms, and a special interest in computational models of simple agent-based processes. This no longer looks like a declaration of a new and general approach to all sociological research — a claim invoked in the earlier manifestos for analytical sociology — but it looks like a much less constraining set of prescriptions than the guiding precepts of the earlier formulations. It is more receptive to a pluralistic approach to sociological research. And it therefore serves better as a guiding framework within which talented researchers can pursue productive research agendas.

Another point was made during the discussion in Torino that deserves comment. A listener suggested that this kind of discussion of “methodology and ontology” has taken up way too much space in the social sciences, and that we would be better off if sociologists just went ahead with their empirical work without worrying too much about the meta-issues. But this seems incorrect to me. Scientific research requires some antecedent ideas about how the world works and how to fruitfully investigate its properties. These ideas are of course provisional. But the history of science shows us that bad “framework” assumptions often lead to bad science. I think here of the harmful effects that radical behaviorism had on psychology in the first half of the twentieth century. So it is important to be as insightful as we can manage as we design research programs in the sciences. And this means that debating the assumptions involved in the analytical sociology research tradition is not wasted effort.

A focus for discussion and comment in the Como presentation was the need for a much deeper understanding of the development of the attitudes and values of young people. How can we explain the rapid rise of extremist right-wing ideologies and values among young people in the United States and many European countries, including Italy? One or two of the people in the Como lecture room were faculty with their own early-teenage children, and they expressed bewilderment about what was driving the surge of support for neo-fascist groups like CasaPound in Italy among young people. Students of contentious politics have not paid enough attention to the mechanisms and pathways through which political attitudes and values gain traction with young people; and yet answering this question is crucial for understanding the success of recruitment and mobilization of followers for organizations and parties like CasaPound. Here is a brief description and history of the neo-fascist CasaPound movement (link).

Organizational failure — upcoming video seminar

2026-05-09T16:14:00.000-04:00

Here is an interesting opportunity to do some thinking about the ways that organizational features create hazards for technology systems at many levels…

Dear problem-solving community

Please join us on Friday, May 15, 11AM Eastern time (17:00 CET), at this Zoom Link for a problem-solving coffee hour with Catino Maurizio (University of Milano-Bicocca) on “Solving the scapegoat problem in organizations.”

Abstract: When a large cruise ship sinks after hitting rocks near the shore, public debate quickly turns to a fundamental question: who is to blame? In the aftermath of negative events—accidents, corporate scandals, crises, and bankruptcies—organizations typically adopt one of two blame management strategies. The first consists in acknowledging responsibility and implementing structural corrective measures. The second involves constructing one or more scapegoats by shifting blame onto individuals directly involved in the event. By personalizing failure, the organization can appear structurally sound and avoid costly reforms. Revisiting the Costa Concordia shipwreck, this talk analyzes the organizational processes and mechanisms through which the “organizational scapegoat” is produced. It shows how individualized accounts of guilt transform systemic problems into moral failures, thereby protecting organizational arrangements from scrutiny. From the perspective of problem-solving sociology, scapegoating represents the opposite of a genuinely problem-oriented approach. While scapegoating closes the problem by locating it in deviant individuals, problem-solving sociology seeks to reopen the analysis at the organizational level, asking how structures, routines, and decision processes made the failure possible. The talk argues that moving beyond blame-centered narratives is a necessary step toward developing a civic epistemology capable of addressing organizational responsibility in complex systems.A Virtual Coffee Hour is an informal discussion of issues that arise in problem-solving research. For more information and the upcoming schedule, see here. To present at a virtual coffee hour, sign up here.

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Racist extremism and inter-group violence

2026-04-15T19:17:00.001-04:00

Ethnic cleansing, Srebrenica, July 1995

Milan Obaidi is a prolific Danish social psychologist who has worked extensively on right-wing extremism. His scientific publications provide greater detail on his emerging views of the psychology of extremism. A useful document for the ongoing discussion of the mechanisms of right-wing extremism here is a well-documented 2020 summary of findings in the field of the social psychology of right-wing extremism here. The title is descriptive: “What are the psychological characteristics of people holding far-right beliefs?”. In this summary research report Obaidi singles out a handful of psychological characteristics that are associated with receptiveness to extremist beliefs and actions.

Avoidance of uncertainty or ambiguity
Rigid mindset
“Significance quest theory” (SQT)
Psychological distress and perceived deprivation
Need for cognitive closure

There is a substantial amount of overlap between these characteristics and the BUC(k)ET theory offered by Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor (link), and it connects to Arie Kruglanski’s 3N theory of the psychology of hate-based extremism as well (Needs, Narratives, Networks). The quest for meaning, the desire for certainty (cognitive closure), and the emotional discomfort with uncertainty and ambiguity all align with Fiske and Taylor’s framework. And like the researchers who have developed the theory of Social Dominance Orientation (link), Obaidi’s account emphasizes a desire for maintaining an “in-group, out-group” division of society in which the extremist individual is in the dominant group. This corresponds to a perverse quest for “belonging” in the sense described by Fiske and Taylor.

Obaidi and his research collaborators have offered an ambitious attempt to unify several lines of thought in social psychology about right-wing extremism.

[Obaidi, Milan; Robin Bergh; Simon Ozer; and Cornelia Sindermann, 2025, “Toward an Integrated Psychological Model of Violent Extremism,” European Review of Social Psychology: 1-50. ]

Here is the abstract of their paper:

ABSTRACT The global threat of violent extremism (VE) has intensified in recent years, evidenced by a significant increase in violent incidents. Despite numerous theoretical and empirical explanations across disciplines, a lack of cross-fertilisation between these research domains has hindered the development of a comprehensive understanding of VE. To bridge this gap, this review integrates diverse lines of research into a comprehensive psychological model of VE, synthesising objective situations, subjective appraisals, and key individual psychological factors contributing to VE inclinations. We aim to develop a framework that more precisely demonstrates how these variables fit together, highlighting the added value of integration over piecemeal investigations. We specifically advocate for a multilevel approach that incorporates predictors from various levels of analysis to provide detailed mechanisms for how these variables relate to and complement one another. We further illuminate a multitude of mediation and moderation effects, some already tested empirically, while others await future research.

As the abstract emphasizes, their goal is to integrate “objective situations, subjective appraisals, and key individual psychological factors contributing to VE inclinations”, which they believe have been largely distinct research topics in past studies of violent extremism. They emphasize that they offer a multi-level analysis of the emergence of violent extremism, which includes information about surrounding social and economic conditions, prevalent ideologies, and individual psychological differences.

The focus on violent extremism requires some comment, since it is likely enough that the large majority of right-wing extremist young people in the US and other democracies draw the line at violence against others. The violent extremists in the United States (like the Michigan Wolverine militia group accused of planning to kidnap Michigan’s governor, or members of the Base, a clandestine terrorist group) are a minority of the right-wing movement (or so one would hope). So how much of the research described here can be applied to the broader group of young people who are “all in” for racist language, discrimination, taunting, and other harmful acts, without crossing the threshold of attacking a church, synagogue, or supermarket? Are non-violent right-wing extremists pretty much the same as violent right-wing extremists, except the latter group has a lower threshold for committing acts of violence? At various points Obaidi and his co-authors make it clear that their ultimate interest is in explaining the factors leading to the violent incidents, not the routine hate-based activism contributing to episodes like the “Young Republican chat channel” scandal of 2025, and this suggests the possibility that there may be important differences between the actively violent members of the far right and the ideological adherents.

Another valuable contribution made by Obaidi and his collaborators is a major empirical research project on the effects of Great Replacement Theory.

[Milan Obaidi, Jonas Kunst, Simon Ozer, and Sasha Y. Kimel, “The ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy: How the perceived ousting of Whites can evoke violent extremism and Islamophobia” (Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2022, 25(7) 1675 –1695).]

This research treats the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory as an incendiary issue currently being used to bring adherents and violent activists into antagonism and violence against other racial groups in the US and Europe, and these investigators attempt to provide empirical evidence concerning the population effects of this conspiracy theory. Here is the abstract for the article:

ABSTRACT Increased immigration and demographic changes have not only resulted in political pushback, but also in violent attacks against immigrants. Several recent terrorist attacks committed by White supremacists invoke rhetoric around a deliberate attempt to make Whites extinct and replace them with non-Western immigrants. Yet, while it is widely acknowledged among extremism researchers that this perception of orchestrated extinction or replacement has tremendous potential to lead to violent extremism, its consequences have not yet been directly examined. Using the Scandinavian context (e.g., Denmark and Norway), in two correlational studies and one experiment, we provide evidence that this perception is associated with the persecution of Muslims, violent intentions, and Islamophobia. Further, we demonstrate that these associations are mediated by symbolic threats. Conspiracy beliefs that one’s group is being replaced seem to drive hostile intergroup attitudes. We discuss the societal implications of this finding (i.e., generating fear, polarization, and hostile public opinion towards immigrants).

An important part of their analysis is their view that this conspiracy theory of “White extinction” is a deliberate strategic effort to show that some “enemy” intends to harm the white Christian population of the United States, and to use the spreading myth as a call to action by far-right leaders and activists. In particular, they call out Stephen Miller’s use of “Great Replacement Theory” to create support for his extremist strategies of expulsion for large numbers of the US immigrant community:

For example, recently leaked emails show the former White House senior advisor Stephen Miller promoting far-right extremist, White nationalist ideas, and anti-immigrant rhetoric through the conservative website Breitbart. Importantly too, he appeared fixated on the prospect of a “White genocide” (i.e., a conspiracy theory associated with White supremacists propagating the idea that the White race is dying due to growing non-White populations; Bellware, 2019). (1676)

Key to their interpretation of this conspiracy theory is the idea that the demographic shifts the US is experiencing are the result of deliberate efforts and actions by nefarious agents to bring about the decline of the white Christian population. The authors note that the same themes are being used in populist and right-wing extremist organizations and networks to stimulate fear and antagonism between “native” Europeans and immigrant people, often Muslim.

In recent years, the “Great Replacement” conspiracy has not only gained prominence among right-wing extremists but has also found a foothold among right-wing populist political parties in Europe. For example, while evoking anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment, such ideas have been espoused by the former leader of the Danish People’s Party Pia Kjærsgaard, the Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán, the Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, and the leader of the far-right movement Rassemblement National Marine Le Pen (Alduy, 2017; Kingsley, 2019; Kjærsgaard, 2020). Various conservative intellectuals and far-right organizations have also utilized language that stokes fear about the decline of the “White race” and “White identity.” (1677)

Obaidi et al connect this use of the Great Replacement myth to the 3N theory of radicalization offered by David Webber and Arie Kruglanski. This is a theory of social mobilization based on three large factors — Needs, Narratives, and Networks, with a strong emphasis on the “quest for significance” on the part of potential followers.

[Webber, David and Arie W. Kruglanski. 2017. “Psychological Factors in Radicalization: A ‘3N’ Approach,” Handbook of the Criminology of Terrorism, eds. Gary LaFree and Joshua Freilich, Wiley Blackwell, 33-46.]

Here again it is worth noticing the convergence of this line of thought with that of Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor in developing their BUC(k)ET model of cognitive and moral development discussed in an earlier post (link). The Great Replacement myth contributes to all of the core needs discussed by Fiske and Taylor: belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing self, and trusting in-group.

What about the methodology used in these studies? Like Lior Zmigrod and her co-authors discussed in a previous post (link), Obaidi’s research methods are largely quantitative and statistical based on interview and survey data for about 100 subjects. The research goal is to provide a strong empirical basis for making claims about the causal relationships among variables. Here is a summary of some of the findings offered in the Great Replacement paper:

The graph represents correlations and associations among the identified variables, leading ultimately to behavioral outcomes (violent intentions, Islamophobia, Muslim persecution).

Do these findings have important implications for the future of inter-group violence in liberal democracies? Obaidi and his co-authors believe they do:

It has been suggested that immigration-related conspiracy theories trafficked by right-wing groups may nurture hate and violence against immigrants and asylum seekers in the West. Moreover, recent FBI documents predict that right-wing, conspiracy-driven extremism will increase in the next few years (Steinbuch, 2019). Indeed, new reports indicate that far-right terrorism has significantly outpaced other forms of terrorism (Jones et al., 2020). More specifically, right-wing terrorist incidents in the West have increased by 320% over the past 5 years (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019). One of the most potent conspiracy theories evoked by right-wing extremists, politicians, and commentators is the “Great Replacement”—the conspiracy arguing that there is an attempt to replace the White autochthonous population with non-Western immigrants. (1687)

These are highly suggestive conclusions, and the research is very interesting. However, it would be useful to have a more extensive theoretical basis for linking the empirical results to a theory of the underlying psychological processes that generate them. Obaidi’s reference in the earlier paper to “objective situations, subjective appraisals, and key individual psychological factors contributing to VE inclinations” remains fairly vague. (This is perhaps predictable in a research program that is focused almost exclusively on identifying discrete operationalized variables that can be separately measured.) So once again, we are faced with the question: what processes and internal factors create attitudes of racist extremism among young people?

(The Southern Poverty Law Center 2024 report on White Nationalist organizations and activism in the US is detailed and alarming, and is very relevant to the findings discussed here; link.)

Social psychologists on the appeal of antagonism and hate

2026-04-15T13:16:00.000-04:00

Our current political scene presents an unresolved and important question: why have the ideologies of hate, fear, nationalism, antagonism, and violence had such appeal to a segment of young men across many countries in the past thirty years? How does it happen that many fairly typical twelve-year-old boys somehow become captivated by the extremist right-wing political ideas of racism, sexism, and nationalism? Previous posts have considered major generational events and pervasive social influencers as causes of the rise of extremist attitudes among young people. But this leaves the psychological question unanswered: why do these particular divisive attitudes and ideas find such a receptive audience among some young people? And why do messages of inclusion, democracy, and tolerance not have a similar appeal?

Kathleen Blee has devoted her career to understanding the minds of racist activists in the United States, and she emphasizes the importance of the developmental process involved in becoming racist. In Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement (2002) she writes:

Intense, activist racism typically does not arise on its own; it is learned in racist groups. These groups promote ideas radically different from the racist attitudes held by many whites. They teach a complex and contradictory mix of hatred for enemies, belief in conspiracies, and allegiance to an imaginary unified race of “Aryans.” (Blee 2002:3)

A new generation of social psychologists have attempted to theorize about the emotional and cognitive systems of children and young people that might help to answer these questions. They have focused on the underlying “needs” that children and young people have, to which various ideologies and belief systems are appealing to a greater or lesser extent. Especially influential is work by Susan Fiske and her collaborators, including especially Social Beings (Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor, 4th edition, 2021). Fiske and Taylor offer a compact theory of social motives, which they summarize as the “BUC(k)ET” scheme:

Social cognition is animated by social motives traceable to belonging, including understanding, controlling, enhancing self, and trusting others. This framework fits the history of motivations in psychology (S. T. Fiske, 2008) as well as current work in social psychology generally (S. T. Fiske, 2010) and social cognition in particular (S. T. Fiske, 2002). Although other frameworks are possible, this highlights some motives that determine when and how people operate in more automatic or more controlled modes. (Fiske and Taylor 94)

BUC(k)ET scheme

This is a proto-theory of what an adolescent is looking for as he or she approaches adulthood as a grounding of his emotional and social landscape. Fiske’s model places a quest to gain a sense of belonging at the center of this set of needs, as well as a thought framework that helps to “make sense” of the world the young person is beginning to experience (through personal experience, media, social media, clubs, and other social associations). The young person wants to find ways of feeling that he or she is able to control some aspects of the social environment he confronts; to find a basis for developing a positive view of himself; and perhaps most importantly, find ways of forming relationships of trust with some other people. Notice how closely this corresponds to some of the themes of extremist messaging and activism.

Consider these passages from Michael Kimmel’s description of some of the young men and boys attracted to the neo-Nazi movement in Sweden. (See this previous post on Kathleen Blee’s excellent special volume on ethnographies of the far-right (link).) Here Kimmel describes a twelve-year-old boy Edward and his inner life:

Insecure and lonely at twelve years old, Edward started hanging out with skinheads because he “moved to a new town, knew nobody, and needed friends.” Equally lonely and utterly alienated from his distant father, Pelle met an older skinhead who took him under his wing and became a sort of mentor. Pelle was a “street hooligan” hanging out in street gangs, brawling and drinking with other gangs. “My group actually looked down on the neo-Nazis,” he says, because “they weren’t real fighters.” “All the guys had an insecure role as a man,” says Robert. “They were all asking ‘who am I?’” …

Already feeling marginalized and often targeted, the boys and men described themselves as “searchers” or “seekers,” kids looking for a group with which to identify and where they would feel they belonged. “When you enter puberty, it’s like you have to choose a branch,” said one ex-Nazi. “You have to choose between being a Nazi, anti-Nazi, punk or hip- hopper—in today’s society, you just can’t choose to be neutral” (cited in Wahlstrom 2001, 13-14). …

For others, it was a sense of alienation from family and especially the desire to rebel against their fathers. “Grown-ups often forget an important component of Swedish racism, the emotional conviction,” says Jonas Hallen (2000). “If you have been beaten, threatened, and stolen from, you won’t listen to facts and numbers.” (209-210)

Belonging is the recurring theme here. And experts on far-right mobilization suggest that the “influencers” who craft messages of hate, antagonism, and racism are just as aware of these underlying cravings of young people as marketers of sports shoes and cell phones: they find persuasive messages and narratives that play into the need for meaning, direction, belonging, and influence that Fiske describes. The impulses of “belonging” and “narratives of meaning” are powerful, according to Fiske, and these deep psychological needs help to explain the appeal of right-wing extremism and “us-them” antagonism. Fiske’s guiding idea here is that political ideas, attitudes, and ideologies are adopted by the young person as ways of forming a link between a group and the individual’s own course in life. Racism is one way of defining one’s primary group for “belonging”: by defining other groups as separate, threatening, and inferior, the individual simultaneously creates an identity group for himself. And this construction of one’s social identity is fertile ground for aggression, hostility, and prejudice towards other groups.

Lior Zmigrod and co-authors have attempted to discover correlations between cognitive traits and ideological propensities (Zmigrod, Leor, Ian W. Eisenberg, Patrick G. Bissett, Trevor W. Robbins, and Russell A. Poldrack. 2021, “The cognitive and perceptual correlates of ideological attitudes: a data-driven approach”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376 (1822)). Their research is relevant to the theories of social cognition offered by Susan Fiske (though they do not mention her work). Here is a relevant description from their abstract:

Even less is known about how cognitive dispositions—individual differences in how information is perceived and processed— sculpt individuals’ ideological worldviews, proclivities for extremist beliefs and resistance (or receptivity) to evidence…. We uncovered the specific psychological signatures of political, nationalistic, religious and dogmatic beliefs. Cognitive and personality assessments consistently outperformed demographic predictors in accounting for individual differences in ideological preferences by 4 to 15-fold. (Abstract)

The methodology pursued here is statistical, based on surveys of a moderate number of subjects. (In fact, the authors are critical of the social-psychology approach that begins with an analysis of psychic needs.) Two kinds of survey instruments are used: one to evaluate the individual’s level on several cognitive measures; and the second to evaluate the individual’s level with regard to a set of political attitudes. The two sets of variables are illustrated on the following table. As the table indicates, “Strategic Information Processing” (a cognitive trait) is strongly negatively associated with each ideological feature except “Social Dominance”. “Caution”, another cognitive feature, is positively associated with each ideological feature across the board.

What were those “psychological signatures” (bundles of psychological attributes strongly associated with features of ideological susceptibility) that Zmigrod and her colleagues discovered? Here is their description of the “religion” signature:

The psychological signature of religiosity consisted of heightened caution and reduced strategic information processing in the cognitive domain (similarly to conservatism), and enhanced agreeableness, risk perception and aversion to social risk-taking, in the personality domain (figure 4 and electronic supplementary material, figure S6). The finding that religious participants exhibited elevated caution and risk perception is particularly informative to researchers investigating the theory that threat, risk and disgust sensitivity are linked to moral and religious convictions [92–97], and that these cognitive and emotional biases may have played a role in the cultural origins of large-scale organized religions [98,99]. (11)

This empirical study is interesting and suggestive, and it has some similarity to research surrounding the Right Wing Authoritarianism scale discussed in earlier posts (link). However, it does not illuminate what seems to be a key question: how are these cognitive attitudes formed, and how does a given set of cognitive attitudes bring about a high (or low) level of receptiveness to racist ideology and extremist political attitudes? We might even ask whether the causal influence might flow in the opposite direction: the person indoctrinated into religious dogmatism is thereby led to develop a low affinity for the cognitive skill of strategic information processing. These are the questions that Fiske’s work seems to provide a basis for answering.

How are an individual’s political values formed?

2026-03-31T14:35:00.007-04:00

Human beings have attitudes, behaviors, habits, stereotypes, and values. And somehow these mental attributes are developed or acquired in the course of normal human social life. But how, when, and with what results does this process work? And how persistent are a set of attitudes and values once established in the individual?

The topic here is a deeply interesting question — what forms us as the adult human beings with values and a moral framework that we eventually become? For the past fifty years political scientists and social psychologists have discussed a theory of the formation of political attitudes and values that emphasizes the “impressionable years”. This theory holds that children are fairly fluid in their values and political affinities, and that young people are most open to new values and ideas in the years between 17 and 25 — essentially the years of a traditional university education. And there seems to be survey evidence supporting the idea that the formative events of that period in a given person’s life become bedrock to their political identities, with relatively little change in later years.

David Sears is one of the early founders of this approach. He presented some of his ideas as early as 1975, and in 1983 he describes the “impressionable years” hypothesis in these terms:

A third view could be termed the impressionable years viewpoint, which suggests that any dispositions are unusually vulnerable in late adolescence and early adulthood, given strong enough pressure to change. In other stages of life, people are resistant to change, and of course, even in the most vulnerable life stage, they would not change in the absence of substantial pressure to change. At all ages, the content of the disposition is irrelevant. A specific and particularly interesting instance of the impressionable years hypothesis is the generational effect. This occurs when a sizable number of those in the supposedly impressionable life stage (late adolescence and earlly adulthood) are subjected to a common massive pressure to change on some particular issue, for example, when the nation is engaged in an unpopular war. It presumably yields interactions of birth cohort and dispositional content. The final viewpoint is persistence, which suggests that the residues of early (preadult) socialization are relatively immune to change in later years. This asserts a simple main effect of age, with dispositions acquired primarily in the preadult years. (“The Persistence of Early Political Predispositions: The Roles of Attitude Object and Life Stage”, Wheeler and Shaver, Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 1983: 81-82)

This theory suggests that the ambient political and cultural environment of one’s “impressionable years” (18-25) represents a powerful influence upon his or her lifetime political attitudes and values. The theory has been subjected to some rigorous quantitative efforts at empirical evaluation, with some evidence supporting its accuracy. Especially interesting is Krosnick and Alwin, “Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change” (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology [1989] 57: 3 : 416-425). They found a reasonable level of support for the impressionable-years hypothesis. Here is their abstract:

Two hypotheses about the relation between age and susceptibility to attitude change were tested. The impressionable years hypothesis proposes that individuals are highly susceptible to attitude change during late adolescence and early adulthood and that susceptibility drops precipitously immediately thereafter and remains low throughout the rest of the life cycle. The increasing persistence hypothesis proposes that people become gradually more resistant to change throughout their lives. Structural equation models were applied to data from the 1956-1960,1972-1976, and 1980 National Election Panel Studies in order to estimate the stability of political attitudes and unreliability in measures of them. The results support the impressionable years hypothesis and disconfirm the increasing persistence hypothesis. A decrease in the over-time consistency of attitude reports among 66- to 83-year-olds was found to be due to increased random measurement error in their reports, not to increased attitude change.

For the Boomer generation (or the middle part of it anyway), the impressionable years were 1966-1974 or thereabouts. Major events during the period? Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in 1968. Major unrest along racial lines occurred in dozens of cities in the US, including Chicago, Newark, and Los Angeles. The Kerner Commission report on urban unrest was released in 1968. The war in Vietnam became more and more divisive for American young people. The Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act had been enacted in 1964 and 1965. Large demonstrations took place in Chicago in 1968 during the Democratic Convention. The first Moon landing took place in 1969. The feminist movement became a powerful national voice for equality in 1970 or so. The Watergate scandal and President Nixon’s resignation took place in 1972 and 1974. Tumult, large social protest movements, corrupt politicians, a seemingly “no-exit” war in Vietnam — the impressionable years for men and women born around 1950 were very different from those of people born fifteen years earlier or fifteen years later. With only one or two exceptions, these events helped to create habits of mind that counseled resistance, the power of public opposition to injustice, and the particular evils of American racism.

How does the impressionable-years theory contribute to the question of the rise of far-right attitudes and values (racism, xenophobia, receptivity to an authoritarian leader, male supremacy) among some young American and European men in the 2010s and forward? Were there features of life for young men and preadults in the period of roughly 1995-2010 that would explain the eruption of racist and authoritarian attitudes in the cohort coming of age during those years?

Two large factors are often mentioned. First is the prominence of racist and extremist social media influencers who have captured sizable audience of young men to subscribe to their hateful conspiracy theories. Nick Fuentes is just one example. But this isn’t entirely helpful; aren’t these right-wing entrepreneurs responding to the demand for hate created by an emerging generation rather than creating it? And second is the drumbeat of “anti-woke” impulses, trolling and “owning the libs”, and deliberately flouting norms like “don’t admire the Nazis”, “don’t deny the Holocaust”, or “don’t use the language of vile racism” in political discourse. (This is reflected in the recent scandals of encrypted chats by young GOP activists revealed in fall 2025.) Some of this extends back to the reckless language of conservative activists like Pat Buchanan and the John Birch Society (link), whose ranting took place before many of these young men were born. These “anti-woke” thrusts seen to resonate with this segment of young conservative men. Offending people is the goal, not the unfortunate side effect. And the “manosphere” is where it percolates in social media posts, game chats, Youtube videos, and encrypted Telegram chat rooms. But here again — did the John Birch Society and the Tea Party lay the ground for the radical far-right attitudes of one segment of Gen Z, or do we need to look for other causes that more directly impacted the lives of these young people?

The rise of the political attitudes of far-right extremism among young people is quite dangerous for our democracy, and dangerous for the groups who wind up being the objects of the vitriol. The language and demonstration of racist and neo-nazi social-political attitudes reflected in the “Unite the Right” riots in Charlottesville in 2017 speaks for itself: this is a movement based on white supremacy, Christian nationalism, and nostalgia for “strong leaders” who can fight for these values. And Trump, his closest allies, and his MAGA movement seem to encourage this hate-based ideological world. Stephen Miller is a true believer and Donald Trump has a long history of racist statements and ridicule.

There is another complication as well: the far-right extremist faction of this age group is virulent and uninhibited; but it is a minority of its own generation. There are other “political attitude groups” in the same generation whose values are quite different — egalitarian, anti-racist, and affirmative of the value of an inclusive multicultural democracy. And, of course, there is the large group of young people who are disaffected from existing political institutions in the United Staes, frustrated by diminished opportunities for themselves and others, but inclined to turn away from any kind of political activism at all. They are “disaffected and disinvolved”. So the “impressionable years” hypothesis has a bit of a problem here as well: how is it that the experience world of the United States for young people in the period 1995-2010 gave rise to such different families of political attitudes among its young people? Part of the answer probably lies with the fact that the experiences of daily life differ widely across social and economic classes in the United States, across regions of the country, and across racial lines. So we might hypothesize that young men in Hamtramck, Michigan whose childhood reflected persistent deprivation; who did not find opportunities in high school that led either to better-paying job opportunities or to higher education; and who developed a rising level of resentment when they visited Somerset Mall in Oakland County for the standard of living that would never be theirs might develop political attitudes that highlighted resentment, disassociation from political loyalties, and an openness to antagonism to other ethnic and racial groups.

This topic relates to the questions raised by Desante and Smith in Racial Stasis (link), who focus on whether there has been substantial generational change on the topic of racial attitudes and prejudice since the 1960s.

Group identities and inclusive multicultural democracy

2026-03-03T18:05:00.000-05:00

The United States is a multicultural democracy. This is simply an empirical fact; the country is a democracy (imperfect by many important measures); and it is multiracial, multi-ethnic, and multi-national. So what is involved in helping bring about a transition to an “inclusive” multicultural democracy — a social and political order embodying fundamental equality across all groups, developing a political psychology of mutual respect for the dignity and freedoms of members of other groups, and creating an environment of reasonably harmonious social and political life across and within different communities?

Jack Citrin and David Sears address some of these questions in American Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism (2014). The book is a notable contribution in many dimensions, but of special interest to the topic of inclusive democracy is their effort to gain empirical insight into the “ethnic” or group identities of the groups that make up our population, and some ideas about the social processes that contribute to the formation of those identities. Here is how they characterize social identities:

Social identities refer to the dimensions of one’s self-concept defined by perceptions of similarity with some people and difference from others. They develop because people categorize themselves and others as belonging to groups and pursue their goals through membership in these groups. They have political relevance because they channel feelings of mutuality, obligation, and antagonism, delineating the contours of one’s willingness to help others as well as the boundaries of support for policies allocating resources based on group membership. Indeed, the intimate connection between the personal and the social bases of self-regard becomes clear when one recalls how quickly an insult to the dignitity of one’s group can trigger ethnic violence. (Citrin and Sears 2014: 31)

A person’s social identity may depend on many different kinds of personal characteristics: religion (evangelical vs. Protestant vs. Muslim), gender (M, F, X), region (Midwestern vs. South vs. Long Island), or occupation (blue collar, white collar, service). But Citrin and Sears underline the particular importance of racial and ethnic affiliations in U.S. social and political life.

This approach views racial and ethnic minorities as having especially strong ethnic identities, a sense of common fate with fellow group members, and perceptions of discrimination against their own group. These psychological foundations, we suggest, underlie the normative precepts of identity politics and multiculturalist ideology, particularly resonating with its emphasis on privileging ethnicity as a primary social identity. (19)

And they draw special attention to the relatively unique features of African-American identity in the United States, which they refer to as “black exceptionalism”:

Third, the black exceptionalism model hypothesizes that African Americans have always faced a uniquely powerful color line, one that is not completely impermeable but that continues to be difficult to crack. Despite their linguistic assimilation and their significant and ongoing contributions to a common popular culture, many blacks are excluded by the legacy of the past from the level of integration into the mainstream that voluntary immigrant groups have undergone, and, we argue, are continuing to undergo. Indeed, of all the major ethnic and racial groups blacks have, on average, by far the strongest levels of aggrieved ethnic group consciousness. Young blacks are especially likely to have strong group consciousness, suggesting enduring obstacles to interethnic cooperation. (22)

The black exceptionalism perspective argues that African Americans remain subjectd to uniquely high levels of prejudice and discrimination. Key to this view is the notion of the inertial power of history. Even as laws change, fundamental social practices and the mentalities of ordinary people typically follow only slowly, as in the classic contrast of “stateways” with “folkways.” The residues of racial prejudice in the behavior and attitudes of ordinary Americans have persisted long after the Emancipation Proclamation and 1960s-era civil rights legislation eliminated formalized racial inequality from the law books. (35)

It is important to reflect on these last two points. The persistence of racial prejudice and discrimination in US society is evident. There is indeed a “uniquely powerful color line” in the US. Likewise, the consequent social, economic, and political disparities for African American individuals and families are well-documented, whether we consider health status, family wealth, or educational opportunities. Black exceptionalism is not simply a perspective; it is a well understood historical reality (though a reality that the Trump administration is working very hard to conceal). (Here is an earlier post on this topic.)

In this book, and the research supporting it, Citrin and Sears are primarily interested in a problem that is somewhat distinct from the question of white racial attitudes. They are interested in the question of “national identity” in the context of multiple “ethnic or racial identities”, which they regard as the key issue raised by multiculturalism. Does the fact that Alice identifies as an African American woman make her less likely to have a strong affinity with the nation as a whole? Is she less “patriotic” than a typical member of another ethnic group? Is there a process of “assimilation” through which local identities (“Polish-American”, “Cuban-American”) subside in favor of a composite “American” identity? (For that matter, is this part of the hysterical reaction offered to the Bad Bunny halftime show by the right?)

On this orientation, the question raised by American Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism is whether specific ethnic and racial identities are compatible with an overarching “civic” or “national” identity. They consider three broad frameworks: cosmopolitan liberalism, soft multiculturalism, and hard multiculturalism. The question of whether levels of “racial and ethnic antagonism” have changed in various groups is secondary. In fact, the topic of generational change in racial attitudes — the question of whether Millennials are less racist than Boomers — is not addressed here directly at all. And yet Sears is himself one of the chief architects of the “symbolic racism” school of thought — the idea that the key change between generations has been the replacement of “old-fashioned biological racism” by a more “color-blind” racism that nonetheless perpetuates antagonism and fear by whites of African Americans.

So how are we to move beyond this “uniquely powerful color line”? Racism is a reality that is conveyed through individual actions and institutional effects. Part of progressive change must take the form of change of attitudes and culture on the part of white people, and of young people in particular. So it is especially important to have empirical and sociological data about the evolution of white racial attitudes since 1950. How have white attitudes, beliefs, and stereotypes about African American people changed during these decades? Has there been generational change? The “impressionable years” hypothesis—which suggests that individuals are highly susceptible to attitude change during late adolescence and early adulthood, and then “crystallize” and remain stable for the rest of their lives—is a cornerstone of some theories of political socialization (Krosnick and Alwin, “Aging and susceptibility to attitude change”). Did the dramatic moments and struggles of the civil rights movement change the way that young white people thought about their black compatriots? (The revolution was televised!) Did the Obama presidency or the Black Lives Movement move the dial? Are we a less racist society today when it comes to attitudes, stereotypes, and expectations? The arguments offered by DeSante and Smith in Racial Stasis suggest — not very much (link). And Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2022) fills in many of the blanks in Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America. We need to have a new surge of practical thinking about how a more genuinely inclusive and respectful “culture of multiculturalism” will come about.

New thinking about generational change about race

2026-02-26T14:43:00.000-05:00

The United States has a long history of racism against African-Americans, at multiple levels. At the level of individuals, we have a history of negative attitudes, stereotypes, fears, and antagonisms that are built into the social consciousness of white men and women about African-Americans. Racist attitudes about “genetic inferiority”, crime, and other negative stereotypes have persisted since the slave period. At the level of behavior, institutions and individuals in “majority society” discriminate against African-American men, women, and children. The code of inter-racial behavior embodied in the Jim Crow epoch has continuing relevance to contemporary society, and discrimination in employment and other socially important opportunities persists. And then there is “structural racism” or “institutional racism” — the persistence of patterns of disparity and disadvantage for African-American individuals and families that seem to result from the workings of the institutions themselves. Residential segregation and its consequences provide a clear illustration of structural racism, and the persistence of health and longevity disparities by race illustrates the deadly seriousness of these patterns of unequal treatment. (Here is an earlier post on racial disparities.)

Observers have recognized for decades that American society needs to change in order to eliminate these facts of racism and substantive disparity of outcomes. But what kinds of change are called for? There is a comforting theory of change that seems to have some empirical basis. It is the idea that each cohort of Americans has become less racist and more tolerant of diversity than its predecessor cohort. On this account, the “silent generation” (1928-1945) had more explicitly racist attitudes than the baby boomers (1946-1964), Gen X (1965-1980), and Gen Z (1996-?). Each successive cohort was more accepting of racial diversity than its predecessor. This narrative suggests that racism and its legacy will die out as the more tolerant generations replace their less tolerant predecessors. GlobeScan, a global public opinion research organization, published the results of a brief survey on this topic in 2023 (link):

This report offers an empirical snapshot of the change across generations that is evident in some public opinion surveys: that concern about racial discrimination has steadily increased across recent generations of people. This is a comforting storyline for anyone who cares about an inclusive multicultural democracy. But Christopher DeSante and Candis Watts Smith argue in Racial Stasis: The Millennial Generation and the Stagnation of Racial Attitudes in American Politics (2020) that the storyline is fundamentally incorrect.

DeSante and Smith do not dispute that the generations since the 1940s have indeed experienced a shift in racial attitudes away from overt and explicit “biological racism”. Generations since the baby boom of the 1950s have internalized more “race-neutral” ways of describing current realities. And they have expressed rising discomfort with the fact of continuing racial discrimination. But these generations — GenX, Millennials, and GenZ in particular — appear not to have moved forward to the logical conclusion — the need for supporting the policy changes that would be effective in addressing the continuing realities of racial discrimination. This is the “stagnation and stasis” to which DeSante and Smith refer in the title of the book: progress on ending racism appears to have stalled.

The heart of their argument involves the question of how to measure “racist attitudes” among individuals. For several decades the primary tool of social-psychological measurement of racial attitudes has been based on the concept of “racial resentment” or symbolic racism. Survey questions were designed to elicit the subject’s level of resentment, fear, or antagonism towards members of another race. DeSante and Smith argue that this approach is no longer satisfactory as a measurement tool. They maintain that racism is inherently multidimensional, involving emotions and cognitive assumptions and frameworks, and a satisfactory measure needs to permit observation of several of these dimensions in the subjects of a survey. Instead they offer a four-dimensional framework that they call FIRE (Fear, Institutionalist Racism, and Empathy), and they use a set of survey questions that allow measurement of each dimension. These questions are designed to capture the emotional and cognitive components of “attitudes about race” among individuals in a racially mixed society.

Their measurement tool elaborates on these four questions:

-- I am fearful of people of other races.
-- White people in the US have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
-- Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations.
-- I am angry that racism exists. (DeSantes and Smith 2020: 227)

The questions are borrowed from several other survey instruments and are validated using statistical tools of consistency and predictive value. Here are the results of using these questions on the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (White respondents only).

The results are striking. Millennials are no less “racist” on average than the population of older whites on each of these measures. Here are the mean values for each question:

-- “Fearful of other races” 3.83 vs. 3.87
-- “Recognize whites have advantages” 2.98 vs. 2.48
-- “Racial problems are rare” 3.64 vs. 3.68
-- “Angry racism exists” 1.78 vs. 1.59

On average, Millennials demonstrate the same level of racist attitudes as older whites. The pattern is somewhat different when we compare “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” responses to the four questions.

-- “Fearful of other races” 14.36 vs. 14.35
-- “Recognize whites have advantages” 43.06 vs. 59.01
-- “Racial problems are rare” 21.28 vs. 19.59
-- “Angry racism exists” 76.84 vs. 85.37

There are two significant differences in these “agree” responses. Millennials are more likely to agree that “whites have advantages” and agree more frequently that they are “angry racism exists”. Millennials are more likely to disagree or strongly disagree that they are “fearful of other races”. But overall, DeSantes and Smith argue that these differences are small, indicating that little change has occurred between the generations born before 1981 and the Millennials. Millennials have abandoned “old-fashioned racism” but have not advanced much further. Here is their summary statement:

Generally speaking, our results in this chapter also highlight the issue of racial stasis, as signs of the countervailing forces remain visible. For instance, White millennials do present more progressive attitudes. Compared to their predecessors, they are more likely to express anger about racism and more likely to acknowledge their privilege. But we also found that nearly one in five White millennials (20 percent) simultaneously feels angry that racism exists and does not believe Whites have advantages because of the color of their skin…. Ultimately we have a large number of walking contradictions in American society that are helping to produce and perpetuate ongoing racial inequities through their political stances and policy preferences. (244)

So if DeSantes and Smith are correct, then the hope that America’s conflicts over race and racism will disappear as a result of generational replacement is not likely to materialize. Instead, positive and purposeful steps will be needed in the realm of public and semi-public policy in order to address the effects of discrimination and prejudice. And since the burdens of discrimination are cumulative, it is not enough to ensure that opportunities are available on the basis of merit and achievement to solve the problem. If residential segregation makes it less likely that black children will receive equal educational opportunities, then all of their opportunities in later life will be stunted as well. If elementary schools or high schools are racially oriented so that black children on average receive lower quality educations, then “equal opportunity” at the university level is insufficient.

DeSante and Smith do not have much to say about what a “non-racist” mentality and culture would look like, but we can extend their thinking by emphasizing the importance of “education for an inclusive multicultural democracy”. This is a view of “civic education” for all of us based on respect across our various lines of division. A major part of such an education is a clear and honest knowledge of some of the sources of racist oppression and violence that have burdened our society in the past. Another is a deliberate and creative effort by educators, leaders, and students themselves to find our way to some of the ideals articulated by MLK and the beloved community. Without some idea of how young people can be genuinely transformed in their underlying attitudes about race, it is hard to see how the “stagnation of racial attitudes” called out by DeSante and Smith can be disrupted and reimagined. (Here is a more extensive discussion of what is needed for an inclusive multicultural democracy to become a reality; link.)

Maintaining social resilience

2026-01-31T16:46:00.003-05:00

What is needed for a community of diverse people and groups to maintain its resilience in the face of hateful language, incidents, and provocations?

This question is particularly important for universities, which commonly seek to create a climate of welcome and respect for the various groups of students who make them up, and which are sometimes subjected to anonymous hateful attacks through graffiti, email, posters, social media, or other means. University communities have periodically been thrown into tense situations of fear, mistrust, and anxiety by hateful attacks — even when no physical threats of violence have emerged (NYT).

Hateful and racist propaganda campaigns like these are deeply destructive to the cohesiveness of a community for several reasons. They undermine trust across groups — “do those other people think this way about me?”. They harden the separations that sometimes begin to emerge across groups. They may lead to a cycle of “tit for tat” hostilities, which have the inherent possibility of escalation. And possibly they reinforce and amplify the latent hateful assumptions of some people to a more virulent and expressive form.

So how can a diverse and multicultural community best prepare itself for attacks like these? How can students, faculty, and staff “take on hate” in a university community?

One avenue is to devote the effort necessary throughout the community to establish strong forms of affiliation and trust across groups, so that members of different groups have a substantial basis for sustaining confidence in the motivations and allegiances of members of other groups. This means creating avenues of interaction and communication across groups in routine times, not just the occasions of crisis when threats to cohesion arise.

Another is for leaders to be explicit and passionate about the values of inclusion that hold the community together.

Third, an important source of social resiliency results from affirmative organizations that advocate for the values of mutual respect and inclusion and that have established strong networks of relationships throughout the community, both within and across groups. Student organizations can play the lead in creating and supporting such groups.

Another important source of resiliency is realistic communication about the continuing possibility of individual anonymous expressions of hate and intolerance. It is a fact that hateful expressions are possible in every social setting, and in fact we seem to be in a period where such expressions are becoming more common. So a community that is mentally prepared for such assaults is probably better able to resist their pernicious effects than the world that Mary Poppins lives in.

It also makes sense that a community will be stronger and more resilient if its institutions establish confidence in protection of all members of the community against violence and intimidation. Fear is a toxic emotion in a multicultural community. If a community can ensure that racist actions will be appropriately addressed, and that no one needs to fear racist or hateful violence, then the anxieties created by anonymous hateful messages should have less effect on the cohesiveness of the community. This means that effective and predictable policing and law enforcement is an important source of community resilience.

So we might say that a resilient multicultural community is one in which --

there are lasting inter-group ties through organizations and person-to-person relationships;
leaders from civil society and from important organizations publicly espouse the values of inclusion and respect;
there is a broad understanding of the dynamics of hate and the possibility of occasional hateful occurrences; and
there is deep confidence in the ability of the community to provide safety for all its members through effective law enforcement.

These circumstances are likely to build the ongoing trust and commitment to positive intergroup loyalties that will make the community resilient to the efforts of hateful outsiders (or insiders) to disrupt its harmonious fabric of civil life.

How democracies die

2026-01-25T17:23:00.000-05:00

image: Senator Josh Hawley salutes January 6 insurrection

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have written with growing alarm about the threat to our democracy by right-wing extremism. How Democracies Die was sobering when it appeared in 2017, and the publication of Tyranny of the Minority: Why American Democracy Reached the Breaking Point (2023) reaches an even higher level of fear for our democratic institutions.

But just as this new democratic experiment was beginning to take root, America experienced an authoritarian backlash so fierce that it shook the foundations of the republic, leaving our allies across the world worried about whether the country had any democratic future at all. Meaningful steps toward democratic inclusion often trigger intense—even authoritarian—reactions. But the assault on American democracy was worse than anything we anticipated in 2017, when we were writing our first book, How Democracies Die. (Tyranny of the Minority, 5)

Levitsky and Ziblatt have spent their careers studying authoritarian regimes and their dynamics, so their assessment of our current situation is eye-opening. And of course, the situation today is worse than what they surveyed in 2023 — much worse. The earlier book focused on the powerful streaks of authoritarianism present in MAGA nationalism — race-baiting, contempt for democratic norms and practices, treating political opponents as contemptible enemies, and barely concealed willingness to defy Federal courts when rulings run contrary to the MAGA agenda. In the current book their focus is on the features of the political institutions (and the elected representatives) which have permitted these authoritarian dreams to come to reality.

They begin by identify a familiar aspect of US politics — the fact that electoral and congressional processes empower “partisan minorities” in dangerous ways.

The U.S. Constitution allows partisan minorities to routinely thwart majorities, and sometimes even govern them. Institutions that empower partisan minorities can become instruments of minority rule. And they are especially dangerous when they are in the hands of extremist or antidemocratic partisan minorities. (Tyranny, 10)

They emphasize that the extremist themes of the MAGA movement — white supremacy, Christian nationalism, anti-immigrant hatred, and glorification of strongman rule — have never been majority views in the US electorate. But a party exploiting these themes has in fact succeeded in gaining control of Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court. And this party has been fully willing to use its power to enforce its agenda on the rest of us.

The authors devote a chapter to several historical episodes of attempted right-wing seizures of power in the twentieth century. The first is an episode in France in 1934 that few of us have heard of. In the 1930s political instability in France, along with economic crises and unemployment, nourished the emergence of a constituency of radical right-wing opposition to French political institutions. These included young men and demobilized soldiers from WWI.

On the afternoon of February 6, 1934, tens of thousands of angry young men, mostly members of veterans’ associations and right-wing militias (or “leagues”) with names like Young Patriots, French Action, and Croix de Feu (Cross of Fire) gathered in or near the prominent Place de la Concorde, across the river from France’s national parliament building. Although the groups diverged in their ideologies and goals, they were united in their hostility toward parliamentary democracy. (Tyranny, 34)

On this winter night a large group of these militants marched on parliament. Clashes with mounted police occurred, and some of the militants were able to enter the parliament. “Members of parliament had to sneak out the back door, frightened for their lives. One minister attempted to escape but was discovered by protesters, who dragged him to the river, changing ‘Throw him in the Seine!’ (He was saved by police officers who happened to be nearby.)” (36)

France’s democracy survived the February 6, 1934, assault. But it was badly weakened. Prime Minister Édouard Daladier immediately resigned. He was replaced by Gaston Doumergue, a right-wing politician who was considered acceptable to the leagues. The goal of some of the insurrectionists had been achieved: the center-left Daladier government had been brought down by street pressure. Right-wing extremists were emboldened and mobilized. (36)

And here is the crucial point: the political leaders of France at this moment of crisis did not stand together in denouncing the violent, anti-democratic assault on the parliament:

Yet France’s leading conservative party, the Republican Federation, took a remarkably tolerant stance toward these extremist groups. Founded in 1903, the Federation had been led for many years by Louis Marin, a man with solid democratic credentials. But in the early 1930s, the party drifted to the right, first flirting with, and then openly embracing, the Young Patriot activists in its midst. Long considered a party of the elite, the Federation grew dependent on the Young Patriots and other far-right leagues as a source of activism and energy. Because the same individuals appeared in both groups, the boundary between the official “party” and the violent activists of the leagues grew harder to discern. (37)

There is a disturbing parallel between the French uprising in 1934 and the January 6 Capitol Insurrection in 2021. It is remarkable and disturbing to see how the Republican Party and Donald Trump have rewritten the history of the January 6 insurrection at the US Capitol. And Trump’s mass pardon of almost 1,600 individuals who were charged or convicted of crimes on that day makes it clear: he condones (and even encouraged) the actions taken by his supporters on that day. He and his MAGA followers seem to agree with the words quoted by Levitsky and Ziblatt from a vice president of the Republican Federation: “martyrs who can never be sufficiently praised or honored, [they] have paid with their lives…. The blood poured out on February 6, 1934 will be a seed of a great national awakening” (38).

Here is the most important conclusion that Ziblatt and Levitsky draw: the most important bulwark of a democracy is a unified rejection across all political parties of violent and anti-constitutional actions, no matter who stands to gain from those actions. And this is precisely where the Republican Party has failed the American public: it has not reaffirmed our shared democratic principles and has entirely failed to denounce efforts to bypass or destroy our democratic institutions.

Democracies get into trouble when mainstream parties tolerate, condone, or protect authoritarian extremists—when they become authoritarian enablers. Indeed, throughout history, cooperation between authoritarians and seemingly respectable semi-loyal democrats has been a recipe for democratic breakdown. (41)

The phrase “semi-loyal democrats” is key to their analysis. This is the weak link in any democracy in which there is prolonged political conflict. These are politicians who officially affirm the constitution and the rule of law; but who look for gestures and language that will establish common ground with the extremist groups and individuals whose actions most threaten constitution and the rule of law. Democratic institutions are most in peril when “semi-loyal democrats” are most numerous.

To be a loyal democrat, Ziblatt and Levitsky argue that political figures must honor four principles:

expel antidemocratic extremists from their own ranks
sever all ties — public and private — with allied groups that engage in antidemocratic behavior
unambiguously condemn political violence and other antidemocratic behavior
join forces with rival pro-democratic parties to isolate and defeat antidemocratic extremists (41-43)

By these standards, there are very few “loyal democrats” among the elected Republican members of Congress today. John McCain would fall in this category; so would Liz Cheney. Mitch McConnell does not, and, judging from the photo above, neither does Josh Hawley. There are a few others who have shown this kind of principle and courage; but it is not the majority. And this is a great risk to the continuing vitality of our democracy.

The dual state (1938)

2026-01-16T14:17:00.000-05:00

Ernst Fraenkel’s book The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship offers instructive and ominous reading today. Written during the rise of Hitler’s National-Socialist state by a German Jewish lawyer, it serves as a piece of “ethnographic study of the transformation of the authoritarian state” by a covert participant-observer. Fraenkel published The Dual State in 1941 after he left Germany and joined the faculty at the University of Chicago. Fraenkel (1896-1975) was Jewish, but he was also a veteran of World War I and was therefore exempt for a time from the expulsion of Jews from the legal profession. He wrote a detailed analysis of the creation by the Nazi regime of a dual state. His fundamental insight, explored in detail in the book, is that Hitler’s totalitarian state was in fact a “dual” state. It consisted of a fairly traditional system of laws and rules governing business, contracts, property, and other issues of ordinary life in civil society (the Normative State) and simultaneously it embodied a dictatorial state consisting of edicts and executive orders from the Hitler regime (the Prerogative State).

By the Prerogative State we mean that governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees, and by the Normative State an administrative body endowed with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, decisions of the courts, and activities of the administrative agencies. (ix)

Fraenkel’s key insight was that this duality was not transitional; it was not simply a moment in time during the process of creating a totalitarian state that governed every aspect of life in Germany. Instead, it was an ongoing necessity created by the fact that Germany required a reasonably predictable legal and business environment in which companies could do the work of preparing for a war economy. The Normative State could not overrule the dictates of the Prerogative State; but the great bulk of transactions in a modern political and economic system do not need special “one-of-a-kind” dictates to function. And at moments of conflict between the apparatus of the two states, the Prerogative State invariably prevailed.

The National-Socialist state is remarkable not only for its supreme arbitrary powers but also for the way in which it has succeeded in combining arbitrary powers with a capitalistic economic organization. One of the basic propositions of Max Weber’s works is that a rational legal system is indispensable for the operation of a capitalistic economic order. (xiv)

Reading The Dual State in 2026 creates a harrowing sense of familiarity: so many of the steps towards dictatorial rule and the Prerogative State in 1933-36 seem to have close parallels with developments in the United States today. Rule by presidential decree, empowerment of legions of unregulated “Homeland Security police”, and methodical dismissal of existing constitutional limitations on the power of the president — these developments are familiar in the US since January 2025, and Fraenkel documents highly similar steps in the creation of the National-Socialist state in 1933-36.

How did the dictatorial state get established in Germany at the end of the Weimar Republic? The answer is prophetic when we consider the strategy pursued since January 2025. Trump promised to be a “dictator for a day”, and has largely attempted to rule by Executive Order rather than by legislation through Congress. He has expressed contempt for the Federal judiciary and the Congress and has made it plain through his actions and decrees that he intends to rule by fiat. This is precisely how Hitler’s regime began, according to Fraenkel:

Martial Law provides the constitution of the Third Reich. The constitutional charter of the Third Reich is the Emergency Decree of February 28, 1933. On the basis of this decree the political sphere of German public life has been removed from the jurisdiction of the general law. Administrative and general courts aided in the achievement of this condition. The guiding basic principle of political administration is not justice; law is applied in the light of ‘the circumstances of the individual case,’ the purpose being achievement of a political aim. (1)

The legal framework of the Prerogative State was established by conferring “absolute dictatorial power [upon] the Leader and Chancellor either personally or through his subordinate authorities…. The sovereign power of the Leader and Chancellor to act unhampered by restrictions is now thoroughly legalized.” (4)

And what about the forces of repression at the command of the state? Fraenkel shows how this function devolved onto the Secret State Police (Gestapo):

Outstanding among the executive branches of the absolute dictatorship is the Secret State Police (Gestapo). This body has always been and still is organized in accordance with state law. In Prussia, the functions of the Gestapo are regulated by three statutes. The Office of the Secret Police was established in April 1933. The Secret State Police was transformed into a special police force in November 1933. The general powers of the Gestapo were finally defined by the Prussian statute of February 10, 1936, which revoked the earlier statutes. (7)

Again, there is a terrible parallel between this development in 1933 and the sudden and reckless expansion and unleashing of Homeland Security and ICE agents against the citizens of numerous US cities. Has Homeland Security become the Trump administration’s Gestapo?

The next step in the formation of the National-Socialist state in 1933 was to formally establish that the security and police organs of the state were no longer subject to legal limitation or review:

In their enforcement of the Decree of February 28, 1933, the police are neither bound by the provisions of the Constitution nor by any other law. The Prussian Supreme Court (Kammergericht) in a decision of May 31, 1935, held that ‘the Prussian Executive Decree (Durchfuhrimgsverordnung) of March 3, 1933, leaves no doubt that Par. 1 of the Decree of February 28, 1933, . . . removes all federal and state restraints on the power of the police to whatever extent is required for the execution of the aims promulgated in the decree. The question of appropriateness and necessity is not subject to appeal.’ (14)

And in fact, the Gestapo simply disregarded the rulings of high courts concerning its actions:

Although the Reichsgericht [court] supported the Supreme Administrative Court, the Gestapo disregarded its decisions. A leading official of the Gestapo, Ministerialrat Eickhoff, characterized theGestapo as a ‘general staff, responsible for the defense measures as well as the equally necessary offensive measures against all the enemies of the state.’ (18)

So any action taken by Gestapo forces was formally and legally unchallengeable. Fraenkel goes into more detail about the “abolition of judicial review” of police actions later in this same chapter, quoting a legal adviser to the Gestapo.

‘The task of combatting all movements dangerous to the state implies the power of using all necessary means, provided they are not in conflict with the law. Such conflicts with the law, however, are no longer possible since all restrictions have been removed following the Decree of February 28, 1933, and the triumph of National-Socialist legal and political theory.’ (23)

This sounds very close to the claims of “absolute immunity” that leaders within the Trump administration have asserted on behalf of Homeland Security and ICE agents in the conduct of their duties. The murder of Renée Nicole Good, it appears, will go entirely unpunished.

Essentially Fraenkel demonstrates that the Prerogative State of National Socialism depends upon the idea that the Supreme Leader and his associates have complete authority in deciding what is to be done for the nation. No courts, no legal framework, no constitution can limit that authority. Fraenkel notes that an earlier advocate for unlimited monarchical power made very similar arguments for the unlimited and unconstrained authority of the “monarch” three centuries earlier:

More than 300 years ago a similar demand was made in England. King James I, in his famous message to the Star Chamber (June 20, 1616), declared that in political questions the decision rested with the Crown and not with the Courts. ‘Encroach not upon the prerogative of the Crown. If there fall out a question that concerns my prerogative or mystery of State, deal not with it till you consult with the King or his Council or both; for they are transcendent matters … As for the absolute prerogative of the Crown, that is no subject for the tongue of a lawyer, nor is it lawful to be disputed. It is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do . . . so it is presumption and high contempt in a subject to dispute what a King can do, or say that a King cannot do this or that. (36)

No wonder the demonstrations around the United States expressing citizen resistance to the authoritarianism of the Trump regime are organized around the slogan, “No Kings!”. We live in a constitutional republic, and no individual or party is unconstrained by constitution and law.

Making a far-right activist

2025-11-25T19:52:00.004-05:00

Far-right supporters of CasaPound

How can we understand some of the factors that lead to the development of far-right beliefs and worldview in young people? Why do a certain number of people in their teens and twenties develop a political fascination with neofascism, anti-immigrant extremism, and a range of racist ideas? Is this an expression of psychopathology just waiting for a trigger? Is it the “politics of cultural despair” re-emerging in the democratic west? Is it economic hopelessness and anger?

Polish-born ethnographer Agnieszka Pasieka has spent the first years of her research career doing in-person ethnography to try to get a better understanding of this issue. Her recent Living Right: Far-Right Youth Activists in Contemporary Europe presents some of her findings. Here are a few short descriptions that she offers concerning the challenges presented to ethnographers who undertake to study far-right organizations and activists.

Transnational ethnography is not easy either. And neither is a (transnational) ethnography of the far right. This book is an attempt to come closer to an understanding of the ideas and practices driving the varied forms of far-right activism that have been unfolding in recent years, both locally and transnationally. It strives to problematize the very ideas of the “local” and the “transnational,” demonstrating, on the one hand, how ethnographic knowledge can help to unpack these notions and, on the other, how research of this sort is a lesson in humility, prompting us to recognize the limits of our ability to define and capture the nature of “here” and “there.” It similarly strives to unpack the notions of the “far-right activist” and the “far-right movement” by juxtaposing common assumptions about who they are and what they represent with the activists’ own understandings. For me, anthropology is the language that mediates this process. (22)

One point that she emphasizes throughout her work is the heterogeneity of paths, beliefs, and worldviews that the activists she studies have experienced. She does not suppose that there is a single pathway or set of causes that lead a young person from adolescent daily life to a political affinity with the far right.

It took time to see through the label “far-right activism” and begin to discover a complex landscape made up of individuals and community, coercion and choice, violence and friendliness, conformism and revolt. It was a journey during which I learned how to get close to and yet keep a distance from people I had previously not even considered talking to, and how to create a respectful research relationship (at times close to friendship) despite the fact that I could not, to say the least, respect some of their claims and actions. It is important to emphasize that although I was accepted as a travel companion, I remained a stranger, sometimes even a suspect one. (22)

Here she articulates two problems that almost any ethnographer must confront: to avoid easy generalizations, and to negotiate the relationship between one’s role as an investigator and the personal rapport that is required in order to gain understanding of the other person’s journey.

Pasieka’s 2022 article, “‘Tomorrow belongs to us’: Pathways to Activism in Italian Far-Right Youth Communities” (link), provides a compact exposure to her style of research and some of her central findings about far-right youth activism. She offers a short historical context of fascist ideology in Italy, and her account focuses on the orientation towards the future that she finds in the language and “grammar” of the fascist and neo-fascist movement. The ethnographic content of the article involves her profiles of three young Italian activists, each with a very different story about their route to what amounts to a neo-fascist set of political commitments. Here is the future-orientation of the fascist/neo-fascist ideology that she describes:

When analyzing their agenda, it appears clear that activists like to present themselves as drawing first and foremost on the “fascism-movement” period as opposed to the “fascism-regime” one (de Felice 1997[1975]). In providing this distinction, Renzo de Felice highlighted the vitality and the revolutionary character of the“fascism-movement,” its emphasis on rebirth and orientation toward the future (ibid.: 28–29). Present-day activists eagerly embrace this vocabulary, particularly the need to adhere to revolution and build a New Man, a new society, and a new civilization. Further, as the“fascism-movement” era was also the one in which the socialist component was accentuated, it corresponds with the view of far-right movements that they are the “true” defenders of the interests of their working-class compatriots. (158)

She describes Leo’s earliest interest in neo-fascist politics in these terms:

Leo explained that he had been an active member of Forza Nuova since late high school, when he joined a meeting after a short encounter with an FN member. Prior to that, he neither held views close to those of FN nor knew much about the group. The first thing he appreciated about it, and at the same time found to be most crucial, was the community’s desire to “break the mold” (uscire dagli schemi): to believe in and create a political alternative. (160)

In spite of her desire not to reach premature generalizations, she closes “Tomorrow belongs to us” by identifying “three key factors” in the appeal of neo-fascist organizations to Italian young people:

My analysis suggests three key factors. The first is the kind of community the far-right promises: this community is presented, and experienced, as having an educational and ethical mission, as focused on“doing,” as providing members with an unconditional support and, fundamentally, as a community that transcends here and now. It is a community grounded in some ideas from the past and simultaneously constituting a model for the future. This aspect best explains people’s fascination with fascism as a movement, such as Codreanu’s grassroots activism. The second factor is that the actions of this community address “injustice”—taking care of neglected co-nationals or forgotten Christians—and speak to the injustice militants claim they too experience. As I indicated, this relates to their experiences of and with ethno-religious diversity and migration which lead them to reevaluate the importance of being rooted in and valuing “national culture.” The community is thus a vehicle which recasts social solidarity in terms of cultural particularism (Feischmidt 2020). The third factor is a lofty vocabulary marking the community discourse: the weight given to altruism and sacrifice, and on their heroic mission and arduous path. Such a rhetoric further reinforces the value of belonging to the community and, by extension, helps to “identify” political opponents (as individualistic, disregarding hierarchies, and lacking any broader vision). (175)

And in Living Right she offers a similar diagnosis:

During a conversation with an Italian activist in which we discussed what made their project special, my interlocutor affirmed: “It is simple. We want people to fall in love with our view of the world. We want to reenchant the world.” Reenchantment—which is necessarily related to the experience of disenchantment and the experience of liberal modernity—opens up numerous interpretative possibilities. It encourages us to discuss the radical nationalist project against the background of a long tradition of antimodernist and anti-Enlightenment critique; to consider it as a kind of Occidentalist narrative; and finally—and perhaps unsurprisingly—to ask whether the process of disenchantment and reenchantment is what radical nationalist activists find most inspiring about the fascist project. (41)

The movements I have been researching are often dubbed fascist or neofascist. These terms are used in political speech meant to cast them as intransigent opponents as well as in scholarly work that tries to make sense of ongoing developments. I acknowledge the importance of the historical dimension both as a source of comparisons for scholars and also, perhaps more critically, as a source on which far-right activists flexibly draw in their interpretations of history, as well as in their activism, to bring about desired futures. While their use of “fascist” grammar and vocabulary is obvious, the ways they are deployed are less so. Rather than assuming activists’ relationship to the past, I ask: What do they do with the past, broadly conceived, to make it speak to the future? (41)

This seems to present a rather idealistic and forward-looking view of the appeal of the ideology of neofascism. And while Pasieka does not ignore the explicit racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Muslim language that is also associated with the Italian neofascist groups she studies, the issue of racism and xenophobia does not enter this closing diagnosis in an explicit way. She refers to “cultural particularism” in this summary, but the motivation of background religious and racial hatred and prejudice does not enter into her summary of the attraction of these parties to young people. We are left here with an impression of “idealistic young people” who are dissatisfied with “politics as usual” and want a new start. But this doesn’t seem to capture the core of neofascist politics and the appeal of these parties and activists.

Pasieka’s somewhat benign view of the motivations of young far-right activists seems to contrast fairly sharply with the findings of other ethnographic researchers of the far right, including Kathleen Blee and Cynthia Miller-Idriss. See in particular the virulent racism that Blee describes in her ethnography of the KKK and the emphasis on racism and violence offered by Blee and Creasap in their review article, “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements” (link).

Right-wing movements in the United States openly and virulently embrace racism, anti-Semitism, and/or xenophobia and promote violence. They include long-standing racist movements such as the KKK; white supremacist, neo-Nazi, and white power skinhead groups; and racialist and violent groups of nationalists and patriots (Gallaher 2004, McVeigh 2009, Zeskind 2009). Their historical orientations vary, with the KKK focused on the Confederacy of the Civil War era, neo-Nazis focused on World War II–era Nazi Germany, and nationalists/patriots focused on the 1776 American Revolution (Durham 2007). Their locations also vary, as the KKK is generally in the South and Midwest, neo-Nazis across the country, and nationalists/patriots in the West and Southwest (Flint 2004a). Most right-wing groups are viciously white supremacist and anti-Semitic, regarding non-whites and Jews as inferior, destructive, and fearsome and seeking to preserve the power and privileges of white Aryans (Blee 2007b, Fredrickson 2002). (Blee and Creasap, 275)

Likewise, Miller-Idriss emphasizes the central part played by racism in mobilization of the far right in the US in Hate in the Homeland. (I should note that Miller-Idriss offers a favorable review of Living Right in Comparative Politics.)

Consider this description offered by Tobias Jones in the Guardian (2/22/2017; link) of the CasaPound movement in Italy. As a piece of documentary journalism it complements Pasieka’s ethnographic research. After describing a covert takeover of an abandoned government office building in Rome, Jones writes:

That building became the headquarters of a new movement called CasaPound. Over the next 15 years, it would open another 106 centres across Italy. Iannone, who had been in the Italian army for three years, described each new centre as a “territorial reconquest”. Because every centre was self-financing, and because they claimed to “serve the people”, those new centres in turn opened gyms, pubs, bookshops, parachute clubs, diving clubs, motorbike clubs, football teams, restaurants, nightclubs, tattoo parlours and barbershops. CasaPound suddenly seemed everywhere. But it presented itself as something beyond politics: this was “metapolitics” , echoing the influential fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile, who wrote in 1925 that fascism was “before all else a total conception of life”. Until then, fascist revivals had usually been seen, by the Italian mainstream, as nostalgic, uncultured and thuggish. CasaPound was different. It presented itself as forward-looking, cultured, even inclusive. Iannone had been drawn to fascism in his youth because of a “fascination with the symbols”, and now he creatively mixed and matched code words, slogans and symbols from Mussolini’s ventennio” (as his 20-year rule is known), and turned them into 21st-century song lyrics, logos and political positions. In a country in which style and pose are paramount, CasaPound was fascism for hipsters. There were reports of violence, but that – for young men who felt aimless, sidelined, even emasculated – only added to the attraction. Many flocked to pay their €15 to become members.

By the early 2000s, it was no longer taboo for mainstream politicians to speak warmly of Mussolini: admirers of Il Duce had become government ministers, and many fringe, fascist parties were growing in strength – Forza Nuova, Fronte Sociale Nazionale, and various skinhead groups. But where the other fascists seemed like throwbacks to the 1930s, CasaPound focused on contemporary causes and staged creative campaigns: in 2006 they hung 400 mannequins all over Rome, with signs protesting about the city’s housing crisis. In 2012, CasaPound militants occupied the European Union’s oﬃce in Rome and dumped sacks of coal outside to protest on behalf of Italian miners. Many of their policies looked surprising: they were against immigration, of course, but on the supposedly “progressive” grounds that the exploitation of immigrant labourers represented a return to slavery.

Like Pasieka, Jones seems to be providing a kind of “progressive populist” interpretation of this resurgence of fascism — something more hip than the old-fashioned dress, language, and symbols of the crude racism of the 1950s that young people can find an affinity with. Ironically, Jones himself seems to share some of the generational cultural discontent that Pasieka’s ethnographic subjects experience as well. Here is the publisher’s description of his book about Italy, Utopian Dreams:

This is a travel book, an account of the year Tobias Jones spent living in communes and amongst unusual dreamers. It is his attempt to retreat from the ‘real world’ – which is making him emptier and angrier by the day – and seek out the alternatives to modern manners and morality. Instead of cynicism, loneliness and depression is it possible to be idealistic, find belonging and companionship? Are there really groups that transcend the opposites of individualism and community, where you can be truly yourself but also part of something else? With his wife and baby daughter in tow, Jones visits unusual orphanages, retirement villages, detox co-operatives and old-fashioned farmyards, and spends time with spiritualists, time travellers, reformed drug addicts and Quakers. He encounters wildly different communities, some more harmonious than others, which lead him to ask the deeply unfashionable question: do groups that place faith at their centre work better than those that don’t?

The role of political education in social progress

2025-11-09T12:16:00.005-05:00

Stephen Esquith has spent much of his career observing, teaching, and engaging in “conflict societies”, and trying to develop an understanding of how best to move from high-violence to low-violence societies. In particular he has spent a great deal of time in Mali in west Africa. He has come to emphasize the importance of “political education” as a critical ingredient of building an enduring and peaceful community. Here are several passages from his recent book Everyday Peacebuilding through Democratic Political Education where he expresses what he means by “political education”.

To achieve everyday peace between neighboring communities at odds with each other, democratic political education must lead to a dialogue, not just a ceasefire or a peace accord. Demobilization, development, and reintegration will have to be regularly renegotiated, and to do this will require a democratic political education that addresses the emotionally charged nature of this process. I have argued that the arts and humanities can prompt such a radically poised dialogue. (240)

Radical poise can do this collectively through a process of democratic political education that prepares citizens, prospective citizens, and conditional citizens to coordinate their antipodal abilities for self-restraint, resistance, humility, political respect for dignity, and protest. (230)

When appropriately cultivated through a democratic political education in the arts and humanities, radical poise in theory and radically poised processions in practice together have the potential to limit negative political emotions such as anger, hatred, and fear and to coordinate a countervailing set of political virtues (self-restraint, resistance, political respect, humility, and protest) necessary for everyday peacebuilding. [It is] the process of making of liberal citizens. (1,3)

We might paraphrase the idea of political education as “the cultivation, formal and informal, of the attitudes, beliefs, norms, and practices of members of society as they interact with other citizens”.

Esquith has the view that these processes can be facilitated by the arts and humanities, and that the arts and humanities can contribute significantly towards the development of expectations and attitudes that facilitate more peaceful inter-group interactions and cooperation.

Esquith criticizes the tradition of liberal political thought for its tendency to present the problem of political education as one of formulating convincing “theories of justice” based on independent purposive individuals, and for a parallel tendency to reduce citizenship to a purely formal status of individuals within a system of law. The moral status of citizens is reduced to the categories of clientelism and consumerism, in place of a richer phenomenology of inter-personal emotions, obligations, and loyalties. It becomes a transactional conception of citizenship.

In place of this abstract and flat conception of the “citizen” as rational and mutually disinterested individuals, Esquith advances a new conception of democratic social practice that he formulates as radical poise. This virtue is thought to be “capable of (1) coordinating the constituent political virtues and emotions of self-restraint, resistance, humility, political respect for civic dignity, and protest to counter the political violence that fuels forced displacement and (2) constituting a more inclusive demos that embodies these coordinated political virtues and emotions in the exercise of political power with one another, not over others” (Everyday Forms, 4-5). “To be radically poised in such moments of political vertigo is to be actively and imaginatively committed to expanding a diverse demos peacefully even when it seems to be splintering further apart.” (5).

The ideal that Esquith has in mind for a transition to a more peaceful Mali or other existing conflict societies is a powerful one. The goal is to help citizens to a new way of thinking about their society and their neighbors:

That is, to imagine a form of politics that is not a zero-sum competitive contest for power over others but rather a collaborative search for power with one another to constitute a political society, a demos, appropriate in scale and more inclusive in active membership that is capable of resisting and overcoming those forms of anger, fear, and hatred that stereotype and exploit forcibly displaced persons, refugees, immigrants, and fugitives and on which further political violence feeds. (13)

Esquith describes his own strategy in these terms:

My focus is on the prior democratic political education needed to limit negative political emotions and cultivate collective political virtues and the concomitant emotions that orient citizens, prospective citizens, and conditional citizens—the emergent demos—toward alternative conceptions of power so that changes in resource availability and the opportunities to use them can be realistically imagined as part of what I call a radically poised procession. (16)

And later:

To be more effective than the procedures for peacekeeping and peacebuilding that have focused primarily but with inadequate success on liberal state-building and retribution, a process of everyday hybrid peacebuilding through political education must be able to counter negative political emotions, cultivate positive political virtues, and reorient citizens and prospective citizens toward democratic conceptions of political power with mutual trust, imagination, and realistic hope. (87)

Here I would like to extend this line of thought by suggesting a parallel with the problem of moving from a society in which there is a high degree of racism and inter-group antagonism to one in which these negative social emotions have been replaced by more tolerant and respectful ideas about members of other groups. In particular, can the cultural strands of hate and racism that persist in the United States and other liberal democracies through some of the same mechanisms of education that Esquith considers for conflict societies? In my view, the parallel is a deep one. Consider this point about political respect as a democratic virtue:

I will use the word “respect” to refer to a particular kind of respectful political attitude toward others. To treat others with political respect is to respect their rights and responsibilities as equal citizens and to recognize their role in the generation and control of power. (118)

This understanding of respect is directly supportive of a deep conception of equality, and it is flatly incompatible with racism. So when processes of political education succeed in cultivating attitudes of political respect for one’s fellow citizens, these processes are also doing the work of dissolving racist attitudes and behaviors.

Esquith uses the concept of demos throughout the book. The concept requires some explication. He is explicit that the demos is the people of a state, and it is heterogeneous in multiple ways: norms, nationalities, ethnicities, and sometimes legal status (citizen, fugitive citizen, non-citizen). As in classical Greek political philosophy, the demos is distinctly different from the concept of the polis. The polis is held together by a civic culture and shared values; whereas the demos is the people of the nation without any assumption of bonds of loyalty, civic identity, or shared values.

An emergent demos of citizens, conditional citizens, and potential citizens—whatever their formal legal status—must learn to limit the negative political emotions of fear, anger, hatred, and resentment (their own as well as those of others) that drive the cycles of political violence in rich and poor countries alike. (9)

We might say that the role of political education is to find effective institutions, arrangements, and practices through which a demos is transformed into some version of a polis — a political community in which most or all citizens regard each other with respect and value each other’s dignity and freedoms. And this begins to sound more like the vision that Martin Luther King, Jr., described in his vision of a post-racist society, a beloved community.

Affirming democracy

2025-11-06T11:27:00.003-05:00

If you are concerned about the fate of our democratic institutions, the rise of xenophobia and hate, and the rule of law, please consider visiting affirmingdemocracy.org — an ongoing group blog aimed at affirming our democracy and opposing the racism, lawlessness, and authoritarianism we now face.

This group blog describes its goals in these terms —

We are a small group of friends and neighbors who reject the turn to authoritarianism, racism, and lawlessness shown by the current Federal administration. This site will serve as a hub for sharing stories and discussions about the realities facing our country and our many communities.

We support a just and equal multicultural democracy, governed by law and constitution, and we want to work together to return our country to these values. In Rousseau’s words, we support a “free community of equals”.

We have many thoughts and fears about the policies and actions of our government today. We do not have a shared credo, but we are united in our love of freedom, equality, constitution, mutual respect, and civil community.

In particular, many of us notice many of the same things:

We condemn the assault on immigrants and the cruel and lawless enforcement regime the Federal government has enacted.
We are horrified at the assault on Medicaid and the likely effects these policy changes will have on millions of people in our country.
We reject the administration’s attack on scientific and medical research, universities, and academic freedom across the country.
We fear for the future of our country when we consider the ongoing assault on medical research and sound public health planning.
We condemn the current administration for its lawlessness and its contempt for both Constitution and the Federal judiciary.
We abhor the administration’s efforts to censor and dictate the museums, libraries, parks, and collections that document our country’s history and share its art, music, and literature.
We are ashamed of our government’s desertion of Ukraine and the president’s embrace of a bloody-handed dictator, Vladimir Putin.
We are horrified at the embrace of white supremacy and racial resentment that is encouraged by the current government.
We reject the government’s war on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, with full awareness of how far our society must go in order to achieve real justice.

Readers of Affirming Democracy are encouraged to find their own ways of supporting peaceful protest and advocacy in support of our shared democratic values and institutions. There is power in collective protest and shared support for our constitutional system.

A guide to being a sociologist

2025-10-29T22:17:00.020-04:00

Karl Marx Imagined

The social world is more complex and heterogeneous than most parts of the natural world, with diverse causal processes, different tempos of change, and multiple influences on a given outcome of interest. If we want to understand, say, why American psychiatry came to have the institutions and prescriptions that it currently has (as Andrew Abbott wants to do in The System of Professions), we need to consider —

actors at a range of levels (local people, state officials, educational institutions and associations …) who have an interest in the definition of mental-health practices, institutions, and regulations
the legal and educational context that affects the interests and strategies of various practitioners differently
the ways in which other professions connected to mental health and behavior (such as nursing or street-level policing) have influenced the development of the profession of psychiatry

… and many other factors and processes that do not yield to the impulse towards simple answers or single-dimensional hypotheses.

So the intellectual process of sociological inquiry and discovery is itself a complex and obscure one. The reader of a rich sociological analysis of a complex institution like Abbott’s treatment of the professions will quickly understand that this research project could not have been drafted out in detail in advance. Rather, the researcher was obliged to discover his or her own questions and insights as they dig more deeply into the specific institutional and practical realities of the profession. And this leads us to ask, what kinds of intellectual and imaginative capacities are invoked in this evolving analysis? To what extent does sociological theory contribute to a researcher’s ability to understand a new and complex social phenomenon? What is involved in applying a “sociological imagination” to a sociological topic?

David Stark’s Practicing Sociology: Tacit Knowledge for the Social Scientific Craft is a contribution to current thinking about methods of inquiry and uses of theory in sociological research. Stark is an organizational sociologist who has devoted a great deal of attention to “how organizations learn”.

The title is deliberately thought-provoking: is the process of investigating the social world a “craft”, or is it a set of precise methods that can be taught in PhD programs? The difference in perspective on this question is important: a craft involves something like “tacit knowledge”, whereas a precise set of methods sounds quite a lot like an algorithm of discovery. Stark’s view, and the view of many of the contributors to the volume, is that there are important aspects of the practice of sociology that are indeed “craft”-like. They are features of the active lives of academic sociologists that need to be learned through concrete practice in the discipline.

Stark’s introduction to the volume lays the ground for the contributions that follow. He argues that important parts of the research process within the social sciences are almost never addressed within graduate education. Three activities in particular are important: the researcher must “(1) come up with a compelling research topic …; (2) develop a publication strategy; and (3) learn how to improve a manuscript while navigating the process of peer review” (p. 1). And Stark suggests that these topics are both crucial to impactful sociological research, and at the same time, substantially under-developed when it comes time to assist young sociologists to make the transition from learners to researchers and creators of knowledge. Stark’s own comments focus on what are somewhat epiphenomenal aspects of the process of research — deciding who your audience is, choosing a title, making productive academic relationships in fields different from your own. Notably, however, Stark’s comments do not connect at all to the problems of deciding how to proceed empirically, how to define the research questions of interest in one’s project, how to decide about the theoretical or explanatory ideas that might be relevant to this topic. And yet these are in fact closest to the problem of conducting innovative, illuminating research on a difficult sociological topic.

The book consists of short commentaries in which a number of established scholars attempt to formulate their own answers to these three questions. And the contributions are excellent, written by highly creative and productive contributors to a range of fields of contemporary sociology.

The book is presented as a series of discussions of how a range of accomplished sociologists have sought to better understand the social world. But that’s not really what we get. Instead, in line with Stark’s emphasis on the “craft” of sociology, the contributors are mostly inclined to reflect on their own practices of writing and publication through an extended career. And this often comes down to mundane questions about choosing a potential publisher (book or journal article), how to respond most productively to feedback on a piece of work, how to decide when an article or book is “finished”, how to balance conference invitations and ongoing work within one’s own well defined research program, and similar pragmatic questions that arise for working academics. But we don’t get much insight into the creative intellectual work in which the sociologist engages. The contributors are themselves imaginative and innovative sociologists; but none of them really addresses the intellectual and imaginative processes involved in sociological research. Rather, we get pragmatic reflections about which kinds of publication venues are best for pursuing tenure at a research university, or how much time to spend on reviewers’ comments on a submitted manuscript.

We could ask whether the figure in the AI-generated image above conformed to any of Stark’s recommendations. And the answer seems to be almost universally “no”. Marx’s titles were unintuitive and unrevealing about the material in his manuscript; he gave virtually no thought to his “audience”; he had little interest in interdisciplinary discovery and collaboration; and Marx’s own published work was only a tiny fraction of his total corpus. He seems not to have thought at all about the pragmatic challenges raised by Stark. And similar comments seem in order for other founders”and early contributors to the scientific discipline of sociology — Tarde, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, or Merton. Of course there is a bit of “selection bias” here, but these figures all turned out to have great impact within their intellectual worlds.

Confronting race through Rawls's political philosophy

2025-10-02T15:25:00.000-04:00

Rawls believes that a just society must be a pluralistic society, and that means that it must be neutral across (reasonable) comprehensive conceptions of the good. Citizens must be enabled to pursue their own comprehensive conceptions without interference from the state. Does this imply that a comprehensive conception based on the idea of ethnic or racial superiority over another must be condoned? It does not, because Rawls is not in fact neutral across all comprehensive conceptions. He believes there is a background condition that is both morally and sociologically necessary for the maintenance of a just society — the requirement that recognizes equal freedoms, dignity, and opportunity for all groups of citizens and that cultivates citizens who share these commitments. This has a very powerful implication: Rawls’s theory implies the urgent need for finding means of developing citizens who embody respect, tolerance, and compassion for others. This means finding effective means of reducing and eliminating racism in our society.

Consider this short text from section 7 of Political Liberalism:

Think, then, of the principles of justice as designed to form the social world in which our character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our comprehensive views and their conceptions of the good, are first acquired, and in which our moral powers must be realized, if they are to be realized at all. These principles must give priority to those basic freedoms and opportunities in background institutions of civil society that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place, and to understand our role as persons with that status. (Political Liberalism, 41)

This paragraph merits close attention. Let’s start with the idea of “forming the social world in which our character … as well as our comprehensive views … are first acquired”. This is an acknowledgement of the plasticity of character, conception of the good, and moral powers in real human beings. These features of the person must be acquired, and they are shaped and influenced by the circumstances in which the individual develops. This introduces a fundamental aspect of historicity into the question of justice: a society both shapes the individuals who constitute it and is the result of the moral identities of past generations of individuals. Moral development is a crucial part of the creation and maintenance of a just society.

This idea has an important implication: a society founded on “bad” institutions, practices, and principles will result in the creation of individual persons — the constituents of the next phase of the social order — who are morally flawed. And this implies that the society that they play a role in creating will itself be morally flawed.

As an example, imagine a society in which sons and daughters are treated very differently within the family, with sons having a privileged role and daughters being expected to behave in subordinate ways and to accept different kinds of opportunities (schooling, employment, sports). How will the institutions and social arrangements of adult society be affected by this feature of family behavior? The answer seems clear: privilege and subordination between boys and girls in the family will seem “natural” and this inequality will carry over into civil society. The institutions of a society consisting of individuals shaped within these family norms and practices will themselves reflect the domination and subordination associated with familial roles for boys and girls.

So what kind of principles and practices must a healthy just society embody? The final two sentences of the paragraph bring the point home. The background principles of a just society “must give priority to those basic freedoms and opportunities … that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place, and to understand our role as persons with that status.” Conversely, a society that does not give priority to equality and basic freedoms will result in generations of citizens who are unable to become “free and equal citizens”. Such a society requires reform before it can become a just and equal democracy.

So a just society over time needs to ensure the legal, normative, and institutional principles that establish basic (and equal) freedoms and opportunities. This means that social, familial, or cultural practices that are inconsistent with equal freedoms and opportunities must be altered. The practice of treating daughters as subordinate is toxic to the creation of a just society because it fails to embody the conditions required for creating men and women who understand themselves as free and equal citizens, and who respect each other accordingly.

This line of thought has direct relevance to the history of racism and racial discrimination in the United States and other countries. It is part of what Charles Mills is getting at in his critique of “the racial contract”. If racial subordination and discrimination are woven into the experience of childhood and young adulthood, then the ambient social institutions and practices fail the test Rawls is proposing. They fail to give priority “to basic freedoms and opportunities … that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place”. It is therefore a first priority that such a society, and the state that governs such a society, must make strenuous and sustained efforts at reforming the social environment in which citizens form their “moral powers” and develop their comprehensive conceptions of the good. That means finding effective ways of removing racial subordination and racist ways of thinking from society.

It is a fact that creating a just society is a process of “boot-strapping”, in which one series of improvements lays the basis for new improvements at the next level. Establishing legal and political equality for all groups — a basic tenet of progressive liberalism in the 1950s — was a pressing goal. It is not yet achieved. The next pressing goal is to find ways of changing the experiences that children and young adults have of inter-group relations. Forms of behavior and ideas of prejudice are formed through lived experience; so teachers, family members, members of civic associations and places of worship, and political leaders can provide powerful and transformative examples that cultivate mutual respect, tolerance, and compassion across groups.

But the point to emphasize here is that both activities — establishing equal constitutional rights and liberties, and changing the developmental environment so as to cultivate attitudes of respect, tolerance, and compassion for others — both these activities are mandatory for a “becoming-just” society, according to Rawls’s prescriptions here. The goal of both kinds of reforms is the same: to “enable us to become free and equal citizens” and to participate fully in a just and multicultural society.

Grounds for impeachment

2025-09-30T11:57:00.001-04:00

In his speech to the top officers of the United States military Donald Trump has crossed the line from reckless right-wing authoritarian politician to aspiring fascist dictator. Here is a report from the Washington Post on the unprecedented event; scroll down to Amy Wang’s coverage of his speech. Here are some crucial excerpts from her reporting.

In his speech to top military leaders, President Donald Trump escalated his rhetoric against the “radical left,” repeatedly calling the group “the enemy within” and insisting that he should be able to use military force in American cities.

“I told [Defense Secretary] Pete [Hegseth] we should use some of these dangerous cities as training grounds for our military National Guard. But military, because we’re going into Chicago,” Trump said Tuesday at Quantico, referring to his efforts to deploy military to blue cities and states “to keep domestic order and peace.”

Though Trump has, in recent months, frequently attacked blue cities and states, it was the first time he directly addressed military leaders and told them they would be “a major part” of fighting a “war from within” in cities such as San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Los Angeles.

“We’ve brought back the fundamental principle that defending the homeland is the military’s first and most important priority. That’s what it is,” Trump said. “Only in recent decades that politicians somehow come to believe that our job is to police the far reaches of Kenya and Somalia, while America is under invasion from within. We’re under invasion from within. No different than a foreign enemy, but more difficult in many ways because they don’t wear uniforms — at least when they’re wearing a uniform, you can take them out. These people don’t have uniforms, but we are under invasion from within, and we’re stopping it very quickly.”

Dangerous cities … enemy within … invasion from within … demonization of the “radical left” … This is not the language of an American president who is committed to democracy, constitution, equal rights, and the rule of law. This is not the language of a president who respects the idea of a non-political military. It is not the language of a president who respects the rights of citizens to assemble, to protest, to express their values and their opposition in a peaceful manner. It is rather the language of a Mussolini in Italy, a Pinochet in Chile, or a Juan Carlos Ongania in Argentina in 1966.

And who is the “radical left” to whom Trump refers? It seems to be any person or group who disagrees with the MAGA agenda, who objects to Trump’s lawlessness, who rejects the racism and cruelty of his anti-immigration crusade — in short, anyone who is not MAGA. Are reporters next? What about critical bloggers and Youtube hosts or podcasters? What about leaders of civil rights organizations who object to the explicit racism of ICE profiling on the streets of Chicago or Los Angeles? And how about Democrat senators and congressmen and women who oppose Trump’s plans? Are these the “radical left” that Trump wants to wage war against? Is James Comey just the first high-profile persecution by Trump’s Department of Justice that we will see? Are we talking detention camps for liberals? Are we thinking of firing professors whose courses mention racism and slavery?

We have a constitution, and it is very clear about our fundamental rights — rights of freedom of speech, conscience, association, and habeas corpus, and yes, citizenship by birthright. The president demonstrates that he has no respect or adherence to the principles and values that are embodied in our constitution and our system of law.

The president’s threats about waging war against “internal enemies” and using the military to conduct such an assault should be the basis for impeachment. These threats demonstrate a fundamental disregard and disloyalty to our most basic principles of freedom and equality. This shouldn’t be a political party issue; it concerns the loyalty of the president to the constitution of the United States, and the oath he took when he assumed office. Articles of impeachment now!

Racial assumptions in western political philosophy

2025-09-24T14:30:00.000-04:00

A prior post asked whether liberal political philosophy can be “anti-racist”. Charles Mills addresses a related question in much more radical terms. He offers a fundamental critique of European/American liberal philosophy grounded in his view that the “social contract” tradition embodies a comprehensive “racial contract” that embodies racial hierarchy and white supremacy. Here is Mills’s critical overview of the social contract tradition from Hobbes to Rawls:

The social contract is, by definition, classically voluntaristic, modeling the polity on a basis of individualized consent. What justifies the authority of the state over us is that “we the people” agreed to give it that authority. (On the older, “feudal” patriarchal model, by contrast—the model of Sir Robert Filmer, Locke’s target in the Second Treatise—people were represented as being born into subordination.) The legitimacy of the state derives from the freely given consent of the signatories to transfer or delegate their rights to it, and its role in the mainstream moralized/constitutionalist version of the contract (Lockean/Kantian) is, correspondingly, to protect those rights and safeguard the welfare of its citizens. The liberal-democratic state is then an ethical state, whether in the minimalist, night-watchman Lockean version of enforcing noninterference with citizens’ rights or in the more expansive redistributivist version of actively promoting citizens’ welfare. In both cases the liberal state is neutral in the sense of not privileging some citizens over others. Correspondingly, the laws that are passed have as their rationale this juridical regulation of the polity for generally acceptable moral ends.

This idealized model of the liberal-democratic state has, of course, been challenged from various political directions over the past century or so: the recently revived Hegelian moral critique from the perspective of a competing, allegedly superior ideal, a communitarian state seeking actively to promote a common conception of the good; the degraded version of this in the fascist corporatist state; the anarchist challenge to all states as usurping bodies of legitimized violence; and what has been the most influential radical critique up till recently, the Marxist analysis of the state as an instrument of class power, so that the liberal-democratic state is supposedly unmasked as the bourgeois state, the state of the ruling class.

My claim is that the model of the Racial Contract shows us that we need another alternative, another way of theorizing about and critiquing the state: the racial, or white-supremacist, state, whose function inter alia is to safeguard the polity as a white or white-dominated polity, enforcing the terms of the Racial Contract by the appropriate means and, when necessary, facilitating its rewriting from one form to another. (Racial Contract, 111-112)

Mills is especially critical of the choice made by modern liberal social contract theorists like John Rawls to restrict their attention to “ideal theory of justice” without paying attention to the actual systemic injustices that US society embodied. In particular, he is highly critical of the fact that these liberal political philosophers have completely ignored the history and current realities of racial domination and oppression in the United States. He argues, along the lines of the main argument in Racial Contract, that this reflects the continued hegemony of the assumptions of White / European supremacy that he maintains were present within social contract theory from its beginnings.

The retreat of mainstream normative moral and political theory into an “ideal” theory that ignores race merely rescripts the Racial Contract as the invisible writing between the lines. So John Rawls, an American working in the late twentieth century, writes a book on justice widely credited with reviving postwar political philosophy in which not a single reference to American slavery and its legacy can be found, and Robert Nozick creates a theory of justice in holdings predicated on legitimate acquisition and transfer without more than two or three sentences acknowledging the utter divergence of U.S. history from this ideal. (Mills 1997, Racial Contract, 106)

And in Black Rights / White Wrongs (2017) he argues:

Rawls and Nozick may be in conflict over left-wing versus right-wing liberalism, but both offer us idealized views of the polity that ignore the racial subordination rationalized by racial liberalism. Rawls and Sandel may be in conflict over contractarian liberalism versus neo-Hegelian communitarianism, but neither confronts how the whiteness of the actual American contract and its conception of the right and of the actual American community and its conception of the good affects their views of justice and the self. Late Rawls may be in conflict with early Rawls about political versus comprehensive liberalism, but neither addresses the question of the ways in which both versions have been shaped by race , whether through an ” overlapping consensus ” (among whites) or a “reflective equilibrium” (of whites). (Mills 2017 : 32)

An important manifestation of the importance of features of “imperfect justice” is the fact that a current generation of society may embody ways of thinking, stereotypes, and prejudices that serve to reproduce racist, sexist, or religious discrimination in the next generation. Is there any doubt that cultures of discrimination, disparagement, and bias continue to exist in American society? Of course not; the persistence of these attitudes and behaviors are all too evident, even when expressed in indirect and “socially acceptable” ways. And these attitudes and emotions have consequences for the freedoms of the men and women who are the object of these prejudices. Mills writes in The Racial Contract:

Similarly, a study of how “American apart-heid” is maintained points out that whereas in the past realtors would have simply refused to sell to blacks, now blacks “are met by a realtor with a smiling face who, through a series of ruses, lies, and deceptions, makes it hard for them to learn about, inspect, rent, or purchase homes in white neighborhoods. . . . Because the discrimination is latent, however, it is usually unobservable, even to the person experiencing it. One never knows for sure.” (Mills 1997 [quoting Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, 84, 97-98]

This is one concrete mechanism of cross-generational racial domination. A few minutes of reflection can allow us to identify numerous other mechanisms through which current racialized thinking leads to future racial domination and disparity. For example, health disparities often derive from assumptions made by caregivers based on racial or gender stereotypes — sometimes entirely unconsciously. Employment decisions are influenced by stereotyped assumptions about a person based on gender, race, or ethnicity. The racial assumptions and attitudes of police officers often lead to differential treatment of members of the public, including increased likelihood of excessive force and firearms against one group as compared to another. And there are many other examples as well.

Failing to consider “non-ideal justice” is crippling for political philosophy, because it leaves completely unspoken the moral fact that discrimination, oppression, and violence are morally and socially unacceptable and that these evils are pervasive in contemporary society; and it leaves no place for focused thinking about how to move from a non-ideal society to a more just society.

So far Mills offers a damning view of the social contract tradition. However, in Black Rights / White Wrongs he suggests that Rousseau does a better job of bringing “domination” into the discussion of justice and the state. Here he draws extensively from Rousseau’s discussion in the First and Second Discourses:

Rousseau can be seen as initiating an alternative, radical democratic strain in contract theory, one that seeks to expose the realities of domination behind the façade and ideology of liberal consensuality. He retains the two key insights captured by the contract metaphor, the constructed nature of the polity and the recognition of human moral equality, but he incorporates them into a more realistic narrative that shows how they are perverted. Some human beings come to dominate others, denying them the equality they enjoyed in the state of nature. (Mills 2017: 36)

Rousseau, then, is at least open to the idea that “non-ideal” features of social life demand philosophical attention. This view creates an entrance for a more fully anti-racist political philosophy within the social contract tradition. It aligns with the political philosophy of republicanism and Philip Pettit’s views in Republicanism : a theory of freedom and government (link), in that Mills’s remarks here emphasize “freedom as non-domination”. If freedom means a set of social arrangements in which no individual or group has the power to dominate others, then a constitution guaranteeing freedom is one that authorizes appropriate steps for recognizing and ending past and present forms of domination.

Mills’s criticisms of the social contract tradition are highly negative. Mills seems to suggest that the tradition is entirely useless as a basis for thinking about justice. However, a more nuanced view would allow that this tradition has largely ignored racial domination, a gaping blindspot that demands correction; but that the abstract philosophical principles through which Rawls, Locke, or Rousseau reasoned about freedom, equality, and consent are indeed appropriate principles for thinking about the just society. Suitably embedded in a philosophy that acknowledges categorical inequality and racism, these principles can in fact be quite radical in their implications for needed reform. And it is worth noting that Rawls does not ignore racial discrimination completely; rather, he looks at its injustice as being obvious and beyond debate. His restatement of this point in Justice as Fairness emphasizes the topic of domination and subservience in language that converges with that of Pettit:

Significant political and economic inequalities are often associated with inequalities of social status that encourage those of lower status to be viewed both by themselves and by others as inferior. This may arouse widespread attitudes of deference and servility, on one side, and a will to dominate and arrogance on the other. These effects of social and economic inequalities can be serious evils and the attitudes they engender great vices… Fixed status ascribed by birth, or by gender or race, is particularly odious (Justice as Fairness, 131).

Particularly odious … that doesn’t sound like a silent endorsement of racial discrimination and domination.

Rawls also addresses the religious arguments used by the abolitionists and by Martin Luther King, Jr., in the context of the issue of public reason versus “comprehensive reason” (arguments based on a particular comprehensive conception of the good). From the point of view of justice, only public reasons have force, since there is no politically relevant comprehensive conception of the good.

On this account the abolitionists and the leaders of the civil rights movement did not go against the ideal of public reason; or rather, they did not provided they thought, or on reflection would have thought (as they certainly could have thought), that the comprehensive reasons they appealed to were required to give sufficient strength to the political conception to be subsequently realized. To be sure, people do not normally distinguish between comprehensive and public reasons; nor do they normally affirm the ideal of public reason, as we have expressed it. Yet people can be brought to recognize these distinctions in particular cases. The abolitionists could say, for example, that they supported political values of freedom and equality for all, but that given the comprehensive doctrines they held and the doctrines current in their day, it was necessary to invoke the comprehensive grounds on which those values were widely seen to rest.289 Given those historical conditions, it was not unreasonable of them to act as they did for the sake of the ideal of public reason itself. In this case, the ideal of public reason allows the inclusive view. (Political Liberalism, 251)

His view is that both the 19th-century abolitionists and civil rights activists like MLK made compelling arguments because their “comprehensive” (religious) arguments are entirely supported by public arguments based on equality and equal freedom. Here again, it seems clear that Rawls’s underlying view is one that regards racial inequalities as fundamentally unjust, within the terms of justice as fairness. Though Rawls did not explicitly put this point forward, it is a strong endorsement of the justice of the demands for equality being advanced by the civil rights movement in the 1960s.

Tommie Shelby has done substantial work in attempting to help thread the way between the ideal theory offered by Rawls and the concrete, sociological and historical realities of racial oppression that Mills believes must be incorporated into theories of the just society. Shelby’s 2017 book Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform offers an extensive and nuanced reformulation of “justice as fairness” in terms that do take racial oppression into account. Here is a key paragraph:

Rawls has suggested that if we were to conceive of society as a system of social cooperation over time and took an impartial view of what the distribution of benefi ts and burdens of participating in this scheme ought to be, we could arrive at conclusions about what social justice requires that warrant our rational assent. The idea of society as a fair system of cooperation is a moral notion to be used in the evaluation of institutional arrangements. Social justice is constituted by the legitimate claims and responsibilities individuals have within a fair overall social arrangement. Thought about in this way, justice is a matter of reciprocity between persons who regard each other as equals. Taking this approach to questions of social justice is particularly apt when considering criticisms often made against the ghetto poor. It provides a framework for settling whether the urban poor are doing their fair share in upholding the system of cooperation and whether they are receiving the fair share due them as equal participants in this system. Reciprocity, as a central value in liberal political morality, is the primary normative standpoint from which I reflect on family structure, joblessness, and crime in ghetto neighborhoods. (Dark Ghettos, 20)

Mills in turn expresses his own disagreement with Shelby’s approach to Rawls in “Dark Mores: Some Comments on Tommie Shelby’s Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform“. Shelby offers a concise summary of his own position in “Racial realities and corrective justice: A reply to Charles Mills” (Critical Philosophy of Race 1:2 (2013)):

In all these interventions, the main thrust of Mills’s critique is to emphasize the need to attend carefully to the realities of racial domination and to deny the value of a normative theory that abstracts away from the actual history of racial injustice. However, this critique has been mainly negative, telling us how not to derive principles of racial justice. Apart from vague suggestions that reparations are due for past racial injustices (e.g., for slavery and land expropriation), the positive normative analysis remains undeveloped. What we get instead is an emphasis on the necessity of getting the historical facts right about white supremacy. Mills does not offer his own positive normative principles for condemning or responding to the history of racial domination that he so forcefully describes. By contrast, Rawls does offer a specific set of normative principles of justice that, I argue, can be usefully applied to racial subordination. Mills, so far as I am aware, does not argue that if we were to follow his methodological approach we would arrive at principles that conflict with the ones that Rawls defends. Nor does he specifically attack or attempt to reformulate Rawls’s principles. So our dispute does not turn on the content of those two principles. (link)

Both Mills and Shelby offer deep and valuable new lines of thought to political philosophy, and their debate is a sign of healthy engagement within a field of philosophy that has sometimes come down to disagreements about the third decimal point. Bringing structures of race and domination into the dialogue within political philosophy is profoundly important.

Can liberal political philosophy support anti-racism?

2025-09-05T15:05:00.000-04:00

John Rawls and Philip Pettit agree about the idea that a liberal democracy depends on the idea that all citizens have equal liberties, rights, worth, and dignity. Therefore they also agree that social and legal arrangements that are incompatible with equal rights, equal liberties, and equal dignity are illegitimate. They disagree in some details about what all of this means — Pettit refers to liberty as “the absence of domination” (link), while Rawls emphasizes the liberty to pursue one’s conception of the good in the way he or she chooses (link). But the common ground between these leading advocates of liberal democracy is extensive. And each philosopher provides an unequivocal basis for rejecting mistreatment and discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or other social characteristics.

What is less clear is whether either of these philosophers has a place for the idea that an inclusive multicultural democracy — in Rousseau’s conception, a “free community of equals” — has a positive value for the whole of society, and whether enhancing this value is itself a legitimate function of a democratic state. These are separate questions, and it is possible that Rawls and Pettit would affirm the first but deny the second. Rawls’s view in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism is largely that the function of the state is (1) to establish and secure the system of law within which all citizens enjoy maximal, equal rights and liberties, and (2) to establish a legitimate majoritarian process through which policies and laws are enacted subject to the authority of the majority of citizens. Anything more extensive than this falls outside the scope of legitimate exercise of coercive authority, according to Rawls. His distinction between a “political conception of the good” and a “comprehensive conception of the good” is crucial for his view of the scope of the state’s authority: the former consists of the minimal commitments that all citizens share concerning the functions and limitations of the state and its legal system; whereas the latter consists of a fully developed set of ideas and values that individuals or groups may adopt for orienting their lives and activities, but concerning which the liberal state must remain neutral (link).

So, for example, the state cannot undertake on its own, without democratically enacted legislation, to ensure a beautiful natural environment, simply on a governmental judgement that “all of society is better off when the natural environment is maintained for public enjoyment”. For Rawls, this judgment falls within a “comprehensive conception of the good”, and cannot be taken as a function of government without majority-supported legislation. By contrast, the state is fully authorized to enact rules and procedures that guarantee free and unfettered elections, because the right to vote is a fundamental democratic right shared equally by all citizens and part of the “overlapping consensus” (the political conception of the good) required for any democracy.

We can raise this question from two related perspectives: the perspective of idealized political philosophy (abstract theorizing about what constitutes a good and well-ordered society and state) and the perspective of the minimum legal and constitutional requirements needed to ensure the equal liberties and rights of individual citizens (minimalist theory). The first is intended to articulate a vision for the future of social life within a democratic society, while the second perspective is intended to articulate the protections of rights and liberties that every legitimate state must embody.

Is there a basis in the “minimalist” version of the liberal democratic state that gives broad authority to government as well as private and public organizations to take positive measures to cultivate attitudes of racial acceptance and respect among their constituents? Can a liberal democratic state enact a set of arrangements through which citizens will learn the values of tolerance and compassion, and learn of the harmful effects of attitudes involving negative stereotypes about members of other groups? And if the answer is that government itself cannot undertake such measures, are private organizations and relatively autonomous public institutions free to do so when it comes to organizing the functioning, supervision, and training of an agency, a private workplace, or a university? Or does the minimalist perspective on political philosophy involve only restrictions on actions that harm others or reduce the freedoms of others, with no basis for undertaking to change how people think? Perhaps “cultivating mutual tolerance, interest, and respect” is itself a value about which reasonable people may differ.

We might imagine, for example, a “liberal cultural separatist” who fully endorses and respects the equal civil and legal rights of member of other groups, and this person condemns discrimination against individuals based on their particular characteristics. However, this person prefers to associate with members of his/her own group and believes that others should do so as well. “Separation of groups is best for the social order,” according to this version of the good society. If so, then according to Rawls the goal of “building a tolerant and inter-connected society” belongs to a “comprehensive conception of the good”, and the state must remain neutral about this value. Citizens are entirely free to form their own associations and advocacy groups around these values, but the state must not take a side.

To put the point somewhat differently, are the ideas of tolerance, compassion, and respect simply specific visions of inter-group relations, to be debated alongside a number of competing views as “comprehensive conceptions of the good” — with the implication that this particular vision cannot be enforced through state mandates? A traditional liberal like John Stuart Mill (and perhaps Rawls as well) might argue that if the values of a tolerant and respectful society make up a compelling idea, then advocates should be able to persuade a majority of citizens to agree. In that case these programs can be democratically enacted through enabling legislation. But if the idea remains “visionary and confined to a small minority” then the state cannot use its coercive power to enact policies based on this vision of a more tolerant society.

On this line of thought the answer to the question is not much different from the formulation offered by J.S. Mill: liberalism is committed to individual freedoms, including freedom of speech and association, and these commitments are fundamental. So the legal system must give substantial deference to the opinions, statements, and programs of individuals, and much of the same deference is due to private and public institutions as well. The task of struggling for anti-racism, toleration, mutual respect, and communication across major racial and ethnic divisions is to be left to private associations rather than to state legislative authority.

On this view of a liberal society, individuals and their free associations have the right to advocate for an inclusive multicultural democracy, and for the steps needed to create such a world. What about other organizations? Is it legitimate for businesses, public school systems, colleges and universities, and labor unions to adopt similar resolutions? Is it legitimate for these organizations within civil society to enact procedures and requirements within their scope that are designed to influence the thinking and behavior of the individuals who make up those organizations? Do private organizations like businesses, private universities, and non-profit organizations have a zone of autonomy that permits them to undertake “pro-inclusiveness” policies, procedures, and training regimes? And what about organizations owned or directed by the “liberal cultural separatists” considered above — do they too have autonomy to enact processes that further embed prejudice and stereotype?

What seems to be lacking within liberalism, both traditional and contemporary, is a way of coping with “imperfect justice” and the fact that the current generation of society may embody ways of thinking, stereotypes, and prejudices that serve to reproduce racist, sexist, or religious discrimination in the next generation. (Charles Mills explores these ideas in The Racial Contract and Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism.) However, to go beyond racism, it seems clear that a process of moral transformation is needed. Children, young people, and adults need to come to understand the history of racist thinking and action in our country and to recognize the value of respecting the equality and dignity of members of other groups.

The assault on “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” programs in universities, corporations, and government departments currently underway (link) seems to reflect a status quo mentality when it comes to racial prejudice and stereotype: “we are who we are, and there is no need for change”. More bluntly, it reflects an ideology of white supremacy. But as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. expressed so vividly, racial equality and justice will only come to pass when the people of our nation have undertaken the hard work of confronting the realities and persistence of racism. Personal transformation is a necessary step on the way to human equality.

These reflections suggest that liberal theories of justice like those offered by Pettit and Rawls need to be supplemented by two things: (1) A clear and developed elaboration of the value of a pluralistic multicultural democracy based on real equality and respect across groups. Such an account will demonstrate both the value of such a society and its connection to profound ideas about liberty, equality, and humanity. (2) A clear account of the extended processes of learning that will be needed to get from here to there. Such an account will incorporate a realistic appraisal of the ways in which persistent racial attitudes and habits inform the next generation’s social environment as well, and it will provide some ideas about how to accomplish these transformations at multiple levels. Achieving racial justice, and ending antagonism and mistrust across groups in society, requires good laws, but it also requires sustained processes of personal transformation for citizens of all ages.

A political philosophy for an inclusive multicultural democracy

2025-09-05T14:05:00.002-04:00

We might say that a political philosophy is a formulation of the normative ideals that the philosopher holds to be primary in implementing the moral and social facts of “assemblages of free individuals in society, with conflicts of interest and belief”. How should such a society be organized? What values should it aspire to realize through its laws and practices? What forms of constitution, law, and state are best for the realization of the individuals who live within the society?

Here I want to lay out the skeleton of a political philosophy incorporating the ideals of an inclusive multicultural democracy. I maintain that a stable and inclusive multicultural democracy is a positive value for the whole of society: all citizens are benefited by a varied and harmonious population of peoples with distinct traditions, values, and practices. This is a society in which there are many groups and identities in society (racial, ethnic, sexual, class, nationality), and in which members of these groups have the moral emotions of compassion and respect towards members of other groups. Difference exists without discrimination and prejudice; more fundamentally, difference exists within the context of a cohesive sense of shared community. Rather than antagonism there is friendship across groups.

This political philosophy corresponds closely to many of the ideas about racial justice formulated by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. during his efforts to find a way towards greater racial justice in the United States. Several ideas in King’s political philosophy stand out in particular. First, his idea of the “Beloved Community” emphasizes that the transformations needed to achieve a good multiracial society go beyond establishing formal legal equality for all, to enhancing the moral emotions of compassion and mutual caring as human beings [“Birth of a New Nation” (1957), “Facing the Challenge of a New Age” (1957), “Stride Toward Freedom” (1958)]. The multiracial society that King envisioned involves a cohesive community of mutual respect, understanding, and compassion. Second, King’s discussions of a future for racial justice in America and other countries always invokes the need for moral transformation — for a change in the way that people think about their fellow human beings with compassion and respect. Third, King’s conception of a just future invokes a deep recognition of shared humanity across race, ethnicity, and other group identities. This advances the idea that citizens in a just multicultural democracy will experience the moral emotions of compassion and respect for each other. King described this as a kind of “civic friendship” in which people from different groups succeed in living together harmoniously and leads them to experience a sense of goodwill and shared identity with their fellow citizens.

All of this requires moral transformation of generations of citizens. Freedom from discrimination, violence, and prejudice is only the beginning of a good multiracial society. Rather, real, concrete human beings need to come to think and feel differently about their humanity and the humanity of others around them.

For King these ideas are placed within a religious or spiritual interpretation, but the theological point is not essential; the values King articulates can be equally endorsed from a purely secular and humanist point of view.

What are those good effects thought to follow from achieving a “harmonious, tolerant, and mutually respectful multicultural society”? Several lines of thought are relevant here. Take Martha Nussbaum’s argument that “compassion is the fundamental moral emotion” and her view that compassion must be learned (link). Exposure to the lived experience and traditions of people different from oneself is a powerful way of developing greater compassion for others — and this presumably makes for better neighbors, citizens, and human beings. Or take the idea that “ethnic conflict is a constant threat in divided societies” (link). It can be argued that a multicultural society that has extensive experience in engaging across communities (racial groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, sexual identities) will be more resilient when crises and conflicts arise (link). I’m thinking here of events like disagreements between neighbors that escalate along racial or ethnic lines; occasions when opportunistic political leaders actively cultivate inter-group suspicion and antagonism; or when economic events occur that seem to divide groups along racial, religious, or ethnic lines. A final benefit that we can imagine is the rewarding experience of learning from another person’s experience or traditions about the norms and events that shaped them, and the reflective benefit that such learning can have for one’s understanding of him or herself (link). For reasons like these we might say that we are all better off if we live in a tolerant and respectful community, and the community itself will be healthier and perhaps even more productive as a result.

So achieving a just, stable, and cohesive multicultural democracy is a worthwhile goal. But will a well-ordered liberal democratic state have the authority — and perhaps the duty — to take measures that enhance the workings of a multicultural democracy? These ideas about inclusive democracy make up a feature of a specific political philosophy, a theory of the values that a good and just society ought to strive to realize. But how can these features be realized within a liberal constitution defining “a good and just society”? Would we do better to recognize that these are ideas open to democratic debate for consideration by the population itself?

In order to bring about a “stable and inclusive multicultural democracy”, it seems evident that citizens themselves need to embrace these values. And this means education. This may mean taking steps to change the ways that children, young people, and adults think about the different groups in their society through education, celebrations, and “inclusive practices” in private and public institutions like corporations, places of work, and universities. This may take the form of promoting forms of education for children that emphasize the values of mutual tolerance and acceptance across lines of race, culture, or ethnicity; it may take the form of universities celebrating Juneteenth or the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.; or it may take the form of hosting a reading of the poetry of Audre Lorde or the fiction of James Baldwin. The goal of such activities is to actively encourage the psychology of acceptance and mutual understanding across social, racial, and cultural divisions in our society.

There are obvious ways of connecting “institutional encouragement of inter-group tolerance and respect” to the agreed-upon mandate of achieving “equal rights of liberty, participation, and opportunity” for all groups. It can be argued that persistent prejudice in a segment of a population is itself a mechanism through which out-group disadvantage is maintained (Mills, The Racial Contract). Residential segregation leads to other social ills for the segregated group (health disparities, for example) and so the mechanisms that lead to the persistent residential segregation, which surely include latent prejudice and negative affect towards the out-group, can legitimately be targeted by state programs aiming at reducing prejudice and antagonism. So “anti-prejudice” and “tolerance-enhancing” programs and educational initiatives are a legitimate mechanism for achieving progress towards civil and social equality, to the extent that we can demonstrate that these efforts are efficacious. This is an instrumental justification for public and private programs aimed at reducing prejudice, stereotype, disrespect for others, and outright antagonism.

However, MLK wanted to argue for a stronger view: that achieving a harmonious, tolerant, and mutually respectful multicultural society is good in itself as an important and beneficial goal for the whole of society — not merely instrumentally valuable for achieving civil equality. In fact, it is a fundamental value for a modern democracy. Can this position be supported within liberal political philosophy? And can achieving a tolerant and respectful citizenry be considered a legitimate duty of the state?

There is a strong basis for arguing that a political philosophy articulating the values of a respectful, compassionate, and free community of equals across all groups in society is an excellent basis for thinking about the challenges of twenty-first century social life. We can offer both intrinsic and instrumental reasons for thinking that progress towards this ideal — a version of Martin Luther King Jr.’s Beloved Community — would lead to a better social world. What is less clear is whether a state organized around the principles of traditional liberalism can effectively adopt — or even tolerate — the steps needed to transform society in a more tolerant and compassionate direction. Seen in this light, the struggle over DEI raises profound questions about the possibility of progress towards real racial justice in our democracy.

(Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry’s edited collection, To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr., provides an excellent and detailed new beginning for understanding MLK’s political philosophy.)

The consequences of a trillion dollars

2025-08-24T19:06:00.007-04:00

Many thoughtful people in the US are concerned about the effects that the 2025 federal budget reconciliation law will have on poor people in many states who are currently enrolled in Medicaid health coverage. KFF has put together a comprehensive analysis of the implications of this omnibus act for Medicaid patients here. I asked Gemini for a summary of the impact this massive change in Medicaid will have, with over $1 trillion reductions in Medicaid spending over the coming ten years(!). Here is the analysis Gemini provided:

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QUERY: what are the main effects of the 2025 budget bill on Medicaid recipients?

GEMINI RESPONSE 8/21/25

The 2025 budget bill, also known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), includes significant changes to the Medicaid program, which is expected to have a considerable impact on recipients.

Here are the main effects of the 2025 budget bill on Medicaid recipients:

Significant funding cuts: The bill implements an estimated $1.035 trillion reduction in federal Medicaid spending over ten years. These cuts will necessitate states either increasing their own funding or reducing services, potentially affecting various benefits, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Work requirements: The bill introduces work reporting requirements, referred to as “community engagement” activities, for most Medicaid expansion enrollees aged 19 to 64. These recipients will need to work, volunteer, or participate in educational activities for at least 80 hours per month to maintain their eligibility.
Increased paperwork and administrative burdens: The new requirements will place a greater administrative burden on recipients to verify their eligibility and for states to manage the process, potentially leading to some eligible individuals losing coverage due to difficulties navigating the system.
More frequent eligibility redeterminations: States will be required to conduct eligibility redeterminations for Medicaid expansion adults every six months, rather than annually, starting January 1, 2027. This increased frequency could lead to coverage losses for those unable to complete the renewal process on time or with changes in circumstances.
Cost-sharing requirements: States are now mandated to impose cost-sharing requirements of up to $35 per service for Medicaid expansion enrollees with incomes above 100% of the federal poverty level, says the Center for American Progress. Out-of-pocket costs will remain capped at 5% of family income.
Restrictions on immigrant eligibility: Some categories of lawfully present immigrants will lose eligibility for Medicaid and Medicare under the bill, notes the Center for Medicare Advocacy.
Potential impacts on specific services: Reductions in federal funding might lead states to cut optional benefits, including home- and community-based services (HCBS) that are crucial for individuals with disabilities and older adults.
Increased risk for certain groups: Older adults, people with disabilities, and individuals in rural areas are particularly vulnerable to losing coverage or facing increased costs due to these changes.

It’s important to remember that some provisions of the bill may have delayed effective dates, and future policy changes could still occur.

________

So why is this a big deal for lower- and lower-middle income people in the United States? Because it seems likely that millions of people will lose affordable health coverage, and many thousands of them will sicken and die from preventable illnesses. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (link) estimates that as many as 36 million people are at risk of losing Medicaid eligibility as a result of new work requirements. The Modern Medicaid Alliance is collecting stories of individual people whose Medicaid benefits have been (or will soon be) cancelled (link). These are short items drawn from various news outlets, and they paint a tragic picture from all over the country of the situations that will confront struggling low-income people, young and old, when these new Medicaid reductions begin to hit.

Let’s recall as well that health disparities in the US are severe by almost any measure. Here are disparities of infant mortality in NE Florida noted by Northeast Florida Healthy Start (link).

Health Disparities by Race

And here is a comparison of urban and rural mortality statistics offered by the Rural Health Information Hub (link).

Does anyone seriously doubt that reductions in Medicaid eligibility to millions of individuals will worsen these disparities? And for what? To reduce taxes on the top 1% of income earners in the US.

Caillebotte's silences

2025-08-18T16:47:00.001-04:00

A current exhibition of the paintings of Gustave Caillebotte (1848-1894) at the Art Institute in Chicago is quite remarkable. It demonstrates the eye, the hand, and the sensibility of this great late-Impressionist painter. But the exhibition is remarkable in another way as well: there is almost no evidence in the paintings on exhibit, or the curatorial texts that support the exhibition, that conveys the intense and prolonged social, political, and military conflict of the period from the late 1840s through the defeat of the Paris Commune (1871).

Caillebotte himself served in the French military during the siege of Paris by the Prussian Army (1870-1871). In the text describing the exhibition at the Musée d’Orsay in Paris a curator writes briefly of his service: “But during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), [Caillebotte] was drafted into the 7th Battalion of the Garde Nationale Mobile de la Seine and assigned to the defense of Paris” (link). The detail about his service in the 7th Battalion of the Garde Nationale Mobile is especially telling. Michael Howard describes the Battle of Buzenval in these terms:

The battle of Buzenval, as it was to be called, settled the fate of Paris. More, it destroyed once for all the belief that a People in Arms could overwhelm a trained enemy by sheer numbers and burning zeal. It was the action for which the clubs had for so long yearned—the sortie en masse. Nearly 90,000 men were involved, of whom about half came from the Garde Nationale, and at dawn on 19th January they debouched from Mont Valérien, and advanced against the German defences between Bougival and St Cloud along a four-mile front. (Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 373).

This battle was yet another disaster for the French military. It essentially sealed the fate of the besieged city and forced surrender of the last part of France still resisting German control. If Caillebotte was an active participant in this battle, he would have had traumatic and transformative experiences of war; and if he was held in reserve in the city during this final break-out attempt, he would have had personal knowledge of the significance and suffering created by the siege of Paris and the several unsuccessful efforts to break the siege through counter-attacks. Surely this is an important element in his development as an observant human being and a painter. And yet there is no evidence in his paintings of the impression the trauma of Paris may have had upon him. It would seem that this is an important contextual feature that should play a highlighted role in the curatorial presentation of the exhibition; but it does not.

Stéphane Guégan, a scientific advisor to the Musée d'Orsay in Paris and author of Caillebotte: Peintre des extrêmes, considers the “military presences” in Caillebotte’s paintings. Referring to the first exhibition of the Impressionist group in 1874, he notes that “the [first Impressionist] exhibition did contain a few resounding echoes of the catastrophic situation from which the country was barely emerging: the crushing defeat of the Franco-Prussian War and the ensuing upheaval of the Paris Commune” (“The Shared War”, Gustave Caillebotte: Painting Men, p. 42). But virtually no such references occur in the exhibition that has travelled from Paris to Los Angeles to Chicago. Guégan notes several exceptions: the painting of a soldier in uniform and an almost imperceptible representation of a uniformed soldier in Le Pont de l’Europe.

But neither image gives any sense of the true military catastrophe of the Franco-Prussian War or its aftermath. Instead, the curators have chosen to organize their ideas about Caillebotte’s paintings around the form of masculinity represented by his work.

Contrast Caillebotte’s silence in his painting with that of Jean-Louis Ernest Meissonier, a generation senior to Caillebotte. Here is Meissonier’s 1849 depiction of a massacre he apparently witnessed following the defeat of the workers’ uprising in June 1848.

And here is Meissonier’s 1884 painting representing a scene of death and destruction during the siege of Paris in 1870:

Finally, here is a daguerrotype of a poignant scene following the massacre of Communards following the fall of the Commune in 1871:

The traumas represented in these images were part of the experience and memory of the people of Paris during those decades, including both Meissonier (who was 33 at the time of the 1848 workers’ uprising) and Caillebotte (who was born in 1848 and was a serving member of the Garde Nationale Mobile in 1870-1871 during the final months of the siege of Paris and the suppression of the Commune itself (by French forces). How could either of these painters not have been deeply affected by these traumatic events of contemporary French history? Meissonier’s paintings take note of these fundamental facts, but Caillebotte’s do not. And yet the exhibition gives no historical context at all that would highlight these important and surely formative events.

And what about Meissonier? His depiction of the massacre of workers in 1848 might suggest that he was offering sympathy and homage to the working class men and women who rose up in June, 1848. Alexis de Tocqueville and Alexander Herzen, both observers of the fighting in Paris in June 1848, offered sympathy and sorrow for the violence that overwhelmed the workers’ uprising. Here are comments offered by Herzen:

But this is not the current interpretation of Meissonier’s work. Rather, critics have suggested that the 1849 painting of the massacre at the barricade conveys a middle-class view of the insurrection, and serves as a caution for the future: “insurrection leads to massacre and death”, while the 1888 painting conveys a sense of patriotism and heroism.

An element of historical change that is entirely evident in Caillebotte’s paintings is the transformation of Paris by Baron Haussmann at the direction of Napoleon III. The “Paris Street: Rainy Day” painting above reflects the Haussmannization of Paris — the broad avenues, the “modernization” of life in the city, and the destruction of working class residential areas. This is a central theme in T.J. Clark’s interpretation of mid-century depictions of Paris in The Painting of Modern Life:

It seems that only when the city has been systematically occupied by the bourgeoisie, and made quite ruthlessly to represent that class’s rule, can it be taken by painters to be an appropriate and purely visual subject for their art….. For the House knew well that Haussmann’s modernity had been built by evicting the working class of Paris from the centre of the city, and putting it down on the hill of Belleville or the plains of La Villette, where the moon was still most often the only street light available. And what did painters do except join in the cynical laughter and propagate the myth of modernity? (The Painting of Modern Life, p. 51)

According to Clark, there was an overriding theme of class conflict and a fear of insurrection that drove both Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann in this urban project. They were concerned to “modernize” Paris in a way that would make working class rebellion (and the barricades through which previous uprisings had proceeded) impossible; troops and cannon would be able easily to clear the avenues of insurrection.

There was no disputing that part of Haussmann’s modernity was his wish to put an end to insurrection. He stated as much himself: it was a good argument to lean on when pleading for funds from the Conseil Municipal. Years after the event, he was still musing in his Mémoires over the hidden benefits of the Boulevard Sébastopol: “It meant the disembowelling of the old Paris, the quartier of uprisings and barricades, by a wide central street piercing through and through this almost impossible maze, and provided with communicating side streets, whose continuation would be bound to complete the work thus begun. The subsequent completion of the Rue de Turbigo made the Rue Transnonain [symbolic capital of the barricades] disappear from the map of Paris!” Nor was this merely a matter of hindsight on Haussmann’s part. The details of counterrevolution weighed heavily on the planners’ minds at the time: Napoleon intervened directly in 1857 to prevent the encirclement of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine from being spoiled by a mere architect’s whim: “the construction of arcades on the Boulevard Mazas,” he wrote, “would seriously damage the strategic system of Paris.” The arcades were quietly dropped from the designs. (75-76)

Here again the current exhibition’s curators have seemingly ignored the social and political context of the Haussmannization of Paris. They emphasize the “new modernity”, the dress of the mostly bourgeois men and women passing across the boulevards, and the relaxed scenes of conversation and amusement among Caillebotte’s male friends. But there is no curatorial mention at all of the political fears and imperatives that appear to have driven Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann in this wholesale restructuring of the urban environment of Paris. And there is no suggestion in the paintings on display in the current Caillebotte exhibition of a sensibility on the part of the painter to the underlying conflicts between working class Parisians and the bourgeoisie. There are notes of awareness and sympathy for working men and women in his corpus — for example, in the painting “The Floor Scrapers”. But there is no suggestion of his own awareness of the concrete circumstances of injustice, exploitation, or unnecessary misery in his paintings.

So the social conditions of class and war seem to be almost entirely absent in Caillebotte’s work. There is no sense of “social critique” or self-awareness of upper-middle-class position in these paintings. Caillebotte is silent about the most momentous events that transformed France and Paris during his adulthood, and this is surprising. But it is also surprising that the curators have not taken more notice of this absence.