What A Cooperative Maritime Strategy Looks Like

Yesterday (Dec. 2, 2008), the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1846. From our perspective, the most significant aspect of this resolution is its inclusion of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) clause. This clause, based on the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, provides an immediately available instrument for logistically effective consequence delivery applicable to 78% of the world's States (those nations who have signed the Convention). The SUA Convention was the result of the hijacking and murder of passengers aboard the Cruise Ship ACHILLE LAURO in 1985 by the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF). The act was doubly egregious because the murdered victim, Leon Klinghoffer, was wheel chair bound and defenseless. The SUA Convention was adopted by the IMO in 1988 and came into force in 1992.

SUA applies to nearly all of the attacks occurring in the Gulf of Aden, and obliges State Parties to criminalize such acts and establish jurisdiction when the offense is committed against their vessels or nationals. SUA establishes a framework whereby masters of ships may deliver suspected SUA offenders to a coastal State Party and the coastal State Party is obliged to accept custody and extradite or prosecute unless it can articulate why the Convention is not applicable. Leveraging States SUA obligations in conjunction with existing international law against piracy provides an effective legal framework to deliver an "endgame." We have worked for several months now with our partners on the Joint Staff, through the "interagency process", and with our international partners to pursue this outcome. This is definitely a step in the right direction and I will provide updates in the future.

Dealing with piracy...What's your endgame? , Web Journal of Admiral Thad Allen, December 3, 2008

Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen isn't the only one who sees the new United Nations resolution as an actionable positive step forward in addressing Somali piracy, a Russian Admiral went on TV today to essentially suggest the resolution gives his ships the freedom of action necessary to use force to defend Russian mariners working in the Gulf of Aden. The UN resolution was passed primarily to give the green light to the European Union to deploy its first naval force for the purposes of insuring European ships stop being attacked by piracy. Apparently the inclusion of the language used in the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was a specific addition advocated by the United States and France.

Robert Farley has a very interesting read of the political angles at play between the EU and NATO in regards to how the Europeans have decided to fight piracy. From a political viewpoint, there are certainly interesting dynamics at work, but I read it like this. Europe is looking for a way to promote both autonomy and unity in executing military action in the protection of EU economic interests, and the EU interests regarding piracy off Somalia are much better defined than the NATO interests. EU interests lie in the elimination of pirate attacks against European ships, while NATO interests are specific to the protection of ships from piracy. The offensive and defensive distinction is important.

Rob's article introduces the possibility that NATO and the EU are in competition here, and Rob rightfully notes that competition is political. From a US strategic perspective, the political interests here are noteworthy and worth keeping an eye on, but at the operational level they shouldn't be a problem. Clearly NATO is monitoring the EU action carefully, because NATO announced today NATO is considering sending a new task force that would supplement anti-piracy missions run by the EU and US. This means we now have NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, several other nations, and supposedly the United States all independently aligned towards a common problem: piracy. From a strategic point of view, we wouldn't want it any other way.

It is time to look at unfolding events at both the operational level but from the perch of the big picture seat. What is the next year going to be like?

A European Navy

EU NAVFOR Somalia is on its way, expected to arrive in the region on December 8th and take over duties from NATO beginning on December 15th. This early period is being called the minimal operating capability and will include a French frigate, perhaps FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792), the British frigate HMS Northumberland (F238), the German frigate FGS Karlsruhe (F212), and the forward operating force will be led by Greek Commmodore Antonios Papaioannou on the Hellenic frigate HS Nikiforos Fokas (F 466). Initial operational capability (IOC) is expected by the end of January while full operational capability (FOC) is planned by April or May. Operation Atalanta is broken into three periods of four months each: December-March, April-July, and August-November 2009.

Different nations are being assigned different roles. For example, Germany is being tasked to escort World Food Organization shipments, and Germany will be providing armed soldiers for merchant ships. The French will be supplying a frigate, aircraft, and will assume logistics responsibilities from its base in Djibouti. Both Greece and Great Britain are contributing a frigate to the EU operation. Spain will take over operational command when they deploy the frigate SPS Victoria (F82) and a logistics ship starting in April. Captain Juan Garat Caram will take over for Commmodore Antonios Papaioannou for the second period. Spain will also be contributing aircraft based out of Djibouti. While not fully confirmed by the government, Sweden is expected to supply one of its International Corvette Force (IKS) which is basically a pair of corvettes and a logistics ship to escort for the World Food Program beginning in the second period. The Netherlands currently has a ship escorting World Food Program shipments to Somalia, HNLMS De Ruyte (F804), but it will not be part of the EU force and return home upon arrival of the EU force. The Netherlands is expected to contribute another ship during the third period and assume command of the EU force at that time. It has been suggested that Belgium will also send a ship in the third period.

All ships part of the EU force will fly the European Union flag.

Everyone Else in the Middle

There are several nations considering sending ships to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, but do not have the same military framework the EU is demonstrating here, and may not even belong to NATO. Nations with ships already in the region include Russia, India, Saudi Arabia, Denmark, and Malaysia, while Norway, South Korea, Japan, and Australia have discussed sending a ship. If you look at what NATO is talking about, basically they are giving a heads up that one of the Standing Maritime Naval Groups will be deploying to the Horn of Africa in early 2009, and that force usually consists of 5-7 ships and could add even more countries to the mix like Portugal, Turkey, Canada, or Italy. What about Task Force 150, Pakistan is a regular contributor and may even take command of the task force in 2009, the Horn of Africa is Task Force 150s patrol area. Finally, the United States, which will likely continue to retain the 5th Fleet requirement of one Carrier Strike Group and one Expeditionary Strike Group throughout 2009.

Clearly this much international participation and partnership at sea during a time absent a looming war is all very new in the modern era. This isn't the Gulf War, there is no unified Command here, this is multiple, perhaps even competing international institutions finding common cause with military forces against the common enemy of Somali pirates. Bryan.. you, Barney, and Admiral Morgan can light up your cigars now, because I'll bet dinner and drinks this goes wildly beyond anything you guys could have imagined when prepping the maritime strategy at the Naval War College, I don't care how many war games you guys ran, I simply don't believe this much individual national participation including multiple unique institutions all fighting a common maritime challenge like piracy at the same time was one of them. The maritime strategy is clearly working better than anyone, including me, ever gave it a chance.

Given this developing formation of what could be the largest armada of international naval power since the first Gulf War, and that it is absent a unified command, what is the role of the United States? When the Commandant of the nations maritime law enforcement agency looks at a UN resolution and posts on his blog that "leveraging States SUA obligations in conjunction with existing international law against piracy provides an effective legal framework to deliver an "endgame," that's good enough for me. I won't pretend to understand the legal particulars of the UN resolution, but if Admiral Allen sees the resolution as actionable, the time for US involvement has come.

The Cooperative, Strategic Approach

First, our most important role is leadership, both political and at sea. If I was making a suggestion, I would suggest it is time to send a LHD to the Horn of Africa to act as an international Command Ship, and I would even consider demonstrating a sign of solidarity with the EU, NATO, and the UN in fighting piracy by flying all three flags with the Stars and Stripes from the mast. Invite the EU flag officers, and the NATO flag officers, and representatives from the UN, Russia, and every other nation operating a ship fighting pirates in the region. In any maritime action like what we are seeing here, the role of the United States isn't to lead operations, let the EU or NATO do that, our role is to do everything we can to lead in coordination.

We are one of perhaps three or four nations of the mix that exercises with every other nation listed in this post. We are the worlds only superpower, insuring that operations are not complicated by the challenges sure to come up with Command and Control, information sharing, and intelligence is very much in our national interest. So what if NATO and the EU are competing politically here for status in the fight against piracy, at the end of the day, the US will be who gets blamed if tension becomes an issue between any two organizations operating towards a common cause. The role of the US Navy when this many countries are cooperating towards a common cause is to build a network for information dissemination, distribution, and be the insurer of assurance in cooperative venture. The role of the superpower in low intensity operations being addressed through military cooperation isn't to be the sharp end of the spear, but as much of the long sturdy shaft as possible.

Should we commit beyond a Command and Control ship? If we do, I'd suggest one of two types of ships, an amphibious ship to help support cooperative action of other nations who may need a base of operations at sea for action, or a Coast Guard cutter to help train other Navies in law enforcement activities at sea. In other words, stick to the strategy, let events flow, and lead in ways most appropriate for the events as they unfold. I would also suggest we send a Flag officer assigned specifically to manage the emerging task at hand, providing leadership means sending a leader.

Our role isn't at the operational level of engagement, nor is it leading operations. For the armada that is gathering off the Horn of Africa, the US Navy isn't best used acting as the strongest node of the emerging network, rather we are best utilized acting as the cooperative networks bandwidth that enables and insures the scale of cooperation. Our success can be measured by the amount of bandwidth we enable, because the success of everyone else will likely be in proportion to the quality of the regional cooperation.