When Secretary of War John Armstrong moved General Henry Dearborn from his command of the northern army to a desk position in New York and replaced him with General James Wilkinson, Armstrong also needed to find a new Major General to take over the command at Plattsburgh and Lake Champlain. Armstrong's choice for this position was Wade Hampton I, an interesting choice in that Hampton was the avowed enemy of Wilkinson, and yet the two generals would have to work hand in hand for the campaign to be successful. The results of the campaign would prove the folly of Armstrong’s choice of commanders.

Hampton was a true Southern aristocrat from South Carolina who had been serving as the top-ranking officer in the Orleans Territory since 1809. Needing a competent commander to support Wilkinson’s anticipated movement down the St. Lawrence River to Montreal, Armstrong transferred General Hampton to the Northern District to command the American army near Lake Champlain. Hampton was instructed to move down the Richelieu River and join with Wilkinson near the St. Lawrence just above Montreal, and then the combined army would assault and capture the city, thus severing the supply line to Upper Canada. But Hampton, who was a man of rigid Southern honor, despised Wilkinson for his low character and constant intrigues. As famed historian A. B. Hart wrote, “He hated Wilkinson with a fine and worthy hatred and despised him with all his ardent soul.” The two Major Generals had battled one another for years within the army officer corps, and Hampton informed Armstrong that he would only accept the position if it were a separate and distinct command. Moreover, Hampton demanded that his orders come directly from the War Department, not from Wilkinson. Armstrong agreed to these demands, and, accordingly, Hampton assumed command on July 3, 1813, joining his troops at Burlington, Vermont. But concerned that his two Generals would fight themselves as much as the British, Armstrong transferred his headquarters to Sackett’s Harbor to act as a buffer between the two antagonists.

Hampton had nearly 4,000 men in his new command, but they were mostly new recruits and had received little or no training, and, moreover, his junior officers lacked experience. He also had a forward base at Plattsburgh, but at this point the north end of the lake was controlled by the British, who had raided Plattsburgh earlier that summer. British naval supremacy on the lake essentially rendered Plattsburgh inaccessible to Hampton’s army until Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, commander of the American navy on the lake, could construct a flotilla to counter the British warships. By mid-September, Macdonough had finally assembled the necessary ships to transport Hampton’s army safely across the lake and did so on September 19. The following week, Hampton moved his army fifty miles west to the Shakopee River and established his base camp at a place called the Four Corners of the Chateaugay. From this strategic position, Hampton was able to threaten both Montreal and the British line of communication up the St. Lawrence. But, as Hampton’s primary mission was to support Wilkinson's movement, Hampton was forced to wait until receiving word that his army was underway. Finally, on October 18, Hampton received a message from Secretary Armstrong that he expected Wilkinson's movement to begin shortly and ordered Hampton to move closer to the mouth of the Chateaugay to be in a better position to affect a junction with Wilkinson's army.

Hampton headed down the Chateaugay River but without his entire force, as a brigade of fickle New York militiamen refused to cross the border into Canada, the same problem General Stephen van Renssalaer had encountered the previous year on the Niagara frontier. Consequently, Hampton’s army moved forward with roughly 2,600 men, including two hundred mounted troops and ten field guns, to Spears, roughly ten miles from the St. Lawrence and fifteen from the mouth of the Chateaugay. The British force confronting the Americans consisted of 1,500 men under Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Salaberry, who established a strong defensive position behind abatis (obstacles made of felled trees) along Hampton’s route of march and positioned another force about a mile away to guard a ford across the Chateaugay.

Hampton’s plan called for Colonel Robert Purdy to circle behind the British position and capture the ford at dawn, while at the same time a detachment under General George Izard launched a frontal assault. But soon after Purdy set out on his mission, Hampton received a letter from Secretary Armstrong that contained the disturbing news that Armstrong was retiring from the theater and Wilkinson was now in charge. Armstrong's letter further informed Hampton that he was to prepare winter quarters for 10,000 men within the limits of Canada, as Armstrong felt that little could be accomplished the rest of the year. Recognizing the campaign was over, Hampton tried to recall Purdy from his movement but was unable to do so and ordered Izard's men to stand down and not participate in the pending attack. Perhaps it was just as well, because Purdy’s brigade got lost on their nighttime march and was not able to engage the British until noon on October 26. And when Purdy’s brigade finally did attack, the assault was quickly broken up, and the Americans retreated in disarray.

As it turned out, the Battle of the Chateaugay was more of a skirmish than a battle, as the Americans suffered fewer than fifty casualties while the British lost roughly half as many. But with Armstrong leaving the scene and Wilkinson still stuck at Sackett’s Harbor, Hampton retired to Four Corners, where he had started his campaign. As promised, the 63-year-old General soon resigned from the army and returned home to his plantation in South Carolina. It was a disappointing end to another disappointing campaign, and the land war of 1813 ended as dismally as that of the previous year. Only Harrison's victory at the Battle of the Thames and Perry's great triumph in the Battle of Lake Erie provided any reason for hope for the Americans for the coming year.

Next week, we will discuss the British northern offensive of 1814. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

The American flotilla of 300 boats conveying General James Wilkinson’s army to Montreal entered the St. Lawrence River on November 5, 1813, but the British were not idle and immediately began to harass the Americans on both land and sea. British Captain William Mulcaster had pierced Commodore Isaac Chauncey’s blockade of Kingston with several gunboats and proceeded to snipe at the rear guard of the American contingent from the river. At the same time, six hundred British troops under Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Morrison marched down the north shore of the St. Lawrence to further annoy the Americans with musketry and cannon shot from the banks.

The following day, Wilkinson received the disturbing news that General Wade Hampton’s army, which was to rendezvous with Wilkinson, had been repulsed on the Chateaugay River and would not be able to support him as originally planned. Wilkinson called a council of war, which agreed to continue downriver, but a want of confidence in Wilkinson was already beginning to show. On the evening of November 7, the American boats ran past Fort Wellington, the British outpost at Prescott, under cover of darkness, and proceeded to the Long Sauté, an eight-mile-long series of rapids with a strong British blockhouse called Fort Matilda at its base. The Americans paused their movement near a farm owned by John Crysler, a Canadian militia Captain, to prepare for their descent through the rapids.

But the harassment of the British was proving intolerable, and, recognizing that the Canadian side of the river and the blockhouse must be secured before confronting the rapids, Wilkinson dispatched Generals Jacob Brown and Alexander Macomb to clear the north shore ahead of the American flotilla. Wilkinson also sent General John Boyd with three brigades consisting of 2,000 regulars and six field pieces to drive off the British army in the American rear. Boyd was a poor choice for this independent command, as he lacked the confidence of the army, with General Jacob Brown refusing to serve under him and General Winfield Scott describing Boyd as “vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a chief under high responsibilities.” On November 11, Brown sent word that he had defeated a force of 500 Glengarry and Stormont militiamen in the Battle of Hoople’s Creek, securing the north bank of the river below the rapids. But it was a different story above the rapids as the British, recently reinforced from Prescott and supported by three cannons and gunboats in the river, confidently approached the American lines, and General Boyd deployed his men for battle.

Boyd initiated the action with an assault by Colonel Eleazar Ripley and the 21st Infantry on the British left flank and drove back the Canadian Voltigeurs, a Canadian militia outfit. But the Americans soon were confronted by regulars from the British 89th, who repulsed their attack, and the Americans fell back. Boyd next ordered General Leonard Covington to lead his brigade against the British right held by the 49th Regiment. Covington led the men forward on his white charger but proved too good a target for the Brits, and he was shot from his horse, mortally wounded, and his second-in-command soon suffered the same fate. Leaderless and under intense fire, the rank and file began to leave the field, and, by late afternoon, the retreat became general along the American line as the soldiers streamed to the riverbank and embarked in the waiting boats, which took them to the safety of the south bank. The Battle of Crysler’s Farm, in which the Americans outnumbered their British adversaries by almost 3 to 1, was an embarrassing and costly loss for the Americans as they suffered over 450 casualties while the Brits lost less than 200 men. But uninspired leadership by General Boyd caused the Americans to lose this opportunity to inflict a punishing defeat on an undersized British force.

Recognizing their good fortune, the British did not press their attack, and the next day the American flotilla moved on, proceeding through the Long Sauté rapids. Wilkinson summoned a council of war with his officers, and it was agreed to end the campaign and retreat to the small village of French Mills just inside the New York border. But here they were 230 miles from the nearest supply depot, and soon the Canadian winter made the one roadway to that depot impassable. With supplies running low and inadequate shelter for the men, Secretary Armstrong ordered Wilkinson to break up the army, sending 2,000 men to Sackett’s Harbor and withdrawing with the rest to Plattsburgh.

But aware that he would be blamed for the failure of the St. Lawrence campaign, Wilkinson conceived an operation whereby he might retrieve his lost reputation before abandoning the field. There was a small British garrison of eighty men stationed in a blockhouse just north of the border at Lacolle Mills, which looked like easy pickings. Wilkinson led 4,000 men and an artillery detachment with eleven cannons there, arriving on March 30, 1814, and opened with a barrage late that afternoon, which proved ineffective against the British defenses. Three miles away, a unit of 400 Canadian Voltigeurs heard the battle sounds and raced to help their countrymen, and they managed to break through the American line and successfully assault the artillery battery. At the same time, British gunboats, which had sailed up the Richelieu River to the mouth of the Lacolle, provided support for the beleaguered Canadians. By evening, the Americans had made little impression upon the British defenses, and demoralized, tired, and hungry, the Americans, who had outnumbered the Canadians nearly ten to one, withdrew from the field after losing over 150 men while the Canadians suffered just 61 casualties.

The Battle of Crysler’s Farm and the subsequent defeat at Lacolle Mills ended an embarrassing campaign for the Americans. Wilkinson was soon relieved of command and court-martialed once again, this time for negligence. But as in all previous cases, the charges were dismissed and the slippery Wilkinson was exonerated, although he was discharged from the service the following summer.

Next week, we will discuss the Battle of the Chateaugay. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

Major General Henry Dearborn was tasked by President James Madison with conducting the right wing of the American invasion of Canada. The objective of this thrust was to capture Montreal and close off the Saint Lawrence River, thereby severing the British supply line to Upper Canada. This responsibility would have been formidable for any commander, but it was especially so for a General in his sixty-second year and in poor health who had not seen active military service since the American Revolution. But such was the state of senior officers in the American Army at the start of the war that Dearborn was the best of the lot.

In 1812, Dearborn commanded roughly 6,000 men near Lake Champlain, the largest military contingent on the American side. But Dearborn’s lack of energy proved a problem, and other than a brief advance into Canada in September and a few raids, there was little activity in this critical sector. But 1813 opened with more hope and more urging from John Armstrong, the new Secretary of War. At Armstrong's insistence, Dearborn and Commodore Isaac Chauncey, commander of the American fleet on the Great Lakes, launched a raid against York, the capital of Upper Canada, and successfully sacked and burned the town and its naval yard on Lake Ontario. Dearborn quickly followed that up with the capture of Fort George, the British stronghold at the mouth of the Niagara River on the other side of the lake. But these initial successes, which gave hope to the American cause, were frittered away in the following months, and 1813 came to a disappointing end.

With the end of Dearborn’s campaign came the end of Dearborn’s military career in the field, and in July, Dearborn was reassigned to garrison duty in New York City, where he served until being honorably discharged at the end of the war. Secretary Armstrong needed a new man to fill Dearborn’s role, and he essentially had two choices: Andrew Jackson and James Wilkinson. History shows that Jackson would have been the wiser choice, but at this point, his military abilities were unproven and Jackson, like Wilkinson, was suspected of supporting Aaron Burr’s conspiracy in 1806 (later disproven). On the other hand, Wilkinson was a well-known entity, although not necessarily in a good way, as he had managed to lose the trust of all that served under or with him, including Armstrong, who had been with Wilkinson at Saratoga.

At the time, Wilkinson oversaw military operations in the southwestern part of the United States, including the critical riverport of New Orleans. But western leaders did not trust Wilkinson either and had recently requested that President Madison remove Wilkinson from his post as he was suspected of secretly being on the payroll of Spain (later proven to be true). Strange as this may seem, it was not so strange for James Wilkinson, who was always under a cloud of suspicion for nefarious activities. The list of infamous scandals with which Wilkinson is associated is startling: the Conway Cabal in 1777 to replace General George Washington with General Horatio Gates as commander of the Continental Army during the Revolution, the Newburgh Conspiracy in 1782 when a group of officers threatened to refuse to disband the Continental Army unless they received a pension for their wartime service, his backroom efforts to undermine General Anthony Wayne and replace him as commander of the Legion of the United States in 1794, and conspiring with Aaron Burr to separate part of the western United States or seize part of New Spain (today’s Texas) and establish an independent country. Wilkinson had been brought up on court martial charges on numerous occasions, but he covered his tracks well and somehow the charges were always dismissed. Wilkinson was arguably the most detested and mistrusted general officer in the United States Army, with Winfield Scott once saying that serving under Wilkinson “was as disgraceful as being married to a prostitute.” But the Secretary of War knew Wilkinson and was unfamiliar with Jackson and, in a case of “better the devil you know than the devil you don’t,” Armstrong entrusted this command to Wilkinson.

Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson in early March 1813 regarding his new assignment, but Wilkinson was in no hurry to leave his comfortable surroundings in New Orleans for this challenging field command in the North and did not reach Washington until July 31. Wilkinson then lingered in the capital, hatching plans for his grand invasion of Canada and discussing them with Secretary Armstrong. The choices rested between attacking Kingston, the main naval base for the British on Lake Ontario and the strongest garrison on the lake, or descending the St. Lawrence River from Sackett’s Harbor and capturing Montreal. While Secretary Armstrong favored an attack on Kingston, Wilkinson preferred to bypass Kingston and move directly on Montreal, and he brought Armstrong around to his way of thinking. The agreed-upon plan called for a two-prong offensive with Wilkinson leading his command of 7,000 men down the St. Lawrence while another 4,000-man army under Major General Wade Hampton marched north from Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain. The two armies would then rendezvous above Montreal, and the combined army under Wilkinson’s command would descend onto the city.

Because of the difficulty of the logistics involved with a winter offensive, it was critical for the American army to get started before summer drew to a close. But due to Wilkinson’s numerous delays and his lack of a sense of urgency, he did not arrive at Sackett’s Harbor, the campaign’s jumping off point, until late August. The 56-year-old General then fell ill from lake fever (dysentery) and remained bedridden until mid-October, by which time the terrible Canadian winter had begun and bad weather further delayed the invasion. It was not until November 5 that the army finally embarked from Grenadier Island in nearly 300 boats of various sorts–scows, bateaux, and sailboats–and proceeded down the St. Lawrence River towards Montreal, 200 miles away. The long-awaited drive to capture Montreal was finally underway.

Next week, we will discuss the Battle of Crysler’s Farm. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

On July 3, 1814, the American army under General Jacob Brown had invaded Canada, marking the third straight year that American forces tried to gain a foothold on Canadian soil along the Niagara frontier. But following a resounding American victory on July 5 in the Battle of Chippawa and a bloody stalemate at Lundy’s Lane three weeks later, the American army was in no condition to renew the fight and had withdrawn back to Fort Erie. The 3,500-man invading army was down to roughly 750 men in fighting condition and supplies were dangerously low.

General Brown, recovering from wounds sustained at Lundy’s Lane, brought in Brigadier General Edmund Gaines to take command of the army and instructed Gaines to hold Fort Erie at all costs. Gaines, recognizing it was only a matter of time before the British were upon the American army, immediately set out to expand and strengthen the works around Fort Erie, extending the fortifications half a mile to the west and anchoring the extreme position on the shoreline of Lake Erie. He also constructed a redoubt for an artillery battery with six guns on Snake Hill, ably commanded by Major Nathaniel Towson, a future Major General, and a second one near the lakeshore. Gaines was aided in his efforts by several excellent Engineer officers, including Major Eleazer Wood of the 21st regiment who had also constructed Fort Meigs on the Maumee River which thwarted the invasion of Ohio by the British in 1813.

On August 4, Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond led 3,000 men to the outskirts of the Fort Erie and laid siege to the American position. The recent bloody encounters with the Americans had made Drummond and the British soldiers more respectful of American fighting qualities and more cautious in their approach to reducing the fort. Drummond had the army construct several artillery batteries and tried to pound Fort Erie into submission, but the batteries were too far away and their fire relatively ineffective. After several days of bombardment, Drummond lost patience and decided to simultaneously assault the walls at three different points. But Gaines kept strong pickets out well in advance of the American lines and, when the British attack started shortly after 2am on August 15, the Americans were ready.

The initial British assault was against the extreme American left, the new battery atop Snake Hill, but the Americans held firm and the Redcoats fell back to their original starting point. On the American right the fight was more determined, and, over the course of three hours, the British and American rank and file vied for control of the northeast bastion. The fighting was vicious and, as daylight broke, the British recognized it would be fruitless to maintain their attack and retreated to their lines. Moreover, their losses had been significant as the British lost over 900 men, including two regimental commanders killed, while in comparison the Americans suffered just 84 casualties. General Gaines was the hero of the hour, and Congress struck a Gold Medal in his honor and promoted him to Major General. But Gaines was wounded the next day and General Brown, although still recovering from a wound himself, resumed command of the army.

The following month, in an attempt to force Drummond to lift the siege, Brown ordered a sortie against the British lines. At 3 p.m. on September 17, under cover of a heavy rain, Generals Porter and Miller led 1,600 men against the extreme right of the British line. The Americans caught the British unawares and succeeded in capturing a block house and two batteries of artillery. The fighting was desperate and three of Porter’s battalion commanders were killed or mortally wounded including Major Wood. Recognizing nothing further could be gained, Brown ordered his troops to disengage and return to Fort Erie. The sortie was costly as the Americans suffered over 500 casualties, while Drummond’s army lost roughly 600 men. But it had its desired effect as, a few days later, Drummond moved his army from Fort Erie to a strong defensive position behind the Chippawa.

Major General George Izard soon arrived with 4,000 reinforcements for the American army, hoping that these reinforcements would finally secure the American gains along the Niagara and Izard, as the ranking officer, assumed command from Brown. At Brown's urging, Izard moved forward to the Chippawa to confront Drummond but Izard, concerned at the cost of taking those formidable lines, halted his advance. At the same time, Izard received word that the British had launched a new frigate and a ship of the line and now dominated Lake Ontario. Worried that the British fleet could quickly move an army onto his flank or rear, Izard withdrew to Fort Erie. There, Izard made the painful decision to blow up Fort Erie, which was done on November 5, and return to American soil. With Canada abandoned, the Niagara campaign of 1814 came to a bitter end, and the army was broken up with Brown taking a division to Sackett’s Harbor and the rest placed in winter quarters in Buffalo.

For the American army, it had been a year of high hopes and valiant efforts, but also one of lost opportunities on the Niagara frontier. In the summer, 3,500 men under General Brown had captured Fort Erie and swept up the west side of the Niagara. The Americans had performed well in two pitched battles against British regulars and withstood a siege before driving the British back behind the Chippawa River. But at the end of the year, the Americans were back where they had started from. Perhaps more disappointingly, after three years of fighting and unprecedented cost, the United States did not possess one inch of Canadian soil.

General Drummond lost no time and immediately reestablished his lines along the Niagara and took a portion of his troops with him to Kingston for the expected attack on Sackett’s Harbor. British reinforcements were now pouring into Canada from the European continent and, with naval mastery of Lake Ontario gained by the British, 1815 was shaping up to be a bad year for the Americans. But 3,000 miles away, in Ghent, Belgium, peace negotiations were drawing to a close, and the war would soon come to an end.

Next week, we will discuss the campaign for Montreal. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

A few days after the resounding American victory at Chippawa, General Phineas Riall moved the British Army north along the Niagara River to Fort George and began to gather a force adequate to strike the Americans and push them from Canadian soil. The American commander, General Jacob Brown, meanwhile was imploring Commodore Isaac Chauncey, commander of the Lake Ontario fleet, to come to his assistance and help drive the British from the Niagara peninsula. But as was often the case, the Army and Navy did not see eye to eye on the matter and that would cause a problem in the days ahead. 

On July 20, Brown marched his army from Queenston, where they had been encamped, towards Fort George. Upon arriving at the fort, Brown discovered much to his disappointment that Riall had been significantly reinforced, including the 89th regiment led by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Morrison, the victor of the battle of Chrysler’s Field the previous November. Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond, Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada and arguably the most capable soldier in British North America, had also arrived and assumed the command from Riall. On the morning of July 25, General Drummond moved his army south toward the American camp and, upon learning of the British movement, Brown put his army of some 2,600 men in motion and headed north to meet them. 

The two armies came together late in the afternoon on July 25 at Lundy’s Lane, a small, elevated offshoot of the main road along the west bank of the Niagara River. 2,000 British soldiers were in position along the road with a strong artillery battery on a hill in the center and another 800 men were on the way from Fort George. The Americans came into view shortly after 5pm led by General Scott's brigade and, undaunted by the strong British position, Scott immediately deployed his 1,200 men and gave the order to attack. So aggressive was the assault on the British left by Major Thomas Jessup’s battalion that the British line was initially forced back before finally stabilizing. For the next two hours, Scott’s brigade repeatedly assaulted the enemy guns until the darkness and sheer exhaustion caused a brief lull in the action. With roughly half his brigade casualties, including Scott and most of his fellow officers, and low on ammunition, Scott sent word to General Brown to bring up the rest of the army, and soon both Ripley’s and Porter’s brigades arrived on the run in the fading summer light.  

The focal point of the fight soon became the British artillery battery in the center of the line and, for the next several hours, a general melee ensued as one side and then the other sought to gain control of the battery. General Ripley, who now assumed command due to wounds suffered by Generals Brown and Scott, ordered Colonel James Miller of the 21st regiment, all Massachusetts men, to capture the guns. Miller's reply was simple, “I will try, Sir,” and that humble phrase and the story behind it was taught to American school boys for the next five decades as an example of modest courage. Miller led his men in the darkness to within a few yards the British battery before firing their muskets and taking the battery with a bayonet charge.  

Temporarily thrown into confusion by the unexpected assault, General Drummond took an hour to reform his ranks and, shortly before midnight, ordered his men to retake the British cannon. For the next two hours, the British launched three separate assaults, all of which the Americans repulsed, but they paid a heavy price for their gallant stand. With nearly all officers either killed or wounded, Brown ordered Miller to retire from the field and return to the American camp, saying they had done as much as they could. The American army collected what was left of its guns, munitions, and supplies and marched in good order for their camp. With the American evacuation of the hill, the British immediately regained possession of their guns and secured their lines.

The heroism and determination of the Americans impressed even their British adversaries with one British officer later writing “that they never saw such determined charges as were made by the Americans.” Both sides had suffered severely in the Battle of Lundy’s Lane with the British losing 84 killed, 559 wounded, including both General Drummond and General Riall, and 235 missing or captured, while the Americans had 171 killed, 572 wounded, including both General Brown and General Scott who would be lost for the remainder of the war, and 110 missing. The losses suffered by Scott’s brigade were exceptionally high as his unit which had numbered 1,388 officers and men on June 30, had lost in killed, wounded, and missing at Lundy’s Lane and Chippawa a combined total of 763 men or 55 percent. Although Ripley’s and Porter’s brigades did not suffer as severely, Browns army had lost roughly one-third of his entire army. 

Brown was disappointed at having to surrender the field to the British after fighting so valiantly and, at 4am, ordered Ripley to take what was left of the command and move forward and reoccupy the field. Accordingly, Ripley gathered what force he could, roughly 1,500 men, and reconnoitered the enemy. Finding Drummond in a strong position and supported by artillery, Ripley, cautious by nature, returned to camp and informed Brown that, in his opinion, the best course of action was to fall back. Accordingly, Ripley led the army to the unfinished bastions of Fort Erie, arriving there late in the evening on July 26. Ripley further recommended to Brown that the army withdraw back to the American side, but Brown would have none of it, as his fighting nature was unwilling to surrender Canadian territory without a fight. Frustrated by Ripley’s timid attitude, Brown replaced him with Brigadier General Edmund Gaines who, over the course for the next few weeks, greatly strengthened the American defenses of Fort Erie in preparation for an attack that they knew was coming from the British. 

Next week, we will discuss Americans retreating across the Niagara. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

On March 31, 1814, the allied armies marched into Paris and with that came the collapse of Napoleon's empire. That was good news for Europe who had been fighting French armies for more than two decades, but it was bad news for the United States as with Napoleon's demise, Wellington’s veteran British regiments would now be freed up to fight in North America, and by mid-summer, four brigades of Wellington's best troops sailed from Bordeaux for Canada. Aware of all this, Secretary of War John Armstrong knew he had to strike before these troops arrived and ordered a third invasion of the Niagara Peninsula. Armstrong also had in mind that peace negotiations were soon to begin in the Belgium city of Ghent, and that the Americans needed a foothold in Canada to use as a bargaining chip. 

The first issue Armstrong had to deal with was who would command this new invasion force given that Henry Dearborn had recently retired and his replacement, General James Wilkinson, had failed miserably in his campaign against Montreal. Armstrong selected General Jacob Brown who had been raised a Pennsylvania Quaker and had taught school before moving to the Black River area near the eastern end of Lake Ontario in 1798. Although Brown’s military experience was limited to the militia, he had shown excellent fighting qualities in the defense of Sackett’s Harbor the previous May and would go on to become the Commanding General of the United States Army in 1821. 

Brown's force consisted of roughly 3,500 men and proved to be a formidable fighting unit. One brigade was stationed at Buffalo and commanded by recently promoted Brigadier General Winfield Scott, a broad-shouldered, mountain of a man at 6’5” who had drilled his men for seven to ten hours each day for the past three months in anticipation of the fighting to come. Scott was destined to lead the United States Army as its Commanding General from 1841-1861 and help formulate the plan that ultimately defeated the Confederacy in the American Civil War. The other brigade was a few miles away at Black Rock, commanded by General Eleazar Ripley, the former speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. There were also four companies of artillery led by Major Jacob Hindman of Maryland, perhaps the finest artillery officer in the army, and a Pennsylvania militia brigade commanded by General Peter Porter, a future United States Secretary of War. These officers, like all the other officers in Brown's command, yearned for an opportunity to restore what Major Thomas Jessup referred to as “the tarnished military character of the country.” To oppose the Americans, the right division of the British Army had roughly 4,000 men under the command of Major General Phineas Riall but almost half were in garrison duty at York and Burlington Heights while the balance was thinly spread along the 35-mile Niagara front with garrisons at Fort Erie, Fort Chippawa, Fort George, and Fort Niagara. 

The American plan called for Brown to cross the Niagara and capture Fort Erie and then sweep down the west bank of the river, pushing all British forces before it, including the recapture of Fort George and Fort Niagara, before moving west against Burlington Heights and York. Thus, with the assistance of Commodore Isaac Chauncey’s Lake Ontario fleet, Brown hoped to drive the British from the Niagara peninsula, a plan that was nothing if not ambitious.

At dawn on July 3, Brown's army embarked in boats and crossed the Niagara to capture Fort Erie with Scott’s brigade crossing the river below the fort while Ripley crossed a few hours later above it. Following a few desultory shots to maintain their honor, the British commander raised the white flag and surrendered his small garrison of 200 men. Meanwhile, General Riall received word of the assault and hastened south from Fort George with a combined force of regulars, militia, and Indians, establishing a strong line at the small town of Chippawa, just by behind the Chippawa River. 

The following morning, the nation’s 38th birthday, Scott moved his brigade from Fort Erie towards the British lines at Chippawa, sixteen miles away, arriving there late in the afternoon with the rest of Brown’s army arriving that night. The two armies were about a mile apart with an open plain between them and the Niagara River bordering the plain to the east; the British were safely behind the Chippawa River, and the Americans encamped south of Street’s Creek. Knowing that Riall’s army was vastly outnumbered, the Americans did not dream that the British would advance from their unassailable position behind the Chippawa and attack their lines, but Riall did just that the afternoon of July 5. Scott, who had drilled his men hard on Independence Day, was marching his men to the plain for a grand parade to pay honor to the country for which they were fighting when he discovered, much to his surprise, that the British were forming in line of battle on his parade ground.  

But Scott was not overly concerned as he had great confidence in his well-trained brigade of regulars and immediately deployed his men to face the Brits. Riall, who had expected to confront militia, ordered an attack, expecting the militia to run as they normally did after a few volleys from the British, but the Americans held firm and launched a counterattack of their own. The greater accuracy of the American cannon and musketry soon had its effect and the British, which had marched so proudly onto the field, broke and fled back to the safety of their lines behind the Chippawa.  

The Battle of Chippawa was over in less than an hour as General Scott’s brigade of regulars gained a complete victory over the British. It was a costly defeat for the British in more ways than one as they suffered nearly 600 casualties including 236 killed, while the Americans suffered just over 300 casualties with 61 killed. But more importantly, the battle represented the first time a unit of American regulars had bested a similar sized unit of British regulars, and that happened largely because of the training regimen and leadership of Winfield Scott. Never again in the war was an army of American regulars beaten by British troops and, although the battle was small, it gave the American soldiers a pride and faith in themselves that they had not previously possessed.  

But the British were still in the field and had their own pride to maintain. With British reinforcements on the way, the Americans, who were in an extended position on the Canadian side on the Niagara River, knew more battles were to come. 

Next week, we will discuss the Battle of Lundy’s Lane. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

While General Henry Dearborn was trying to make headway along the Niagara front, the British were busy launching an offensive of their own against Sackett’s Harbor. This was not the first British attack on the American outpost, as the previous summer, on July 19, a British fleet had attempted to destroy Sackett’s Harbor’s critical navy yard, but the British were repulsed in that attack which marked the first armed engagement in the War of 1812. In any event, aware that General Dearborn had pulled most of the soldiers from Sackett’s Harbor for his invasion of the Niagara area, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, felt it was an opportune time for the British try again.  

Sackett’s Harbor was located at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, nestled safely in Black River Bay, with several batteries along the southern shore guarding the approaches. Besides being the primary American navy yard on Lake Ontario, it was the home base of the lake’s American fleet, commanded by Commodore Isaac Chauncey. Unlike some of his fellow naval commanders such as Stephen Decatur and Oliver Hazard Perry, Chauncey was not infused with an aggressive nature and saw danger at every turn. Although the home base of the British fleet on the lake was only thirty nautical miles away in Kingston, Ontario, Chauncey never engaged the Royal Navy ships in a pitched battle to gain command of the lake. 

On the evening of May 27, Captain Sir James Yeo, the commander of the British fleet on Lake Ontario, loaded Prevost’s 1,200 troops onto transport ships and, with six warships as a convoy, sailed to Sackett’s Harbor, arriving there the next afternoon. To oppose the Brits, there were about 400 regulars and 250 New York volunteers, but upon the appearance of the British, hundreds of other New York militiamen quickly assembled at the fort. The commander was Jacob Brown, a Brigadier General in the New York State militia who lived in the area and would prove to be one of the most aggressive and capable American Generals during the war. As the British landing party made their way ashore, the untried New York militiamen, experiencing gunfire for the first time in battle, quickly retreated in disorder and, although the regulars performed well, they too gradually gave way. When the battle appeared to be lost, Lieutenant Wolcott Chauncey, who was in charge of the naval yard, decided to set fire to the General Pike, a warship which was on the stocks and nearing completion, as well as all naval stores and the naval barracks and storehouses rather than have them fall into enemy hands. Brown was appalled when he saw the smoke rising from the naval yard, later commenting “The burning of the marine barracks was as infamous a transaction as ever occurred among military men.” 

Brown eventually rallied some of the troops at their second defensive line, a row of newly built log houses, and the Americans stood firm. Seeing his line stabilize but with the outcome of the fight still in the balance, Brown was determined to rally the militiamen who had earlier fled the field. Brown confronted the men, who were huddled on the outskirts of the village, and informed them that the British were in full retreat and that they should join in the rout. Brown’s stratagem worked, and soon several hundred militia were following him into the fray. With adverse winds keeping the British warships too distant from the shore to support the assault and facing stiffer opposition from the Americans than was expected, Prevost, a timid man by nature, ordered a withdrawal rather than press the fight further. And Brown, relieved to see the British invasion force pulling back and reembarking in their landing craft, did not press his advantage and allowed the British to leave unmolested. Prevost had many enemies in Canada and was widely criticized for the failed attempt at Sackett’s Harbor. But most official American reports supported Prevost’s view that the American lines could not have been taken under the circumstances, with General Brown writing “had not General Prevost retired most rapidly under the guns of his vessels he would never have returned to Kingston.” The casualty list supports the view that this was a desperate fight as nearly one-third of the British force became casualties in the fight for Sackett’s Harbor. 

Although later that summer, Colonel Scott and Commodore Chauncey again attacked and burned York, activities along the Niagara front largely came to an end for the year. General Dearborn finally retired and was replaced by General James Wilkinson, perhaps a case of going from bad to worse. In October, General Wilkinson planned an expedition against Montreal and pulled Colonel Scott and 800 men to participate in the invasion. But this troop removal from Fort George greatly weakened the American garrison and General George McClure, who had been left in charge, decided his position was too tenuous and blew up Fort George. McClure also had his troops burn the nearby town of Newark, as well as part of Queenston, to deny winter quarters to the British and retired to the American side of the river at Fort Niagara.  

In December, the British reoccupied Fort George and were incensed to find the Americans had burned the towns and left hundreds of Canadians homeless. An angry British army of 1,000 men crossed the river and captured Fort Niagara, taking over 350 prisoners and bayoneting 67 soldiers to death. The British then moved up the east bank of the Niagara River burning Lewiston, Manchester, Black Rock and its navy yard with four warships, and retired to Canada, except for maintaining a garrison at Fort Niagara which they held until the end of the war.  

Thus ended 1813, another dismal year in the land war along the Niagara front for the United States. After repeated marching and counter marching, invasions and retreats, the American army possessed no Canadian soil and had managed to lose Fort Niagara, its main outpost on the river. But better commanders had been discovered during the year including Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott, and, in 1814, a stronger American army would take the field. 

Next week, we will discuss the Battle of Chippawa. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

In early May 1813, Commodore Isaac Chauncey loaded General Henry Dearborn’s army onto his waiting ships and sailed back across Lake Ontario for the second phase of Dearborn’s campaign, the capture of Fort George, discharging the soldiers about four miles east of Fort Niagara. Between the men stationed at Fort Niagara and Dearborn’s contingent, the American force consisted of roughly 4,000 men, while opposing them were 1,000 British regulars and 400 Canadian militiamen under Brigadier General John Vincent, along with a contingent of Mohawk warriors. With Dearborn still incapacitated, effective command of the army fell to 26-year-old Colonel Winfield Scott, destined to be one of the great military commanders in American history. On the morning May 27, Colonel Scott led 500 men ashore, deftly transported by Captain Oliver Hazard Perry’s boats to the landing area and supported by Chauncey’s fleet guns as well as those from Fort Niagara across the river. General Vincent and the Indians contested the landing, but the American vanguard established a foothold and the main body soon followed. The opening engagement lasted for about thirty minutes before American numbers and accurate musketry drove the British from the field.  

General Vincent ordered the guns at Fort George spiked and the ammunition destroyed and withdrew the garrison. He issued similar orders to the garrisons at Fort Chippawa and Fort Erie, and established Beaver Dams, eighteen miles to the west, as the rallying point, leaving the Americans in complete control of both banks of the Niagara River. The British loss was severe as they suffered roughly 450 men killed, wounded, and captured, while the Americans suffered less than 200 casualties. The hero of the day was clearly Colonel Winfield Scott who Major General Morgan Lewis said, “fought nine-tenths of the battle.” Scott hoped to follow up his victory by striking the retreating British before they could reach their lines at Beaver Dams, stating to General Lewis “I have the enemy within my power…in seventy minutes, I shall bag their whole force,” but Scott was called off from his pursuit by Lewis, an overly cautious, politically appointed General.  

Still, with Chauncey in control of Lake Ontario, York sacked, and Vincent's army on its heels, the time seemed ripe for the American conquest of Upper Canada. It would prove to be the best opportunity of the war for the Americans, but unfortunately one they would squander as several days passed before the Americans began their pursuit. And during that brief respite, British General John Vincent had retired further west to Burlington Heights and had received much needed reinforcements from York, bringing his force to 1,600 soldiers. In early June, Generals William Winder and John Chandler moved their brigades totaling some 3,000 men west to confront Vincent's army. The Americans probed the British position on June 5 and retired for the night to Stoney Creek, ten miles from the British lines. But a British reconnaissance party under Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey discovered the American camp and urged Vincent to attack that night, noting that “the enemy’s camp guards were few and negligent” and many of the American regiments were too far in the rear to support those at Stoney Creek; Vincent agreed and directed Harvey to lead 700 men against the American camp. Perhaps more importantly, Vincent had obtained the counter sign for that night from a Canadian who had joined the American army and then deserted back to the British. Consequently, the British were able to capture the American sentinels without giving alarm. 

The assault began at 2 a.m. in the pitch-black night and, in the darkness, confusion reigned and the undermanned British force quickly broke the American line which had been taken completely by surprise. During the 45-minute engagement, both Winder and Chandler mistakenly stumbled into the British lines and were captured. Now leaderless and thinking themselves defeated, the Americans retreated from the field, back towards Fort George, while Colonel Harvey, recognizing his small force could not hold the field, retreated as well. In a testament to the intensity of the fighting, casualties were unusually high with the British losing 23 men killed, 100 wounded, and another 55 missing while the Americans suffered 17 killed, 38 wounded, and 99 missing. 

With the repulse of the Americans, General Vincent moved his base forward 20 miles to Beaver Dams, today's Thorold, Ontario, and from here conducted almost daily raids against the American camp. Annoyed by these raids, General Dearborn sent an expedition of 570 men under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Boerstler to dislodge the enemy. On June 21, while waiting to move forward against Beaver Dams, several American officers lodged at the home of Captain James Secord, a Canadian militia officer who had been wounded the previous year at Queenston Heights. His wife, Laura, overheard the Americans discussing the pending attack at Beaver Dams and, the following morning, Laura set out on a 20-mile hike through the woods to warn Lieutenant James Fitzgibbon, the British commander, of the American plans. On June 24, when the Americans finally moved towards the British outpost, they marched through a densely wooded area and straight into an ambush of several hundred Indians.  

The Americans fought hard for three hours but were preparing to retire from the field when a British officer under a flag of truce approached the Americans. The messenger was Lieutenant Fitzgibbon who informed Colonel Boerstler that a contingent of 1,500 British soldiers and 700 Indians were minutes away preparing to attack and asked if Colonel Boerstler would consider surrendering to avoid more bloodshed. Thinking he was badly outnumbered, the wounded Boerstler agreed to surrender if the officers kept their firearms and the soldiers were paroled. The Americans stacked their arms and waited for the British reinforcements to arrive on the field. But that never happened as Fitzgibbons’ story of British reinforcements was simply that, a story, and over 500 Americans surrendered to a force of only 250 British soldiers, thus ending the Battle of Beaver Dams and firmly ensconcing Laura Secord in Canadian lore. For the Americans, this second check on their invasion ambitions effectively crushed their spirit of initiative and, for the remainder of their time at Fort George, they stayed within its walls, more a prisoner of the besieging British army than an invasion force. 

Next week, we will discuss the American retreat across the Niagara River.  Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

The man to whom President James Madison and Secretary of War William Eustis gave command of the overall war effort for the War of 1812 was Henry Dearborn from New Hampshire. In addition to the overall command, Dearborn was assigned the right wing of the three-pronged American attack into Canada, up the Lake Champlain corridor to the St. Lawrence River and then onward to Montreal. Arguably, this invasion sector was the most critical, as the St. Lawrence represented the only means of communication between Lower Canada and Upper Canada. If the Americans were able to choke off the St. Lawrence at any point, all supplies for Upper Canada would cease flowing, and with that would come an end to the war. Many noted that this task was not formidable, in fact the Quebec Gazette noted “a few cannon judiciously posted or even musketry could render the communication impracticable without powerful escorts. It is needless to say that no British force can remain in safety or maintain itself in upper Canada without a ready communication with the lower province.” 

Dearborn, who was a doctor prior to the American Revolution, began his military career in 1775 as a Captain of New Hampshire militiamen, fighting alongside General John Stark at the Battle of Bunker Hill, and Dearborn's competence and bravery were soon noted. Dearborn accompanied Benedict Arnold on the failed invasion of Quebec in 1775, performed heroically at Saratoga in 1777, and was at Yorktown when Lord Cornwallis surrendered his British Army in 1781, rising to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Following the war, Dearborn returned to his home, a farm on the Kennebec River, but was soon back in public service, serving two terms in Congress as a Democratic-Republican representative from Massachusetts and then eight years as President Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of War. Following that stint, Dearborn was appointed collector of the port of Boston by President James Madison and served in that capacity until Madison appointed him to command the United States Army in the War of 1812.  

The initial campaigns of the war had not gone well, in part due to the lethargy shown by the often ill 61-year-old General Dearborn. In January 1813, Secretary of War William Eustis was replaced by John Armstrong, an energetic former officer in the American Revolution who seemed to be always mired in controversy including the Newburgh Conspiracy. Despite his abilities, Armstrong was not a man who was widely trusted as seen by the narrowness of his confirmation vote of 18 to 15 in the U.S. Senate. But Armstrong soon pushed Dearborn to begin an active campaign for the invasion of Canada and ordered the aging General to assemble an army at Sackett’s Harbor, a recently expanded navy yard at the source of the St. Lawrence River and directly across from the British base at Kingston. 

By early April, Dearborn had assembled over 8,000 men at Sackett’s Harbor and Dearborn and Commodore Isaac Chauncey, commander of the American fleet on Lakes Ontario and Erie, decided to act before the spring thaw when British reinforcements were expected to arrive up the frozen St. Lawrence. Their plan was to cross the lake and destroy the British naval yard at York, located on the north shore of Lake Ontario at the head of a beautiful harbor and the capital of Upper Canada, and then recross the lake and reduce British-held Fort George, the main British outpost on Lake Ontario, at the mouth of the Niagara River. On April 25, the flotilla, led by Chauncey with 1,700 men under Dearborn’s command, pushed off from Sackett’s Harbor and arrived at York two days later. Dearborn was ill and bedridden, and the command of the landing party passed to General Zebulon Pike, a famous explorer and considered by many to be the brightest Brigadier General in the United States Army. Facing the American invasion force was Major General Roger Sheaffe, the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, with 600 men, half regulars and half militia. The defenses of the town were surprisingly poorly prepared to receive an assault as several cannons were without trunnions and several others were not mounted on carriages. 

Still stung from the embarrassing setbacks the previous year, Pike exhorted his men to “be mindful of the honor of the American arms, and the disgraces which have recently tarnished our arms, and endeavor by a cool and determined discharge of their duty, to support the one and wipe off the other.” The Americans landed at 8 a.m. and, by late morning, Sheaffe recognized his small force could not hold the town and withdrew his regulars across the Don River, leaving the Canadian militiamen to strike the best deal they could with the Americans. But prior to leaving, Sheaffe rigged the powder magazine with 74 tons of iron shells and 300 barrels of gunpowder to explode rather than let it fall into American hands. Around 1 p.m., the charge denoted and beams, metal, and stone from the magazine flew off in every direction for 500 yards, killing or wounding over 200 Americans and nearly as many Brits. Sadly, one of the American casualties was General Pike whose chest was crushed by a large boulder dislodged by the explosion.  

Although the Americans were temporarily confused, they quickly regained their ranks and drove the remaining British from town. Angered by the explosion, some Americans set fire to the town’s public buildings including the Government House and Legislative Assembly, and this destruction of York’s public buildings was later used as justification for the British burning Washington. Although the naval yard at York had been destroyed, the expedition was costly as the Americans suffered nearly 300 casualties, most from the magazine explosion, while the British lost 400 men, including 290 Canadian militiamen taken prisoner. But most importantly, the Americans had tasted the sweetness of victory for the first time in the war at the Battle of York. 

Next week, we will discuss the Battles of Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

The center thrust of the three-prong American advance into Canada was along the Niagara River frontier. This thirty-five-mile stretch was the most contested piece of real estate during the War of 1812 and would change hands several times over the course of the war. Secretary of War William Eustis entrusted the command of this sector to Stephen van Rensselaer, among the bluest of the blue bloods, a fifth generation landowner in upstate New York, descended from one of the earliest American patroons whose massive estate was on land granted to the family by the Dutch government when the area was the Dutch colony of New Netherlands. Not surprisingly given his wealth, van Rensselaer was a Federalist who had long served in the militia. When war came, President James Madison offered van Rensselaer a Major General’s commission and the command of the Niagara frontier, in part to keep van Rensselaer from running for Governor against Democratic-Republican George Tompkins. Despite his opposition to the war, van Rensselaer accepted the command, feeling he must put his country ahead of his personal feelings but fully aware of his lack of experience commanding large bodies of troops. 

Although war had been declared on June 18, it took time for General van Rensselaer to assemble his army for the invasion of Canada across the Niagara River. But by early October, van Rensselaer’s army consisted of roughly 6,000 men, 2,000 regulars and militia under General Alexander Smyth at Buffalo, General William Wadsworth with 2,300 men at Lewiston, and 1,350 regulars at Fort Niagara. But right away there were command issues, as Smyth, a regular army officer, refused to take orders from van Rensselaer, who was his senior in rank but a militia officer. Consequently, when van Renssalaer announced his intention to invade below the falls, Smyth refused to participate in van Rensselaer’s plan as he thought the invasion should take place above the falls. Opposing the Americans on the Niagara front were 1,500 British soldiers, a combination of regulars and militia, and a smattering of Indians under the command of General Roger Hale Sheaffe and General Isaac Brock, the victor of Detroit. This small army was scattered across several outposts including Fort George at the mouth of the Niagara on Lake Ontario and Fort Erie at the head of the river on Lake Erie. 

Van Renssalaer established his headquarters at Lewiston, directly across the Niagara River from Queenston which sat atop bluffs two hundred feet above the river. At 3 a.m. on October 13, van Rensselaer put his plan in motion and sent 300 regulars and 300 militiamen under Lieutenant Colonel John Christie, commander of the 13th Infantry, across the river to take Queenston Heights, but the river at this point was full of swirling eddies and Christie's boat failed to make the landing. Consequently, the command devolved to Captain John E. Wool, a relatively new officer, and Colonel Solomon van Rensselaer, the General's nephew. Despite Wool’s inexperience, he immediately seized control of the situation and led his men from the riverbank to the plateau above where he and Colonel van Renssalaer organized the troops into line of battle. The British attacked and van Rensselaer, who was wounded five times, ordered a retreat to the riverbank to seek protection from the rocks below. Wool, despite being shot through both thighs, soon found another route to the top of the plateau, one on the steep side of the heights and unobserved by the British. Despite his wounds and the difficulty of the approach, Wool led his men to the summit and stormed the British position, driving the Redcoats from the field. 

At this point, General Brock at Fort George, seven miles down the Niagara River, brought reinforcements to Queenston and personally led the charge up the hill. But Brock was shot from his horse, mortally wounded, as was his second in command Lieutenant Colonel McDonnell of the York militia and, with both commanders gone, the British soldiers retreated to the safety of their lines. American reinforcements soon arrived from across the river including General van Rensselaer, General William Wadsworth, and Lieutenant Colonel Winfield Scott. 

As a group of Americans led by Scott dug in to secure their position, General van Rensselaer recrossed the river to encourage the 1,200 New York militiamen to hurry across and join the fight. Shockingly, the militiamen refused to leave American soil and no argument from General van Rensselaer could sway them. As van Rensselaer watched helplessly from across the river, he saw another long column of British soldiers led by General Sheaffe approaching from the direction of Fort George. At 4pm, Sheaffe began his assault of the American position, but the Americans held firm. Sheaffe then brought up his artillery and attacked both flanks and finally the American line finally broke, and the retreat became a rout. The Americans fled to the safety of the riverbank, hoping to be rowed to safety in the boats they expected to be waiting for them, but the river men refused to go back across the river and bring their countrymen to safety. Surrounded by an overwhelming force and with their backs against the river, Colonel Scott had no choice but to surrender. When the final tally was taken, the British lost about 130 men while Americans suffered 190 casualties and had another 900 Americans taken prisoner. Fortunately for the American cause, Scott would be returned to the Americans in a prisoner exchange the following month. 

As for van Rensselaer, after his defeat at Queenston, the General resigned his commission and Smyth, the regular army officer who refused to support van Rensselaer’s plan, assumed command. Smyth immediately issued a call to arms and within a month raised a force of roughly 4,500 men. But Smyth was more a man of talk than of action and, after raising the force and planning two attacks on Canadian soil, failed to execute either attack. Frustrated with Smyth and the inactivity, many New York militiamen headed home, while Smyth resigned three months later and returned to Virginia where he was elected to Congress.  

The rest of the army went into winter camp thus ending the land campaign of 1812. It had been a dismal performance thus far by the Americans between the surrender of Detroit, the embarrassing loss at Queenston Heights, and a complete lack of activity on the Montreal-Lake Champlain front. What was supposed to be a walk in the park according to Warhawks like Henry Clay, turned out to be anything but that. However, plans were made to reverse the situation the following year. 

Next week, we will discuss the burning of York. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

On September 12, 1813, General William Henry Harrison received word of Captain Oliver Hazard Perry's great victory on Lake Erie two days before. Recognizing that the Navy had done their part and cleared the lake of British warships, Harrison knew the time had finally come for the invasion of Upper Canada, and the General immediately put the wheels in motion to strike the British while he held the advantage. 

Besides two brigades under Generals Duncan MacArthur and Lewis Cass, Harrison had also requested the support of Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky and, as always, Kentucky responded to the call with men in forty-eight of the state's fifty-six counties volunteering. Impressively, the sixty-six-year-old Governor, a veteran of the great victory at Kings Mountain in the American Revolution, personally took the field at the head of over 3,000 volunteers, stating to Harrison, “I will lead you to the field of battle and share with you the dangers and honours of the campaign.”  Harrison's most formidable unit would come from this Kentucky contingent, a regiment of 1,000 mounted men under the capable leadership of Colonel Richard M. Johnson, who had formed the force earlier that year to defend the Kentucky settlements against Indian depredations. 

On September 20, General Harrison loaded his army onto Captain Perry’s transport ships and one week later landed them on the Canadian shore, three miles below Fort Malden. To oppose the American force, General Henry Proctor had under his command an army consisting of 400 regulars and approximately 3,000 Indians. But Proctor recognized that with Perry's destruction of the British fleet, his army could not be easily resupplied. Accordingly, on September 18, Proctor announced to the Indians his intention of retreating east to shorten his supply line. Tecumseh, furious with what he viewed as Proctor’s cowardice, argued vehemently with Proctor that he should oppose the expected American landing. But Proctor could not be dissuaded, and many warriors began to leave for home rather than join in the retreat. Before leaving, Proctor had his troops destroy all supplies they could not carry, as well as all public property and the forts at Malden and Detroit. When Harrison landed and saw the smoking remains Fort Malden, he was shocked that Proctor had not stood his ground, and many of Proctor’s subordinate officers later voiced the same criticism. 

Leaving behind two regiments of regulars to garrison Detroit and Malden, Harrison's pursuit of the British began in earnest on October 2 up the Thames River valley with a contingent of 3,000 men. Although the British were already fifty miles ahead of the Americans, Proctor had neglected to burn bridges or place obstacles along Harrison's expected route of march and the Americans, led by Johnson’s mounted Kentuckians, quickly closed the gap. Left with little choice but to turn and fight, Proctor finally halted his retreat on October 5 and drew up his army in line of battle just west of Moraviantown. By now, Proctor’s force had dwindled to roughly 400 infantrymen, a few dragoons, and one six-pounder for which there was no ammunition, and the once mighty host of 3,000 Indians led by Tecumseh had shrunken to 500.

Proctor placed the Indians to his right with their flank resting on a swamp and his regulars he positioned on the left but surprisingly arrayed in open order behind trees and undergrowth rather than in the more traditional European closed ranks style. When Colonel Johnson observed the open formation and the space between each man, he suggested to Harrison that the Americans open the assault with a mounted charge rather than with infantry. Although Harrison considered the tactic unconventional, later stating a charge of mounted infantry “was not sanctioned by anything that I had seen or heard of but I was fully convinced it would succeed,” Harrison allowed Johnson to give it a try. At 4p.m., Johnson sounded the bugles and Kentuckians led by Lieutenant Colonel James Johnson, Colonel Johnson's younger brother, charged crying “Remember the Raisin” and the fury of the American assault quickly broke through the British line. The contest on this flank was over in less than twenty minutes as the British regulars that were not casualties all surrendered, essentially annihilating the only British army in Upper Canada.  

The left of the British line, comprised of the remaining Indians and led by Tecumseh, proved a much tougher fight. Here Colonel Johnson personally led the charge but was met with a heavy fire from Indians hidden behind trees and in the underbrush, and the battle raged back and forth for over an hour. Johnson received several bullet wounds and nearly lost his life in hand-to-hand combat with a warrior before shooting the Indian in the chest with one of his pistols. There was some sentiment later that this Indian was Tecumseh but that was never confirmed and, in fact, several Indians at the battle remarked that they had carried Tecumseh’s body from the field. Regardless, with Tecumseh’s death, the remaining Indians lost heart and fled from the field. More importantly, with his passing, Tecumseh’s confederacy collapsed and Indian resistance in the northwest largely came to an end. All told, the British suffered roughly fifty casualties and over four hundred prisoners in the Battle of the Thames, while American losses were relatively light with roughly seventy-five killed and wounded, including Colonel Johnson who soon recovered from his wounds.  

Meanwhile, General Proctor, seeing the battle going against him, took flight with several aides, racing forty miles to the east that night and outdistancing his American pursuers. Eventually, Proctor made it to Burlington Heights and, upon mustering his remaining force, found that his unit had dwindled to forty soldiers. Not surprisingly, Proctor was court-martialed for mismanaging the campaign and was never given another command. Although the time seemed ripe to build on this victory and drive east to assault British outposts on Lake Ontario and roll up the entire flank of Upper Canada, no provision had been made for an extended Canadian campaign, and supplies were running low. Consequently, Harrison released the Kentuckians and sent them home.  

As for General Harrison, his great victory at the Thames, which finally secured Upper Canada, was his last hurrah in the war, as he had a falling out with Secretary of War John Armstrong and resigned his commission. But Harrison would go on to serve in the United States House and Senate before being elected the nation’s ninth President in 1840, using the slogan “Tippecanoe and Tyler Too.” 

Next week, we will discuss the fight for the Niagara frontier. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

The key to controlling Upper Canada in the War of 1812 was gaining naval mastery of the Great Lakes, especially Lakes Erie and Ontario. Given the lack of adequate roads in that area, neither side could hope to sustain an army of any size in the field without the ability to deliver supplies and reinforcements via these lakes. As 1813 opened, the British were in firm control of both and, despite the clamor of the Madison administration and Americans living west of the Appalachians to invade Canada, General William Henry Harrison, commander of the western army, was painfully aware that he must wait for a situational change on Lake Erie before beginning his advance. 

To that end, in February 1813, Secretary of the Navy William Jones appointed Lieutenant Oliver Hazard Perry to take command of the American fleet on the lake. Perry was twenty-seven years old at the time but had already been serving in the United States Navy for twelve years, joining as a midshipman at age fifteen and serving under Commodore Edward Preble at Tripoli in the Barbary War. Perry was currently the commander of a flotilla of gunboats in Newport, Rhode Island, but chafing at the inactivity of his current post and anxious to get into the war. Perry jumped at the opportunity and reported to Sackett’s Harbor and Commodore Isaac Chauncey, commander of naval forces on Lakes Erie and Ontario. Chauncey ordered Perry to proceed to Presque Isle, today’s Erie, Pennsylvania, and there oversee the completion of six warships, two brigs, a schooner, and three gunboats that were already on the stocks. Perry, who had recently been promoted to Captain, was then to combine these vessels with five other warships at the Black Rock Naval Yard on the Niagara River and destroy the British fleet then controlling Lake Erie. Although Presque Isle was virtually undefended and the British were aware that the Americans were building warships there to take control of the lake, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, inexplicably failed to attack the naval yard and destroy the ships. By May 24, all the vessels were completed and now only awaited the arrival of the ships from Black Rock before heading out to open water to confront the British fleet.  

Providentially, at about that same time, the lone American victory on the Niagara front in 1813 took place, a successful assault on British controlled Fort George at the mouth of the Niagara River. This attack was carried out by General Henry Dearborn and Captain Perry, who briefly left Presque Isle to manage the flotilla carrying Dearborn’s army and its landing on Canadian soil. Dearborn’s success at Fort George forced the British to evacuate Fort Erie, across the Niagara River from Buffalo at the eastern end of Lake Erie and under whose guns all ships must pass to gain entry to the lake. With the threat at Fort Erie removed, Perry was able to sail the five American warships from Black Rock to Presque Isle in July and, after spending a month manning the vessels, Perry took his fleet in search of the British. 

Meanwhile, the British had been busy assembling their own fleet below Fort Malden on the Detroit River. The commander was Captain Robert H. Barclay, thirty-two years of age, who had served under Admiral Horatio Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar. Barclay’s fleet consisted of six ships, the largest which were the Detroit, 19 guns, and the Queen Charlotte, 17 guns. In comparison, Perry’s fleet consisted of nine warships, including two 20-gun brigs, the Lawrence, which Perry named his flagship, and the Niagara, which Perry assigned to Captain Jesse Elliott. Importantly, the tonnage that could be fired at close range by the Americans was almost double that of the British. 

Just after dawn on September 10, Perry’s lookouts spied the British fleet in line of battle, roughly five miles away. At 11:45 a. m., the British long guns on the Detroit opened the engagement and Perry gave the order to close with the enemy. For a reason never fully explained, Captain Elliott on the Niagara disregarded Perry’s order and remained at long range, essentially out of the fight. Seeing the Niagara was holding back, Barclay focused British fire on Perry’s flagship the Lawrence and, for two long hours, the Lawrence fought the Detroit and the Queen Charlotte by itself. The Lawrence received terrible punishment, suffering eighty-three casualties out of a crew of 103, including all the officers either killed or wounded, except for Perry, who seemed to live a charmed life. Recognizing the Lawrence was in peril and assuming Perry was dead, Captain Elliott finally sailed the Niagara towards the fight. Seeing the Niagara, fresh and unharmed, entering the battle and knowing that the Lawrence must soon strike its colors, Perry made an incredibly bold decision. He ordered a boat lowered over the side and had a small crew row Perry to the approaching Niagara, attempting to transfer his flag to another ship in the midst of battle, an audacious move almost unheard of in naval warfare.  

Captain Barclay, shocked but recognizing what Perry was up to, brought all his guns to bear on Perry’s rowboat, and soon the small crew was drenched from the round shot splashing around the boat; but Divine Providence must still have been watching over Perry as again he emerged unscathed from the ordeal. Upon reaching the Niagara, Perry took over command from Captain Elliott and boldly sailed the Niagara into the fray. Perry smashed through the British line, taking on five ships and firing broad sides to the right and left. Perry then brought the ship about and did the same thing one more time. Inspired by Perry’s heroic efforts, the other American ships that were still able to fight rejoined the battle. By now, Captain Barclay was wounded and his ships badly damaged by the superior weight of the American guns. And what had seemed to be a certain victory for the British turned into an inglorious defeat within fifteen minutes of Perry’s breakthrough of the British line. One after another, all British ships struck their colors and Perry returned to the Lawrence to receive the surrender of the British captains.  

Then, taking a scrap of paper and pencil from his pocket, Perry sent a note for the ages to General Harrison, stating, “We have met the enemy and they are ours; two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop. Yours with great esteem and respect. O. H. Perry.” 

Next week, we will discuss the Battle of the Thames. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Hello America!

Subscribe to receive weekly complimentary articles and videos delivered straight to your inbox.

Following the American disaster at Frenchtown, General William Henry Harrison gathered another force to turn the tide in the West. On February 1, 1813, Harrison returned to the rapids of the Maumee with 1,800 Pennsylvania and Virginia militiamen and tasked Major Eleazer D. Wood of the Engineers, an early graduate of West Point, to construct Fort Meigs. Wood finished the fort by the end of the month, but unfortunately the enlistments of most of the men expired at the same time and Harrison was left with a formidable fort but a garrison of less than 500 soldiers. Harrison sent out urgent appeals for men and supplies to the Governors of Kentucky and Ohio and, by the end of April, had assembled 1,000 men at Fort Meigs and another 1,200 Kentucky militiamen under General Green Clay, Henry Clay’s cousin, at Fort Winchester, thirty miles upriver from Fort Meigs. Additionally, Harrison stationed 160 men at Fort Stephenson, commanded by Major George Croghan, a promising young officer and the nephew of George Rogers Clark. 

Fortunately for Harrison and the American army, the British commander, recently promoted General Henry Proctor, was a cautious man. Proctor, whose force greatly outnumbered Harrison’s, had done very little since winning the battle at Frenchtown to harass the Americans while their ranks were thin and made no attempt to prevent the construction of Fort Meigs. Instead, Proctor remained at Fort Malden assembling a larger army and, by the end of April, had roughly 500 British regulars, 500 Canadian militiamen, and 1,500 Indians under his command. Finally feeling strong enough to strike, Proctor loaded his troops onto transport boats and crossed Lake Erie to the mouth of the Maumee River, 12 miles below Fort Meigs, landing there on April 28. When Harrison learned of the British presence, he ordered General Clay to descend the river and come to his assistance at Fort Meigs.  

On May 1, the British army appeared on the opposite bank of the Maumee and initiated a siege with two batteries of artillery. Later that afternoon, Tecumseh and 1,500 Indians crossed the river to attack the fort from the rear, but Harrison and Wood had prepared for this contingency, and the attack failed. Despite Tecumseh’s unsuccessful assault, Proctor had Fort Meigs practically surrounded and, after pounding the fort with artillery for four days, sent in a demand that Harrison surrender the fort or face the consequences. But “Old Tippecanoe” was made of stiffer stuff than most and Harrison told the messenger, “Assure your General…that he will never have the post surrendered on any terms.” On May 4, Clay got word through the lines to Harrison that he was just upriver from Proctor’s artillery battery and awaiting instructions. Harrison ordered Clay to capture and spike the British cannons and then cross the river to the safety of the fort.  

The following morning, Clay detailed Colonel William Dudley and 800 men to carry out the mission which they did in short order as the British were unprepared for an attack from that direction. But enthusiasm got the better of the Kentuckians and, despite orders from Harrison to return to the fort, they raced after the retreating British. Their impetuous pursuit proved fatal as waiting in the woods just beyond the British battery was a large contingent of Indians who ambushed the Kentuckians and were joined by British reinforcements sent by Proctor.  

As Harrison and the soldiers at Fort Meigs helplessly watched from across the river, Dudley’s force was destroyed, only 170 men managed to escape and make their way back across the river to Fort Meigs. The remaining 630 soldiers were either killed or captured, including Colonel Dudley, who was killed and mutilated by the Indians; the British suffered less than 50 casualties. Sadly, as happened at Frenchtown, General Proctor carelessly handled the guard around the American prisoners and at least 40 of them were massacred and scalped by the raging Indians before Tecumseh arrived and stopped the carnage.

Despite defeating Dudley’s force and still outnumbering the Americans, Proctor lost heart and abandoned the siege, retreating to Fort Malden. But when Proctor returned, he found another 2,500 Indians had arrived in his absence, bringing his total force to over 5,000 men. Tecumseh urged Proctor to take the initiative and attack the Americans before they could be reinforced. Bowing to Tecumseh’s wishes, Proctor again loaded his men into transport vessels, crossed Lake Erie to the Maumee River, and took a position across the river from Fort Meigs on July 21. Tecumseh’s warriors then staged a mock battle just out of sight of the garrison, hoping the sounds would lure the Americans from the safety of their fort. But General Clay, left in charge of the fort by Harrison, sensed a trap and wisely refused the bait. Recognizing his deception had failed, Proctor called off the attack on Fort Meigs, reloaded the boats, and sailed back down the Maumee to Lake Erie. After coasting the shore of the lake, Proctor took his force of 400 regulars and 3,000 Indians up the Sandusky River to Fort Stephenson, a seemingly easier target. 

Anticipating Proctor’s move, on July 30 Harrison ordered Major Croghan to abandon the fort, more of a supply depot than a strong fortress, and retreat to Fort Seneca, sixteen miles away. But Croghan replied that Harrison’s order “was received too late to be carried into execution. We have determined to maintain this place and by heavens we can.” Croghan further informed Harrison that the woods surrounding the fort were already infested with Indians and felt it more prudent to remain within the walls of Fort Stephenson rather than risk a march to Fort Seneca, and Harrison, who had great respect for the Major, rescinded his order to withdraw.  

Proctor opened his bombardment of Fort Stephenson the afternoon of July 31, and the next afternoon British regulars from the 41st Regiment assaulted the walls. But Croghan had mounted his one 6-pound cannon at the weak point of the fort and loaded it with grapeshot, anticipating Proctor to strike this spot. Croghan guessed correctly and when the Redcoats were just twenty paces away the American gunners discharged the cannons, devastating the ranks. After two hours of futile assaults and nearly 100 casualties, Proctor called off the British attack, and the 2,000 Indians who had clamored for this fight refused to try their luck against the Americans. That same night, Proctor reboarded his men into the waiting boats and returned to Fort Malden, ending the last attempt by the British to invade American soil from Upper Canada.  

General Harrison knew he must take the fight to the British but recognized that until Lake Erie was secured any invasion of Upper Canada was impractical. That situation would soon change with one of the most significant naval battles in early American history.  

Next week, we will discuss the Battle of Lake Erie. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Following General William Hull’s ignominious surrender of Fort Detroit, the outlook for the United States in Upper Canada was bleak. The western army essentially had been eliminated with Hull’s surrender, and a new army had to be raised. But perhaps more importantly, a new commander had to be found, and that man would be William Henry Harrison, governor of the Indiana Territory and acclaimed in the West as the hero of Tippecanoe. 

Harrison was born on February 9, 1773, on the family estate of Berkeley Plantation, twenty-five miles southeast of Richmond, the son of Benjamin Harrison V, a signer of the Declaration of Independence. Harrison was a smallish man at 5’8” and slightly built, but he had dreams of martial glory and at age eighteen obtained a commission in the 1st Infantry Regiment. In 1794, Lieutenant Harrison accompanied General Anthony Wayne as his aide-de-camp on Wayne’s campaign to destroy Little Turtle’s Northwestern Confederacy and participated in the climactic Battle of Fallen Timbers, where Harrison’s performance won many laurels. But with the destruction of the Confederacy came an end to opportunities for Harrison to advance his career and, despite being promoted to captain, Harrison resigned his commission and left the army in 1798.  

In 1800, President John Adams appointed Harrison governor of the newly created Indiana Territory and, while in office, Harrison acquired over 55,000 square miles of Indian lands for the United States through various treaties. Harrison was well liked and that popularity grew into hero-like adulation when he destroyed a large Indian force at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811. Following Hull’s debacle at Detroit in August 1812, a cry went up in the West to give Harrison command of the new army being created to salvage the situation. Speaker of the House Henry Clay of Kentucky, echoing the general sentiment, wrote to Secretary of State James Monroe, “No military man in the United States combines more general confidence in the West” than Harrison, and he was appointed major general of the Kentucky militia. 

To augment Harrison’s authority in raising troops, President James Madison issued him a federal brigadier general’s commission as well, with the authority to raise 10,000 men. But enthusiasm was lukewarm and Harrison was only able to build a force of 6,000 soldiers. Harrison’s plan was to consolidate his army at the Maumee Rapids and then move forward to Detroit in the spring, recognizing that his army was unprepared to launch a winter offensive. And, after General James Winchester arrived with his two regiments from Fort Defiance in mid-January 1813, the army was assembled, and it was just a matter of waiting for the coming thaw.

But a few days after arriving at the rapids, Winchester received word from residents at Frenchtown, a small village thirty miles north on the River Raisin, that they were in danger of being attacked by a nearby Anglo-Indian force, and asked Winchester to come to their aid as quickly as possible. Although Harrison had instructed Winchester to not advance beyond their base camp, Winchester felt compelled to respond to their plea and notified Harrison that he planned to move forward. Harrison, recognizing the danger into which Winchester was placing his army as Frenchtown was only eighteen miles from the British stronghold at Fort Malden, began to assemble a relief force for the trouble that he sensed was coming.  

Winchester sent two detachments under Colonels William Lewis and John Allen, numbering roughly 680 men, to Frenchtown, arriving there on January 18. It was then that Lewis discovered the enemy had already arrived and occupied the village with a mixed force of 600 British, Canadian and Indian forces. Lewis ordered an immediate assault and quickly drove the British and their allies from the town and into the adjacent woods, but sharp fighting continued until dark when the British finally withdrew and headed north towards Malden. 

Three days later, Winchester arrived with 300 reinforcements bringing his total strength at Frenchtown to nearly 1,000 men, but with no artillery and no axes to chop down trees and create breastworks. Winchester laid out his camp with Kentucky militiamen behind a split rail fence on the left and the regulars from the 17th and 19th Infantry Regiments on the right but completely exposed with no cover to their front. Winchester did little to improve his position and neglected to distribute additional ammunition that had recently arrived, but more importantly failed to send out scouts to keep an eye on the British. These careless mistakes would prove fatal as British Colonel Henry Proctor had not been idle and advanced with roughly of 1,200 men, half British regulars and half Indians from Fort Malden, to strike the American army. The British arrived on the outskirts of Frenchtown at dawn on January 22, but the Americans, with no distant sentries, were completely unaware of their presence.  

The British commenced their attack at 5 a.m., concentrating on the exposed American position on the right, which broke when ammunition ran out. Panic set in and the men raced across the frozen River Raisin, but the Indians, many of them mounted, ran down the fleeing Americans and slaughtered them wholesale, refusing surrender pleas and taking no prisoners. It was a different story on the American left where Kentuckians with their deadly rifles repulsed three British charges and maintained their position. 

Winchester, who had spent the night in a farmhouse about a half mile behind the lines, finally made it to the battlefield as the rout on the right was beginning and was captured. Colonel Proctor confronted Winchester and demanded the surrender of his entire force, including the Kentucky militiamen who were holding their own on the left, or face certain slaughter by the Indians. And Winchester, badly shaken by what he had already seen, agreed to unconditionally surrender his entire command including the Kentuckians. When the firing ceased around 11 a.m., 400 Americans had been killed and another 500 taken prisoner; incredibly, only 33 soldiers from Winchester’s entire command escaped.  

Colonel Proctor, pleased with the complete victory he had gained but fearful of a counterattack by General Harrison, who was approaching with reinforcements, withdrew later that afternoon. To speed his march to Malden, Proctor left behind the more seriously wounded Americans, roughly 65 men, but with no protection. Later that night, several hundred Indians drifted back into Frenchtown, most drunk on whiskey, and over the course of the night murdered and scalped all the American wounded. 

Before Harrison and his reinforcements could reach the scene, he received word of Winchester’s defeat and, thinking Proctor’s army would soon fall on his small force, Harrison retreated to a position on the Portage River to plot his next move. The Frenchtown massacre and the loss of Winchester’s force was viewed as a national disgrace, and the pressure grew on Harrison to retrieve the situation in the West.  

Next week, we will discuss the British invasion of Ohio. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Early in 1812, when war with Great Britain seemed imminent, President James Madison named William Hull, the Governor of the Michigan Territory and a veteran of the American Revolution, to command the western war effort. Hull was a reluctant warrior who initially declined the post recognizing his best years were behind him, but when President Madison could not find a suitable replacement, Hull agreed to take the command. The army General Hull was destined to lead consisted largely of Ohio militiaman organized into three regiments, plus a troop of mounted dragoons, and 500 regulars of the Fourth Infantry Regiment led by Lieutenant Colonel James Miller, a total of 1,600 men. 

Hull’s mission was to lead the army north to Detroit, a town of roughly 800 inhabitants and surrounded by a two-square acre palisaded enclosure, and there await further orders to invade Upper Canada once war was declared. The main British outpost in the region was Fort Malden, eighteen miles south on the east bank of the Detroit River, garrisoned by 200 British regulars, 600 Canadian militiamen, and 250 Indians, with a small British fleet at anchor in the river. Hull’s task was formidable for several reasons, not the least of which was that his supply line stretched for over 200 trackless miles through hostile Indian country, including a 60-mile stretch that straddled the shore of Lake Erie, then controlled by the British navy.  

Hull started north on June 1 and while enroute received a dispatch from Secretary of War William Eustis that war had been declared, arriving at Detroit on July 5. Recognizing the need to move fast, Hull crossed the river and invaded Canada on July 12 and issued a proclamation encouraging all residents to flock to the American banner. The Americans occupied the town of Sandwich, directly across from Detroit, and began the move south to capture Fort Malden. But Hull called a council of war, and it was decided to halt the advance until large cannons could be brought over from Detroit to assist in the assault. The delay proved costly as General Isaac Brock, Governor of Ontario, quickly sent reinforcements under Colonel Henry Proctor to Fort Malden, and personally led another contingent to the beleaguered post a few days later.  

On August 3, while waiting for his field guns to arrive, Hull was informed that Fort Mackinac, the Gibraltar of the Great Lakes, had been captured by the British. Its collapse meant that several thousand Indians who had participated in that attack would soon be coming down from the north towards Fort Detroit. And a few days later, Hull received even more disturbing news that a detachment of Ohio militiamen under Major Thomas Van Horne sent to retrieve supplies at the River Raisin, thirty miles to the south, was ambushed and routed at Brownstown by Tecumseh, which meant that Indians were in significant strength on both flanks. This combination of unfortunate events caused Hull, already greatly worried about his exposed position, to return to Detroit with his entire force on the evening of August 8.

Desperate for supplies and men, Hull sent another party under Lieutenant Colonel Miller to try and reach the River Raisin supply camp. This group was also attacked and, although the Americans repulsed the combined British and Indian force, Miller chose to return to Detroit rather than pressing on to the River Raisin. With upwards of 5,000 Indians descending on him from the north and his supply line to the south severed and a strong British force at Fort Malden, Hull recognized that to salvage the situation he must immediately retreat behind the Maumee River. Hull again called a council of war on August 9 and stated his intentions, but Colonels Lewis Cass and Duncan McArthur, commanders of the Ohio volunteers, declared that the militia would desert en masse if Hull ordered a retreat and so Hull had little choice but to stay put.  

Less than a week later, on August 15, General Brock appeared with 1,500 men on the opposite bank of the Detroit River and demanded Hull’s immediate surrender. Hull refused and that night, while an artillery duel commenced, Tecumseh led 600 warriors across the river and at dawn Brock followed with the rest of the force. Brock again sent a surrender demand to Hull but this time adding a note that if Hull did not surrender, Brock would not be responsible for any atrocities committed by the Indians. The vision of a widespread slaughter of the women and children including his own daughter and grandchildren who had accompanied him to Detroit, was too much for Hull and he ordered a white flag to be raised. In the capitulation terms, Hull surrendered Detroit, the Michigan Territory, and his entire command of 2,200 men. 

Tragically, on the same day that Hull surrendered Detroit, another disaster befell the American army in the west. Fort Dearborn at Chicago was a strong blockhouse on the Chicago River garrisoned by fifty-four men, many with their wives and children present, and commanded by Captain Nathan Heald. When Hull retreated from Canada, he sent word to Heald to evacuate Fort Dearborn. Although many of the soldiers pleaded with Heald to disregard Hull’s orders and remain within the stout walls of the fort, and despite warnings from friendly Miami Indians that Potawatomi warriors planned to attack the column, Heald insisted upon following his instructions. The Americans had not proceeded more than a few miles when 500 Potawatomi ambushed Heald’s unit and two thirds of the Americans were killed or wounded, including more than a dozen children.  

Hull’s surrender of Detroit, combined with the loss of Forts Mackinac and Dearborn, resulted in the greatest loss of territory that United States has ever suffered, essentially moving the military boundary of the country from the western shores of Lake Superior to the Wabash and Maumee Rivers, and it was even doubtful that that line could be held. General Hull was sent home on parole by General Brock but, based on the greeting he received, probably wished he had remained in captivity. Hull was court-martialed, found guilty, and sentenced to death, a sentence which President Madison rescinded due to Hull’s Revolutionary War service. While all the blame was thrust upon Hull, the real cause for the disaster more accurately lay with the Jefferson and Madison administrations’ decision to essentially defund the United States Army over the course of a dozen years. And unfortunately for the country their negligence would lead to more disasters. 

Next week, we will discuss the disaster at the River Raisin. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

In June of 1812, President James Madison asked Congress to declare war on Great Britain for refusing to honor American maritime rights. In some ways, Madison’s hand was forced by the young firebrands who made up the Twelfth Congress with its unprecedented seventy new members and dominated by Democratic-Republicans, men like John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, and Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky. But the ringleader was thirty-four-year-old Henry Clay of Kentucky, who was elected Speaker of the House by his fellow war hawks.  

But support was not unanimous, as New England, dominated by Federalists, failed to see the need for the war and fully recognized that the country was woefully unprepared for a conflict due to the neglect of the army and navy by the Jefferson and Madison administrations. Additionally, although the main issue voiced by the Madison administration was violations of American rights on the high seas, the American plan called for a land war against British Canada to secure them. That seemed odd to many of Madison’s critics such as John Randolph of Roanoke, who argued that American expansionism was the true motive behind the declaration of war.  

But Democratic-Republicans could not be dissuaded as they considered Canada relatively weak with only 500,000 residents, compared to the United States population of 7,500,000, and lightly defended by only 5,000 British regulars. To the war Republicans, Canada seemed an easy conquest, one by which the United States could punish the British for their eternal arrogance but more importantly expand our national boundaries and expel the British from North America once and for all. Clay boldly declared that the Kentucky militia alone could conquer Canada and Thomas Jefferson, the patriarch of the party, commented that “the acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching.” Consequently, when the vote on Madison’s request was taken on June 18, 1812, it was the closest vote in our country’s history on a declaration of war with the Senate passing the measure largely along party lines by a 19 to 13 margin, while in the House the vote was 79 to 49.  

Interestingly, Great Britain wanted this war even less than the United States as its focus was on Napoleon, who still dominated Europe. Perhaps more importantly, the British army fighting Napoleon in the Peninsular War was largely being fed by grain and meat imported from the United States. Additionally, British merchants urged their government to avoid a war that would cripple trade with America. Consequently, on June 16, two days before the United States declared war, Parliament rescinded its Orders in Council, one of the main reasons why Americans supposedly went to war. Word of the British decision reached Washington the following month but “the dogs of war” had been loosed and President Madison, never a strong leader, did not have the will to push back against the war hawks and stem the tide of martial emotion. 

But more importantly, the nation was simply not prepared for a conflict, especially not against the world’s greatest power. The army was in a deplorable state and, at the start of the war, was comprised of only 7,000 regulars and another 5,000 men in volunteer regiments, scattered in garrisons across the vast country. Recognizing the need to increase this force, Congress voted to expand the regular army to 35,000 soldiers and levy another 100,000 volunteers from state militias. But authorizing an army and filling the ranks are two different things, and the Madison administration struggled to meet its enlistment goals throughout the course of the war. Consequently, the burden of fighting the war largely fell to state militias, who tended to be less reliable in battle than the regulars and whose short-term enlistments always seemed to expire at the most inopportune times.  

Initially, the leadership of the army was weak as President Madison appointed men to its highest positions based on political leanings rather than on their talents. His Secretary of War was William Eustis, a rare New England Republican, who had served in the American Revolution as a hospital surgeon but seemed to have no real qualifications for his position. Madison selected 62-year-old Henry Dearborn, then serving as the tax collector for the Port of Boston, as the overall commander of the army and 63-year-old Thomas Pinckney as his second in command; neither man had seen active military service since the American Revolution. His other key generals were also political appointees, including William Hull, Stephen Van Rensselaer, and James Winchester, all roughly 60 years of age and well past their prime. It would not be until disaster on the battlefield and national disappointment in these aged generals that Madison, out of necessity, would turn to younger, more talented men such as Jacob Brown, Winfield Scott, Andrew Jackson, and William Henry Harrison. 

The Secretary of the Navy was Paul Hamilton, a party stalwart and former governor of South Carolina who had fought under Francis Marion in the American Revolution but had no naval experience, and his department was unprepared for war due to the Jefferson and Madison administrations hostility to a standing navy. Consequently, the navy had only sixteen warships in 1812, including eight frigates but no ships of the line, the main battle wagon during the age of sail. To make matters worse, most of the frigates were in dry dock in various states of repair. But importantly, the men who had captained the ships so well in the Barbary War were still in their prime and eager for laurels, men such as Isaac Hull, Stephen Decatur, and Oliver Hazard Perry. In comparison, Great Britain possessed the greatest navy in the world, numbering over 1,000 vessels, including 150 ships of the line and 164 frigates. But as with the British Army, the Royal Navy’s efforts were concentrated in Europe and initially the British had only 80 warships on the American station, certainly more than the Americans possessed but not nearly enough to cover the vast area from Halifax to the Leeward Islands. It would not be until 1814, when ships were released from the European theater, that the full brunt of the Royal Navy’s blockade of the American coast was felt. 

The American strategy called for a three-prong invasion of Canada; one led by Dearborn to capture Montreal and close the St. Lawrence River, thereby severing the British supply line to Upper Canada, and another led by Van Rensselaer across the Niagara River to secure Lake Ontario. But it was the western theater, emanating from Detroit into Upper Canada, that would initiate the land war. 

Next week, we will discuss the surrender of Detroit. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

The last great battle between Indians in the old Northwest Territory and the forces of the United States, and one of the most consequential in our nation's early decades, was the Battle of Tippecanoe, fought on November 7, 1811, between Shawnee, Potawatomi, and Kickapoo warriors and American troops led by General William Henry Harrison, the Governor of the Indiana Territory. The Indians, unhappy with the continual encroachments on their land by American settlers, had gathered in Prophetstown to follow the teachings of Tenskwatawa, known as the Prophet.  

Recognizing the need to strike before the situation got out of hand, Harrison planned an expedition up the Wabash River to erect a fort to intimidate and, hopefully, peacefully disperse the Prophet’s followers. Harrison requested that Secretary of War William Eustis order regular army troops be sent to assist in his effort so he would not have to rely simply on local militia. Eustis immediately dispatched the 4th Infantry Regiment, roughly 400 men under the command of Colonel John Boyd, from Fort Fayette to Vincennes. Boyd’s contingent arrived on September 19, bringing Harrison’s command to roughly 1,200 men, 800 militiamen from Indiana and Kentucky, including 200 of whom were mounted, and the soldiers of the 4th Infantry. A few days later, Harrison started his movement north to Prophetstown up the east side of the Wabash River with a long wagon train and cattle and hogs on the hoof to provide meat for the men.  

Remembering the disasters of Harmar in 1790 and St. Clair in 1791, each evening Harrison had the camp enclosed with breastworks and posted a guard of over 100 men. Given the need to entrench each evening and the slow pace of the wagon train, the army covered about twelve miles a day. Harrison's force spent much of the month of October building Fort Harrison, roughly halfway between Vincennes and Prophetstown, to provide a base of operations closer to their destination. Near the end of October, Harrison resumed his movement north, crossing over to the west side of the Wabash which was more of an open prairie and less susceptible to ambush. Naturally, as the Americans approached, the Prophet and his followers grew alarmed and sent emissaries to Harrison asking his intention. Harrison responded that he was on a peace mission and simply hoped the Indians would disperse. 

The Americans arrived outside Prophetstown the afternoon of November 6, five miles north of today's West Lafayette, IN, and set up a triangular shaped ten-acre camp. Most of Harrison's leading officers including Colonel Boyd and Colonel Joseph Daveiss, famous for charging Aaron Burr with treason, advised an immediate attack, worried that the Indians would take the initiative and strike that night. But Harrison was under strict orders from Secretary Eustis to maintain peace if possible and not initiate an attack. Harrison was also cautious because he estimated there were roughly 600 warriors in camp and, during that era, it was generally believed that Euro-American type armies, when engaged with Indians in their woodland domains, must outnumber Indians two to one to be successful. And between garrisoning Fort Harrison and losses due to desertion and sickness, the American army had dwindled to 950 men. Due to a lack of wood, the camp was not fortified with breastworks, for which Harrison was later criticized, but the troops were ordered to sleep with their bayonets fixed and cartridge boxes ready. 

With Tecumseh away, the responsibility for dealing with the American army fell on Tenskwatawa. Although Tecumseh had stressed that a battle was to be avoided at all costs until his return, the Prophet felt he must do something. Accordingly, knowing that his followers believed him to be possessed of supernatural powers, Tenskwatawa chanted mystical words over the warriors that he pronounced would render them impervious to American bullets. Thus armed, the Indian warriors crept close to the American camp and attacked shortly before dawn on November 7. Despite the precautions taken by Harrison, the speed of the Indian attack was extraordinary, and a few warriors were in the camp and amongst the tents before the Americans could respond.  

But Harrison kept his cool and immediately brought reinforcements to the endangered northwest perimeter of the camp and quickly stabilized his lines. The Indians soon made a second rush, this time on the American right, or northeast corner of the camp, and it too was driven back. Finally, a group of Winnebago warriors pressed an aggressive attack against the southern perimeter of the camp, but with Harrison moving reinforcements to the threatened area, those lines held firm as well. As dawn broke, the Indians were still on the outside of the camp looking in and dismayed at the determined resistance of the Americans. Harrison then ordered a counterattack from both flanks, and the fury of the American charge was too much for the Indians who fled the field, only to be run down by the mounted dragoons. The determination of the American soldiers and General Harrison’s calmness under fire resulted in a great victory, but it was dearly bought for they lost 37 dead and another 151 wounded, 29 of whom would die in the next few weeks. It was always difficult to measure Indian losses because they carried off most of their dead, but it is estimated that they lost about the same.  

The Prophet and his remaining followers headed north to Wild Cat Creek, roughly 20 miles away, while Harrison ordered Prophetstown and several thousand bushels of corn burned, thus destroying the Indian’s food supply for the coming winter. Two days later, the Americans began their march back to Vincennes and a hero’s welcome from the grateful citizens. Not surprisingly, General Harrison was widely lauded for his leadership with militia officers stating, “the cool undaunted bravery of the commander-in-chief contributed more than even the courage of the army to defeat the ferocious…enemy that assailed us.” 

With the failure of Tenskwatawa’s medicine and prophecies, came the end of his influence. Tecumseh returned in the spring to find that the confederacy he had worked so hard to create had largely splintered apart. But within months, Tecumseh’s hopes would be revived as the United States declared war on Great Britain and drove British support into Tecumseh’s waiting arms.  

Next week, we will discuss the American plan for the War of 1812. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

Tecumseh’s War was the last great Indian war in the Northwest Territory and raged from 1811 to 1817. The cause of the conflict was Indian anger at the numerous land cessions made between Indian nations and the United States from 1803 to 1809. While this war overlapped with the War of 1812, the two conflicts were separate events with different goals for the participants. While the one was in part a struggle between Great Britain and the United States for the control of Upper Canada, Tecumseh’s War was the final effort by Indian nations in the Great Lakes region to stem the tide of American expansion into their native homelands. Significantly, Tecumseh’s War was the last time a European power would ever support Native Americans in a conflict. And because the only chance Indian nations had to stand up against American forces was if they were supplied with European weapons, Tecumseh’s War was the last time North American Indians had even a remote chance of victory.  

Tecumseh, whose name appropriately means Shooting Star, was a Shawnee born in 1768 in Old Piqua, part of the Ohio Country. Little is known of his early life except that he was orphaned at a young age and raised by older siblings and that even as a youth Tecumseh was notable for his bravery and aggressive spirit. In the spring of 1788, Tecumseh began accompanying warriors on raids into Kentucky and attacking flat boats descending the Ohio. In 1794, Tecumseh took part in the Battle of Fallen Timbers in which General Anthony Wayne and his Legion of the United States dealt a crushing blow to the Shawnee nation. Tecumseh’s unhappiness with both British and American authorities and the loss of what he considered his ancestral homeland caused Tecumseh to head further west to live the life of his ancestors, establishing a small village on the White River in east-central Indiana. By all accounts, Tecumseh was a formidable looking man and an exceptional warrior, and both allies and enemies were impressed with Tecumseh’s noble bearing and demeanor. British General Isaac Brock called Tecumseh “the Wellington of the Indians” and stated that “a more sagacious or more gallant warrior does not I believe exist.” And General William Henry Harrison, who would become Tecumseh’s greatest nemesis, commented that Tecumseh was “one of those uncommon geniuses, which sprang up occasionally to produce revolutions and overturn the established order of things.” 

Despite Tecumseh’s prowess, he may have remained unknown to history were it not for his brother Tenskwatawa, better known to history as the Prophet, who rose to prominence in 1805 following a series of visions. The Prophet claimed the Great Spirit, or Master of Life, desired that the Shawnee return to their ancient ways and renounce white man's dress, drink, and customs, and forbidding Indian women to marry white men. The Prophet further urged Indians to discard domestic livestock and instead rely on hunting and traditional foods such as corn, beans, and squash, and especially to avoid alcohol, reminding his followers that this white man's poison only brought misery. The purer mode of life preached by the Prophet grew into a sort of religion that promised a reward for its adherents in the afterlife and gained followers as his message reached more and more Indian villages. By 1808, the Prophet, who had once been a drunkard and held in low regard by his fellow tribesmen, emerged as one of the most influential men in the region and established the village of Prophetstown at the confluence the Wabash and Tippecanoe rivers, roughly 150 miles north of the territorial capital of Vincennes. 

Part of the reason why the Prophet’s message resonated so well with Indians in the Great Lakes region was their growing frustration over repeated land cession treaties between willing chiefs and the United States. This rapid expansion of federal land was the result of an aggressive expansionist policy of President Thomas Jefferson who came to power in 1801 and envisioned an “empire of liberty” stretching across the continent. While the 1803 Louisiana Purchase is the best-known manifestation of this policy, his actions in the Northwest Territory followed the same pattern. The President hoped to turn Indians into farmers, largely adopting the white man's agricultural way of life, or, failing that, push them further west across the Mississippi. Consequently, between 1803 and 1809, the President instructed General Harrison, the Governor of the Indiana Territory, and others to sign a series of fifteen land cession treaties with various tribes yielding over 70,000 square miles (44,000,000 acres) of Indian land to the United States. The last of these treaties was the Treaty of Fort Wayne and, although it ceded only 4,700 square miles, it proved to be the straw that broke the camel's back.

The third interested party in the Northwest Territory was the British whose province of Upper Canada bordered the northern shoreline of the Great Lakes. The British had been supportive of Indian nations in the region since acquiring Canada from the French in 1763 but had significantly reduced that support since the Jay Treaty in 1795. But as Great Britain and the United States drifted closer to war, especially after the Chesapeake-Leopard affair in 1807, the British began to rethink their Indian policy. Recognizing that if war broke out with the United States Indian assistance would be critical to British success in Upper Canada, the British walked a tightrope between maintaining ties to the Indian nations in the region and yet not guaranteeing their support in an Indian war with the United States. Consequently, when Tecumseh traveled to Fort Amherstburg in 1810 to seek guarantees of British support should war breakout, British officials were evasive. 

In 1811, Indian raids became more frequent, and Harrison requested a meeting with Tecumseh to settle differences. Their strained talks yielded no results, but during the meeting Tecumseh informed Harrison that he would be away from Prophetstown until the following spring. Although Tecumseh did not state the reason for his absence, he was traveling south to recruit tribes for his confederacy in the Mississippi Territory, modern-day Mississippi and Alabama. Harrison, worried that an Indian war was in the immediate future and fully aware that Tecumseh’s absence would weaken the confederacy, soon put plans in motion to defuse this potential rebellion before it became a reality.  

Next week, we will discuss the Battle of Tippecanoe. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

When James Madison was sworn in as President on March 4, 1809, his most pressing issue was dealing with British and French violations of American neutrality on the high seas. But he also had a rising issue in the west in the form of an Indian confederacy headed by the Shawnee chief Tecumseh and his younger brother, Tenskwatawa, better known to history as the Prophet. The focal point of this movement was the old Northwest Territory, the most fought over area in American history where white settlers and Native Americans vied for control in a virtually continuous conflict that lasted for more than fifty years before coming to an end in 1817. 

The French were the first Europeans to reach this fertile land, but they were not interested in colonizing North America as much as exploiting the area’s abundant natural resources, especially the rich fur trade. Over the course of a century, the French created alliances with many tribes and supplied them with greatly desired European metal utensils and weapons in exchange for furs and, as a result, the French were welcomed by the Indians. But with the end of the French and Indian War in 1763, the British gained possession of all French lands in North America, including the Northwest Territory which was then part of Canada. Unfortunately, while the French traders blended into Indian culture, many of them taking Indian wives, the British very much considered themselves masters of the Indian nations and treated the natives as conquered people.  

Despite the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which was intended to check colonial encroachments on Indian land and subsequent agreements between British authorities and Indian nations such as the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Americans eyed this land for settlement and were not to be put off by decrees passed by Parliament. In 1769, Daniel Boone, following in the footsteps of Thomas Walker, passed through the Cumberland Gap and, in 1775, blazed the Wilderness Road into Kentucky. As more settlers poured into Kentucky and others floated down the Ohio River in search of land, Americans began to homestead on Indian land north of the Ohio and, quite naturally, met with violent resistance from the tribes then occupying the area. 

In 1761, an Ottawa war chief named Pontiac began organizing a confederacy of a dozen Indian nations including Ottawa, Miami, and Shawnee across the southern crescent of the Great Lakes region, from Lake Michigan to the eastern end of Lake Erie to resist white settlement. Two years later, Pontiac initiated his war with an attack on Fort Detroit in May 1763. Pontiac's adherents captured and destroyed eight British forts and killed hundreds of settlers and soldiers until the British army finally regained control of the region in the fall of 1764 and secured the peace through several treaties including the Treaty of Niagara. 

But in the complexity of the Indian world, treaties signed by one chief or one tribe were not necessarily honored or accepted by other chiefs or other tribes or even by other chiefs within the same tribe. As a result, Indian depredations on settlers both north of the Ohio and in Kentucky frequently occurred. Naturally, the settlers demanded protection, first by Royal authority and then, with the onset of the American Revolution, the responsibility shifted to the fledgling Confederation Congress. However, due to its limited resources, Congress was unable to assist in the West with the ongoing Indian wars and both protection and retribution fell to militia units formed in Kentucky by leaders such as George Rogers Clark, Daniel Boone, and John Todd.

With the successful conclusion of the war in 1783, the Indians in the northwest lost the support of the British. It was hoped that as a result peace would finally come to the area and for a while it did, but it proved to be a brief respite. That same year, a brilliant Mohawk chief named Joseph Brandt, formed the Northwestern Confederacy and gathered delegates from thirty-five Indian nations on the upper Sandusky River. Like Pontiac, Brandt’s goal was to unite Indian nations to resist encroachments on their ancestral lands and, by the mid-1780s, depredations by the Indians in this region began to rise. 

With the establishment of the new Constitution in 1789, the federal government finally had the authority to raise and fund an army and President George Washington, who was committed to bringing the Indian atrocities in the Northwest Territory to an end, immediately put an army in motion. In 1790, Washington ordered General Josiah Harmar to take an army north from Fort Washington, today’s Cincinnati, on a punitive raid and destroy as many Miami and Shawnee towns as possible and, thereby, deter the Indians from future attacks. Instead, Harmar suffered a serious reverse by a coalition of warriors led by the Miami chief Little Turtle.  

Embarrassed by the defeat, the President ordered Arthur St. Clair, the territorial Governor and a former General in the American Revolution, to take a second force north to put down the rebellion. But in 1791, St. Clair suffered the greatest loss ever inflicted on the United States Army by Native Americans in the Battle of the Wabash, better known as St. Clair’s Defeat. Finally, in 1794, General Anthony Wayne and his Legion of the United States dealt a crushing blow to a large native force led by Little Turtle and a Shawnee chief named Blue Jacket at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, near today’s Maumee, Ohio, destroying the Northwestern Confederacy. The following year General Wayne dictated the Treaty of Greenville to the confederacy, establishing the Greenville Treaty Line and and reserving the southeastern two-thirds of Ohio for the United States and the rest of the Northwest Territory for the Indians. 

The Greenville Line was intended to be permanent but as was always the case with Indian treaties, nothing was permanent, and between 1803 and 1809 fifteen more land cession treaties were signed. Twelve of these agreements were initiated by William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, who would soon be confronted by a coalition of Indians unhappy with the loss of their land.  

Next week, we will discuss Tecumseh’s Confederacy. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.

On March 4, 1789, the Constitutional government, largely the creation of James Madison’s fertile mind, took effect. Naturally, Madison was there at the start to help President George Washington implement and execute this new government. But within a matter of just a few years, Madison would be opposed to the new administration that he helped bring to power as he saw the federal government going in a direction he had not envisioned. Madison’s about face, arguably the greatest political transformation by a national figure in American history, came about largely because of differing ideas regarding what the new government should look like. 

In February 1789, Madison was elected to the House of Representatives for the first Congress under the new Constitution, defeating James Monroe, an avowed anti-Federalist and future fifth President of the United States. In addition to becoming a leader in the House, Madison was instrumental in helping to shape the Washington administration, even drafting President Washington’s inaugural address. Madison also helped the President form his cabinet by recommending Alexander Hamilton for Secretary of the Treasury and Thomas Jefferson for Secretary of State.  

But Madison’s primary job was to organize and oversee the House. As promised during the Constitutional Convention, one of Madison’s first acts was to propose a series of amendments to guarantee to the people the personal liberties so recently won in the American Revolution. And in September, Madison’s twelve amendments were approved by both chambers of Congress and ultimately ten of those were ratified by the states, known to history as the Bill of Rights. But a break quickly developed between the Madison-Jefferson faction, soon to be known as Democratic-Republicans, and Hamilton's Federalists over Hamilton's national credit plan that included the assumption of debt incurred by the states during the war. Madison felt that debt assumption was not authorized by the Constitution, but Hamilton argued that the “necessary and proper” clause found in Section 8, Article I gave implied powers to the federal government to execute and carry out the enumerated responsibilities, a position that Madison himself once supported.  

During the debate over debt assumption, there was another discussion taking place regarding the permanent location of the national capital. Naturally, Madison and Jefferson as Virginians favored a more southerly capital while others, especially those from New York, wanted to keep the capital in New York City. To gain the votes necessary to overcome opposition to his debt assumption plan, Hamilton agreed to persuade his fellow northerners to support placing the nation's capital permanently on the banks of the Potomac in the yet to be created Federal City. And to persuade Pennsylvania congressmen to support this deal, it was further agreed that the capital would reside in Philadelphia for ten years, the Pennsylvanians believing that once the capital was established in Philadelphia it would never move.  

As Madison came further under Jefferson’s sway and viewed first-hand Hamilton’s implementation of the new Constitution, Madison’s view shifted from a fear of too much state power to a fear of an ever-expanding federal government. While Hamilton favored executive supremacy, Madison sought legislative supremacy. Whereas Hamilton wanted power vested in a few select men or even just one, Madison wanted power vested in the many, or the people. It did not help that Hamilton admired all things British, including their form of government, while Madison detested the British with an almost unhinged hatred. Unfortunately, these irreconcilable differences created an impasse between two devoted Patriots who both wanted only the best for the United States.  

The final split between Madison and Hamilton came in 1791 when Hamilton proposed a National Bank to bring creditworthiness to the nation and to stabilize the chaotic currency system then in place. While recognizing the need, Madison strongly opposed Hamilton's proposal, declaring that the Constitution did not explicitly authorize a national bank. As with his debt assumption argument, Hamilton justified the creation of the bank by invoking the “necessary and proper” clause of the Constitution. Hamilton's bank bill passed in Congress, supported by northern commercial interests but opposed by southern agrarian interests. The bill then went to President Washington’s desk who asked both Hamilton and Jefferson to submit arguments for and against the constitutionality of the bank. As part of his dissertation, Hamilton cited Madison’s own compelling argument in Federalist 44 regarding the theory behind the “necessary and proper” clause in the Constitution. Madison had written that “no axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, then that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it, is included.” Although torn by the decision, President Washington, on the last day available to him, signed the Bank Bill of 1791 into law.

For Madison, this legislation represented another step down the dangerous road of an all-powerful and tyrannical central government and moved Madison further from his nationalist roots of the 1780s, and with Madison’s radicalization came a lesser role in the Washington administration. Madison was increasingly seen as the leader of the Democratic-Republican opposition party and began to create an alliance with like-minded leaders in New York such as Aaron Burr, Robert Livingston, and Governor George Clinton, all anti-Hamiltonians. He even helped establish a strongly partisan newspaper, with Phillip Freneau as its editor, called The National Gazette, arguably marking the start of party politics in the United States. Hamilton, who once collaborated so closely with Madison, was disappointed at Madison’s shift in political perspective, writing that Madison’s and Jefferson’s views were “unsound and dangerous. They had a womanish attachment to France and a womanish resentment against Great Britain.”  

Madison retired from the House in 1797 but enjoyed only a short retirement before returning to the national stage in 1801 as President Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of State. For eight years Madison served in this capacity and was groomed to succeed Jefferson in the White House. Finally in 1809, James Madison became the 4th president of the United States, a presidency largely spent dealing with issues with Great Britain, but his first major problem was an Indian War in the Old Northwest. 

Next week, we will discuss Tecumseh’s War. Until then, may your motto be “Ducit Amor Patriae,” love of country leads me.