As observers of the U.S. Supreme Court know well, closely divided opinions can say much about justices’ approach to the task of judging.  But, Green pointed out, “The breakdown of the [California] justices’ positions defies ideological and political expectations.  No single bloc is emerging on the court, and not one majority opinion includes the same four justices.”  Green then made the astute observation that, more than anything else, the Court’s 4-3 decisions reveal a difference of opinion among the justices over how to interpret statutory law.  She noted that Justices Baxter and Kennard are greater adherents of a “plain meaning” approach, while Justices Werdegar and Liu “tend to place more emphasis on the law’s legislative history.”  Even so, the justices often seek the middle ground, especially when deciding controversial cases, which reflects a value judgment that consensus is more important than ideology.  Green emphasized the point by quoting Justice Liu as recently saying the justices craft their opinions so as “‘to garner the most votes.’”

Green concluded by noting the justices’ differing views regarding statutory interpretation would be put to the test again in City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patient’s Health and Wellness Center, S198638, in which the Court was called upon to decide whether state law preempts the authority of local municipalities to ban medical marijuana dispensaries within their borders.  The Court issued that opinion earlier this month, as noted in this Los Angeles Times article, and upheld local authority to ban such dispensaries. 

So does the City of Riverside opinion support Green’s hypothesis?  Yes, to some degree.  The opinion’s unanimity underscores the importance of consensus in high-profile cases.  And it probably is not a surprise that the opinion, authored by “plain meaning” adherent Justice Baxter, is rooted heavily in the operative language of the governing statutes and gives less weight to the Legislature’s statements of intent.  (See typed opn., 33-34 [“We cannot employ the Legislature’s expansive declaration of aims to stretch the MMP’s effect beyond a reasonable construction of its substantive provisions.”].)  On the other hand, the opinion’s very unanimity tends to vitiate the notion that there is a deep divide on the Court over the proper approach to statutory interpretation.  It is true that Justice Liu wrote a separate concurrence, but it was not to advocate a broader approach to statutory interpretation.  Instead, he wrote separately to reaffirm the proper state vs. local preemption inquiry.  (Conc. opn. of Liu, J., p. 1 [state law preempts local legislation not only “when local law prohibits . . . what a state statute ‘demands’ but also what the statute permits or authorizes”].)

Review Granted

Conservatorship of McQueen, S209376—Review Granted—May 15, 2013

The question presented is whether a motion under Code of Civil Procedure sections 685.040 and 685.080 for attorney’s fees and costs expended in enforcing a judgment is barred after full satisfaction of the judgment.  The Court of Appeal, First District, Division Four, held in an unpublished decision, Estate of McQueen, A134337, that Code of Civil Procedure sections 685.040 and 685.080 bar such a motion once the judgment is satisfied in full.

Review Denied (with dissenting justices)

Church of Scientology International v. Superior Court, S210314—Review Denied [Baxter, J. and Chin, J., voting for review]—May 15, 2013

The question presented was whether communications between the plaintiff and the clergy of the Church of Scientology are protected by California’s clergy-penitent privilege, where the plaintiff seeks disclosure and the communications were not limited to one clergy member, but were shared with other clergy.

The Church of Scientology filed a petition for writ of mandate after the trial court compelled it to produce records of communications between the plaintiff and its clergy members.  The trial court compelled disclosure of the communications, finding the privilege did not apply since the communications were made available to other members of the clergy.  The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, denied the petition.

Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles, S209633—Review Denied [Kennard, J., and Corrigan, J., voting for review]—May 15, 2013

The question presented is whether a county ordinance that requires retailers to charge customers 10 cents for each recyclable paper carryout bag used to carry goods away from a store imposes a tax that was not approved by county voters.  The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, held in a published opinion, Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1310, that the 10 cent charge is not a tax because it is payable to and retained by the retail store, not given to the county.

Depublished

None.

The press release also explains the court’s staffing in general.  Besides each justice’s own chambers attorneys, the court has three separate central staffs.  The Capital Central Staff, with nine attorneys and a director, assists the justices in death matters, including drafting memoranda and opinions in capital appeals, habeas corpus petitions, and related motions.  The Criminal Central Staff prepares conference memoranda on petitions for review and habeas corpus petitions in non-capital criminal matters.  The Civil Central Staff prepares conference memoranda on petitions for review in civil cases and attorney and judicial discipline matters.

The opinion can be viewed online tomorrow beginning at 10:00 a.m.